Jake Sullivan

Jake Sullivan on Russia

December 10, 2020
Thomas Schaffner, Daniel Shapiro and Aleksandra Srdanovic

This compilation of observations and policy ideas related to Russia by Jake Sullivan is part of Russia Matters’ “Competing Views” rubric, where we share prominent American thinkers’ takes on issues pertaining to Russia, U.S.-Russian relations and broader U.S. policies affecting Russia.  

On Nov. 22, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden selected Jake Sullivan to serve as his national security adviser. Previously, Sullivan served in the Obama administration as deputy assistant to the president and national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden. Sullivan also served as a senior adviser to the U.S. government in the Iran nuclear negotiations. Additionally, Sullivan has worked as a senior policy adviser to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign and was a visiting professor at Yale Law School.

This compilation is meant as a sampling of Sullivan’s views. All sections may be updated with new or past statements. The quotes below are divided into categories similar to those in Russia Matters’ news and analysis digests, reflecting the most pertinent topic areas for U.S.-Russian relations broadly and for drivers of the two countries’ policies toward one another.

Bulleted text that is not italicized, bracketed or in parentheses is a direct quote from Sullivan.


I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

  • To be updated.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • I believe that Kim Jong-Un sees his nuclear weapons as existential to his regime, so he will no more give them up than he would give up power. But I do believe the Chinese could get the North Koreans to stop moving forward, meaning no more tests, no more advancement in capability. … Our immediate goal should be a halt on further testing, both missile testing and nuclear testing, because if we halted it now, we would be in a position where we would then have time to be able to deal with the broader North Korea nuclear program. And I think that China has the capacity to do that and the question is, is all of this tough talk from the administration, a means of trying to get the Chinese's attention so that they feel a greater incentive to do that or is it actually a precursor to war? (Interview with Charlie Rose, 08.10.17)

Iran and its nuclear program:

  • I think we have to see where we are in January of 2021. It absolutely means returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran if Iran returns to a nuclear agreement, and then working on negotiating a follow-on agreement that deals with additional issues and that continues to secure American interests over the longer term. The real question, though … is how do you relate nuclear diplomacy, on the one hand, to regional diplomacy on the other? I definitely do not want to be advocating for holding the former hostage to the latter, because, of course, it is possible the latter doesn’t go anywhere. I think it is important that we return to a durable set of understandings on the nuclear file that can be enforced and implemented over the course of the next several years. But my view is you can have an informal linkage between these two. You can get some early wins on the nuclear program but tie long term sanctions relief to progress on both files. (Event with CSIS, 06.23.20)
  • I would suggest that if Iran continues to abide by its commitments under the JCPOA, the U.S. should rejoin the JCPOA and open negotiations. (Interview with the Hudson Institute, 03.15.19)
  • On what the United States should do if Iran does not abide by its commitments under the JCPOA: We will have to see how that plays out, but at that point—let’s say they begin increasing their centrifuge capacity or building up their stockpile. Whatever the thing may be, the U.S. will have to continue to use the heavy sanctions tool to try to bring them back into compliance. Basically, my message would be in January 2021, if they were out of compliance, would be to say, you have to come back to the table or the sanctions are going to get worse for you. If you come back to the table, we are prepared to re-create the terms of the JCPOA and deal with the issue of timelines so we are pushing out the days into the future … The one thing I object to is the notion that at the bargaining table between the U.S. and Iran or anyone else, we will settle the issue of Syria and Lebanon and Yemen—I don’t buy this idea that the JCPOA is somehow inadequate because it did not solve all of these regional issues. (Interview with the Hudson Institute, 03.15.19)
  • The best strategy to counter the full range of Iranian threats is to commit to the deal and enforce it relentlessly, not cast it into doubt and raise questions about America’s credibility. We want our European partners and others to join us in increasing the pressure on Iran for its revisionism and expansionism. … But it is a lot harder to get them to focus on these broader Iranian threats when their attention is on the nuclear deal and its uncertain future. It is a lot harder to induce their cooperation when they are thinking more about the risk Washington poses than they are about the risk Tehran poses. (Written Testimony to United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10.11.17)
  • Walking away from the nuclear deal would be a disaster for the United States. Whether we left by design or by accident, because this decertification gambit set off a chain of events that led to the collapse of the deal, we would be strategically worse off. Iran would return to racing forward on its nuclear capability and we would not be able to rally the international community to stop them through sanctions. … [I]f all that is required to keep Iran in check is the credible threat of military force, then why are the deal’s opponents worried about the precise provisions of the JCPOA? It’s because they know that severe nuclear restraints and verification measures are a much better and more stable solution than relying on the military option. (Written Testimony to United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10.11.17)

