5 Ideas to Explore

1. Donald Trump’s Monday call with Vladimir Putin yielded no breakthrough on Russia-Ukraine war with Putin rejecting an unconditional full ceasefire again and Trump asserting that, going forward, Moscow and Kyiv will need to negotiate conditions directly, perhaps, in the Vatican in what Financial Times reporters interpreted as a signal that Washington is “stepping back from a role as a mediator.” Putin was first to offer his take on the call, which lasted for more than two hours, telling Russian media that Russia has stated readiness to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum regarding a possible a peace treaty “with a number of positions to be defined.” These positions, according to the Kremlin’s account of Putin’s remarks to the media included “the principles for settlement, the timeframe for a possible peace deal, and… a potential temporary ceasefire, should the necessary agreements be reached.” Trump’s account of the call appeared to be more upbeat than that of the Russian counterpart. “The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent,” U.S. leader wrote on Truth Social. He also wrote that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War” and that “the conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” Ominously, perhaps, Trump also wrote that “the Vatican, as represented by the Pope, has stated that it would be very interested in hosting the negotiations.” Trump’s remarks, in the view of Financial Times’ reporting team, indicate the Trump administration is done trying mediating between Moscow and Kyiv.¹ The Monday call was preceded by the direct Russian-Ukrainian talks, which took place in Istanbul on Friday. Those talks did not significantly advance the peace negotiations either, although both sides agreed on what would become the largest prisoner-of-war exchange since the start of the war. The outcome of the Friday meeting represented a “tactical win for Mr. Putin, who managed to start the talks without first agreeing to a battlefield cease-fire that Ukraine and almost all of its Western backers had sought as a precondition for negotiations,” according to NYT.
2. Putin may be thinking that Russia will outlast Ukraine in his war, and he has a reason to do so, according to FT’s Gideon Rachman. This columnist cites “sources” as estimating that “Ukrainian casualties are running at roughly two-thirds the level of Russia’s… while its population is roughly a quarter that of Russia’s.” “Putin [therefore] has reason to believe that he would ultimately prevail in a war of attrition,” in spite of Russia’s “staggering losses,” according to Rachman.² Putin has also managed to consolidate the public at home as he aims to “outlast Ukraine and the U.S.,” according to Amy Knight’s commentary in Wall Street Journal.
3. A group of CSIS military fellows have inferred insights for future conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine war and they include that West’s “incremental escalation—providing support and then pausing to gauge the Russian reaction before providing more advanced support—contributed to the absence of a nuclear detonation in this conflict." Another insight is that "Despite rapid advances, the use of unmanned sea and aerial drones today is still an evolution, not a revolution, of warfare” with tanks remaining “relevant.” The Russia-Ukraine war also indicates that "Future success in contested environments will depend not only on moving supplies but on mastering data, defending networks, and leveraging innovation across all domains."
4. Ukraine’s defense industry keeps churning more and more lethal products with value of the latter increasing by 3400% since the beginning of the war, according to Wall Street Journal. “The value of weapons Ukraine's defense industry can make has ballooned from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion over three years of war… Last year Ukraine said it produced more artillery guns than all NATO countries combined,” according to WSJ. “More than 40% of the weapons used on the front line with Russia are now made in Ukraine” and in “some areas, such as drones, unmanned ground systems, and electronic warfare, the figure is close to 100%,” WSJ reported. At the same time, Ukraine’s efforts to procure arms abroad have not been all exemplary. A Financial Times investigation “has uncovered how hundreds of millions of dollars Kyiv paid to foreign arms intermediaries to secure vital military equipment has gone to waste over the past three years of war.”
5. Trump’s Golden Dome will press Russia into a new arms race, forcing it to devote yet more resources to its strategic forces at a time when the country can least afford it, according to James D.J. Brown of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. So far, the significant increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons “that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized,” according to Hans M. Kristensen of FAS and his colleagues’ report: "Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025."

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Russia's State Nuclear Giant Is Now Inseparable From Its War on Ukraine,” Charles Digges, The Moscow Times, 05.12.25.

• “Rosatom [is a primarily a formidable political tool. This allows it to couple a broad mandate at home with a campaign of influence abroad. By offering its reactor customers enormous state-backed loans to build nuclear plants that Rosatom will service, fuel and, in many cases, even staff for decades to come, the corporation is vital to creating regimes that are friendly to—and dependent on—Moscow around the world.”
• “While the war in Ukraine has perhaps cost Rosatom some of its former markets in the West, the company has, as our report shows, survived these geopolitical shifts and remained a powerful vector of Russian influence. As a result, the company will continue to help cleave away many of the world’s nations to Moscow’s geopolitical cause. “

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Speed in a Crisis: What Europe Can Learn from Ukraine on Emergency Reconstruction," Mustafa Nayyem, European Council on Foreign Relations, 05.16.25.
• "Mothers who soldier on: Our work to support Ukraine, its widows and children, must continue," Susan Mathison and Lisa Mure, The Boston Globe, 05.16.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Insights for Future Conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine War," CSIS Military Fellows, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 05.09.25.

• "Russia’s nuclear threats impacted both the speed and scale of Western military support to Ukraine… The Russia-Ukraine War provides a successful model of how incremental military aid can keep warfare at the conventional, nonnuclear level. Incremental escalation—providing support and then pausing to gauge the Russian reaction before providing more advanced support—contributed to the absence of a nuclear detonation in this conflict."
• "Despite rapid advances, the use of unmanned sea and aerial drones today is still an evolution, not a revolution, of warfare. Judged through the lens of defense offset strategy, a revolutionary advance would gain and maintain a significant advantage over adversaries over long periods of time."
• "Tanks remain relevant… Tanks with infantry do what air power, indirect fires, and drones cannot do alone: seize and hold terrain."
• "The very short design, construction, combat testing, and hardware/software revision cycles of dynamic acquisition create a competitive edge. Authorizing these decisions at lower levels and with less oversight incurs accountability and program sustainment risks but is necessary to innovate at the speed of war."
• "Future success in contested environments will depend not only on moving supplies but on mastering data, defending networks, and leveraging innovation across all domains."
• "The Russia-Ukraine War previews the future role of AI and data integration in warfare. Militaries gain advantages by creating a common platform for intelligence, operations, logistics, and planning functions; developing user-friendly systems to minimize training load; and granting authority to frontline forces to rapidly evolve tactics."
• "The will to fight makes the difference."
• "Whole-of-society resiliency creates a competitive advantage."

"Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign," Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 05.13.25.

