Russia Analytical Report, April 8–14, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

Two Russian ballistic missiles struck Ukraine’s city of Sumy on Palm Sunday, killing 34 and injuring over 119. Donald Trump called the strike “horrible,” but noted that he was told Russia “made a mistake.” Trump also blamed Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelensky for the war as well as reportedly claimed that he had set a deadline for Putin on agreeing to a ceasefire in the war,¹ which he claimed to have left millions dead.² Some top officials in the Trump administration were more explicit than Trump in their criticism of Russia over the strike, according to NYT. For instance, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine Kieth Kellogg asserted that Russian forces had crossed “any line of decency,” while his Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the strike as “horrifying.” For his part, Zelenskyy rejected Trump’s accusations and urged the U.S. leader to visit Ukraine and see the devastation caused by Russia himself. Russia’s Sergei Lavrov admitted to the strike, but claimed that it was targeting a gathering of Ukrainian military.³
Where six months ago Ukraine’s forces worried that the enemy was slowly rolling them back, they now think that fiber-optic drones and well-prepared defensive positions can keep them at bay, according to The Economist.“Indeed, Russian forces have made very little progress for well over two years. Whether a ceasefire deal will come is uncertain. Ukraine is relying on its own strengths,” this weekly claimed in an April 8 article. The Russian armed forces have been advancing in Ukraine, but their overall pace of advance has recently declined, according to RM’s War Report Card.⁴ RM staff has recently estimated that it would take the Russian forces 15 years or more at their recent rate just to capture the entire regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, if the Russian forces were to focus only on these four regions.
Commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ukraine (AFU) Oleksandr Syrskyi has granted a lengthy interview to Ukraine’s LB.ua, in which he described accounts of Russia threatening to use nuclear weapons as the AFU pushed Russian forces out of the city of Kherson in 2022 as “nonsense.” In the interview, Syrskyi also acknowledged that he doubts whether Russian forces could be expelled from Ukraine militarily and implied that Ukrainian authorities need to mobilize at least 30,000 troops every month to ensure that the AFU has sufficient personnel vis-à-vis the increasing grouping of Russian forces in Ukraine and the “constan[t] expanding of the front-line.” Syrskyi chose not to offer his assessment of how many of the 30,000 monthly mobilized Ukranians are to compensate for casualties⁵reducing the size of the AFU’s combat personnel, but he did acknowledge another source of that reduction: desertions. “Some units are almost half-staffed by those service members who left the units unauthorized,” he admitted.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“The Battlefield Lessons North Korea Has Learned Fighting Ukraine,” Jane Lytvynenko, Dasl Yoon, and Alistair MacDonald, WSJ, 04.08.25.

While the West has learned from the Ukraine war, including how to strategically use modern equipment such as drones, the fighting [in Russia’s Kursk region] is providing the North Koreans with unmatched battlefield experience. Those skills can now be taken home and spread throughout the country's massive army.
While the North Koreans' tactics weren't sophisticated, the sheer number of soldiers charging at the Ukrainians was unsparing. After about three weeks in Kursk, the North Koreans had about 3,000 dead and wounded men, said Ukrainian and U.S. officials at the time. The North Koreans now have sustained around 5,000 casualties, with a third of those killed in action, according to one Western official.
After taking massive losses early on, North Korean troops withdrew from the Kursk battlefield in early January. They returned about a month later, as Russia was accelerating its efforts to oust Ukrainians from its territory. The Kremlin had made a win in the region a priority to deny Ukraine a bargaining chip in peace negotiations, and deployed some of its best drone operators there. Since then, North Korean soldiers have been among the most valuable on the battlefield, as better integration with Russian forces and superior tactics combined with their endurance, Ukrainian soldiers and analysts said.
Looking at the North Koreans' unflinching advances under deadly fire made Shyriaiev [a Ukrainian commander] realize a key advantage they hold over the Ukrainians: an apparent disregard for the value of human life, surpassing even that of the Russians.

Iran and its nuclear program:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Trump Describes Russia’s Deadly Strike on Ukrainian City as ‘Horrible,’” Constant Méheut, NYT, 04.14.25.

Two ballistic missiles hit the center of Sumy on Sunday morning, killing at least 34 people and injuring more than 100.⁶ The attack was the second in just over a week to cause large numbers of civilian casualties in Ukraine, which Kyiv has said shows that the Moscow is not truly interested in stopping the fighting despite U.S.-led negotiations for a truce.
- “I think it was terrible. And I was told they made a mistake. But I think it’s a horrible thing,” Mr. Trump said about the Sumy attack when he was aboard Air Force One on Sunday. It was not immediately clear what Mr. Trump meant when he said he had been “told” Russia had “made a mistake” — a formulation that could also be interpreted as an attempt to make excuses for Moscow. Mr. Trump has generally avoided criticizing President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia since taking office in January.
- Some top officials in the Trump administration were more explicit. Keith Kellogg, a retired U.S. general and Mr. Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, said that Russian forces had crossed “any line of decency” by targeting civilians in Sumy.
- Secretary of State Marco Rubio also condemned what he described as a “horrifying Russian missile attack on Sumy.” “This is a tragic reminder of why President Trump and his Administration are putting so much time and effort into trying to end this war and achieve durable peace,” Mr. Rubio wrote on social media.
The condemnations came as the U.S. efforts to broker a cease-fire have failed to yield results. In recent days, White House officials have said that Russia was running out of time to convince the Trump administration that it is serious about striking a peace deal—and not just playing for time.
In an interview broadcast on Sunday but recorded before the attack on Sumy, Mr. Zelensky invited Mr. Trump to Ukraine to witness the realities of the war firsthand... Mr. Zelensky was speaking with the broadcaster from Kryvyi Rih, his home city, where a Russian missile strike killed 19 people, including nine children, earlier this month.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

See graph at the bottom of this section.

“Oleksandr Syrsky: ‘The enemy's prepared mobilization resource is about 5 million people. And the total mobilization resource is 20 million,’" LB.ua, 04.09.25.^ Clues from Ukrainian Views.

