In the Thick of It

A blog on the U.S.-Russia relationship
Munich Security Conference
Graham Allison
Graham Allison

The Munich Security Conference is the largest annual gathering of political and security leaders from government, think tanks and academia worldwide. This month more than 600 key decision makers and policy shapers from across the globe gathered in Germany to discuss and debate pressing security issues.

Unsurprisingly, Russia has often figured prominently at the conference. In 2007, President Vladimir Putin shocked the audience with a speech forcefully challenging what he saw as U.S. hegemony; two years later, then U.S. Vice President Joe Biden offered Moscow a “reset.” Below we offer insights on how Russia fit into this year’s conference from Graham Allison—Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, a former assistant secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton and author of nine books, most recently “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?”

RM: What are your main takeaways from this year’s conference?

GA: I’ll share them in terms of superlatives.

The most interesting unanswered question concerned a recent poll by the Pew Research Center. Respondents in 26 large countries were asked which countries’ power and influence they see as a threat. Among Russia, China and the U.S., which do French citizens rank as the largest threat? Some 49 percent see the U.S. as a top threat, while Russia and China were tied for second at 40 percent. What about Germans? Forty-nine percent see “U.S. power and influence” as a major threat to Germany, whereas only 30 percent see Russia’s power and influence as a threat. The specific question was put to Chancellor Merkel’s designated successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer: In a democracy whose policies are supposed to reflect the will of the people, when half of your citizens see U.S. power and influence as a major threat and fewer than a third see Russia as a threat, how can the German government side with its American alliance partner rather than Russia on key issues? What is the content of an alliance in which the citizens of a state fear their ally more than they fear the adversary? I think this is not lost on the Russians.

The most deafening silence at a speechwriter’s applaud lines in the prepared speech of a major leader unquestionably came after U.S. Vice President Mike Pence’s repeated quotation from President Donald Trump telling Europeans what they must do: Follow the U.S. lead in withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [a.k.a. the Iran nuclear deal]; stand against Nord Stream 2 [the Russia-led gas pipeline project]; reject Chinese telecom companies like Huawei; meet the 2 percent defense-spending threshold for NATO members and, by 2024, invest 20 percent of defense spending on procurement.

The most striking contrast between two leaders’ speeches was Merkel’s reaffirmation of the verities of the transatlantic alliance, multilateralism and cooperation in upholding the current order versus Mike Pence’s reiteration of the Trump administration’s policy of “America First,” which is upending much of the architecture and procedure that Merkel and others have become accustomed to.

If you were to ask me which presenter gave the most successful presentation of his country’s perspective, making the case for his country’s views and interests, I would say Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif. Rather than give a long, prepared speech, he engaged in combat with a very effective and aggressive BBC reporter, and with challenging questions from the audience. But he did so succinctly, pointedly and even at times humorously. The second most impressive presentation came from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He gave a very short, fast speech, maybe five minutes, then a Q&A, responding with a very direct answer to every question. Since I don’t agree with the Russian or Iranian views, I’m not endorsing them, but if you judge a minister’s performance by how well he presented his client’s case, those two did the best.

RM: Could you expand a little on Lavrov’s presentation?

GA: One very interesting wrinkle that he introduced—and maybe he’s done this before—was the distinction between international law, which he says Russia is eager to uphold, and the rule-based order, which is, he says, an American trick to agree with some parties on some rules that actually violate international law, and then call out Russia for failing to comply with those rules. In his words—this is, again, the way he was presenting the Russian case—Russia subscribes to international law, which it sees as something it signed on to in the U.N. Charter, U.N. resolutions, or conventions. But it has not agreed to some further rules that the Americans have agreed to perhaps with some other people. So, for example, he always goes back to the events in Kosovo in 1999. International law says use of force against a sovereign nation needs to be authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but unable to win a vote in the Security Council, the U.S. formed a coalition of parties who agreed to use force against then Yugoslavia. That, according to Lavrov, violated international law as agreed to in the U.N. Charter. Similarly with Ukraine: In his view, the clauses of the Minsk agreements are very clear, but now U.S. envoy Kurt Volker is proposing 30,000 peacekeeping troops from other parties for Donbass. This and other further proposals to settle the conflict, according to Lavrov, are contrary to the criteria agreed to by Russia and the other parties in the Minsk-2 agreement.  

