This image taken from a video released by the Ukrainian Tsunami Assault Regiment, Liut Brigade, shows the northeastern frontline town of Vovchansk, Ukraine, during heavy bombardment by Russian forces May 28, 2024. (Tsunami Assault Regiment, Liut Brigade photo via AP)

Will a Ceasefire Remain Elusive? Assessing Negotiation Readiness in Russia-Ukraine War

September 25, 2024

This is a working paper by the Negotiation Task Force (NTF). NTF is an advisory and R&D group that specializes in negotiation strategy in crisis environments. The NTF was incubated through the Scholar-Entrepreneur Initiative at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

Between 1946 and 2005, 21 percent of all interstate wars concluded with a military victory for one side, 30 percent with a ceasefire agreement, 16 percent with a peace agreement and the remainder ended without a definitive victory or negotiated resolution. Given that nearly half of all interstate wars conclude with some form of negotiated settlement, the question arises: Why has a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, remained so elusive in the Russo-Ukrainian War? Is it because interstate wars that cross the one-year threshold of continuous fighting extend to over a decade on average, as data shows? Or is it because the war has not yet entered the stage of a “mutually hurting stalemate” when both parties experience suffering and believe they are unable to escalate their way to victory?

We contend that in the current phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the strategies of the key parties—Ukraine, Russia, NATO, China and others—are predominantly shaped by their “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA), rather than a thorough exploration of each other’s underlying interests. Essentially, the BATNA represents a negotiator’s fallback plan: absent a negotiated agreement, what actions will I undertake to achieve my objectives? While understanding one’s BATNA is crucial in any negotiation, an excessive focus on it can restrict strategic flexibility and diminish negotiation readiness. This approach may seem sensible if a party believes it can eventually unilaterally dictate the terms of conflict resolution. However, if negotiations are expected to play a role in resolving the conflict, an overemphasis on BATNA can weaken a party’s long-term strategic position.

We define “negotiation readiness” as the extent to which parties in a conflict are prepared to engage in communication that is designed to reach an agreement to achieve a peaceful resolution of their conflict. This readiness is not merely about willingness but encompasses the capability to negotiate effectively, which includes understanding one’s interests and those of the opposing parties, as well as having a clear strategy to bridge gaps. For a party to be considered negotiation-ready, it must possess both the internal alignment of goals and the external capacity to implement negotiation strategies. Negotiation readiness is predicated on a comprehensive assessment of both the BATNA and the potential gains from negotiation, ensuring that the party is prepared to make informed decisions that could lead to a sustainable agreement. Negotiation readiness can remain low even if a party is theoretically prepared to discuss terms, because it may lack the political, diplomatic or logistical means to execute and uphold an agreement. The complexity of the Russo-Ukrainian War, involving multiple actors and layered geopolitical interests, necessitates a high degree of negotiation readiness to move toward a sustainable resolution.

If historical data on past interstate wars are any indication, there is about a 50-50 chance that negotiations will play a role in resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war, if not higher. Therefore, it is strategically prudent for all involved parties to prepare for potential negotiation scenarios, even though a ceasefire or peace agreement may currently seem improbable. Following this premise, this paper is structured as follows: First, we identify and analyze three dilemmas in the West’s current strategy toward Ukraine that have unintentionally perpetuated an “unequally hurting stalemate” on the battlefield. Next, we apply negotiation analysis techniques to explore the key interests that shape the BATNAs and negotiation readiness of the relevant parties. We conclude with examples of how the “pro-Ukraine” coalition might recalibrate its strategy to strengthen its stance in prospective ceasefire negotiations.

Three Dilemmas in the West’s Current Ukraine Strategy

The war’s history since the full-scale Russian invasion can be divided into three distinct stages: First, the unexpected resilience of Ukraine, bolstered by coordinated actions from the West, coupled with Russian military and geopolitical miscalculations (spring 2022). Second, a phase marked by Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive (fall 2022). Third, a stalemate has set in with a relatively steady frontline (November 2022 to summer 2024). During this phase, both Ukrainian and Western military and geopolitical strategies have faced challenges in achieving decisive victories or inflicting significant damage on Russia, up until the August 2024 Kursk offensive. To what extent this offensive will now trigger a new phase or remain merely an episode of the current one remains unclear at the time of this writing.

The West’s coercive strategy—comprising sanctions, isolation measures and military support for Ukraine—has proven ineffective in compelling Russian troop withdrawal from Ukraine. Simultaneously, prospects for a successful ceasefire negotiation between Russia and Ukraine appear bleak. This has resulted in an “unequally hurting stalemate.” This does not imply that the frontline is entirely stagnant. It means that the ongoing armed conflict disproportionately impacts Ukraine more than Russia, Europe, the United States or other indirectly affected parties. 

