3 Things to Know

1. Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026), Russian forces endured a net loss of 1 square mile. In comparison, the previous four-week period (April 14–May 12, 2026) saw Russia make a net gain of 41 square miles, according to the June 10 issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. In the past week (June 2–9), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 6 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, according to DeepState, an increase over the reported loss of 10 square miles the previous week (May 26–June 2, 2026). In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) assesses that Russia lost a net of 91 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, and during the past week (June 2–9, 2026), lost 10 square miles of Ukrainian territory. Speaking in the Kremlin before Russian participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war on June 12, Vladimir Putin said: “We are making progress; perhaps not as quickly as we would like, but we are moving forward every day.”
2. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has now lasted more than 1,568 days, longer than WWI, according to reports by NYT and Meduza, which underscore that the conflict has become a grinding industrial war of attrition rather than a short, maneuver-centric campaign. “This is World War I, but with drones,” Yaroslav Hrytsak, a Ukrainian historian who has recently explored similarities and differences between the two wars, told NYT.
3. NATO’s top U.S. commander, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, said intelligence shows that Russia is not looking for a conflict with the alliance. “I’ve watched the intelligence very closely,” the Supreme Allied Commander Europe said at an event in Berlin this week, according to FT. “Russia is not looking for a conflict… They do understand the term ‘defensive alliance,’ and they do understand that we have a number of asymmetric advantages.” The United States plans to reduce the number of its F‑16/F‑15E fighters in Europe from about 150 to 100 and maritime patrol aircraft from 26 to 15, also removing all 8 aerial refueling tankers. Washington will also withdraw one aircraft carrier strike group carrier, according to NYT, FT and WP.

NB: Next week’s Russia in Review will appear on Thursday, June 18, instead of Friday, June 19, because of the U.S. Juneteenth holiday.

3 Ideas to Explore

1. In an interview with NV Radio, former foreign minister of Ukraine and Belfer Center senior fellow Dmytro Kuleba systematically dismantles what he sees as misleading narratives about the Russia-Ukraine war—above all the idea that the war has reached a turning point favoring Ukraine. Against manifestations of optimism regarding this proposition in Western capitals and Kyiv, Kuleba warned, “People are racing ahead of reality… No turning point in any war has ever been recognized in real time… Of course not. That's nonsense. Turning points are identified retrospectively.” “Claims that Ukraine has achieved a decisive turning point and is now heading straight toward victory are largely nonsense,” he added. “In November, we'll probably return to discussing how to survive another winter,” he warned. Kuleba also said “there are really only two major unanswered questions in this war. First: Will Ukraine develop a ballistic missile capability that can genuinely threaten Moscow and other major Russian cities? Second: If that happens, will Putin be willing to use nuclear weapons in response?” During WP columnist David Igantius's Q&A, when asked by RM whether he thinks the war has or has not entered a turning point favoring Ukraine per Kuleba’s proposition, Ignatius responded, “I think Ukraine's brilliant use of technology… has allowed them to survive in this war—where survival is a kind of victory. But I think people should be careful about announcing a turning point or saying that Russia is finished. My hope is that Ukraine's technology mastery will force even Putin to see that this war is ‘unwinnable’—and change course. But I don't think he's there yet." Ignatius is not the first to describe how Ukraine’s survival can be framed as a victory. Former commander of the Ukrainian armed forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi did so earlier this year.*
2. In the view of The Economist’s staff, “Ukrainian strikes are inflicting pain deep inside Russia,” while Jack Clover writes in The Times of London that “Ukraine transforms war with mid-range drones that ‘destroy anything.’” These drones play a significant role in “really hurting the Russians,” Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general, told Marc Santora of NYT. In fact, “Ukraine is winning—for now at least,” Hal Brands of Bloomberg claims in his recent column. According to Balázs Jarábik of R. Politik, however, the battlefield is “mixed:” “Ukraine has stabilized parts of the front, slowed Russian momentum,” but “Russia continues advancing gradually; retains advantages in manpower, glide bombs, missiles and industrial capacity,” so “Ukraine recovered coherence not dominance.” Moreover, in the view of John J. Mearsheimer, “the Russians are winning on the battlefield.” “For sure, and not as quickly as I'm sure the Russian people and Russian leaders would like, but they are moving inexorably forward,” this professor claims in an interview with Andrew Napolitano. Mearsheimer also claims that “the Ukrainian military is in deep trouble [because] they're unable to raise large numbers of troops to replace those who are killed in battle” and “because the United States and a number of European countries are no longer able to provide as much weaponry to Ukraine as they have in the past.” Mearsheimer predicts that ultimately, “the Russians will end up capturing all of the territory in those four oblasts that they had formerly annexed.” To the extent that estimates of changes in territorial control are a useful criterion for determining whether and which side is winning (but not sufficient on their own), RM keeps track of such changes in its weekly Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. Citing data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, the June 10, 2026, issue of the card shows that during the four-week period of May 12–June 9, 2026, Russian forces saw a net loss of 1 square mile. In the past year, Russia made a net total gain of 1,369 square miles, according to DeepState data, and Russia’s average monthly gains for the past 12 months were 120 square miles per month.
3. Fiona Hill argues in a research paper for Brookings that “Ukraine and Iran may prove the nemeses of Russian and American ambitions,” as both expose the limits of great‑power coercion. “Deadlock in Ukraine discredits Russia as a global military force,” while the Gulf standoff “undermines the United States and Trump,” pushing allies “to look beyond them at new regional security options.” Ukraine has inflicted “massive casualties” and “heavy costs,” on Russia and is now “the most competent military force in Europe,” according to Hill, who is member of the Harvard University Board of Overseers and an alumna of the Belfer Center. Both Hill and Neil MacFarquhar of NYT argue that Russia in Ukraine and the U.S. in Iran misread supposedly “second‑rate” adversaries, assuming quick capitulation. Meanwhile, David Ignatius argues in his recent WaPo column that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are “trapped in the power they created,” each having launched wars they “thought would be quick and decisive” but which “turned into quagmires.” 

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 9, 2026, update:¹ 

Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) Russian forces endured a net loss of 1 square mile. In comparison, the previous four-week period (April 14–May 12, 2026) saw Russia make a net gain of 41 square miles. In the past week (June 2–9), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 6 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, according to DeepState, an increase over the reported loss of 10 square miles the previous week (May 26–June 2, 2026). In addition, DeepState reported in its daily map updates that Russian armed forces advanced near or in eight settlements during the June 2–9, 2026, period, while Ukrainian forces were not reported by DS to have made advances in that time.² In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) indicates that Russia lost a net of 91 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, and during the past week (June 2–9, 2026), lost 10 square miles of Ukrainian territory.³

Territorial Control (figures as of June 9, 2026)⁴