RM: Speaking of the rules-based order, the main question posed by the 2019 Munich Security Report is: Will the defenders of the post-1945 international order succeed in preserving and piecing back together at least some of its main elements or will the world continue moving closer to a perfect storm of crises that could destroy the old international system before we have begun to build a new one? What do you think?

GA: Basically, if you look at the piece I wrote for Foreign Affairs last year—about which there was great controversy—it argues that the concept of the liberal international rules-based order is mostly mythology. Contrary to the conventional claims about this “liberal international rules-based order,” as I explain in that article: (1) The primary cause of the “long peace” of the past seven decades has not been some liberal international order, but rather, for the first four decades of that period, the stalemate between two deadly adversaries in the Cold War; (2) the primary driver of U.S. involvement in the world over these decades was not to build some liberal international order but to defeat what it saw as an existential threat to itself posed by an expansionist, revolutionary, Communist Soviet Union; (3) and although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability. The main changes that have happened in the arrangements and procedures of the past seven decades are: the decline in U.S. share of global power as China has risen meteorically; the return of Russia as a player that is still a nuclear superpower, or certainly second to none with respect to destructive power, with a military that’s willing and ready to fight for the Kremlin’s objectives; and the discrediting of the American foreign policy establishment in the 21st century, from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to attempts to create a democracy in Afghanistan. All those, in my view, are much greater factors in the changing world order than Donald Trump—though most people want to avoid these painful truths and just blame Trump.

RM: One idea that Russian representatives routinely raise at such events—and the latest conference is no exception—is of a “shared” or “common” European house, which would include Russia and goes back to Mikhail Gorbachev’s days. How did the audience react to Lavrov’s repetition of that proposal?

GA: I don’t think it resonated much. Most of the people gathered there see Russia as an adversary and a spoiler, a “malign actor” as Joe Biden called it. But these are the security experts. As I said, the fact that the German population thinks that the Americans are a greater threat to them than the Russians means their politicians have to dance gingerly. That was the most silent elephant in every room: the ocean-wide gulf between the national security mavens gathered in Munich and the views of their own populations about security issues. This surrealism is most evident in Germany: Its citizens see no serious security threat to their nation, and that’s reflected in their unwillingness to pay 2 percent of their GDP for defense against a threat they don’t believe really exists. But a similar elephant was just over the shoulder of almost every expert there talking about what their country “should” do—since they know that most of their own fellow citizens do not agree with them. As far as the idea of a common house, I think mostly the agreement would be that unless and until there’s a different Russia, it would be unrealistic. And I think the idea that there’s soon going to be a different Russia seems not very likely. In which case the United States is going to be living with our insufferable, inseparable Siamese twin—and that’s going to be painful.

RM: One of the early press reactions to the Munich conference was that the discord between Washington and Europe was evident and Russia and China will be eager to exploit that. How would you respond?

GA: If you simply think of it from a strategic point of view, if you are playing Putin’s hand and if the Americans and Europeans are saying you’re the malign actor, then to whatever extent the alliance can be undermined and the differences among these parties can be accentuated that’s good for you. Russia’s not the main source of these developments. But I think a Russian strategist would say this is all great and if Russia can do anything to move this along they should. So, undermining NATO and undermining the EU are understandable strategic objectives for a Russia that thinks of itself as the adversary of NATO and America, or for a Russia that believes that it’s seen by them as an adversary. Ditto for China. The weaker the American-European relationship is, the more opportunity there is for China to thicken its relationship with the EU. Again, from a strategic point of view, the more problems the Americans and the Europeans have with each other, the more opportunity that is for the Chinese. That’s just the logic of the situation—and it’s not likely to have been missed by the Chinese or the Russians. The question is whether they have much impact on that. And, I would say, while the problems are mostly homegrown, where they can encourage it, they do.

Prof. Allison also discussed some of these issues at a recent event on world leadership. The video below was originally published by the Atlantic Council, which hosted the event.

Photo: 2019 Munich Security Conferene by MSC/Kuhlmann.

The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia.

