6 Ideas to Explore

1. “Our support for Ukraine will not waver, NATO will not be divided, and we will not tire,” U.S. President Joe Biden told an audience in Poland one day after visiting Kyiv to meet the Ukrainian leadership. In his Feb. 21 speech at Warsaw’s Royal Castle, Biden said one of the aims that Vladimir Putin pursued with his invasion of Ukraine a year ago was to attain Finlandization of NATO.  “Instead he got … the NATOization of Finland—and Sweden,” the U.S. president said. While seeking to convince Putin of NATO’s cohesion and its continued support for Ukraine, Biden sought to assure the Russian people that “the United States and the nations of Europe do not seek to control or destroy Russia.”
2. Vladimir Putin announced suspension of Russia’s participation in the New START treaty and ordered his government agencies to be ready to conduct a nuclear test in case U.S. carries one out. “No one should have any dangerous illusions that global strategic parity can be destroyed,” Putin warned, invoking Russia’s nuclear arsenal yet again to try dissuading the West from escalating aid to Ukraine. In his address to parliament on Feb. 21 the Russian leader also reiterated his usual grievances vis-à-vis the West, accusing the U.S. and its allies of using Ukraine as a “battering ram against Russia” and seeking to finish his country “once and for all.” While signaling preparedness for a drawn-out conflict with the Kremlin’s external foes, Putin also appealed to Russia’s rich to stop seeking a haven in the West and start developing projects in Russia. Putin’s speech demonstrated he is nowhere close to winding down the war, according to the FT’s Tony Barber.
3. Putin got many things wrong when calculating whether to invade Ukraine, but there are four things he did get right, according to Stephen Walt of Harvard University: Russia could ride out sanctions; the Russian people would tolerate high costs; other states would follow their own interests and would not universally condemn Putin for his actions; and Ukraine’s fate was more important to Russia than to the West. “When both sides start thinking that their vital interests require inflicting a decisive defeat on the opponent, ending wars gets harder and escalation becomes more likely,” Walt writes in FP.
4. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that smaller states can “make themselves an unappetizing meal for their larger neighbors” by building up their own military capabilities and receiving support from other countries, according to Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center. For such a dual approach to work, however, policymakers need to "reject premature triumphalism, acknowledge the practical limits to … power, learn to delegate defense to the states at the pointy end of the spear and grow more comfortable with the ambiguity needed,” she writes in FA.
5. The EU should not rush to admit Ukraine, according to Bloomberg editors. “Supposing Ukraine prevails in defending its homeland, it will [still] be a big, poor country with a shattered economy, broken institutions and a long history of corruption,” they write. For as long as this war goes on, Europe should focus on sustaining and increasing its material aid to Kyiv, according to Bloomberg.
6. The Kremlin’s outreach to African countries is meant to help Russia compensate for repeated failures to anchor ex-Soviet republics economically and politically, according to Vadim Zaytsev, an independent researcher of Russia's foreign policy. One aim of this outreach is to try to create the impression that “the cautious neutrality of most African countries” is actually evidence of their “commitment to a profound partnership” with Moscow. In reality, however, “the African elites will gladly join [the Kremlin] in condemning neocolonialism, ignoring the colonial nature of the war in Ukraine, but they are hardly likely to risk their ties with the EU or United States to help Russia in any practical way,” Zaytsev writes in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“There can be no real peace in Ukraine without justice,” Oleksandra Matviichuk, head of the Center for Civil Liberties in Kyiv, which shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, WP, 02.19.23. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• "I'm sometimes asked why the Russians shot civilians in Bucha and left their bodies lying in the street until the area was liberated. My answer is simple: This cruelty is a direct result of the impunity that Russia has enjoyed for decades. The Russian military has committed horrible war crimes in Chechnya, in Georgia, in Moldova, in Mali, in Syria and in Libya and has never been punished for it."
• "That's why the democratic world's actions must demonstrate that the guilty in Ukraine cannot be allowed to hide behind Putin. Sooner or later, those who have committed crimes must be held accountable for what they have done with their own hands."
• "The guarantee of accountability could help to reduce the brutality of the violations that the Russians continue to commit in Ukraine every day; indeed, it can even save lives. A war turns people into numbers. Only justice can give names back to the victims. Only justice can restore their human dignity."

"Putin’s War Is Crippling Ukraine’s Economy—and Russia’s, Too," Bloomberg columnist Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.16.23.

• "Russia’s onslaught has obviously crippled Ukraine, and it’s unclear what it will take for the country to recover in our lifetime. Gross domestic product fell more than 30% in 2022, the steepest decline since Ukraine gained independence three decades ago."
  • "The physical damage is compounded by Ukraine’s deep corruption, which remains entrenched even as the war has rendered theft of public funds that much more morally reprehensible than it is in peacetime."
• "What about the economic consequences for Russia? The country’s GDP dropped only 3% in 2022, according to the Bloomberg consensus estimate. … The Bloomberg consensus on Russia’s GDP in 2023 is zero growth, compared with an expansion of 2% for Ukraine."
• "It’s increasingly evident that neither side can emerge an economic winner—no matter what happens on the battlefield. Both will suffer crippling consequences long after the last shells fly."

“Russia Has Already Lost in the Long Run,” Harvard Kennedy School graduate student Brent Peabody, FP, 02.13.23.

• "Of course, one can argue that, however much the war has cost Russia, it has cost Ukraine exponentially more. This is true. Ukraine’s economy shrank by more than 30 percent last year, while Russia’s economy contracted by just about 3 percent. And this says nothing of the human toll Ukraine has suffered. But … Western sanctions on Russia will play out as a slow burn, not an immediate collapse. And while Russia enters a protracted period of economic and demographic decline, once peace comes, Ukraine will have the combined industrial capacity of the EU, United States, and United Kingdom to support it as the West’s newest institutional member—precisely the outcome Putin hoped to avoid. Russia may yet make new territorial gains in the Donbas. But in the long run, such gains are immaterial—Russia has already lost."

