Speaking to BBC on Sept. 10, 2023, America’s outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Mark Milley predicted that the weather will continue to favor fighting in Ukraine until about Oct. 10-25. “There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done,” the general said. Milley, whose JCS role ends Oct. 1, could have a plausible weather forecast we do not have access to. Or he could be speaking from the experience of watching (and advising on one side) the Russian and Ukrainian forces as they battled each other last fall and winter. If so, does this very recent history (October 2022-February 2023) support the proposition that “Generals Mud and Frost” may force the Ukrainian and Russian forces to scale down combat and enter a seasonal stalemate? Here is what we have learned.

The Levada Center has just released the latest installment in its series of polls on which countries Russians consider to be “great” as well as on their general attitudes toward certain countries. The polls show that the share of Russians who view their own country as great has almost doubled in the past two decades from 43% in 2002 to 80% in 2023 (Table 1) in a clear reflection that both a recent streak of increases in Russia’s national power and the Kremlin’s consistent messaging on Russia’s “rise from its knees” during Vladimir Putin’s rule continue to have an impact on the Russian public.

In addition to increasingly seeing their own country as great, Russians also see a similar trend in China. In fact, the share of Levada respondents who view China as great has more than tripled, from 19% in 2002 to 63% in 2023, reflecting the steady strengthening of Moscow’s alignment with Beijing. The share of Russians who view India, with which Russia has enjoyed steadily positive relations, as great, has also nearly tripled, from 5% to 14% during the same period.  

The results of the Levada Center’s latest installment in its series of polls on Russians’ attitudes’ toward Russia’s war in Ukraine indicate that the share of peaceniks exceed the share of war hawks among common Russians.

In fact, if adding the shares of those who definitely support and those who rather support the launch of peace negotiations (Option 1) with those who definitely support and those who rather support the continuation of the so-called special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine (Option 2), then total support for the launch of peace talks (Option 1) has exceeded total support for continued war (Option 2) in (almost) all monthly polls since September 2022,1 except for May 2023 (see Graph 1).

"Russia becomes Europe’s biggest economy.” That’s the headline that Kremlin-funded RT’s editors put on a story they ran Aug. 4. The story went on to trumpet that “Russia was among the world’s five largest economies and the largest in Europe in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) as of the end of 2022, despite Western sanctions, the latest World Economics report has revealed.” Three days later, analytical resource bne IntelliNews, which is focused on emerging markets, published an article repeating these two claims. “In these terms Russia has just overtaken Germany to become the fifth wealthiest economy in the world and the largest in Europe, worth $5.3 trillion,” the report said, without citation.

But are these claims accurate? We consulted the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) databases, which both offer the following methodologically different approaches toward measuring countries’ GDP in terms of purchasing power parity: (1) absolute value of GDP, PPP, measured in current dollars, (2) absolute value of GDP, PPP, measured in constant 2017 international dollars, and (3) countries’ shares in world GDP, PPP, also measured in constant dollars. Only the first of these three approaches (GDP, PPP, in current dollars) supports the dual claim that Russia has become Europe’s largest and the world’s fifth largest economy in 2022 (see Table 1). The other two methods (GDP, PPP, in constant dollars and share of world’s GDP, PPP, in constant dollars) ran counter to these two claims, showing that Russia was Europe’s second largest economy after Germany, as well as the world’s sixth largest economy in 2022 (see Tables 2 and 3).

In the aftermath of PMC Wagner's rebellion, poll results reveal the shifting views of Russians toward Prigozhin, Putin and more.

The following is a selection of views on the impacts of the mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23-24, shared by defense analyst Michael Kofman of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kofman originally posted these and other takeaways via Twitter on June 25: 

-It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge.

-Wagner was unexpectedly successful because they moved much faster and more deliberately than Russian forces, which seemed to lack orders, largely allowing Wagner units past unopposed.

-But Prigozhin also miscalculated in part because this was an act of desperation. He had limited aims, and didn't appreciate the implications of his mutiny. I was puzzled by his theory of victory. A run on Moscow to do what? Get attention? Storm the Kremlin with a battalion?

-Putin’s inaction & the slowness of the Russian response has become typical. I’ve often described him as a master procrastinator. The problem with Wagner was growing, it would reach a crisis point after the June 10 declaration by MoD [of the need for PMCs to sign contracts with MoD], Putin was likely warned and did nothing.

-Prigozhin had declared that Wagner would not sign contracts with the Russian military, designed to neuter their autonomy. Theatrics ensued, but this standoff was clearly going to end poorly. The trajectory was a downward spiral from his May ultimatums leading into a crisis.

-Wagner’s autonomy will end in the context of this [Russian-Ukrainian] war. In states like Mali the situation might be different.

-After Bakhmut, the military was far less dependent on Wagner. Folks often conflated Bakhmut for the entire Russian winter offensive, and Wagner’s role as though it was omnipresent on the front. It was quite narrow, and Wagner was not used for defense in the south.

-My conclusion is that Prigozhin ultimately lost. Wagner will also lose out. But Putin lost as well, and the regime was wounded. 

Vladimir Putin’s hosting of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Moscow and Sergei Lavrov's trip to Africa this week are the latest in a flurry of recent initiatives aimed at advancing Russian interests vis-à-vis the continent. In the short term, these diplomatic efforts aim to foil the ongoing campaign by Western powers to isolate Russia over its war against Ukraine. In the medium to long term, they may enable Russia to position itself to benefit from the continent’s rapid growth forecast.

Lavrov’s trip — his third to Africa this year alone,— has included stops in Kenya, Burundi, Mozambique and South Africa, where he is participating in a gathering of BRICS foreign ministers June 1-2. And Russia’s veteran foreign minister will likely be back on the continent at least once more this summer, provided that Putin attends the Aug. 22-24 BRICS summit in Johannesburg in person. (South African authorities have floated the possibility that they would grant the Russian leader immunity from an arrest warrant issued recently by the International Criminal Court — whose jurisdiction Johannesburg recognizes — though they may alternatively end up asking either China or Mozambique to host the summit in their stead.) Regardless of whether or where the BRICS summit takes place, both Putin and Lavrov can also be expected to meet their African counterparts again when they host the second Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg on July 26-29.

CIA director William Burns discusses four areas of long-term strategic importance for the CIA — and, by extension, for the United States: 1. The war in Ukraine, 2. U.S. strategic competition with China, 3. Climate change, energy security and other transnational threats, and 4. the intelligence community’s adaptability to the changing environment.

Though many Russian officials and pundits wonder whether the latest Pentagon leak was the product of a Western-Ukranian disinformation campaign, many others have kept mum on the issue, despite the fact that the contents of the leaks fall within their remit.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has just released the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Unsurprisingly, one of the most notable changes in ATA-2023 compared to ATA-2022 is the addition of sections on various aspects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and its impact. In addition to Russia, the new assessment also details threats emanating from China, Iran, North Korea, climate change, environmental degradation and other transnational issues.