New Cold War/sabre rattling:

  • Given the current hazy discourse on competition, there is an understandable temptation to reach back to the only great-power competition Americans remember to make sense of the present one: the Cold War.But the analogy is ill fitting. China today is a peer competitor that is more formidable economically, more sophisticated diplomatically, and more flexible ideologically than the Soviet Union ever was. And unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the world and intertwined with the U.S. economy. The Cold War truly was an existential struggle. … The Cold War analogy at once exaggerates the existential threat posed by China and discounts the strengths Beijing brings to long-term competition with the United States. Although the risk of conflict in Asia’s hot spots is serious, it is by no means as high, nor is the threat of nuclear escalation as great, as it was in Cold War Europe. (Foreign Affairs, with Kurt Campbell, Sept./Oct. 2019)
  • Putin's position as a KGB agent in the waning days of the Cold War is relevant in two important respects. The first is that it has completely shaped his view about history and his conclusion that the fall of the Soviet Union was a great historical catastrophe. That has lingering effects to this day. The second is to do with mentality and specifically his zero-sum view about the United States and Russia, [the view] that increasing American influence in a way necessarily detracts from Russian influence and Russian security. That zero-sum mindset and mentality at times was overcome by a post-Cold War view that maybe there was a cooperative arrangement to be had, but it was always there. And today I would say it’s there in spades. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • On some fundamental levels, the United States and Russia, under Vladimir Putin, have divergent interests, and we've got to be clear-eyed about that. Believing that somehow Russia and the United States can be great partners in a global project and see eye-to-eye on some of the major issues of the day is only going to end up in disappointment. (PBS, 06.22.17)

NATO-Russia relations:

  • I think that there is a reasonable chance that we don’t see him [Trump] walking away from NATO, or him [Trump] really doubling down on his cheering for the disintegration of the European Union—or, for that matter, him really cozying up to Putin the way that it seemed like he might. However, at any given moment, because of the uncertainty inside the administration and the fact that there are voices like Steve Bannon pushing him in that direction, it will remain a risk all the way through his presidency. And that makes the United States a less reliable partner in the transatlantic alliance. (Talk with Harvard’s Belfer Center, 03.30.17)

Missile defense:

  • To be updated.

Arms control:

  • Washington will need to enhance both U.S.-Chinese crisis management and its own capacity for deterrence. Even as Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union worked concertedly to reduce the risk that an accidental collision would escalate to nuclear war; they set up military hot lines, established codes of conduct and signed arms control agreements. The United States and China lack similar instruments to manage crises at a time when new domains of potential conflict, such as space and cyber­space, have increased the risk of escalation. (Foreign Affairs, with Kurt Campbell, Sept./Oct. 2019)


  • America stumbled into the War on Terror, which started with the justified invasion of Afghanistan but continued with the invasion of Iraq, one of the most catastrophic decisions in American history. The result, a decade and a half later, is an open-ended military commitment that spans multiple countries. (The Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2019)
  • The U.S. has to wind down its participation in the forever wars of the Middle East. This doesn’t mean abandoning the region or shutting down the counterterrorism mission. But it does mean finally bringing the war in Afghanistan, which has now gone on for more time than any other war in American history, to a responsible close. … The blank check for military action that Congress gave the president in 2001 should be transformed into a much narrower authorization, one that excludes participation in counterproductive missions, such as the ongoing one in Yemen, whose only clear outcome is a humanitarian crisis. (The Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2019)
  • The policy that he [Trump] has put in place is, I think, a fairly modest modification to the policy that President Obama was pursuing, which was rapidly shrinking the territory that the Islamic State controlled in Iraq and Syria. So I think that in the next 12-15 months, it is not implausible that the Islamic State will lose its territorial hold on any major towns or cities in Iraq and Syria. … That to me is not the end of the ballgame when it comes to defeating terrorists in the Middle East. … You need a strategy at that point so that the son of ISIS doesn’t just emerge from the ruins of ISIS, and in order to achieve that, you’ve got to be bringing all elements of American power to bear—not just military, but diplomacy and development. (Talk with Harvard’s Belfer Center, 03.30.17)

