2 Ideas to Explore

1. “Russia is close to achieving a decisive edge on the energy front of the Russo–Ukrainian war,” argues Theresa Sabonis-Helf of Georgetown University. According to Sabonis-Helf’s estimates in War on the Rocks, Russian attacks have damaged Ukraine’s electrical grid so much that it has become 70% reliant on three complexes of nuclear reactors. “These reactors are increasingly threatened by the instability of the grid itself and could become unsafe to operate, forcing a shutdown and grid collapse,” she warns. Moreover, with Ukraine having submitted to heightened oversight by IAEA, “the decision to shut down its nuclear plants if the perceived risk becomes too high may not be entirely its own,” this Georgetown University professor observes in her data-rich commentary. “We now find ourselves in a moment in which a slow war of attrition could come to an abrupt end, resolved by the triumph of cold and darkness,” she warns.
2. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka, which has been described as a “most important fortified area” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donetsk region, underscores the effectiveness of a tactic that Russian forces have been employing to take towns: using its personnel advantage to attack relentlessly, gradually trapping Ukrainian forces in a pincer movement and forcing them to retreat to avoid encirclement, according to NYT’s Constant Méheut. Russia’s seizure of this eastern Ukrainian town “followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses and their eventual retreat” with the battlefield dominated by drones, and armor playing a minimal role, according to the Economist’s article on this battle, entitled “Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling.” "It would not be accurate to claim that the Russians don’t know how to fight," Maj. Ivan Sekach of Ukraine’s 110th Brigade, acknowledged in an interview with NYT.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Will Iran and Russia’s Growing Partnership Go Nuclear?" Nicole Grajewski and Or Rabinowitz, FA, 01.28.25.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"The Electricity Front of Russia’s War Against Ukraine," Theresa Sabonis-Helf, War on the Rocks, 02.03.25.

• “Winter demand [for electricity in Ukraine] is 18 gigawatts, but Ukraine is currently able to generate only 12–13 gigawatts domestically. This leads to frequent outages. Ukrainian sources report that household electricity outages in 2024 totaled nearly 2,000 hours: In November, power was down 25 percent of the time, and in December that rose to nearly 40 percent. Ukraine can make up some of the deficit by importing electricity from neighboring E.U. countries. Under existing agreements, however, Ukraine cannot import enough to meet demand. Widespread residential blackouts are frequent across the country, even when power plants and the grid are not under immediate Russian attack.”
• “And supply seems constantly under threat: There have been over 1,000 attacks on Ukraine’s power grid since the start of the war, with Russia escalating its energy-focused attacks in 2024.  A new round of bombardments in August undermined the efforts of Ukrainian authorities to restore the power supply over the summer. By September, the grid was reportedly generating only one-third of its pre-February 2022 level. Due to the repeated bombings of thermal and hydropower plants, the majority of Ukraine’s remaining electricity generation now comes from nine nuclear power plants arranged in three complexes: Rivne (four reactors), South Ukraine (three reactors), and Khmelnitsky (two reactors). Russia has been reluctant to attack these facilities directly due to the risk of releasing radioactive contaminants into the surrounding environments.”
  • “Ukraine’s damaged electrical grid is 70 percent reliant on three complexes of nuclear reactors.”
• “Russia does not need to attack the three remaining nuclear power plant complexes to collapse Ukraine’s electricity supply. The national grid is connected by 103 substations, which used to integrate electricity from several sources (e.g., nuclear, coal, gas, and hydro) but now rely mostly on nuclear power. This lack of source diversity weakens the grid, increasing the chances of cascading failure.”
• “The substations are a vital part of the entire system. Without them, nuclear power plants can neither supply the grid nor retain the backup supply of power that is essential for reactor safety.”
• “Forcing a shutdown of a nuclear power plant by attacking the surrounding substations is straight out of the Russian playbook: In September 2022, Russia compelled  the closure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant using similar means.”
• “The prospect of using the [IAEA] agency as a tool to compel shutdown offers a potentially attractive option to the Kremlin.”
  • “Since Ukraine has submitted to heightened oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the decision to shut down its nuclear plants if the perceived risk becomes too high may not be entirely its own.”
• “International advisors and Ukrainian energy experts agree that the best measure Ukraine can take to avoid grid collapse is to concentrate air defense systems on protecting the key substations.”
• “Ukraine is 70 percent urban, with five major cities having over 900,000 residents each. Large urban areas such as these rapidly become ungovernable without electricity. ...A catastrophic outmigration would create a refugee crisis across Europe, especially in neighboring states.”
• “We now find ourselves in a moment in which a slow war of attrition could come to an abrupt end, resolved by the triumph of cold and darkness. Ukraine’s survival now turns not on megatons, but on megawatts.”
• “Protecting the grid’s key substations is now the single most important priority for the survival of the Ukrainian state. By targeting electricity, Russia has made the current phase of the war an urban battle between darkness and light — and there is a clear scenario whereby darkness could triumph.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "‘People had nowhere to go’: the innovators rebuilding Ukraine’s 2mn war-damaged homes," Francesca Perry, FT, 02.03.25.  

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling," The Economist, 01.27.25.¹

• “The final battle for the small Donbas town of Velyka Novosilka dragged on for six days, though the outcome was obvious long before that. Things became critical early in the new year, when Russian troops took over villages immediately to its north-east and west, pinching the Ukrainian defenders on three sides. By January 23rd the narrow corridor to what had become a nearly-isolated pocket had become impassable.”
• “Russia’s small victory in Velyka Novosilka (population just 5,000 before the war) followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses, and their eventual retreat. The immediate focus for the units that had been fighting there will now probably shift back to Pokrovsk to the north, a much-bigger logistical hub that Russia has been attacking at various intensities for the past six months.”
• “The Kremlin’s plan probably depends on where it can make quick progress. The minimum requirement of its “special military operation” appears still to be occupying the entirety of the Donbas region (comprising the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk), regaining control of Russia’s own Kursk region, which Ukraine has partly occupied, and holding on to the “land bridge” it seized in the early stages of the war connecting Crimea to Russia.”
• “The modern battlefield—dominated by drones that spy, stalk and strike—is rapidly changing the nature of the fighting. In Velyka Novosilka, for example, armored vehicles played a minimal role.”
• “Put simply, Russia has the infantry and Ukraine does not. Issues with mobilization and desertion have hit Ukraine’s reserves hard. “We struggle to replace our battlefield losses,” says Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, the commander of a Ukrainian tactical grouping in the Donbas. “They might throw a battalion’s worth of soldiers at a position we’ve manned with four or five soldiers.” The brigades that make up the Donbas front line are consistently understaffed, under pressure, and cracking. The front line keeps creeping back.”
• “As long as the front line keeps moving, Mr. Putin appears to have little reason to compromise. The Russians will not run out of weapons any time soon, says Mr. Cherniak, [Ukrainian] intelligence officer. “They have at least a year, possibly two, to continue fighting as they have been.”²
• “Three years into its grinding attritional fight, it is still unclear if Russia can turn its many tactical gains into something bigger—enough to press deeper behind Ukraine’s weakening lines and to cause real worry. Mr. Cherniak says the evidence so far suggests that this is unlikely.”

"Russia Seizes Another Ukrainian Town in Push to Take All of Donetsk," Constant Méheut, NYT, 01.29.25.

• “Although the gain of Velyka Novosilka by the Russian troops is modest compared with Russia’s recent seizure of nearby Ukrainian strongholds like Vuhledar and Kurakhove, it underscores the effectiveness of a tactic that Moscow has been employing to take one town after another in eastern Ukraine: using its overwhelming personnel advantage to attack relentlessly, gradually trapping Ukrainian forces in a pincer movement and forcing them to retreat to avoid encirclement.”
• “From a tactical perspective, their approach was correct — they understood their capabilities and advantages and used them effectively,” Maj. Ivan Sekach, a press officer for the Ukrainian military’s 110th Brigade, which has been defending the area, said in an interview. “It would not be accurate to claim that the Russians don’t know how to fight.” 

"‘Everybody is tired. The mood has changed’: the Ukrainian army’s desertion crisis," Luke Harding, The Guardian, 01.31.25. 

• “After three years of war, Ukraine is desperately short of soldiers, especially infantry. This has made it easier for Russia’s army to advance in the east."
• “The issue of desertion has made headlines in Ukraine. Last week the government launched an investigation into the 155th Mechanized Brigade. Fifty-six soldiers disappeared while training in France. Hundreds of others are said to be missing. The unit’s commander, Dmytro Riumshyn, was arrested. He faces 10 years in jail for failing to carry out his official duties and to report unauthorized absences.”
• "Olha Reshetylova, Ukraine’s commissioner for protecting service members’ rights, said she understood why some people went awol. 'Let’s be honest. The problem is big. It’s natural in a situation where you’ve had three years of major war.'"
• "Reshetylova said there were hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers staying in their positions and 'not going anywhere.' The recruitment crisis could be solved, she added, if Ukraine’s allies sent their own troops."

