
Keith Kellogg on Russia and Ukraine
By tapping Keith Kellogg to be his special envoy to Ukraine and Russia, U.S. President Donald Trump has made the former vice-presidential national security adviser and retired lieutenant general central to any negotiations to end the war. In public, Kellogg invariably defers to Trump’s judgement on foreign policy; however, it is likely that he will be also driven by his own beliefs in his efforts to end the war.
Kellogg served 36 years in the U.S. military, including periods in the U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam and Cambodia, and in the 82nd Airborne Division in the First and Second Iraq Wars. Following his military retirement, Kellogg transitioned into government. In March 2016, he was named a foreign policy adviser to Trump's first presidential campaign. Subsequently, he served as the Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff of the United States National Security Council during Trump's first term. After the resignation of Michael Flynn in February 2017, Kellogg briefly assumed the position of acting national security adviser until H.R. McMaster's appointment. In April 2018, Vice President Mike Pence selected Kellogg as his national security adviser, a post he occupied until January 2021. Kellogg’s service in this post overlapped partially with that of his would-be predecessor, Kurt Volker, who served as the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017 to 2019, achieving no breakthrough in these talks.
Following Trump’s 2020 election loss, Kellogg was among the founding members of the America First Policy Institute think tank, where he is a co-chair. In November 2024, Kellogg’s return to government was confirmed with his selection as special envoy to Russia and Ukraine for Trump’s second term.
Kellogg’s chief responsibility as special envoy is to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Trump had previously pledged to end the war in “24 hours” after taking office, though this has since been pushed back. In his recent public statements, Kellogg has been stridently critical of the Biden administration for its sanctimonious attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders and its refusal to engage them in negotiations. In his manifesto of intent published by the America First Policy Institute in April 2024, Kellogg argued that “Biden’s hostile policy toward Russia not only needlessly made it an enemy of the United States, but it also drove Russia into the arms of China and led to the development of a new Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis.” Kellogg also criticized Joe Biden for his refusal to phone Putin, citing Trump’s record of consistent engagement with the Russian president. Nonetheless, Kellogg sees Russia as an adversary, acknowledging that “[t]he confrontation with Russia is a reality and will last decades.”
Kellogg has repeatedly attacked the Biden Administration for its lack of strategy for the war in Ukraine, calling the outgoing president’s approach “not a strategy, but a hope based on emotion.” At best, he argues, the current administration has made an ill-thought-through promise to support Ukraine “as long as it takes,” despite providing no clear criteria for success and withholding the weapons (such as ATACMS) needed by the Ukrainians to push the Russians back. At worst, Kellogg accuses the Biden Administration of treating Ukraine as a “proxy war” to weaken Putin’s regime at home.
Given that Trump has tasked him with ending the war in 100 days, it is no surprise that the retired lieutenant general has favored immediate peace talks as the best way to stop the war, even as he postponed a planned visit to Kyiv, which may be followed by a visit to Moscow. His latest statements suggest he wants to pursue a carrot-and-stick approach to bring the warring sides to an agreement. While Ukraine would be incentivized to negotiate by making continued military aid contingent upon its engagement in peace talks, Russia would be persuaded by a potential lifting of sanctions and the renunciation of Ukraine’s path to NATO membership.
Kellogg sees ending the war as a vital foreign policy objective since, in his view, it will allow the U.S. to undermine solidarity between the “axis” of authoritarian states. In interviews, he has stated his belief that “[i]t is important in international security to take actors off the stage. You need to work individually with each one of them.” Kellogg is hawkish on Iran, North Korea and China, believing each poses serious threats to the U.S. and to global security, and has criticized the Biden administration for its alleged weakness in dealing with these adversaries. In these respects, Kellogg’s approach and views align closely with those of Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz.