What can we expect for Russia in 2019 and beyond? At a recent policy workshop held by the Washington, D.C.-based PONARS Eurasia network, scholars and analysts addressed this broad question and related issues, including the outlook for Vladimir Putin’s fourth term as president, the expected impacts of sanctions and some aspects of Russian foreign policy. With Russia’s political and economic environment arguably the most challenging the Kremlin has faced in years, the points that resonated the most at the workshop were that Putin will maintain his power through the end of his term (and possibly beyond), will likely implement policies to combat his falling approval ratings and will continue shifting Russia toward new partnerships—mainly in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Prospects for U.S.-Russian relations were generally seen as grim, although one historically minded scholar provided a spark of optimism for the future, saying that America’s current turmoil could lead to more normal relations sooner than commonly believed.

Putin: Strong or Weak?

Regarding Putin’s near future, one group of scholars at the Feb. 1 workshop generally agreed that the Russian president will maintain power for the duration of his current term, discussed potential Kremlin fixes to problems of legitimacy and lower-than-usual approval ratings and debated whether or not Putin would retain some form of power after his term ends in 2024. Nikolay Petrov, from Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, argued that the “relationship between society and government has changed” since the Kremlin’s unpopular pension reforms, with Russians no longer willing to accept things they would have “gladly” accepted before the reforms. A Levada Center poll from June 2018 showed that 89 percent of respondents negatively viewed the increase in men’s retirement age to 65 years and 90 percent opposed the increase for women to 63. Levada also found that the share of people who named Putin as their most trusted public figure dropped from 59 percent in November 2017 to 39 percent in September 2018. Petrov argued that Putin has a “huge problem with legitimacy” and believes the Kremlin will likely embark on another “small victorious war”—an idea Brian Taylor of Syracuse University disagreed with, saying that such an undertaking would only compound Putin’s approval-ratings problem after five straight years of declining domestic living standards. Kirill Rogov of the Moscow-based Liberal Mission Foundation agreed that Putin’s low ratings are “challenging and dangerous for the regime” and that some sort of change is needed. He argued, however, that the Kremlin had demonstrated its strength, not weakness, in 2018, able to tell the public “all [its] bad news” (budget consolidation, pension reforms, tax hikes) and not sustain critical damage. Sarah Wilson Sokhey from the University of Colorado Boulder agreed that the regime remains quite strong, noting that there are some “very capable people” working in the Kremlin and that, pension controversies notwithstanding, Putin will remain firmly in power over his next six years. Beyond that time frame, Petrov put forward two possible scenarios that could help Putin keep some hold on power post-2024: (a) He could move to chair the Security Council and the State Council after leaving office; or (b) he could pursue a “Belarusian option,” involving leadership, in some form, of the Russian-Belarusian Union State, which has existed de jure since 2000.

Economic Challenges

Russia’s economic forecast poses its own challenges. While the Putin administration has laid out ambitious macroeconomic goals—including ensuring that Russia’s economic growth stay above the world average, that inflation remain below 4 percent per year and that productivity increases by 5 percent each year—Brian Taylor noted that these goals are “highly unlikely to be achieved in the next five or six years.” Although macroeconomic stability does exist in Russia, growth remains low, and certainly below the world average, he said; living standards are falling, and Russia is underperforming compared to its fellow BRICS countries. Indeed, in its January 2019 Global Economic Prospects report, the World Bank predicts that Russia’s GDP will grow by 1.5 percent in 2019—well below the projected world forecast of 2.9 percent and the forecasts for any of the BRICS countries, with the exception of South Africa. Additionally, sanctions remain a key problem for the regime—and will likely continue to be for some time. Nigel Gould-Davies of Mahidol University International College focused on sanctions’ impacts on Russia’s elites, arguing that Russian business elites are in an “unprecedented state of anxiety.” (That said, recent reporting shows that some business elites have clearly benefitted in the face of sanctions.) David Szakonyi of George Washington University argued that while sanctions have heightened the political risk involved in doing business with Russia and, as such, have scared off many Western companies, the weakened ruble has made some Russian exports much more competitive in world markets. In February 2014, the exchange rate was around 35 rubles to the dollar; currently it is about 65, helping boost Russia’s 2018 budget surplus close to 3 percent of GDP. Additionally, Szakonyi argued, despite Western skittishness toward trade with Russia, Moscow has made steps toward increased cooperation with countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, blunting the effect of sanctions to some degree. Thus, while sanctions have hit some elites and companies hard and have spawned a “cloud of risk” surrounding business in Russia, the government is accumulating resources for a “spending spree” should another crisis hit. Overall, the panelists discussing Russia’s economy and its great-power status generally agreed that sanctions are here to stay, as did those discussing Russia’s foreign policy and its impacts.