[When asked: American investigative journalist Bob Woodward... claims that the Russians frightened the U.S. with the [potential] use of nuclear weapons if the Defense Forces destroyed the main enemy forces during their retreat from Kherson in 2022, and Washington pressured Ukraine’s leadership. Was there really such a situation?] I think this is some kind of nonsense.
A just peace—when we’ve reached the borders and raised the flags. And that’s the maximum task. Realistically—when the enemy leaves our territory. I don’t know in what way. Whether by military means. But we are doing everything, at least, to make it happen.”
[When asked: “The President announced a figure—30,000 mobilized per month. If we talk about plans, will it remain the same or will we increase it?”] The President announced the figure he announced. And this is indeed the figure we must adhere to. The enemy increases the size of its Armed Forces by eight to nine thousand each month through contractors … And the enemy has increased its grouping fivefold since the beginning of the aggression. Every month they increase by eight to nine thousand, per year this comes out to 120-130 thousand. On January 1, 2025, the Russian grouping of troops participating in combat operations in Ukraine numbered 603 thousand military personnel, today it is already 623 thousand.
Some units are almost half-staffed by those service members who left the units unauthorized.
[When asked: “President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia is preparing for a new offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv regions.”] I can say that the President is absolutely right and this offensive has actually already begun. Because for several days, almost a week, we’ve been observing an almost twofold increase in the number of enemy offensive actions on all main fronts … The enemy continues its strategic offensive operation aimed at capturing our territory, defeating our troops, advancing deep into the country, and seeking to fully capture Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and to create a buffer zone in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions.”⁷
“The front is constantly expanding, the Kursk operation and the enemy’s actions in Kharkiv region, in Vovchansk, gave us an increase in the front by 200 km.
[When asked: “Many commanders of lower and middle ranks publicly talk about the problem of fictitious reporting” by field commanders on the situation on the ground] “Well, this is true. And this is probably our main problem.”

“Ukraine Thinks It Can Hold Off Russia as Long as It Needs To,” The Economist, 04.08.25.

The drones will make it even harder for soldiers or vehicles to move along the front lines than it is now,. That means fewer soldiers are required to man positions. Where six months ago Ukraine’s forces worried that the enemy was slowly rolling them back, they now think that drones and well-prepared defensive positions can hold the Russians off. Indeed, Russian forces have made very little progress for well over two years. Whether a ceasefire deal will come is uncertain. Ukraine is relying on its own strengths. From March 11 to April 8, 2025, RM calculates that Russian gains, not counting the orderly withdrawal of Ukraine’s forces from Kursk, were only 113 square miles across the entire line of contact.

“Why Don’t Russian Soldiers Revolt?” Amelie Tolvin, FP, 04.09.25.

While financial and ideological factors help explain why Russians choose to enlist, they do not account for the continued acquiescence of soldiers once they face the meat-grinder tactics and systematic acts of violence.
Soldiers’ compliance with such high levels of casualties and brutality can best be understood as a product of the pervasive and deeply ingrained culture of violence within the Russian military.
In the Russian military, however, a particularly brutal tradition of hazing known as dedovshchina has been institutionalized into its very culture.
Russia has reportedly used barrier troops to kill or otherwise stop its own soldiers from retreating.
The Russian military’s use of violence against its own creates a cycle of behavior in which violence is routinized and internalized, conditioning soldiers to accept it as the norm and undermining their ability and will to dissent.
This large-scale quiescence stems not from an acceptance of the military’s culture of violence, but rather from a fear of the consequences that it enforces.
Conditioned by a brutal military culture, Russian soldiers are trapped in a cycle of violence from which they are unlikely to break free.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

⁸

ballistic missiles launched by russia ⁹

Military aid to Ukraine:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

“Europe Should Buy From Ukraine’s Defense Industry — And Invest in It Too,” The Economist, 04.09.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Boeing Helped Power Russia’s Economy. Could It Return?” Anton Troianovski, Niraj Chokshi and Ivan Nechepurenko, NYT, 04.12.25.

There is widespread skepticism in U.S. aviation circles about the business sense of Boeing returning to Russia, a reflection of the enormous damage that three years of war have done to the country’s standing in the American corporate world. “If given the choice between re-entering Russia and drinking bleach,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace consultant, “I’m sure that that glass of bleach is looking mighty good.”
Russia’s commercial airline fleet still relies on more than 450 planes made by Boeing and its European rival, Airbus. Those jets — a lifeline for a nation spanning 11 time zones — account for more than half of the passenger planes in use in Russia today, according to Cirium, an aviation data firm....The European Union, where Airbus is based, remains staunchly opposed to any rapprochement with Russia.
Even if Boeing did return, analysts say, the relationship would almost certainly not be as deep as it was before the invasion — an era when Boeing operated a flight training campus in Moscow and its executives met with Mr. Putin.
Russia appears to be interested in a broader deal that would lift aviation-related sanctions imposed by the United States.

Ukraine-related negotiations:

“Why a Temporary Ceasefire in Ukraine Is Pointless,” Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 04.09.25.

The goal should be a full peace settlement, not a temporary ceasefire that would risk entrenching a very dangerous and damaging situation for the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine. A ceasefire that lasted only a month would be pointless. The goal should be to make the ceasefire permanent while talks continue. This however would risk replicating the Donbas ceasefire of 2015-22, that solved none of the underlying issues, was repeatedly broken by clashes and provocations on both sides, and eventually led to full-scale Russian invasion.
Such a ceasefire would encourage hardliners on both sides to reject a peace settlement in the hope of successfully renewing the war later. Russian hardliners would hope that the breathing space would allow the Russian army to be decisively strengthened for a new offensive. Ukrainian hardliners would hope that a Democratic victory in the U.S. 2028 presidential elections would renew unconditional U.S. aid for Ukrainian victory. If it saw good reasons to fear this, the Russian government would surely be tempted to launch a preemptive strike.