This compilation of Kellogg’s views covers the past two years. It is part of Russia Matters’ “Competing Views” rubric, where we share prominent American figures’ takes on issues pertaining to Russia, U.S.-Russian relations and broader U.S. policies affecting Russia. All sections may be updated with new or past statements. The quotes below are divided into categories similar to those in Russia Matters’ news and analysis digests, reflecting the most pertinent topic areas for U.S.-Russian relations broadly, and for the drivers of the two countries’ policies toward one another.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant comments.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- Kellogg advocates renewing U.S. diplomatic engagement with authoritarian leaders shunned by the Biden administration. Kellogg and Fred Fleitz wrote in the Washington Times in May 2024 that “the United States employed tough policies toward our adversaries… but kept the door open to diplomacy and dealing with these nations from a position of strength. This included… Mr. Trump’s personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which led North Korea to halt its nuclear tests and long-range missile tests.” (Washington Times, 05.09.24)
Also see Iran and its nuclear program section.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- In criticizing Biden, Kellogg says that he “resumed President Obama’s foolhardy efforts to appease Iran in the absurd hope of making it a U.S. partner for peace in the Middle East.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- Kellogg commented on the Iranian nuclear deal on Fox News in August 2024: “Every time you hear about the potential of Iran to getting a nuclear weapon… it’s a delaying game… We’re past the nuclear deal. We should be concerned now… about a nuclear breakout… This deal is gone. And we need to be worried and concerned about what happens if they have enough enriched uranium to build a bomb… the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, that’s all gone.” (X, 08.29.24)
- “Iranian influence has greatly diminished. Many of you have helped to build this potential…We know that inside Iran, the regime’s leaders lead by coercion and people pay the price.” (X, 01.11.25)
- America’s goal must be a “more friendly, stable, non-belligerent and a non-nuclear Iran… For the United States, a policy of maximum pressure must be reinstated, and it must be reinstated with the help of the rest of the globe, and that includes standing with the Iranian people and their aspirations for democracy.” (Fox News, 01.15.25)
- “Why are [the Iranians] going to [90% enrichment]? Because they want to destabilize the Middle East… this shows a real weakness… the Iranians know President Trump is coming back in. They know he’s strong, that he’s got a maximum pressure campaign against Iran… Russia is losing a massive amount of soldiers in Ukraine, it’s an asymmetric war, and they rely a lot on the Iranians for equipment… The path they’re on is not the same as the North Koreans… the Iranians won’t [provide troops]… But it shows weakness on both parts… They’re developing a dependence on each other because they’re afraid of what’s coming.” (Kellogg’s X account, 01.17.25)
Also see Counterterrorism section.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- “The Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people will have trouble accepting a negotiated peace that does not give them back all of their territory or, at least for now, hold Russia responsible for the carnage it inflicted on Ukraine. Their supporters will also. But as Donald Trump said at the CNN town hall in 2023, ‘I want everyone to stop dying.’ That’s our view, too.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “If Ukraine doesn't want to negotiate, fine, but then accept the fact that you can have enormous losses in your cities and accept the fact that you will have your children killed, accept the fact that you don't have 130,000 dead, you will have 230,000–250,000. Demographically, what does that do to the country?” (VOA News, 07.25.24)
- “When you look at the damage, when you look at what is happening in Ukraine, and the casualties alone are enormous. The Russian casualties and the Ukrainian casualties. This is where it stands… We want to get to a position where the war is actually over…. He’s [Trump] not trying to give something to Putin, to the Russians. [Trump]’s actually trying to save Ukraine, save their sovereignty… he wants to make [any agreement] fair and equitable, he has that said that repeatedly.” (Fox News, 01.08.25)
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “Biden’s feeble attempts at “integrated deterrence,” threatening sanctions and aid to Ukraine, failed in their intended purpose of deterring Putin’s aggression.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 12.20.23)
- “Some Republicans argue that the Ukraine conflict is a European matter of no consequence to the United States. Strategically, as his public comments reinforce, Trump disagrees. He sees ending the war as a major foreign policy issue—one that he plans to accomplish on day one.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 12.20.23)