“Interview with Gen. Viktor Nazarov³ on Zaluzhnyi, Syrskyi and the Course of the War,” BBC News Ukraine, 02.02.25.^ 

• “BBC: At the start of the full-scale war ... did you believe a large-scale war was unlikely, as the authorities publicly stated? Or was the army actually preparing for an invasion?”
  • “Viktor Nazarov: In my assessment, at the beginning of 2022, the threat level was moderate. But within a month, it became much more tangible, rising to a "high" or "red" alert level.”
  • “From my perspective, the risk of war was significant. … [H]owever, for the AFU to be fully prepared to repel an invasion, several key conditions needed to be met:”
    • “Presidential Decision: The Supreme Commander-in-Chief (President) had to authorize the use of the AFU and other defense forces. Without this, the military could not legally act.”
    • “Martial Law: The legal framework had to be in place to allow the military to operate effectively. This includes restrictions on civilian freedoms and the formation of military-civil administrations.”
  • “However, at the time of the invasion, these decisions had not been made. There was no order to use the AFU, no mobilization decree and no martial law in effect.”
• “BBC: Some argue that the military leadership is responsible for the loss of Kherson, citing failures in fortifications and troop deployments. What is your take on this?”
  • “Viktor Nazarov: At the start of the war, Ukraine’s ground forces had only 24 brigades, half of which were already engaged in combat in the east. That left only 12 brigades to defend the rest of the country’s borders, which was insufficient. There was also no full-scale mobilization or transition to wartime structures, leaving the AFU unable to effectively repel the invasion.”
  • “AFU could not legally mine the Crimean Isthmus in peacetime—it would have required a formal state of war. In 2014, we faced similar legal obstacles when trying to fortify defenses in Odesa and Mykolaiv regions. At the time of the invasion, these measures had not been taken. Even if there were minefields, they would have been ineffective without properly positioned and reinforced troops to defend them.”
• “BBC: In the fall of 2022, Ukraine successfully liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and recaptured Kherson. What made these operations successful?”
  • “Viktor Nazarov: By late summer 2022, Ukraine had completed its first wave of mobilization, adding new brigades. Meanwhile, Russia had exhausted many of its initial invasion forces.”
  • “This combination—Ukraine’s increased capabilities and Russia’s weakened position—enabled these successful operations... Ukraine physically lacked the firepower to destroy Russian troops retreating across the [Dniper] river [from Kherson]. We only had around 15-18 HIMARS launchers with limited ammunition.”
• “BBC: In 2023, Ukraine’s counteroffensive stalled. Why did it fail?”
  • “Viktor Nazarov: The Russians had time to fortify their defenses, particularly the heavily mined “Surovikin Line.” The Ukrainian General Staff may not have had accurate intelligence on these fortifications. Additionally, Russian air superiority and increased use of drones further hindered Ukraine’s progress. ... In my view, we delayed the offensive too long. Ideally, it should have started in early 2023—or even late 2022—before Russia had time to reinforce its positions.”
• “BBC: Ukraine launched an operation in Kursk Oblast in 2024. Was it necessary?”
  • “Viktor Nazarov: Yes. The operation was well-executed, taking Russia by surprise and putting pressure on its logistics. Interestingly, a similar operation was proposed by Zaluzhnyi in late 2022—targeting Belgorod rather than Kursk. His plan aimed to neutralize Russian artillery shelling Kharkiv. However, the political leadership did not approve it.”
  • “Had Zaluzhnyi’s plan been implemented, it could have significantly altered the course of the war.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Counting up the costs if the US chooses to lose in Ukraine,” George F. Will, WP, 01.31.25. 

• “The United States is now at a crossroads in Ukraine, and the path it chooses will have profound consequences for global stability.”
• “A decision to abandon Ukraine would signal to the world that American commitments are unreliable.”
• “Russia’s Vladimir Putin would interpret such a retreat as an invitation to further aggression, not just in Ukraine but elsewhere.”
• “The costs of losing in Ukraine would far outweigh the costs of continuing to support Kyiv.”
• “American credibility, painstakingly built over decades, would be irreparably damaged.”
• “Allies in Europe and Asia would question the value of U.S. security guarantees, potentially leading to a destabilizing arms race.”
• “The lesson for adversaries would be clear: American resolve can be broken with enough persistence and pressure.”

"Biden Must Explain What the Ukraine War Was For," Ted Snider, The American Conservative, 01.28.25.

• “It is no longer easy to tell what the Ukraine War was for. Very early on, U.S. goals got grafted onto Ukrainian goals, and the hybrid braid became hard to disentangle.”
• “Zelensky will need to explain to his exhausted nation why choosing the path of war over the path of diplomacy after the Istanbul talks in March and April of 2022 was worth the cost.”
• “Ukraine no longer has the capacity to field the men nor the weapons to hold off the Russian advance. More land will be lost the longer the war goes on, and more men and weapons are not on their way.”
• “Zelensky will need to blame someone higher up than the field commanders. In recent weeks, he’s laid some of that blame on Biden, complaining of insufficient support.”
• “The Biden administration repeatedly promised Ukraine whatever they needed for as long as it takes. But that promise evolved into whatever we agree to for as long as convenient.”
• “If Biden was not prepared to give Ukraine whatever it needed to reclaim its territory, and if he was not prepared to offer Ukraine NATO membership, then what was American support for the war all about?”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "How Can Ukraine's Security Be Guaranteed?" Lawrence Freedman, Substack, 01.28.25.
• Podcast: "Assessing Ukraine’s Prospects in 2025," Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, War on the Rocks, 01.27.25.
• "Norway Should Cede Its War Windfall to Ukraine," Håvard Halland and Knut Anton Mork, Project Syndicate, 01.30.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Biden’s Final Sanctions on Russia Are a Strategic Disaster," Brandon J. Weicher, NI, 01.28.25.

• “We’ve reached the end of the time where sanctions actually do something other than galvanize the other side. Beyond that, there exists the real possibility that these sanctions could compel Vladimir Putin to go for broke and try to utterly defeat Ukraine, sans a negotiated settlement, because of how far the Americans have taken their support for Ukraine.”
• “These new sanctions by Biden might lock the Russian leadership into the most destructive course possible in Ukraine—which, again, may be the hope of President Biden and his team, so they can blame Trump for the failure.”
• “It’s a tragedy that the transition period in this country is not shorter. Because the longer President Biden remains in charge, the greater the chance for disaster there is.”

"Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ and Sanctions Evasion: What Is To Be Done?" Nick Childs, IISS, 01.31.25. 

• “The activities of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ have suddenly come under the global spotlight due to a growing focus on efforts to counter its role in evading sanctions and also amid growing suspicions of its involvement in an escalating Russian campaign of hybrid warfare against the West. Identifying options to clamp down further on shadow-fleet activities was the focus of an IISS workshop held in November 2024 in conjunction with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, which brought together UK officials, maritime industry representatives and a range of international academics.”
• “Those options  include whether and how to be more assertive and effective in the enforcement of acknowledged and accepted international requirements under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, there are potential options exploring ways in which existing legal requirements under UNCLOS could be interpreted more assertively and creatively to address evolving concerns over security, safety and environmental risks at sea. In the latter case, addressing shadow-fleet vessels’ inadequate insurance provision has been highlighted as an avenue to pursue. Debates over the greater use of naval assets and maritime power to pursue these approaches revolve around both the legal frameworks to do so – including the reinterpretation of how to apply the right of ‘innocent passage’ and the potential risks that could expose in terms of retaliation by other powers, escalation or increased fragmentation of international shipping norms – as well as states’ capacity to deploy them.”
• “A watershed moment may be approaching as the risk calculation of Western states shifts in light of growing perceptions of the direct security threat posed by shadow-fleet vessels. But because of the complexity of global shipping, there is no ‘silver bullet’ solution. To be effective, a new strategy will likely need to be comprehensive and focus on targets beyond individual ships to include the cargoes and their customers, flag states, port states and authorities, and potentially other levers affecting ship operations, such as crewing, or creating additional restrictions based on environmental concerns. However, to gain international adherence and have real effect, such a strategy must be backed up by a coherent rationale and a set of transparent criteria that are consistent with international law.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "How Trump Could Put Tighter Screws on Moscow," Keith Johnson, FP, 01.29.25. 

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"How China and US can work together to end Ukraine war," Zhou Bo, SCMP, 02.01.25. 

• “Can China and the US work together to end the war in Ukraine? The answer is yes. To do so, they should take the lead on a plan where major powers offer a collective security guarantee.”
• “Trump does have a unique advantage. As president of the country sending the most weapons to Ukraine, he can use his leverage on both parties. If Russia doesn’t meet his conditions, he can provide more weapons to Ukraine to keep fighting.”
• “In the fog of war, we only know what late US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld described as a “known unknown”, which means we know something exists that we don’t know. No one knows how long this war will last but it is good that a unilateralist American president knows now that he needs help.”