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Kyiv and Moscow Are Fighting Two Different Wars," Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London, FA, 02.17.23.

“The Ukraine war is a slugfest that Ukrainians will win,” Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, who commanded the 1st Armored Division during the Iraq surge and later U.S. Army Europe, WP, 02.20.23.

• "Since December … the front might not have moved much, there has been significant fighting and extensive casualties on both sides. This phase is best understood not as a stalemate, but as Ukraine struggling to survive a Russian onslaught."
• "Ukraine's armed forces have admirably adapted in each phase of this fight, learning lessons from training they received over the last decade, and from the scars earned on the battlefield itself. And Russia has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to do the same. It will remain difficult for Russia to change—simply because it can't. A nation's army is drawn from its people, and a nation's army reflects the character and values of the society. While equipment, doctrine, training and leadership are important qualities of any army, the essence of a fighting force comes from what the nation represents. Putin's autocratic kleptocracy is thus far proving no match for Ukraine's agile democracy."

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“How to break the stalemate in Ukraine,” Editorial Board, WP, 02.18.23.

• "To thwart Russia and safeguard Ukraine's sovereignty, the United States and its European allies have little choice but to intensify their military, economic and diplomatic support for Kyiv. That means equipping Ukrainian forces with more decisive weapons and in greater numbers, imposing more aggressive sanctions on Moscow and galvanizing a more muscular international coalition to isolate and ostracize Russia. That agenda is urgent; the status quo of relatively static battle lines is untenable."
• "The main purpose of beefing up Ukraine's arsenal is not to kill more Russian soldiers… Rather, the aim should be to convince Russia's dictator of the futility of his military escalation by demonstrating that the West—richer, stronger, more technologically advanced—will not scrimp on the hardware needed to repel his attacks. Only when the Kremlin grasps that victory is impossible—that it cannot hold sovereign Ukrainian territory seized illegally—will negotiations be possible."
• "Russian GDP contracted much less than expected last year and is projected to grow, slightly, this year. That should be a signal to Mr. Biden and European leaders to undertake a more thorough crackdown."
  • "One place to start is with more than $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves, currently frozen in Western and Japanese banks. … [T]here is precedent for seizing central bank funds; Iraq was compelled to pay more than $50 billion in restitution in the decades after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990."
  • "Western companies that have not yet severed ties with Russia can be pressed to do so."
  • "The price ceiling on Russian oil exports, set at $60 a barrel by the G-7 last year, could be lowered further, slowing the flow of revenue that undergirds Putin's war machine."
  • "The European Council should also take up the question of banning imports of Russian gas, both to deprive Moscow of an easy source of revenue and a means of political leverage."
• "As for the Russian autocrat, he has nothing left to escalate with other than manpower and nuclear weapons. If the West adequately arms Ukraine, he cannot win with the former and is very unlikely to resort to the latter, which would alienate his most important ally, China. A tactical nuclear strike by Russia would be one of history's greatest acts of strategic self-immolation, cementing Russia's pariah status for decades."

“How to Beat the Wagner Group,” Christopher Faulkner, an assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, and Marcel Plichta, a former U.S. Defense Department analyst and doctoral candidate at the University of St. Andrews, .

• "Despite consensus in Washington that the Wagner Group is an abhorrent problem both inside Ukraine and out, what so-called victory against the group looks like is less clear. Stopping Wagner’s activities writ large seems improbable, and U.S. officials have not yet answered the strategic question of what constitutes success. Short of incapacitating the group, the United States and its allies might measure success in curtailing Wagner’s spread to new theaters and restricting its ability to fulfill ongoing contracts."
• "Although this is within reach and addressing Wagner’s crimes should be a short-term priority, Washington must remain mindful of the fact that private military companies are as much a symptom of instability as a cause. Even if Wagner itself becomes defunct, Russia will have no shortage of combat veterans looking for work and can promote alternative private military companies with their own illicit financial networks. So long as conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa continue to grow in scale and intensity, transactional security services like those provided by the Wagner Group will remain in high demand."

Ukraine-related negotiations:

"To Save Ukraine, End the War," Editorial Board, The Nation, 02.16.23.

• "A diplomatic settlement will not be easy to achieve. Both sides will have to make concessions. Ukraine will need security guarantees, resources for rebuilding—and a future within Europe. But it will have to surrender hopes for regaining all the territory it has lost since 2014. Russia will need to relinquish much of the territory it claims to have annexed. Eventually, it will need relief from international sanctions."
• "We must reject the siren song of those who would fight to the last Ukrainian. Given the suffering they have endured, Ukrainians may be understandably reluctant to accept a settlement. But the U.S. and its NATO partners surely know that time is not on Ukraine’s side. The Western unity so vital to Ukraine’s defense is already beginning to fracture."
• "Russia—and Putin—has also paid a high price for its aggression. Ukraine has suffered terrible losses but gained national cohesion and confidence. To save Ukraine—and to avoid the risk of a truly catastrophic, possibly nuclear, great power conflict—it is time to seek an end to the war. For that to happen, the U.S. and its allies must now lead the push for peace."

"There is no quick path to peace in Ukraine," Gideon Rachman, FT, 02.20.23.