Data on casualties and displacement from the conflict must be considered in the context of the populations of the involved countries. For example, U.S. officials estimated in August 2023 that up to 190,000 Ukrainians and 300,000 Russians have been killed or wounded. Despite the larger number of Russian casualties, Russia’s population is nearly four times that of Ukraine, which means the proportional impact on Ukraine is greater. Moreover, civilian casualties are heavily skewed, with Ukrainian civilian deaths estimated at 35,000 compared to minimal civilian losses in Russia. The most recent estimates, in September 2024, place the total number of killed or wounded on both sides at roughly one million. The conflict has also triggered a massive refugee crisis, with 3.7 million internally displaced persons within Ukraine and another 6.5 million Ukrainians fleeing to neighboring countries. In contrast, about 200,000 Russians were evacuated following Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Territorially, Russia controls about 109,000 sq km of Ukraine, or 18 percent of its territory, while Ukraine controls 1,200 sq km of Russian territory.1

This presents the international pro-Ukraine coalition, which consists predominantly of Western powers,2 with three key dilemmas:

  1. The punishment-escalation dilemma: On one hand, there is a strong desire to hold Vladimir Putin accountable for his illegal invasion of Ukraine. The West adamantly opposes Russia annexing another nation’s territory, recognizing the dangerous precedent it sets for what Western leaders call the “rules-based international order.” Most Western strategists argue that failure to respond decisively could embolden Russia to launch further attacks on other states, while also encouraging authoritarian regimes worldwide to pursue territorial expansion through force. However, the West is wary of escalating the conflict into a full-scale war with Russia. This self-imposed restraint limits the scale of punishment that NATO is willing or able to inflict on Russia. While military, economic and diplomatic support for Ukraine is provided, there is a reluctance to grant all of Ukraine’s requests, fearing that certain weapons systems or actions could cause an unintended and/or direct escalation between NATO and Russia. Paradoxically, the resulting status quo, while extremely painful for Ukraine, is deemed more tolerable for both the West and Russia. All negative consequences notwithstanding, Europe and Russia have been able to largely adjust their way of life to the ongoing war in Ukraine, while Ukrainians on whose territory the war is fought do not have this luxury.
  2. The nuclear threat-deterrence dilemma: On one hand, Western leaders are determined not to succumb to Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. Negotiating from a position of fear due to nuclear coercion is perceived as weakness. However, Russia’s some 5,500 nuclear warheads are not going to disappear anytime soon. As long as these weapons exist, Putin can—and will—leverage them psychologically to advance the political objectives of his “special military operation;” as emphasized recently by repeated military exercises and the announced deployment of sub-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus. Any negotiations concerning the future of Ukraine must navigate this backdrop of potential nuclear risk manipulation by Russia. A sober acknowledgement of this fact would give Western policymakers more flexibility to explore a dual strategy that could maintain a firm stance against nuclear coercion while simultaneously exploring diplomatic pathways to end the war.
  3. The coalition size-goal dilemma: In coalition negotiations, a common rule dictates a choice between a broad coalition with a narrow goal or a narrow coalition with a broad goal.3 However, the West finds itself attempting to pursue both: building a broad and global pro-Ukraine coalition while simultaneously advocating for an increasingly expansive agenda that extends beyond ending the war as soon as possible. This dual approach has proven ineffective. One key reason behind the waning or outright loss of appeal among countries in the Global South and the “BICS” (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) toward the pro-Ukraine coalition is suspicion regarding Western motives surrounding the Ukraine war. While these nations generally oppose Russia’s breach of international law and are averse to nuclear escalation, they are cautious about the West’s broader aims. Concepts such as seeking a “strategic defeat” of Russia, framing the Ukraine war within a global narrative of “democracies versus autocracies” or drawing parallels between Ukraine’s situation and potential future geopolitical conflicts, like Taiwan, certainly mobilize domestic support in North American and European societies. However, they simultaneously alienate many important non-Western actors, thereby undermining the coalition’s global appeal in efforts to end Russia’s invasion. Support from the Global South is critical, however, as these nations collectively wield substantial economic and demographic influence, which could potentially enhance the international legitimacy and effectiveness of war termination strategies pursued by the pro-Ukraine coalition.

The Outcome: An “Unequally Hurting Stalemate” and Persistent Risk of Further Escalation

The West’s underlying assumption in its response to the illegal Russian invasion was to help Ukraine prevent its full conquest by Russia, and ideally achieve victory or inflict such severe damage on Russia that it would withdraw its troops. However, Russia possesses vast conventional, nuclear and economic resources, along with greater manpower compared to Ukraine, rendering the latter improbable. Moreover, such a strategy carries significant risks, including the potential triggering of a supposed Russian “red line” that could lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Wherever exactly this supposed red line concerning Western support to Ukraine is (nobody knows), it is certain that a complete military victory by Ukraine would cross it. In other words: The closer Russia perceives itself to complete military failure, the greater the risk of nuclear escalation. Even without explicit nuclear threats, and even if Putin might eventually not push the nuclear button (again, nobody knows), this dilemma persists. There are also other escalation risks, such as Russia resorting to carpet bombing Ukrainian cities, deploying chemical weapons or turning Ukraine into another Syria. These escalation scenarios could exacerbate the humanitarian crisis even further and dramatically intensify the war’s toll on Ukrainians.

However, envisioning an armistice seems nearly inconceivable to the Ukrainian government and many Ukrainians. After two years of resilient resistance against an unlawful invasion, settling for a frozen conflict would appear to diminish the sacrifices made. At best, according to this rationale, it would delay the next attempt by Russia to grab more Ukrainian land. Indeed, a realistic assessment of the nature of the Russian regime under Putin’s leadership indicates that a sustainable ceasefire deal would be difficult to achieve. There has been a hardening of ideology and reluctance toward negotiation with the Ukrainian government, which the Kremlin says is obedient to its “Anglo-Saxon masters.” Putin perceives his current vulnerability to Western reprisals, let alone Ukrainian actions, as minimal. From his perspective, there appears little incentive to make concessions. Additionally, the United States and the West face competing priorities such as managing relations with China and the Middle East, potentially diverting attention and resources away from Russia.