• “Russia’s drone campaign utilizes inexpensive Shahed drones to saturate Ukrainian air defenses and erode civilian morale through persistent nightly attacks. Originally Iranian made, these drones are now mass produced in Russia using Western electronics and essential Chinese components.
• Ukraine urgently requires layered, cost-effective air defenses, including high-energy laser systems, to counter drone saturation. Targeted long-range strikes on drone production and launch sites and disrupting China’s supply of critical electronics to Russia are essential steps.
• Russia’s relentless use of low-cost drones signals a broader shift toward attrition warfare based on overwhelming air defense systems with sheer numbers. Western governments must innovate in economical defenses and tackle Chinese technology flows fueling Russian drone production.”

"A Wall of Drones Vs. Hordes of Motorcycles: Will Russia Succeed in Its 2025 Campaign if No Truce Is Reached?," Re: Russia, 05.14.25.

• “If we evaluate the results of last year's offensive in terms of ‘territory vs. losses,’ it appears more a failure than a success. The Russian army managed to capture less than 1% of the territory controlled by Kyiv at the start of the offensive, while sustaining massive losses—around 450,000 personnel killed and wounded, along with several thousand pieces of armored equipment.”
• “Amid spring consultations over potential negotiations, the Russian army has been demonstratively preparing for a new major offensive in 2025.”
• “The biggest challenge facing the Russian army remains the poor quality of its manpower and the shortage of combat-ready equipment on the front line, says renowned military expert Michael Kofman on the War on the Rocks podcast. This, he argues, is precisely why motorcycles, quad bikes and buggies are being used. However, this tactic does not allow for any serious breakthroughs and only increases the number of casualties, according to Kofman.”
• “Should Russia persist in demanding maximalist conditions for a ceasefire, including the demilitarization of Ukraine and restrictions on arms supplies from its allies and another military campaign becomes inevitable, both sides will face severe challenges. For Ukraine, continued U.S. military support will be critical, particularly in the areas of intelligence, replenishment of air defense systems, and European assistance in providing conventional weapons and artillery shells. In addition, Ukraine’s primary defensive resource remains the 'drone coalition' with European nations, which significantly offsets the shortage of manpower. This drone-based warfare also requires constant innovation, as the enemy continually adapts to new technologies and tactics. If these conditions are met, and Ukrainian troop morale holds, Russia is unlikely to achieve more than a repeat of its modest gains in 2024. This result would be both exhausting and demoralizing for Moscow.”

"Russia Has Started Losing the War in Ukraine," Michael Kimmage, Foreign Policy, 05.19.25.

• “The problem for Putin is that the military and diplomatic challenges of the war compound one another, as do the economic and political challenges.”
• “Russia faces two serious military dilemmas.”
  • “One is its own inability to advance… By the end of 2025, at this rate, Russia will have over a million casualties, and its strategic situation will not be any better than it was in 2022.” In the past month, Russian forces made a net gain of 120 square miles in Ukraine (a little more than 1 Nantucket island), according to the May 14, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card.
  • “Russia’s other military dilemma is Ukraine… The brutality of the Russian occupation coupled with countless assaults on civilians and civilian infrastructure convinced most Ukrainians that they had to fight.”
• Russia has ways to gain advantage in a long war of attrition. It could facilitate a U.S. withdrawal from the war… [but] Russia has mismanaged its diplomacy with the West. It squandered the opportunities presented by an avowedly pro-Russian Trump administration in February, March, and April, bombing its way past multiple cease-fires.”
• “Putin’s obsession with not losing in Ukraine has damaged the Russian economy. The sugar high of military spending is over, and growth has dwindled from 5% at the war’s start to zero.” In its revised outlook IMF expects Russia’s GDP growth to exceed that of “Advanced Economies” in 2025 (1.5% vs 1.4%), but this growth rate is significantly slower than that of “Emerging Market and Developing Economies” (3.7%) and it will slow down to 0.9% in 2026, according to a recent RM news digest.
• Putin’s ‘dictator’s prerogative’ makes him uniquely the man in charge, which is as much a vulnerability as it is a strength—a strength to the degree that he can win the war and a vulnerability to the degree that he is losing it. Perhaps for this reason, after years of silence on the topic, Putin has begun to speak about a successor. As he himself may be aware, he has staked his political fortunes on a foolish war, and he is not winning.”

"Russian Soldiers Want to Press On, Lest All the Sacrifices Be in Vain," Anatoly Kurmanaev, The New York Times, 05.18.25.

• “In interviews, 11 Russian soldiers who are fighting or have fought in Ukraine expressed deep skepticism of diplomatic efforts that on Friday produced the first direct peace talks in three years, but were brief and yielded little. Speaking by telephone, the soldiers said they rejected an unconditional cease-fire proposed by Ukraine, adding that Russian forces should keep fighting at least until they conquer all of the four southern and eastern Ukrainian regions claimed, but only partly controlled, by the Kremlin.”
• ''We're all tired, we want to go home. But we want to take all of the regions, so that we don't have to struggle for them in the future,'' said Sergei, a drafted Russian soldier fighting in the eastern Donetsk region, referring to the annexed territory. ''Otherwise, have all the guys died in vain?''

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

"General Knowledge: Russian Military Chiefs, the Russian Public and Ukraine and China: When Russian military leaders are thought to oppose government policy, the Russian public appear to give them a sympathetic hearing," Risa Brooks, Kirill Shamiev, Margarita Zavadskaya, European Council on Foreign Relations, 05.15.25. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Ukraine Is Making More Weapons Than Ever—but Still Can’t Fight Russia Alone," Isabel Coles and Ievgeniia Sivorka, The Wall Street Journal, 05.18.25.

• “Ukraine had only a single prototype of its domestically produced Bohdana howitzer when Russia invaded. Last year, Kyiv said it produced more artillery guns than all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries combined.”
• “While Western allies have been slow to increase arms production, the value of weapons Ukraine's defense industry can make has ballooned from $1 billion in 2022 to $35 billion over three years of war, even as Russia fires missiles at its factories.”
• “More than 40% of the weapons used on the front line with Russia are now made in Ukraine, Zelensky said. In some areas, such as drones, unmanned ground systems, and electronic warfare, the figure is close to 100%.”
• “Ukraine needs the U.S. and other Western allies to square up to Russia's war machine. It can't produce anywhere near enough ammunition to keep its guns firing, or any of the air-defense interceptors it needs to shield against Russian missiles.”

"How Ukraine lost hundreds of millions on arms deals gone wrong," Isobel Koshiw and Miles Johnson, Financial Times, 05.16.25. 

• “A Financial Times investigation, based on leaked Ukrainian state documents, court filings and dozens of interviews with procurement officials, weapons dealers and manufacturers, and detectives, has uncovered how hundreds of millions of dollars Kyiv paid to foreign arms intermediaries to secure vital military equipment has gone to waste over the past three years of war.”
• “To date, Ukraine has paid out $770mn in advance to foreign arms brokers for weapons and ammunition that have not been delivered, according to figures from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, as well as documents seen by the FT. This represents a significant chunk of Ukraine’s annual $6bn-$8bn weapons budget spent from its own state funds since the start of the invasion.”
  • “In one instance, in April 2022, according to Ukrainian court documents, the Ukrainian state weapons broker Ukrspetsexport purchased 120mm mortars from Sudan from sellers later found to have close ties to Russia’s FSB security service, as well as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, which later would use Russian prisoners to fight a brutal war of attrition against Ukrainian soldiers.”
• “At the same time, some foreign arms companies say they have been the victims of infighting and corruption by Ukrainian officials and state weapons brokers, which may account for some of the missing millions. The Kyiv government is attempting to clean house..”

“How Trump Can Reset His Failed Ukraine Policy,” Philip H. Gorden and Rebecca Lisner, Foreign Policy, 05.12.25

• “Instead of walking away from involvement in peace talks, if Trump wants to succeed as a peacemaker, it would make more sense for him to test the proposition that even somewhat more pressure on Moscow—without requiring the large-scale U.S. financial commitments he opposes—could help end the war,” the authors write.
• “For example, Trump could lend his support to a new, bipartisan Russia sanctions package, developed by supporters in the Senate such as Lindsey Graham, to intensify economic pressure on Moscow. Building on existing U.S. and European measures to curb Russian oil profits, these new measures would target countries and individuals who purchase Russian oil or sovereign debt, which would be applied if Russia refuses to engage in good-faith negotiations for lasting peace or violates future peace agreements,” according to the authors.
• “Second, Trump could direct the Pentagon to spend the remaining $3.8 billion that Congress has already authorized in Presidential Drawdown Authority—the ability to transfer defense articles and services from existing U.S. stockpiles—to Ukraine.”
• “Third, Trump could accelerate efforts to improve Ukrainian air defenses, which do not threaten Russia but benefit the U.S. defense industry and save Ukrainian lives, which Trump claims to support.”
• “Finally, Trump could seek agreement with the Europeans, who have maintained their strong support for Ukraine even as the United States has backed away, to bolster Ukraine’s long-term deterrence through training, weapons, and financing.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Why This is the Best Time to Sanction Russia,” Chrisian Caryl, Foreign Policy, 05.13.25

• “If Trump were genuinely interested in pressuring Putin (a dubious assumption, I know), his advisors should tell him that this is the perfect moment to do it. For the past few weeks, the Europeans have shown striking unity and fortitude as they engineered an ultimatum for Moscow: either agree to a cease-fire or get ready for a wide array of new sanctions,” the author writes. “The Russian economy is showing new signs of vulnerability that could be exploited by intelligent sanctions that close some of the rather large loopholes of the current regime.”
• “Even as inflation remains persistent, growth is stalling, falling from 5% in 2024 to an annualized rate of around zero at the start of this year, prompting some observers to warn of stagflation. Many businesses struggle with sinking profits and debts they can’t pay back … The labor shortage caused by the defense boom has left private businesses starved for workers. Making the shortage worse, deepening xenophobia has led to mass deportations of Central Asian migrant workers—the very sort of low-cost workers Russia desperately needs at the moment,” the author writes.
• “Most dangerously for the Kremlin, global oil prices are steadily trending downward, mainly the result of the OPEC+ grouping’s decision to surge production. If oil prices stabilize in the range of $60 to $65 per barrel, Russia may avoid the worst, said Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. But even then, she added, ‘large-scale investment and robust growth would remain elusive,’” according to the author.

“How Zara’s unorthodox Russian exit left it primed for a return,” Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli, Courtney Weaver and Barney Jopson, Financial Times, 05.15.25.

• “Within days of Vladimir Putin’s 2022 full-blown invasion of Ukraine, Zara owner Inditex announced “the termination” of its Russian operations in what appeared to be a clean break from its largest market by stores outside Spain. But the details of its exit have left the world’s biggest fashion group—whose Bershka, Pull & Bear and Stradivarius brands also had a presence in the country—well placed should it choose to return.
• “In early 2023 Inditex injected cash into its Russian business, now called New Fashion, just before selling it for a “not significant” sum to members of a Lebanese family that runs the Spanish group’s franchise in the Middle East, according to corporate filings and company statements.”
• “Replacement brands set up by the buyer are selling near-identical products to Inditex while relying on the same suppliers and employing its former staff, a Financial Times investigation has found. And under the terms of the deal, Inditex has the right “immediately” and at no cost to convert the deal into a franchise arrangement under which its own brands would return to its former Russian stores.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Trump leaves Russia and Ukraine to settle war in talks,” Christopher Miller, Steff Chávez, Guy Chazan, and Polina Ivanova, FT, 05.19.25.

• “Donald Trump said on Monday that Russia and Ukraine would begin negotiations “immediately” on preparations for peace talks, but added that he was leaving Moscow and Kyiv to find a deal without the US as a broker. After a two-hour call with Vladimir Putin, Trump posted that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War.”
• “In remarks that indicated that Washington may be stepping back from a role as a mediator, Trump said the “conditions” for a deal could only be negotiated by the warring parties “because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” He also said the Vatican would be “very interested” in hosting the talks, adding: “Let the process begin!””
• “In his own, more guarded readout of the conversation, Putin said he was “ready to work” with Kyiv on a memorandum to frame future talks, which could include a possible ceasefire “for a certain amount of time... if certain agreements are reached.”

“Peace Talks Between Russia and Ukraine Stop After Short Meeting,” Paul Sonne, Safak Timur, Maria Varenikova, 05.16.25.

• “After days of confusion and theatrics, direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian negotiators took place on Friday [May 16] in Istanbul for the first time since the start of the war, resulting in an agreement to conduct what would be the largest prisoner swap of the conflict.” This claim is partially inaccurate. Direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian negotiators did take place in Istanbul in Spring 2022, weeks after the launch of the full-blown Russian invasion in February 2022. More recently, Ukraine and Russia were reported in January 2025 to be holding limited talks in Qatar about rules to shield nuclear facilities from being targeted as well as prisoner swaps and bringing back deported children.
• “After the negotiations, which lasted an hour and 40 minutes, the leaders of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations confirmed in news briefings that they had agreed to exchange 1,000 prisoners each soon… delegations agreed to write up and share with each other the conditions that would make a cease-fire possible, Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, whose government convened the talks, wrote on X. The Ukrainians and Russians also agreed to meet again, in principle, Mr. Fidan added.” If implemented, the POW exchange would be, indeed, the largest in this war.
• “From the start, the Istanbul negotiations were not expected to yield any huge breakthroughs. But the meeting was a tactical win for Mr. Putin, who managed to start the talks without first agreeing to a battlefield cease-fire that Ukraine and almost all of its Western backers had sought as a precondition for negotiations.” While the May 16 talks did not yield any major breakthroughs, they did constitute a tactical win for Putin for reasons accurately described by NYT.

“The Istanbul Talks Were a Success,” Jennifer Kavanagh and Peter Slezkine, The American Conservative, 05.17.25.

• “Despite naysayers on both sides of the Atlantic and the uncertainty up to the last minute, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators not only met, but achieved notable results. According to statements made by the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, the two teams agreed to at least three next steps: to conduct the largest single POW exchange to date (1,000 personnel on each side); to produce a written version of their vision for peace for discussion at a future session; and to hold initial discussions about a meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky.”
  • “The positive report from the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, as well as their Turkish hosts, contrasted sharply with the negative reactions of Zelensky himself and key European leaders. “
• “Ending the war between Russia and Ukraine will take time and require many rounds of talks. At this point, process is more important than high profile summits or dramatic dealmaking. It may take longer than he originally hoped, but with a little more patience, Trump’s goal of peace in Ukraine looks increasingly achievable.”

"Putin thinks that time is on his side," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 05.19.25.

• “Vladimir Putin is unlikely to stop. The Russian president thinks that time is on his side in his war on Ukraine — both on the battlefield and on the international stage.”
• “The essential Russian goal still seems to be the termination of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign and independent state.”
• “Unfortunately, as things stand, it looks like the odds favor Russia.”
• “Even if Trump and the EU are persuaded to keep sanctions in place, after a failure of peace talks, a substantial reduction in US financial and military support for Ukraine is likely.”
• “Ukraine’s expertise in defensive and drone warfare is also inflicting staggering losses on Russia — estimated to be 1,500 troops killed or wounded a day. But some of the same sources who cite this figure think that Ukrainian casualties are running at roughly two-thirds the level of Russia’s. Given that Ukraine’s population is roughly a quarter that of Russia’s, Putin has reason to believe that he would ultimately prevail in a war of attrition.”
• “If Trump truly wants “Vladimir” to stop, he is going to have to put some pressure on him.”

"Putin's Plan to Outlast Ukraine and the U.S.," Amy Knight, The Wall Street Journal, 05.19.25.

• “Having rallied his people to support a patriotic struggle against Western enemies and fueled Russia's economic growth with massive military spending, Mr. Putin wants Mr. Trump to cut off arms deliveries and crucial intelligence to Ukraine so that Russian troops can move beyond their snail's-pace offensive and gain substantial swaths of Ukrainian territory. With this goal in mind, Mr. Putin is going along with the negotiations in the hope that Mr. Trump eventually will give up on a peace settlement and walk away from the conflict altogether.”

"Taking Inches in Battle, Russia Demands Miles in Talks," Paul Sonne and Adam Entous, The New York Times, 05.14.25.

• “Over the past 16 months, as Russian forces seized the initiative, Moscow took 1,827 square miles of Ukraine, an area smaller than Delaware, according to data from the Institute for the Study of War measuring up to April 1.Over that period, the U.S. government estimates, Russia lost more than 400,000 troops to death or injury—a high cost for wresting control of less than 1% of Ukrainian territory.”
• Yet, “Moscow thinks it's winning in Ukraine and can play hardball diplomatically.” In contrast, “Washington sees costly, incremental gains and an unrealistic negotiating position.”

"Don’t Blame Trump If He Gives Up on Russia-Ukraine," Daniel R. DePetris, The American Conservative, 05.17.25. 

• “Putin, despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties over the last 16 months for an area smaller than the size of Delaware, is still harping on his original terms: formalizing his annexation of five Ukrainian regions, curtailing the size and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces, and dictating Kiev’s foreign policy. The Ukrainians remain dead set against any of this, and the loss in men and materiel over the last three years don’t seem to be having an appreciable effect on what they are—and aren’t—willing to live with.”
• “All of which is to say that Trump’s declining optimism is indicative of where the war is at this stage. If progress continues to elude, the White House could hardly be blamed if it threw up its hands, quit the peace process, and consoled itself that no stone was left unturned.”

“Putin Still Holds All the Cards in Ukraine, With No Reason to Fold,” Max Hastings, Bloomberg, 05.16.25.

• “If—or, in my opinion, when—the U.S. again cuts off supplies, Ukraine can keep fighting for maybe four months before it runs out of key munitions, especially 155mm artillery ammunition and Patriot air-defense missiles. Whatever supportive rhetoric comes out of Europe’s capitals, the European Union is incapable of filling the gap,” the author writes. “Meanwhile, Putin sees himself holding the cards, a view Trump has publicly endorsed. Economic sanctions, which since January the U.S. has quietly eased on Russian financial transactions, are nowhere near tough enough to make the Kremlin quit.”
• “Putin gambles that if he hangs on, this transactional U.S. president will sooner or later walk away, because he sees nothing in Ukraine for himself. The country would thus eventually become a failed state, over which Putin can secure hegemony,” according to the author. “Putin remains stubbornly committed to gaining control of the entire country, ousting its government and installing puppets. He wants Ukraine demilitarized and quarantined from the West. The only prospect of changing his mind is to increase the pressure on him, both military and economic. Above all, he needs to be convinced, as today he is not, that the U.S. won’t abandon the Ukrainians.”

“Inside the Trump administration’s quiet shift on Ukraine,” Guy Chazan, Financial Times, 05.14.25.

• “When U.S. vice-president JD Vance was asked about the war in Ukraine at a foreign policy forum in Washington last week, diplomats were expecting Maga-style criticism of Kyiv and veiled sympathy for Russia. Instead, they heard something quite different. Vance said of a set of Russian proposals to end the conflict: “We think they’re asking for too much. Vance’s comments were part of a noticeable shift in tone by the Trump administration. U.S. officials appear increasingly impatient with Vladimir Putin, as suspicions grow that the Russian leader, rather than Zelenskyy, may be the biggest obstacle to peace.”
  • “Trump is concluding that Putin is not a friend of the U.S.,” said Bill Taylor, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2006-09.”
  • “Trump definitely sees that Putin isn’t playing ball,” said Eric Green, a former aide to President Joe Biden at the National Security Council who is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think-tank.”
  • “Senator Lindsey Graham, a Trump ally, has said he has bipartisan support for a bill that would apply “bone-crushing” sanctions on Russia, including a 500 per cent tariff on imports from countries that buy its oil and gas, if Putin does not begin serious negotiations to end the war. The bill has been backed by 72 senators—a sign that support for Ukraine remains strong on Capitol Hill.”

