A second Russian pollster reports that the share of Russians who advocate for peace negotiations with Ukraine has exceeded the share of their compatriots who favor continuing the war. The devil is in details, however.

When It Comes to Ukraine, Doves Appear to Continue to Outnumber Hawks in Russia

The share of Russians who advocate for peace talks with Ukraine has overtaken the share of those who favor continuing the war for the first time since the Russian Field (RF) pollster began taking stock of Russians’ attitudes toward their country’s so-called special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine in April 2022.

When asked by this pollster on Oct. 21-29, 2023, if Russia should continue the so-called special military operation (SVO) or move to peace talks, 48% chose the latter, while 39% said Russia should opt for the former. In contrast, the share of peace and war advocates was 44% and 45%, respectively, in the previous poll conducted by this Moscow-based private research agency in June 2023. Moreover, when asked in October whether they would support Vladimir Putin’s decision to sign a peace deal and stop the SVO if he were to do so tomorrow, only 18% answered in the negative, while 74% answered in the affirmative, the highest such share in the history of RF’s polling on the subject since April 2022. It also follows from RF’s October poll that many of its respondents are disinclined to support sacrificing more Russians lives for the sake of the SVO. When asked whether they supported a second wave of mobilization in Russia, 58% said they do not, and 32% said they do. Moreover, 61% of Russians said they would have negative emotions if a second wave of mobilization was declared. RF’s findings that the share of doves among common Russians is growing are concurrent with recent measurements of public opinion on the SVO conducted by Russia’s leading independent pollster, the Levada Center. This center’s two latest polls on the SVO have revealed that the share of Russians who advocate for peace talks (56% in October, compared to 51% in September) has continued to be greater than the share of those who support continuing the war (37% in October, compared to 39% in September).3

Time journalist Simon Shuster has just published an article titled “Volodymyr Zelensky’s Struggle to Keep Ukraine in the Fight,” which contains three revelations that do not bode well for that struggle. First, the article reveals that Zelensky—who remains staunchly opposed to either truce or peace—is so convinced of Ukraine’s victory that one of his closest aides describes him as “delud[ing] himself.” Second, the article reveals that after his September trip to the U.S., Zelensky has been feeling betrayed by his Western allies, who he feels have left him without the means to win the war, only the means to survive it. Last but not least, even if the West did come through with all the weapons they have pledged, “we don’t have the men to use them,” one of Zelensky’s close aides told Time’s Shuster, revealing that the average age of a Ukrainian soldier has already reached 43.1 That third revelation is, perhaps, the most consequential of the revelations that Shuster—who has been relentlessly covering post-Soviet conflicts for decades—makes in his Nov. 1 article.

The reason I think this last revelation might be the most consequential is because it shows both Ukraine’s adversary and its allies, that, on its current trajectory, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) will have to conscript pre-pension age males in the not-so-distance future. And here’s why: Less than a month after the Russian invasion began on Feb. 24, 2022, the average age of Ukrainian soldiers was 30-35, according to FT.2 Thus, if the ageing of the ZSU’s rank-and-file continues at the rate reported between the launch of the invasion and now, then the average age of Ukrainian soldiers one year and two years from now would be 48-51 and 52-58, respectively. Thanks to the aging of Ukraine’s population, the pre-war number of 35 to 49-year-old males (a 26% share of the total male population) was estimated by the World Bank to be greater than the number of 20 to 34-year-old males (a 17% share of the total male population) in 2022.3 However, older cohorts tend to have greater health problems, especially in a country with a male life expectancy of 65, ranking 98th of 123 in the world by that metric. As the close aide to Zelensky explained to Shuster, “They’re grown men now, and they aren’t that healthy to begin with ... This is Ukraine. Not Scandinavia.”

During a discussion on the future of AI hosted by Graham Allison at the Harvard Institute of Politics, former Google chairman Eric Schmidt extrapolated the future of geopolitics, stating that “future national security issues will be determined by how quickly you can innovate against the solution.” Schmidt articulated his belief in the ultimate substitution of soft power with “innovative power” in geopolitics and candidly described the benefits of AI while admitting that the threats are “quite profound.” Schmidt spoke on six areas of significant relevance for the future of AI.

After weeks of stalemate, Louisiana Rep. Mike Johnson was elected as the new Speaker of the House on Oct. 25, 2023. Johnson, who was elected to Congress in 2016, initially expressed support for Ukraine in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, stating that the United States “should impose debilitating sanctions on Russia’s economic interests.” However, Johnson has since shown resistance to the provision of aid for Ukraine. For instance, he stated that the U.S. should not provide additional aid “when our own border is in chaos, American mothers are struggling to find baby formula, gas prices are at record highs and American families are struggling to make ends meet, without sufficient oversight over where the money will go.” This stance has earned him an “F” on the GOP Congressional Report Card, both in terms of his voting patterns as well as his anti-Ukraine statements.