A significant setback for the West has been the gradual erosion of its soft power influence over Russia. As a result, the West has limited power in shaping Russia’s internal politics today. In the early 1990s and even into the 2000s, the average Russian held favorable views of the United States, with a similarly positive sentiment toward the European Union. Before the first invasion in 2014, Ukraine did not feature prominently as an issue on the people’s agenda. Before the annexation in 2022, even the issue of Crimea was relevant mainly to a small minority of nationalist groups within Russia. The most plausible scenario for fostering enduring change within Russia would likely stem from internal dynamics, akin to the destalinization efforts led by Joseph Stalin’s associates within just a few years after his death. Similarly, the late Soviet Union underwent significant transformation primarily through internal leadership changes, with direct military confrontation, as seen in the current war, deemed unthinkable by both sides at the time. However, such a process seems unlikely at the current moment and does not offer a quick way out of the unequally hurting stalemate.

The Consequence: Bad Options to Choose From

If NATO is (for good reasons) unwilling to risk war with Russia, and if the prospect of Ukraine achieving full military victory (defined as the expulsion of all Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, including Crimea) is highly improbable, the current stalemate will continue. While scenarios like a “Prigozhin 2.0”4 or a collapse of the Russian regime remain conceivable, they are remote. But simply continuing the current unequally hurting stalemate indefinitely, hoping for a low-probability “black swan” event to suddenly trigger Russian withdrawal, is not a strategy. Moreover, the black swan could also be a new U.S. president willing to abandon Ukraine, ending the war on terms vastly favorable to Russia over Ukraine.

Admittedly, for the West, there are several bad options to choose from: a) continuing an “unequally hurting stalemate” that perpetuates the war in Ukraine; b) engaging in negotiations that could potentially allow a nuclear power to benefit from an illegal territorial acquisition; or c) significantly enhancing military support to Ukraine, which could provoke a proportional conventional response from Russia and potentially increase the likelihood of Russia deploying a tactical nuclear weapon in Europe.

Hence, the current stalemate has ironically become somewhat tolerable for both the Kremlin and the West, yet significantly less so for Ukraine. For the West, it represents a temporary resolution to the dilemma of preventing permanent Russian annexation while minimizing the risk of further escalation. The reduced risk of a Russian front collapse compared to earlier stages of the war suggests a lower likelihood of Russia resorting to nuclear use.

Meanwhile, in Russia, the Kremlin has successfully consolidated elite support, partly bolstered by Western sanctions which have incentivized loyalty by eliminating safe exit options for elites. The economy remains stable and is even growing, buoyed by a wartime redistribution of wealth that has substantially increased incomes for members of the armed forces and workers in war-related industries. Western sanctions unintentionally helped the Kremlin address one of Russia’s chronic and most painful economic issues: the constant outflow of capital. By bringing most of its substantial commodity export revenues back home, the sanctions have boosted local demand and consumption, effectively mitigating economic downturns. Furthermore, Russia has been able to counter Western isolation attempts in the international community with the successful negotiation of ad-hoc deals based on shared economic or security goals. In the longer run, the Russian economy is likely to face the consequences of technological sanctions, and expanding military budgets will lead to a growing budget deficit and accelerating inflation. However, the current model appears robust enough to endure for another two to three years.

Conversely, Ukraine faces a dire situation with a much bleaker outlook. The human toll of the war has been devastating. The war also hinders economic development and delays recovery efforts until hostilities cease. The country has suffered significant population losses, including refugees, military casualties and those in occupied territories, exacerbating the human and economic toll.

BATNAs, Interests and Negotiation Readiness

An assessment of the role that negotiation strategy could play in ending the war must not be guided by wishful thinking, nor by the desire to negotiate a ceasefire at all costs. Instead, it should commence with a sober assessment of the different parties’ BATNAs, their readiness for negotiation and their underlying interests. In negotiations theory, the concept of BATNA is crucial for assessing the leverage and potential outcomes of engaging in negotiations. If one party’s BATNA is superior to what they could reasonably expect to achieve through negotiation, they may opt not to engage in talks at all.

In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, analyzing the BATNAs of the relevant parties—Russia, Ukraine, the West, China and others—can provide insights into why negotiations have been elusive. For example, for Russia, particularly under Putin, the calculus may be influenced by the perception that its current military and geopolitical position is stronger than any potential concessions it might secure through negotiations. This perceived strength, bolstered by control over significant portions of Ukrainian territory and the implicit threat of further military escalation, could lead Russia to view continued conflict as preferable to negotiating from a position of perceived weakness.

Conversely, Ukraine’s BATNA has evolved over time, initially focused on defending its sovereignty and now encompassing a resilient stance supported by Western military aid and diplomatic backing. Despite significant losses and ongoing humanitarian challenges, Ukraine’s BATNA may include the hope of eventual military or diplomatic support shifting the balance in its favor, diminishing the incentive for immediate ceasefire negotiation. Hence, the prospect of Ukrainian and Russian negotiators reverting to the types of agreements considered in 2022 seems unlikely. Ukraine’s resolve to join NATO has only strengthened, while Russia insists that Ukraine must abandon its NATO aspirations as a precondition for negotiations. (Russia also demands the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson as part of these conditions.)

