In the Thick of It

A blog on the U.S.-Russia relationship
Russia war report card

July 12 update: No major territorial changes. NATO said Ukraine will eventually become a member, waiving the membership action plan and offering support, but gave no timeline. Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +37 square miles.

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Wagner tanks

In the aftermath of PMC Wagner's rebellion, poll results reveal the shifting views of Russians toward Prigozhin, Putin and more.

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Russia war report card

July 5 update: No significant territorial change. Ukraine and Russia accused each other of planning to attach the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +143 square miles.

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report card

June 28 update: No significant territorial changes. In the aftermath of a mutiny that saw Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner troops march largely unimpeded toward Moscow on Saturday, the fate of the mercenary group and its leader remain uncertain, and the impact the rebellion may have on the Ukrainian war remains uncertain.

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A man with a Wagner PMC flag in Rostov-on-Don

The following is a selection of views on the impacts of the mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23-24, shared by defense analyst Michael Kofman of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kofman originally posted these and other takeaways via Twitter on June 25: 

-It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge.

-Wagner was unexpectedly successful because they moved much faster and more deliberately than Russian forces, which seemed to lack orders, largely allowing Wagner units past unopposed.

-But Prigozhin also miscalculated in part because this was an act of desperation. He had limited aims, and didn't appreciate the implications of his mutiny. I was puzzled by his theory of victory. A run on Moscow to do what? Get attention? Storm the Kremlin with a battalion?

-Putin’s inaction & the slowness of the Russian response has become typical. I’ve often described him as a master procrastinator. The problem with Wagner was growing, it would reach a crisis point after the June 10 declaration by MoD [of the need for PMCs to sign contracts with MoD], Putin was likely warned and did nothing.

-Prigozhin had declared that Wagner would not sign contracts with the Russian military, designed to neuter their autonomy. Theatrics ensued, but this standoff was clearly going to end poorly. The trajectory was a downward spiral from his May ultimatums leading into a crisis.

-Wagner’s autonomy will end in the context of this [Russian-Ukrainian] war. In states like Mali the situation might be different.

-After Bakhmut, the military was far less dependent on Wagner. Folks often conflated Bakhmut for the entire Russian winter offensive, and Wagner’s role as though it was omnipresent on the front. It was quite narrow, and Wagner was not used for defense in the south.

-My conclusion is that Prigozhin ultimately lost. Wagner will also lose out. But Putin lost as well, and the regime was wounded. 

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Russia war report card

June 21 update: No significant territorial change. Zelensky said counteroffensive is going “slower than desired,” but compared it to fall counteroffensive which eventually had sudden breakthrough. Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +91 square miles.

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Russia war report card

June 13 update: Ukraine made small advances in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. Zelensky declared that “counteroffensive and defensive actions are taking place.” Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +96 square miles.

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Russia war report card

June 6 update: No major territorial changes. The Kakhovka Dam in southern Ukraine was blown up, flooding territory near Kherson. Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +47 square miles.

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Eritrean pres

Vladimir Putin’s hosting of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Moscow and Sergei Lavrov's trip to Africa this week are the latest in a flurry of recent initiatives aimed at advancing Russian interests vis-à-vis the continent. In the short term, these diplomatic efforts aim to foil the ongoing campaign by Western powers to isolate Russia over its war against Ukraine. In the medium to long term, they may enable Russia to position itself to benefit from the continent’s rapid growth forecast.

Lavrov’s trip — his third to Africa this year alone,— has included stops in Kenya, Burundi, Mozambique and South Africa, where he is participating in a gathering of BRICS foreign ministers June 1-2. And Russia’s veteran foreign minister will likely be back on the continent at least once more this summer, provided that Putin attends the Aug. 22-24 BRICS summit in Johannesburg in person. (South African authorities have floated the possibility that they would grant the Russian leader immunity from an arrest warrant issued recently by the International Criminal Court — whose jurisdiction Johannesburg recognizes — though they may alternatively end up asking either China or Mozambique to host the summit in their stead.) Regardless of whether or where the BRICS summit takes place, both Putin and Lavrov can also be expected to meet their African counterparts again when they host the second Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg on July 26-29.

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Russia war report card graphic

May 30 update: Continued territorial stalemate. Several drones hit buildings in Moscow, following a large Russian drone attack on Kyiv. Net territorial change in the past month: Ukraine +51 square miles.

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