When recently asked by the Levada Center to name “the most outstanding individuals of all time and peoples,” the top three named by Russian respondents were Josef Stalin (42%), Vladimir Putin (31%) and Vladimir Lenin (28%). In fact, of the top 10, only three are not military-political leaders: poet Alexander Pushkin (4th), cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (6th) and chemist Dmitri Mendeleev (10th), according to the results of Levada’s poll, which was conducted in April and published in June. Levada is yet to take its analytical take on the dominance of authoritarian leaders in the Top 10. Meanwhile, one can guess that it might have something to do for a strong preference for a strong state led by a strong leader among many Russians, which should not be surprising, given the long history of authoritarian rule in Russia.

It should be noted that of the top 10, figures, as many as five came to prominence in Soviet times: Stalin, Lenin, Gagarin, Georgy Zhukov and Leonid Brezhnev, while four lived in pre-Soviet Russia: Pushkin, Mendeleev, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Opposition-minded Russians may find Vladimir Putin not so great, especially when compared to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, but he is the only person in Levada’s April 2025 top 10 to have come to prominence in post-Soviet times. 

Having taken a pause in his comments on Iran after the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin weighed in on June 23 to describe the strikes as a “completely unprovoked act of aggression against Iran” that is “without foundation or justification” during the public part of his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that day. In his public remarks during that meeting, Putin also told Araghchi that “we are committed to supporting the Iranian people through our continued efforts,” but chose not to elaborate on what that support could be and how it might be rendered. 

When asked that same day whether Tehran had requested military support from Moscow, Putin’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov offered no direct answer. “We are working with Iran in various areas, and it would be irresponsible to disclose some details of this cooperation,” he told Interfax. Ryabkov’s ministry was actually the first Russian government agency to criticize the June 22 strikes by the U.S., which Western commentators described as a “gamble” within hours, stating that "Russia strongly condemns” them. Some other Russian officials who offered their hot takes on the strikes warned of increased risks of a World War III (e.g. Leonid Slutsky of the State Duma) and of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (e.g. Konstantin Kosachev of the Russian Senate). Others (e.g. Dmitry Medvedev) welcomed the diversion of Washington’s attention from the Ukraine crisis to the Iran crisis and claimed Iran’s nuclear program will rebound and continue. Like Putin and Ryabkov, most non-governmental Russian commentators, whose opinions I came across when scanning Runet for hot takes on June 22-23, refrained from calling for assistance to Tehran. These commentators (one exception was conservative oligarch Konstantin Malofeev) refrained from doing so even though Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian¹ described their countries as allies last year,² and the two signed a bilateral strategic partnership treaty. That January 2025 accord has no mutual military aid clause and does not describe the two countries as allies, but it does refer to “military” and “military-technical” cooperation³ between Moscow and Tehran.

In July 2015, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran’s Quds Force traveled to Moscow to explain to his Russian hosts how a series of defeats for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad could be turned into victory—with Russia's help, according to Reuters. In fact, that visit by Soleimani “was the first step in planning for a Russian military intervention that has reshaped the Syrian war and forged a new Iranian-Russian alliance in support of Assad,” according to Reuters.¹ Fast-forward to 2025, and you find Assad’s regime in Syria, which Russia and Iran did manage to prop up for several years, gone, Soleimani killed in a U.S. strike and Russia’s other regional ally, Iran, doing so badly in its armed conflict with Israel that it is facing a regime change. Does that mean, though, that Russia only stands to incur costs if Israel prevails in the conflict, in which Russia has limited means for intervention?² Not necessarily.

Whether Russia stands to lose or benefit from the conflict depends in part on whether Israel manages to attain a durable end to Iran’s capacity for producing nuclear weapons. If Iran is denuclearized that way, then Russia actually stands to benefit from that outcome. After all, as I wrote years ago, having a nuclear neighbor, separated from Russia only by the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, has never been in Russia’s interest.

As of Friday afternoon, Russian President Vladimir Putin was yet to directly weigh in on Israel’s overnight attacks on military, nuclear and other targets in Iran, though his spokesman Dmitry Peskov did speak out. In his statement, Peskov avoided blaming Israel explicitly, saying Russia is concerned and condemns “the sharp escalation” of tensions between Isael and Iran. As for Peskov’s boss and Russia’s ultimate decision-maker, Putin was to take a call from Benjamin Netanyahu on the strikes, according to Peskov. Putin’s deputy in the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, invoked the threat of a nuclear war in his response to the attacks. "I am often accused of whipping up nuclear hysteria. Take that! When I write about a nuclear conflict, it's not just like that. It's real,” he wrote in his Telegram channel.

