4 Things to Know

1. Many U.S. officials now privately concede that within a few months, Ukraine could be pushed into negotiations with Russia to end the war and that it could be forced to give up territory, WP reported on Nov. 26. Speaking publicly on that day, Anthony Blinken acknowledged that Ukraine might end up entering into talks with Russia sometime soon, according to NYT. A statement, which Blinken and his G-7 colleagues adopted after their meeting on Nov. 26, contained no explicit calls for peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, a Pew poll released one day before the G-7 event shows that Americans are split on whether the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion. Half of Americans say the U.S. is responsible, while 47% say it is not, according to Pew’s Nov. 12–17 poll.
2. Ukrainian intelligence believes that Russia is gearing up for a bold assault on the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, which is located 30 kilometers from the front, according to a Nov. 25 story in The Economist. East of Zaporizhzhia, in the Donetsk region, Russian forces are already moving faster than at any time since the early days of the invasion, according to the Economist. In the past month, Russia gained 269 square miles (696 square kilometers) while Ukraine controlled 200 square miles (520 square kilometers) of Russian land in the Kursk region as of Nov. 27, according to this U.K. newspaper’s analysis, which partially relies on ISW’s data. ISW itself assesses that Russian forces have gained 222 square miles (574 square kilometers) since Nov. 1, 2024, describing these advances as of “gradual and tactical nature.”  In addition to making net land gains, Russia has also expanded its aerials attacks, launching a record number of drones (188) at Ukraine on the night of Nov. 25–26.
3. The Kremlin is preparing to designate career diplomat Alexander Darchiev as the new Russian ambassador to the United States to replace Anatoly Antonov, who served in that position for seven years before leaving for Moscow, according to Kommersant’s multiple sources. The appointment is to occur in the foreseeable future, according to the daily. Darchiev's career in the Russian MFA system began in 1992. By the mid-1990s, he had become head of a subdepartment at the department of North America, and in 2003, he became the deputy director of that department. He has also served as an adviser to the Russian embassy in the United States as well as an adviser-envoy at the Russian embassy in Canada. 
4. Russia has advanced legislation this week recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate authority in Afghanistan. A group of Russian lawmakers has submitted a draft bill to the State Duma that would allow for the suspension of bans on organizations designated as terrorist in Russia, Meduza reported. Political analyst Pavel Sklyanchuk noted in an interview with this outlet that the bill could pave the way for removing the Taliban from the terrorist registry. In addition, head of Russia’s Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov called for working with the Taliban in combating drug and arms trafficking despite the militant movement currently being officially recognized as a terrorist organization in Russia, according to MT.