“Trump Envoy: Ukraine Could Be Divided Like Postwar Berlin,” Samuel Lovett, The Times, 04.11.25.¹⁰

President Trump’s envoy to Ukraine has said the country could be partitioned “almost like Berlin after World War Two” as part of a peace deal. General Keith Kellogg, a leading figure in US efforts to end the three-year war, suggested that British and French troops could adopt zones of control in the west of the country as part of a “reassurance force”, with Russia’s army in the occupied east. Between them would be Ukrainian forces and a demilitarized zone.
Kellogg, 80, said the Anglo-French-led force west of the Dnipro river, which bisects Ukraine from north to south and runs through Kyiv, would “not be provocative at all” to Moscow. He said Ukraine was a big enough country to accommodate several armies seeking to enforce a ceasefire. “You could almost make it look like what happened with Berlin after World War Two, when you had a Russian zone, a French zone, and a British zone, a US zone,” he said. “You’re west of the [Dnipro], which is a major obstacle,” Kellogg said. He later clarified that America would not be providing any ground forces. He suggested that a demilitarized zone of 18 miles could be implemented along the existing lines of control in the east.
Kellogg warned Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron not to count on American support for the coalition. “Always plan for the worst case,” he said. Asked if the coalition’s reassurance force would be effective, he suggested Trump would be pleased that Europe was more willing to stand on its own feet. He said the force, if nothing else, would send a good message to Putin. Although Kellogg indicated that America’s involvement in the coalition would be limited, he encouraged Starmer and other European leaders to “pick up the phone” and plead their case.

“Spoil or Shape: How Europeans Can Impact US-Russia Talks on Ukraine,” Marie Dumoulin, ECFR, 04.10.25.

Europeans spoiling the US-Russia discussions to buy time only makes sense if their intervention can bring about a new, more favorable outcome. As the conflict currently stands, Ukraine is holding the line and Russia’s limited advances have come at a huge cost, but it would be naive to expect Russia’s military to collapse to the extent that it surrenders. It is also unwise for Europeans to hope for a radical political change in Moscow, or for them to expect the Trump administration to act solely in Ukraine’s best interest
Europeans should instead agree that their desired outcome is to preserve a sovereign and viable Ukraine. They should work to maintain the country’s ability to defend itself and use the various instruments at their disposal—sanctions, security guarantees, reconstruction and EU integration—to weigh in on the negotiations. They should ensure that Ukraine always has several options to choose from, instead of being pushed to accept Russia’s conditions, and that Russia’s options are limited. Europeans should be ready to spoil the conversation in order to steer it in the desired direction.

“How to Find an End to the War That Russians and Ukrainians Can Agree On,” Elena Koneva, Russia.Post, 04.14.25. Clues from Russian Views.

The most acceptable ceasefire scenario identified in the study of views of Ukranians and Russians on the war —supported by 60% of Russians (vs. 29% opposed) and 62% of Ukrainians (vs. 34% opposed)—includes the following four interconnected parameters:

Territorial control:
- Russia retains control of occupied territories (with the caveat that “Ukraine does not officially recognize this”).
- Territorial parameters ranged from full Russian control to partial return of Zaporizhzhia/Kherson regions. For Ukrainians, the non-recognition clause is critical, preserving the possibility of future legal/political challenges to Russia’s claims.
Security guarantees:
- Ukraine receives security guarantees from the West, including the deployment of a foreign military contingent (e.g., NATO or international forces) to police the demarcation line.
- Ukrainians prioritize security over NATO membership, viewing guarantees as essential to prevent renewed aggression. For Russians, this reduces the perceived threat of NATO expansion.
Economic recovery:
- Ukraine receives funds for postwar reconstruction. This addresses Ukrainians’ existential need to rebuild their economy and society, which respondents tied directly to accepting territorial compromises.
Sanctions relief:
- Sanctions against Russia are lifted in stages. While 65% of Russians (Sept. 2024) hoped for sanctions cancellation, Ukrainians reluctantly acknowledge their potential removal as part of negotiations, despite viewing sanctions as a key Western lever.

“Interview With Andrei A. Polishchuk, Director of the Second CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry,” Rossiya Segodnya via Russian Foreign Ministry, 04.13.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This outlet is Russian government-funded and has been accused of propaganda in the West.)

Question: Under what conditions is Moscow ready to start direct negotiations with Kiev? Answer: The Russian side is open to discussing serious and realistic proposals that take into account modern realities and lead to the elimination of the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and the achievement of a truly comprehensive, fair and lasting peace. However, the behavior of the Kyiv authorities shows that they are not ready for this. They withdrew from direct negotiations with Russia, which were conducted from late February to mid-April 2022. In September 2022, a decree of the President of Ukraine was adopted on a self-prohibition on negotiations with the Russian leadership, which is still in effect.
Question: Do Russia and Ukraine have a working channel of communication, if so, which one? What issues are being discussed between the parties? Answer: A channel of musical correspondence has been established between Russia and Ukraine, mainly on legal and consular issues. Such communications are carried out through the embassies of the two countries in Belarus. We are grateful to Minsk for maintaining this channel of communication. •
Question: Will Russia agree to send peacekeepers to Ukraine if the group includes Russian representatives? Answer: The issue of peacekeeping is not on the agenda now. ... Negotiations on the formation of the so-called guarantee forces, which are currently being conducted by the "coalition of the willing" led by France and Britain, are in fact preparations for foreign intervention. Foreign intervention under peace-guarantee flags... is unacceptable.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

"The US and Russia Are Negotiating in Bad Faith," Nina L. Khrushcheva, Project Syndicate, 04.11.25.
“Trenin: It makes no sense for Russia to make concessions to Washington,” Dmitry Trenin, Pravda, 04.11.25.
“Putin's Secret Dealmaker Emerges From the Shadows in Ukraine Peace Talks,” Joe Parkinson, Drew Hinshaw and Thomas Grove, WSJ, 04.11.25. (Profile of FSB Gen. Sergei Beseda.)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Fiona Hill Argues Putin Has No Incentive for Durable Peace in Ukraine,” Dasha Zhukauskaite, Russia Matters, 04.11.25.¹¹

Two weeks after the closely-watched bilateral talks between Russian and American delegations in Riyadh, Fiona Hill, former Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on the National Security Council and member of Harvard University's Board of Overseers, joined experienced journalist Lucian Kim for an illuminating conversation with exiled editor-in-chief of the New Times, Yevgenia Albats. Their discussion at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, titled "Unfair Triangle," confronted the reality that in negotiations intended to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has no incentive to seek a lasting peace. The title itself alludes to the unfair and asymmetrical nature of the evolving diplomatic dynamic in which talks are largely shaped by U.S.–Russia power politics, while Ukraine—whose fate hangs in the balance—is often sidelined.
Hill detailed the likely consequences of the Trump administration’s views of Putin’s long-term goals and American disengagement, while emphasizing Ukraine's military successes and diplomatic fortitude, which she sees as underrepresented in American media. She outlined the broader implications of U.S. withdrawal from the conflict, not only for European security architecture, but also for what U.S. analysts Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor have termed the "Axis of Upheaval:” Russia, Iran, North Korea and China. Hill dissected Putin's negotiating posture and the calculated tactics the Kremlin employed in its communications with the Trump administration.
In discussing the recent New York Times article detailing the extent of U.S. involvement in supporting Ukraine at the onset of the full-scale invasion, both Hill and Kim emphasized that, while the U.S. has provided significant aid, its strategy was never aimed at securing a Ukrainian victory. Instead, the goal has been to offer just enough support for Ukraine to defend itself. Hill attributes this restrained approach to a hierarchy of U.S. strategic priorities, with managing the Russian threat taking precedence.¹²
Though U.S. support for Ukraine may have seemed too little and too late from Ukraine’s perspective, the actual scale of U.S. involvement in the conflict underscores why Washington is ill-suited to act as a neutral mediator—under the Biden administration, after all, the U.S. was a deeply invested party… Beyond its limited impartiality, the current U.S. administration faces another significant challenge in its negotiations with Russia: a lack of experienced diplomats and regional experts on its side. This was evident during the 12-hour U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24, which Albats and Hill saw as exposing a level of asymmetry—the Russian delegation was composed of seasoned diplomats and carefully selected representatives, while the American team lacked comparable regional expertise.
According to Hill, the inclusion of business-oriented figures on the Russian negotiating team, such as Dmitriev who visited the U.S. last week for more talks, reflects Vladimir Putin’s broader objective: to achieve a favorable rapprochement with the U.S. while deferring substantive negotiations on the war itself… To this end, Hill observed the Russian side has increasingly employed rhetoric focused on economic loss for the American public. This messaging is deliberately tailored to appeal to figures like Trump, who, as Hill points out, is drawn to the idea of making a deal and "getting back what’s yours." Hill warned that these developments signal a dangerous drift back toward a 19th-century model of imperialism, where international order is shaped by land grabs and resource competition rather than rules-based cooperation.

“Top commander, in potential clash with Pentagon, warns US troops should stay in Europe,” Connor O’Brien, Politico, 04.11.25.

Republican lawmakers—and the commander of U.S. forces in Europe—argued Tuesday against withdrawing troops from the continent, clashing with a potential Trump administration plan. U.S. European Command chief Gen. Christopher Cavoli told the House Armed Services Committee that he’s “consistently recommended” keeping the same troop levels since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. “It’s my advice to maintain that force posture as it is now,” he said.
His comments, echoed by some top Republicans, follow reports that the Pentagon is weighing removing up to 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe. And they showcased increasing public tension between the Trump administration and GOP defense hawks over the military’s role abroad.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Splitting Russia From China Is Possible—and Vital,” Mark Episkopos, The American Conservative, 04.09.25.

Michael McFaul and likeminded voices have insisted for years that any effort to draw Russia away from China is a fool’s errand because the Moscow-Beijing axis is an ideologically ordained entente between autocracies against democracies. This is a kind of self-fulfilling geopolitical prophecy that tries to obfuscate the consequences of concrete policy decisions made by successive neoconservative policymakers since 1991 behind a contrived metaphysical narrative that has nothing to do with actual Russian or Chinese strategic objectives. As with much of the post–Cold War Atlanticist canon, it’s a story we tell ourselves to justify a failing and unsustainable status quo. Part of adapting to a multipolar world is to work toward a renewed sense of foreign policy agency, of America as a geopolitically nimble actor capable of pragmatically engaging allies and competitors alike. There are few better or more pressing places to apply this skill than the U.S.–Russia–China strategic triangle.

“Why Are Chinese Soldiers Fighting in Ukraine?” The Economist, 04.10.25.

There is no proof that the Chinese nationals fighting for Russia in Ukraine are state-supported. It is no surprise, however, that they are there. Chinese fighters on both sides in Ukraine have been posting videos of their exploits on social media throughout the war......Those who fight for Russia have said they go seeking thrills and cash.¹³

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

"Underestimating China: Why America Needs a New Strategy of Allied Scale to Offset Beijing’s Enduring Advantages," Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, FA, 04.10.25.

Missile defense:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Trump Prompts Rethink of Nuclear-Weapons Deals,” Laurence Norman, Marion Messmer, and Debak Das, WSJ (Podcast), 04.13.25.

Debak Das: So, in terms of difficulty, the question is, what exactly is it that France is trying to do with a nuclear cover? So, if the question is, is it to prevent conventional military attacks by Russia, then the answer is no. This would be very difficult to prevent. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. They still fight conventional wars against each other. Then there's a question of, is it to prevent sub-conventional attacks or land grabs by Russia in Poland or Eastern Europe? And the answer there, again, is, with strategic weapons, you cannot prevent that. If the goal is to prevent a strategic nuclear strike by Russia on Germany or Poland, that's possible. But then the question is, would that be a credible nuclear umbrella? In theory, there could be a commitment made, which would be an agreement that you could sign with another country. Now, that would not be credible till you have actual forces on the ground or deployments that threaten the adversary. Now, what would those deployments be? France right now has 290 nuclear weapons. It has submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and it has an air-launched cruise missile capability. That is not going to be enough. France will then have to take those aircraft with air-launched cruise missiles, put them in Germany, or put them in Poland. And those are going to come with their own threats, because increasing your credibility also increases the threat of escalation.
Debak Das: So, in terms of difficulty, the question is, what exactly is it that France is trying to do with a nuclear cover? So, if the question is, is it to prevent conventional military attacks by Russia, then the answer is no. This would be very difficult to prevent. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. They still fight conventional wars against each other. Then there's a question of, is it to prevent sub-conventional attacks or land grabs by Russia in Poland or Eastern Europe? And the answer there, again, is, with strategic weapons, you cannot prevent that. If the goal is to prevent a strategic nuclear strike by Russia on Germany or Poland, that's possible. But then the question is, would that be a credible nuclear umbrella?

Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at “Meeting on Development Strategy for the Navy,” President of Russia (Kremlin.ru), 04.11.25.

In recent years, we have been implementing a large-scale Navy modernization program. From Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, Russia's shipyards are engaged in the serial production of both surface ships and new missile submarines, including the state-of-the-art Project Borei-A and Project Yasen-M vessels. Significant funds have been allocated for this. Over the past five years, 49 ships of various classes have been built, and from 2020 to 2024, to this date, four Project Borei—A strategic submarines and four Project Yasen-M multipurpose submarines have been commissioned.
At the same time, it is evident that the dynamics of the changing global situation, the emergence of new challenges and threats, including those in maritime domains, as well as the vigorous technological and digital revolution, robotization, and the widespread implementation of unmanned systems—all these necessitate the formation of a new profile for the Navy.
In this context, I consider it imperative to emphazise the importance of systematically and consistently developing all components of the Navy, including submarine and surface ship groups, naval aviation, coastal missile and artillery troops, as well as support systems. Undoubtedly, one of our priority tasks is to strengthen the domestic fleet in its key segment of strategic nuclear forces, which serve as the most important guarantee of Russia’s security and the preservation of global balance. In this connection, I must note that the share of modern armaments and equipment in Russia’s maritime strategic nuclear forces has already reached 100%. I underscore that this indicator must be maintained in the future.
Alongside this, we must continue and expand the serial production of modern vessels across various classes. These must be equipped with advanced technology, including high-precision and hypersonic weaponry, robotic systems, and possess new-generation control, reconnaissance, communication, radar, hydroacoustic, and navigation systems. I previously mentioned the Perm, a multipurpose submarine launched on March 27 this year. It has become the first submarine armed with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles. This alone demonstrates the emergence of such elements within our strategic nuclear forces… This [Zirkon] is effectively a weapon capable of fulfilling strategic-level missions.
I would like to note that 8.4 trillion rubles have been allocated to build new warships for the Navy over the next decade, and these funds should be taken into consideration when drafting the state armament program.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Counterterrorism:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

“Examining the Geopolitics of Gas in U.S.-Russia Negotiations,” Tatiana Mitrova, NI, 04.11.25.

With Trump back in office, the… both U.S. and Russian officials are discussing possible cooperation on gas sales to Europe. Rumors even suggest a revival of Nord Stream 2 or U.S. companies joining Russian upstream and LNG projects in the Arctic.
Trump faces a three-way balancing act: keeping energy cheap at home, expanding U.S. LNG abroad, and developing a symbolic peace deal. However, he wants fast, high-visibility wins over complex resolutions. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to shift the discussion away from the Ukraine conflict and toward broader U.S.-Russia economic cooperation—floating joint projects on rare earths, Arctic cooperation, and gas. Will this tactic work? That remains to be seen. But any shift in gas sanctions will have a ripple effect across global gas markets. Russian volumes are a real wildcard: whether they return or disappear, they will impact prices, gas flows, financial investment decisions on new projects, and the geopolitics of gas.

“Could the U.S. and Russia Strike a Deal to Restart Nord Stream 2?” Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 04.10.25.

From a technical point of view, a relaunch of Nord Stream 2 makes a lot of sense. But there are plenty of political and economic stumbling blocks.
- First, will Germany ever want to buy Russian gas again?
- Second, what would the U.S. attitude be toward an increase in supplies of Russian gas to Europe?
- Third, will Ukraine acquiesce to a project that will see large amounts of gas being shipped from Russia to Europe? Theoretically, Europe’s appetite for Russian gas needs could be met by a fully
- Fourth and finally, would Moscow agree to pump gas through a pipeline that was controlled and managed by a U.S. investor?
In the final analysis, Nord Stream 2—the only U.S.-Russian business project that looks like a viable prospect after the fighting in Ukraine ends—raises more questions than answers. Kyiv would undoubtedly lose out. But there are at least as many cons as there are pros for all the possible participants.

“Could a Global Trade War Destabilize Russia’s Finances?” Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 04.11.25.

A combination of Trump’s tariffs, fears of a global economic slowdown, and an unexpected reversal in the pricing policy of cartel OPEC+ have led to an oil price plunge. The price of a barrel of Brent crude fell from $75 on April 1 to $59 on Wednesday, its lowest level for four years. On Friday, the United States Department for Energy lowered its forecast for the average price of Brent in 2025 from $74.20 to $67.87. Of course, the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions mean Russian oil typically sells for about $10 cheaper than Brent.¹⁴
Russia’s economic managers were not caught off guard by the development. In fact, the Central Bank last year floated the possibility of a fall in oil prices and greater fragmentation of the global economy. This scenario, outlined in the Bank of Russia's Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in Autumn 2024, involved increased deglobalization amid deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China and a fall in oil prices to $50 a barrel or less. The resulting global economic crisis, the bank said, could be similar in scale to 2008 (when global GDP fell by 1.3%). In such a scenario, the Russian government would be forced to burn through even more reserves from the National Welfare Fund (NWF). “At this rate of spending there is a risk of exhausting the NWF’s liquid assets as early as 2025,” the Central Bank cautioned.
Meanwhile, a trade war significantly increases the risk of U.S. dollar inflation, and therefore of higher U.S. interest rates. Combined with reduced revenue from oil-and-gas exports, this could make it harder for the Central Bank to reduce interest rates in Russia: in simple terms, high borrowing costs would likely be here to stay. That means it would be more expensive for the Finance Ministry to cover the budget deficit, which could further slow economic growth. This year’s growth rate is already expected to be half that of 2024.
Right now, it is hard to predict what damage Russia might sustain from a trade war since there are so many uncertainties. That level of uncertainty is reflected in highly volatile markets and oil prices. But it’s important to remember that today’s oil price is less important to the Russian economy than where the oil price settles after the current turbulence. If prices do end up moving as suggested by the Central Bank in its forecast last year, then Russia’s budget will exhaust its reserves this year—making reductions to government spending inevitable. But, if average annual oil prices hover around $60 a barrel, then Russia should be able to survive relatively unscathed. In any case, the 2026 budget is awaiting spending consolidation.

Climate change:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“Can U.S. New Tariffs Trigger Structural Changes in Global Economy?” Andrey Kortunov, RIAC/CTGN, 04.07.25.Clues from Russian Views:

The Trump administration's recent announcement of "reciprocal tariffs" has made almost all countries victims of its protectionism. As Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, said, the sweeping new tariffs plunged the global trade system into a highly challenging situation. Although the tariffs have had a negative influence on Russia, it has not been directly affected by them. The reason for this is that numerous U.S. anti-Russia economic sanctions introduced since 2014 have already reduced bilateral trade to almost nothing.
There are reasons for strategists in Moscow to be concerned about more remote implications of the recent U.S. tariff decisions. The precise impact of these decisions on the global economy is still hard to predict; but in the worst-case scenario, we could record a rise of global inflation, a significant slowdown in economic growth worldwide and even a new global recession followed by higher unemployment and a decline in real incomes across the world.
The new U.S. tariffs raise another, a more fundamental question. If a decision by one man can undermine economic stability in the whole world in such a profound way, and practically all economies of this world depend on just one sole country with highly volatile and even unpredictable trade policies, it means that there is something seriously wrong with how the modern world economic order is functioning. What kind of order is it, if it is so easy to disrupt?
Can the world overcome this asymmetrical dependence overnight? Of course, it cannot. However, as Medvedev pointed out, "old trade chains will be broken, but new ones will emerge." There are many ways to gradually mitigate the asymmetrical dependence—expanding multilateral trade within such groups as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, introducing new international payment systems, enhancing the role of the World Trade Organization, promoting regional integration projects and so on.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Does Trump have red lines with Russia? The question has experts stumped,” Chris York and Andrea Januta, Kyiv Independent, 04.08.25.

We asked three experts if Trump actually has a red line with Russia and what they think it would take for him to finally take action against the Kremlin.
- Ivo Daalder: I am not sure President Trump has a red line when it comes to Russian actions… [H]e and his administration have taken positions that clearly favor Russia and disfavor Ukraine… Rather than drawing a clear red line, Trump is more likely to tire from the conflict and move on to other matters even while the war continues.
- Mariana Budjeryn: [U]npredictability seems to be the name of the game with the current administration. The Trump administration's initial ambition was to impose a ceasefire and/or negotiate the end of war settlement quickly. It is proving harder than anticipated as Russia clearly does not intend to abandon its maximalist goals. What is happening here is not exactly Russia crossing Trump's red lines but rather upsetting Trump's plans for quick war termination. How he will react remains to be seen.
- Jenny Mathers: I don't think you will find that red line—if it exists at all—in continuing brutality against Ukraine, including violating the ceasefire terms, attacking civilian targets, and killing children. These things just don't register with Trump as Putin's crimes since he seems to blame Ukraine for not giving in to Putin and giving him what he wants. It would be a different story, though, if Putin does something that makes Trump look foolish, publicly humiliates Trump in some way, or perhaps makes the U.S. look foolish. Otherwise, Trump is likely to accept any kind of behavior from Putin without retaliation.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Somewhere Between Mauritania and Portugal: Possible Trajectories of the Putin Regime Through the Lens of Comparative Data,” Daniel Treisman, Re:Russia, 04.09.25.

The scenarios for a 'post-Putin' Russia will depend on the context in which the transfer of power occurs. The variety of factors that influence this process makes prediction especially difficult. However, these observations at least suggest that the personalist nature of the current regime should not necessarily provoke the degree of pessimism that may arise from a superficial reading of the data. Other careful analysts agree, noting that Russia has an atypical profile for a personalist dictatorship. For example, Timothy Frye observes: 'To be sure, no two personalist autocracies are alike. Russia is better educated and wealthier, and has a larger footprint in global politics than most personalist autocracies.'
This raises questions about the usefulness of comparing Russia to the average personalistic dictatorship… Within the class of wealthy personalist dictatorships, two types can be identified. Two examples of personalist dictators whose countries had income levels comparable to Putin’s Russia are Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan—in both cases, the source of wealth is oil. Other examples include the postwar dictators of the Iberian Peninsula: Franco, Arias Navarro, and—during the year preceding the return to democracy—Adolfo Suárez in Spain, as well as Caetano and Costa Gomes in Portugal, whose regimes reached per capita income levels of about $11,000 to $15,000.
A question for those inclined to speculate is the following: what does contemporary Russian society more closely resemble—Gaddafi’s Libya or the Iberian Peninsula in the final years of its dictatorships in the early 1970s?
- Russia, like Libya, possesses vast hydrocarbon reserves—although its per capita oil revenues are significantly lower. Still, optimists may see greater similarities with the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. Despite the fascist regimes’ efforts to reshape society, destroy leftist parties, and impose reactionary ideological frameworks—remember, for example, Franco’s delusional declarations about the threat of global Freemasonry!—both Iberian dictatorships eventually collapsed. Demands for greater freedom, coming both from within the elites and from external influences, proved to be a powerful force, along with the appeal of returning to an open world. After the country took important steps in this direction, exiles returned from abroad to help rebuild civil society, which had been devastated by decades of repression. Although the nature of Putin’s regime and its current trajectory may seem to render that outcome unlikely, comparative data suggests that we should not rule such a development out.

“Vladimir Putin’s War Chest Under Threat as Oil Prices Slide,” Anastasia Stognei, FT, 04.12.25.

Moscow’s budget—about a third of which comes from oil and gas—may be as much as 2.5 per cent lower than expected in 2025 if crude prices stay at current levels. That would force the Kremlin to increase borrowing, cut nonmilitary spending or draw down its remaining reserves.
The average price of Urals crude, Russia’s main export grade, has fallen to the lowest in almost two years, after the U.S. president’s tariff announcements and an unexpected move by the OPEC+ coalition to boost output. Urals was trading at about $50 a barrel as of Thursday, according to price reporting agency Argus. Russia planned its budget for 2025 based on Urals at $69.70 a barrel.¹⁵
If oil prices hold near current levels, Russia could lose about a trillion rubles this year, the equivalent to 2.5% of its expected budget revenues, according to chief economist at Moscow-based T-Investments Sofya Donets. That would mean GDP growth falling by 0.5 percentage points, she said.
In a rare acknowledgment of economic uncertainty, Russian officials have voiced concerns over the drop in oil prices. “This indicator is very important for us in terms of budget revenues… The situation is extremely volatile, tense and emotionally charged,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters earlier this week.
Russia’s central bank chief Elvira Nabiullina warned on Tuesday, on the eve of Trump’s 90-day pause announcement, that “if trade wars continue, they usually lead to a global economic slowdown and possibly lower demand for our energy exports”.
Russia’s economy is already running at full capacity, with growth—fueled largely by war-related government spending—expected to slow. Official forecasts suggest an expansion of 1-2.5%t in 2025, down from about 4% over the past two years.
Since 2020, the liquid portion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund—known as the national welfare fund—has fallen by two-thirds. If it is used to cover a widening budget deficit, it might not last far beyond the end of the year, according to Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute.
If the oil price stabilizes at a very low level, Russia will probably have to tax export companies more to offset some of the revenue decline, according to Oleg Kuzmin, chief economist at Renaissance Capital… Moscow could also try to raise more debt on international markets
Hilgenstock expected serious constraints for the Russian economy but not a sudden collapse. “It is all not great for the budget, but not catastrophic,” he said.

“Down But Not Out: The Russian Economy Under Western Sanctions,” Nicholas Fenton and Alexander Kolyandr, CSIS, 04.11.25.¹⁶

It would be a gross understatement to say that the Russian economy of today faces long-term challenges. With its access to key technologies and components either restricted or constrained by inflated prices connected to the costs of importing under sanctions, Russian companies in many cases lack the materials needed to build the competitive industries of the future. Additionally, with the Russian economy essentially cut off from the U.S.-dominated international financial system, Russia’s capacity to raise capital on international markets remains curtailed. However, at least in the short to medium term, in many ways the Russian economy has weathered the storm dramatically better than expected.
- Growth rates remain impressive, and while inflation remains a serious concern, the technocrats running the Russian central bank and ministry of finance have remained determined enough in their efforts to keep the problem controllable, at least for now.
- Continued Russian profits from hydrocarbon exports allowed the Russian state to postpone and limit the kinds of spending trade-offs the sanctions regime was designed to cause.
- Furthermore, the Kremlin has effectively used the context of economic war to write a new domestic social contract for Russia’s political economy—one that economically strengthens the regime’s internal allies and weakens its opponents.
- Due to Russia’s labor shortages, workers find themselves in a uniquely advantageous position, leading to the real wage growth described above. Russia’s working classes are now an interest group directly benefiting from the war’s continuation.
- A parallel process of enrichment has played out within the upper echelons of Russian society.
- Just like with Russia’s lower classes, the Kremlin has used the dramatic changes forced on the Russian economy by the war and sanctions to strengthen its power base within the Russian elite—by rewarding loyalty and seizing assets from anti-war business leaders driven from the country by their refusal to kowtow politically. One prominent example is the case of Oleg Tinkov, former owner of Tinkoff Bank, who claims he only received 3% of the market value of his bank shares after he was forced to sell off his assets after speaking out against the full-scale invasion. With sanctions limiting the opportunities for Russian wealth to move abroad, the Kremlin has functionally achieved a long-held goal dating back to the 1990s—the reshoring of Russian oligarchic wealth. Combined with an effective purge of Russian society’s system-liberals, the war has provided the Putin regime with the opportunity to build a new class of stakeholders invested in the system’s durability and success.
- Since the start of the war, Russia has witnessed the most significant redistribution of property since the massive privatization of the 1990s. While many of the assets involved belonged to foreign companies leaving Russia, this redistribution was not limited to those assets alone.
  - According to research by a Russian law firm, NSP, at least 85 companies have been nationalized by the courts since 2022. In many cases, it took the courts just a day to decide in favor of nationalization. ‘
In sum, all of these domestic economic changes have institutionalized an outright rejection of the path to Westernization offered by a development model rooted in the new consensus that emerged in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This rejection of economic collaboration with the West is coupled with a symmetrical economic pivot to the East—to trade with China, often denominated in renminbi—proving a critical lifeline to Russia’s war effort, and broader macroeconomy. Today, we see the formulation of an alternative political economy of Putinism that empowers certain sections of society, and certain segments of the ruling elite, over others, and generates a new narrative of legitimacy for the Putin regime.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

Defense and aerospace:

“Three Years Into the Ukraine War, Russia’s Army Is Stronger Than Ever,” Stavros Atlamazoglou, NI, 04.09.25.

What is the condition of the Russian military today after over 1,000 days of fighting? Surprisingly to many—and unfortunately for Kyiv—the Russian military is reconstituting fast.
The Kremlin has ordered an expansion of the Russian military with a goal of reaching an active force of 1.5 million. To achieve that goal, the Russian military is currently recruiting approximately 30,000 men each month. However, that number is not enough to sustain both an expansion and the fighting in Ukraine. Last year, the Russian forces lost over 400,000 men in the fighting. But they managed to replace losses on an almost one-to-one ratio. Cavoli’s statement about 30,000 new recruits every month most likely indicates that the Russian military is just replacing losses for now, rather than expanding at the same time.
The Russian military reconstitution efforts are not just limited to manpower. The Kremlin is dedicating money and resources to replace losses in weapon systems

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

“Russia Retains Its Ground in Bangladesh,” Aleksei Zakharov, Observer Research Foundation, 04.11.25.

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Rewarding Russian Aggression Would Send Shockwaves Across Eurasia,” Zaur Shiriyev, Carnegie Politika, 04.11.25.Clues from Russian Views:

The risk is that once done with Ukraine, Russia will turn its attention back to its neighbors—exerting pressure or offering economic incentives to pull them back into its orbit—even as its ability to reclaim true hegemony has likely passed. At the same time, many in the region quietly fear the West will return to business as usual with Moscow, possibly as a consequence of a U.S.-led push to end the war in Ukraine. This could stall the emergence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia as viable alternatives to the Russian-dominated transit routes that were prevalent before the full-scale invasion.
This is why any Ukraine settlement will be closely watched across the former Soviet space. A deal that cements Russia’s territorial gains would not end the war—it would merely redraw lines on a map, most likely temporarily. And an emboldened Russia will not be content with limited gains. Its ambitions go beyond Ukraine’s borders. A deal imposed on Ukraine would mean that borders remain open to revision, show that power overrides principle, and give legitimacy to the idea of a Russian sphere of influence. Such an outcome must be avoided at all costs. Negotiators should work toward a settlement that Russia can live with, but not one that rewards aggression, or grants Moscow the influence it seeks to reclaim.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

“With a Peace Deal at Hand, Armenians Demand Justice for Loved Ones Lost in War With Azerbaijan," Sona Hovsepyan, MT, 04.11.25.

Footnotes

As a candidate in 2024, Trump claimed that he would have the Russia-Ukraine war solved within 24 hours—and even before he even took office. Then his special envoy for Ukraine said after Trump’s taking of office that he was given a deadline to end the war in 100 days of his presidency, which would be April 30, 2025. Also, April 20^th, which is Easter for Christians, has been floated by the U.S. side as the deadline for a full ceasefire. Then on March 30 Trump said that there is a "psychological deadline" for Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine, without naming a specific date. And on April 4 Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio said The United States will know in a matter of weeks if Russia is serious about peace.”
Estimates cited in Russia-Ukraine War Report Card indicate that, in contrast to Trump’s claim, there were between 600,000 and 1,000,000 Russian servicemen killed and wounded in the war, while Ukraine lost anywhere between 400,000 and 700,000 killed and wounded. In addition, at least 12,654 Ukrainian civilians and 652 Russian civilians were killed.
There is no evidence that any active-duty Ukrainian military personnel were killed in the strike on Sumy, according to FT. However, an Ukrainian MP and a city mayor in the Sumy region alleged that a local Ukrainian military ceremony had been arranged for Sunday morning, according to this newspaper.
Russia’s net territorial control in Ukraine changed from 43,588 square miles in January to 43,770 square miles in March (an increase of 183 square miles), but it then changed from 43,770 square miles in February to 43,869 square miles in March (an increase of only 99 square miles) according to RM’s April 9 Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.
Recent estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and wounded:
400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
43,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed and 370,000 wounded, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
According to FT, 119 were injured.
There seems to be some confusion regarding whether Syrskyi admitted a Russian offensive toward Kharkiv and Sumy has already been launched by Russian armed forces. Speaking on April 9, the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Andriy Kovalenko, said: “The Russians have indeed been active in the direction of Sumy and Kharkiv regions for quite some time now. But it is definitely impossible to talk about an offensive on Sumy and Kharkiv. These are completely different things,” NV.ua reported.
Republished with permission. Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025
Ukraine's poor defenses against ballistic missiles visualized by our colleague Quinn Urich for an April 2 issue of RM’s “The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card” on the basis of data supplied by CSIS.
Trump's special envoy, Keith Kellogg, stated that Ukraine could be divided like Berlin. However, he clarified that this referred to a post-war zone of responsibility for allied forces, not the division of the country, according to a post by Kellogg on the social media platform X. (RBC, 04.12.25)
Also see “No quick end to Russia-Ukraine war, analysts say,” Christina Pazzanese, Harvard Crimson, 04.11.25.
In a surprise appearance with MI-6 chief Sir Richard Moore on Sept. 7, 2024, William Burns famously confirmed earlier reports that in the Fall of 2022, as Ukrainian forces appeared poised for a major breakthrough, possibly resulting in Ukraine regaining sovereign control of its easternmost oblasts and Crimea, the CIA advised President Joe Biden that the chance of Putin authorizing the use of nuclear weapons had risen to 50-50. So, if Hill is correct, a U.S. strategy of “keeping Ukraine from losing” traded short term costs (especially to Ukraine) for two significant long-term gains: (1) economic sanctions would have more time to reach full effect; and (2) the Baltics and Poland would benefit from a seriously strained and over-committed Russian military.
Chinese military officers have, however, been in the theater behind Russia's lines with Beijing's approval to draw tactical lessons from the war, the former official told Reuters.
As of April 14, 2025, price for Russia’s Urals crude was $ 67.61 a barrel.
As of April 14, 2025, price for Russia’s Urals crude was $ 67.61 a barrel.
For Russia Matters’ take on economic and other costs and benefits of that invasion for Russia see "3 Years Later: What Russia’s Aggression in Ukraine Has Cost It and What It’s Gained," Simon Saradzhyan, Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Angelina Flood, Russia Matters, 02.24.25.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated

Slider photo: AP Photo/Volodymyr Hordiienko.

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Russia Analytical Report, April 8–14, 2025

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I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

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Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

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Military aid to Ukraine:

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II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Defense and aerospace:

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

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