Russia’s Shifting Place in the World

Panelists also discussed various aspects of Russian foreign policy, including Moscow’s relationship with former Soviet republics, its shift toward East and Southeast Asia and U.S.-Russian relations. Irina Busygina from the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg discussed Russia’s relationship with other post-Soviet states, focusing mainly on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which she considers to be the “first relatively successful attempt to establish strong multilateral institutions of post-Soviet regional integration.” Generally, until 2014, negotiations regarding the formation of the EAEU involved “non-transparent bilateral bargains” with potential members; however, following the Ukraine crisis, this approach changed. Moscow felt it could no longer afford to lose “any member” of the union and moved quickly to establish an “ambitious multilateral project in Eurasia,” which Busygina argued in fact has reduced Russia’s relative power in the post-Soviet space. Additionally, according to Dmitry Gorenburg of CNA Corp. and Harvard University, Russia has moved closer to Southeast Asia as part of an overall “turn east” that began after the 2008 financial crisis. The goals of this move are many—to avoid overdependence on the West, to modernize the Russian Far East, to find markets for Russian weapons and resources and so on. The discussion of Russia-U.S. relations was dominated by sanctions, with a separate, briefer discussion of the Arctic, and the overall outlook was relatively bleak. However, Ivan Kurilla of the European University in St. Petersburg claimed that a return to normal relations is “not as distant” as many might think, arguing that the United States is going through an “identity crisis” whose end could provide an opportunity for improvements in relations, as such critical junctures have, according to Kurilla, many times in the past.

Daniel Shapiro is a graduate student associate with Russia Matters and Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Photo by essuera shared on Pixabay for free use.

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In policy and academic circles the “New Cold War or Not” debate has been percolating for years, prompting thoughtful dueling Twitter threads among the professorial social-media set. Those who call today’s tensions a “Cold War” sometimes use the term simply to emphasize the intensity and dangers of the current standoff between Russia and the West. When details of the comparison surface, they tend to involve military threats—top among them nuclear war, including accidental war—and the two sides’ competition for global supremacy. Those who say “Cold War” doesn’t apply today also marshal plenty of convincing arguments. These include Russia’s relative weakness since the Soviet collapse, the absence of an ideological battle between Moscow and Washington, the end of the global bipolarity that had accompanied that battle, Russia’s much greater interconnectedness with the global economy and, of course, the rise of China. Both those who do subscribe to the term “Cold War” and those who don’t point out differences between today’s confrontation and the 20th-century version. Many foreign-policy experts, for example, have noted with alarm the lack of communication channels between Moscow and Washington and of safeguards to manage the risks of escalation.

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Present-Day Russian Politics

Harvard’s own Alexandra Vacroux chaired a panel on the connections between Russian foreign and domestic policy, with speakers discussing political networks, xenophobia and sanctions. Henry Hale of George Washington University argued that Russian politics are largely defined by extended networks of personal acquaintance and that the Putin regime is not as stable as it may appear, since it is vulnerable to interruptions in these networks, among other problems. Yoshiko Herrera from the University of Wisconsin-Madison approached the topic from a different angle, focusing on Russian nationalism. She noted that while xenophobic violence in Russia has decreased, it has been refocused toward a dislike of the West, although not toward a rejection of European identity. Other panelists focused more on economics. Oksana Antonenko, an analyst with the global consultancy Control Risks, addressed Russia’s continued resource reliance and lack of presence in many global supply chains. Antonenko also discussed sanctions, arguing that they have in fact served to benefit state-run industry to the detriment of the private sector. Christopher Jarmas, a recent Davis grad now working as an analyst at the Sayari consultancy, also addressed sanctions, emphasizing that they are meant to have a long-term impact and are more effective when states are closely tied together economically, and that their impact on Russia will really be felt once oil prices fall.
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