4 Ideas to Explore

1. Keith Kellogg, Donald Trump’s pick for the envoy for the Ukraine war, has argued that America should continue to arm Ukraine, but only if Ukraine agrees to engage in peace talks with Russia.  This follows from a recent AFPI research report in which the retired general and AFPI’s Fred Fleitz explored how to bring the “Russia-Ukraine war to a close”: “We tell the Ukrainians, ‘You’ve got to come to the table, and if you don’t come to the table, support from the United States will dry up… And you tell Putin, ‘He’s got to come to the table and if you don’t come to the table, then we’ll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field,’” Kellogg said of his and Fleitz’s peace proposal, which he presented to Trump in June.¹ Moscow sees Kellogg as likely to follow in the footsteps of Trump’s previous Ukraine envoy Kurt Volker, who is widely unpopular in Russia, according to Sergei Markov, a Kremlin-connected political analyst cited in WP. Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldier and journalist Oleksii Yarmolenko has expressed doubts about Kellogg’s plan: “[Kellogg’s] tool is blackmail with military aid, on both sides. But whether it will work—I don’t believe it yet,” he wrote, according to Meduza. The announcement of Trump’s selection of Kellogg has prompted Politico.eu to run an article with a headline that said “7 weeks until Trump: Russia and Ukraine fight for advantage before peace talks are imposed,” as if it were describing U.S.-led diplomatic and military interventions in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It is highly doubtful, however, that the U.S. can impose peace talks on Ukraine and Russia in January the same way Washington and its allies did in former Yugoslavia, especially in the case of a nuclear-armed Russia, whose forces are advancing in Ukraine (see the next highlight) and which has proved its ability to withstand economic pressure from the West.
2. Ukraine is struggling to recruit new soldiers as desertions from combat units rise and it continues to yield territory to advancing Russian units, according to FT’s Isobel Koshiw. More Ukrainian soldiers have deserted in the first 10 months of this year than in the previous two years of the war, with prosecutors opening 60,000 cases in January-October against deserters, Koshiw reports. Meanwhile, Russia has captured 2,700 square kilometers in 2024, compared with just 465 square kilometers last year, according to ISW estimates cited in the FT article. ISW itself assesses that the Russian forces gained 222 square miles (574 square kilometers) last month alone. In addition to draft-dodging and desertion, the Ukrainian authorities’ efforts to adequately reinforce personnel in its combat units, which are outmanned by Russia in ways that contribute to Russia’s territorial advances in Ukraine, is the authorities’ unwillingness to lower the conscription age to 18 even though the average age of a Ukrainian soldier hit 43 one year ago. The older conscripts tend to have greater health problems, prompting one frontline Ukrainian battalion commander to recently complain that “At times it feels like I’m managing a day-care center rather than a combat unit.” 
3. Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine isn’t a blueprint for weapons use. Rather its primary value is manipulation, according to Nicole Grajewski of CEIP. The newly amended “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” follows a “pattern common among nuclear powers in creating ambiguity around nuclear use conditions, a long-standing feature of nuclear deterrence.” However, “what distinguishes Russia’s approach is its repeated nuclear saber-rattling and efforts to sow transatlantic divisions through intimidation,” the former Belfer Center fellow writes. The past week has seen Vladimir Putin follow up his signing of the basic principles on Nov. 19 with some more saber-rattling. When describing Russia’s purportedly new MRBM “Oreshnik” to fellow CSTO leaders, Putin claimed the missile can turn targets into dust. “When used in a concentrated, massive strike—using several Oreshnik missiles simultaneously—the resulting impact is comparable in power to that of a nuclear weapon,” he claimed. While at the CSTO summit in Kazakhstan on Nov. 28, Putin was also conveniently asked by a TASS reporter to comment on alleged suggestions by Western politicians to give “nuclear weapons back to Kyiv.” “In this case we will use all—and I want to stress it—all weapons Russia has, all of them. We will not let this happen,” said Putin, reaffirming how far behind he has left the image of himself as a “foreign policy moderate” that he had cultivated until 2022. Russian officials have made such threats before, even though neither the original version of its deterrence principles nor the amended one lists transfer of nuclear weapons (by itself) from one country to another among what this declaratory documents describes as “Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.”
4. Grim analytical assessments of Russia’s economic present and future have exploded over the past week in the Western press in the wake of the ruble’s recent weakening, which was partially triggered by U.S. sanctions on Russia’s key bank, Gazprombank. “Russian economy in freefall,” declared U.K. newspaper Express’ Alycia McNamara on Nov. 27. She was followed by Arthur Sullivan of Deutsche Welle, who claimed on Nov. 28 that “Russia [is] in panic as U.S. sanctions trigger ruble collapse.” “Russia’s war economy shows new cracks after the ruble plunges,” said the headline on a Nov. 29 analysis by WSJ’s Georgi Kantchev and Chelsey Dulaney. “The war in Ukraine is straining Russia’s economy” and “Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort,” the Economist warmed on Nov. 28 and Dec. 1, respectively. Not all of this week’s doom-and-gloom was seen as consequential for Russia’s external policies, however. Writing in NYT on Dec. 2, journalist Anatoly Kurmanaev observed that while the Russian economy is experiencing a slowdown, “the economic strains are still far from provoking the kind of crisis that might compel Mr. Putin to curtail his ambitions in Ukraine.” SWP economist Janis Kluge concurs, writing in his recent commentary that “While the economic difficulties are likely to dampen optimism among the population and force the government to make political trade-offs, Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine will not be directly affected.” It should be noted that the slowdown is not exactly news, and it has been predicted by the IMF and World Bank, among others.² Nor is the weakening of the Russian ruble all bad news. The cheaper Russian currency increases the price of imports into Russia, but it also generates greater ruble income for the budget from activities such as exports of oil, gas and other commodities. And, while inflation runs high, wages continue to outstrip upticks in prices, and real wages in Russia grew nearly 18% since the start of the war, according to Kurmanaev’s article. That said, one should treat the Russian government’s data with a pinch of salt, as FT’s Tony Barber reminds us, citing the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics’ report on the Russian government’s manipulation of data.

Production of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card is currently on hold. Please see below for the most recent issue. You can also access past issues via the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

July 16 update:

July 16 update: No significant territorial changes. NATO members pledged to sustain steady military aid for Ukraine through next year at $44 billion minimum. Net territorial change in the past month: Russia +56 square miles.