For the West, including the United States and European allies, the BATNA has centered on imposing sanctions and providing military assistance to Ukraine while avoiding direct military confrontation with Russia. The West’s challenge lies in balancing its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty with broader geopolitical concerns, including managing relations with Russia and other powers.

China’s BATNA is notably robust. The drawn-out nature of the conflict serves Beijing’s interests by redirecting global attention and resources away from the strategic U.S.-China rivalry, simultaneously reinforcing Russia’s role as a client-ally in economic and technological realms. Nonetheless, China’s BATNA remains flexible, influenced by the potential trajectories of regional and global escalations, along with any spillover effects. The prospect of China mediating a ceasefire could enhance its international standing, providing a reputational boost. While China is not inclined to see Russia decisively defeated by Ukraine and the West, it is equally concerned about an unopposed Russian victory. Such an outcome, which would starkly contravene international norms regarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity, could unsettle Beijing, which prefers a balance that prevents any single country from dominating Eurasia at the expense of others. China also strongly opposes nuclear use, sharing this key interest with NATO and non-aligned states. This nuanced BATNA provides a currently underutilized opportunity for more coordination between the West and China on potential war termination scenarios.

In essence, the divergent BATNAs of the parties involved—shaped by military capabilities, economic leverage and geopolitical calculations—contribute to the current deadlock in negotiations. Until there is a perceived shift in these calculations, negotiations to resolve the conflict in Ukraine are likely to remain elusive. An assessment of the key players’ interests and negotiation readiness indicates several hurdles that stand in the way of ceasefire negotiations, let alone genuine peace talks.

Western Interests and Negotiation Readiness

The stance of the West, particularly the United States and Europe, in the Ukrainian conflict reflects several imperatives and strategic considerations that influence their approach to negotiations:

  1. Imperative Against Appeasement: For the West, any negotiation that does not lead to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory risks being seen as capitulation or appeasement. Allowing Putin to benefit from his illegal annexation of Crimea without consequences would undermine Western credibility and is perceived as encouraging further aggression.
  2. Imperative to Avoid Escalation: There is a strong reluctance within Western capitals to escalate the conflict to a direct war with Russia, especially (but not only) given the nuclear risk and the potential catastrophic consequences. This imperative limits the viability of achieving a Ukrainian military victory over Russia and reinforces the (unspoken) tolerance of a protracted conflict as the West’s (de facto) BATNA.
  3. Strategic CalculationsSome players in the West see an opportunity to fully isolate Russia, exhaust Russian resources and undermine domestic support for Putin’s regime. This approach hinges on the belief that Russia’s centralized system is vulnerable to economic strain and internal dissent, potentially leading to unforeseen developments such as internal unrest or leadership challenges akin to Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023.
  4. Domestic and Global Context: In the United States, the conflict in Ukraine intersects with domestic political dynamics, particularly in the context of polarized presidential elections. Additionally, the broader geopolitical rivalry with China underscores the proclivity for the U.S. and certain European allies to view the Ukrainian conflict within the framework of a larger global struggle of “democracies against autocracies.”
  5. European Perspective: The war in Ukraine has shattered Europe’s dream of a continent without wars or borders, governed by economic cooperation and adherence to international norms. The failure to protect this ideal has led to a profound political and psychological trauma among Europeans. The EU specifically faces a dilemma between confronting the harsh reality of military aggression on its doorstep and the realization that its de facto security guarantor, the U.S., may not possess the will or capability to uphold European security decisively. However, not all European countries view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an equal threat, reflecting diverse geopolitical priorities, national economic interests or elite preferences and security perceptions. These contradictions and the struggle to identify a new compelling security paradigm to guide their foreign and security policy make a “muddling through” the often dominant approach to European geopolitical crisis management.

While both goals—holding the aggressor accountable and avoiding the worst escalation scenarios—are plausible, the resulting policy appears contradictory. The West’s reluctance to negotiate with Russia reflects attempts to simultaneously support Ukraine, pressure Russia, and avoid escalation, all within a single strategy. This contradictory approach contributes to the prolongation of the unequally hurting stalemate on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Russian Interests and Negotiation Readiness

For Russia, its war against Ukraine presents a complex set of internal and external dynamics that shape its objectives and strategy:

