Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

April 1 update: Russian gained 99 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about 1 Nantucket island) in the past month, and overall picked up the pace of its advance. Last week’s gain of 47 square miles is a threefold increase over the previous week’s gains. A NYT investigation revealed how U.S. assistance helped Ukraine quickly turn the tide against the Russian invasion, prompting Russian top brass to discuss nuclear use. 

Who’s Gaining and Who’s Losing What?

Territorial Control (figures as of April 1, 2025)

For a higher-resolution image, click here (full screen button in top right).

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory. 

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +27,244 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of New York state).¹
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +43,869 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)
• In past month (March 4–April 1, 2025): Russia gained 99 square miles.²
• In past week: Russia gained 47 square miles—three times the previous week’s rate—the equivalent of 2 Manhattan islands.
  • This week Ukraine again continued its fighting withdrawal from Kursk, giving up control of an additional 3 square miles of territory there.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–March 2025. (Also based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

Military casualties  

Russia: More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate.³ 48,000 missing.

• Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate.⁴ 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

• Russia:  652 killed.⁵
• Ukraine:  12,654 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment⁶

• Russia: 20,982 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 12,231.
  • Aircraft: 305.
  • Naval vessels: 22.⁷
• Ukraine: 8,402 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 4,252.
  • Aircraft: 183.
  • Naval vessels: 35.⁸

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions ⁹

In March 2025

• Russia launched
  • 4,019 drones
  • 24 ballistic missiles
  • 54 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 2,381 drones
  • 1 ballistic missile
  • 35 cruise missiles 

Since September 2022

• Russia launched
  • 26,505 drones
  • 386 ballistic missiles
  • 3,419 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 18,063 drones
  • 61 ballistic missiles
  • 2,380 cruise missiles

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • 112,000 were displaced in Russia’s Kursk region during Ukraine’s incursion in August 2024-March 2025.
• Ukraine: 10.2 million displaced Ukrainians, 23% of Ukrainian pre-invasion population of 44 million.
  • Internally displaced: 3.7 million.
  • International refugees: 6.5 million.

Economic impact¹⁰

• Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 1.6% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7%  of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01184 U.S. dollars.  Approximately the same rate as on invasion day.
  • 3-year bond yield: 15.97%.
• Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 2.5% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia:  0.02415 U.S. dollars. -26% since invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 23.96%

Infrastructure

• Russia:  
  • A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2024 that Ukrainian strikes had rendered facilities which accounted for 1/6^th of the production of gasoline and diesel fuels in Russia non-operational.
  • A journalistic investigation estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector have caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
• Ukraine:  
  • Ukraine's extensive transmission infrastructure has suffered severe damage in the war, with capacity falling from 25 GW to an estimated 9 GW by the end of 2024.
  • Some 64%, or 16 out of Ukraine’s 25 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied as of 2024.
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Ukraine relied for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls, as of 2024.

Popular support

• Russia: 58% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 51% support peace negotiations.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Footnotes

1. According to Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group’s map, as of April 1, 2025, Russian forces occupied 112,482 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (43,430 square miles), which constituted 18.6% of Ukrainian territory.
2. In the past 30 days, Russian forces made a gain of 212 square kilometers (82 square miles), according to a April 1, 2025 estimate by the Economist.
3. According to Donald Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 1 million Russian soldiers have been killed.
4. According to Trump’s January 2025 estimate, 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed.
5. This estimate was given by Russia’s Investigative Committee in March 2025.
6. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.
7. Not being updated as of 2025.
8. Not being updated as of 2025.
9. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack  and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
10. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01.

*This card is being produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project researcher Quinn Urich.