- “The Biden Administration began in late 2022 to use the Ukrainian military to fight a proxy war to promote U.S. policy goals of weakening the Putin regime at home and destroying its military. It was not a strategy, but a hope based on emotion. It was not a plan for success.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)Kellogg quotes retired Col. Kurt Schlichter (U.S. Army) that “Ukraine is not losing because America hasn’t given it enough shells. Ukraine is losing because there aren’t enough Ukrainians. And I’m on the side of the Ukrainians. I helped train them. … We agree with President Trump and Col. Schlichter. America needs a new approach and a comprehensive strategy for the Ukraine War.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Christmas should be a time of a peace, yet Ukraine was brutally attacked on Christmas Day. Launching large-scale missile and drone attacked on Christmas Day. Launching large-scale missile and drone attacks on the day of the Lord’s birth is wrong.” (X, 12.25.24)
Military aid to Ukraine:
- “Biden pursued an overly cautious wartime strategy. Instead of clearly defining a goal of victory, Biden vowed to help Ukraine ‘as long as it takes.’ But this only raises the question: as long as it takes to do what? Biden should have provided Ukraine with the weapons it needed to win quickly, but instead, he was afraid of potential Russian ‘escalation’ and provided a cautious IV-drip of arms. Biden opposed providing many major weapons systems, like tanks, aircraft and long-range artillery before changing his mind. The result is that Ukraine has had enough weapons to fight but not enough to win.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 12.20.23)
- “Trump said, ‘I would tell Putin, if you don’t make a deal, we’re going to give him [Zelenskyy] a lot. We’re going to give [Ukraine] more than they ever got if we have to.’ … Trump might very well remove the Biden-eras constraints on arms transfers and give Ukraine the weapons it needs to win … If faced with the prospect of a costly military defeat, Putin may very well prefer negotiations.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 12.20.23)
- “Ukrainians wanted our block 2 ATACMS missile. We’re not giving it to them. This is just symbolic of what we’re not doing for Ukraine. A year ago, the Ukrainians had the Russians on their heels. If we had just provided air support, or more tanks, or more ATACMS, it could have changed the nature of the battlefield.” (X, 02.22.24)
- “Although some U.S. critics of military aid to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government might indeed be isolationists, the vast majority are Americans worried about whether America’s vital strategic interests are at stake in the Ukraine War, the potential of the involvement of U.S. military forces and whether America is engaged in a proxy war with Russia that could escalate into a nuclear conflict.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The Trump Administration promoted a strong deterrent approach by authorizing the first-ever lethal military aid package to Ukraine, equipping its armed forces with advanced Javelin anti-armor missiles, naval vessels and Mark VI patrol boats. This was a major break from the Obama administration, which agreed only to provide nonlethal military assistance despite passionate appeals by Ukrainian officials for U.S. arms to fight pro-Russian separatist rebels in the Donbas. President Obama refused to send weapons to Ukraine because he feared it would provoke Putin. President Trump disagreed and sent weapons to Ukraine as a sign of American strength and support for a friendly state.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The United States and its allies should have sent substantial lethal aid to Ukraine in the fall of 2021 to deter a Russian invasion… Biden ignored urgent appeals from Zelenskyy for military aid—especially anti-tank Javelins and anti-air Stingers—and warned Putin that the United States would send lethal aid to Ukraine if Russia invaded. Biden’s message conveyed U.S. weakness to Putin, implying he could use military intimidation to manipulate U.S. policy toward Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Biden failed to recognize until it was too late… that it was in America’s interests and the interests of global security for the United States to do everything possible short of direct U.S. military involvement to help Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The vast sum of support depleted U.S. military stockpiles, strained our defence industrial base, and jeopardized America’s military readiness.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “It is too late to avoid the possible consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sending weapons to an endless stalemate for these reasons is expensive virtue signaling and not a constructive policy to promote peace and global stability.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The Biden Administration should place a higher priority in stopping the huge influx of illegal immigrants crossing the U.S. southern border, the fentanyl crisis plaguing American communities and the deterioration of our military instead of spending tens of billions of dollars on weapons for the war in Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “You have to give more arms to them [Ukrainians] because you can’t trust the Russians. You just have to do it, and the question is, do you do this before Europe tires, Americans tire, Ukrainians tire? Two and a half years—that’s a long war and the destruction is enormous. Sometimes you have to look at what we call in America the long game. And that is security guarantees, financial support and military support.” (VOA News, 07.25.24)