  1. Divergent Interests: While negotiated peace would likely be in the best interest of ordinary Russians due to the human and economic costs of the war, the Kremlin’s priorities diverge significantly. For Putin and his inner circle, the conflict has become a tool to consolidate power domestically, maintain political stability through external threats and bolster the regime’s legitimacy.
  2. Military and Economic Considerations: Despite initial setbacks, the Kremlin now holds the military initiative with substantial reserves available for further escalation if deemed necessary. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive does not alter the fundamental balance of resources and manpower that the two antagonists have been able to mobilize. Economically, Russia has managed to restore stability and even achieve moderate growth despite Western sanctions, thanks in part to redirected resources and a Keynesian-style stimulus effect from military spending. 
  3. Social Impact: The war has had mixed effects on Russian society. While many ordinary citizens endure hardship and many young Russian men have died in the war, the war effort has provided significant economic benefits to lower-income groups and military-related industries. Higher salaries for military personnel and increased demand in these sectors have contributed to a localized economic boost, albeit at the expense of broader economic uncertainty and international isolation.
  4. Political Strategy: Internally, the Kremlin has tightened control, eliminating political competition and dissenting voices under the guise of national security. This consolidation of power reinforces the regime’s narrative of a besieged fortress facing external threats, which helps maintain internal stability and justify increasingly authoritarian measures. The Kremlin has shaped a narrative of its “Special Military Operation” that echoes the West’s imperative against appeasement: Any withdrawal of Russian forces from Luhansk, Donetsk or Crimea would be a “capitulation” to an aggressive Western agenda that seeks to kneecap Russian security and prosperity.
  5. Long-term Strategy: While a protracted conflict may seem beneficial for maintaining domestic stability and enhancing geopolitical leverage, the Kremlin's BATNA remains somewhat flexible. Prolonging the stalemate with intermittent escalations allows Moscow to consolidate its influence without committing to a decisive resolution that may require fully leveraging Russia’s escalation dominance. However, this apparent domestic stability should not be perceived as unchanging. Over the course of two and a half years, Russia has faced at least three major crises: the initial upheaval at the start of the war and subsequent sanctions; the military setbacks and public dissatisfaction with the mobilization in fall 2022; and Prigozhin’s coup attempt in the summer of 2023. The ongoing war and a sustained sanctions regime, while tolerable for now, is likely to increasingly burden the Russian economy and its populace, potentially jeopardizing the country’s internal stability. 

In summary, there are certain tensions between the Kremlin’s key strategic imperatives (domestic stability, geopolitical influence and regime survival) that may provide an opening for negotiation opportunities. The Kremlin should prefer not to bear for a generation the burden of the sole (indirect) military adversary of the West. It should be inclined to achieve some form of armistice, while keeping the political narrative of its sacred fight with the West for internal and international use. Such a scenario would give the Kremlin time to consolidate resources and wait for a more favorable situation to test its forces. In the current set-up the Kremlin is not ready to make concessions to achieve this result, as this outcome seems to be almost a given, should the unequally hurting stalemate at the expense of Ukraine remain as it is now. Negotiation readiness is likely to increase if the currently tolerable mix of push and pull factors offered by external parties (West, China, India) were to change, but this would require those parties to embrace a very different approach to international coalition building.

Ukrainian Interests and Negotiation Readiness

Ukraine’s current situation reflects difficult and painful considerations:

  1. Military and Humanitarian Toll: Despite early victories and successful counteroffensives in 2022, Ukraine has since faced relentless military attacks and sustained high casualties among both military personnel and civilians as well as infrastructure. The ongoing conflict has resulted in daily fatalities, widespread destruction of industrial infrastructure through constant shelling and a substantial refugee crisis with millions displaced.
  2. Occupation and Economic Dependence: About 18 percent of Ukrainian territory remains occupied, further complicating efforts for stabilization and recovery. The Ukrainian economy is heavily reliant on direct Western support. Major reconstruction efforts cannot commence until a ceasefire is achieved. This economic pressure increases Ukraine’s vulnerability and limits its ability to influence the course of the conflict without external assistance.
  3. BATNA and Strategic Options: Ukraine’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement appears weak in the absence of clear pathways to achieving a decisive military victory or meaningful territorial gains. While there is a willingness to continue the fight, the practical ability to achieve escalation dominance is limited without robust Western military support, resources and elevated risk tolerance in Washington and Brussels. This BATNA has arguably been weakening since the initial wave of voluntary mobilization has subsided and increasing numbers of Ukrainian men are resisting conscription and refusing to serve in the war.
  4. Existential Threat and Escalation Dynamics: Ukraine perceives the conflict as existential, which contrasts with the West’s concerns over broader geopolitical stability and nuclear risks. This divergence in threat perception influences Ukraine’s readiness for conflict escalation but underscores its dependence on international alliances and support for any significant strategic maneuvers.
  5. Political and Public Will: Despite these challenges and dependencies, a resilient and unified political will persists under President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership, committed to Ukraine’s initial strategy of full-scale resistance against Russian aggression. This collective resolve has significantly influenced the trajectory of the conflict, enabling Ukraine to halt the invasion and even reclaim occupied territories. The population's determination to defend against external threats appears to remain robust, fueled by the perceived existential nature of the conflict and the critical stakes for national sovereignty. This collective will continues to be a pivotal factor in shaping the war. It transcends mere rational calculations of alternatives and resources.

In sum, Ukraine’s resilience and determination to defend its sovereignty remain strong, yet the path forward hinges critically on international support and efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable resolution to the conflict. Recent polls underscore Ukraine's precarious position and the difficult trade-offs confronting its leaders and citizens. Although 44 percent of Ukrainians now believe it is time to initiate peace talks with Russia—up from 23 percent last year—61 percent remain opposed to making any concessions to Russia.

