About a year ago, Vladimir Medinsky, Vladimir Putin’s assistant and Russia’s then chief negotiator with Ukraine, told The Wall Street Journal: “With Russia, it’s impossible to fight a long war.” As one of us has written earlier, he then cited Russia’s participation in a 21-year war against Sweden in the beginning of the 18^th century as evidence of Russians’ ability to endure historically longer hostilities than Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine. As is the case with many historical analogies, Medinsky’s was far from perfect if it was meant to convince Ukrainians that Russians would outlast them in combat, given that Ukrainians fought on both Russia’s and Sweden’s sides of that 18^th century conflict, better known as the Great Northern War. More importantly, while that war ended with Russia and its allies inflicting a military defeat on Sweden, no such defeat is in sight in the current Russia-Ukraine war, which entered its fifth year on Feb. 24, 2026. In fact, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine officially surpassed the duration of World War I earlier this month. That led one of us (Simon Saradzhyan) to wonder, first, what other wars Russia has fought against other states;¹ second, for how long; and, third, with what outcomes. 

You can find our collective attempt to answer these three questions below in Table 1 of this evolving product.² Russia fought 49 inter-state wars since Ivan IV was crowned as the first tsar of Russia in 1547, including its current full-fledged invasion of Ukraine. Of these, Russia won 28, lost 11 and eight ended in a draw, with one outcome difficult to categorize and the conflict in Ukraine ongoing. Seventeen conflicts lasted longer than the ongoing Russian invasion as of June 2026. Of these 17, 11 ended in Russian victories, one ended in a draw and five ended in losses.

Given that we are looking at just one country, which has changed drastically multiple times since the establishment of the Tsardom of Russia in 1547, these results cannot have external validity. Nevertheless, they could perhaps be useful for those wondering if the characteristics of Russia’s past wars might impact Vladimir Putin’s thinking—who is fond of reading Russian history—on how long to continue fighting in Ukraine and what kind of outcome he might accept in this conflict.

RM’s analysis indicates that Russia’s military expenditures increased 3.16–4.62 times in nominal terms from 2021 to 2025.   

Source of the claim: The Wall Street Journal (Jan. 11, 2026)

In a Jan. 11, 2026, op-ed titled “The U.S. Could Make 2026 Even Worse for Putin Than 2025,” Amy Knight wrote that “Russia’s total military spending in 2025 has been estimated at 15.5 trillion rubles—in nominal terms, five times that of 2021.” However, RM’s analysis of Russian budgetary documents and data from both the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), indicates that Russian military expenditures increased from 3.16 to 4.62 times in nominal terms (without adjusting for inflation) from 2021 to 2025 (See Table 1). In real terms, expenditures increased from 2.43 to 3.12 times over the period of study (See Table 1). 

Ukraine’s goals and strategies, the current battlefield situation and how and when the war might end were among the key topics Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces and current ambassador to the U.K., addressed in his latest extended Q&A. The wide-ranging conversation with students of Serhiy Nyzhny Kyiv School of Government also touched on the state of the world order, conflicts in the Middle East and Western cohesion, amid Russia’s war against Ukraine. Below is our selection of highlights from the hour and a half conversation.

On April 15, 2026, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs launched its new Carnesale Convenings series¹ with a question central to American national security: can a “frayed” nuclear nonproliferation regime survive rising geopolitical tensions and new proliferation pressures? Belfer Center Director Meghan O’Sullivan moderated a wide-ranging discussion to answer that essential question with speakers including Graham Allison (Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University), Rose Gottemoeller (William J. Perry Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research at Stanford University), Laura S.H. Holgate (Former Ambassador to the IAEA and Belfer Center Senior Fellow), and Matthew Bunn (James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard Kennedy School). Moving between moments of optimism and unease, the panel grappled with the prospects of new nuclear-armed states, the erosion of traditional arms control, the growing imprint of great power politics on the IAEA, and NATO’s efforts to send a clear deterrence message to Moscow.

On March 2, we at RM selected and published assessments of the then-early stage of the Iran conflict as part of our “Clues from Russian Views” rubric. A month later, several of these predictions turned out to be accurate, in our view.  

First, Alexei Chepa, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, predicted that U.S. involvement in Iran would divert Washington’s attention from Ukraine, likely delaying a peace agreement. Second, Sergei Balmasov, an expert at Russia’s Institute of Middle East Studies assessed that Iranian strikes could generate new enemies for Tehran in the region. Third, Vladimir Mukhin, senior journalist at Nezavisimaya Gazeta, predicted that Iran’s attacks on U.S., Israeli and allied targets would negatively impact the military aid that Western nations can supply to Ukraine (that prediction was a no brainer). Fourth, Nikita Smagin, a Russian expert on Russian-Iranian relations, argued that instability affecting Iran’s energy exports could create an opening for Russia to expand its oil exports (also a no brainer). Fifth, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin’s warning that the conflict could escalate across the region appears accurate as Iranian-backed proxies in Lebanon and Yemen have also been involved in the fighting. In contrast, Russian energy expert Mikhail Krutikhin predicted a possible revision of Iran’s “political course,” which we find to be inaccurate so far.

Comparing the U.S. intelligence community’s newly-released Annual Threat Assessment-2026 with the previous edition of this document reveals a change in how this community approaches analyzing Russia and other countries that negatively impact U.S. national security. While the 2025 assessment had separate chapters on China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, the 2026 document, which was presented on March 18, includes chapters on regions, such as Europe-Eurasia, Asia and the Middle East rather than country profiles. The 2025 assessment looked at Russia through perhaps, a more comprehensive analytical lens, emphasizing the broad‑spectrum threats posed by Russia to U.S. global interests. By contrast, the 2026 assessment of Russia is more dispersed across thematic and regional categories. The sheer amount of space the annual document dedicates to examining Russia has also diminished. While the 2025 document included 152 references to Russia, the 2026 document included only 99 such references (see Table 1). The three other countries to which the 2025 document dedicated separate chapters, (China, Russia, Iran¹ and North Korea,) also saw their number of references decrease in the 2026 document. References to China and its leaders declined from 148 in 2025 to 98 in 2026; references to Iran decreased from 65 explicit mentions in 2025 to 51 in 2026; and references to North Korea and its leader fell from 59 in 2025 to 41 in 2026. Unsurprisingly, both assessments point to cooperation within this quartet as a cause for major concern for the United States.

A recent survey by the Levada Center indicates that while a large majority of Russians express support for the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine and for its strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, support for peace negotiations has reached its highest level to date. 

Strong support for actions of Russian army in Ukraine…

The survey, which Levada conducted on Feb. 18-25 and released on March 3, shows 72.2% of respondents support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, down from 75.8% in January 2026. Opposition to these actions stands at 16.7%, slightly higher than 15.8% in Jan. 2026. Compared with most of 2023–2025 (typically 74–78% support), the latest figures suggest modestly declining support, although backing for the war remains above 70%, indicating continued majority approval.

Russia’s official line regarding the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran has been, so far, to condemn the attacks, call for the preservation of Iran’s sovereignty and position the Kremlin as a guardian of “law” and diplomacy. Meduza reports that Russian authorities have called the crisis an “unprovoked act of armed aggression” and criticized the U.S. for its “serial” “practice of hunting foreign leaders,” although Vladimir Putin refrained from naming names of those he believes are guilty of the "cynical" murder of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, Russia’s Kremlin-controlled television has leveled its criticism at the West’s “tried-and-true trick” of luring adversaries into talks and then striking, Meduza reports. Voices on Russian television have also rattled the nuclear saber, saying that the “only thing that can deter the enemy is nuclear weapons and an iron will that leaves no doubt they will be used,” according to Meduza. Russia’s pro-war Telegram channels (“Z-channels”) also rattled the nuclear saber, suggesting Russia let Tehran borrow a nuclear bomb, and have called into question the wisdom of “negotiat[ing] about anything with Trump” following the strikes on Iran, Meduza reports.

As for Russia’s actual strategic calculation, it appears that the Kremlin believes the Iran crisis is dangerous, as it could lead to a regime change in Iran that would impact Russia geopolitically and economically. However, the Kremlin appears to also be considering the potential dividends of the crisis for Russia, such as the diversion of U.S. focus and Western weapons supplies away from Ukraine.

See below an evolving selection of (mostly) Russian officials and experts’ views on the Iran crisis, arranged in chronological and alphabetical order.

Introduction

Is Vladimir Putin a rational actor who weighs costs and gains before making a momentous decision, such as whether to invade another country? Multiple scholars of Putin assert he is. If so, the fourth anniversary of Putin’s announcement of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate opportunity for Russia Matters’ staff to revisit¹ the costs and benefits of the ongoing invasion for the Russian dictator and the country he rules. 

Before we do so, however, we must note that providing quantitative estimates of these costs and benefits is, predictably, very challenging; as it is difficult to find rigorous research that separates the impacts of the aggression on aspects such as, for instance, Russia’s economic output, from other factors that impact its GDP. It is also difficult to estimate the duration of many of these costs, given varying degrees of the Kremlin’s success at reducing them through, for instance, the evasion of sanctions imposed on Russia in the course of the invasion, which has already been underway longer than the Soviets’ war against Nazi Germany. 

While trying to estimate the “pros” and “cons” of the invasion for Russia, we of course acknowledge the horrendous costs which have been endured by Ukraine and Ukrainians, many of which we refer to below.

The Levada Center has again measured Russians’ attitudes toward some of their countries’ foes (and one friend) and the results come as no surprise.

Almost half of the respondents to the center’s January 2026 poll said they had a negative attitude toward the U.S., reaffirming that the brief period when more Russians had a positive view of this country than a negative one last year, is over. As many as 45% of these respondents said “bad” when asked “How do you generally feel now about the United States of America?” by this Russian pollster, which shared a detailed breakdown of the results of the recent polls on Russians’ attitudes toward the U.S., EU, Ukraine and China with Russia Matters. The Jan. 15-23, 2026, result of 45% of respondents with a negative opinion of the U.S. was three percentage points above the historical average of 42% for such measurements since Levada began polling post-Soviet Russians on that question in 1992. (That year, as many as 74% of Russians viewed the U.S. in a positive light). Whether and when more Russians may warm up to Americans again may, in part, depend on whether U.S.-mediated peace talks on the Russia-Ukraine war end on conditions suitable enough for Moscow.