- Kellogg argued in a Fox News interview in November 2024 that President Joe Biden's recent approval for Ukraine to use U.S.-provided longer-range missiles for deeper strikes into Russia—something Biden had denied Ukraine for months despite its pleas—was a positive development and has "actually given Trump more leverage." (WP, 11.28.24)
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
- Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022: “I don’t think sanctions are going to do anything… I think there was a way to finesse this a lot earlier and we didn’t do… We could have told everyone that Ukraine wasn’t going to join NATO. It was so corrupt anyway, probably the second most corrupt nation in Europe after Russia. All 30 nations in NATO are not going to approve Ukraine coming in.” (America First Policy Institute, 01.27.22)
- “Sanctions are not the way to do it [deter Russia], they’re just going to blow off sanctions. We did the same thing in 2014 when they went into Crimea. We sanctioned them and it didn’t bother them at all.” (America First Policy Institute, 01.27.22)
- “The Trump administration imposed strong sanctions against the Nord Stream II Pipeline, built to transport Russian natural gas from Russia to Germany, to halt its completion. Trump officials also pressured European states to delink from the Russian energy supply, an effort that undermined Russia’s ability to weaponize energy in the region— and one that Europe resisted until Russia invaded Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The Biden administration waived U.S. sanctions on the construction of the Russian Nord Stream II pipeline, a decision that garnered bipartisan opposition.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- Kellogg has also indicated that the Trump administration is open to discussing whether the U.S. can use frozen Russian assets to buy military aid for Ukraine; in his words, it is “on the table”. (X, 01.24.25)
Ukraine-related negotiations:
- "When you look at Putin, you can’t just say, ‘Well, stop the killing,’ because candidly, that’s not their mentality. That’s not how they do things,” he said. “So you have to approach a different way, and the president fits into that." (NY Post, 01.24.25)
- “Supporting the policy to bring Ukraine into NATO by this definition of ‘after the war,’ however, will only ensure a prolonged war by eliminating a feasible pathway to reaching a negotiated end state to the war. Moreover, Ukraine’s entrance into NATO threatens to bring the NATO allies and the U.S. into a direct military confrontation with Russia if either side were to violate the ceasefire. This could set the scene for a wider war.” (American First Policy Institute, co-written with Gloria McDonald, 11.02.23)
- “Bringing Ukraine into NATO under the terms of a cease-fire demonstrates the very real threat that admitting Ukraine into NATO during a frozen conflict constrained only by a cease-fire likely would bring America into direct military engagement with Russia.” (American First Policy Institute, co-written with Gloria McDonald, 11.02.23)
- “Bringing Ukraine into NATO while a cease-fire is in place and Russia still occupies Ukrainian territory threatens to derail future peace efforts toward a permanent end-state and, therefore, risks the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.” (American First Policy Institute, co-written with Gloria McDonald, 11.02.23)
- “Ukraine’s NATO status is one of the strongest leverage and bargaining chips it has in any peace deal with Russia. Pre-emptively granting Ukraine NATO membership while Russia still occupies Ukrainian territory with a cease-fire in place, however, reduces the incentive for Russia to abide by an agreement or even enter into peace talks.” (American First Policy Institute, co-written with Gloria McDonald, 11.02.23)
- “We cannot accept the consensus that peace talks are a sign of American defeat or that they are impossible while Russian President Vladimir Putin is in power.” (Washington Times, 02.23.24)
- “Why, after two years of war where Ukraine’s ability to ‘win,’ or militarily defeat Russia and liberate all its territory, seems increasingly unlikely and American resources become scarcer, would the president of the United States dismiss a call from a foreign leader to discuss peace?” (Washington Times, 02.23.24)