• "While the Russian military has performed worse than expected, the Russian economy has performed better. … By contrast, the Ukrainian economy is in deep trouble and dependent on western aid. For this reason, influential western analysts argue that time is not on Ukraine’s side—and that if Kyiv is to win, it must do so quickly."
• "The Ukrainians still have to consider the possibility that western support could erode over time. Both Republicans and Democrats in the large U.S. congressional delegation in Munich were adamant that American backing for Ukraine is rock-solid. But the U.S. presidential election could change the atmosphere. The political climate could also shift in Europe, if populists make further breakthroughs."
• "This, of course, is what Russia is relying on. As one western official puts it: 'Putin thinks we lack strategic patience and will eventually lose interest.' But just as Moscow is hoping that western resolve will crack, so Ukraine and its allies are watching Russia closely for any signs of second thoughts or threats to Putin. Because both sides have some reason to hope that the other will crack, they both have an incentive to keep fighting."
• "It is right to push for a quick resolution to this war. It may be more realistic to expect a long conflict."

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine," Defense Priorities, 02.13.23.

• Emma Ashford, Stimson Center: "Perhaps the most dangerous lesson that policymakers could take from the war in Ukraine is the widely touted notion that the war is a triumph of Western values and security cooperation, reinforcing the moral imperative for the United States to defend democracy everywhere. In reality, the war in Ukraine is more a reflection of the re-emergence of great power competition."
• Liana Fix, Council on Foreign Relations: "[The West's] reactive approach needs to change, to prevent the second tragic anniversary of Russia’s invasion being followed by a third and fourth… Instead of only reacting to Russia’s actions (or inactions), the West should proactively define with Kyiv the outcome that it would like to see in 2023 and equip Ukraine accordingly. One such potential outcome could be to break up the land bridge to Crimea and isolate Russian forces in the south and east from each other, bringing Ukraine closer to the pre-invasion lines."
• Thomas Graham, Council on Foreign Relations: "For many in the United States, its role in the Ukraine conflict has been a welcomed reminder of the 'indispensable' role the country plays in Europe and elsewhere on the global stage. But a sober look ahead leads to a different conclusion. Given the emergence of China as a peer competitor and the mounting strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, the United States needs a Europe with credible hard power capabilities that can exercise at least a modicum of strategic autonomy, not perhaps in dealing with Russia but certainly with the other security challenges it will face at home (in the Balkans, for example) and in contiguous regions."
• Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft: "The first lesson of the Russia-Ukraine conflict so far is a very old one: war’s ability to surprise. Very few military experts expected Russian strategy and tactics in the first months of the war to be so deeply incompetent and Ukrainian resistance to be so determined and skillful… A second military lesson is also old and even a constant in military history: the ability of an army that stands on the defensive in urban areas to hold superior attacking forces at bay."
• Stephen Pifer, Brookings Institution and Stanford University: "The takeaway from the 'do not underestimate' lesson is that the Ukrainian military, properly supplied with Western weapons and ammunition, can defeat and drive out the Russian military or, at a minimum, make enough progress on the battlefield that Moscow will change course and pursue a negotiated settlement on terms that Kyiv can accept. A long war offers no advantages to Ukraine or the West. Ukraine’s partners should act now to give them the capabilities, including ATACMS missiles and F-16 fighters, needed to prevail sooner rather than later."
• Barry Posen, MIT: "Those who pushed hard for NATO enlargement may not wish to think about their possible share of the political responsibility for President Putin’s decision to go to war. … But we should try to learn something from this tragic war that might be of use later. When we take actions that seem highly inimical to the power and security positions of rival nation states, however attractive those actions may be on ideological, ethical, or even strategic grounds, we should also be alert to the possibility that we are pushing too hard and may produce the opposite of the desired outcomes."
• Angela Stent, Brookings Institution and Georgetown University: "As long as President Putin and those around him who share an imperial mindset and nostalgia for the time when Russia dominated its neighbors remain in power, it will be difficult to deter future invasions of Russia’s neighbors. … However, once the war ends, the United States will have to redouble its efforts, along with its NATO allies and partners, to create disincentives for future Russian aggression."
• Stephen Walt, Harvard Kennedy School: "First, the war reminds us that states in the international system typically unite to oppose overt acts of aggression… The second lesson is that 'it ain’t over till it’s over.' … Successful counteroffensives last summer reinforced Kyiv’s hopes of regaining all its lost territory, including Crimea. Russia is still a major power, however, with more than three times Ukraine’s population and deep reserves of military equipment. Its leaders see the war as an existential conflict that Russia must win… The third lesson—and arguably the most important—is that this war would have been far less likely if the United States had adopted a strategy of foreign policy restraint."

“What Putin Got Right,” Stephen M. Walt of Harvard, FP, 02.15.23.

• "Russian President Vladimir Putin got many things wrong when he decided to invade Ukraine. … But if we are honest with ourselves … we should acknowledge that Russia’s president got some things right, too":
  • "Putin went to war convinced that Russia could ride out any sanctions we might impose, and he’s been proved right up till now."
  • "Second, Putin correctly judged that the Russian people would tolerate high costs and that military setbacks were not going to lead to his ouster."
  • "Third, Putin understood that other states would follow their own interests and that he would not be universally condemned for his actions."
  • "Most important of all: Putin understood that Ukraine’s fate was more important to Russia than it was to the West."
• "[A] fundamental asymmetry of interest and motivation is why the United States, Germany, and much of the rest of NATO have calibrated their responses so carefully, and why U.S. President Joe Biden ruled out sending U.S. troops from the get-go."
  •  
    • "Given this asymmetry of motivation, we are trying to stop Russia without U.S. troops getting directly involved. Whether this approach will work is still unknown."
    • "Recognizing this asymmetry also explains why nuclear threats have only limited utility and why fears of nuclear blackmail are misplaced. … Nobody wants to use even one nuclear weapon, but the side that cares more about a particular issue will be willing to run greater risks, especially if vital interests are at stake. For this reason, we cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that Russia would use a nuclear weapon if it were about to suffer a catastrophic defeat, and this realization places limits on how far we should be willing to push it."
      • "Does this mean we are succumbing to 'nuclear blackmail'? Could Putin use such threats to win additional concessions elsewhere? The answer is no, because the asymmetry of motivation favors us the further he tries to go. If Russia tried to coerce others into making concessions on issues where their vital interests were engaged, its demands would fall on deaf ears. Imagine Putin calling Biden and saying that he might launch a nuclear strike if the United States refused to cede Alaska back to Russia. Biden would laugh and tell him to call back when he was sober. A rival’s coercive nuclear threats have little or no credibility when the balance of resolve favors us, and it is worth remembering that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever engaged in successful nuclear blackmail during the long Cold War—even against non-nuclear states—despite the enormous arsenals at their disposal."
• "Unfortunately, when both sides start thinking that their vital interests require inflicting a decisive defeat on the opponent, ending wars gets harder and escalation becomes more likely."

