3 Things to Know

1. Zelenskyy replaces Syrskyi with Drapatyi, but no role so far for Fedorov: Despite several days of protests across Ukraine over the ouster of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Volodymyr Zelenskyy refused to reinstall the 35-year-old reformist to his post, offering him a range of other job opportunities to choose from, only for Fedorov to decline them. While refusing to reinstall Fedorov at the MoD, Zelenskyy did agree to heed the protesters’ other demand, to fire Fedorov’s 60-year-old arch-rival, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, from the post of commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After interviewing several candidates, Zelenskyy replaced Syrskyi with Fedorov’s ally, 43-year-old veteran of Ukraine’s conflict with Russia Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi. Western and some Ukrainian media portray Drapatyi as a modern war leader, with NYT describing him as someone who “represents a newer generation of post-Soviet military leadership in Ukraine that has embraced more modern approaches to warfighting.” In contrast, Syrskyi is described by the Kyiv Post as someone known for “micromanagement of tactical-level operations and [a] preference for costly assaults.” Syrskyi’s predecessor, U.K. ambassador Valerii Zaluzhnyi, broke his silence on the military reshuffles this week to call Drapatyi’s job “incredibly difficult,” while describing him as “a person of honor” who will have “no reason to be ashamed.” Whether Drapatyi proves to be more effective in running Ukraine’s war than his predecessor is something we will likely learn during the remainder of the summer campaign already under way.*
2. Putin wants to hold on to parts of Sumy and Kharkiv, while Rubio tells Lavrov new ideas are needed: “Russia is no longer willing to return some occupied territories to Ukraine as part of any deal to end the war and plans to retain them as buffer zones,” “people close to the Kremlin” told Bloomberg. Vladimir Putin now intends to retain occupied border areas of the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts as permanent “buffer zones” and remains determined to seize all of the Donetsk oblast before returning to talks, according to the news agency. “While the U.S. insists no deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine was reached at the summit last August, Kremlin officials have repeatedly asserted that a package of undertakings existed under a so-called ‘spirit of Anchorage’ agreement between Putin and [Donald] Trump,” according to Bloomberg. Meanwhile, Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week pronounced that spirit dead. Rubio took a question on the proposals made during the August 2025 Anchorage summit when talking to press after meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Manila on July 23. In his response, Rubio said of the so-called Anchorage proposals “we’ll have to find new suggestions and new ideas, because certainly that one, it was not acceptable in Ukraine at the time.” Lavrov, for his part, "reaffirmed Russia's readiness for a political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict," telling Rubio that Moscow remained committed to proposals put forward at the August 2025 summit, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry statement cited by Reuters. Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow is not optimistic about a quick peace deal, but hopes U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will visit Moscow when available. 
3. Russia keeps gaining land in Ukraine: Based on data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, in the past four weeks (June 23–July 21, 2026) Russian forces made a net gain of 15 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about two-thirds the size of Manhattan Island). In comparison, during the prior four-week period (May 26–June 23, 2026), Russia made a net gain of 12 square miles, according to DeepState’s data. In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW data indicates that in the past four weeks (June 23–July 21, 2026), Russia made a net gain of 10 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. 

3 Ideas to Explore

1. Ex-SACEUR Christopher Cavoli argues the Russia-Ukraine war’s defining feature is scale. “The main thing that we see in the war in Ukraine is ... scale... just scale, scale, scale—the quantities of munitions consumed, the number of lives spent, the number of vehicles,” Cavoli said in a recent podcast. Human losses in this war are particularly stark, in Cavoli’s view, which he shared on the “Boots on the Ground” podcast. “Human wise, 600,000 people have died. I think 450,000—these are rough numbers—were Russian, which is incredible... it's more than twice … the Ukrainian losses,” Cavoli said. “So, the Ukrainians ... have been enormously, enormously, enormously successful” given that casualty ratio, the retired general argued. For alternate estimates of Russian and Ukrainian casualties, including fatalities, please see endnote 9 in the latest issue of RM’s The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.*
2. What Volodymyr Zelenskyy must have erroneously hoped last week would be just another cabinet reshuffle has exploded into a multi-day national affair, in the course of which thousands across Ukraine protested the president’s decision to side with old-guard commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces Oleksandr Syrskyi in the latter’s dispute with reformist-minded Defense Minister Mikhailo Fedorov. Since the announcement of firing Fedorov on July 15, Zelenskyy has tried to mitigate the resultant uproar by offering various jobs to Fedorov, but the 35-year-old reformist insisted he would accept nothing short of being reinstated in his old job, according to FT. Sensing the increasingly shaky ground under his feet, Syrskyi penned a column for “The Militarny” on July 20. In it, the 61-year-old commander—who could reportedly be out within days—apologizes to Fedorov, but rejects claims that he is so old guard that he “does not want to fight with drones.” “Ukraine is bigger than Fedorov, Syrskyi and any of us,” and “to reduce this war to a confrontation between two people is the greatest service we can do the enemy,” wrote Syrskyi, implicitly admonishing Fedorov, who penned his own column in NV.ua. In that July 17 column, Fedorov argued that Ukraine must fight so that “we will lose drones, not people,” but “in this construction [with Syrskyi], I personally don’t know how to win the war.” “I don’t need the position of defense minister to be defense minister. I need it to win the war,” wrote Fedorov, who has been lauded by the Ukrainian public for not only his vision for how to wage war, but also for his efforts to uproot corruption in military procurement.
3. In a recent podcast with his former boss Jake Sullivan, Jon Finer wondered “what will happen if Ukraine actually stops making incremental progress and starts making more substantial progress on the battlefield?” “Does that lead Russia to contemplate again, as we believe they did at least contemplate in 2022, the use of a nuclear weapon, maybe a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield, maybe a nuclear test somewhere else to send the message? … I don't think that can be totally ruled out,” Finer said. “I guarantee you in the situation room and in NATO capitals, they are war gaming and scenario planning against … it would be, of course, the first use of a nuclear weapon since Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II,” Finer told Sullivan. Sullivan also appeared to be concerned about the possibility of escalation by Russia vis-à-vis NATO. He said: “I find the idea that Russian troops … will actually conduct an incursion and hold territory, or that you will see a clear, unambiguous Russian strike on NATO territory that they don't immediately disclaim as an accident. … I think it's a real risk.”

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

July 21, 2026 update: Based on data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, in the past four weeks (June 23–July 21, 2026) Russian forces made a net gain of 15 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about two-thirds the size of Manhattan Island).¹ In comparison, during the prior four-week period (May 26–June 23, 2026), Russia made a net gain of 12 square miles, according to DeepState’s data. In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW data indicates that in the past four weeks (June 23–July 21, 2026), Russia made a net gain of 10 square miles of Ukraine’s territory.  

Territorial Control (DS and ISW figures as of July 21, 2026)²