- “[T]he Biden administration has argued against the commencing of talks because of the widely held view that negotiations with Russia will never work because you cannot trust Mr. Putin, which means that negotiating with him is futile… The assessment that entering talks with Mr. Putin is futile and America must therefore pursue continuous indirect military engagement with Russia cannot be accepted by Americans as a feasible course of action from their commander in chief… If America can approach negotiations with Russia from a position of strength, such as enabling Ukraine to gain a significant tactical advantage on the battlefield and reestablishing credible U.S. deterrence, the U.S. can lead in moving this conflict toward resolution.” (Washington Times, 02.23.24)
- “Biden’s preference for using the Ukraine conflict as a proxy war to hurt Russia rather than help Ukraine win the war is also why the United States has done nothing to promote a cease-fire or a peace agreement… Under an America First approach to the Ukraine conflict, once it became a stalemate and a war of attrition, it was in the best interests of Ukraine, America and the world to seek a ceasefire and negotiate a peace agreement with Russia.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “In lieu of establishing direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, President Biden has eroded the diplomatic channels necessary to reach a negotiated end-state to the war. Biden has repeatedly demonized Putin by calling him a war criminal and a dictator and even alluding to supporting regime change in Russia… The president has yet to have a single phone call or meeting with Putin since the war began.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- Kellogg advocates “a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “To convince Putin to join peace talks, President Biden and other NATO leaders should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “We tell the Ukrainians, ‘You've got to come to the table, and if you don't come to the table, support from the United States will dry up.' And you tell Putin, 'He's got to come to the table and if you don't come to the table, then we'll give Ukrainians everything they need to kill you in the field.'" (Reuters, 06.25.24)
- “The Russians did clearly an unwarranted invasion of a sovereign state and this must be addressed… You want to make sure that Ukrainians are not put at the position when they’re operating from weaknesses, but from strength… Nobody is ever saying that: ‘Oh, we just have to make Ukrainians give up land and give it to Russia’… Ask yourself questions [sic] is this what’s best for Ukraine as a nation? I don’t care about Russia. I care about Ukraine.’” (VOA News, 07.25.24)
- When pressed in an interview on why Ukraine should negotiate, Kellogg said: “That is part of negotiation. That’s where both sides draw the red lines. That’s where both sides make the determination: this is what we're going to do or not do… Minsk agreements worked very well, didn't they? They're lousy. They didn't do anything because nobody trusted anybody, and nobody worked together. You had Minsk 1, failed; Minsk 2, failed. Budapest memorandum, failed. So, you have to have some kind of degree of confidence and security.” (VOA News, 07.25.24)
- Kellogg acknowledges that Moscow’s previous demand at Istanbul (that Ukraine is “demilitarized”) is an “unacceptable demand.” He proposes the presence of an interlocutor to have the “actual” negotiation. He rejects Turkish President Recep Erdogan, German Chancellor Olaf Sholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and the British Government. He suggests Klaus Iohannis, president of Romania. (VOA News, 07.25.24)
- “President-elect Trump has been clear the war must end. This is his top international priority, and, as his envoy, I am ready to help advanced peace.” (X, 12.23.24)
- "This is a war that needs to end, and I think he can do it in the near term.” Kellogg defined the "near term" as 100 days out from Trump’s Jan. 20 inauguration. (Kyiv Independent, 01.08.25)
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- “It was in America’s interest to make a deal with Putin on Ukraine joining NATO, especially by January 2022 when there were signs that a Russian invasion was imminent. This was the time when the Biden Administration should have dropped its obsession with publicly criticizing Putin and worked toward a compromise.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “We believe the most important way the America First approach to national security could have affected the Ukraine War was to prevent it. A strong and decisive president who stood up to Russian President Vladimir Putin with a tough and coherent U.S. foreign policy for Russia, Ukraine and NATO could have prevented Putin from ordering the Feb. 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The America First approach also requires a strong military, the prudent use of U.S. military force and keeping U.S. troops out of unnecessary and unending wars. It means working in alliances and with partners to promote regional security while requiring alliance members and allies to carry their full weight in defending security in the region.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Trump dissuaded Putin from invading neighboring states because his leadership and foreign policies promoted deterrence and peace through strength. Putin saw in Trump a strong and decisive president who was prepared to use all tools of American power—peaceful and coercive—to defend U.S. interests.