"Ukraine’s Path Forward: Negotiating Peace Amid Competing Futures," Robert Benson, Center for American Progress, 01.28.25. 

• “Ukraine has every right to self-determination and has plainly affirmed its place in the Euro-Atlantic community. The United States can adopt a similar approach to the West German model by extending a concrete invitation for NATO membership to Ukraine’s western regions and by facilitating their rapid integration into the trans-Atlantic fold. This would involve recognizing the de facto contact line as an interim border and consolidating the remaining territory under a provisional security guarantee.”
• “On the other hand, failure to secure Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration would embolden authoritarian powers and signal that brute force can redraw international borders at will. While Washington is undoubtedly aware of these risks, some in the Trump administration might welcome these developments. A deal imposed over the objection Ukraine and NATO allies would fracture trans-Atlantic unity and weaken the collective security framework that Trump has frequently derided as a burden. It would embolden the MAGA movement’s ideological allies within the EU, amplifying divisions and fueling antidemocratic forces across the continent. Such a deal would fundamentally dismantle the post-World War II security architecture, ushering in a period of instability and realignment unseen since the end of the Cold War—an outcome both desired by Putin and dangerous to U.S. national security.”

“Ukraine peace hopes rest on fragile foundations,” Tony Barber, FT, 02.01.25. 

• “On Tuesday [Jan. 28], the Doomsday Clock was moved from 90 seconds to 89 seconds to midnight. The US Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists… said the dial was now “the closest it has ever been to catastrophe.” What caught my eye was one reason the scientists gave for their latest move of the dial: “In regard to nuclear risk, the war in Ukraine, now in its third year, looms over the world.”
• “Is Ukraine losing the war? Despite an audacious incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August, Ukrainian forces have mostly been fighting a grim defensive war of attrition over the past year or so. But do Russia’s incremental territorial gains in eastern Ukraine mean that President Vladimir Putin is winning the war? General Christopher Cavoli, Nato’s supreme allied commander in Europe, takes a more nuanced view but isn’t downbeat about Ukraine’s prospects. He said in January:”
  • “I’m not worried that Ukraine could suddenly lose. I don’t see the potential for a massive [Russian] breakthrough… After all, there is a reason why Russia brought thousands and thousands of soldiers from North Korea… I think we’re going to continue to see this tension between the desire to attack and the lack of manpower on the part of the Russians.”
• “[As to] battlefield losses… The Economist last month quoted Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, commander of a Ukrainian tactical grouping in Donbas, as saying:”
  • “We struggle to replace our battlefield losses… [The Russians] might throw a battalion’s worth of soldiers at a position we’ve manned with four or five soldiers.”
• “For Putin, it’s not all about territory… Putin’s objectives are so ambitious that, although a temporary halt to the fighting might be possible, a lasting settlement of the conflict will, I think, be extremely difficult to reach. In the past year, this is the best analysis I have read on Russia’s war aims. Fredrik Löjdquist… lists what he sees as Putin’s underlying goals:”
  • “1. Survival of his regime in Russia”
  • “2. Restoration of Russia’s historical empire”
  • “3. Demolition of the rules-based international order and post-1945 European security order”
  • “4. Ending and reversing Nato enlargement and the U.S. presence in Europe”
• “Putin’s hostility to Ukrainian sovereignty—indeed, to a Ukrainian national identity separate from that of Russia—is of central importance.”
• “What will happen if Putin and Trump meet for a summit? Would Trump sell out Ukraine, either deliberately or because Putin duped him? In a perceptive article for the Sunday Times of London, Mark Galeotti, a British specialist on Russia, observed that Putin has been busy stroking Trump’s ego since his election victory in November. Galeotti also says a U.S. Republican official told him that Trump’s team contains many friends of Ukraine, “and they are lobbying hard that it is Zelenskyy who should be his closest ally.” Perhaps Trump ought to treat the Ukraine war as Putin does—as part of a wider confrontation between the west and Russia.”
• “Seen from this angle, the U.S. has some strong cards to play, George Beebe, once director of the CIA’s Russia analysis unit, suggests here. In particular, Trump is president of a country that leads a 32-member alliance, Nato, “whose military and economic might far exceeds that of Russia.” Because of this advantage, the U.S. would have “leverage to end the war while protecting core western and Ukrainian interests—including a secure path towards Ukrainian membership in the EU,” Beebe says.”

"Models for Securing a Possible Ceasefire," Claudia Major and Aldo Kleemann, SWP, 01.25.25.^ (In German.)

• “Currently, there are no promising approaches to convince Russia and Ukraine to end the war. There are no signs that Russia intends to end the war. Russia’s goals remain unchanged. While Putin appears open to talks, he insists on preconditions that would equate to Ukraine’s capitulation. He shows no genuine willingness to negotiate, as evidenced by the continued fighting.”
• “There is also concern that Russia may use tactical negotiations while continuing the war to wear down Ukraine and divide the Western alliance. Support for Ukraine in Western countries could decline as these tactical negotiations create the illusion of an imminent end to the war (“peace”).”
• “If a ceasefire is reached, it must be determined how it will be enforced and how Russia can be deterred from future aggression. As long as Moscow clings to its objectives—rejecting an independent Ukraine and seeking to alter Europe’s security order—and has the means to pursue these goals, Ukraine and Europe’s security remain threatened.”
• “It is unclear whether the U.S. under Trump will pursue a “peace through accommodation” or a “peace through strength” approach. What is clear is that the U.S. rejects a central role in securing a potential ceasefire in Ukraine and expects Europe to take responsibility. Currently, European countries lack the military capabilities to credibly assume this role without U.S. support, and no European country has shown serious readiness to deploy troops. Additionally, traditional legal-political models, such as a UN mandate, are not applicable.”
• “A sui generis model is needed—one that can reliably secure Ukraine despite Europe’s limited military capabilities and political cohesion. So far, no feasible ideas have emerged that could effectively protect Ukraine. The resources that Europeans could provide immediately would not offer credible protection.”
• “A “bluff and pray” approach, deploying insufficient troops while hoping Russia won’t test the commitment, would be reckless and increase the likelihood of war in Europe.”
• “Three models are conceivable:”
  • “NATO Membership”
  • “Deployment of Western Troops in Ukraine (up to 150,000 personnel)”
  • “Incremental Integration of Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic Structures with Increasing Military Presence Over Time (“the normative power of facts”)”
• “Progress in Model 3 would bring Ukraine closer to Models 2 and 1.”
• “These models present conflicting objectives for NATO states. Most NATO members currently believe that securing Ukraine would compromise their own security, deeming it too risky. They consider the benefits of a secure Ukraine for Europe’s security and the international order to be less critical than the need to safeguard NATO’s own security.”

“Weak Link: Frontline Instability and Lack of Manpower Are Becoming a Key Factor Weakening Ukraine's Bargaining Position with the Kremlin," Re: Russia, 01.29.25. 

• “Four key factors that will determine the course of the negotiations can be distinguished at the moment: 1) Trump’s team’s views on the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine and the 'reliability' of a deal; 2) the availability of leverage to increase economic pressure on Russia; 3) the stability of arms supplies to Ukraine, and 4) the combat capability and sustainability of the Ukrainian army.” 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Russians Want the Ukraine Conflict to End – but Without Concessions from Russia," Alexei Levinson, Russia.Post, 01.31.25.Clues from Russian Views.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Wayne Merry’s [05.28.1994] Dissent Channel Cable from American Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, ‘Whose Russia is it Anyway? Toward a Policy of Benign Respect,’” NSA, January 2025.³ AI was used to extract text from scans and conduct a spellcheck.

• “Democratic forces in Russia are in serious trouble. We are not helping with a misguided over-emphasis on market economics. There is no reason to believe the Russian economy is capable of rapid market reform. There is reason to fear that an intrusive Western effort to alter the economy against the wishes of the Russian people can exhaust the already diminishing reservoir of goodwill toward America, assist [anti-]democratic forces, and help recreate an adversarial relationship between Russia and the West. The legacy of Soviet mismanagement has inverted the normal direction of social change, with the political realm driving the economic.”
• “Reform in Russia will take different forms from those we favor: forms of statist direction of the economy and of communitarian social priorities derived from Russia’s objective needs and long traditions. The United States should seek a non-aggressive Russian external policy and development of workable democratic institutions, even (perhaps especially) when the economic choices of that democracy do not achieve an American standard of "success."
• “U.S. interests depend on Russia's performance as a great power—as a great power it shall remain, with the only arsenal of weapons of mass destruction capable of threatening the life of the American nation. The Yeltsin government’s aspiration as a great power is acceptance as a full participant in the Western community of states. The West should judge Russia's acceptability primarily by political standards, reflecting its performance in adhering to agreed international norms in human and civil rights, in developing accountable and durable democratic institutions, and in conducting responsible relations with other countries. In all these areas, post-Soviet Russia has made considerable, if incomplete, strides and aspires to more.”
• “Our interests are only indirectly and tangentially linked to the form of Russia's domestic economy, a field where no accepted international norms exist and Western countries themselves vary widely in both theory and practice. If Russia elects to follow a non-Anglo-American school of economics, it will be in excellent company. American interests are directly tied to the fate of Russian democracy but not to the choices that democracy may make about the distribution of its own wealth and about the organization of its means of production and finance. Our interests are best served by neutrality on these questions even if the choices prove to be "wrong" according to current American academic theory and even if they result in objective economic failure in the near term, as they probably will. Russian society has an almost limitless capacity to absorb failure and to accept responsibility for its own errors. Increasingly, however, Western policy is shifting the locus of accountability in Russian eyes for economic failures onto the West, with the United States in the bull's eye.”
• “Sadly, very few of the multitudes of American "advisors" in Russia since the Bolshevik demise acquainted themselves with even the most basic facts of the country whose destiny they proposed to shape. As a result, to say that America is wearing out its welcome in Russia is no longer a prediction; it is a descriptive fact. Even the most progressive and sympathetic of Russian officials have lost patience with the endless procession of what they call "assistance tourists," who rarely bother to ask their hosts for an appraisal of Russian needs (in sharp contrast to the basic approach underlying the Marshall Plan). Russians of all political persuasions are also less than charmed by the frequently expressed American attitude that their country is a social-economic laboratory to test academic theories. If there is one thing Russians learned to distrust in seventy-four years of socialism, it is economic theory and theorists.”
• “Even though we cannot do much good for the Russian economy, we can and should focus our attention where our interests are directly involved—in Russian conduct outside its borders. Fortunately, the breakup of the Soviet Union effectively prevents continuation of global rivalry with the United States or serious challenge to our interests beyond the Eurasian landmass. Use of the term "the world superpower" by many diplomats to refer to the United States reflects this reality. Nonetheless, Russian behavior can still be of great importance, to our benefit or hindrance, while some parts of the world welcome Russian influence as a counterweight to our own, as was recently shown in the Middle East and in Bosnia (where an active Russian presence as the leading Orthodox state is essential to any effort at conflict resolution along the fault line between Western and Eastern Christianity). The area where Russia can and will exercise the most influence, for good or ill, is the so-called "near abroad."
• “For the United States to be in a position to encourage restraint and responsibility in Russian external policy will require corresponding restraint on our part toward Russian internal policy, particularly in the economic field.”
• “The key to a constructive American role in supporting the growth of Russian democracy is mutual respect. The reservoir of goodwill which overwhelmed Americans at the collapse of Soviet power is not yet empty but has become dangerously shallow.”

"The Price of Trump’s Power Politics," Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, FA, 01.30.25

"Deterring Russia: U.S. Military Posture in Europe," Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels, CSIS, 01.27.25.

• “The U.S. military presence in Europe will likely remain contentious for several reasons. Numerous U.S. policymakers and analysts assess China to be the most significant threat to the United States for the foreseeable future and argue that the United States should focus the bulk of its military posture and attention—including its military air, naval, and maritime forces—toward and into the Indo-Pacific. In addition, some policymakers and analysts support decreasing the U.S. presence in Europe because some European governments have generally failed to increase their defense budgets or focus on high-end military capabilities. Finally, some contend that the United States should focus on problems at home, such as combatting immigration, improving health care, and stemming the production, trafficking, and use of such drugs as fentanyl.”
• “There is some validity in all of these points. China is a major threat, European governments need to spend more (and spend more effectively) on defense, and the United States needs to better address a wide range of challenges at home. Yet, as this analysis maintains, the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe that will require a force posture of forward defense. A notable decline in the United States’ force posture in Europe would likely be significant and dangerous for U.S. national security in several ways.”
• “First, it would embolden a revanchist Moscow and undermine deterrence in Europe. President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders would likely see a declining U.S. force posture in Europe as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve and potentially declining power. The United States’ limited response following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military action in eastern Ukraine later that year likely encouraged Russia to take future action. Second, a deteriorating U.S. posture would likely embolden other U.S. adversaries, such as China, and heighten concerns among U.S. allies and partners in Asia about U.S. resolve. The views in Taipei, the most likely flashpoint with China, are striking. Some of Taiwan’s national security leaders have warned that a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe—including aid to Ukraine—would heighten Taiwanese concerns about U.S. resolve.⁷³ Only 34% of those in Taiwan in 2023 believed that the United States is a trustworthy country, a decline of more than 11 percentage points from 2021. Researchers concluded that the drop was partly caused by a perception that U.S. resolve is weakening in Europe, including in Ukraine.”⁷⁴
• “Europe remains a vital region for the United States. The last two U.S. national security and national defense strategies have prioritized China as the main global threat. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, its continuing aggression, and its growing cooperation with China are stark reminders that the United States has significant and enduring interests in Europe as well.”

"Former national security adviser Jake Sullivan: ‘The core engines of American power are humming,’" Demetri Sevastopulo, FT, 01.31.25. 

• “I ask how [Sullivan] evaluates the situation in Ukraine. “The question is, can the current administration display sufficient staying power that Putin sees we’re going to hang in there and the costs are going to continue to mount?” he says. “In which case, I do believe there’s a deal to be done.”
• “Just before our lunch, Trump had threatened to hit Russia with more tariffs and sanctions if there was no agreement to end the war, which Sullivan says was a “good” move. Biden came under criticism for not providing certain weapons systems, including F-16 fighter jets, as quickly as requested by Kyiv. Sullivan pushes back. Biden approved F-16 transfers in May 2023, but the Ukrainian air force has only 18 jets because, Sullivan explains, it has only 16 pilots trained to fly the sophisticated fighters.”
• “After he orders mint tea and I ask for a coffee, Sullivan presses home his point. “The conventional wisdom that we did too little too late, and if only we had given this weapons system at this time rather than that time something would be dramatically different in the war, is not borne out by any serious review of the evidence,” he says.”

"The Domino Theory Is Coming for Putin," Casey Michel, FP, 01.29.25. 

• “Russia truly is… battered and bloodied. On the economic front, Russia has seen both soaring interest rates and galloping inflation, providing a toxic brew of stagflation, from which there’s little likelihood of escape. On the manpower front, Russian President Vladimir Putin is so skittish of a potential new round of mobilization that he’s forced to rely on North Korean conscripts. And on the tactical front, Putin is no closer to Ukrainian collapse than he was in early 2022.”
• “We’ve started to see a Russian variant of a domino theory emerge—one that has begun gutting Russian interests elsewhere, and illustrating, as few other things can, just how atrophied Russian power projection has become.”
  • “The first domino to fall came in 2023, when troops from Azerbaijan stormed into the separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing ethnic Armenians to flee en masse. Rather than being the supposed guarantor of stability—and a key security partner of Armenia, which backed Nagorno-Karabakh for decades—Russia wilted in the face of Azerbaijan’s push. Tucking tail, Russian troops left the region entirely, scuttling a military base where nearly 2,000 Russian troops had once been deployed.”
  • “A year later, the next domino toppled. With the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Russia not only lost its key regional ally, but watched as its primary claim as a security guarantor for autocratic regimes disintegrated. Rather than act as a swaggering great power that could shore up illiberal leaders, Moscow was suddenly outed as a government that could do neither.”
• “Both developments—the disappearance of Nagorno-Karabakh and the dissolution of Assad’s regime—are downstream from Putin’s overwhelming focus on subjugating Ukraine, regardless of the cost. All of which begs a pair of questions: Given that he’s been completely consumed by this messianic obsession with Ukraine, which pro-Russian domino will be the next to fall?”
• “All these developments—Transnistria going dark, Georgia turning turbulent, and Belarus once again facing the same ingredients that sparked its largest pro-democracy protests just a few years ago—would be newsworthy on their own. But it’s the fact that the primary backer of Transnistria separatists, Georgian illiberals, and Lukashenko’s regime are suddenly watching their external influence erode that presents new opportunities for the West, if only Brussels, London, and Washington take advantage.”
• “Questions and crises of Russia’s internal stability are still a ways off. But that is, ultimately, where this accelerating collapse of dominoes is heading. That is all the more reason the West must begin formulating policy not just on the next dominoes to fall—places like Transnistria, Georgia, and even Belarus—but also on what a post-Putin Russia may well, and should, look like. After all, once they start tumbling, dominoes have a way of continuing to fall. The West should be ready.”

"Remaking the World Order: No Small Feat," Thomas E. Graham, NI, 01.30.25. 