“The Kremlin’s Grand Delusions. What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Putin’s Regime,” Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, FA, 02.15.23.

“Remarks by President Biden Ahead of the One-Year Anniversary of Russia’s Brutal and Unprovoked Invasion of Ukraine” at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, Whitehouse.gov, 02.21.23.

• "When Russia invaded, it wasn’t just Ukraine being tested. The whole world faced a test for the ages. Europe was being tested. America was being tested. NATO was being tested. All democracies were being tested."
• "When President Putin ordered his tanks to roll into Ukraine, he thought we would roll over. He was wrong."
  • "Instead of an easy victory … Putin left with burnt-out tanks and Russia’s forces … in disarray."
  • "He thought he’d get the Findalization [Finlandization] of NATO. Instead, he got the NATOization of Finland—and Sweden."
  • "He thought NATO would fracture and divide. Instead, NATO is more united and more unified than ever."
  • "He thought he could weaponize energy to crack your resolve… Instead, we’re working together to end Europe’s dependence on … Russian fossil fuels."
  • "He thought autocrats like himself were tough and leaders of democracies were soft. And then, he met the iron will of America and the nations everywhere that refused to accept a world governed by fear and force."
  • "He found himself at war with a nation led by a man whose courage would be forged in fire and steel: President Zelensky."
• "Putin no longer doubts the strength of our coalition. But he still doubts our conviction. He doubts our staying power. He doubts our continued support for Ukraine. He doubts whether NATO can remain unified. But there should be no doubt: Our support for Ukraine will not waver, NATO will not be divided, and we will not tire."
• "[N]o one can turn away their eyes from the atrocities Russia is committing against the Ukrainian people. It’s abhorrent."
• "Tonight, I speak once more to the people of Russia. The United States and the nations of Europe do not seek to control or destroy Russia. The West was not plotting to attack Russia, as Putin said today. And millions of Russian citizens who only want to live in peace with their neighbors are not the enemy."
• "It’s simple. If Russia stopped invading Ukraine, it would end the war. If Ukraine stopped defending itself against Russia, it would be the end of Ukraine. That’s why, together, we’re making sure Ukraine can defend itself."
• "Let there be no doubt, the commitment of the United States to our NATO Alliance and Article 5 is rock solid. … And every member of NATO knows it. And Russia knows it as well. An attack against one is an attack against all. It’s a sacred oath. A sacred oath to defend every inch of NATO territory."

“Putin’s ultimate aim is to seal Russia off from the West,” editor Tony Barber, FT, 02.21.23.

• "Putin’s state of the nation speech … offered no hope that he would wind down the war … or retreat from his ambition of carving up the Ukrainian state. But his speech also highlighted the way his war is closely linked to a parallel effort to stamp out domestic dissent and seal off Russia from what he condemns as hostile or degenerate Western influences. In other words, Putin’s objectives are not only permanent territorial conquest in Ukraine but the reconstruction of Russian society on a permanent, non-Western basis, reversing a trend that has proceeded in fits and starts since Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953."
• "Putin’s first aim is reason enough for the Ukrainian people to continue their war of self-defense. But his second objective underlines how wide a gulf has emerged between his vision of Russia and a Ukrainian society that has identified ever more closely with the West since … 2014."
• "Confirmation that the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations extends beyond the Ukraine war appeared in Putin’s statement that Moscow is to suspend its participation in the New START treaty."
• "Yet the broad thrust of Putin’s speech was contained in his assertions that Russia is under military, political, economic and cultural assault from the West and that Ukraine’s pro-Western leadership is a pawn in this strategy."
• "In an apparent reference to the arguments of some commentators … that the Russian state itself might disintegrate under the pressures of the Ukraine war, Putin attacked the West for 'making a bet on national traitors' to 'break up Russia from within.'"
• "He asserted that the Russian economy was becoming more self-reliant thanks to Western sanctions, and he reinforced his commitment to inculcating his country’s education system with non-Western, patriotic values."
• "It was significant that, at different moments in his speech, Putin poured disdain on Russian business oligarchs … and praised the distinctive historical tradition of Russian identity rooted in the Orthodox Christian religion. In effect, Putin was warning business elites that the reconfigured state and society of his imagination would have no place for the Western-leaning tendencies that began to shape much of Russia’s economy during the 1990s."
• "The president sought to cloak his rule in the legitimacy of what he sees as the pre-communist tradition of a powerful, centralized state that organizes Russian society behind a common purpose. For Putin, one element of that common purpose is an unrelenting and still incomplete military campaign in Ukraine. No end to the war seems probable in the near future."

"Ukraine and the Contingency of Global Order: What If the War Had Gone Differently—or Takes a Sudden Turn?" Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins SAIS, FA, 02.14.23.

“The Persistence of Great-Power Politics. What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry,” Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center, FA, 02.20.23.

"'Not one inch’: unpicking Putin’s deadly obsession with the details of history," Mary Elise Sarotte of Johns Hopkins SAIS, FT, 02.20.23.

• "Though it launched the first major European land war of the 21st century and is one of only two strategic nuclear powers to arise in the 20th, Moscow has failed at a quintessentially 19th-century challenge. It has botched the imperial incorporation of a proximate territory. As the Yale historians Paul Kennedy and Arne Westad have argued, states that over-extend themselves in such a profound way tend to meet unhappy fates in the long run. But they do a lot of damage on their way down."
• "A year has made it apparent that Moscow has already caused outcomes it did not want for itself: more rather than fewer NATO activities, munitions and even members on its borders. Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, Turkish objections notwithstanding. Finland alone will add 830 more miles to the NATO-Russian border. Germany and other European states are, together with the United States, sending tanks—while also increasing their energy independence from Russia."
• "The greatest damage has, of course, been done to Ukrainians. They have faced unspeakable war crimes and immense suffering with bravery and dignity. Further from the front, others will be forced to adapt to bitter new realities as well: a new generation of Western policymakers will have to learn the rigors of great-power military competition in Europe. Sadly, the European past provides abundant examples for them to study. As I will be telling my classes again this week: History matters. And so does the unravelling of twisted tales."

“The West Shouldn’t Be Losing So Many Hearts and Minds. A refusal to face up to its own imperialist past is giving Vladimir Putin and other demagogues a free pass,” Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra, Bloomberg, 02.13.23.

• "Western political and media classes are only just becoming aware of the problem and its magnitude: how, for instance, the majority-white nations of Europe and North America appear more and more isolated in their accelerating military and economic campaign against Russia. In a recent poll, more Indians blamed either NATO or the U.S. than Russia for the war in Ukraine. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, one of the most admired leaders in the Global South, believes that 'it’s not just Putin who is guilty. The U.S. and the EU are also guilty.' Popular support for Putin has been widespread in Indonesia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Putin’s anti-colonial rhetoric also increasingly falls on receptive ears in Africa."
• "Today, Western nations denounce Putin’s aggression while tolerating, if not nurturing, at home a racial and civilizational arrogance derived from their own colonialist pasts. The world’s opportunistic anti-colonialists may well win this propaganda war by default."

Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly (in Russian and English), Kremlin.ru, 02.21.23. Clues from Russian Views.

• "Our relations [with the U.S.] have degraded and all the ‘credit’ goes to the U.S."
• "Judging by the information we received, there was no doubt that everything would be in place by February 2022 for launching yet another bloody punitive operation in Donbas… Crimea and Sevastopol would be the next target."
• "We are defending human lives and our common home, while the West seeks unlimited power."
• "I would like to recall that, in the 1930s, the West had virtually paved the way to power for the Nazis in Germany. In our time, they started turning Ukraine into an 'anti-Russia.' … [T]his project is not new. … [It] dates back to the 19th century. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland had conceived it for one purpose—that is, to deprive Russia of these historical territories that are now called Ukraine. .… The West expedited the implementation of this project today by supporting the 2014 coup."
• "We are not at war with the people of Ukraine. I have made that clear many times. The people of Ukraine have become hostages of the Kiev regime and its Western handlers… The current Ukrainian regime is serving not national interests but the interests of third countries. The West is using Ukraine as a battering ram against Russia and as a testing range."
• "The Western elite make no secret of their goal, which is, I quote, 'Russia’s strategic defeat.' What does this mean to us? This means they plan to finish us once and for all."
• "Millions of people in the West realize that they are being led to a spiritual disaster… We will protect our children from degradation and degeneration."
• "Clearly, the West will try to undermine and divide our society and to bet on the fifth columnists who, throughout history, and I want to emphasize this, have been using the same poison of contempt for their own Fatherland and the desire to make money by selling this poison to anyone who is willing to pay for it."
• "I am proud, and I think we are all proud that our multi-ethnic nation, the absolute majority of our citizens, have taken a principled stance on the special military operation."
• "The share of latest systems in Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces is more than 91%."
• "At the beginning of February of this year, NATO issued a statement that contained an actual demand for Russia to return, as they put it, to the implementation of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty [New START], including admission of [U.S.] inspectors to our nuclear defense facilities… The U.S. and NATO openly say that their goal is to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. … They want to inflict a strategic defeat on us and get into our nuclear facilities. In this regard, I am compelled to announce today that Russia is suspending its participation in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms."
• "The Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosatom must ensure readiness for testing Russian nuclear weapons. Of course, we will not be the first to do this, but if the United States conducts tests, then we will conduct them. No one should have any dangerous illusions that global strategic parity can be destroyed."
• "Large Russian businesses are responsible for the work of strategic enterprises, for thousands of labor collectives [e.g., teams of workers]. They determine the socioeconomic situation in many regions. If someone wants to live out his life in an arrested mansion with blocked accounts, to try to find a place in what may seem an attractive Western capital or a resort … this is the right of any person… [F]or the West those people are alien. Buying counts’ titles won’t help… But there is another choice: to be with your Motherland, to work for [your] compatriots."

“It won't be over soon: forecast for the next 12 months of the SVO [special military operation]," interview (in Russian) with Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, MK.ru, 02.21.23. Clues from Russian Views.