Chinese Interests and Negotiation Readiness

China’s position and influence in the Ukraine conflict are pivotal, albeit indirect:

  1. Influence and Stance: China maintains significant influence over Russia, primarily through economic ties and shared interests in countering perceived Western global dominance. While not directly involved in the conflict, China’s stance is influenced by its broader geopolitical concerns, particularly its rivalry with the United States and aspirations for global leadership.
  2. Avoidance of Global Destabilization: China perceives open wars and nuclear escalations as highly undesirable due to their potential to disrupt global stability, which could undermine China’s economic and strategic interests. Therefore, maintaining stability and avoiding direct involvement in conflicts that could escalate are key priorities for Chinese leadership.
  3. Economic Leverage and Benefits: Throughout the Ukraine conflict, China has adeptly utilized the situation to bolster its economic standing. By stepping in as a strategic partner to Russia, China has filled the void created by Western sanctions and the withdrawal of Western economic interests. In a world increasingly characterized by economic and technological fragmentation, China has effectively incorporated Russia into its sphere of technological influence. Chinese cars quickly populate Russian cities, while Chinese technology, consumer goods and investments have replaced Western alternatives, providing Beijing with significant economic benefits and strengthening its influence over Moscow.
  4. BATNA and Strategic Positioning: China’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement in the Ukraine conflict appears robust. By avoiding direct involvement and leveraging its economic prowess, China benefits from Western distraction (Israel/Gaza, populism, U.S./European elections) and economic strain, while enhancing its stature as a global mediator or broker of peace. A China-brokered armistice could significantly elevate its international prestige without compromising its economic gains from the current status quo. In other words, while the prolonged conflict currently serves as China's robust BATNA, this stance could shift depending on its role in bringing the war to an end.
  5. World Outlook and Self-Perception: Beyond the situation in Ukraine, China’s approach is rooted in its vision of creating a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” and its ambition to be recognized as a “responsible great power.” Effectively managing conflicts such as the one in Ukraine is consistent with this worldview. China sees such engagement not only as beneficial to global stability but also as a means to bolster its international stature and align with its economic interests, fulfilling its long-term strategic objectives.

In conclusion, China’s role in the Ukraine conflict underscores its strategic pragmatism, economic leverage and global ambitions. While avoiding direct entanglement, China maneuvers to maximize its influence over Russia, mitigate global instability risks and position itself favorably on the global stage through calculated diplomatic and economic strategies.

Global Interests and Other Players’ Negotiation Readiness

The broader international perspective on Ukraine, most notably in the Global South, is nuanced:

  1. Impact on Global Stability: The Ukraine war has far-reaching consequences beyond Europe, impacting global markets, food security and overall stability. Indirectly, millions of people worldwide are affected by economic disruptions and higher prices for essential goods. There are indications that the global economy may be splitting into two distinct blocs (US/E.U.-led vs. China/Russia-led), threatening multilateral trade rules and confronting non-aligned states with difficult choices.
  2. Desire for Peace: There is a desire for ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, as the ongoing war strains resources and endangers stability on a global scale. However, many actors such as Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa contend that a resolution requires the involvement of all stakeholders, including Russia, in negotiations. Consequently, they declined to sign the communique of the “Summit on Peace in Ukraine” hosted in Switzerland, citing the exclusion of Russia from the event. When Zelenskyy recently indicated a willingness to invite Russian representatives to the follow-on “peace summit,” he explicitly cited the international community’s stance on Russian inclusion as a key factor: “If the whole world wants them at the negotiating table, then we can't be against it.”
  3. Territorial Integrity: Since World War II, the principle of territorial integrity, enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, has served as a significant global good. Should Russia succeed in gaining territory as a result of its illegal invasion of Ukraine, it would severely undermine this norm, posing a substantial threat to global stability and making the world a significantly more dangerous place for many smaller states.
  4. Hesitation to Support Western Actions: Although maintaining a global order largely free of military aggression and territorial wars is a critically important common good, many countries in the global South perceive the West’s stance on the Ukraine conflict as hypocritical. They question the moral legitimacy of Western actions, given the U.S.’ and NATO’s military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, among others, which have often resulted in prolonged conflicts and instability without achieving lasting peace or prosperity. The call for sanctions and international solidarity against Russia’s actions in Ukraine hence does not resonate universally. Countries in the Global South are often reluctant to take sides. Moral arguments alone are insufficient to garner support in international affairs, especially when there are perceptions of hypocrisy and inconsistency in Western policies.
  5. Untapped Influence: Despite the global implications of the Ukraine conflict, most countries outside of direct stakeholders like Russia, Ukraine and the Western coalition find themselves on the sidelines. This lack of direct involvement changes when key players to the conflict engage external actors with genuine interest in mutually beneficial coalition building instead of through moral pressure or war termination proposals that external actors perceive as one-sided or unrealistic.

The Ukraine conflict highlights deep divisions and perceptions of double standards in international relations. The Global South’s skepticism toward Western-led initiatives makes it more difficult to expand the pro-Ukraine coalition, even though the war has broad global repercussions. Key players in the Global South could offer essential leverage and communication channels with Russia, which the West lacks. However, these opportunities have largely remained untapped.

Why a Protracted Conflict Seems Tolerable

The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) for most political actors is the status quo of a protracted conflict with an escalation risk that is perceived as manageable. To both the West and Russia, this unequally hurting stalemate, while ugly, seems currently more attractive than the prospects of peace talks. Ukraine and its citizens hence find themselves caught in the middle of a cynical informal consensus among antagonistic forces. They are effectively held hostage by the de facto preference of great powers for a prolonged stalemate over pursuing genuine ceasefire negotiations.

To clarify: This BATNA analysis acknowledges Ukraine’s political agency, recognizes that it has the most at stake in this war because it views its engagement as a matter of survival and understands that Ukrainians are highly motivated to continue fighting. Moreover, Ukraine’s persistent appeals for Western arms have been crucial in securing external support. Indeed, many Western political leaders have hesitated to provide specific weapon systems due to, among other factors, the imperative to avoid escalation. The continued supply of arms to Ukraine by the West is not driven by NATO’s or America’s desire to perpetuate the war at any cost.