• “There is no doubt that Russia wants to be a great power, and being respected by other great powers as such is a core element of Russia’s national identity.”
• “Today, the challenge for Russia is retaining its strategic autonomy, especially given its ever-closer embrace of China, a consequence of Western sanctions and Russia’s rejection of the West. For all the talk of an equal partnership, the relationship is profoundly asymmetric. China’s economy is seventeen times the size of Russia’s, depending on how GDP is calculated, and the gap is only growing in China’s favor.” 
• “The United States will not be able to rupture the current China-Russia strategic alignment—there are compelling strategic reasons for closer relations, but the United States could attenuate them. Easing sanctions so that Russian and Western firms can cooperate in such places as Central Asia and the Arctic would help Russia counter growing Chinese influence in both regions.”
• “Carefully restoring Europe’s energy relations with Russia to avoid an over-reliance on Russia would be another. The near-term goal is not to split Russia from China but to ensure that any deals Russia cuts with China, diplomatic or commercial, are not so heavily tilted in China’s favor as they are now. ”

“Europe Is Pouring Money Into Defense. Is it Enough?” Josh Holder, NYT, 01.25.25.

• “After the end of the Cold War, European military spending told a story of stability and optimism. Money flowed away from tanks and submarines and went instead to hospitals and pensions. But that era is over. With a full-blown land war raging in Ukraine and an isolationist American president back in the White House, European leaders have come to a stark conclusion: They must spend more on their militaries.”
• “NATO countries formally committed to spending 2% of G.D.P. on their militaries in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, though the benchmark had been discussed for over a decade. But eight countries still do not reach that benchmark, and many analysts say even that is not enough. Now, President Donald J. Trump has said he believes they should spend 5%.”
• “That is more than twice the current target—and far higher than America’s own military spending, which is near a post-Cold War low… Some European leaders, too, are calling for higher targets. Robert Habeck, the German economic minister, proposed raising military spending to 3.5% in a recent interview with Der Spiegel. “We need to spend almost twice as much on defense so that Putin does not dare to attack us,” Mr. Habeck said.”
• “While countries in Western Europe are debating spending more on their militaries, those closer to Moscow have already acted. Poland’s spending reached 4% of its G.D.P. in 2024, the highest in NATO. But even with the increase in spending, many experts say Europe should be spending more.”
• “Going beyond the 2% military spending target may pose a dilemma for some leaders. Over the past three decades, expenditures on health care and social protections, among them pensions, unemployment benefits and housing allowances, have risen sharply. Raising military spending even to 3.5% of the G.D.P. might mean dramatic shifts in spending.”
• “Even with the war in Ukraine still raging, some European politicians are already talking about plans for peacetime. Germany’s economy minister said that a 3.5% spending goal would be temporary, and could be reduced once Germany’s security reached a “reasonable state.” That might prove unwise, said Mr. Monaghan, the Center for Strategic and International Studies fellow.”
  • “The constant threat from Russia is the new normal, and we need to prepare for that and invest in our defense for that,” he said. “I think there’s still a lot of wishful thinking around.”

"I'm the Foreign Minister of Poland. Europe Has Got the Message," Radoslaw Sikorski, NYT, 02.03.25.

• “As some allies grow weary of American power, Americans seem to be growing weary of their allies. For years—in his first term and in his recent campaign—President Donald Trump has been clear that he will put America first and has repeatedly reminded other members of NATO that the alliance is not a free ride.”
• “Europeans finally got the message: Our security is not a service provided by the United States. It begins with us. But European security independence does not have to be incompatible with close collaboration with the United States. In an ideal world—in a safer world—there will be both.”
• “The trans-Atlantic alliance has never been a one-way street. The United States supported European defense for decades after World War II, but the only time NATO’s Article 5 has ever been invoked was in response to Sept. 11, when allies came to America’s aid. Poland sent brigades to Afghanistan and Iraq, and kept them there for almost two decades. It never sent a bill.”
• “In 2025, those who do not wish us well are many. The autocratic axis comprising Russia, Iran, North Korea and China represents a grave threat to much of the world. To face such an alliance, America and Europe need each other more, not less—our adversaries want nothing more than to see us fragmented, plagued by economic disputes and unable to lead. Instead, let’s continue on the path of partnership, of peace through strength, as friends and allies.”

“The Case for Reglobalization,” Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., and Maximilian F. Hippold, FA, 01.30.25.

“How Trump’s bluntness shatters the liberal world order,” Fyodor Lukyanov, RG/RT, 01.3025. Clues from Russian Views. (Both Rossiiskaya Gazeta and RT are funded by the Russian government.)

• “U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the center stage of world politics has once again ignited discussions about his peculiar political behavior.”
• “At the core of Trump’s political behavior is a rejection of hypocrisy and duplicity, replaced instead with bluntness and rudeness. He insists on getting what he wants and disregards counterarguments, often repeating the same demands relentlessly.”
• “Trump’s approach aligns with the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy, adopted during his first term, which officially recognized modern international relations as a competition between great powers.”
• “What sets Trump apart is his focus on results rather than ideals. He doesn’t aim to prove himself right; he simply wants to achieve his objectives.”
• “Trump’s appeal stems not only from fear but also from his fundamental rejection of what can be termed 'post-hypocrisy.' In traditional politics and diplomacy, hypocrisy has always existed as a tool to smooth over conflicts and enable dialogue.”
• “Trump’s bluntness acts as a reset button. By stripping away the pretense, he forces discussions to focus on tangible interests rather than vague value-based rhetoric.”
• “Ultimately, Trump’s willingness to 'rip the band-aid off' forces the world to confront uncomfortable truths. What is clear is that the era of subtlety and diplomatic niceties is giving way to a new age of bluntness, where power and self-interest dominate the conversation.”

"Speech at the General Meeting of the Russian Council on International Affairs," Sergei Lavrov, RIAC, 01.31.25.Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The balance of power on the international stage is changing dramatically. In many ways, it has already changed. The hegemonic aspirations of the 'collective West,' 'built' by Washington during the previous administration, are evident to everyone."
• “The geopolitical divide today is not between the West and Russia, but between the Western minority and the Global Majority. An increasing number of large, medium, and small states have received an impulse towards forming a multipolar world and are pursuing independent, nationally-oriented policies."
• “The role of the 'aggregator' of these regional processes of strengthening self-awareness is played by BRICS—a global organization that many want to join. It is expanding both through the addition of new members and through the creation of a new category of partner countries.”

"They will all stand at the master's feet and gently wag their tails." Putin on the relationship between European leaders and Trump,” Meduza, 02.02.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “The leaders of European countries "will gently wag their tails" in front of the new U.S. President Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin said in an interview with VGTRK correspondent Pavel Zarubin. "Trump, with his character, with his persistence, he will bring order there quite quickly. And all of them, you'll see, it will happen quickly, all of them will stand at the master's feet and gently wag their tails," Putin said, discussing the relationship between "European political elites" and U.S. President Donald Trump, which he called "some kind of fuss."
• “According to Putin, even during the time of Joe Biden, European leaders "were happy to carry out any order from Washington," and nothing has changed since then. "They just don't like Trump, they actively fought him… And then they were confused when Trump won,” he added.”
• “Putin also spoke in general about the [stature] of European leaders, comparing them with politicians of past years. In Europe, there were such outstanding political world figures as [Charles] de Gaulle, [Francois] Mitterrand, [Jacques] Chirac; in Germany, there were Willy Brandt, [Helmut] Kohl, and I would put Schroeder in the same row. These are people who had their own opinion and the courage to fight for this opinion… Today, there are practically no such people there, sometimes you even look with surprise at what is happening—they have no education, and they are clearly doing something that is not their business. They are simply political small fry.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Components of Russia’s Undeclared War Against the West," Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, RUSI, 01.28.25.
• "See How Russia Is Winning the Race to Dominate the Arctic," Daniel Kiss, Thomas Grove, Vipal Monga, Austin Ramzy, and Roque Ruiz, WSJ, 02.03.25.
• "Russia Is Spinning Up a New Barrage of Lies in Europe," Luke McGee, FP, 01.27.25.
• "Fact-Checking Russia's Claims on Chemical Weapons," John V. Parachini, Khrystyna Holynska, and Kateryna Ionova, RAND, 01.27.25.
• "The U.S. Military’s Recruiting Crisis," Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker, 02.03.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"A Decadal Review of Russia-China Economic Relations," Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash, ORF, 02.03.25. Clues from Indian views.

• “As the Chinese-Russian partnership rapidly evolves within the international system, supplemented by shared interests in global geopolitics and geoeconomics, there remains a persistent tendency to misinterpret their strategic partnership as a formal alliance aimed at countering the West. However, structural factors continue to undermine the growth of a true Russia-China alliance. The growing asymmetry in their bilateral economic partnership is evident, with China’s economic influence expanding swiftly in Russia. China has become a major Russian export destination, particularly for energy resources and raw materials, with more than a third of Russia’s exports directed to Chinese markets. Conversely, since 2022, Russia—facing fewer export destinations—has become increasingly dependent on industrial and manufactured goods from China, positioning itself as a price-taker. The rising economic dominance of China in Russia exposes Moscow to the market forces of China's domestic political economy.”
• “Further, due to the threat of Western secondary sanctions, Beijing has reduced its critical technology transfers to Moscow. Alongside this, most Chinese banks have not only ceased ruble transfers but also stopped processing yuan transactions from Russia since 2024.”
• “Taking note of the growing Chinese influence in the Russian economy and its direct limitations has incentivized Moscow to maximize its bilateral partnerships in the non-Western world. This includes improving relations with Southeast Asian countries, West Asia, India, and African countries; not only as an avenue to project Russia’s influence but also building alternative channels that redirect Western trade to Russia.”
• “However, despite the limitations in the Russia-China economic partnership and the limited likelihood of a formal alliance anytime soon, the bilateral partnership is at its peak. Trade with China remains a critical factor in understanding the health of the Russian economy, as Russia would have suffered had China joined the sanctions regime against it. Even with China observing certain sanctions and export control mechanisms, the 2024 bilateral trade from January to November was at US $222.77 billion, likely to cross the 2023 trade turnover of US $240 billion. Thus, China’s role in powering the Russian economy has been pivotal.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States," Lyle J. Morris, Asia Society, 01.22.25.
• Also see section “Cyber security/AI.”

Missile defense:

"Trump's 'Iron Dome' is a fantasy. But there are practical options," Max Boot, WP, 01.30.25.

• "There is zero possibility of a comprehensive missile defense of the United States in the foreseeable future," James N. Miller, who served as undersecretary of defense in the Obama administration, told me on Tuesday. "We are not going to escape mutual assured destruction vis-à-vis Russia or China." He added that "a lot of studies have shown space-based interceptors to only have value if the adversary doesn't take obvious steps to defeat them. I don't think we can count on our adversaries being that stupid." Indeed, satellites are relatively easy to shoot down; Russia just launched what is believed to be a new satellite capable of knocking out U.S. satellites.”
• “That doesn't mean there is no need for missile defense. It does mean that the objective must be more modest than trying to protect the entire U.S. population. Robert Soofaer, who served in the Defense Department during Trump's first term, just issued an Atlantic Council report, written in conjunction with other missile-defense experts, outlining a more realistic vision. Soofer aims to preserve nuclear deterrence by making it more difficult for an adversary such as China or Russia to stage a decapitating first strike against U.S. nuclear forces. The report recommends, therefore, focusing missile defenses on U.S. nuclear forces, national leadership targets, and nuclear command, control and communications, all with an eye to "enhance U.S. nuclear survivability."
• “Many well-respected defense experts are skeptical that even this more modest program could achieve much success in shooting down ICBMs, which travel at 15,000 mph and can be equipped with multiple, independently targetable warheads.”
• “In an email to me, Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace expressed another concern: that Trump's plan could lead to "nuclear arms-racing." In other words, China and Russia will react by further boosting both the quality and quantity of their own nuclear forces to maintain the ability to overwhelm U.S. defenses.”
• “Those concerns are valid, but there is a strong case to be made for upgrading homeland missile defense to intercept a limited attack from a rogue state such as North Korea, or to discourage a first strike from China or Russia.”

Nuclear arms:

"The Doomsday Clock Just Moved Closer to Midnight," Juan Manuel Santos and Daniel Holz, Time, 01.28.25.

• “Today, the Doomsday Clock was set to 89 seconds to midnight, the closest to midnight ever in its 78-year history. It’s the duty of the United States, China, and Russia to lead the world back from the brink. Humanity’s continuing existence depends on immediate action from the world’s leaders.”
• “But we must not give up hope that the world can come together and celebrate our shared humanity. Everyone wants to pass down a brighter future to their children and the generations to come. Young people are demanding solutions. World leaders must meet the challenge or risk fueling despair and disillusion.”
• “The cost of failing to choose cooperation over competition can only result in our future doom. The United States, China, and Russia don’t have to agree on every issue, but they should agree on one crucial point: advancing toward a man-made apocalypse benefits none of their national interests. They must come together with the shared intention of setting aside short-sighted competition and working together on our long-term survival. And they must come together now, because every second counts.”

 "Life After New START: Navigating a New Period of Nuclear Arms Control," Mike Albertson, Arms Control Today, 01.02.25. 

• “The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire on February 5, 2026, with little likelihood that any of its provisions will remain in force.”
  • “One alternative is extending the treaty.”
  • “Another alternative is continuing just the New START verification provisions, such as inspections and notifications, after the treaty expiration.”
  • “Replacement by an entirely new treaty or agreement theoretically is another alternative, but it has proven impossible even in better geopolitical times.”
  • “The last alternative would be a mutual agreement to stay below New START limits.”
• “After New START ends, the United States should take the lead in proposing a new legally binding agreement. It should be on the one thing where the contours of nuclear competition are clear: Over the next decade, China, Russia, and the United States will move together toward a multilateral world at higher levels of nuclear weapons. At the end of this road, they will all be at higher numbers but with the same deterrence challenges as today.”

“'The Russians Worked Fast': How Ukraine Lost Its Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Dmytro Shurkhalo, RFE/RL, 01.30.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• “When Ukraine declared its independence from the USSR in August 1991, Kyiv came into possession of the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world… Besides large and complex strategic missiles, Kyiv had also taken over thousands of the Soviet Union's “tactical” nuclear devices, designed to be small enough to use on an active battlefield. Gen. Lt. Oleksandr Skipalskiy was the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence through the 1990s.”
• “After Skipalskiy ordered a review into the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, a report was compiled calling for the proposed transfer to be canceled. In early 1992, as Russian teams were already removing the nuclear munitions, the retired intelligence head says, “I saw with my own eyes how [Ukrainian Security Service Head] Yevhen Marchuk placed our report arguing against the removal of tactical nuclear weapons into a folder and said, ‘I’m going to take this to the president.’”
• “For two weeks following the delivery of that report, the extraction of the weapons was paused. “Then it got back under way without any explanation; at least I wasn’t told anything,” Skipalsky says. “I believe [then-Ukrainian President Leonid] Kravchuk made the final decision himself. But who advised him and what arguments were put forward? That I don’t know.” Russian crews tasked with removing the weapons, he says, worked “fast and around the clock” to load and transport the tactical nuclear warheads out of Ukraine.”
• “Skipalskiy claims, “they didn’t allow our observers to oversee this [the destruction of the tactical nuclear weapons], we were just shown some building and told, ‘this is our processing facility,’ but no one was let inside so no one witnessed the claimed disposal of these warheads.”
• “Skipalskiy says Moscow was able to spook Washington into piling pressure on Kyiv. The Kremlin, he says, “argued that there was a lack of control and that there was the threat of nuclear terrorism. Even if there were no Ukrainian terrorists per se, they claimed that the technological situation was dangerous. As a result, the Americans helped to twist Ukraine’s arm, demanding the transfer of nuclear weapons.”

"Preparing for Adversary Employment of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: Tactical Effects, Operational Impacts, Strategic Implications," James H. Gifford, Joint Force Quarterly, 01.24.25.

• “While most of the world thinks of city-destroying nuclear weapons, the figure shows that adversary use of a 10 kiloton weapon would have a limited effect on the featured brigade and its operational mission. Strategic leaders could determine that retaliation need not be nuclear—that increasing the intensity of conventional attacks may be an appropriate response to a limited nuclear strike like the one shown in the figure. If a nuclear response is deemed necessary, the decision and authority to use a nuclear weapon rest solely with the President, who must consider a host of issues in the decision, including the status of the whole war, national strategic goals, the need to demonstrate resolve, an attempt to “escalate to de-escalate” the conflict, and many others.”
• “This strategic-level decision, however, relies on first understanding the tactical-level effects, how they influence the operational mission, and whether a “strategic” (nuclear) response is called for. Those in senior leadership roles likely have no experience thinking through a limited nuclear battlefield. It is important that the response policy is clearly thought through and rehearsed/wargamed with those leaders, so they understand the potential tactical, operational, and strategic consequences on adversary nuclear use. Leaders in the United States must think harder about the types of strategic policy decisions that they might face and prepare how to respond. Waiting for the first mushroom cloud would be too late.”

Also see the nuclear arms section of: "Deterring Russia: U.S. Military Posture in Europe," Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels, CSIS, 01.27.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• "The Right Way to Engage With Syria’s New Rulers," Nafees Hamid, Nils Mallock, Broderick McDonald, and Rahaf Aldoughli, FA, 01.31.25. 

Cyber security/AI: 

"The Autonomous Arsenal in Defense of Taiwan: Technology, Law, and Policy of the Replicator Initiative," Eric Rosenbach, Ethan Lee, and Bethany Russell, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 02.03.25. 

• “The fully autonomous weapon systems envisioned for the defense of Taiwan are at least five years away from operational maturity and fielding.”
• “The United States is unlikely to utilize fully autonomous weapon systems against China’s most likely strategy: a blockade of Taiwan.”
• “Recent advances in counter-drone technologies will likely limit the efficacy of attritable semi-autonomous weapons and increase the urgency of developing fully autonomous weapons.”
• “Replicator will fuel the U.S.-China security dilemma in the context of autonomous weapon systems.”
• “Senior military leaders must continue to develop and exercise realistic, sophisticated concepts of operations for autonomous weapon systems that are fully integrated into any formal military plans for the defense of Taiwan.”
• “The Department of Defense should prioritize accuracy and traceability over explainability due to the “black box” trade-off.”
• “Limited real-world data will require the Department of Defense to manage the risk of using synthetic data for the development of fully autonomous weapon systems’ advanced AI models.”
• “Fielding fully autonomous weapon systems will require advancements in battery and edge computing technologies.”
• “The Department of Defense’s interpretation of international law will be embedded in the AI algorithms for fully autonomous weapon systems, effectively serving as a codification of the United States’ approach to the laws of war.”
• “The Department of Defense’s publicly released policy sets a high international standard for transparency on the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems.”

“DeepSeek has created a 21st-century Sputnik moment,” Fareed Zakaria, WP, 01.31.25. 

• “Is this a Sputnik moment? The world has reacted with astonishment to the release of a disruptive AI model from Chinese company DeepSeek, which appears to be able to perform as well or, in some cases, better than ChatGPT and other cutting-edge models put out by U.S. companies. Americans had assumed their massive lead in funding, access to high-quality chips, and innovation would keep them well ahead. That assumption now looks like hubris.”
• “The episode is in some ways a much bigger deal than Sputnik. Sputnik was about the Soviet Union's space program competing with that of the United States. Few thought the Soviet economy in general was more technologically advanced than America's. But DeepSeek is a private Chinese company that demonstrated its stunning prowess on the cheap in the most important technology for the future.”
• “A technology decoupling means that AI will become the central part of a new global arms race, totally unregulated and unconstrained, with the world's two largest economies hurtling toward superintelligence no-holds-barred, and incorporating it into all military applications—including nuclear weapons. If artificial intelligence is as revolutionary a technology as predicted, having it unleashed in every realm of human life with absolutely no guardrails points to a scary future—one far more dangerous than anything people imagined because of the Sputnik satellite.”

Energy exports from CIS:

"More sanctions on Russian oil tankers," Robin Brooks and Ben Harris, Brookings, 01.30.25.

• “On Jan. 10, 2025, the United States announced a massive sanctions action covering 183 Russian-controlled and shadow fleet ships. This round of sanctions is by far the largest such action toward limiting Russian oil tanker capacity, with especially acute implications for Russia’s Pacific ports. Yet, despite the sweeping nature of this action, global oil prices have not seen a sustained rise since the announcement—indicating additional room to sanction more shadow fleet oil tankers without risk of roiling global energy markets.”
• “This evidence justifies our prior calls for more sanctions on Russian oil tankers, in which we argued that further sanctions would weaken Russia’s trading activity while also adding to the mounting strain on the Sovcomflot fleet—with limited risk for spiking global oil prices.”
• “Ultimately, given that the Jan. 10 sanctions had a sizable impact on shipping capacity but with no obvious enduring price impact, further sanctions on shadow fleet oil tankers can likely be levied without any meaningful spike in global oil prices. We conclude by noting that shadow fleet oil tankers are especially prevalent in the Baltic Sea and recommend that policymakers target ships in this region in future rounds of sanctions.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "OPEC+ Will Buckle Under Trump's Pressure," Javier Blas, Bloomberg, 01.29.25.
• "Three Years After Ukraine Invasion, Europe Still Deals With Energy Crisis," Stanley Reed and Liz Alderman, NYT, 02.03.25. 

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Keith Kellogg on Russia and Ukraine,” Chris Conway, RM, 01.31.25.

• “By tapping Keith Kellogg to be his special envoy to Ukraine and Russia, U.S. President Donald Trump has made the former vice-presidential national security adviser and retired lieutenant general central to any negotiations to end the war. In public, Kellogg invariably defers to Trump’s judgement on foreign policy; however, it is likely that he will be also driven by his own beliefs in his efforts to end the war.”
• “Kellogg’s chief responsibility as special envoy is to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Trump had previously pledged to end the war in “24 hours” after taking office, though this has since been pushed back. In his recent public statements, Kellogg has been stridently critical of the Biden administration for its sanctimonious attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders and its refusal to engage them in negotiations.”
• “At best, he argues, the current administration has made an ill-thought-through promise to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” despite providing no clear criteria for success and withholding the weapons (such as ATACMS) needed by the Ukrainians to push the Russians back. At worst, Kellogg accuses the Biden Administration of treating Ukraine as a “proxy war” to weaken Putin’s regime at home.”
• “Kellogg sees ending the war as a vital foreign policy objective since, in his view, it will allow the U.S. to undermine solidarity between the “axis” of authoritarian states. In interviews, he has stated his belief that “[i]t is important in international security to take actors off the stage. You need to work individually with each one of them.” Kellogg is hawkish on Iran, North Korea and China, believing each poses serious threats to the U.S. and to global security, and has criticized the Biden administration for its alleged weakness in dealing with these adversaries.”

“The Senate’s Tulsi Gabbard Test,” George Beebe, The American Conservative, 01.29.25.

• “As it weighs the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard for the position of Director of National Intelligence, the United States Senate faces a fundamental choice: Should it reject those like Gabbard who challenge conventional wisdom, or should it recognize that sensibly questioning orthodox views is essential to avoid the kinds of intelligence and foreign policy failures we have experienced in such places as Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine?”⁵
• “In the messy political scrum over acquiring and exercising power over foreign policy, Americans have too often confused analytic empathy with sympathy for the views and agendas of foreign adversaries. Hence the potency of Hillary Clinton’s accusation that Gabbard is a Russian “favorite” and the buzz from her skeptics that she harbors a disqualifying fondness for autocrats.”
• “In fact, one of the most fundamental duties of any analyst of foreign affairs is to be able to walk in the shoes of adversaries and view U.S. actions from their perspective. That is not because their views are typically accurate and justified. Rather, it is because an inability to understand their perceptions and misperceptions greatly increases the likelihood of intelligence and policy failures.”

"We're Russian. We know what happens when Big Tech coddles dictators," Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yulia Navalnaya and Ilya Yashin, WP, 02.03.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• “In many countries around the world—from Russia and Iran to Venezuela and Cuba—dictators regularly draft new laws aimed at destroying citizens' rights, including those related to the internet. Far too often, U.S. tech companies comply with these laws without asking too many questions.”
• “Block access to foreign media? Done. Restrict tools that bypass censorship? No problem. Deny citizens tools to encrypt their messages to avoid repression? Even to that, Big Tech says "yes."
• “There is room for discussion. And we aim to start it. The principle of "following local laws, no matter what they are" provides a convenient excuse. But it's just that: an excuse and a moral dodge. Local laws can demand stoning a woman for uncovering her face or imprisoning someone for 15 years for calling Putin's war a crime. We propose companies replace the principle of blindly "following local laws, no matter what" with three other simple ones.”
  • “Principle 1: Put human rights first.”
  • “Principle 2: Focus on real-world outcomes.”
  • “Principle 3: Establish mechanisms for dialogue with civil society.”
• “We believe technology can stop being an unwitting accomplice to dictators and an easy tool for oppression. We believe technologies that protect freedom, rights and users' interests will ultimately bring greater benefits to their creators.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"The 2025 Crossroad: Russian Authorities Will Have to Choose Between Two Scenarios for the Russian Economy," Oleg Vyugin, Re:Russia, 01.27.25. 

• “The key feature of fiscal policy from 2023 to 2025 is its inflationary nature, driven not only by deficit financing but also by the significant reallocation of expenditures toward unproductive military production and subsidies for industries addressing military needs. This shift has drained financial and labor resources from civilian sectors.”
• “There are two options to increase real military expenditures: raising taxes or reducing social and infrastructure-support obligations. Social obligations can be reduced nominally or diluted in real terms through inflation—this approach is already in effect. Increasing the tax burden (also already underway) is another factor suppressing economic activity in the civilian sector. The negative consequence of this approach to revenue consolidation is a decline in real production in civilian industries. This, in turn, creates the risk of crossing a threshold where inflation becomes self-sustaining, leading to the danger of entering a regime of runaway inflation.”
• “All of this raises the need for a political decision: a choice between halting the expansion of government spending or plunging the economy into a prolonged period of poorly controlled inflation. Under current conditions, the threat of runaway inflation can likely only be countered by curbing demand growth from the public sector and maintaining the Central Bank’s anti-inflationary rate for a sufficient period to activate its effects. However, in such a scenario, the military-political confrontation would have to be at least frozen.”
• “Thus, in 2025, a decision must be made to adjust fiscal policy starting in 2026. If the decision to 'freeze' is implemented, it will take several years to stabilize the economy, going through a recession that could be severe under the current sanctions regime. If this decision is not made, the economy will enter a regime of poorly controlled inflation, slowing growth, and declining living standards with no means of compensation. Exiting this scenario will be extremely difficult. Moreover, it will accumulate long-term negative consequences and risks, which at some point could escalate into political risks.”

"Nationalization campaign charges ahead," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 01.31.25.

• “A new chapter has opened in the ongoing campaign to seize private property for the state and individuals close to the authorities. Domodedovo airport, Moscow’s second largest, is under threat of imminent nationalization. It marks the third attempt to seize the prime asset over more than two decades of wrangling. Now, the invasion of Ukraine has given the authorities a new justification to try to seize it.”
• “The targeting of Domodedovo is the first significant nationalization attempt this year amid an escalating campaign. Earlier instances were typically politically motivated or a response to spontaneous protest, such as in the case of the Bashkir Soda Company in 2020—a landmark case that challenged its privatization in the 1990s. But since Russia invaded Ukraine, there have been dozens of nationalization attempts.”
• “There is no end to the flow of lawsuits being backed by either the state prosecutor or, occasionally, the anti-monopoly service. In January alone the Prosecutor General went after the following organizations, alongside Domodedovo airport:”
• “Salavatneftemash oil equipment plant, whose owner turned out to be a Lithuanian citizen and left Russia.”
• “Plots belonging to the Epron-8 construction company in Adler, which was privatized in 1993. The land is located on a site where a highway is planned to be built.”
• “The Petersburg oil terminal, where the deceased owner's heirs have French and German citizenship.”
• “Two yacht clubs on the shore of Uliss Bay in Vladivostok.”
• “Grain trader Rodnie Polya, whose owners have also been accused of violating the foreign investment law.”
• “This flurry of nationalizations should not be viewed as a reversal of the controversial privatization of the 1990s. Most often, new private owners are quickly found. It cannot simply be considered a distribution of assets in exchange for future loyalty—the new owners are already super-loyal and connected to the corridors of power. Nor is it just a means of topping up the treasury—the planned revenue is too small to cover the demands of Russia’s military budget. It isn’t even a way of satisfying the appetites of officials and state managers, who do not always get what they want. In reality, it is a combination of all of that, as well as a tool to ensure obedience from owners of businesses and real estate across the country.”

“Unprecedented Defense Ministry Purge Sparks Concern in Russian Elite,” Mikhail Komin, Carnegie Politika, 01.31.25.

• “The biggest source of tension within the Russian elites in 2024 was the purge of the Defense Ministry. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was moved to a different post, and several dozen officials were detained over the course of many months, including three former deputy defense ministers. The shake-up was likely conceived as a way to improve the management of Russia’s ballooning military spending. In order to speed up the process of clearing out Shoigu-era placeholders, the Kremlin opted for a method that could be described as “rotation through repression.”
• “This is not a new approach, but the scale of what occurred at the Defense Ministry is unprecedented. The purge has not only redirected rent flows associated with the ministry, but also led to the dismantling of Shoigu’s entire clan within the Russian elite. Although Shoigu seems—for the moment—to be under the personal protection of President Vladimir Putin, he has been powerless to intervene in unfolding events.”
• “The easiest way to understand the purge is to look at the criminal cases that followed the first—and most high-profile—arrest: that of Shoigu’s long-time associate, ex-deputy defense minister Timur Ivanov. Each wave of arrests seemed to lead to new arrests in turn, as well as generate new charges against Ivanov himself.”
• “The Defense Ministry’s new approach will inevitably lead to increased competition among the elites for rent flows. The Kremlin’s plan is probably that this will help to make military spending more efficient. However, there is a flip side: other elite groups will now be worried about being treated in the same way as Shoigu’s clan.”
• “Those feeling vulnerable might include, for example, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev, who has built an influential clan over many years of overseeing the Far East, and the brutal leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. Given Kadyrov’s reported health problems, a power transfer in Chechnya could lead to a purge even more dramatic than that at the Defense Ministry.”
• “Dismantling major elite groups and encouraging inter-elite competition might become an approach that the Kremlin ends up using more broadly. It would be a logical way to adapt to a long standoff with the West. But it would also lead to an even greater personalization of power in Russia, and increased uncertainty for the elite.”

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Victory Will Ensure Critical Mineral Security," Margus Tsahkna, NI, 01.31.25.

• “Rare earth elements and other important raw materials such as titanium, lithium, gallium, and graphite are essential for the production of high-tech electronics, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries. They are also widely used in the aerospace and defense industry.”
• “These valuable resources are abundant in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine is one of the main exporters of titanium and manganese to the United States, where these are used in the U.S. aerospace, steel, and automotive industries.”
• “It is vital that the West ensures Ukraine’s sovereignty not only over its territory but also over its resources. This means securing Ukraine’s military victory.”
• “Helping Ukraine to secure control over its vast areas of critical minerals is in the direct interest of the United States and its partners. If we were to fail in helping Ukraine to victory and the minerals are used for the benefit of authoritarian powers, the consequences would be devastating, reaching far beyond Ukraine’s borders over decades to come.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Moscow Sees Transnistria Gas Crisis as an Opportunity to Wreak Havoc in Moldova," Vladimir Solovyov, CEIP, 02.03.25. 

• “Ever since the unrecognized republic of Transnistria broke away from Moldova in 1990, it has been described as a “Russian outpost” and “the edge of Russian land.” For decades, Moscow propped up the statelet—only to suddenly leave it without crucial gas supplies from the start of this year when the Ukrainian transit of Russian gas was halted. The act of leaving Transnistrians without heating in the middle of winter may help the Kremlin achieve something decades of negotiations with Chișinău could not: to force Moldova to reunite with Transnistria.”
• “Moscow would benefit from Moldova’s reintegration in more than one way. The return of Transnistria to the jurisdiction of Chișinău, or even just the launch of that process, will at the very least greatly strain the resources and state apparatus of the impoverished republic, if not plunge it into chaos. That will surely give rise to internal conflicts. Proof of that is Gagauzia, which also declared independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union but has long since returned to the Moldovan constitutional field, yet still has fractious relations with Chișinău.”
• “Another important point is that incomes and living conditions on the right bank of the Dniester have long been higher. Many Transnistrians prefer to work in Moldova because they can earn significantly more there. In the event of reunification, tariffs in Transnistria will have to be raised, and then economic problems will likely become political in no time at all. The Moldovan government is already saying that it will not be able to handle reunification without external assistance. In addition, the issue is not a priority for Moldovan society: many people have a negative attitude toward Transnistria.”
• “Then there is the impact Transnistrians will have on Moldovan elections. In the event of reintegration, Moldova will acquire about 300,000 Transnistrian voters, many of whom oppose EU integration and will vote for forces closer to Moscow than to Brussels and Washington. That suits Russia just fine.”
• “Finally, there is the issue of Russian troops in Transnistria and the depots containing tens of thousands of tons of ammunition that they guard. The Moldovan government wants the troops to leave and the arsenals to be liquidated. But the military presence cannot simply evaporate: any parameters must be agreed upon, which means sitting down at the table with Moscow.”
• “While the economic collapse of Transnistria does not bode well for right-bank Moldova, refusing reintegration is hardly an option for Chișinău either. The opposition would certainly accuse the government of taking an anti-state approach and of being unwilling to make use of a rare opportunity to finally unite the divided country—creating just as many problems as reintegration.”

"It’s Time to Roll Back Sanctions on Putin's Ally in Belarus," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 01.31.25. 

• “Western policy should distinguish between peoples and governments to avoid accelerating the emergence of a new Iron Curtain in Europe. In Belarus, ordinary citizens and non-regime companies should be encouraged to travel to and trade with the West, to build ties and counter the effects of Lukashenko’s propaganda and re-education polices. At the same time, we need to distinguish Minsk from Moscow, understanding that their interests are not the same, at least not yet. If they were, Belarusian troops would already be fighting for Putin in Ukraine.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The European Union's Strategic Test in Georgia," Teona Giuashvili, IFRI, 01.27.25.
• “Nuclear Power in Central Asia: The New ‘New Thing’?" Andrew C. Kuchins, NI, 01.29.25. (Video.)

Footnotes

1. For a recent description of the dynamics of fighting, see: "Ukrainian troops losing ground to Russia as Trump talks of ending war," Samya Kullab, Vasilisa Stepanenko, and Evgeniy Maloletka, AP News, 02.03.25.
2. For prior claims that Russia was running out of missiles, see here.
3. BBC: Nazarov was the chief advisor and later a consultant to former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
4. NSA: This cable, written by Wayne Merry as a Dissent Channel message, reminds one of the famous Long Telegram written by George Kennan in 1946 in its analytical power and predictive precision.
5. Gabbard vote expected Feb. 4, 2025.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Yakiv Liashenko.