Abstract 

A buffer zone can separate great powers, but this arrangement only works if the competing states-and the buffer itself-agree on the terms. Ukraine's domestic turmoil and relations with Russia, the U.S., and Europe may not make it an ideal candidate for a buffer state, argue professors Thomas Graham, Rajan Menon, and Jack Snyder, but that outcome could be better than the other alternatives.

The conflict in Ukraine that began in early 2014 produced the worst crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. In its wake, foreign policy mavens have engaged in contentious debates over Ukraine’s future and the West’s choices. During the Obama administration, the West imposed sanctions on Russia, viewing its annexation of Crimea and material support for rebel forces in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region as violations of the basic norms of post-Cold War international relations. This approach to Russia was based on a consensus within Europe and between Europe and the United States.

But things changed in 2016. Donald Trump was elected U.S. president, bringing to the office a disdain for the American establishment’s liberal internationalist foreign policy. Major transformations were also underway in Europe: Brexit, disarray in the European Union, and the rise of nationalist and populist parties, which held in common with Trump a more positive view of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Because of these changes, the West may shift gears and seek an accommodation with Russia over Ukraine’s status. As such, intermittent discussions in the West about the feasibility and desirability of Ukraine becoming a buffer state have acquired added significance, notwithstanding that such talk has always made Ukrainians uneasy due to their aspirations to be part of the West—politically, economically, and militarily.

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Photo by Iurii Bakhmat shared under a CC BY-SA 2.0 license.