In contrast to Peskov, who condemned the escalation, Russia’s Foreign Ministry also weighed in,  condemning Israel’s overnight attacks on Iran as “unacceptable.” The statement was echoed by Konstantin Kosachev, who said “there was “no excuse for Israeli actions.” Of pro-Kremlin commentators whose views on the attacks we managed to find, most criticized Israel, while some expressed concern about the disintegration of Iran, which only 11% of Russians view as an ally despite the newly concluded Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty and Teheran’s supply of attack drones for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

When it comes to Russian authorities’ practical public steps, they have mostly focused on ensuring the safety of Russian citizens. Russia’s Embassies in Iran and Israel advised Russian citizens to avoid traveling to these countries. In addition, Russia’s federal aviation service (Rosaviatsiya) banned Russian airlines from flying to or over Israel and Iran. Meanwhile, Brent crude surged as much as 13%¹ while the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) Russia Index and the RTS were both up 0.33% in the wake of the attacks. 

The latest of the Levada Center’s polls on Russians’ attitudes toward foreign countries reaffirms the proposition that whatever major foreign policy decision Vladimir Putin makes, most of his country’s subjects tend to eventually publicly support, even if that decision constitutes a U-turn of the kind Russia’s authoritarian ruler did when deciding to pivot from West to East.

For instance, as recently as last year, almost three quarters of respondents to these regular polls told Levada that they had a negative attitude toward the U.S. under Joe Biden. However, fast-forward to the return of Donald Trump—whom Putin has clearly favored over Biden—to the White House in 2025, and you will discover that this share declined by more than a third, while the share of Russians with a positive attitude toward America has doubled (Table 1).

One reason for this change in Russians’ attitudes toward America is, obviously, that Trump, unlike Biden, throughout his third presidential campaign, reportedly hinted at readiness to support some of Russia’s demands if he were to get a chance to mediate an end to Russian-Ukrainian hostilities from the White House. But many Russians would not have appreciated these hints if Russia’s state-controlled national television channels—which over half of them rely on for news, according to Levada—had not, on orders from the Kremlin, publicized them, ramping up the positive coverage of Trump, who had not only had “a very good” relationship with the Russian leader, but also whom Putin apparently viewed as more likely to strike a deal on ending the Russia-Ukraine war on terms that would be favorable for Russia. 

Would Russia be capable of mounting a full-blown invasion into a NATO country? If so, would it exercise that capability, and when would it do so?¹ Western officials and experts provided no shortage of affirmative answers to these questions even before the launch of Russia’s full-blown invasion into Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, to say less of the subsequent period. Predictably, many (but not all) of these forecasters have made the materialization of their predictions contingent on Russia being able to regenerate its offensive capabilities once the Russian-Ukrainian hostilities are ended without Vladimir Putin’s Russia being defeated (or paused on terms acceptable for Russia for a long period of time).²

To hear Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Carsten Breuer put it, Russia will be militarily ready to attack NATO countries by 2029, at the earliest. "By then, based on our analysis, Russia (will have) reconstituted its own forces to a degree that an attack against NATO soil could be possible," Lt. Gen. Breuer predicted, according to Reuters, during a visit to Poland in April 2024. Then-secretary-general of NATO Jens Stoltenberg also said that a Russian attack on a NATO country or countries as soon as 2029 was something he was concerned about. By that year, Russia would not only be ready to attack, but would also be willing to do so, according to Stoltenberg’s February 2024 remarks. Some of the more recent forecasts, which I have found and catalogued in Table 1 below, assume it would take Russia longer to become ready for an attack. For instance, Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service in March warned that Russia could be fully ready for a "large-scale conventional war" by 2030. Of the forecasts for when Russia will acquire the capability and/or intent to attack a NATO country, which I have visualized in Figure 1 below, the most frequently forecast years for when Russia would be able to attack a NATO country (capability) are:

• 2030 (mentioned or implied 13 times),
• 2029 (mentioned or implied 12 times) and
• 2028 (mentioned or implied 10 times). 

As for when Russia might intend to attack a NATO country, the most frequently forecast years are 2027 and 2028 (each mentioned or implied 5 times).   

As President Donald Trump’s administration neared the 100 day mark, former U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan, now inaugural Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), reflected on the defining challenges of his tenure under the Biden administration. In conversation with Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at HKS, Sullivan offered a candid account of the Biden administration’s foreign policy decisions, including navigating the fine line between aiding Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression and averting nuclear catastrophe.

Sullivan emphasized that national security decision-making is rarely black-and-white. A key dilemma throughout the Ukraine conflict was how to calibrate increased military support without triggering a wider war. “Policy formulation is inherently imperfect,” Sullivan acknowledged, describing the administration’s objective as navigating between two extremes: recklessness—ignoring the risks of nuclear escalation—and excessive caution—failing to act out of fear of triggering World War III. He argued that “if you look at the pattern of choices we made over time, and the results that we generated, that it was a robust and effective policy that has helped save Ukraine. The main reason Ukraine was saved was the bravery and courage of the Ukrainian people themselves, but the United States played a damn important role alongside many allies and partners in helping to ensure that Russia did not achieve its strategic purpose, which was effectively to wipe Ukraine off the map.”