"Russia has to know that Ukraine is just too big of a bite," Eric Ciaramella, Ukrinform, 05.14.25.

• “There's no way to engineer a ceasefire where Russia doesn't rearm. So, the key is to structure it so that Ukraine is able to rearm at a pace and on a scale that does not create a fundamental imbalance such that Russia thinks in the future that it could invade again, with impunity. That's the point. In February 2022, when Putin made that decision, he felt that the balance of power was so much in Russia's favor that he could take Kyiv in three days. Obviously, he misread Ukrainians and what local sentiment would be, he fundamentally misread the capabilities of the Ukrainian Army and the willingness of international partners to support Ukraine.”
• “So, during a ceasefire period—and I think this is what Trump is trying to do—you have to convince the Russians that they can use that period to rearm. But then, at the same time, you focus on ensuring that Ukraine does so, too, at the necessary level, such that even a Russian rearmament doesn't allow them to be at such an advantageous level that they could attack again.”
• “It's fundamentally about the psychology of one person and that person's cost-benefit analysis. There's no real scientific equation for how you get there, but you have to find a way to signal that Ukrainian capabilities are somehow keeping pace with Russia's, and there is some strategic balance between the two. Ukraine is never going to reach the level of capabilities of Russia, but Russia has to know that Ukraine is just too big of a bite.”
• “Dilemmas are mounting for Putin where he's being forced into positions to be seen as more constructive. And I think those can be exploited by Ukrainian and European sides to get some better terms for the negotiating table.”

"Putin outlines results Moscow seeks in Ukraine," RT and “Russia’s special military-op in Ukraine aimed at long-lasting peace—Putin,” TASS, 05.18.25. RT and TASS are Russian-government funded media outlets. Clues from Russian views.

• Vladimir Putin stated that Russia has “enough strength and resources to bring what was started in 2022 to its logical conclusion” while accomplishing Moscow’s key goals. "The objectives are about the elimination of the original causes of this crisis, the formation of conditions for the long-lasting and sustainable peace and the provision of security to Russia," he said.
• Putin added that it also goes "for people residing on these territories and considering the Russian language to be their native tongue and Russia as their homeland." The president was apparently referring to Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and the regions of Kherson and Zaporozhye.

"What Is Russia’s Game Plan for the Ukraine Peace Talks?," Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 05.15.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “The process Russia is proposing appears to be three-stage and somewhat drawn-out, with Putin’s role reserved for the final stage, when his counterpart will be not Zelensky, but Trump—and the subject not just peace in Ukraine, but the full rehabilitation of Russia as a global player, despite its aggressive war. Moscow sees the current moment as a convenient time not to end the war, but to achieve its goals in spite of it.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Jake Sullivan on Russia-Ukraine war: "We need a real peace, not a false peace",” (video interview) Politico, 05.15.25.
• “In High-Stakes Negotiations, Trump’s Opponents Are Learning His Patterns,” David E. Sanger, The New York Times, 05.13.25.
• "The possibilities and pitfalls of unorthodox diplomacy," Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 05.18.25.
• “A European Peacekeeping Force in Ukraine Won’t Work,” Azeem Ibrahim, Foreign Policy, 05.15.25
• "History is a Strategic Necessity for Negotiations with Russia," Harm Kaal and Floris van Berckel Smit, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 05.14.25.
• "Trump needs to push Putin hard to end war in Ukraine—now," Wesley Clark and Matthew Murray, USA Today, 05.15.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"A Russia-NATO War Would Look Nothing Like Ukraine," Fabian Hoffmann, Foreign Policy, 05.19.25.

• A “NATO-Russia war would likely be very different from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s primary goal in a war against NATO would not be to seize large territories—at least not initially—but to destroy the alliance as a political and military entity capable of opposing Russia.”
• “Moscow’s political and military elites understand that Russia would likely lose a full-on conventional war with NATO, even without U.S. involvement. For Russia, avoiding a prolonged attritional conflict and securing a swift, favorable resolution is therefore essential… The aim would be to keep the confrontation localized, involving only one or a few NATO states at most, and to end it quickly.”
• “A plausible scenario could begin with a limited incursion into NATO territory at a perceived weak point—for example, in one or more of the Baltic states. After the initial attack, Russia might declare that any attempt to retake the occupied area would trigger nuclear escalation—a strategy that military analysts call aggressive sanctuarization. To reinforce this, Russia could arm and disperse several missiles equipped with tactical nuclear warheads and declare readiness to launch at a moment’s notice. If NATO prepared a counterattack, Russia could escalate further by striking civilian infrastructure deep inside Europe with conventionally armed missiles, signaling that continued resistance only raises the costs. Should Russia conclude that a more drastic escalation would serve its interests, nuclear warning shots into the European rear cannot be ruled out.”
• “Russia’s decision to attack one or more European NATO states would… hinge less on the balance of forces and more on the perceived balance of resolve.”
• “Russia has made abundantly clear that its revisionist ambitions do not end in Ukraine. It would be reckless not to prepare for war… A short-term, high-intensity scenario designed to fracture the alliance and remove European resistance as a relevant factor appears the most likely Russian approach.”

“Europe needs smart rearmament,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 05.14.25.

• “If Europe wants to avoid war, Europe must get ready for war,” Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, said in March. Most European countries have finally confronted the need to spend big on rearmament, and started to mobilize the financing. Now they need to spend the money wisely. They must avoid the trap of preparing to fight the last war, and instead leapfrog ahead in developing the technologies needed to fight, or hopefully deter, the next one.”
• “Drones—in the air, on land and underwater—are now among the most effective weapons.”
• “Command and control hierarchies also need to be restructured to use drones and electronic warfare more effectively.”

"War and International Politics," John J. Mearsheimer, International Security, 05.01.25.³

• “With the end of unipolarity, security competition among the great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—is back with a vengeance.”
• “There is an enduring need to understand the nature of politics and its intimate connection to war. It is essential to recognize that conflict is endemic to politics, and political disputes have the potential to become deadly. In international politics, this means that war is a perennial danger that can put the survival of states at risk. That possibility causes great powers to fear one another and compete for power. In such a world, preventive wars and wars of opportunity can never be ruled out, and the threat of escalation in wartime is ever present. In the final analysis, political considerations will invariably trump economic, legal, and moral considerations whenever they are in conflict. This is hardly a rosy picture. But that is what politics looks like in the international realm.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Summit survival guide: How NATO’s June 2025 Summit can preserve the Alliance’s core values and interests," Stephen Evans and Adam Thomson, European Leadership Network, 05.19.25.
• "Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences", Ben Barry, Douglas Barrie, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Michael Gjerstad, James Hackett, Fenella McGerty, Ben Schreer, Tom Waldwyn, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 05.
• "Europe can't keep pace with Putin's military spending," Lee Hockstader, The Washington Post, 05.16.25.  
• "Russia Beefs Up Bases Near Finland’s Border," Jeffrey Gettleman, Amelia Nierenberg, and Johanna Lemola, The New York Times, 05.19.25.
• "The Montreux Paradox: How a Ukraine Ceasefire Could Set the Stage for Escalation in the Black Sea," Aron Lund, War on the Rocks, 05.16.25.
• "Who Won WWII in Europe?," John J. Mearsheimer, Substack, 05.09.25.
• "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to questions at a Diplomatic Club meeting," Sergey Lavrov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 05.15.25. Clues from Russian Views.
• "Coalitions Against Blocs," Andrei Kortunov, Izvestia, 05.11.25. In Russian. Clues froM Russian Views.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Xi Jinping has Vladimir Putin over a barrel," The Economist, 05.17.25.  

• “Western sanctions have left Russia with few alternative buyers for its raw materials, and no real alternative supplier for all the imported goods it needs. Dependencies in the other direction are diminishing. Russia is still China’s biggest foreign supplier of weapons. But these days China can make most of what it needs itself. Its total weapons imports fell by 64% from 2020 to 2024 compared with the previous five years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a think-tank. All this gives China a lot of leverage.”
• “China is happy to buy Russian commodities and dump its own consumer goods there, but its investment remains low, and it has little interest in helping Russia modernize or diversify its economy.”
• “At the same time, China maintains some diplomatic distance. Both Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi enjoy railing against “hegemonism” (read: America). And China wants to keep Mr. Putin in power and his war economy afloat. But it would rather not encourage Mr. Putin to engage in more militarist adventures, says Alexander Gabuev, of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre.”
• “One sign of China’s caution can be seen at the un General Assembly, where it has abstained in most votes on the war.”

"Former U.S.-China Ambassador Nicholas Burns on the Trade War and Diplomacy," (interview transcript) David Gura and Naomi Shavin, Bloomberg, 05.16.25.⁴

• “I think we're at a moment of great transformation in the global power picture, uh, with alliances shifting very rapidly. You see that China and Russia and Iran and North Korea and Venezuela and Nicaragua are kind of all working together, authoritarian dictatorships, and they're working together to try to cut down the power of the United States, reduce it in the world, and of our democratic allies.”
• “Despite the fact that we are still the strongest power in the world, you do need friends and allies in the world. And I do think that's the greatest mistake that President Trump has made in his first four months in office. If Donald Trump had faced China down, but had not, uh, placed high tariffs on Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, all those countries would've been on our side of the table.”

"Hedging on Hegemony: The Realist Debate over How to Respond to China," Stephen M. Walt, International Security, 05.01.25.

• “Barring a dramatic change in the global balance of power and political conditions in Asia, Chinese leaders would be foolish to make a bid for regional hegemony. It would likely leave China worse off than it is today—either contained by a powerful coalition or defeated in a direct clash of arms—just as all but one of the would-be regional hegemons of the past four centuries have been. Such an outcome could also pose a grave threat to the legitimacy and authority of the Chinee Communist Party.”

"China, Russia should stay ahead of the curve," Andrey Kortunov,⁵ Global Times, 05.12.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Let us imagine for a second that the U.S. could have succeeded in playing the role of a malicious spoiler in the China-Russia relationship. Could such a development contribute in any way to international security or even to the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. itself? Not very likely—no nation can possibly benefit from more tensions and less stability in the international system.”
• “The challenge for the leaders of the two nations is not only to react promptly to the evolving global agenda but also to actively shape that agenda. Russia and China should stay ahead of the curve, not behind it.”
• “At the same time, China maintains some diplomatic distance. Both Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi enjoy railing against “hegemonism” (read: America). And China wants to keep Mr. Putin in power and his war economy afloat. But it would rather not encourage Mr. Putin to engage in more militarist adventures, says Alexander Gabuev, of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "China and Russia are deploying powerful new weapons: ideas," The Economist, 05.15.25.

Missile defense:

"What Will the U.S. Golden Dome Missile Defense Mean for Russia?," James D.J. Brown, Carnegie Politika, 05.19.25.

• The question is “whether Golden Dome is feasible.”
  • “The first obstacle is technical. Even though technology has advanced enormously since the 1980s, the challenge of developing a space-based missile defense shield remains formidable.”
  • “Another obstacle is cost… A National Research Council study from 2012 estimated that the total cost of a space-based, boost-phase missile defense system could be as much as $831 billion (in 2025 dollars).”
• “What does all this mean for Russia?” “Since the survival of the nation is at stake, strategists must proceed from the worst-case scenario and assume that Golden Dome would be effective at least against a Russian second strike. Russia will therefore need to respond.”
• “That will entail accelerating existing efforts to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad by replacing Soviet-era delivery systems with newer Russian designs.”
• “We can also expect renewed emphasis on exotic weapons that promise to evade all conceivable missile defense systems.”
• “Another probable response is a redoubling of Russian interest in nuclear anti-satellite weapons.”
• “Golden Dome will therefore press Russia into a new arms race, forcing it to devote yet more resources to its strategic forces at a time when the country can least afford it.”
• “Ultimately, Golden Dome may never achieve Trump’s grandiose ambitions. However, even if it does not, it will have serious consequences for strategic stability and for Russia in particular.” The dilemma Russia faces with Golden Dome appears analogous to the one faced by Gorbachev when U.S. President Ronald Reagan declared the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1984.

Nuclear arms:

"Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025," Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 05.13.25.

• “Russia is in the late stages of a multi-decade-long modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. However, this program is facing significant challenges that will further delay the entry into force of these newer systems. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that Russia now possesses approximately 4,309 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Although the number of Russian strategic launchers is not expected to change significantly in the foreseeable future, the number of warheads assigned to them might increase. The significant increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized. A nuclear weapons storage site in Belarus appears to be nearing completion.”

"Russian Nuclear Weapons in Space?," Jonas Schneider and Juliana Süß, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 05.15.25.

• “According to the U.S. government, the Russian government is developing a program to arm some of its satellites with nuclear warheads. Should the Kremlin acquire this capability, it could destroy key parts of the civilian satellite infrastructure by detonating a single nuclear weapon in low Earth orbit.”
• “Important U.S. military satellites are also located in space. The use of Russian nuclear weapons there could severely weaken the U.S. military and potentially trigger a military escalation on Earth.”
• “The deployment of a nuclear warhead in space would constitute a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. The development of this capability appears to align with Russia’s strategic approach of undermining the established international order and engaging in high-risk actions to extract concessions from the West, particularly in the context of Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to incorporate the increasingly militarized domain of space into this strategy by using non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons. Europe must be prepared to address this ongoing challenge.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Welcome to the New Nuclear Age. It's Even More Chaotic," Hal Brands, Bloomberg Opinion, 05.18.25.
• "One Nuclear War Can Ruin the Whole Climate," Ted Nordhaus and Mark Lynas, The Wall Street Journal, 05.16.25.
• "Nuclear War Avoided, Again. But What About Next Time?," W.J. Hennigan, The New York Times, 05.16.25.   

Counterterrorism:

No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Trump’s AI Playbook Has Napoleon Written All Over It," Tobin Harshaw, Bloomberg Opinion, 05.18.25.

• "New tech, new threats: drones, 3D-printed guns, artificial intelligence and violent extremism," Jean-Luc Marret, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), 05.15.25.

Energy exports from CIS:

"How Has Russia’s Gazprom Gone From Record Losses to Mega-Profits?," Sergey Vakulenko, Carnegie Politika, 05.16.25.

• “Despite sanctions, windfall taxes, the loss of European markets, and other troubles that have befallen Gazprom since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the company’s financial reports suggest that it is doing just fine. The state gas giant’s recently published figures for 2024, calculated according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), indicate a net profit of 1.2 trillion rubles ($15 billion). The year before, it had reported a loss of 629 billion rubles.”
• Gazprom went from record losses in 2023 to mega-profits in 2024 primarily due to accounting changes, acquisitions, and oil revenues, not core gas business recovery, according to the author.
• “For now, Gazprom still has a large safety margin. Many projects could be frozen without inflicting too much damage on the company’s future cash flows, which will improve its financial position. But the concern seems to have gotten into the habit of carrying out several expensive and lengthy construction projects at the same time, and it is virtually impossible to stop even some of them without major reforms within the company.”

"Having Exited Europe, Gazprom Has Nowhere to Go," Mikhail Krutikhin, The Moscow Times/Russia.Post, 05.16.25.

• “The transformation of Gazprom into an instrument of political blackmail has been costly for the company. Its losses from exiting the European market are estimated at $40 billion a year, and its frenzied efforts to find new markets have failed to find success.”
• “The overall picture does not look pretty for Gazprom. Russia’s colossal gas reserves (the largest in the world) are unable to be monetized currently. No one trusts Russia and Gazprom as a supplier. If by some miracle something is achieved with the Chinese, earnings from these exports will not cover either the construction of the needed gas transportation infrastructure or even the operating costs of the gas production and transportation. This hardly resembles a business.”

“Oil Sanctions Would Hit Russia Harder Now Than in 2022,” Eric Van Nostrand, Wall Street Journal, 05.14.25.

• “In 2022, seriously reducing Russian oil exports would have rendered energy prohibitively expensive for consumers and businesses across the globe. But changing market conditions have simplified matters. Now is the time to take Russian oil off the market and shrink the Kremlin's war chest,” the author argues. “The West has several options to take Russian oil off the market. The G7 could simply lower the price cap. Or it could ban any G7 business from servicing the Russian oil trade at any price -- essentially lowering the cap to zero. But the new shipping infrastructure Russia has built to evade the price cap could limit the effectiveness of either approach.”
• “There is a bolder option. The West could impose sanctions on anyone who buys Russian oil, using its full might to shrink the Kremlin's exports -- what policymakers call secondary sanctions. The U.S. could lead the effort, or the European Union and U.K. could take this step without American collaboration. If such a strategy removed 2 million barrels a day from the market -- only one-fourth of Russian oil exports -- I estimate based on economists' models that Kremlin oil revenues would plummet 20% while lifting gasoline prices only 15 cents a gallon,” the author writes.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Fiona Hill,⁶ former Trump adviser: ‘The president wants to be an autocrat; he sees himself as an emperor,’” (interview) El Pais, 05.18.25.

“Question: you’ve personally observed the interactions between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in the past. How would you describe their relationship?

Fiona Hill: “For Putin, the relationship is one in which he tries to take advantage of Trump’s weaknesses to be able to manipulate him. And Trump hasn’t been able to do the same in terms of Putin because he’s too much infatuated with Putin as a symbol and as an example of what he wants to be. Trump wants to be an autocrat. He sees himself as a king, as an emperor. He sees himself as a colossus walking the world stage. And he sees Putin as the kind of titan that he wants to be. And unfortunately, he doesn’t see him for who he really is, which is also someone with a great deal of weaknesses. He doesn’t see that Russia is not the superpower that the Soviet Union was. And frankly, at the moment, all the leverage is with Putin in that relationship.”

“Preserving U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Science and Marine Stewardship: Opportunities for Civil Society in the Bering Strait," Margaret Williams and Anand Patel, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 05.12.25. 

• “Despite the heightened tension between Russia, the United States, and other Western nations, solving planetary challenges, such as Arctic sea ice loss, permafrost thaw, and biological diversity loss, requires all nations to work together.”
• “In the Bering Strait – a location where all of these challenges intersect – civil society can assume a leadership role in devising and implementing solutions that consider the transboundary nature of the place.”
• “Universities, independent research institutions, conservation groups, and coastal communities must take a “pragmatic but principled” approach toward cooperation with Russian non-governmental entities, with a view toward the future beyond the war in Ukraine. Workshop participants concluded that such an approach could be accomplished without legitimizing the current Russian regime.” 

"What a Trump Reset With Russia Could Look Like," Edward Lucas, Foreign Policy, 05.09.25.

• “Perhaps most importantly, all attempted U.S.-Russian resets since the 1990s have ended in failure, with varying degrees of damage to U.S. allies before reality dawned. It is not clear why a Trump-Putin version should be any different. In the end, Russia’s national interests are antithetical to those of the United States.”
• “In the end, Trump’s unfathomable personality holds the key to his future relations with Putin. A full-scale love-in with the strongman in the Kremlin may be unlikely. But for erstwhile U.S. allies in Europe, the fact that it is even conceivable is alarming.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Trump Isn’t the First President Putin Has Played,” Tom Rogan, Wall Street Journal, 05.13.25.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin’s New Hermit Kingdom: At War With the West and Its Own Elites, the Russian Regime Inches Toward a Fully Closed Dictatorship,” Andrei Yakovlev, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, and Yuri Danilov, Foreign Affairs, 05.16.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• The authors of this FA article argue that “Russia could arrive at a sociopolitical equilibrium that looks less like a capitalist authoritarian country with private-sector elites and more like a North Korean–style militarized autocracy.”
• “For the Kremlin, such an equilibrium could help it withstand even major challenges to its rule, as Pyongyang did during a devastating economic crisis in the 1990s.Moreover, given Russia’s large size and military strength, this kind of transformation could also pose profound risks to global security,” the authors warn.
• “If Russia, with its large nuclear arsenal, were to make a full transition to North Korean autocracy, it would pose enormous geopolitical challenges. Such a regime would also be a natural close ally to China,” according to the authors.
• “For the United States and its allies, there is not much time left to steer Russia from its current path,” according to the authors.

