Contestable Claims
Far too often we see a significant gap between Russia-related claims, even by top officials and respected authors, and the reality on the ground. We also often encounter a wide divergence in expert views on crucial policy questions related to Russia. This section has two basic aims: (1) to dispel misconceptions that could adversely affect the quality of U.S. policy toward Russia, particularly when vital U.S. interests are involved, through rigorous fact-checking where possible and (2) to identify and debate key dilemmas for decision-makers per the adage that “truth is born in argument.”
We invite you to explore the section and send us more claims to fact-check or debate using the rectangular red button below. (For most fact-checks, we’ve adopted the "traffic light" rating system: red for incorrect; yellow for partially correct; green for correct.)
We invite you to explore the section and send us more claims to fact-check or debate using the rectangular red button below. (For most fact-checks, we’ve adopted the "traffic light" rating system: red for incorrect; yellow for partially correct; green for correct.)
Claim in 2019: Russia became stronger in 2019.
Partially Correct: We have employed three methods of calculating national power to ascertain Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov’s claim. Only one of those formulas confirms Peskov’s claim that Russia became stronger in 2019. The other two disprove it.
Read More
Share
Claim in 2020: “Nobody wants to invest [in Russia].”
Partially Correct: Although foreign direct investment in Russia has generally been trending down since the onset of sanctions in 2014, foreigners still have an active presence in Russian financial markets as of 2020. Other indicators of investor confidence have also decreased, although the trends for these indicators are less clear: Purchases of Russian companies by foreign entities have decreased, but numbers are volatile, and while “greenfield” investment in Russia shows some growth since 2014, numbers remain well below their apex a decade ago. While some negative trends in investment can be observed in Russia, claiming that “nobody wants to invest in Russia” is an oversimplification, as many indicators show more nuanced results. (Fact check done in September 2020.)
Read More
Share
Claim (in 2004, 2015 and 2017): The U.S. government supported Chechen separatism.
Partially Correct: There is no publicly available evidence that the U.S. ever provided direct material support to armed Chechen separatist groups, much less North Caucasus-based militants who have engaged in terrorist attacks. However, U.S. officials did openly meet with Ilyas Akhmadov, who represented the Chechen separatist movement and whom the Russian government described as a terrorist. In addition, former and serving U.S. government officials publicly expressed sympathy for “moderate” Chechen separatists and the separatist cause.
Read More
Share
Claim in 2019: “Real incomes [in Russia] have fallen for five of the past six years.”
Partially Correct: Of the two types of real income officially calculated in Russia for individuals, both real monetary incomes and real disposable incomes contracted in 2014-2018, according to Moscow’s Higher School of Economics. However, according to data available from Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) at the time of the claim, only real disposable incomes had fallen every year from 2014 through 2018. Rosstat data published by Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development show that real monetary incomes rose in 2018, contradicting the above claim. (Fact-check done in November 2019.)
Read More
Share
Claim in 2018: 54 percent of Ukrainians now support joining NATO.
Incorrect: While one 2015 poll did show that 54 percent of Ukrainians supported joining NATO, more recent polls consistently show a lower level of support. (Fact-check done in September-December 2018.)
Read More
Share
Click to Subscribe
Russia Matters offers assorted weekly news and analysis digests, event announcements and occasional newsletters.
Choose and sign up here!
Recent Analysis
The Real Russia ‘Reset’: Reassessing US Sanctions Policy Against Russia
February 25, 2021
Daniel P. Ahn
Biden’s Russia Policy Will Be Shaped by His Priorities, Not Just His People
February 18, 2021
Paul Saunders
When Allies Go Nuclear: How to Prevent the Next Proliferation Threat
February 12, 2021
Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, Kevin Rudd and Ivo Daalder
Managing the Great-Power Competition Between Russia and the U.S.
February 05, 2021
Alexander Gabuev, Thomas Graham and Dmitri Trenin