A video distributed by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, on Dec. 9, 2020, a rocket launches from missile system as part of a ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile test launched from the Plesetsk facility in northwestern Russia.

Scenarios for the Future of US-Russia Strategic Stability and Arms Control: Results From a Track II Dialogue

January 09, 2025

This is a summary of an article originally published by RAND.

  • As broader disagreements between Moscow and Washington in 2024 threaten to do away with the remnants of an arms control regime that once underpinned strategic stability between the two nuclear powers, the future of bilateral strategic stability is highly uncertain.
  • The U.S. and Russian experts brought together for this project agreed that the gamut of possible outcomes over the next five to ten years is broad. The U.S.-Russia relationship could deteriorate to the brink of a direct clash, or it could stabilize significantly, making conflict a remote prospect. However, a steady decline without significant calamity or improvement was seen as the most likely course of events. Neither side expected their respective governments to desist in activities that the other views and describes as destabilizing.
  • The group also agreed that even in the most dire scenario, the United States and Russia can take steps to mitigate risk. The assembled experts established a menu of arms control options to manage strategic competition and reduce the risk of crisis for each of the three scenarios, including the worst-case future. It is up to political leaders on both sides to open the menu and choose among the options. Doing so is less challenging during comparatively peaceful periods. However, the most dangerous moments can also produce arms control breakthroughs. The stakes in this bilateral relationship are too high to let matters spiral completely out of control.
  • This document and the Track II dialogue that produced it represent a joint analytical effort by nongovernmental specialists from two countries whose governments have effectively disavowed almost all joint efforts on the first track (i.e., between officials). The very fact that the group reached an analytical consensus on these important issues is perhaps as equally important as the content of the scenarios and related measures.
  • All of the participants openly acknowledged the severity of the divide between the countries—and they did not set out to bridge that divide. By accepting the persistence of that divide but looking beyond the present, the participants were able to find common ground.
  • The group admittedly decided on scenario-building and options development because they recognized it would be impossible—even for them at the Track II level—to find consensus on prescriptions to address present disputes. And even if they did, there is no appetite in the capitals to hear such prescriptions. Nonetheless, that this document represents a joint effort of Russian and U.S. arms control specialists is significant and hopefully can provide input for governments in the future, even if that future is more tense than today.

Read the full article at the RAND website.

Author

Samuel Charap

Samuel Charap is Distinguished Chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy and a senior political scientist at RAND.

Author

John J. Drennan

John J. Drennan is Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Ukraine Country Director. 

Author

Julia Masterson

Julia Masterson is a defense analyst at RAND. Masterson previously worked as a Foreign Affairs Officer at U.S. Department of State, in the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS).

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File.