Conflict in Syria:

  • If I were going back to the period of 2011, 2012, 2013, in Syria, I would have advocated for doing more to accomplish less … I’ll come on to what I mean by that is the gap between our means and ends. So, our ends in Syria through that period were “Assad must go.” We need a complete transition of government, but our means were basically some combination of marginal economic sanctions and various forms of support for the opposition--definitely not enough to cross the means-ends gap. … [I]f the United States had actually been prepared to potentially take very limited direct military action—for example, in response to the gassing—but not to produce regime change in Syria, but rather to produce progress at the bargaining table, I think the chances of a potentially positive outcome would have gone up. … Our problem in Syria is our diplomatic goal was the transformation of Syria. I think at the end of the day, that was probably a mistake. (Event with CSIS, 06.23.20)
  • I would argue that Russia believes at this point, it can achieve all of its objectives in Syria. That it can essentially ensure that Assad is in power for the indefinite future, that it will protect its own military positions. So having dealt with the Russians directly for years on the Syria question, when I was in government, I heard them say repeatedly, we don't care about the future of Assad, however their actions have always suggested that defending this regime, because they see no alternative to this regime, Assad at the top ... They don't see someone who they could bring in as a replacement that could hold the country together and protect their interests. … And I think the deals they are currently cutting are setting them up for success for themselves for Russia at the expense of the Syrian Sunni Communities … and long-term regional stability because it is not going to deal with the underlying problem of violent extremism. (Interview with Charlie Rose, 08.10.17)

Cyber security:

  • Well, I mean, obviously, the first thing that comes to mind is enhanced cyber defenses for the campaign, for the DNC, for others. And I think that that should be incumbent on every dimension of a political campaign, government servers, election systems servers, campaign servers. We should all learn going forward. But I think we also have to recognize that when you have highly sophisticated cyber actors like Russia, offense tends to get ahead of defense over time. They tend to find a way through. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)

Elections interference:

  • What dramatically enhanced the urgency of this for me was the shift from simply Russia being in the system and looking around and learning things to weaponizing by releasing the information publicly, which was a big change from past elections where, you know, foreign countries got into email systems but didn't do much with it. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • Putin and the people around him would think is: We have essentially a pliable partner here who is seeing what we're doing because it's being publicly reported. He's encouraging it and cheering it on. He's saying, "This is a good thing," and he's saying, "Do more, please." And so, from their perspective, I think this reinforced their view that having Donald Trump in the White House would be a benefit to Russian foreign policy and national security. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • I think the Russians—you talked about how they may come back and do it again. I think they are sort of doing it again in a way already on certain issues that aren't just about elections, where it's state-sponsored information warfare for purposes of destabilizing the American political debate on issues. And I think we've got to put a stop to that too. So, for me, it's not just about elections. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • I think there is ample evidence at this point in the public record of collusion, coordination, and conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russians. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)

Energy exports from CIS:

  • The fact is that Europe still remains pretty vulnerable from the perspective of its reliance on Russian gas. That is changing and could change much faster if we actually implemented a strategy to begin to diversify to a greater extent their sources of energy and to put—set a glide path for being able to hold Gazprom much more significantly at risk than we have been able to. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • I think about sanctions right now less as about accountability for 2016 and more about deterrence for 2018 and 2020. So the way I would think about the sanctions tool is not just to pile on a new set and say, "These are just more punishment for what you did." Rather, I would go to our European partners and say: This has become an urgent priority for the United States of America, and frankly, it should be an urgent priority for you too and your democracies. Here's the deal. We should go sit down with the Russians and lay out for them that if we see this again, this is the menu of sanctions that are coming. And be quite straightforward and predictable on that. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • I have not been privy in the last three years to a forensic analysis of which Russian financial institutions are doing the most work to prop up Putin and the oligarchs around him or which he would feel the most pain in or, for that matter, which are most European exposed and could cause the greatest systemic risk. So you have got to balance slapping sanctions on banks that hurt but not going so far as to potentially destabilize the global financial system. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

  • [Biden] has made clear that he is going to stand up to Russia on issues related to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe including in Ukraine. He has made it clear that he is going to speak out on issues related to values and human rights and human dignity … But he’s also prepared to be practical when it is in America’s interest. He will look to extend the New START treaty on nuclear weapons, he will look to engage Russia on other issues where it can advance American interests and the interest of our allies and partners. He’s not going out of his way looking to escalate things out of control. He is looking to stand up and stand firm, and then find those areas where potentially working together can still produce effective outcomes. (Interview with the Lowy Institute, 09.07.20)
  • You’ve got more reports of Russia actively interfering in the American election, you had a Russian force in Syria aggressively attack an American force and actually injure American service members … now you have the apparent poisoning of Navalny with a nerve agent that is apparently only in the possession of the GRU … [and] Russian bounties on the heads of American soldiers … Something is going on, that is not okay … I no longer believe the “oh he [President Donald Trump] has got this particular view on Russia because of his perspective on foreign policy” is a sufficient explanation for his weakness in the face of Vladimir Putin. (Interview with the Lowy Institute, 09.07.20)
  • Biden has been very strong over the course of this campaign and standing up and speaking out for things like free and fair elections. … And over the course of his time as Vice President and going back years in his time in the Senate, he has stood up for democracy and freedom and democratic institutions across eastern Europe and across the countries on the periphery of Russia. He obviously is set in independence and sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. As Vice President Biden has taken the measure of Vladimir Putin. He knows the man. He knows the dangerous path that Russia has decided to pursue and he will be robust and rigorous to fight back against that. More than that, he will really invest in rallying our allies and partners in the region so that we are presenting a common front, a common push back against Russian aggression and Russian interference in elections and that we are speaking out with a common voice against the Russian hand in both its own country and abroad in seeking to suppress the rights of its citizens. (Interview with the Atlantic Council, 08.21.20)
  • I think as long as Putin’s president, it is hard for me to see how he decides “I want to get to a more positive relationship with these guys” because he seems to have a very focused view that it is Russia’s job to destroy any remaining threads of American leadership or polarity or dominance in the world. When you have a leader who is fixated on that, it’s very difficult to see anything other than a tense, adversarial relationship. (Interview with the Hudson Institute, 03.15.19)
  • The other thing that I was focused on … was raising questions about why—what was motivating Vladimir Putin to [interfere in the election]. And, of course, it's no secret that he and Hillary Clinton didn't have the greatest of relationships. But the other factor here was that Donald Trump, in the time that he had spent on the campaign trail, was adopting a series of positions that seemed to track almost exactly to Vladimir Putin's wish list, whether it was about NATO or about Ukraine or about human rights on down the list. And I found that very curious that a major Presidential candidate in the Republican Party would be taking these positions. But also it would be the kind of thing that would motivate Putin to want to see him get elected. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • And then the other dimension of this that I put on the table, which I found strange and continue to find strange, is the nature of the connections between several members of Trump's foreign policy and political team and elements of the Russian Government or Russian-backed proxies, whether you're talking about Mike Flynn or Paul Manafort or Carter Page and that when you add all of this up, it's a pretty disturbing picture. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • The fundamental idea behind it was that the United States and Russia should look for areas where they could cooperate together to advance shared interests in nuclear disarmament, in sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and help Russia could give us in the war in Afghanistan, etc. The concept was where we have common interests, we should work together, and where we don’t, where our interests diverge, we would continue to stand up for our principles and values. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russia relationship has always involved a mix of three things: cooperation on shared interests; tension and push and pull on divergent interests; and then the United States standing up for the Russian people in their effort to pursue a stronger civil society and a stronger democracy. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • Both Secretary Clinton and President Obama spent time with Putin talking to him about the U.S. attitude toward NATO, toward Russia, toward the rules-based international order in which they saw Russia playing an important role over time, all in an effort to dispel Putin's paranoia. This was done privately in their meetings; it was done in public speeches that both Secretary Clinton and President Obama gave. It was clear to us that an effort at reassurance was needed because of this aspect of Putin's worldview and his deep belief that the United States was up to something. But over time, it also became clear that those efforts at reassurance weren't particularly fruitful. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • Trump has had an affinity for Russia and Russian oligarchs and Russian leaders for quite some time that relates to his business interests, that relates to his general attitude toward values and democracy. And all of that came together in this unholy alliance. Whether it was witting or unwitting, whether there was active collusion or passive collusion, it all came together during this campaign. (PBS, 06.22.17)


II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

  • It was difficult for us to know exactly what the dynamic was between Medvedev and Putin. We knew that Putin was the ultimate shot caller in the Russian Federation. [He] had been since he had assumed the presidency after Boris Yeltsin. But we also knew that he was giving Medvedev a lot of latitude to pursue a more constructive relationship with the United States; that he was not going to stand in the way of that. The real question was, how much of that was passive permission, and how much of it was active encouragement? I don't think to this day we know the answer to that question. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • Putin conveys a huge amount through body language. He tries to show you that he’s the alpha male in the room … That's the first thing that really strikes you when you're in the room with him. He also is somebody who’s got a debater’s mindset. … Once you push through all of that, though, he’s not an impractical guy. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • The Russian parliamentary elections unfolded in late 2011. It was clear on the evidence available to the international community that there was funny business going on in those elections, and it was clear to the Russian people as well, which is why tens of thousands of them poured into the streets for demonstrations, not just in Moscow but in many cities across Russia. (PBS, 06.22.17)

Defense and aerospace:

  • To be updated.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • To be updated.


III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • Vladimir Putin … needs to be understood as having an overriding interest in preserving and extending his own power, first and foremost; secondly, in restoring the role and relevance of Russia on the global stage; and third, in ensuring, as a defensive proposition— which ends up having very offensive elements to it—that Russia is secure in its near abroad and has dominion in one way or another over the former Soviet space. … One should understand his effort to divide and weaken NATO and the European Union, his effort to discredit democracy as an effective form of government, his effort to split the Transatlantic Alliance, all in the context of those goals. (Interview with The Wilson Center, 05.16.18)
  • On whether Russia has an easier job of setting foreign policy strategy than the United States: Russia, China, other actors who operate in one way or another as revisionist actors—they have one massive advantage over the United States and that is: they are not the United States. They are relying upon the U.S. as the burden-bearer of last resort, as the main security broker in key regions. And they’re playing off against that. … So … the Russians can be friends with the Iranians and the Saudis, the Kurds, the Turks, and the Iraqis. They can bring the Sunni opposition groups and also sit down and talk to Hezbollah. And why is that? It’s because they’re not—no one’s ultimately counting on them to produce outcomes as a broker, you know. … [F]undamentally, it is the presence of the United States that allows Russia to play that kind of role. If the U.S. disappeared tomorrow and Russia were thrust into a similar role, Moscow’s job of policy planning and strategy would get a heck of a lot harder because they would have to deal with the contradictions and tensions that we’re forced to struggle with on a regular basis.   (Interview with The Wilson Center, 05.16.18)
  • [Putin] would like to essentially reconstitute the sphere of influence that was in the Soviet Union...he is perfectly prepared, as we saw in both Georgia and Ukraine, to use military force to advance this objective. But that means Central Asia, it means the caucuses, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and it means Eastern Europe. It means members of NATO who he believes rightly belong in the Russian sphere of influence. And I have to say he has done a very good job of kicking up dust about NATO expansions, saying you made me do this. (Interview with Charlie Rose, 08.10.17)

China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?

  • These [threats] fall into two categories. The first emanate from other countries, specifically the major powers: There is China’s long-term strategy to dominate the fastest-growing part of the world, to make the global economy adjust to its brand of authoritarian capitalism, and above all to put pressure on free and open economic and political models. And there is Russia’s pursuit of a related strategy to spread neo-fascist ideology and destabilize Western democracies. (The Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2019)


  • [T]he positions Donald Trump was taking on the issues, all of which were publicly known and available positions, walking back the Article V guarantee, talking about how Russia could have Crimea, saying that, you know, America's no better than Russia on human rights and killing journalists, on down the line. All of that was disturbing to me. (Interview with the House Intelligence Committee, 12.21.17)
  • The United States’ policy toward the Ukraine during this period was to essentially say it’s up to Ukraine. If Ukraine wants to pursue an association agreement with the European Union and get on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration, that's their right. If Ukraine decides they don't want to do that, that’s their right, too. Our view was that the U.S. shouldn’t be at the center of that negotiation. That really should be a negotiation, first of all, among the Ukrainian people and their government, and then secondly between Ukraine and Europe. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • We had strong suspicion from the moment that masked men with guns and uniforms, even if they didn't have the insignia on them, showed up in Crimea, that they were Russian. But this was not something that we’d ever seen before. … Ultimately, our response was to begin to impose a series of sanctions on individuals and entities linked to Crimea and to begin to open a dialogue with the Russian government that basically said we're going to have to increase the pressure and increase the amount of sanctions if you're not prepared, essentially, to find an exit ramp from this situation and de-escalate and ultimately pull your forces back. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • The debate over the use of defensive weapons, primarily anti-tank weapons, the deployment of those to Ukrainian forces essentially came down to a basic question: If we do that, are we more likely to deter further Russian escalation or more likely to invite further Russian escalation by doing that? … I ultimately supported the provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine, but I understood the counterargument. I think this debate over whether the United States should or should not have provided lethal weapons to the Ukrainians crystallizes this core challenge about escalation. Is the United States ultimately prepared to go as far as the Russians are prepared to go in a country like Ukraine? And if the answer to that question is no, then that has a big impact on our policy. (PBS, 06.22.17)
  • Russia is playing the role of arsonist while masquerading as the firefighter. So we've demonstrated that the costs will only mount if Russia continues its destabilizing behavior. We've already expanded our sanctions, targeting not just individuals but crony-linked firms and banks, as well as Russia's high-tech defense industry. I know that there are those who would like us to do more and faster, but it's hard to deny the economic hit Russia has taken. Its markets are down. Its grow[th] forecasts are down. The ruble is down. The world knows that Russia is not a very good bet right now. Of course Russia has not ceased its illegal intervention and provocative actions so we must be prepared to impose still greater costs. Beyond Ukraine, there's the larger question of how to handle Putin's Russia and the threat that it poses to the post-Soviet space and beyond. (Speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 05.01.14)
  • Short-term political, economic and security measures are simply not enough. Ukraine will only succeed in charting its own course if it can shrug off the yoke of corruption and push back against the anti-democratic forces that have held it back for so long. That will require a long-term commitment across the board—from the Ukrainians themselves, first and foremost, but also from American or European partners. And we're committed to that. And as we pursue these lines of effort on Ukraine, we have to keep our eye on the bigger picture—a strong trans-Atlantic community, a revitalized NATO, deeper trade and investment ties, European energy security and further steps along the path of a Europe whole and free. (Speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 05.01.14)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

  • From early on in the Bush administration, but particularly advancing in the period where you saw revolutions in Ukraine, revolutions in Georgia, the Freedom Agenda of the Bush administration in its second term, Putin started to worry increasingly that the entire design and focus of U.S. foreign policy was at the end of the day about unseating him in Russia and about undermining Russian security more broadly in the region. (PBS, 06.22.17)

Photo by Ellen Wallop/Asia Society shared under a Creative Commons license. 


Thomas Schaffner

Thomas Schaffner is a graduate student at Harvard University and a student associate with Russia Matters.


Daniel Shapiro

Daniel Shapiro is a recent graduate of Harvard University and a current associate with Russia Matters.


Aleksandra Srdanovic

Aleksandra Srdanovic is a graduate student at Harvard University.