Two weeks after the closely-watched bilateral talks between Russian and American delegations in Riyadh, Fiona Hill, former Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on the National Security Council and member of Harvard University's Board of Overseers, joined experienced journalist Lucian Kim for an illuminating conversation with exiled editor-in-chief of the New Times Yevgenia Albats. Their discussion at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, titled "Unfair Triangle," confronted the reality that in negotiations intended to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has no incentive to seek a lasting peace. The title itself alludes to the unfair and asymmetrical nature of the evolving diplomatic dynamic in which talks are largely shaped by U.S.–Russia power politics, while Ukraine—whose fate hangs in the balance—is often sidelined.

Hill detailed the likely consequences of the Trump administration’s views of Putin’s long-term goals and American disengagement, while emphasizing Ukraine's military successes and diplomatic fortitude, which she sees as underrepresented in American media. She outlined the broader implications of U.S. withdrawal from the conflict, not only for European security architecture, but also for what U.S. analysts Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor have termed the "Axis of Upheaval”: Russia, Iran, North Korea and China. Hill dissected Putin's negotiating posture and the calculated tactics the Kremlin employed in its communications with the Trump administration. Both Hill and Kim advocated for stronger European defense collaboration through NATO frameworks, suggesting that the vision of a unified European military force, once dismissed as unrealistic, now appears increasingly viable and necessary.

In discussing the recent New York Times article detailing the extent of U.S. involvement in supporting Ukraine at the onset of the full-scale invasion, both Hill and Kim emphasized that, while the U.S. has provided significant aid, its strategy was never aimed at securing a Ukrainian victory. Instead, the goal has been to offer just enough support for Ukraine to defend itself. Hill attributes this restrained approach to a hierarchy of U.S. strategic priorities, with managing the Russian threat taking precedence.¹

Though U.S. support for Ukraine may have seemed too little and too late from Ukraine’s perspective, the actual scale of U.S. involvement in the conflict underscores why Washington is ill-suited to act as a neutral mediator—under the Biden administration, after all, the U.S. was a deeply invested party. As Hill noted, drawing a parallel to Teddy Roosevelt’s mediation during the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, it is therefore inappropriate. Unlike then, the U.S. today is not a detached actor, but one with clear stakes in the outcome. Beyond its limited impartiality, the current U.S. administration faces another significant challenge in its negotiations with Russia: a lack of experienced diplomats and regional experts on its side. This was evident during the 12-hour U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24, which Albats and Hill saw as exposing a level of asymmetry—the Russian delegation was composed of seasoned diplomats and carefully selected representatives, while the American team lacked comparable regional expertise. While commenting on the negotiations at large Hill also noted that the Kremlin’s appointment of figures like Kirill Dmitriev, a former Goldman Sachs executive skilled in client relations, reveals a strategic advantage for Moscow. Dmitriev, she emphasized, knows precisely how to engage personalities like Steve Witkoff—an American billionaire and real estate investor currently serving as U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East—and Donald Trump, tailoring his approach to resonate with their sensibilities, explaining his choice for Washington talks in April. 

According to Hill, the inclusion of business-oriented figures on the Russian negotiating team, such as Dmitriev who visited the U.S. last week for more talks, reflects Vladimir Putin’s broader objective: to achieve a favorable rapprochement with the U.S. while deferring substantive negotiations on the war itself. Kim described this strategy as a “decoupling” of U.S.-Russia relations from the conflict in Ukraine—a normalization of ties that the Kremlin actively seeks. To this end, Hill observed the Russian side has increasingly employed rhetoric focused on economic loss for the American public. This messaging is deliberately tailored to appeal to figures like Trump, who, as Hill points out, is drawn to the idea of making a deal and "getting back what’s yours." The emphasis on lost business opportunities also echoes in Witkoff’s interviews with Fox News, reinforcing this narrative. Hill added that Elon Musk’s role in this dynamic should not be underestimated; in the realm of science and technology, particularly space and nuclear energy, Russia continues to hold a certain allure. These sectors, historically areas of cooperation between the former Cold War rivals since 1991, remain symbolic touchpoints that Russia leverages strategically.

Hill, Kim and Albats were unanimous in their assessment that genuine negotiations are not currently sought by Putin or the broader Russian leadership. From their perspective, time and resources remain on Russia’s side, even in the face of economic challenges such as declining oil prices. Hill underscored the significance of perception in Putin’s strategic calculus: He views himself as holding greater power than Ukraine, a belief reinforced by the White House’s own rhetoric, which often emphasizes Ukraine’s weakness and “lack of cards.” In response, Hill called for greater Western public recognition of Ukrainian victories on the front lines, arguing that such acknowledgment is crucial to countering the perception of imbalance and boosting both morale and international support. To underscore Russia’s unwillingness to pursue peace, Albats cited a recent statement by Putin regarding Ukraine: “Only recently, I said that we would squeeze them into a corner, but now we have reason to believe that we are set to finish them off.”

Hill emphasized that it is increasingly apparent the U.S. may be moving toward disengagement from European security and, even if that does not fully materialize, the idea has already taken root. She noted that Europeans now do grasp the existential nature of the conflict, recognizing that, like Ukraine, their own security is at stake. She cited that 40% of the U.K.’s gas supply that comes through underwater pipelines that are vulnerable to Russian targeting. 

However, the implications of a potential U.S. withdrawal extend beyond Europe. According to Hill, countries like Iran and North Korea have long justified their positions by framing the war as a proxy conflict with the United States. With the prospect of American disengagement, their strategic calculus may shift. Hill suggested that China's public reaction to the capture of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces will serve as a key indicator of how Beijing may adapt its stance in this evolving geopolitical setting.

Hill expressed cautious optimism about the future of European security, urging a shift away from envisioning a European army solely within the framework of the EU. Instead, she emphasized that the most likely structure will emerge through bilateral and regional cooperation within existing NATO frameworks. In her view, a European army already exists in practice—the real challenge lies in how it is configured and coordinated. The key question facing such a security alliance, she noted, is the nature of its operational focus: should it prioritize support for Ukraine on the ground, or concentrate on self-defense within European borders?

Hill warned against rhetoric like Witkoff’s, which entertains the idea of recognizing territorial concessions to Russia, especially in light of the “referenda” held in the occupied regions. She emphasized that any de jure recognition of these territories could have serious long-term consequences. Even in the future, the hypothetical problem of reintegrating these areas into Ukraine would pose significant challenges. Hill pointed to the example of East Germany, which had been a separate state, noting that reintegration was difficult even under those circumstances—whereas the annexed Ukrainian territories have already been formally incorporated into the Russian constitution. Furthermore, Hill cautioned that Russian meddling in Ukrainian domestic politics after the war, like what occurred in Georgia, is a highly probable scenario. As the unifying force of a common enemy fades, Ukraine is likely to face internal divisions. Hill stressed the importance of guarding against the dilution of Ukrainian identity and language once domestic political debates resume.

Hill noted that Trump’s ambition to acquire Greenland is being actively encouraged by Putin, who envisions a return to a Yalta-style gathering of great powers dividing spheres of influence. Kim linked this to the rare earth minerals deal in Ukraine, initially proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, while President Biden was still in office, but crafted with an eye toward its potential appeal to Trump. Aimed initially at securing continued U.S. security and intelligence support, the proposal has since expanded into a broader strategic package that includes energy, ports, and gas infrastructure, much of it managed through a U.S.-backed investment fund. Hill warned that these developments signal a dangerous drift back toward a 19th-century model of imperialism, where international order is shaped by land grabs and resource competition rather than rules-based cooperation.

Footnotes

1. In a surprise appearance with MI-6 chief Sir Richard Moore on Sept. 7, 2024, William Burns famously confirmed earlier reports that in the Fall of 2022, as Ukrainian forces appeared poised for a major breakthrough, possibly resulting in Ukraine regaining sovereign control of its easternmost oblasts and Crimea, the CIA advised President Joe Biden that the chance of Putin authorizing the use of nuclear weapons had risen to 50-50. So, if Hill is correct, a U.S. strategy of “keeping Ukraine from losing” traded short term costs (especially to Ukraine) for two significant long-term gains: (1) economic sanctions would have more time to reach full effect; and (2) the Baltics and Poland would benefit from a seriously strained and over-committed Russian military.

Dasha Zhukauskaite is a graduate student associate with Russia Matters.

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and the individuals quoted. Photo by Evelyn Hockstein/Pool Photo via AP, File.