Speaking to BBC on Sept. 10, 2023, America’s outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Mark Milley predicted that the weather will continue to favor fighting in Ukraine until about Oct. 10-25. “There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done,” the general said. Milley, whose JCS role ends Oct. 1, could have a plausible weather forecast we do not have access to. Or he could be speaking from the experience of watching (and advising on one side) the Russian and Ukrainian forces as they battled each other last fall and winter. If so, does this very recent history (October 2022-February 2023) support the proposition that “Generals Mud and Frost” may force the Ukrainian and Russian forces to scale down combat and enter a seasonal stalemate? Here is what we have learned.

The Levada Center has just released the latest installment in its series of polls on which countries Russians consider to be “great” as well as on their general attitudes toward certain countries. The polls show that the share of Russians who view their own country as great has almost doubled in the past two decades from 43% in 2002 to 80% in 2023 (Table 1) in a clear reflection that both a recent streak of increases in Russia’s national power and the Kremlin’s consistent messaging on Russia’s “rise from its knees” during Vladimir Putin’s rule continue to have an impact on the Russian public.

In addition to increasingly seeing their own country as great, Russians also see a similar trend in China. In fact, the share of Levada respondents who view China as great has more than tripled, from 19% in 2002 to 63% in 2023, reflecting the steady strengthening of Moscow’s alignment with Beijing. The share of Russians who view India, with which Russia has enjoyed steadily positive relations, as great, has also nearly tripled, from 5% to 14% during the same period.  

The results of the Levada Center’s latest installment in its series of polls on Russians’ attitudes’ toward Russia’s war in Ukraine indicate that the share of peaceniks exceed the share of war hawks among common Russians.

In fact, if adding the shares of those who definitely support and those who rather support the launch of peace negotiations (Option 1) with those who definitely support and those who rather support the continuation of the so-called special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine (Option 2), then total support for the launch of peace talks (Option 1) has exceeded total support for continued war (Option 2) in (almost) all monthly polls since September 2022,1 except for May 2023 (see Graph 1).

"Russia becomes Europe’s biggest economy.” That’s the headline that Kremlin-funded RT’s editors put on a story they ran Aug. 4. The story went on to trumpet that “Russia was among the world’s five largest economies and the largest in Europe in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) as of the end of 2022, despite Western sanctions, the latest World Economics report has revealed.” Three days later, analytical resource bne IntelliNews, which is focused on emerging markets, published an article repeating these two claims. “In these terms Russia has just overtaken Germany to become the fifth wealthiest economy in the world and the largest in Europe, worth $5.3 trillion,” the report said, without citation.

But are these claims accurate? We consulted the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) databases, which both offer the following methodologically different approaches toward measuring countries’ GDP in terms of purchasing power parity: (1) absolute value of GDP, PPP, measured in current dollars, (2) absolute value of GDP, PPP, measured in constant 2017 international dollars, and (3) countries’ shares in world GDP, PPP, also measured in constant dollars. Only the first of these three approaches (GDP, PPP, in current dollars) supports the dual claim that Russia has become Europe’s largest and the world’s fifth largest economy in 2022 (see Table 1). The other two methods (GDP, PPP, in constant dollars and share of world’s GDP, PPP, in constant dollars) ran counter to these two claims, showing that Russia was Europe’s second largest economy after Germany, as well as the world’s sixth largest economy in 2022 (see Tables 2 and 3).

In the aftermath of PMC Wagner's rebellion, poll results reveal the shifting views of Russians toward Prigozhin, Putin and more.

The following is a selection of views on the impacts of the mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23-24, shared by defense analyst Michael Kofman of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kofman originally posted these and other takeaways via Twitter on June 25: 

-It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge.

-Wagner was unexpectedly successful because they moved much faster and more deliberately than Russian forces, which seemed to lack orders, largely allowing Wagner units past unopposed.

-But Prigozhin also miscalculated in part because this was an act of desperation. He had limited aims, and didn't appreciate the implications of his mutiny. I was puzzled by his theory of victory. A run on Moscow to do what? Get attention? Storm the Kremlin with a battalion?

-Putin’s inaction & the slowness of the Russian response has become typical. I’ve often described him as a master procrastinator. The problem with Wagner was growing, it would reach a crisis point after the June 10 declaration by MoD [of the need for PMCs to sign contracts with MoD], Putin was likely warned and did nothing.

-Prigozhin had declared that Wagner would not sign contracts with the Russian military, designed to neuter their autonomy. Theatrics ensued, but this standoff was clearly going to end poorly. The trajectory was a downward spiral from his May ultimatums leading into a crisis.

-Wagner’s autonomy will end in the context of this [Russian-Ukrainian] war. In states like Mali the situation might be different.

-After Bakhmut, the military was far less dependent on Wagner. Folks often conflated Bakhmut for the entire Russian winter offensive, and Wagner’s role as though it was omnipresent on the front. It was quite narrow, and Wagner was not used for defense in the south.

-My conclusion is that Prigozhin ultimately lost. Wagner will also lose out. But Putin lost as well, and the regime was wounded.