• "I estimate the chances [of SVO lasting into 2024] as quite high, unfortunately. Due to the involvement of various interests of direct and indirect participants, the conflict has acquired a very significant scale. The Ukrainian question itself … is only a part of it."
• "Objectively, of all parties actively involved in the confrontation, the United States is incurring the lowest costs and is potentially extracting benefits. … [In Europe] the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation … makes it possible to put aside differences, marginalize dissidents and rally under the slogan 'enemy at the gates.'"
• "The world has entered a period of reshaping and upheaval, … and the transition to another [cycle] will inevitably be accompanied by cataclysms."
• "Failure in Ukraine will deal a hard blow to Russian positions in the world because the (non-Western) world evaluates strength and effectiveness [using criteria of] managed or failed… But [Russia’s] success in Ukraine, especially if it is incomplete and achieved at an excessively high cost, would not necessarily entail Russia's rise in the world hierarchy."
• "The Americans, by the way, do not hide the fact that they expect the sanctions against Russia to intimidate China. And in a sense it worked … however, Beijing does not intend to abandon any of its strategic goals."

"Ukraine’s Future Is Not in NATO," Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bloomberg, 02.19.23.

• "Plan A for Ukraine might … be membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an aspiration enshrined in the country’s constitution. … Alas, it’s unlikely to happen. As a rule, NATO does not admit countries with ongoing border disputes, let alone semi-frozen conflicts on their territory, because it doesn’t want to make the problems of new members its own. So unless the war ends with a total Russian withdrawal and capitulation on matters of Ukrainian territorial integrity, Kyiv may be left on the outside—a victim of the cruel irony that the very condition that makes NATO membership desirable also makes it impossible."
• "Plan B, then, is a Ukraine that is affiliated with but not formally allied to the West—and that has a very powerful military to protect its own independence."
  • "Ukraine is likely to emerge from this conflict as one of the foremost military powers in Europe. No country on the continent will take defense more seriously; Ukraine will also have huge reserves of trained manpower."
  • "A second component of Ukraine’s security [is] a close and ongoing partnership in which Western countries advise and help train the Ukrainian military, while also continuing providing Kyiv with weapons and supplies it needs for self-defense."

"On the virtues of whataboutism," Andrew J. Bacevich of the Quincy Institute, TomDispatch, 02.14.23.

• “'To defend civilization, defeat Russia.' Writing in the unfailingly bellicose Atlantic, an American academic of my acquaintance recently issued that dramatic call to arms. And lest there be any confusion about the stakes involved, the image accompanying his essay depicted Russian President Vladimir Putin with a Hitler mustache and haircut. Cast Putin as the latest manifestation of the Führer and the resurrection of Winston Churchill can’t be far behind. And, lo, more than a few observers have already begun depicting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the latest reincarnation of America’s favorite British prime minister."
• "But if Putin is a criminal, how then are we to judge those who conceived of, sold, launched, and thoroughly botched the Iraq War? With the passing of 20 years, has some statute of limitations kicked in to drain that conflict of relevance? My own sense is that the national security establishment is now strongly inclined to pretend that the Iraq War (and the Afghanistan War as well) never happened. Such an exercise in selective memory helps validate the insistence that Ukraine has once more conferred on the United States the primary responsibility for defending 'civilization.' That no one else can assume that role is simply taken for granted in Washington."
• "Under the guise of turning the century around, we underwrite violence in faraway lands and thereby dodge the actual challenges of changing our own culture. Unfortunately, when it comes to rehabilitating our own democracy, all the Abrams tanks in the world won’t save us."

"Biden’s Kyiv Visit Shows He’s a War President," National Interest editor Jacob Heilbrunn, NI, 02.20.23.

• "With his dramatic trip to Kyiv, President Joe Biden directly escalated his confrontation with Russian president Vladimir Putin—and with his Republican detractors at home. Biden, you could say, is all-in on standing by Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression. His visit not only to Kyiv but also to Warsaw … marks a pivotal moment. More than ever, Biden is signaling that he is a war president."

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“What China Has Learned From the Ukraine War,” Carnegie's Evan A. Feigenbaum and Adam Szubin of SAIS, FA, 02.14.23.

“Little in Common: Prospects for U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia Security Cooperation,” Raphael S. Cohen, et al, RAND, February 2023.

• "As the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes clear, the primary national security concern facing the United States now is 'strategic competition' with Russia and China, rather than terrorism. Of course, that does not mean that cooperation with Russia and China is not desirable, as long as it comes 'from a position of strength and [is] based on our national interests.' But is there any room for meaningful strategic cooperation in this era of competition among great powers? RAND researchers studied this question and found that … the prospects are slim":

1. "There is not much room to work in— … the 'trade space' for cooperation is already narrow."
2. "The obstacles to cooperation—particularly the absence of trust—are growing."
3. "There are relatively few wedge issues that could be used to divide Russia and China."
4. "The side benefits of cooperation over competition do not clearly outweigh the costs."

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms control:

“The Ukrainians gave up nuclear weapons at our behest. Here's what we owe them,” Jon B. Wolfsthal of Global Zero and the Center for a New American Security, WP, 02.10.23.

• "Moscow has nuclear weapons and Kyiv does not in large part because the United States and its European allies and partners made sure that all Soviet nuclear weapons left in Ukraine in 1991 were relocated to the Russian Federation."
• "Failing to stand up for a country that chose to disarm itself at our behest sets all the wrong precedents."
• "If we successfully thread this needle—help Ukraine defeat Russia without Moscow resorting to nuclear weapons—there is a chance to reverse some dangerous nuclear trends."
• "Nuclear weapons can work against U.S. security interests just as they can work for them. For that reason alone, the United States cannot give up on the effort to find ways to negotiate agreements with adversaries such as Russia and China to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict, even when the near-term prospects seem dim."
• "As we weigh how much support the United States should provide to Ukraine, and for how long, we have to keep our obligations, moral and self-interested, in mind. Sadly, not being able to indulge every one of those instincts is just one of the many costs of living in a world backed by nuclear deterrence. If we do get to celebrate Ukraine's victory, we would do well to then re-energize U.S. efforts to reduce the role and utility of nuclear weapons everywhere."

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

"Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe," FPRI’s Mitchell Orenstein, FPRI, 02.16.23.

• "Not only has Russia’s energy war on Europe been unsuccessful, but it may have the unintended consequence of accelerating Europe’s energy transition over the long term. Attempting to win recognition as Putin the Great by uniting the Slavic lands of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin may be hailed instead as Putin the Green, the man who convinced Europe to give up dependence on fossil fuels."
• "Reduced government revenues from European fossil fuel markets will limit Russia’s ability to finance the war. But it will not stop Russia. Putin confirmed in a December 2022 press conference that the war is a 'long-term process.' The European Union has not proven able to defeat Russia decisively on the battlefield and has remained tied in knots over sending tanks and fighter jets to Ukraine for almost a year after the start of the conflict. But the European Union is an 'economic superpower,' and it has managed to leverage over a decade of bureaucratic planning to deal Russia a serious defeat in Europe’s energy wars."

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Can Russia Ever Become a ‘Normal’ European Nation?” senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Adrian Karatnycky, FP, 02.20.23.

• "While a complete dissolution of Russia is unlikely, many of these regions—some with vast natural resources—have the potential for national mobilization, especially in cases where ethnic Russians are only a small minority. This, in turn, can reinforce chauvinist trends inside the Russian Federation for years to come and withdraw support from moderates, liberals, and anti-imperialists."
• "Putin has long argued that Ukraine is an essential part of Russian history and identity. In ways he did not anticipate, events may soon prove him right: A victory in which Ukraine reclaims control over its territories and successfully defends its national and European identity can become a crucial factor in pushing Russians onto a path of normal development previously trod by other European peoples and post-colonial states. By compelling Russians to embrace a national narrative stripped of imperialism—a narrative that seeks to build a civic state rooted in a clear national identity within its sovereign boundaries—Ukrainians can help ensure not only their own and the region’s security, but a better future for Russia as well."

“Project 2024: Russia’s Presidential Election in the Shadow of War,” SWP's Sabine Fischer, SWP, 02.20.23.

• "The regime will hold presidential elections on 17 March 2024—many of the steps taken in recent years must be seen in this light. … Putin has little room for maneuver. He can hardly afford not to run in the election—such a sign of weakness could inflame criticism of his warfare and turn into a domestic trap. The same applies to a postponement of the election."
• "Meanwhile, Russian society remains atomized and apathetic. Many politically active people have left the country, and more will follow. Russia has turned into a dictatorship with fascist and totalitarian tendencies after 24 February 2022. It is unrealistic to expect changes from below under such conditions."

"Does Russia risk disintegration? Experts' Perspectives," Russia.Post, 02.21.23.

• Irina Busygina, Harvard University: "It seems unlikely that ethnic regions will create big problems for Moscow—or expecting as much is at least premature—for a number of reasons."
• Harold Chambers, Foreign Policy Research Institute: "Separatist calls remain in the diaspora, with the existence of sufficient local support questionable, except in the case of Chechnya. As such, while tensions may increase, any grand rupture remains unlikely, absent a massive change at the top."
• Kyle Marquardt, University of Bergen: "In the absence of increased instability in Russia, the strong incentives of the regional political elites are to ensure that such an anti-center political program does not emerge; any increased tensions due to the war have not drastically weakened the control of these elites over their population as of yet."

Defense and aerospace:

"Russia's Evolution Toward a Unified Strategic Operation," Clint Reach, Alyssa Demus, Michelle Grisé, Khrystyna Holynska, Christopher Lynch, Dara Massicot, David Woodworth, RAND 2023.

• "In the post–Cold War period, NATO's enlargement and Russia's reduction in land forces have played a critical role in Russian operational concept development."
  • "These factors place the military burden on Russia's long-range strike capacity to overcome the geographic separation of forces."
  • "Russian operational concept development for regional war is driven by how to coordinate, allocate, and employ long-range, kinetic, and nonkinetic attack assets in a conventional fight that could escalate to nuclear use."
  • "Currently, Russia's limited conventional long-range strike capacity, combined with NATO's strategic depth, suggests a continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and large-scale operations when the existence of the Russian state is in jeopardy."
• "The unified strategic operation is a proposed solution to the coordination of forces to engage regional-level targets and degrade NATO's ability to launch an aerospace attack deep into Russia."
• "This concept is an organizing construct for a future Russian force structure with increasing conventional capacity. It includes nuclear and nonnuclear components and involves the coordinated action of joint strategic commands."
• "The key military tasks of the unified strategic operation are all related to engaging targets beyond the range of Russian ground forces and artillery."
• "Russia has fielded conventional systems capable of striking NATO targets beyond artillery range and has plans to extend the ranges of multiple systems."
• "Russia has invested heavily in EW assets and reinvigorated its military space and counterspace capabilities."
• "Russian military strategists view cyber operations as useful for achieving effects against critical infrastructure, but Russian cyber capacity remains unknown."

See also section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

"How Russia's FSB Embraced Religion in the Face of a Baffling War," CEPA's Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, CEPA/MT, 02.14.23.

• "We’ve known most of our contacts in Russia’s special forces and the FSB for years, and none was particularly religious before the war. Now a wave of mysticism has descended on them, the apparent trigger being a growing understanding that the war is not going to end anytime soon."
• "Since the war in Ukraine began, the Church has made itself an arm of the Kremlin, not only justifying the war but also blessing Russian troops regardless of their conduct in an attempt to raise morale and provide a cause worth dying for—something Putin’s regime has so signally failed to do. The more primitive and mystical that cause is, the better, as long as it bolsters the war effort."

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“What’s Behind Russia’s Charm Offensive in Africa?” journalist and independent researcher Vadim Zaytsev, Carnegie Endowment, 02.17.23.

• "By 2023, it was abundantly clear that protracted efforts to create economic and political architecture that would integrate the former Soviet republics under the Kremlin’s leadership had failed. Moscow’s integrational platforms, from the Commonwealth of Independent States to the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization, are rapidly becoming empty shells. Against this backdrop, Africa looks like promising terrain to recuperate at least some losses by building new logistical chains, creating routes to circumvent sanctions and expanding cultural and military cooperation."
• "Moscow chooses to portray the cautious neutrality of most African countries as commitment to a profound partnership, and interprets nonbinding consultations as a breakthrough from international isolation. The African elites will gladly join in condemning neocolonialism, ignoring the colonial nature of the war in Ukraine, but they are hardly likely to risk their ties with the EU or United States to help Russia in any practical way."

"Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa," independent researcher Raphael Parens, War on the Rocks, 02.17.23.

• "NATO countries should begin by developing a comprehensive response to the Wagner Group’s disinformation and state capture strategies."
  • "The first step is addressing misinformation with proof. France has already set the tone for such responses in Mali, using photographic evidence to rebut a Wagner Group disinformation operation that blamed a massacre of civilians on exiting French forces."
  • "Second, Western states should lobby African regional and continental bodies, including the Economic Community of African States and the African Union, to halt mercenary operations."
  • "Beyond this, NATO and other bodies should continue naming and shaming mercenary activities."
• "Finally, NATO members and African states should also be prepared to deploy sanctions and travel bans against Western-based mercenary groups that commit human rights violations as well."

Ukraine:

"The European Union Shouldn’t Rush to Admit Ukraine," Bloomberg editorial, 02.14.23.

• "Supposing Ukraine prevails in defending its homeland, it will be a big, poor country with a shattered economy, broken institutions, and a long history of corruption. Even if it wasn’t still fighting for its very survival, aligning with the conditions for accession wouldn’t be easy or quick."
• "For these reasons, many of the EU’s existing members don’t wish to speed the process, and some would prefer to see the idea shelved. The issue could therefore divide the union at a time when unity is crucial. The eagerness of the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, to promote Ukraine’s bid adds to this danger. Von der Leyen is a civil servant, and her forthright advocacy on so grave a matter risks putting her at odds with many of the union’s elected politicians."
• "Most important, advancing Ukraine’s accession would be tactically unwise. The move would be a kind of escalation, giving Putin more to lose and making it harder for Russia to concede defeat—yet it would do nothing in the short term to help Ukraine’s people or strengthen their ability to fight back. For as long as this war goes on, Europe should focus on sustaining and increasing its material aid. This is not the time to be talking about expansion plans."

“The Problem With Russia Is Russia,” author Oksana Zabuzhko, NYT, 02.20.23. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• "I remember only too well how the specter of extinction was stalking Ukraine through the 1970s and early 1980s, until the Chernobyl disaster finally broke our social paralysis and pushed Ukrainians to take our security into our own hands."
• "Looked at closely, this war on Moscow's part is a monstrously enlarged version of the Ukrainian purges of the 1970s (Operation Block, as it was known in the KGB files): same language, same techniques. The only difference is the scale. Those purges were selective and unostentatious, whereas nowadays each of the thousands of Russian rockets that have so far hit our cities howls the same message—'Speak human!'—at the highest possible pitch. Ukrainians respond with the glorious phrase from the defenders of Snake Island. We will survive the Russian Federation, just as we survived the Soviet Union."

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Could the New EU Mission Sideline Russia in Armenia-Azerbaijan Settlement?” Kommersant journalist Kirill Krivosheev, Carnegie Endowment, 02.16.23.

• Summary: "If the Europeans end up securing relative peace for Armenia and corroborate Azerbaijan’s border encroachments, it will be undeniable that Russia is not the only force Yerevan can rely on."
• "The international presence in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict zone is once again expanding, with an EU monitoring mission set to join Russian peacekeepers there. Since the Europeans were invited by Armenia, they will only be able to work on the Armenian side of the border; they won’t be permitted to enter Azerbaijan, including the Armenian-controlled part of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region."
• "The EU mission scheduled to be deployed in the next month is modest in size and powers, consisting of just 100 unarmed monitors. That said, they are to stay for two years, which will likely prove decisive for the future of the region. The EU mission will be winding down in 2025, at about the same time the fate of the 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh will be decided."
• "Yerevan considers the EU involvement a major diplomatic victory, since if the situation at the border escalates again and Azerbaijan attacks internationally recognized Armenian territory, it will need an independent party to corroborate that."
• "Work on the peace agreement has now slowed. The Armenians believe—not without reason—that it would be imprudent to make such a critical decision while the world is preoccupied with Ukraine. The West and Russia may offer the South Caucasus something new once they free up their resources."
• "Armenia hopes that the world will be more predictable in two years’ time: that the Ukraine conflict may have deescalated, and that Turkey may have entered a period of greater stability… Of course, these hopes can hardly be described as a well thought-out strategy, but Armenia has long learned not to make far-reaching plans. In November and December, the presence of just 40 European observers helped to reduce shooting and avoid the need to make new concessions. The chances are that that might just work again."

“Putin's Next Target: Moldova; Russia wants to topple the pro-Western government in Chișinău,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 02.13.23.

• "Vladimir Putin covets all of the former nations of the former Soviet Union, and his next target if he succeeds in Ukraine is almost certainly Moldova. On Monday [Feb. 13] Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her country's pro-Western government."
• "Sandu’s allegations come amid the Kremlin’s efforts in recent months to use Moldova’s economic woes to foment political unrest."
• "The unease in Moldova underscores the stakes in Ukraine. A victorious Kremlin has other conquests in mind."