4 Things to Know

1. Russian forces made a net gain of 31 square miles (slightly larger than the area of Manhattan Island) of Ukrainian territory in the past four weeks (June 2–30, 2026), according to RM’s analysis of data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group. In comparison, during the four weeks prior to that (May 5–June 2, 2026), Russia gained a net of 3 square miles, according to DeepState’s data analyzed in the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In contrast, based on data from ISW, Russia gained a net of 11 square miles of Ukraine’s territory from June 2–30, 2026. ISW assessed in a statement on July 1 that Russian forces maintained a presence in 37% of the key Donbas city of Kostyantynivka. In a July 1 post of its own, DeepState acknowledged that “the enemy had successes in the area of ​​Kostyantynivka” and its July 2, 2026 map showed Russian forces continue attempts to capture this key element of Ukraine’s so-called Donbas fortress belt in a pincer movement.
2. Russia’s overnight July 1–2 assault on Kyiv was among its heaviest of the war. Ukrainian officials reported at least 18–21 people killed and more than 80–90 injured, with around 70 hospitalized. Ukraine’s Air Force said Moscow launched 74 missiles—including four Zircon, 24 Iskander ballistic, 34 Kh‑101, eight Kalibr and four Kh‑59/69—plus 496 Shahed‑type attack drones and decoys. Ukrainian air defenses said they intercepted 48 missiles and 476 drones, meaning 26 missiles and 20 drones reached targets.¹ Ukraine continues to suffer from lack of Patriot inceptors, which are the only means in the Ukrainian arsenal capable of reliably shooting down Russian ballistic missiles such as Iskanders.
3. A new Center for Strategic and International Studies study estimates that combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing soldiers, have exceeded 2 million since the beginning of Russia’s full-fledged invasion in February 2022. According to the study, Russia is bearing the heavier toll: about 1.4 million casualties, including 450,000 killed. In contrast, Ukrainian forces have suffered somewhere between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties, with fatalities totaling somewhere between 125,000 and 150,000.² For a chronology of estimates of Russian and Ukrainian casualties see the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.

4. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed Russia is in talks with unspecified countries to import gasoline as domestic supplies tighten after Ukrainian drone strikes cut refinery output by about 25%. Deputy PM Alexander Novak has called imports a “key measure,” according to the Moscow Times. At the same time, Russia’s seaborne crude exports hit a wartime record in June, averaging 4.13 million barrels per day over the four weeks to June 28 as damaged refineries force more crude abroad, according to Bloomberg and Meduza.

4 Ideas to Explore

1. Vladimir Putin has disclosed that he received “new proposals” from Kyiv, including mutual halts on deep strikes and confining fighting to four Ukrainian provinces (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk). Answering questions of a journalist from the Kremlin pool on June 28 he appeared to reject these proposals, arguing that Kyiv had made them to try win “salvation” for its troops. Putin then vowed to pursue “the final liberation of Donbas and Novorossiya." In mentioning Novorossiya, Putin may be signaling a re‑expansion of Russian territorial ambitions in Ukraine. According to ISW, the Kremlin believes nine eastern and southern Ukrainian provinces¹ constitute Novorossiya. The Kremlin used to refer to Novorossiya for years (since 2014), but the frequency of such references diminished somewhat last year as Putin, perhaps, became hopeful that Volodymyr Zelenskyy would agree to withdraw from the remainder of Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) as a condition for peace talks. These hopes perhaps peaked at the 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska, but then diminished as Zelenskyy continued to refuse to give up the remainder of Donbas with or without U.S. mediation. This may explain why Putin—who insists Russian forces are advancing in Donbas—invoked Novorossiya again on June 28, signaling that Kyiv’s refusal to give up the remainder of Donbas will be punished by Russia reviving more expansive territorial demands (hence, Novorossiya). A report last month by NYT’s Paul Sonne and his colleagues estimated that “[a]t its average monthly rate of advance so far this year, it would take Russia more than 30 months to seize full control of the Donbas.”
2. Ukrainian medium and long-range drone and missile strikes are depicted across multiple Western media outlets as a combined military and influence campaign that is inflicting mounting stress on Russia. The Financial Times’ Max Seddon and Fabrice Deprez report that Putin has publicly conceded drone “problems” and fuel shortages over the weekend. Meanwhile, Dave Lawler at Axios reminds us that last week saw Volodymyr Zelenskyy announce “a 40-day influence operation” to be carried out by Kyiv’s long-range strike units “aimed at compelling [Russia] to end the war.” Catherine Belton and Natalia Abbakumova at the Washington Post also report on the “influence operation” in an article entitled “Unease deepens in Russia as Ukraine steps up long-range strikes.” Influence operations are much more about manipulating perceptions than changing facts. An influence operation is essentially what reality TV (an entertainment format intimately familiar to both President Trump and President Zelenskyy) does: carefully selecting, framing, and presenting information to shape how audiences feel and what they believe.
3. CEIP contributor Artyom Shraibman argues that Belarus’s quiet compliance with Kyiv’s ultimatum to shut border relay stations aiding Russian drones signals a new vulnerability-driven pragmatism in Minsk: Lukashenko, aware that Belarus is highly exposed to Ukrainian long‑range strikes and that Belarusians are unwilling to fight, is making unilateral concessions that reveal Russia’s waning ability to shield its ally. Still, Belarus under Lukashenko remains a growing security threat as an integrated platform for Russian coercion, according to Ondrej Ditrych at EUISS.
4. In a counterpoint to collapse narratives, The Economist’s “Russia’s war economy has problems—but is not about to crash” article argues that talk of imminent breakdown of the Russian economy under sanctions and Ukrainian strikes is overstated. The article concedes the 0.2% year‑on‑year drop of the Russian GDP in Q1 2026, but argues that this decline does not continue a genuine recession. Citing alternative gauges (Goldman Sachs, Russia’s VEB), The Economist sees sluggish growth but no slump, noting real GDP per capita up 12% since 2022, real wages 25% above 2019, unemployment near 2%, inflation at about half its recent peak over 10%, and April 2026 exports slightly above the previous year. It stresses that, despite war spending of 7–8% of GDP and a deficit near 3%, the Kremlin still has substantial fiscal levers—higher taxes, sovereign funds, captive domestic borrowing, and even deposit “raids.” Meanwhile Torbjörn Becker and Moritz Schularick argue in a Kiel Institute report that “the Russian economy has not collapsed, but the structural foundations have eroded faster than the headline numbers reveal.”

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 30, 2026 update: Based on data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, Russian forces made a net gain of 31 square miles (slightly larger than the area of Manhattan Island) of Ukrainian territory in the past four weeks (June 2–30, 2026).¹ In comparison, during the four weeks prior to that (May 5–June 2, 2026), Russia gained a net of 3 square miles, according to DeepState’s data. In contrast, based on data from ISW, Russia gained a net of 11 square miles of Ukraine’s territory from June 2–30, 2026. Meanwhile, in ISW’s assessment, Russian forces continued attempts to advance in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka area on June 29–30, but did not make confirmed advances. DeepState’s June 30, 2026 map of the area showed Russian forces trying to capture this key element of Ukraine’s so-called Donbas fortress belt in a pincer movement. In a July 1 post, DeepState acknowledged that the “the enemy had successes in the area of ​​Kostyantynivka” in the second half of June.

Territorial Control (DS and ISW figures as of June 30, 2026)^2,3