Two weeks after the closely-watched bilateral talks between Russian and American delegations in Riyadh, Fiona Hill, former Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on the National Security Council and member of Harvard University's Board of Overseers, joined experienced journalist Lucian Kim for an illuminating conversation with exiled editor-in-chief of the New Times Yevgenia Albats. Their discussion at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, titled "Unfair Triangle," confronted the reality that in negotiations intended to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has no incentive to seek a lasting peace. The title itself alludes to the unfair and asymmetrical nature of the evolving diplomatic dynamic in which talks are largely shaped by U.S.–Russia power politics, while Ukraine—whose fate hangs in the balance—is often sidelined.

Hill detailed the likely consequences of the Trump administration’s views of Putin’s long-term goals and American disengagement, while emphasizing Ukraine's military successes and diplomatic fortitude, which she sees as underrepresented in American media. She outlined the broader implications of U.S. withdrawal from the conflict, not only for European security architecture, but also for what U.S. analysts Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor have termed the "Axis of Upheaval”: Russia, Iran, North Korea and China. Hill dissected Putin's negotiating posture and the calculated tactics the Kremlin employed in its communications with the Trump administration. Both Hill and Kim advocated for stronger European defense collaboration through NATO frameworks, suggesting that the vision of a unified European military force, once dismissed as unrealistic, now appears increasingly viable and necessary.

The Levada Center’s latest poll shows that a majority of Russians continued to support the launch of peace negotiations to end the Russian-Ukrainian war in March (58%), though, as usual, one should keep in mind on what conditions these dovish respondents would agree to end the conflict. In contrast, only 33% favored continuing the war, according to Levada’s late March poll, the results of which were released April 1. These results are not very different from recent polling of Ukrainians, which showed that the share of those who favor direct negotiations with Russia climbed from 38% in January to 64% in February, according to Ukraine’s Reiting pollster.

Import tariffs, which U.S. President Donald Trump slapped on about 90 countries on April 2 and which some of America’s previously friendly neighbors described as attempts to make their economies “collapse,” had some surprise omissions. One of them has turned out be Russia, which made many wonder why. To hear U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent explain it, Russia was spared because the sanctions imposed on the country after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 mean that U.S.-Russian trade had effectively stopped, according to NYT. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt offered a similar explanation, telling Axios that Russia was left off the list because U.S. sanctions already "preclude any meaningful trade."

But low levels of trade didn’t prevent Trump from slapping tariffs on other countries.¹ For instance, the U.S. exported $526 million worth of goods and services to Russia last year, while importing $3,007 million, with America’s deficit in this bilateral trade totaling $2,481 million that year, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. In comparison, the volume of Angola’s trade with the U.S. ($2.6 billion in goods last year) was lower than America’s trade with Russia, as was the deficit ($1 billion), but this African country still found itself with a 32% import tariff.  

So, low levels of trade don’t quite explain why Russia was spared. Perhaps the structure of U.S. imports does? As NYT’s Anatoly Kurmanaev has reminded us, Russia is a Top 3 supplier of fertilizer to the United States. However, Russia’s share in U.S. imports of this commodity has not exactly been game-changing; Russia accounted for 16% of $9.97 billion worth of fertilizer that U.S. imported in 2023.  

Perhaps there has been another factor in the confluence of drivers of Trump’s decision to spare Russia from the tariffs. It could be that Trump still harbors hopes that, despite having stalled so far in the negotiations on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin may eventually agree to implement Trump’s vision of first embracing a temporary but full ceasefire, and then using that halt to negotiate a permanent cessation of hostilities. 

Whatever the reasons, Trump’s decision to spare Russia has not been lost on Russia’s ruling elite. Moreover, some top members of that elite, such as Dmitry Medvedev, could not help gloating over how some of America’s traditional allies were reeling from Trump’s tariffs, while Russia was untouched. Russian markets also, arguably, welcomed the omission of Russia from the trade war, with the Moscow Exchange and RTS indices rising by 1.1% after opening on April 3. 

Not everyone was celebrating though. Dmitry Drize, political commentator at Russia’s Kommersant FM radio station, expressed faint hope that Trump’s Liberation Day is a nightmare the world will wake from. See what other influential and not-so-influential Russians said in response to Trump’s tariffs in the list below, with entries arranged in alphabetical order. They are followed by reactions from other post-Soviet republics (also in alphabetical order) and by a table of which of these republics were slapped with what tariffs, if at all (in addition to Russia, Belarus was spared, while Moldova was subjected to the highest tariffs among these states at 31%, and a 10% tariff was imposed on Ukraine).