However, the BATNA analysis also makes us conclude that both the West and Russia, when faced with a binary choice—whether ironically, cynically or tragically—share an unspoken preference for maintaining the protracted conflict in its current form rather than earnestly pursuing ceasefire negotiations. For NATO and Russia, the ongoing conflict serves as an uncomfortable yet somewhat tolerable BATNA, to which most of their citizens have adjusted. 

For American and European societies, the primary reason for this adaptation is that the costs borne are predominantly economic, financial and societal (through the intake of Ukrainian refugees), rather than direct human costs through war casualties or displacement. This economic burden, exemplified by Europeans confronted with higher energy prices, may be significant but still allows for a level of conflict tolerance among the populations that might not be sustainable under more direct consequences. For Ukraine, however, the protracted conflict represents an excruciating BATNA, exacting a severe toll in terms of lives lost and ongoing suffering. This persistent state of war continues to inflict deep and devastating impacts on the Ukrainian population.

What Could be Done?

As this negotiation analysis illustrates, a ceasefire agreement will continue to be elusive as long as the strategies of key parties are primarily dictated by their BATNAs. However, the analysis also reveals that the BATNAs of certain parties, such as Russia and China, exhibit some flexibility, offering potential openings for negotiation. Indeed, even Ukraine’s recent Kursk offensive can be viewed through this lens: While seizing Russian territory does not advance any key Ukrainian interests—Kyiv, after all, makes no territorial claims—it could weaken Russia’s BATNA by escalating the war’s costs for both the Russian people and leadership, and potentially increase Ukrainian negotiation leverage. However, should negotiation readiness evolve, the underlying interests of these parties, as outlined previously, are likely to play a more significant role in shaping their conflict management strategies.

In the absence of changes in negotiation readiness, with overall willingness to engage in ceasefire talks remaining low, what measures can be taken? While a comprehensive assessment of potential negotiation tactics by the involved parties is outside the scope of this paper, there are specific actions that the West could implement now to enhance its position—and by extension, Ukraine’s—in potential ceasefire negotiations. (While Ukraine and Russia would be the direct participants in such negotiations, external parties including the U.S., NATO, EU, China, Turkey and others are also likely to play significant roles. These actors could be involved directly or indirectly, serve as mediators or provide security guarantees during later stages of the talks).

Whatever the eventual format of the negotiations may be, the West remains a key player in facilitating the onset of ceasefire discussions, despite prominent claims that it’s “only the Ukrainians” who decide their fate regarding war, peace and negotiations. Western leaders, even if not directly at a future Russian-Ukrainian negotiation table, exert significant influence over the course of the war through their support for Ukraine. Pretending that Ukraine alone decides when and how negotiations start is disingenuous and not an accurate reflection of political realities. There is a difference between NATO’s current political imperative that nothing about Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine's involvement, and the fact that many decisions about Ukraine could potentially be made without it, should political preferences shift in Western capitals. This highlights the precariousness of Ukraine’s position and underscores the need for thinking through potential negotiation scenarios in advance.

A ceasefire negotiation strategy for the West (that is perceived as more attractive than their current BATNA by Western political leaders) must address the three dilemmas described previously, while targeting the underlying interests of the other conflict parties. Opening a path toward negotiations that serve key Ukrainian goals requires acknowledging the intertwined interests and strategies of multiple global actors, the ambivalent role of Western support and the imperative for a new approach that balances assertive action with new diplomatic initiatives. Before making any specific offers in negotiations, it is essential to establish a clear understanding of one’s own interests. This strategic clarity is currently missing within the pro-Ukraine coalition. However, if the West aims to prioritize overcoming the “unequally hurting stalemate” through negotiations aimed at supporting constructive Russo-Ukrainian ceasefire negotiations, there are viable options available to make such a scenario more likely.

Such a ceasefire negotiation strategy could be based on three pillars: (1) continued, or even enhanced, support for Ukraine; (2) a more focused coalition-building campaign aimed at the Global South; and (3) clear diplomatic signals to Moscow that indicate the willingness to help negotiate first a ceasefire, then a Russo-Ukrainian peace agreement, and lastly principles for the future of European security between all affected parties.

The willingness to open channels for communication are not signs of weakness but essential for resolving conflicts. Or, as John F. Kennedy put it, “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.” The dichotomy between fighting and negotiating oversimplifies the complex strategies needed to de-escalate and eventually end armed conflicts. Successful strategies often involve a blend of military readiness and diplomatic engagement. It is possible not to abandon one’s values or strategic goals in the face of an adversary but to leverage both coercive measures and opportunities for dialogue effectively.

Negotiations in a context lacking trust and featuring illegal violence, cannot afford naivety. Offers must be underpinned by resolve and the willingness to walk away. Robust mechanisms to ensure the enforcement and implementation of any agreed terms must be developed. The imperative lies in balancing assertive actions with diplomatic efforts, recognizing that this dual approach can mitigate further suffering in Ukraine while opening pathways that lead to lasting peace and stability on the European continent. 

In fact, a more assertive version of this strategy could involve intensifying signals of military resolve toward Russia while simultaneously extending an explicit offer to negotiate. For example, NATO could consider speeding up the delivery of defensive weapons to Kyiv while clearly and openly stating its readiness to engage in discussions with Moscow. A strategy that focuses solely on punishment has run its course and only reinforced the Russian regime’s domestic control. A different strategy should also present a potential exit route. By ensuring that negotiations are contingent on Ukraine's direct participation, the West would demonstrate strategic clarity and dispel any notions of “dirty deals” between great powers at the expense of smaller nations.

To construct a broader coalition, negotiators typically need to maintain a narrow, focused common goal. Currently, the West appears to be conflating the globally appealing objective of protection against wars of aggression with a broader array of specific military, economic and geopolitical ambitions, such as promoting democracy or enhancing the West’s stance vis-a-vis Russia and China. This approach complicates the formation of a broader coalition by mixing universally appealing goals with objectives that are more specific to Western interests or domestic imperatives. But more effective coalition-building with non-Western countries such as China, Brazil and South Africa is crucial for garnering global support to end the war in a way that restores Ukrainian sovereignty. This endeavor demands humility and a shift in focus towards a more narrowly defined common interest in upholding international law, particularly in preventing wars of aggression, territorial conflicts and nuclear use.

In an increasingly multipolar world where the West cannot dictate outcomes, it needs to learn how to collaborate more effectively with others. The pro-Ukraine coalition has predominantly remained Western, and it has lost appeal in the Global South over the past two years. Two decades ago, the West seemed to be winning the global competition of values, but today it faces skepticism and scrutiny. The West must acknowledge its mistakes, especially in the aftermath of interventions like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, which have tarnished its moral reputation. While these actions were not “the same” as Russia’s territorial invasion of a neighboring state (the modern United States did not invade Canada and annex Quebec), Western interventions have come at a high human toll and often in violation of international law.

Tangible progress toward sustainable conflict resolution often emerges from pragmatic negotiation rather than idealistic declarations of perfect outcomes. The first step toward conflict resolution in the Russia-Ukraine War would likely be a negotiated ceasefire. Recent joint statements from Brazil and China calling for de-escalation and a political settlement, while opposing the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the Ukraine war provide an opening for building an anti-nuclear war coalition. Leveraging such positions more creatively as part of a comprehensive negotiation strategy would do more to discourage Russian nuclear use and paving a path toward peace than preparing the next package of Western sanctions and refusing to give negotiations a chance.5

Footnotes

  1. See Council on Foreign Relations, “War in Ukraine:” https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Ukraine Emergency:” https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/; “Russia to evacuate thousands more from Kursk region attacked by Ukraine,” Reuters, Aug. 14 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-evacuate-thousands-more-kursk-region-attacked-by-ukraine-2024-08-15/; “Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say,” Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes, NYT, Aug. 18 2024: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html; “One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War ,” Bojan Pancevski, WSJ, Sept. 17, 2024: https://www.wsj.com/world/one-million-are-now-dead-or-injured-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-b09d04e5; “Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia's invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2024,” Statista.com, Aug. 13 2024: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/; and “Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia,” BBC News, Aug. 22 2024: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682.
  2. Broadly defined, the pro-Ukraine coalition includes Ukraine itself as well as the collective West and its non-Western allies. With “collective West,” we refer to the U.S., NATO, the EU and non-American/non-European Western powers such as Australia. “Non-Western allies” include states largely allied with the collective West, such as Japan. Internal disagreements within this coalition exist but are simplified here for analysis purposes. We understand that these groupings may sometimes appear simplistic or contradictory. However, given the important role of the collective West in the pro-Ukraine coalition and contemporary geopolitics at large, this simplification appears in order. Hence, when we write “the West,” we mean the U.S./NATO/EU/Allies bloc that shapes the strategy of the pro-Ukraine coalition, along with Ukraine itself.
  3. In negotiation theory, the coalition dilemma describes the strategic trade-off involved in forming coalitions, specifically the tension between the breadth of the coalition and the scope of its objectives. Broad coalitions typically demand narrowly defined goals to maintain cohesion among diverse participants. Conversely, when the objectives are expansive and varied, the coalition usually needs to be more selective, encompassing members with aligned, comprehensive interests. This dilemma challenges negotiators to carefully balance inclusivity against goal specificity to effectively manage and sustain coalition dynamics.
  4. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, a private military company, attempted what was essentially a mutiny against the Russian government in June 2023. Prigozhin and his mercenaries started by seizing military command centers in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don before advancing toward Moscow. He demanded the removal of top military leaders, whom he blamed for the high casualty rates among his fighters and general mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. This represented a direct challenge to Putin’s authority, exposing significant fissures within the Russian power structure. Prigozhin halted his march on Moscow after negotiating with the Kremlin. Two months later, he died in an airplane crash.
  5. The authors thank the members of the Working Group on Negotiating Nuclear Disarmament of the Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament (AMC) at Uppsala University, in addition to Mariana Budjeryn, Sascha Hacha and Jingjie He, for their constructive feedback. The views expressed in this paper represent solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Negotiation Task Force, of those experts providing feedback, or of any institutions that the authors are affiliated with.
Author

Marat Atnashev

Marat Atnashev is an adviser for the Negotiation Task Force (NTF) and is co-founder and CEO of MetaGames Academy. He was formerly an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

Author

Arvid Bell

Arvid Bell is a scholar and entrepreneur who specializes in negotiation strategy, crisis management, conflict system analysis, international security, and simulation design. He is the CEO of the Negotiation Task Force (NTF), an advisory and R&D group, and is also an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors. Photo is by Ukraine's Tsunami Assault Regiment, Liut Brigade photo via AP.