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “A prolonged war in Ukraine also risks deepening the alliance between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which has been strengthened by the conflict.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Biden’s approach ignored Putin’s fear of Ukraine moving closer to the West and joining NATO. Although Biden and his senior officials never explicitly called for Ukraine to join NATO, they dangled NATO membership before Ukraine and repeatedly said this decision was up to Ukraine… these statements and gestures appeared to be more than implicit endorsements of Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership in the near future. Putin’s paranoia about Ukraine joining NATO grew in September 2021, when the Kremlin strongly objected to Ukraine joining joint military operations with NATO members and said the expansion of NATO military infrastructure in Ukraine would cross a Russian ‘red line.’ … As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine, the Biden Administration scolded Putin and threatened ‘unprecedented’ sanctions. Instead of using negotiations to de-escalate tensions, Biden reiterated to Putin and Zelenskyy that NATO membership for Ukraine was still in Ukraine’s hands.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “It was in America’s best interests to maintain peace with Putin and not provoke and alienate him with aggressive globalist human rights and pro-democracy campaigns or an effort to promote Ukrainian membership in NATO. It made no sense even to allude to supporting eventual NATO membership for Ukraine, as this would require a unanimous vote of NATO members, which at the time was highly unlikely.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “The truth is that NATO members stepped up to help Ukraine because it was in their security interests. It had nothing to do with the Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Putin is solidifying the alliance he’s got with China and North Korea as well, because he really needs the armaments that North Korea can provide. It is important in international security to take actors off the stage. You have to work individually with each one of them. What’s happened, is that they have all come together… When you don’t have that personal dialogue [with these authoritarian leaders], the whole thing falls apart.” (X, 06.18.24)
- “It is often argued that fighting in Asia would require mostly U.S. naval and air forces, while European fighting will mostly call on ground forces. This is only partly correct and too comforting. Air defenses would be in strong demand in both theaters, as would logistic assets for strategic air and sea lift. Even more critically, in practical terms, it is extremely difficult and taxing both politically and economically to fight one great power war, let alone two at the same time. In other words, should the United States be involved in a conflict against China over Taiwan, the odds that it would come to Europe’s defense if Russia simultaneously invades a NATO country are much lower than in the case of sequential conflicts.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 08.16.24)
- “The current Ukraine war of attrition will likely result in some sort of armistice. That would free up a resentful Russia to leave some forces on the Ukraine border and aim the bulk of its military to attack NATO countries to its west. It has a large military and a humming war economy. The logic of war may now be hardwired into Moscow’s politics and planning.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 08.16.24)
- “The confrontation with Russia is a reality and will last decades. The expansionist bloc countries of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are rapidly growing their military capabilities and have shown themselves willing to use and threaten to use military power to achieve this revisionist aims.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 08.16.24)
- “I don’t think World War III has begun, but we’re on the precipice… now you’ve got an axis together [of China, North Korean, Iran and Russia]… You’re seeing the scene starting to build… that I think nationally, is going to be President Trump’s biggest thing which he’s going to have to solve, which is the fight there in Ukraine with Russia.” (Kellogg’s X account, 11.22.24)
- In a piece for The National Interest co-written by Kellogg: “A second Trump administration would define China as a “formidable military and economic adversary.” It would start from the understanding that “the Chinese Communist Party, represents the most comprehensive threat to our national security since the fall of the Soviet Union three decades ago.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 11.25.24)
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “Biden’s hostile policy toward Russia not only needlessly made it an enemy of the United States, but it also drove Russia into the arms of China and led to the development of a new Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis. China and Russia hope to use this axis to challenge the current U.S.-led world order and the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Russia has used this axis to obtain attack drones from Iran and missiles and artillery shells from North Korea for its invasion forces in Ukraine.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
Nuclear arms:
- “The United States no longer tolerated Russia’s repeated nuclear treaty violations and withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. The Trump Administration also began the process of withdrawing from the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia in hopes of negotiating a stronger and more effective treaty that also would include China’s nuclear arsenal.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- Kellogg told Fox News that Washington should call Russia’s bluff in response to Putin’s recent ballistic missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro and threats of further escalation. “[Putin] used [the nuclear-capable missile] for psychological reasons,” Kellogg said. “He didn’t use it because it was militarily effective… but because he is kind of saying to the West ‘see what I can do?’” Rather than “back off,” he added, the U.S. and Western allies should “lean in, because Putin will not start a nuclear war in Europe.” (FT, 12.02.24)
Counterterrorism:
- After the Crocus City Hall attacks in Russia, Kellogg told Fox News “we picked up eight ISIS-K individuals from Tajikistan who crossed the southern border illegally. Why are they here?” Kellogg suggested an attack similar to that perpetrated against Crocus City Hall was increasingly likely due to lax border controls. (X, 06.24.24)
- “Iran’s defense spending has increased since the Biden-Harris administration stopped enforcing the Trump-era economic sanctions. Iran has also used its newfound wealth to fund its terrorist proxies.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 11.25.24)
Conflict in Syria:
- “In light of Trump’s… bombing [of] Syria for using chemical weapons on civilians…Putin could not be sure how Trump would respond to Russian belligerence… After the Russian mercenary Wagner Group advanced on U.S. bases in Syria, they were met with immediate and decisive action when President Trump authorized punitive airstrikes against them. Those airstrikes set back Russia’s operations and influence in the region.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
Cyber security/AI:
- No significant comments.
Elections interference:
- No significant comments.
Energy exports from CIS:
- "Russia is getting billions of dollars of money from oil sales. What if you drop that to $45 a barrel, which is basically the baseline break-even point." (NY Post, 01.24.25)
- “We … call for placing levies on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
- “Trump condemned Germany’s support of the Nord Stream II pipeline, saying, “Germany, as far as I’m concerned, is captive to Russia because it’s getting so much of its energy from Russia”… “Germany will become totally dependent on Russian energy if it does not immediately change course.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
Climate change:
- No significant comments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant comments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- “Trump was open to cooperation with Russia and dialogue with Putin. Trump expressed respect for Putin as a world leader and did not demonize him in public statements. Trump’s political opponents criticized him for this, but Trump’s approach was no different from how multiple U.S. presidents dealt with Soviet leaders during the Cold War. This was a transactional approach to U.S.-Russia relations in which Trump used his experience as a dealmaker to find ways to coexist and lower tensions with Putin while standing firm on American security interests.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “During a February 2024 interview with Putin by journalist Tucker Carlson, Putin provided a long, nonsensical account of Russian and Ukrainian history in which he disputed Ukraine’s nationality and history and repeated his ridiculous claims that Russia invaded Ukraine in part to fight Nazism in the country.” (America First Policy Institute, co-written with Fred Fleitz, 04.29.24)
Defense and aerospace:
- In February 2024, Kellogg speculated that raised concerns over Russian space and hypersonic weapons were being used to drum up support for military aid to Ukraine. (X, 02.14.24).
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant comments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
See North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, Iran’s nuclear and missile program, Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations and Conflict in Syria.
Ukraine:
- No significant comments.
Other post-Soviet republics:
- Writing with Dan Negrea, Kellogg wrote in August 2024 that “Russia has shown by its expansionist and illegal wars against Ukraine and Georgia that it is a chronic threat to the peace and security of Europe.” (The National Interest, co-written with Dan Negrea, 08.16.24)
Chris Conway
Chris Conway is a student associate with Russia Matters and a graduate student at Harvard University,
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the individual quoted. AP Photo/Mariam Zuhaib.