Source of the claim: WP columnist Lee Hockstader in The Washington Post (June 20, 2025)

Claim 1: (June 20, 2025): Russian casualties have averaged at least 1,200 a day in the past year.

Claim 2: (June 20, 2025): Russian territorial gains have not exceeded the area in square miles of the U.S. state of Rhode Island (1,545 square miles) in the past year.

Research period = June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025 (12 months, 364 days).

Claim 1: Average Russian Casualties per Day, June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025¹

Casualties-per-day from UK MOD Intelligence Update (06.12.25):

“Russia has likely sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 so far, with Ukrainian General Staff reporting a daily average of over 1,250 Russian casualties. Russia's permanent combat losses (killed, missing and irrevocably wounded) are likely currently between 400,000 and 500,000 personnel.”

Casualties-per-day from UK MOD Intelligence Update (07.11.25):

Table 1 features the data from this UK MOD Defense Intelligence Update, and fills in the missing data to give us a complete year of estimates. NB: In four of the 12 months of the research period (June, July and August 2024, and May 2025), the daily totals fall below 1,200 Russian casualties. But the average daily Russian casualties for the year based on these same data comes to 1,306, according to our analysis of UK MoD’s estimates.

Table 1

Casualties-per-day from Ukraine’s MOD:

06.01.24 = 508,780

05.31.25 = 987,330

Number of days between 06.01.24 and 05.31.25 = 364

Average daily casualties = 1,315 Russian casualties per day (on average).² So for that estimate, which may be biased in Ukraine’s favor, the claim is supported.

Casualties-per-day estimates based on CSIS & The Guardian data 

During the research period there were 364 days, and the best estimate based on CSIS and The Guardian average out to 500,000 casualties during that period. Crudely then, dividing 500,000 by 364 gives a total of 1,374 casualties per day. This remains close to estimates from all other OSINT sources RM could find.

Bottom line, claim 1: A number of credible OSINT sources that report average Russian casualties per unit of time support the claim that Russia has lost ≥ 1,200 casualties per day. RM was unable to locate Russian casualty data for the period in question that wasn’t ultimately reliant on DeepState, UK MOD, or Ukraine MOD. NB: All casualty statistics we have are likely to be biased to some extent; though all experts agree that regardless of source, the numbers reported likely underestimate the actual figures for both sides.

Claim 2: Net Territory Gained by Russia, June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025 (square miles)

From DeepState, June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025:

According to DS, between June 1, 2024 (109,157.848 square kilometers) and May 31, 2025 (113,105.899 square kilometers), Russia has gained a total of 3,948 square kilometers or 1,524 square miles. Rhode Island’s area is 1,545 square miles.

From ISW, June 1, 2024–May 31, 2025 (with data solicited from ISW):

According to ISW, on June 1, 2024, Russia controlled 108,920 square kilometers or 42,054 square miles of Ukrainian territory (including Crimea). In an email on July 15, 2025, ISW reports the total Russia controlled on May 31, 2025, as 113,455 square kilometers or 43,805 square miles. The difference for the 12 months from June 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025, would be 1,751 square miles; or 206 miles greater than the area of Rhode Island (1,545 square miles).

Bottom line, claim 2: analysis of data on territorial control reported by DeepState (1,524 square miles) and data provided by ISW (1,751 square miles) both show that during the research period, Russia gained control of a territory slightly less than (DS -21 square miles) or slightly greater than (ISW +206 square miles) the U.S. state of Rhode Island (1,545 square miles). So, Claim 2 is mostly supported.

Endnotes

1. A collaborative reporting project by Mediazona/BBC/Meduza (MBM) on Russian and Ukrainian casualties in the Russia-Ukraine War (February 2022–present) reports that Russian soldiers listed in obituaries as KIA are 136,286, but that importantly, this figure likely underestimates actual Russian KIA by anywhere from 54–122% (under the heading “What are the real figures of losses?” MBM reports a range of 209,670–302,860 KIA. If we use that range, at the low end we get losses under reported by 53.8%, and at the upper range, by 122.3%). Note that this number doesn’t include Russian casualties from the “Luhansk People’s Republic” or “Donetsk People’s Republic,” which MBM estimates to be anywhere from 21,000–23,500 additional Russian KIA. If we sum MBM’s listed Russian KIAs from Jan. 1–May 31, 2025, we get 31,880, according to MBM’s “Number of Published Obituaries in 2025 by Month” chart. If we use an 88% KIA under reporting estimate given in MBM’s report (the mid-range of the estimated under reporting), the actual KIA figure would be closer to 59,934, or 397 Russian KIA per day, from Jan. 1–May 31, 2025. The problem is that KIA and “casualty” are not the same, so unless we know the ratio of casualties to KIA, we won’t have a good comparison. That said, the ubiquity of drones making it impossible to evacuate wounded soldiers (MBM) and endemically under-resourced Russian medical evacuation capacity (Center for European Policy Analysis), the ratio of casualties to KIA in Ukraine is close to 2:1. That would result in 794 casualties (wounded, missing) for every 397 killed per day, or a total of 1,191 Russian soldiers killed or seriously wounded every day during the research period. Between June 2024 and May 2025, the number of KIAs (число смертей) reported by the BBC/Mediazona article was 29,874. This would imply 2,489 dead per month, 622 per week and 89 per day. If we apply the 88% under-reporting estimate to this figure, we get a “real” projected KIA figure of 248,950 KIA per year, 20,745 per month, 5,186 per week and 740 per day. Add to this an estimated 2:1 casualty-KIA ratio, total casualties for June 2024-May 2025 based on BBC/Mediazona figures would be 746,850 per year, 62,237 per month, 15,559 per week and 2,222 per day. Due to the unusually high figure at the “mid-range” estimate of 88% under-reporting, it is possible that the true under-reporting figure is below 88%.
2. The broader argument that the ratio of Russian casualties (the highest per unit of time since WWII) to Russian advances in Ukraine in a year (1,753 square miles per ISW figures) stands as a measure of “Putin’s callousness” may be correct, but ignores the long history from Tsarist times to the present of Russian callousness when it comes to manpower losses in war. Historically, Russia’s military advantages traditionally revolved around three key factors: (1) an overwhelming supply of young males relative to adversaries; (2) a huge amount of territory between enemy frontiers and Russia’s capital; and (3) ‘General Winter.’ Note that two of these three matter only when Russia is being invaded and is on the defensive. In sum, in historical terms there’s nothing uniquely callous about Putin’s willingness to sacrifice Russia’s young men and women to achieve the Kremlin’s political objectives.