"Vladislav Inozemtsev: 'At the end of the year, we will see a major struggle between the economic and security blocs over military spending'," Vladislav Inozemtsev, Republic, 05.16.25. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian Views.

• “It seems to me that military spending [in Russia] has reached a certain limit this year. And all these years the danger was that these expenses were growing uncontrollably. And the military lobby wanted more and more. And this was considered, let's say, an indisputable item that would be financed in any volume. Let's see what happens in the fall, when the new budget is adopted. But I bet that there will be no increase in military spending. It may be a minimum of 2–3% in nominal terms. They have reached the maximum limit—there is no way to go any further.”
• “Accordingly, the next question: can the budget withstand the current level of spending? My answer: it can. Because in any case, tax revenues will grow—at least by 10–12% per year, in line with the inflation rate. In addition, "targeted" tax increases will probably continue. Therefore, there will be no less money in nominal terms—and the budget will cope with the current level of military spending painlessly.”
• “My forecast: the country can afford such expenses for a long time, if they lie, as stockbrokers say, in a sideways trend, that is, do not grow further. But if Putin wants to spend 20 trillion next year, then, it seems to me, everything will go haywire. I think that at the end of the year we will see a major struggle between the economic and security blocs over military spending.”

"In Russia, Power Horizontals Are Paving the Way for a Power Transition," Andrey Pertsev,  05.07.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Amid personnel stagnation and a shortage of resources, many officials have long occupied their positions and are well aware that expanding into related spheres or cooperating with the curators of those spheres (i.e., establishing a horizontal dialogue with them) increases their influence.” Such “Horizontal expansion is a risky tactic.”
• “The practice of horizontal ties and dialogue is bringing forward the dawn of post-Putin Russia. It blurs the contours of the vertical, providing opportunities for elite groups to resolve issues among themselves, without resorting to presidential arbitration. Finally, it is becoming a school for the creation of coalitions: of political battles and opposing processes away from the public eye. Ultimately, horizontals are paving the way for a transition of power, because the elites are coming to understand that it is entirely possible to live without Putin.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "After Putin: The Maximum Program," Boris Grozovsky, The Moscow Times, 05.19.25. In Russian. Clues from Russian Views.
• "The Algorithm of Regime Collapse, or the Scientific Fall of a Dictatorship," Sergey Konyashin, The Moscow Times, 05.17.25. In Russian. Clues from Russian Views.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Moderates Find Success in Romania, Poland, and Portugal Elections," CFR.org Editors, Council on Foreign Relations, 05.19.25.

• “In a surprise result, a centrist defeated a populist candidate in Romania’s presidential election, while moderates in Portugal and Poland maintained a narrow lead over the far-right.”
  • “Romania’s presidential vote was a do-over after a court annulled its previous iteration in November following accusations of Russian meddling. Pro-Russia candidate Călin Georgescu won that now-cancelled vote. Although he was barred from participating in the redo election, his close ally George Simion ran and led the first round of voting. Voter participation in yesterday’s runoff surged to its highest level in around twenty-five years. Pro-European centrist Nicușor Dan, mayor of Bucharest, earned around 54% of votes compared to Simion’s 46%.”

Ukraine:

"Why Trump’s Ukraine resources deal won’t show results for a decade," Leslie Hook, Camilla Hodgson and Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 05.13.25.

• “The resources deal that Donald Trump has struck with Ukraine will not yield mining production for at least a decade and require huge private sector investment to get projects off the ground. That is how companies and industry veterans view the agreement, ratified by Kyiv’s parliament on Thursday, which aims to lift investment in the Ukrainian mining and energy sectors and create a joint “reconstruction investment fund” from the proceeds of future projects.”
• “It could be 10–15 years—that’s the sort of timeline we talk about,” said Eric Rasmussen, former head of natural resources at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Peter Bryant, chair of mining advisory group Clareo, said the accord “does little to de-risk the supply chain in the next 10 years, as it will take at least that long to discover and develop mines” in the eastern European country.”

• “Ukraine’s commercial natural resources include iron ore, coal, lithium, graphite and titanium-bearing ores. It is also Europe’s third-largest gas producer. Future oil and gas developments will be included in the resources deal, and could be quicker to develop than mining projects, observers said.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "I was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. I resigned because of Trump's foreign policy," Bridget Brink, Detroit Free Press, 05.16.25.
• "Sleeping Mineral Bomb: Who might need a resource deal between Kyiv and Washington, and why," Re: Russia, 05.15.25.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Rethinking EU Strategy in Central Asia: Achieving Long-Term Success for the Middle Corridor," Shyngys Zipatolla, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 05.14.25.
• "The Perpetual Horizon: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Prospects for Peace," Marie Dumoulin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 05.16.25.
• "Russia and China in Central Asia", Janko Šćepanović, War on the Rocks, 05.14.25.
• "Article by Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Planning of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.V. Trofimov for the scientific journal 'Problems of National Strategy' of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), No. 2, 2025. In Russian. Clues from Russian Views.

Footnotes

1. In comments made ahead of the Monday call, JD Vance said that if it looks like Russia isn’t interested in a peace deal, “we’re more than open to walking away.”
2. “Over the past 16 months, as Russian forces took 1,827 square miles of Ukraine [while...] losing than 400,000 troops to death or injury—“a high cost for wresting control of less than 1% of Ukrainian territory,” according to The New York Times. At the same time, it is worth noting that “Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated. In fact, the Russian army, which has borne the brunt of combat, is today larger than it was at the beginning of the war—despite suffering an estimated 790,000 casualties,” according to SACEUR Christopher Cavoli’s recent estimate.
3. This article is a revised version of the inaugural Richard K. Betts Lecture, which the author delivered at Columbia University on November 16, 2023.
4. Ambassador Nicholas Burns is a HKS professor and member of the Belfer Center’s board.
5. For a preview of Xi’s recent visit to Russia co-written by Kortunov see: "President Xi Comes to Town, Zhao Huasheng and Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council (RIA), 05.07.25.
6. Fiona Hill is a member of Harvard’s board of overseers.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

NB: Due to the Memorial Day holiday in the U.S., the next issue of the Russia Analytical Report will be published on Tuesday, May 27, 2025.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky.