5 Ideas to Explore

1. Who is winning in Ukraine three years after Russia’s invasion? No one, according to retired general Mick Ryan’s commentary in FA. “Now, the war in Ukraine has reached an apparent stasis. Russia continues to take small parcels of territory along the eastern front, but only by incurring unsustainably high casualties,” the Lowy Institute’s military expert argues. According to Russian military analyst Nikolay Mitrokhin’s commentary for the opposition-minded Russian resource, Russia.Post, however, “a Ukrainian defeat in the war” is “shaping up,” and it is doing so for three possible reasons: “corruption [which] has done much to erode the country’s mobilization capacity and limited supplies going to the front”; “poor planning”; and “woefully inadequate attention to building up Ukraine’s defense industry.” Russia gained 190 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (about 2 Martha’s Vineyard islands) in the past month, according to the Feb. 19, 2025, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. The monthly rate of the Russian advance may have slowed down recently, but it is still nearly five times higher this winter than last, according to the card.
   1. The 3^rd anniversary of Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine has produced several efforts to estimate the costs of the conflict. For an estimate of the costs endured by the Ukrainian side, consult Victoria Craw’s piece in The Washington Post and Marcus Stanley’s piece in Responsible Statecraft. For an estimate of the costs of the invasion for Putin and his country, as well as the benefits, consult RM’s blog.
2. Thomas Graham of CFR was told in Moscow that “the toughest issue, is what happens to that part of Ukraine that is not occupied by Russia whenever a settlement is reached.” “It’s quite clear from the Russian standpoint that President Putin wants ... control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, to a limited extent its domestic politics,” according to Graham. “I think from the American standpoint ... our goal has to be the preservation of a sovereign, independent Ukraine that has a Western orientation,” he was quoted as saying at a CFR event. “How you reconcile those two diverging visions, I think, is quite difficult,” Graham said.
3. “Europe must ... ensure it can act independently of America” as “80 years of American-backed security” are over, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared in the Economist, following the Trump team’s blistering criticism of the Europeans’ input into their own defense. “This will require significant investments in capabilities such as air defense, refueling and other logistics that sustain military operations—and for which Europe is almost entirely reliant on America,” Rasmussen writes. Among other things, Europeans should “increase their nuclear weapons production,” Garvan Walshe, former international security policy adviser to the British Conservative Party, claims in FP.
4. Russian proponents of a doctrinal shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear intimidation will likely consider the revision of the “Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” as a move in favor of their stance, according to IMEMO’s Aleksey Arbatov. “Nevertheless, the amendments to the nuclear doctrine do not indicate its radical overhaul but rather a clarification of its provisions. There is no endorsement of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war or the use of nuclear weapons as a functional means of achieving success in local or regional military operations. All the amendments refer specifically to retaliatory measures in the event of aggressive nuclear and conventional military operations against Russia and its allies,” according to Arbatov’s commentary for RIAC. Arbatov advises that “it is important for Russia not to engage in a quantitative and tit-for-tat arms race.” “Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge,” he predicts.
5. Will Western energy companies return to Russia? Stanley Reed asks in NYT following news reports that Western sanctions relief for Russia could be on the table. Analysts told this NYT writer that returning may be easier for smaller Western companies that provide services like hydraulic fracturing and other technical support, according to Reed, such as America’s SLB, the former Schlumberger, which continues to work in Russia. “Of all large Western energy companies, TotalEnergies of France seems best placed to return to business as normal in Russia, if the political situation permits,” he writes. According to U.S. shale magnate Harold Hamm, however, U.S. oil majors will think long and hard before investing following any peace deal due to the geopolitical risks, and opportunities elsewhere, FT reported. 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Prioritizing Nuclear Negotiations With Iran," Ariel (Eli) Levite, CEIP, 02.18.25. 

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Bucha Has a Question: Does Trump Remember the Russian Massacre?” Kim Barker, NYT, 02.20.25. 

• “President Trump’s comments blaming Ukraine for the war with Russia angered residents of Bucha, where more than 400 civilians were killed by Russian forces.”
• “Andrii Pobihai, a retired Ukrainian commander, expressed disgust at Trump’s words, questioning how the U.S. could now side with Russia after the massacre in Bucha.”
• “Bucha became notorious for Russian brutality after the invasion, with images of atrocities, such as priests and civilians executed, circulating globally.”
• “Residents are now alarmed by Trump's statements and wonder if the U.S. is really considering siding with Russia, a pariah state on the world stage.”
• “Alla Kriuchkova, a local resident, fears that if the U.S. abandons Ukraine, the country will be "screwed" given the devastation they have already endured.”
• “The ghosts of the massacre are still present, with reminders of Russian violence, including mass graves and memorials for the dead.”
• “Iryna Abramova, a Bucha resident, fears that the court will do nothing about her husband’s killer due to political developments, including Trump’s rhetoric.”
• “The Rev. Andriy Halavin, an Orthodox priest, shared haunting images of victims, including children, and a satirical cartoon of Trump claiming the massacre wouldn’t have happened under his leadership.”
• “At Bucha’s municipal cemetery, 52 graves are marked with numbers, indicating unidentified bodies, a grim reminder of the Russian occupation and killings.”
• “Despite the anger, some like Pobihai hope Trump will eventually change his stance, fearing that Ukraine’s capture by Russia could provoke NATO and Europe into action.”

"The Staggering Cost of Russia's War in Ukraine, by the Numbers," Victoria Craw, WP, 02.24.25. 

• “10.6 million: That's the number of Ukrainians who have been displaced, according to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It includes 3.7 million who have moved inside the country and 6.9 million abroad, most of whom are in Russia, Germany and Poland. More than 2 million homes, or about 10 percent of Ukraine's housing stock, have been destroyed, the agency said.”
• “1.5 million: The number of Ukrainian children at risk of long-term mental health consequences from the war, according to the UNHCR.”
• “152,295: An estimate of the minimum number of people — soldiers and civilians — killed in the war. This is almost certainly a significant undercount of the toll because of the difficulty of confirming deaths in a war zone, with both Russia and Ukraine suspected of dramatically underplaying their losses.”
  • “At least 12,654 civilians have been killed in Ukraine, according to figures verified by the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, which says the true toll "is likely considerably higher," particularly given the near impossibility of confirming deaths in areas occupied by Russia.”
  • “Over 95,000 members of the Russian military have been killed, according to researchers from the Russian media outlet Mediazona and the BBC Russian service, who have tracked verified publicly available sources.”
  • “Zelensky told NBC's "Meet the Press" this month that Ukraine has lost 46,000 soldiers, with "tens of thousands more who are missing in action or are in captivity."
• “20: The approximate percentage of Ukrainian territory under Russian control.”
• “25: The conscription age in Ukraine, having been lowered from 27.”
• “$65.9 billion: The amount the United States has spent so far on military assistance since Russia's invasion, according to State Department figures.”
• “55: The number of times the United States has used the emergency Presidential Drawdown Authority since August 2021 to provide Ukraine military assistance worth approximately $27.6 billion from Defense Department stockpiles.”
• “12: The number of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems and munitions the United States has sent to Ukraine, according to the State Department.”
• “300,000: The number of soldiers European Union nations, along with the United Kingdom and Norway, would have to mobilize to defend themselves against Russia without U.S. backing, according to Germany's Kiel Institute for the World Economy.”
• “$279 billion: The total amount of aid Ukraine has received from donor governments over the course of the war, according to figures from the Kiel Institute.”
• “57: The percentage of Ukrainians who trust Zelensky, according to a survey conducted this month by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, a prominent Ukrainian polling organization. That's an increase of 5 percentage points from a survey in December.”

"The Ukraine War After Three Years: Roads Not Taken," Marcus Stanley, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 02.19.25. 

• “The Ukraine War is inarguably the bloodiest and costliest war in Europe since World War II. While accurate casualty figures are difficult to come by, in September 2024, The Wall Street Journal estimated that the war had already resulted in more than one million casualties, with more than 250,000 dead and some 800,000 wounded. The carnage has only increased since then.”
• “The war has also been a demographic and economic disaster for Ukraine — a smaller and more vulnerable country than Russia. Due to invasion and refugee flight, the resident population of Ukraine has declined to some 28–30 million, a population loss of one quarter when compared to the prewar figure of some 42 million. The nation faces a long-term demographic crisis. In 2024, Ukraine had the world’s highest death rate and lowest birth rate. Estimates are that its population size will continue to decline in the future, absent a return to peace.”
• “Ukraine was already one of the poorest countries in Europe before the invasion, with the second-lowest gross domestic product, GDP, per person (ranking above only Kosovo) and a pre-invasion GDP of only about $200 billion. By the end of 2025, estimates suggest that the economic cost of the war to Ukraine will be a $120 billion cumulative loss in GDP and $1 trillion in damage to infrastructure and capital stock. When compared to the size of Ukraine’s already relatively poor prewar economy, these figures are staggering.”
• “By late 2022 — around the time that shifts in the front line slowed to a crawl and the war became a bloody battle of attrition — General Mark Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, assessed that the Ukrainians had “achieved about as much as they could reasonably expect on the battlefield” and should therefore “try to cement their gains at the bargaining table.” The events of the next two years proved him essentially correct, but his advice was not put into policy — indeed, the Biden administration publicly rejected it and reassured its allies and Ukraine that it did not currently favor diplomacy and would not push Kyiv to negotiate. At around the same time as Milley’s assessment, some progressive members of Congress called for diplomatic engagement but were also met with sharp opposition.”
• “Why have Ukraine’s allies failed to pursue, and even seemed to reject, opportunities for opening negotiations until now? There are a number of reasons, but an important factor seems to be a belief that, given Russia’s actions in invading Ukraine, the war should be pursued until Russia is greatly weakened and adequately punished.”

"Rebuilding Ukraine: Priorities and Strategies," Charles Becker, Peter Devine, Aaron Lam, Michelle Schultze and Eva Spektorov, CFR, February 2025. 

• “Ukraine’s long-term stability and security depend on its ability to recover economically. While Western policymakers have prioritized military aid and large capital transfers, these alone will not rebuild Ukraine’s economy. A successful recovery requires specific actions that will alter the trajectory of Ukraine’s labor force, attract private investment to ease the burden on public finances, and provide long-term economic stability. Without those, Ukraine’s economy will stagnate and be significantly more vulnerable to Russian expansionism in the future.”
• “Ukraine faces three major challenges that threaten its economic recovery. First, Russia’s invasion dramatically accelerated the decline of Ukraine’s labor force, which has been shrinking since the Soviet dissolution. The loss of nearly a third of its population to displacement and emigration, when added to the loss of workers who were taken from productive economic activities and sent to the front, threatens the country’s long-term economic growth more than any other factor. Without targeted incentives for return, Ukraine’s workforce will remain stunted, permanently weakening its economy. Second, low private investment and structural weaknesses will raise the burden on Ukraine’s public finances. Ukraine historically has struggled to attract foreign direct investment, and war-related uncertainty has further deterred investors. Third, current Western strategies are blind to both those vulnerabilities, but especially the mission-critical need to reverse Ukraine’s population decline. So far, other than considerations for rebuilding infrastructure and demining, Western planning for Ukraine’s recovery has been negligently deferred until after the war. Ukraine and its supporters should take the following steps to strengthen the country’s postwar economic outlook:”
• “In short, Ukraine is in a highly stressed position, but there is some bright economic news. The challenge facing its international supporters is to build on those positives to sustain long-run economic growth.”
• “European Union (EU) nations should ensure that workers returning to Ukraine retain pension entitlements earned elsewhere and gain credit toward residency rights in supporting EU countries based on work in Ukraine.”
• “Ukraine, the EU, and other supporting nations should provide transitional housing, health care, and education for the families of returning workers and offer returning refugees short-term financial support to ease reintegration.”
• “Ukraine’s supporters should expand the underwriting of private investments while Ukraine should strengthen anti-corruption measures by funding independent watchdog organizations and increasing defined public financial transparency mechanisms.”
• “The EU and the United States should formalize support for a currency board backed by international reserves to stabilize its currency and build investor confidence.”
• “Ukraine should reopen a commercial airport, such as in Lviv, to facilitate business travel and investment inflows.”
• “Implementing those policies would reduce Ukraine’s dependence on aid, enhance regional stability, and create a stronger, self-sufficient economy and defense capability. Failing to make those or similar changes would swiftly risk entrenching Ukraine’s economic decline and undermining its postwar recovery.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Is Putin’s Brainwashing of Ukrainians Into Russians Even a Crime?" Peter Pomerantsev, The Economist 1843 Magazine, 02.21.25.
• "Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine's Future—and Its Past," Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 02.20.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"Why No One Is Winning in Ukraine," Mick Ryan, FA, 02.21.25. 

"Three Years Since the Invasion: How the Russia-Ukraine Front Line Looks Today," Nikolay Mitrokhin, Russia.Post, 02.24.25. 

• “Both armies, like both countries and their economies, are in need of a stop in the fighting and a period to recover. That said, Ukraine is in the weaker position. The Russian army continues to advance, though in the first two months of 2025 the pace of the advance – if we look at the amount of Ukrainian territory captured – has at least halved versus November 2024.”
• “The reasons for what is shaping up to be a Ukrainian defeat in the war, besides the oft-heard arguments about insufficient Western support and a lack of Ukrainians willing to fight in the east, have been debated in the Ukrainian press.”
  • “It is said that corruption has done much to erode the country’s mobilization capacity and limited supplies going to the front.”
  • “Poor planning at all levels of the military is another common allegation.”
  • “Finally, critics say that the country’s leadership, banking on generous support from the West, has paid woefully inadequate attention to building up Ukraine’s defense industry.” 

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Now Is the Time for Europe to Show Strength, Not Division," Sanna Marin, The Economist, 02.19.25. 

• “Europe must rid itself of the dangerous illusion that it is weak—and stop acting like it. Europe’s NATO members have a combined GDP of $23trn, ten times that of Russia. Nevertheless, their lack of decisive action so far means that Russia and its impoverished allies still spend around 40% more on destroying Ukraine than the combined West spends on helping Ukraine defend itself.”
• “According to new research by the Tony Blair Institute, an additional $40bn per year in military support for Ukraine—just 0.2% of the GDP of European NATO members—would probably be enough to match Russia’s resources on the battlefield.”
• “Simply buying materiel directly from the Ukrainian defense industry, for use by the Ukrainian armed forces—an approach the Danes have pioneered—is one of the fastest and cheapest ways to further scale up European defense-industrial capacity.”
• “By acting decisively now, Europe can ensure that it emerges from the war, together with Ukraine, stronger and more secure than it was in 2022. Failing to do so would mean abdicating responsibility for its own security and no longer having a say in its own future. That ought to be an astonishingly simple choice for European leaders to get right.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "It’s Not Too Late for the US to Back Ukraine – for Its Own Benefit," James Nixey, Chatham House, 02.24.25. 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Europeans Will Need to Decide Which Russian Sanctions to Keep," Robin Niblett, FT, 02.23.25.

• “European governments have collective economic clout. They and the EU have imposed 15 rounds of sanctions on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which are costing Russia dearly.”
• “European governments urgently need to develop an inventory of those sanctions they would be willing to lift to help secure a peace. And their position must be communicated to Washington as quickly as possible. Otherwise Trump might make concessions on sanctions unilaterally, present them as a fait accompli and then blame the Europeans if their reservations end up torpedoing his peace deal.”
  • “For example, European governments should refuse to return the roughly €250bn of Russian Central Bank reserves held by European financial institutions unless Moscow pays full war reparations. But they could let certain Russian banks back into the Swift payments system to settle their trades with foreign counterparts on unsanctioned trade.”
• “While they consider their position on sanctions, Europeans also need to find points of leverage with Trump. His demand that Ukraine give the US a long-term concession to a large portion of Ukraine’s critical minerals as payment for America’s past military support, offers one such opportunity. Europeans could put forward their own plans for investment alongside the US in Ukraine’s natural resources, as part of a larger package deal that would include the European security guarantees — and US military back-up — to protect their collective assets into the future.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Media Briefing: Trump, Russia, and the Future of Ukraine," Stephen Sestanovich, Thomas Graham and Charles A. Kupchan, CFR, 02.20.25. 

• “Kupchan: I do support, in principle, the Trump administration’s decision to try to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, and in principle the decision to open a direct dialog between Washington and Moscow, including a phone call between Trump and Putin and the meeting that took place in Riyadh just a few days ago, where Secretary Rubio and Secretary Lavrov began a conversation. I think this is overdue. I think we’ve known for quite some time that Ukraine is not going to win this war. And I think that reasonable people could come together around a redefinition of a successful outcome to this war, which would be, at least in my mind, that the 80 percent of Ukraine that is still free emerges as a success story, as a defensible, secure, prosperous democracy. And I think that should be the aim of American diplomacy in the months ahead. ... in principle, I appreciate what Trump is trying to do. In practice, it is a big, hot mess.”
• “Graham: From the Russian standpoint, these discussions are not simply about Ukraine. Ukraine is embedded in the larger question of European security.... Second point, when it comes specifically to Ukraine. The Russians have made it clear, and President Putin has made it clear repeatedly, that they are not interested in a simple ceasefire. President Putin wants what he calls an enduring settlement. And he wants to have a settlement that deals with what he calls the root causes of the conflict... think, going forward are going to be two major ones—territory and Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. From the Russian standpoint, a ceasefire along the line of contact at this point is not satisfactory. That will leave territory that the Russians consider sovereign Russian territory in the hands of the Ukrainians—in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk in particular. You know, from the Ukrainian position that is their territory. And they want the 1991 borders, although they realize they can’t get those militarily at this point. So where that line is drawn is going to be important to Russia.   And the second, and I was told in Moscow this is going to be the toughest issue, is what happens to that part of Ukraine that is not occupied by Russia whenever a settlement is reached? It’s quite clear from the Russian standpoint that President Putin wants to control Ukraine, and all of Ukraine. That he wants control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, to a limited extent its domestic politics. That his vision of a future Ukraine that’s beyond Russia’s physical control is along the lines of the relationship that Belarus has with Russia at this point. I think from the American standpoint, as Charlie has already mentioned, we have a different vision for the future of Ukraine. At a minimum our goal has to be the preservation of a sovereign, independent Ukraine that has a Western orientation, on whatever territory Kyiv controls at the end of this conflict.  .. How you reconcile those two diverging visions, I think, is quite difficult.”
• “Sestanovich: What I think is most striking, if you step back from the confusion and the nastiness of the past few days, is how little the administration has said about providing for support for Ukraine in the future, and in particular for Ukrainian security. There has not really been any commentary on whether the United States would be prepared to offer support for a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine if it materializes. There has been nothing said about other forms of security assistance in the future. There has been nothing said about cooperation between Western defense industry and Ukraine’s innovative—own innovative defense industry. There has been nothing said about economic support for Ukraine in the future, and of course nothing on the actual terms of a ceasefire settlement.”

"Grand Bargains in History: Trump’s Ukraine Gambit," Benjamin Jensen, CSIS, 02.20.25. 

• “Beyond the headlines and the heartache, the Trump team is charting a course that is as bold as it is risky in relation to Russia and Ukraine. The private calls to Putin and dialogue in Saudi Arabia are likely not just about ending the war in Ukraine. These talks pivot around striking a new grand bargain linked to a mix of geopolitical spheres of influence and cross-cutting issues from access to natural resources to twenty-first-century arms control, which involves not just nuclear concerns but competition in space and cyberspace. In other words, the president’s foreign policy team appears to be leveraging negotiations around Ukraine as a forum to negotiate remaking the international system. The theory of victory is simple and seductive: use a grand rapprochement with Russia to undermine the authoritarian axis linking Moscow to China, Iran, and North Korea while advancing U.S. economic interests.”
• “With great risk comes great reward and a need to take stock of the role of similar grand bargains historically. A cursory review of other major diplomatic pushes at the end of major wars provides more caution than cause for celebration. There is a long history of states seeking grand bargains at the end of wars to recalibrate the international system. These diplomatic pushes tend to involve pivots in a long-term strategy that result in famous treaties—think Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, and Vienna in 1815. The bargains also cluster around long-term competition and recurrent conflicts in which statesmen use secret trips and high-stakes diplomacy to change the balance of power, as seen in Henry Kissinger’s famed trip to China in 1971, Carter’s secret shepherding of Arab-Israeli negotiations at Camp David in 1978, and Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated trip to Munich in 1938.”
• “While it is impossible to predict the generational impacts of grand bargains—would Kissinger still go to China in 1971 if he read about the Chinese Communist Party in 2025—it is possible to assess the opportunity costs and likely tradeoffs the latest grand bargain foretells.”
  • “First, land for peace is more likely to buy a temporary armistice than long-term stability.”
  • “Second, using peace in one region to gain security in another is a hard strategy to pull off.”
• “While Trump’s team should be bold and define a new grand strategy, failing to take stock of the history of grand bargains to calibrate its diplomatic approach increases the risk the gambit fails, and the United States finds itself more insecure. For every Kissinger in China, there is a Chamberlain in Munich and cold wars turned hot due to strategic overconfidence.”

“The Art of a Ukraine Deal,” Michael Froman, CFR, 02.21.25. 

• “In all his dealings, Trump seeks leverage. The negotiations in Riyadh are no exception. As CFR Distinguished Fellow Thomas Graham writes, “Because Kyiv faces deteriorating conditions, it should be easier to persuade it to negotiate seriously than it will be with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who believes he is making progress toward achieving his maximal war aims.”
• “In seeking the path of least resistance, Trump will lean hard on the Ukrainians to accede to some of Putin’s terms. Yet he will still need to secure concessions from the Russian side, because accepting Moscow’s maximalist war aims would deal a crippling blow to his reputation as a shrewd statesman. Nobel Peace Prizes are not awarded for capitulation. Acquiescence would also undermine Trump’s grand strategy to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe.”
• “To extract meaningful concessions from the Russians, Trump will have to convince Putin that time is not on his side. He could do so by supplying Ukraine with more lethal military aid, tightening sanctions on Russia, pledging long-term support for a sovereign Ukraine along the current lines of control, and dangling the prospect of normalized U.S.-Russian relations.”
• “To secure peace through strength, it would be in Trump’s interest to work in tandem with our European partners, who will bear the burden of Ukraine’s financial and economic survival. It would be a mistake for a ceasefire deal to come at the cost of the transatlantic alliance. As CFR Fellow Liana Fix writes, in fact, a coordinated U.S.-European plan would increase the odds that any European peacekeeping mission succeeds, while giving the United States “greater freedom to operate in the Indo-Pacific by persuading its European allies to increase their defense spending.”
• “As for a ceasefire itself, allowing Russia to retain de facto control of seized Ukrainian territory has always been a part of the expected dealmaking. The bigger issue, which remains unresolved, is what sort of security guarantees Ukraine will get once the fighting stops. Can Ukraine be part of NATO? That seems unlikely for now. If Ukraine can’t be in NATO, can NATO be in Ukraine? To this point, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said last week that a “durable peace” in Ukraine requires that “any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops.” But he stipulated that these troops must be part of a non-NATO mission and cannot be covered by Article V, NATO’s collective defense agreement.”
• “With near-term NATO membership effectively off the table, Ukraine's best bet is probably a security guarantee backed up by European boots on the ground.”
• “In addition to security guarantees, Ukraine needs a great deal of foreign investment to rebuild its economy and achieve prosperity. Therein lies an opportunity for the United States.”
• “Charlie Kupchan and I have written that if Trump accepts anything short of a deal that ensures a sovereign, secure Ukraine, the country risks turning into a failed state.”
• “Trump shouldn’t let Ukraine become his Afghanistan. While he is right to try to end the war, a hastily negotiated deal at the expense of our allies and partners would be a grave error. It could embolden our adversaries, fracture the transatlantic alliance, make it more difficult to pivot to Asia, and demonstrate a terrific failure of U.S. diplomacy—not to mention undercut Trump’s desire to be seen as the ultimate peacemaker. If you thought the optics of the Taliban parading American Humvees through Kabul looked bad, imagine the Russians driving a convoy of Abrams tanks through Kharkiv.”

"The Right U.S. Strategy for Russia-Ukraine Negotiations," Thomas Wright, FA, 02.24.25.

"Russia-Ukraine After Three Years of Large-Scale War," Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 02.19.25. 

• “The [Trump] administration’s first steps will undermine its prospects for success [in ending the war]. First, having signaled an eagerness to engage Moscow and agreement with key Kremlin positions, the administration will find it harder to move the Russians to acceptable compromises. Second, it has alienated Europeans whom it hopes will provide military forces to implement a settlement and provide security guarantees to Ukraine. Third, it has raised concerns in Kyiv that the Ukrainians will confront a U.S.-Russian fait accompli.  At the end of the day, success requires that Kyiv as well as Moscow agree to terms.”
• “A darker interpretation of the administration’s unseemly rush to engage Moscow is that these missteps are not accidents or “rookie” mistakes but a deliberate plan that is fully prepared to throw Ukraine (and Europe with it) under the bus in order to curry favor with Putin, perhaps with the goal of peeling Russia off from China. If so, the administration badly misunderstands Putin’s relationship with Xi Jinping and Russia’s dependence on China.”
• “Such a “plan” would fail to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. It would mean the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war, with Kyiv’s position badly undercut by the end of U.S. assistance. It would cause Europe to scramble for alternative security arrangements in the face of a growing Russian threat and to be less likely to support the administration’s drive to contain China. Putin would have scored gains, while the United States would have little to show in return. The blame for that foreign policy failure would rest squarely on Trump’s head.”
• “Assuming missteps rather than intent, the administration’s rocky start has made its task as broker more difficult. Failure will mean that Russia and Ukraine continue the war. It will also lay bare Trump’s weakness as a global negotiator. Will he self-correct and create the basis to broker a just and durable peace? If he wants to succeed, he and his administration need to do much better.”

"The Politics of Twitter Dilettantism: Trump's Team Suffers a Crushing Defeat in Negotiations With the Kremlin, Passing It Off as a Success," Re: Russia, 02.19.25.Clues from Russian Views.

• “After winning the election, two different approaches to negotiating with Putin emerged within Trump's inner circle. However, Keith Kellogg, who advocated for a longer process and sought leverage over Russia, was completely sidelined from Kremlin contacts in the last week. Instead, the advocates of a rapid negotiation blitz, without Europe and Ukraine’s involvement, gained the upper hand. Meanwhile, those insisting on effective measures to deter Moscow became the primary targets of Trump’s political attacks.”
• “Trump’s signature hardline negotiation strategy is based on presenting a substantial threat followed by an enticing offer. However, in Riyadh, Trump’s negotiators effectively skipped the first stage and moved straight to the second – without gaining any leverage. As a result, they were forced to lay a series of concessions on the table, addressing almost every point of Putin’s ultimatum, without securing a single public commitment in return.”
• “Experts point out that Trump, despite his reputation as a strong negotiator, has a long track record of failures. The most glaring examples include the deal with the Taliban, which led to the US collapse in Afghanistan, and the completely failed nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong-un. Trump’s latest diplomatic blitz resembles both the Korean and Afghan scenarios simultaneously.  Having gained nothing from Moscow, the Trump administration has already managed to alienate Europe and attack President Zelensky. Moreover, it has effectively revised the US foreign policy strategy that had remained unchanged for 80 years, abandoning the principles of bipartisan consensus and indivisible Euro-Atlantic security. Instead, the new administration prioritizes partisan and ideological considerations, focusing its attacks not on geopolitical rivals but on domestic opponents in America and Europe.”
• “Even if Trump's goal is to shift strategic containment efforts toward China, the loss of trust in the US among European allies will undermine efforts to build partnerships in Asia. Additionally, Trump's team's hopes of driving a wedge between Russia and China appear both naïve and unrealistic, given Russia’s economic dependence on Chinese trade. To make such a shift feasible, roughly 30% of Russia’s trade would need to be redirected toward Europe, which is a highly unlikely scenario.”
• “In the end, Trump and his team rely on fictitious threats, projects, and figures that may generate social media popularity but leave no impression on Moscow or Beijing. Even if securing Ukraine’s independence and defending Europe are not Trump’s priorities, nothing suggests that his administration will achieve its own objectives. However, what is certain is that Putin has already secured his gains – an outcome the world will recognize and remember.”

"With Trump’s Prostration to Putin, Expect a More Dangerous World," Nicholas Kristof, NYT, 02.19.25. 

• “I’m not sure most Americans appreciate the monumental damage President Trump is doing to the post-World War II order that is the wellspring of American global leadership and affluence. He’s shattering it. He’s making the world more dangerous. He’s siding with an alleged war criminal, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and poisoning relations with longtime U.S. allies. The trans-Atlantic alliance is unraveling.”
• “In a falsehood-filled rant on Truth Social ... Trump ... denounced Ukraine’s elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, as a “dictator” who had squandered money and had “better move fast or he is not going to have a country left.” Trump’s post had the tone of statements from the Kremlin. Trump embraced these positions of Putin without apparently negotiating much in return. Diplomacy is normally about give and take, but — as happens so often when Trump interacts with Putin — Trump has been all give.”
• “The Trump approach to international relations buttresses Russia in other ways. His demands for territory from Panama, Greenland and Canada reinforce the Russian position that superpowers can grab whatever they want.”
• “The danger goes beyond Europe. Perhaps the greatest international relations nightmare in the coming years would be a war between the United States and China, beginning near Taiwan or in the South China Sea.”

“The Z-Community and a Peace Deal,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik in Weekly Digest No. 7 (66), 02.24.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “The 18 February negotiations between Russia and the US provoked a strongly negative reaction among many Russian ultra-patriots and a large part of the pro-war camp. Fears of major concessions or even an outright betrayal have been intensifying. This reaction stands in sharp contrast to the cautious rhetoric of government officials, who have largely avoided making bold statements. The exception was Yevgeny Balitsky, the governor of annexed Zaporizhzhia region, who openly opposed  a ceasefire, stating: “I am against any freeze—Minsk-2, Minsk-3, Minsk-4, or the Khasavyurt agreements. If we stop the war, the Russian world will be under great threat—Odesa, Nikolaev, and even more so Transnistria. And in general, the very structure of peace itself.”
• “One of the key questions is whether the negative reaction to a potential Trump-Putin deal from the pro-war community could pose a political problem for the Putin regime. It is unlikely to be a factor that Putin himself considers when deciding whether to sign a deal. He tends to dismiss the significance of nationalist discontent.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "How Vladimir Putin Plans to Play Donald Trump," The Economist, 02.18.25.
• "Trump’s Opening Gambit on Ukraine Peace Already a Loser," Editorial Board, The Boston Globe, 02.21.25.
• "Trump’s Push for Peace in Ukraine Is Doomed to Fail," Mikhail Korostikov, CEIP, 02.21.25.
• "Trump’s Bargain With Putin Is ‘Shameful,’" David French, Kori Schake and Vishakha Darbha, NYT, 02.24.25.
• "Negotiating With Moscow," Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Melinda Haring and Paul J. Saunders, NI, 02.21.25. Video.
• "Trump and His Three Musketeers: A New U.S.-Russia Approach to Ukraine," Ahmed Charai, NI, 02.21.25.
• "From Wall Street Banker to Vladimir Putin’s Point Man," The Economist, 02.21.25. Profile of Kirill Dmitriev.
• "A Brief History of Broken Russian Promises," Editorial Board, WSJ, 02.24.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump's Attack on Zelensky Signals New World Order Taking Shape; From alienating allies to praising adversaries, Trump appears set to abandon decades of American foreign policy,” Alexander Ward, WSJ, 02.19.25.

• “President Trump has dramatically shifted the direction of U.S. foreign policy in four short weeks, making the U.S. a less reliable ally and retreating from global commitments.”
• “His top envoys have floated concessions to Russia in peace talks that stunned European allies, followed by Trump calling Ukraine's leader a dictator, and he kept Europeans at arm's length as negotiations began.”
• “Trump has dismantled the leading U.S. aid agency providing assistance to the developing world where China aims to establish a foothold.”
• “Trump’s plan to own Gaza and remove Palestinians from the enclave erased decades of Washington's efforts to broker a two-state solution.”
• “We are no longer in the post-World War II era and we have to accept that the geopolitical landscape has shifted,” said Victoria Coates, vice president for national security and foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation.”
• “Trump has injected a new element, proposing to expand U.S. borders and take territory overseas unilaterally.”
• “It will be very difficult to undo what is being done in foreign policy or to persuade allies this was a never-to-be-repeated one-off,” said Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.”
• “Trump agreed to negotiations that could end Moscow's global isolation following a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and suggested Ukraine would not join NATO.”
• “Trump blamed Kyiv for starting the war in Ukraine, though it was Russian forces that invaded, prompting Zelensky to accuse him of parroting Kremlin disinformation.”
• “This is a serious challenge to the foundation of the post-World War II world order,” said Chuck Hagel, former Republican senator and defense secretary.”

"There Are No Shortcuts to Manage the Russia Challenge," Alexander Gabuev, FT, 02.22.25.Clues from Russian Views.

• “Whatever the unpredictable outcome of Trump’s diplomatic cavalry charge, one thing is clear: even if the guns in Ukraine fall silent, and even if Trump lifts US sanctions against Russia, the current regime in the Kremlin will continue to view the west as a mortal enemy. Putin’s triumphalism, vengefulness and desire to make a mark on Russian history, along with the glaring lack of checks and balances in the Kremlin, will prompt Moscow to start preparing for the next war while stepping up its intimidation campaign against Europe.”
• “Three years ago, western capitals believed that Kyiv would fall in a matter of days. A combination of Ukrainian courage and ingenuity, Russian sloppiness, and western support averted that scenario. Ukraine is still standing, Europe has painfully reduced its dependency on Russian raw materials and investments in deterrence have been made. But by other metrics, the situation for Europeans is worse than in early 2022. Progress in upgrading the defense industrial base remains patchy. The difficult post-Covid recovery was derailed in many countries by the impact of the war, making increased defense spending a hard sell for voters. Most importantly, instead of its traditional role as the bedrock of European security, the US under Trump is itself a source of risk. To top it all, unity inside the EU and within larger countries is more fractured. Even if competent road maps such as the Draghi report are drawn up to address these problems, will there be the political will to follow them?”
• “One problem that the west can and should address is its wishful thinking about shortcuts to defeat Putin and manage the Russia challenge. Unrealistic expectations of an outright victory, rooted in a glaring lack of clear-eyed perspective, have been part of the problem all along. It’s time to have a quiet, sober-minded conversation about how to mitigate the threats that will emanate from Russia in the coming decade, and how to prepare for what might come next.”

"The Transatlantic Relationship Is Crumbling, Says an Ex-Head of NATO," Anders Fogh Rasmussen, The Economist, 02.24.25. 

• “After 80 years of American-backed security, we Europeans must now shoulder the burden of securing peace on our own continent. Doing so will require us to address two equally pressing challenges: ensuring Europe can finally defend itself, and securing a sustainable peace for a sovereign Ukraine.”
• “As a baseline, European defense spending must return to cold-war levels. On a purchasing-power-parity basis, Russia spent more on defense last year than all of Europe combined. I believe that NATO’s current defense-spending target of 2% of GDP should become a requirement of 3% immediately, and of 4% by 2028. That would mean $350bn-400bn in additional annual defense spending.”
• “Spending it on tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft will not be enough. Europe must also ensure it can act independently of America. This will require significant investments in capabilities such as air defense, refueling and other logistics that sustain military operations—and for which Europe is almost entirely reliant on America.”
• “Europe must also be able to produce at scale the equipment and technology it needs. Roughly 80% of its defense procurement is from outside Europe—primarily from the United States.”
• “Europe must allow for major consolidation in its defense industry, even if it means the merger of dozens of small and mid-sized national defense companies. To encourage new private investment, the European Investment Bank must change its ESG (environmental, social and governance) guidelines to allow it to lend more to the sector. You can forget about funding the green transition if Russian forces are marching on Tallinn while America looks on.”
• “A post-war Ukraine will need concrete security guarantees to deter a rested and rearmed Russia. NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense clause is the most ironclad and cost-effective of guarantees—so we should forcefully make the case for Ukraine’s NATO membership.”
• “The decisions facing Europe are not easy. An increase in defense investment will mean less money for social spending. The deployment of men and women in uniform must be treated as the potentially life-and-death decision it is. But we do not have time to waste on indecision.”
• “The security architecture that Europe has relied on for generations is gone and is not coming back. Amid a new global conflict of ideals, we no longer know where America stands. If the mission of defending freedom and democracy in Europe falls solely on us, we must finally be ready to take it on.”

"War or Peace in Ukraine: US Moves and European Choices," François Heisbourg, IISS, 02.19.25. 

• “In itself, the outcome of the war in Ukraine – whatever it turns out to be – doesn’t implicate Article 5’s credibility. Ukraine isn’t in NATO and the precedent of the forceful annexation of Crimea in 2014 did not lead Russia to test Article 5, even if some analysts had already begun to wonder whether NATO would be able and willing to defend Narva, NATO’s outpost 102 km down the road from St Petersburg. But Trump’s long-standing rejection of set-piece alliances in general and his animosity towards NATO in particular raise doubts about the actual strength of America’s defense guarantee. In February 2024, he stated that the Russians ‘could do whatever the hell they want’ to a NATO country that hadn’t paid its fair share. This Trumpian sally wasn’t a frontal assault on Article 5, which remained unnamed, but it shifted the US commitment from treaty obligation to financial deal, if not outright protection racket. Coming on top of America’s conceptual revision, the West’s inability to secure a satisfactory outcome in Ukraine could change Russia’s own assessment of what Article 5 now really means. Trends in European and transatlantic relations are not likely to forestall such a development.”
• “A Russian leader believing that his armed forces would have prevailed in Texas-sized Ukraine may be difficult to deter from going after smaller and less robust targets. For example, seizing Lithuania in order to establish continuity between continental Russia and the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad would be militarily doable even if a German Bundeswehr brigade were in the process of being deployed in the area. To test the waters, Putin could first go after Moldova, one-fifth of whose territory and population have been under Russian military tutelage and political pressure since the fall of the Soviet Union.”
• “The room for mischief is substantial, and much of it could be undertaken through influence and grey-zone operations. It would take only a few ill-advised words from Trump on NATO to set a geopolitical bonfire.”

“Europe’s New Reality: Trump May Not Quit NATO, but He’s Already Undercutting It,” David E. Sanger, NYT, 02.20.25. 

• “European officials knew the president’s win would threaten the fundamental precepts of the post-World War II order.”
• “In his first term, President Trump episodically threatened to pull out of NATO, removing the United States as the linchpin of the most successful military alliance in modern times.”
• “In his second term, he is trying a different approach: hollowing it out from within.”
• “Mr. Trump’s decision to reverse three years of unity in aiding Ukraine against Russia’s invasion and open negotiations with President Vladimir V. Putin has forced NATO leaders to confront a fundamental question: If Mr. Putin decided to pick off a member of the alliance, is there any reason to assume Mr. Trump would come to that country’s defense?”
• “We have to assume not,” a senior member of the German government said at the Munich Security Conference.”
• “Mr. Trump has undercut the trust that sits at the center of the 75-year-old defense pact.”
• “It is a rewriting of modern history that has left the NATO allies stunned and questioning the viability of an alliance with Washington at the center.”
• “European officials knew when Mr. Trump was elected that the fundamental precepts of the post-World War II order would be threatened.”
• “The speed at which it has all unraveled has created a crisis of enormous proportions, at a time when European leadership is weak.”
• “We cannot rule out the possibility that America may refuse to cooperate with Europe on issues that threaten it,” Mr. Zelensky said.”

“Geopolitical Experts Assess Western Adversaries’ Alignment as Transatlantic Alliance Falters,” Chris Conway, RM, 02.21.25.

• “On Feb. 15, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Meghan O’Sullivan convened an MSC panel to discuss “Adversarial Alignment” and its future ramifications for European and global security, delivering the opening remarks.”
• “O’Sullivan was joined in conversation by Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group and Belfer senior fellow; Fiona Hill, former Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on the National Security Council and member of Harvard University's Board of Overseers; Dmytro Kuleba, former Ukrainian foreign minister and Belfer senior fellow; and David Sanger, White House and National Security Correspondent for The New York Times and former Belfer senior fellow.”
• “The speakers agreed that adversarial alignment between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea is based much more on quid pro quos related to the war in Ukraine than deep ideological convergence. Hill argued that Russia did not embark upon its invasion with intentions of forging closer relationships with China, Iran or North Korea. “A quid pro quo is emerging,” she said, as Russia needs resources to fuel its war effort.”
• “Hill and Kuleba are concerned that the Global South has internalized the “wildly popular” view that Ukraine is an American proxy war. Kuleba recalled conversations from his time in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry with Chinese counterparts, who expressed the opinion that “China cannot let the U.S. win this war.” Hill similarly concluded that Xi seeks to avoid Russian “defeat” in Ukraine as something that would undermine China’s own position.”
• “Nevertheless, the speakers assessed that China is diverging from Russia, Iran and North Korea in its worldview and grand strategy. Bremmer outlined that China does not consider itself a rogue state. It is, in fact, the main creditor for the Global South, having long ago displaced the U.S. in that role. China therefore needs global stability to prosper.”
• “Kuleba assessed that “the only person that is in a real rush [for a peace deal] is President Trump.” Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will exert pressure on Trump to forestall a rapid conclusion to the war, knowing that “anything fast can only happen at their expense.” Both Ukraine and Russia have the resources to continue fighting at least until summer, Kuleba added.”
• “Kuleba outlined that China “dreams of splitting the U.S. and EU apart” and replacing the U.S. as the leader in global multilateral institutions like the U.N. Amid such a rapid disintegration of the post-1945 order, Kuleba declared, “either Europe wakes up, or it is doomed.”

"Trump Is Surrendering Much More Than Ukraine to Putin," Fareed Zakaria, WP, 02.21.25.

• “It is true that Donald Trump has found a lightning-fast way to end the war in Ukraine: surrender. ... The Trump administration has preemptively conceded most key Russian demands before the formal negotiations have even begun. No return of all the Ukrainian territory acquired by force, no NATO membership for Ukraine, no American troops on Ukrainian soil. Oh, and Trump trashed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, calling him a dictator and saying he "better move fast or he is not going to have a Country left." It is no wonder that senior Russian officials, including former president Dmitry Medvedev, appear almost giddy with joy.”
• “What explains Trump's desire to sell out Ukraine and cozy up to Vladimir Putin? There have been so many theories about Trump and Russia, but I think the real story is about Trump and Zelensky. Trump views almost everything through a personal lens, and his own relationship with Zelensky has been fraught for many years.”
• “I would guess that, for Trump, Ukraine represents a set of bad memories and Zelensky is a foreign leader who has not gotten with the program: constant flattery and submission to Trump's demands. The result, alas, goes well beyond the personal. It will result in a truly historic surrender of Western interests and values, built over decades.”
• “[According to] "The Internationalists" by Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro... [b]etween 1816 and 1945, there were more than 150 territorial conquests. Since 1945, with the international system of rules and norms the United States helped create, territorial "conquests have almost completely disappeared." But thanks to Donald Trump's personal pique, this enduring American achievement is about to be lost.”

"How Europe Can Defend Itself," Garvan Walshe, FP, 02.18.25. 

1. “Europe should include Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in summits such as the one in Paris: Theater matters in international relations.”
2. “European governments should immediately seize the $150 billion in Russian assets frozen in European banks.”
3. “All major EU countries should immediately increase defense spending to the equivalent of 3 percent of their GDPs if they haven’t already and make plans to raise it to 5 percent within the next three years.”
4. “European countries should increase their nuclear weapons production.
5. “Sweden should send Ukraine all of its approximately 100 Gripen fighter aircraft, whose maintenance requirements are low compared to those of the F-16 and whose ability to fight without air superiority makes them ideal for Ukraine.”
6. “Norway should use the extra profits that its oil fund has made from higher energy prices caused by the war to fund the war effort.”
7. “The U.K. should reopen a large-scale artillery shell production plant.”

“A coalition of the willing should impose secondary sanctions on businesses that do business with those doing business with Russia.”

8. “Europe should expand the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), a group in which the U.K. and several EU countries are already members.”
9. “And finally, Europe should begin (if it hasn’t already) contingency planning for how European armies would fight Russia without the United States, doing so under the diplomatic excuse of preparing to defend Europe in the event that the United States becomes preoccupied with a conflict in Asia.”

"Germany’s Election Winner Pledges ‘Independence from US,’" Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Laura Pitel, and Olaf Storbeck, FT, 02.24.25. 

• “Germany’s Friedrich Merz promised to move swiftly to unite Europe and “achieve independence” from the US after his center-right bloc won federal elections.  In an election where Germany shifted to the right, Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) came first with 28.5 per cent of the vote on Sunday, leaving it needing at least one coalition partner to secure a working parliamentary majority.”
• “The result gives Merz the option of forming a two-party government with outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic party (SPD), albeit with a slim parliamentary majority. But the strong showing by the AfD and the leftwing Die Linke risks limiting Merz’s room for maneuver to increase investment, including expanding the defense budget.”
• “Within hours of polls closing, Merz declared that Germany had to fundamentally remake its security arrangements and end a decades-long reliance on Washington, saying US President Donald Trump was “largely indifferent” to Europe’s fate.  “I am in close contact with many prime ministers — heads of government of the EU,” Merz said. “And it must be an absolute priority to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we actually achieve independence from the USA.” He added: “I wouldn’t have thought I’d have to say something like that . . . But after Donald Trump’s statements, it is clear that the Americans, at least this American government, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The Neglect of Asia Was the Great Failure of Yalta," Stephen Kotkin, The Economist, 02.11.25.
• "The New Meaning of ‘Munich,’" Michael Hirsh, FP, 02.19.25.
• "Achieving ‘Peace Through Strength’ in the 2020s," Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings, 02.21.25.
• "Trump Wants a World Safe for Autocracy," Gideon Rachman, FT, 02.24.25.
• "Why Trump Is Wrong About Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine," David J. Kramer, FP, 02.19.25.
• "It’s Time for Europe to Do the Unthinkable," Kishore Mahbubani, FP, 02.18.25.
• "How Europe Must Respond as Trump and Putin Smash the Post-War Order," The Economist, 02.20.25.
• "Network Reflections: On the Third Anniversary of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine, How Can Europeans Make Their Voices Heard?" Maria Shagina, Sergey Utkin, Anatoliy Grytsenko, Nadezhda Neynsky, Carsetn Sondergaard and Liana Fix, ELN, 02.24.25.
• "Belgium’s Ex-PM Alexander De Croo: ‘There’s a Risk That Europe Is Being Redrawn,’" Alice Hancock, FT, 02.21.25.
• "Is the United States Europe’s Ally or Adversary?" Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, FP, 02.21.25.
• “Completely Different,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, February 2025. Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian. This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Trump Is Helping Russia and China Take America's Place in the World," Rahm Emanuel, WP, 02.21.25. 

• “Playing to our strengths, we defeated the Soviet Union during the Cold War and, more recently, pursued a strategy to isolate an imperious China. Now, President Donald Trump and his appointed officials are taking the opposite tack, helping Moscow's and Beijing's explicit intentions to replace the U.S.-led international order. If they are successful, China will emerge as the globe's dominant superpower.”
• “To understand why Trump's policy is sure to turn into an American "own goal," you first need to appreciate two principles underlying Moscow's and Beijing's strategic approaches.”
  • “First, they both believe in spheres of influence. As a revanchist ruler, Vladimir Putin plays the role of Peter the Great; Xi Jinping.”
  • “Second, both Russia and China venerate the idea that "might makes right." 
• “Trump's team is negotiating with Russia in Saudi Arabia over Ukraine's and Europe's fates without our allies at the table. His behavior is consistent with China's foreign minister telling countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that because China is big and they are small, their voices don't matter. For the United States, this is a loser's bet. ..., it means giving up on the very policy that has brought credibility to our deterrence.”
• “Putin and Xi must be delighted. As Washington alienates its allies and squanders 80 years of international credibility, Trump is helping Russia and China achieve their explicit mission of replacing the United States as the world's preeminent superpower. Moscow's goal has long been to break up the North Atlantic alliance. Who would have thought that an American president would do its dirty work?”
• “If we are conned into becoming some cheap version of Russia or China, nations will choose the real thing over a knockoff.”

“‘True Friends’: Xi and Putin Emphasize Their Ties as Trump Courts Moscow,” David Pierson and Paul Sonne, NYT, 02.24.25. 

• “The Chinese and Russian leaders reaffirmed their relationship in a video call on Monday, an apparent rebuff to the idea that the Trump administration could drive a wedge between them. China’s leader said his country and Russia were “true friends who have been through thick and thin together” after a video call with President Vladimir V. Putin on Monday, according to Chinese state media.”
• “The warm words attributed to Xi Jinping were clearly intended to dampen speculation that the Trump administration might succeed in driving a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. The call came on the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, after three years in which China has served as Russia’s most important foreign partner amid Moscow’s isolation in the West.”
• “History and reality show us that China and Russia are good neighbors who won’t move away, and true friends who have been through thick and thin together, support each other and develop together,” Mr. Xi was quoted as saying by Chinese state media. Mr. Xi said relations between China and Russia were not “affected by any third party,” in what appeared to be an oblique reference to the United States. And he said the two countries’ foreign policies were for the “long term.”
• “The Kremlin issued a similarly cordial statement after the call, describing Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin’s conversation as “warm and friendly.” In a rebuff of the idea that President Trump could divide the two countries, the Kremlin added: “The leaders emphasized that the Russian-Chinese foreign policy link is the most important stabilizing factor in world affairs,” and said the relationship was “not subject to external influence.”
• “There’s strategic and geopolitical alignment for this relationship,” said Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who specializes in Chinese-Russian relations. “They don’t see eye to eye on everything, but I think they both realize they need each other.” Mr. Radchenko said Beijing was probably feeling uncomfortable with Mr. Trump’s bid to court Mr. Putin, but that it was unlikely that Mr. Putin would see his interests better served by aligning more closely with the United States over China. “The idea that Putin can be manipulated as some kind of weapon against China, I think that’s naïve on the part of the Trump administration,” he said.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "See How Xi and Putin Are Ramping Up Joint Military Drills," Austin Ramzy, WSJ, 02.22.25. Infographic.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability," Aleksey Arbatov, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 02.14.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• “Over the past few years, public attention in Russia and abroad has focused on an unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater urgency following the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election in November. These developments will have a tangible impact on the prospects for nuclear arms control, the arms race, strategic stability and the likelihood of nuclear war.”
• “Russian leadership acknowledged that the country’s nuclear doctrine could be amended to take into account changes in the objective situation on the ground, compared to the time when the previous document had been adopted in 2020. These adjustments were reflected in the new edition of “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” published on November 9, 2024. Russian proponents of a doctrinal shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear intimidation will likely consider the revision of the “Basic Principles” as a move in favor of their stance. Nevertheless, the amendments to the nuclear doctrine do not indicate its radical overhaul but rather a clarification of its provisions. There is no endorsement of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, or the use of nuclear weapons as a functional means of achieving success in local or regional military operations. All the amendments refer specifically to retaliatory measures in the event of aggressive nuclear and conventional military operations against Russia and its allies.”
• “The situation in this critical area of international relations is more in line with the proposals of the proponents of “reinforcing the nuclear factor in international affairs.” The U.S. set this process in motion in 2002 when, still reeling from the shock of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C, it withdrew from the ABM Treaty—without any compelling strategic justification. Since the late 2010s, this destructive process has been moving like an avalanche.”
• “Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START before its extended expiration date in February 2026 under the pretext of alleged Russian “violation” or as part of a broader effort to build up U.S. nuclear capabilities to counter the other two superpowers taken together. This was the rationale behind the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. It seems that the Republican government will drop the talk on Russia’s “strategic defeat” but deliberately play on the threat of nuclear escalation to advance its policy on Ukraine and other sensitive international issues.”
• “The threat of destabilization of strategic relations should not be underestimated. The arms control system, a cornerstone of strategic stability, is unraveling and may collapse entirely soon. This process is intertwined with the introduction of advanced weapon systems and potentially destructive technologies and is accompanied by the development of destabilizing strategic concepts. Some of these trends will, if not destroy, then at least erode strategic stability in its classical definition: a state of strategic relations between the parties that removes incentives for a nuclear first strike.”
• “In parrying these security threats, it is important for Russia not to engage in a quantitative and tit-for-tat arms race but to respond asymmetrically, a strategy that has often proven successful in the past. One can recall the Soviet Union’s lead in developing thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-mobile ballistic missiles and ensuring the survivability of naval strategic forces with the help of other forces and means of the fleet, effective systems for overcoming missile defense (including its space-based components) and more. While making efforts to preserve the remaining arms control agreements and to restart the dialogue on strategic stability, Russia should firmly reject the concepts of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, controlled nuclear escalation and the integrated use of nuclear and conventional weapons. In this effort, it would gain support from China, India and professional realistic circles in the U.S. and other Western countries.”

Counterterrorism:

• "A Threshold Moment in Terrorist Trends and Targeting?" Bruce Hoffman, David Brannan and Jacob Ware, War on the Rocks, 02.24.25. 

Conflict in Syria:

"Will the Fall of Bashar al-Assad Weaken Russia’s Position in the Middle East?" Nikolai Kozhanov, ELN, 02.19.25. 

• “Moscow will maintain its presence in the region. It will force other players to reckon with it, albeit as a second-class player. It is important to have a more nuanced view of Russia and Russia’s capabilities to pursue its regional policies rather than either blindly believing in its past greatness in the Middle East or accepting the false assumption by some analysts that the fall of Assad’s regime means the demise of Russia’s presence in the region.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "After Assad’s Fall, Russia Looks to Libya and Sudan," Nosmot Gbadamosi, FP, 02.19.25.
• "Can Syria’s New Rulers Sustain Its Fragile Peace?" Andrew England and Raya Jalabi, FT, 02.24.25. 

Cyber security/AI: 

• "AI and Cyber: Could the War of the Robots Be the Next War in the Wires?" Tom Johansmeyer, RUSI, 02.19.25. 

Energy exports from CIS:

"Russia Is Wooing Western Energy Companies, but Will They Return?" Stanley Reed, NYT, 02.23.25.

• “There is no doubt that Russia has vast troves of oil and natural gas, but an effort to lure American or other Western energy companies to undertake Russian projects is likely to encounter skepticism, not least because of the companies' recent history in Russia. Nevertheless, Kirill Dmitriev, a Kremlin financial official, expressed optimism last week about the prospect, pitching the potential for investment opportunities by Western companies, including oil producers.”
• “Energy companies would need to weigh access to troves of oil and natural gas against potential pitfalls, including reputational damage from taking part in an industry that has financially sustained a government waging war against its neighbor. “Russia has enormous resources and scale always matters” to large energy companies, said Ben Cahill, an energy analyst at the University of Texas at Austin. “But aboveground risk is the killer,” he added, using industry parlance for political and legal problems.”
• “There appear to be potential routes for oil companies to go back to Russia. Exxon Mobil, for instance, gave up its role in a valuable oil project that it had operated on Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East for 20 years, leaving its stake in limbo. “There is a potential for return,” said John Gawthorp, an analyst at Argus Media, a London research firm.”
• “Any return of Western companies to Russia is likely to require an end to the Ukraine conflict, and the removal of extensive sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on Russian oil and gas-related activities and entities. Analysts say it may become easier for American companies to return than for their European counterparts because Washington seems more inclined than Brussels to lift restrictions.”
• “Taking the wraps off the Russian industry may also not be in the interests of parts of the American energy industry. For instance, lifting U.S. curbs imposed by the Biden administration targeting exports of Russian liquefied natural gas is likely to create more competition for L.N.G. from the United States, which has replaced Russian gas in Europe during the last three years. “Russian L.N.G. on the global market is a direct competitor to U.S. L.N.G.,” said James Waddell, a gas analyst at Energy Aspects, a research firm. “This is not something that the U.S. administration would be willing to give away readily.”
• “The Russian oil industry and government have always been ambivalent about sharing wealth with foreign investors. BP assembled a successful Russian oil company in the early part of this century but was subject to harassment including raids on its premises by armed security personnel. Bob Dudley, the chief of the local company, who later became chief executive of BP, was forced to flee Russia.”
• “Of all large Western energy companies, TotalEnergies of France seems best placed to return to business as normal in Russia, if the political situation permits. The company wrote off $14.8 billion on its Russian business in 2022, but it has continued to import liquefied natural gas from a facility called Yamal that it helped develop in the Russian Arctic with Novatek, a Russian gas company in which the French company owns a 19 percent stake. TotalEnergies declined to comment, but it has said that these shipments contribute to Europe’s energy security.”
• “Analysts say returning may be easier for smaller Western companies that provide services like hydraulic fracturing and other technical support. SLB, the former Schlumberger, is one of the largest such companies and continues to work in Russia, saying it is in compliance with sanctions.”

"Top Shale Boss Says US Oil Companies Will Not Flock Back to Russia," Jamie Smyth, FT, 02.22.25. 

• “US oil producers are not going to rush back into Russia following any peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv because they have been badly burnt in the past, according to US shale magnate Harold Hamm. The Continental Resources’ founder and prominent donor to Donald Trump’s election campaign told the Financial Times that Russia had been a tough place to work for decades and he was thankful he had not followed others who ploughed money into the world’s third-largest oil producing nation. “A lot of people lost a whole lot of money over there. I think they’re going to be very reticent to want to go back. Once in a while, peace breaks out over there, but not very often,” said Hamm in an interview.”
• “Most analysts agree with Hamm that US oil majors will think long and hard before investing following any peace deal due to the geopolitical risks, and opportunities elsewhere. “Political risks remain sky-high — sanctions relief could be reversed with a US administration change. Companies won’t rush back into a market where rules shift overnight,” said Tatiana Mitrova, a research fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.”
• “Hamm...said the president had a big decision to make on whether to lift sanctions. “They can be very effective. Particularly with secondary sanctions, which apply to anyone who transports or handles or trades,” he said.”
• “Hamm said US liquefied natural gas exports would continue to play a critical role in ensuring Europe’s energy security. Europe could depend on the US, despite tensions over Ukraine, he said, adding that the continent’s leaders would be “silly” if they went back to relying on Russian piped gas.”

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"The Rapid Rehab of Vladimir Putin," WSJ, 02.19.25. 

• “We realize that the ruthless men who rule much of the world can't be ignored. But usually those men aren't rewarded with a visit to the U.S., as Mr. Trump hinted last week, before they've made any compromises. Visits with Soviet leaders during the Cold War at least had some preparation to assume the U.S. would get something from the diplomacy. Any peace Mr. Putin strikes has to be made with all of his legacy of destruction in mind.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "As Moscow and Washington Talk, Russians Hope the Result Is Normalcy," Ivan Nechepurenko, Nataliya Vasilyeva and Alina Lobzina, NYT, 02.19.25.
• "Trump’s Putinization of America," Susan B. Glasser, The New Yorker, 02.20.25.
• "Putin Raised the Anti-Woke Banner Long Before It Flew Over Washington," Mary Ilyushina, WP, 02.19.25.
• "Atlas Shrugged? A Real Coup Unfolds in the U.S. Before the World's Eyes," Yan Matusevich, Republic, 02.20.25. (In Russian.)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Kremlin Steps Up Efforts to Seize Key Businesses," Nataliya Vasilyeva, NYT, 02.22.25.

• “The Russian government is stepping up a wartime campaign to [seize] private businesses, this time in the name of national security.  In the last month, courts have ordered Russia's largest warehouse owner to be taken over by the state and also directed the nationalization of a major grain exporter. And in the most stunning case, prosecutors filed a lawsuit in January to seize Moscow's second-largest airport.”
• “The new spate of expropriation expands on the seizures of Western-owned businesses in Russia after President Vladimir V. Putin's invasion of Ukraine began three years ago. But in these latest cases, the owners are Russian, a sign of how the Kremlin's push to seize control of the economy amid the war in Ukraine is reaching into ever more industries. Critics say the asset seizures are also undermining the last vestiges of Russia's rule of law. They have become ''chaotic'' and ''out of control,'' said Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.”
• “By seizing lucrative private enterprises, the Kremlin can put large sections of the economy either in state hands or under indirect control of Mr. Putin's associates, allowing the government to tailor industrial output to the needs of the war effort and also be in a position to introduce price controls. It also aligns with the Russian leader's goal of tightening his grip on domestic policy. Researchers at the London School of Economics have identified more than 200 Russian court rulings to nationalize private companies since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The courts, they said, mostly used claims that the companies violated 1990s privatization laws to seize them from businesses deemed ''unfriendly to the Kremlin regime.'' Taken together, those seizures amount to ''the largest redistribution of property in Russia since the privatization drive'' in the 1990s, said Alexander Kolyandr, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.”

"The Main Goal of the 'SVO' Is to End the 'SVO': How Russians Feel About the War Three Years After It Began," Maxim Zagovora in conversation with sociologist Oleg Zhuravlev, Republic.ru, 02.24.25.

• “According to the latest polls, including those by the Levada Center, we see that the share of people who want negotiations has jumped as soon as negotiations have become more tangible. Throughout the year, we have recorded an increase in the number of people who want negotiations, but now people want them even more.”
• “Most Russians have nothing against America and the West in general. ...People have the idea that big powers are fighting each other - hence the war. They are dividing up money, dividing up territory. Within the framework of such ideas, the West is the most important, the most powerful player, which is currently fighting Putin for resources.”
• “[Russian respondents] want all the nervous tension associated with the "SVO [special military operation]" to stop. "SVO" constantly produces some kind of nervous events: mobilization, then the threat of new mobilization, then Prigozhin's rebellion, then the invasion of the Kursk region. The third and final wave of our research shows that most people do not need new territories. Even if people show nationalism, it is not imperial nationalism; no one sees any sense in seizing Ukrainian cities and villages. ...People say that it would be better if [the Russian authorities] thought about "Russia itself."
• “The main goal of the "SVO" is to end the "SVO." This is how most people understand the goals of the war.”
• “Even the most ardent fans of Putin do not like repression. ... People who are not just loyalists, but conscious, organic supporters of the regime, who believe that Russia is currently experiencing an upswing (even through war and blood, but nevertheless an upswing), they still say that they do not like repression, they do not like censorship.”
• “People are getting even more tired of the war, at the same time getting even more accustomed to it and, even more want negotiations.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Actual Navalny: Life After Death," Kirill Rogov, Re: Russia, 02.17.25.
• "Political Actors in the North Caucasus and Moscow Hijacking Decolonization to Cement Their Power," Jean-François Ratelle, PONARS Eurasia, 02.18.25. 

Defense and aerospace:

"Modernizing the Army Is Essentially in Contradiction with the Putin Regime," Alexander Golts, Russia.Post, 02.21.25. 

• “The decree signed by Putin on February 8, “On Amendments to the Regulations on the Military District of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” has gone almost unnoticed. Apparently, most observers saw it as yet another document dealing with the Russian military bureaucracy’s internal problems. In my view, however, this decree marks a turning point in the Kremlin’s approach to military organization – it is a fundamental rejection of modernization of the army.”
• “Putin’s decree officially stipulates that air force and navy units and formations are no longer subordinated to military district commands. Separately, it places the military police and military commissariats under the military district commands. Thus, the organization of the armed forces has done a full 360, reverting to how things were before Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms. Recall that in 2010, at the height of what were considered radical reforms, the air force and navy were subordinated within Russia’s military districts; in the event of war, the districts would turn into joint strategic commands.  This was the Defense Ministry’s response to the poor performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, when combat operations were affected by a total lack of coordination between the branches of the armed forces. Columns of ground forces moved without aerial reconnaissance and fell into enemy ambushes.”
• “[There is a]  general trend: the Russian military does not want to modernize. If modernization is understood as adapting to use the most advanced technologies in the most effective way, then the Russian army simply does not need it right now. The fact is that combat operations in Ukraine are radically different from “future warfare” scenarios that emerged based on the experience of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those wars demonstrated the triumph of the so-called revolution in military affairs: the qualitative technological superiority of one side over the other resulted in military defeat of the enemy in a short time. Yet the Ukraine war has not required modernization from the Russian side: it is being waged by armies that are at roughly the same technological level. Modern weapons – drones and electronic warfare systems – have not given either side a decisive upper hand on the battlefield.”
• “The Ukraine war long ago took on a positional, attritional character. In this war, quantity – of men and equipment – is much more important than quality. In Russia, superiority in troop numbers is achieved through “voluntary mobilization,” where recruits are paid huge amounts of money (by Russian standards) for enlisting. With an estimated 450,000 men being recruited each year, this amounts to mass mobilization. As for weapons, Soviet tanks and artillery, produced 60-70 years ago, have proven rather successful against the relatively modern equipment provided to Ukraine by Western countries. Basically, the Ukrainians and Russians are fighting with arsenals from the (first) Cold War.”
• “If the current political regime remains in place, the military-political leadership will face a practically insoluble dilemma. Moving toward a model like those of Western states’ armed forces, with their relatively small numbers and high technological sophistication, would inevitably require backtracking on the concept of mass mobilization and reorganizing the armed forces along the lines of [Anatoly] Serdyukov’s reforms.”
• “The bottom line is, attempts to modernize the Russian armed forces inevitably come into conflict both with the main demand put on them (the ability to wage a long conventional war to capture swaths of territory) and with the core ideological principles of the regime, which are based on steadily growing militarism.”
• “Judging by the recent presidential decree, we can assume that the military will recommend to Putin the same old “modernization,” which in reality entails weakening the capabilities of the armed forces. It is about steadily going back to the Soviet model: maintaining the largest possible army in peacetime and renationalizing industry so the country’s entire industrial potential can be used to prepare the country for war. It remains to be seen how sustainable this model will be in 21st-century Russia.”
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"After Assad’s Fall, Russia Looks to Libya and Sudan," Nosmot Gbadamosi, FP, 02.19.25.

• “Sudan’s military government has reached an agreement for Russia to set up its first African naval base near Port Sudan, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef Ahmed al-Sharif said last week following a meeting in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov.”
• “By securing a military base on the Red Sea coast, Russia would join the United States and China, both of which have bases located in Djibouti. The ejection of Russian troops from Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has led Russian President Vladimir Putin to reallocate military assets to Libya and Sudan, according to multiple intelligence reports.”
• “The latest satellite imagery suggests that Russia is expanding the Maaten al-Sarra airbase in southeast Libya, which is located near the borders with Chad and Sudan. The photos suggest that Russia has reconstructed the runway, built new storage facilities, and boosted its logistical capabilities.”
• “In addition to the base at Maaten al-Sarra, Moscow has been relocating equipment to Libyan airbases at al-Khadim, located east of Benghazi, and al-Jufra (a former outpost of the Wagner Group) to serve as a hub for operations in Africa. The Russian Navy is reportedly on the lookout for a port under Haftar’s control. Syrian media reported in late January that Russia’s 49-year lease for the Syrian port of Tartus had been canceled.”
• “Ultimately, strategic Russian bases in eastern Libya would give Haftar more power in U.N.-facilitated negotiations about the future of Libya—potentially prolonging an already fractured timeline for national elections.”

"New Horizons of New Delhi: India Steps Into the Role of a Great Power," Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 02.24.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “It is projected that by 2030, India will have a population of 1.515 billion people, approximately 100 million more than today. The rapid expansion of the middle class will continue—while today around 100 million Indian families belong to this group, by 2030, that number is expected to rise to 165 million. In the near future, India will grow faster than other leading economies, with annual GDP growth rates of 6.5–7.0%, enabling the country to surpass $7 trillion in GDP by 2030. This will firmly establish India as the world’s third-largest economy, following the United States and China. However, India will remain a relatively poor country, with per capita GDP unlikely to exceed $4,000. In this regard, India will lag significantly behind not only Western economies but also China. Furthermore, its current dependence on Western, primarily American, technological solutions is likely to increase over time.”
• “The next five years could be decisive in transforming India from a predominantly continental power into a truly global one. Its great power ambitions will be reinforced by growing military expenditures. India’s defense budget has already reached $75 billion, placing it fourth globally after the United States, China, and Russia. By 2030, military spending is projected to rise to between $90 billion and $120 billion. At the same time, India will reduce its reliance on imported foreign weapons by increasing domestic production.”
• “India's foreign policy priorities will also shift. Currently, most practical foreign policy projects and initiatives, including major technical assistance programs, focus on India's immediate neighborhood, covering countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Going forward, India’s direct sphere of interest will increasingly extend to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and in the longer term, to Central Asia and East Africa.”
• “At the global level, India’s efforts will reflect its desire to enhance its status in the international system through active participation in multilateral organizations such as the G20, BRICS, SCO, and Quad, as well as by pursuing permanent membership on the UN Security Council. However, India will continue to avoid any restrictions on its sovereignty, which means that in many multilateral structures, New Delhi will often play the role of the "lowest common denominator", seeking consensus while maintaining strategic flexibility.”
• “Despite the many challenges and issues India will face in the coming years, its position appears more stable compared to other major powers. Unlike the deeply divided societies of the United States and Brazil, India does not suffer from extreme political polarization. Unlike Russia, India is not engaged in a large-scale military conflict. And unlike China, India is not yet under significant demographic or structural economic pressures. As a result, India is likely to remain a pillar of stability and predictability in an otherwise unstable and unpredictable world.”
• “India’s leadership and society have no interest in revolutionary upheaval of the existing world order, which, for the most part, favors India’s rapid development. However, India is undeniably committed to gradually reshaping its role within this global order.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions Following the G20 Ministerial Council Meeting," Russian Foreign Ministry, 02.21.25. Clues from Russian Views.
• "The Arctic as a New Region of Global Politics: Strategies of Western States," Natalia Vyakhireva, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 02.18.25.Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian. This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

Ukraine:

"Economic Partnership Will Protect the Ukrainian People and the US Taxpayer," Scott Bessent, FT, 02.22.25. 

• “As has been previously reported, Zelenskyy proposed giving the US a stake in Ukraine’s rare earths elements and critical minerals on a visit to Trump Tower in September. In other words, it was the Ukrainian president himself who first proposed to President Trump a future, economic partnership with shared benefits to both nations.”
• “We know Ukraine’s economic future in a time of peace can be more prosperous than at any other point in the nation’s history, and a partnership with Americans will ensure its prosperity. President Zelenskyy recognizes this and so does President Trump.”
• “This partnership will support the US’s continued commitment to the people of Ukraine as well as lay the foundation for a robust reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy. While asset prices can be fickle, Ukrainian debt has been trading up on the news, signaling that Ukraine’s creditors and financial markets appreciate the benefits of the economic partnership.”
• “The terms of our partnership propose that revenue received by the government of Ukraine from natural resources, infrastructure and other assets is allocated to a fund focused on the long-term reconstruction and development of Ukraine where the US will have economic and governance rights in those future investments. This structure and relationship bring the high standards of transparency, accountability, corporate governance and legal frameworks necessary to attract the robust private investment for postwar growth in Ukraine.”
• “The US’s involvement would leave no room for corruption and insider deals.”
• “President Trump’s proposed partnership aligns the interest of the American people with those of the people of Ukraine. The president recognizes that national security is built alongside economic security, and the more successful and secure postwar Ukraine is, the more that both the Ukrainian people and the people of the US will benefit. This economic partnership would lay the foundations for a durable peace by sending a clear signal to the American people, the people of Ukraine, and the government of Russia about the importance of Ukraine’s future sovereignty and success to the US.”

"Donald Trump Makes Ukraine an Offer It Can’t Refuse," The Economist, 02.23.25.

• “Ukrainian officials are locked in talks with America whose brinkmanship is dizzying even by Donald Trump’s standards. He and his team are demanding Ukraine sign over profits from its mining, ports and other industries in return for any backing from Uncle Sam.”
• “Under the latest, “disastrous”, version of a deal, say Ukraine’s officials, it would be asked to transfer 50% of future state profits from natural resources and infrastructure like ports to a new investment fund owned by the United States government. The contributions will continue until the fund hits $500bn, a figure that corresponds to Mr. Trump’s wildly inflated claims of how much America has spent on aid to Ukraine since the start of the war. At current rates of state income, that would take hundreds of years. Speaking on the 23rd, Mr. Zelensky said under the latest terms the fund looked like a vehicle to repay debt, not one to encourage investment. And he would not accept that debt, he said: the American aid was furnished by Joe Biden as a grant. A Ukrainian official says: “If we sign this as it stands, tomorrow we’d be thrown out of office, and lynched by an angry mob.”
• “Mr. Trump may react with fury to Mr. Zelensky’s rejection of his terms on February 23rd. There is a fear that the Trump administration could resort to even cruder sources of leverage, for example cutting off access to Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites, the lifeblood of Ukraine’s frontline communications. Such drastic actions might leave Ukraine with little choice but to sign an unpopular deal. A senior Ukrainian official says that the negotiation is  “rude,” but “it’s not the worst that could happen.” “Everything else that happens later will be worse.” 

"Trump’s Disregard for Democracy Gives Ukraine’s Zelensky Free Rein at Home," Konstantin Skorkin, CEIP, 02.24.25. 

• “It has often been suggested that the pressures of wartime have led to a dangerous centralization of power in Ukraine. Previously, it was hoped that the West’s support for democracy would be a restraining factor in this process. But the arrival of the anti-democratic Trump means that brake has now been removed.”
• “For Ukrainians, the U.S. calls for elections look a lot like Kremlin rhetoric about Zelensky’s “illegitimacy.” And it’s true that Trump and his administration have little interest in promoting democracy for its own sake—they’re only interested in a deal to end the war.”
• “However, by compelling Zelensky to make peace, Trump is also untying Zelensky’s hands at home, allowing him to strengthen his political position without worrying about what the West might think. Despite Ukraine’s historical intolerance of any hint of dictatorship, authoritarianism might start to look increasingly tempting.”

“A Presidential Election in Ukraine and Putin’s Perspective,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Weekly Digest No. 7 (66), 02.24.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Trump’s demand for a [presidential] election [in Ukraine]  partially aligns with Putin’s interests: both want to remove Zelensky, but their preferred methods differ. While Trump is advocating for a presidential election, seeing it as important but not urgent, Putin would prefer to deal with the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. Putin has repeatedly signaled that Ukraine’s Constitutional Court should clarify the legitimacy issue, revealing that his administration has spent significant time studying Ukraine’s constitutional law and sees holding an election as a less favorable option.”
• “From Russia’s perspective, a presidential election poses several problems. Firstly, the campaign process would take too long. Secondly, Russia has no viable “friendly” candidate and, in the current political climate, cannot realistically find one. Thirdly, election-related instability could be a challenge if Putin and Trump move closer to reaching a broader deal. The view that Putin would like an election to install a pro-Russian president is unfounded. However, there is, albeit tenuous, hope in Moscow that a military figure might be more pragmatic and open to negotiations.  Another issue surrounding the election is the problem of voters living in the Russian-occupied territories.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Zelenskyy’s Toughest Battle Begins," Christopher Miller and Max Seddon, FT, 02.24.25.
• "Team Trump Wants to Get Rid of Volodymyr Zelensky," The Economist, 02.19.25.
• "Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin," Kateryna Bondar, FP, 02.19.25.
• "Three Years On, What’s Next for Europe and Ukraine? Nine thinkers on the bombshells coming out of Washington," FP, 02.21.25.
• "A Grand Bargain With Russia Would Be a Disaster," Christian Caryl, FP, 02.20.25.
• "Assessing the Viability of a U.S.-Ukraine Minerals Deal," Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz, CSIS, 02.21.25.
• "The Adventures of a Ukrainian Intelligence Officer," Joshua Yaffa, The New Yorker, 02.24.25. 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• "Assassins’ Bullets Rip Through Golden Elite of Tashkent," Polina Ivanova, FT, 02.23.25.

Footnotes

1. RM’s estimate is that Russia’s monthly rate of advance has been five times higher this winter compared to the previous winter.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi.