3 Things to Know

1. As Israel continued to pound an increasingly air-defenseless Iran, Vladimir Putin condemned these strikes in calls with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. The Russian leader also unsuccessfully offered to his U.S. counterpart that Russia mediate a ceasefire and diplomatic talks on Iran’s nuclear program. In sync with their country’s leader, Russian diplomats also condemned the Israeli strikes while warning the United States—which is reported to be in possession of conventional munitions capable of destroying Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant, which is buried deep within a mountain—against joining the attacks. The warning came as it was reported that the U.S. will decide within two weeks whether to join Israel’s campaign. If Trump refrains from deciding in favor of U.S. strikes prior to June 26–27, then Putin will have another shot at mediation, as both he and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian are reportedly planning to be in Minsk during that period.¹ In the meantime, Putin—who earlier this year signed the Russian-Iranian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Pezeshkian, with both leaders describing their countries as allied—sought to limit the damage done to Russia’s reputation as an ally. In an interview this week, Putin claimed that the January 2025 treaty contained “no clauses pertaining to defense cooperation,”² and that Russia had proposed to Iran cooperation in air defense systems, but Iran “showed limited interest, and the matter concluded there.” On balance, one acceptable outcome of the conflict for Putin would be an Iran that has been durably denied the capability to produce nuclear weapons while still ruled by a Kremlin-friendly regime. It is doubtful, however, that Israel and its main ally, the U.S., which are both interested in not only denying Iran nuclear weapons,  but also in regime change, would agree to both parts of this outcome.* 

2. “I have already said that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours,” Vladimir Putin claimed at a plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20. In his remarks at that session, Putin also cited what he said was an “old rule” that “wherever the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is ours.” The week preceding June 17 saw Russian soldiers capture 64 square miles of Ukrainian territory (about 3 Manhattan islands), according to the June 17, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. That represent a slight increase in pace over the previous week’s gain of 62 square miles.
3. Donald Trump left the 2-day G-7 summit in Canada after the first day, thus cancelling his June 17 meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and derailing the Ukrainian leader’s hopes of trying to convince his U.S. counterpart to back more sanctions on Russia, the Wall Street Journal reported. If that setback weren’t enough, Trump also lamented Russia’s absence from the leaders’ get-together and rejected the idea of issuing a joint G-7 statement in support of Ukraine, according to the New York Times.

3 Ideas to Explore

1. The primary goal of operation “Rising Lion,” which Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu launched against Iran on June 13 with America’s tacit support, is regime change in Teheran, not its nuclear program, according to a commentary in Foreign Policy by Jeffrey Lewis of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. However, if Netanyahu’s most powerful ally and U.S. President Donald Trump is committed to a nuclear-free Iran, then “his best bet is to get the Iranians and Israelis to stop the war and bring Tehran back to the negotiating table,” Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group argues in Foreign Affairs. In fact, as Financial Times' Gideon Rachman warns, “It would be a supreme irony—and a terrible policy failure—if Trump found himself dragged into another war for regime change in the Middle East.” During his June 14 call with Trump, Vladimir Putin called for de-escalation of the conflict and offered to mediate talks between Iran and Israel while denouncing the latter’s attack on the former. One key question for both the belligerents and external stakeholders in this conflict is whether Israel can attain a durable end to Iran’s capacity for producing nuclear weapons and/or eliminate Iran’s purported intent to acquire such weapons with use against Israel in mind (by somehow having a less hostile leader installed in Teheran). While, in theory, Russia could try to help Iran’s current regime prevent Israel from attaining such goals,¹ it can be argued that it is actually in Russia’s national interest to keep Iran, separated from Russia by only the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, from crossing the nuclear threshold. It is also, however, in Russia’s interest to prevent Israel and its allies from changing the regime in Iran, with whom Russia has recently signed a treaty on strategic partnership.² Moscow—which has already lost one regional ally (Syria)—is interested in the survival of the current Iranian regime if only because it needs to keep Teheran on its side in its war against Kyiv and in the standoff with the West in general. Thus, if Iran were somehow denied the capability to produce nuclear weapons (by force or through resumed negotiations) while Iran is still ruled by a Russia-friendly regime, then the Kremlin would be content with such a dual outcome. The benefits Russia may collect from a protracted Iranian-Israeli conflict in which neither side prevails may also include further diversion of America’s already diminished attention from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Additional, shorter-term benefits for Russia from the protraction of this conflict could also include increased oil prices.*
2. “The era of nuclear weapons reductions appears to have ended,” SIPRI proclaimed in its newly released Yearbook 2025. “Bilateral nuclear arms control between Russia and the USA entered crisis some years ago and is now almost over,” according to the yearbook. Moreover, “revitalized national debates in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia about nuclear status and strategy suggest there is some potential for more states to join the nuclear club.” The book warns that “the signs are that a new qualitative nuclear arms race is gearing up and, compared with the last one, the risks are likely to be more diverse and more serious.”³
3. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Thomas Graham believes four steps need to be taken to end the Russia-Ukraine war. “First, confidential negotiations, not public spectacles such as in Istanbul, must commence in earnest,” he writes in The National Interest. “Second, the talks must be embedded in discussions of European security and strategic stability questions,” according to Graham. “Third ... the Trump administration needs to engage actively in diplomacy” and “fourth, the United States must continue its full support of Ukraine,” according to Graham. However, “even if these four steps are taken, ... settlement will not produce the moral clarity or clear-cut victory that Europe and Ukraine seek,” he writes. “Ultimately, the aggressor will not be stripped of all his ill-gotten gains. ... Instead, the United States, its European allies and Ukraine will have to find a way to coexist with Russia. Peace is the priority,” according to Graham.

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 17 update: In the past week, Russian forces gained 64 square miles of Ukrainian territory (about 3 Manhattan islands), a slight increase in pace over the previous week’s gain of 62 square miles. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s armed forces lost a sliver of their foothold across Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod regions, where they are down to 5 square miles total from last week’s 6 square miles.

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of June 17, 2025)