Four years ago, on Feb. 24, 2022, Russian tanks rolled across the Russia-Ukraine border as Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Experts including George Beebe of the Quincy Institute believe that at that time, Putin was aiming to demonstrate to NATO and the West what Russia’s role in the European security order “ought to look like,” while others, such as Angela Stent of the American Enterprise Institute believe that Putin’s goals included a regime change in Kyiv, with the subjugation of Ukraine. Four years in, multiple Western experts concur with Stent that Putin has not achieved that goal. According to Max Bergmann and Maria Snegovaya of CSIS, however, Putin still believes that Russia is winning the war of attrition—and that, eventually, “it can overpower and outlast Ukraine.” If this duo is correct in their assessment of Putin’s calculations, then that could explain why some of their fellow scholars believe Russia’s engagement in the negotiations with Ukraine is not genuine. The University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer, writing this month, argues “there is no way you can negotiate a genuine peace settlement to this conflict,” and calls the current peace negotiations “basically Kabuki Theater.” The Economist’s Editorial Board is skeptical that any peace plan will “satisfy Russia.” Last but not least, James Gilmore, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said “the objectives of Russia and Ukraine are so diametrically opposed that it's not realistic to expect a breakthrough.”

Below you can find a compilation of mostly Western experts’ views structured as answers to five Russia-Ukraine-war-related questions Russia Matters staff have formulated. Some of these views have been expressed exclusively to Russia Matters via interviews, but most have been sourced by RM staff from recent publications.¹ 

1. What do you see as Putin’s ultimate goal regarding the war in Ukraine? Has that shifted in the course of the war? If yes, why and how? If no, why not?

• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “Putin’s primary goal was to prevent Ukraine’s incorporation into the NATO alliance and end a deepening military partnership between the United States and Ukraine.  His secondary goals included protecting compatriots living in eastern and southern Ukraine, recovering formerly Russian territory, replacing a perceived ethno-nationalist regime in Kyiv, and putting a decisive end to a US-centric global order. At no point did he hope to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine.  His primary goals have not changed, and his pursuit of the secondary goals will depend on his estimation of which he can achieve at reasonable cost.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.13.26) 
• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “This war in Ukraine did not really have its origins in a Russian effort to capture territory in Ukraine, a Russian effort to extend its empire, to rebuild the Soviet Union, [it was] not fundamentally a war of territorial aggrandizement. Really this war began as a geopolitical clash between the United States and NATO on the one hand, and Russia on the other over what the European security order ought to look like, what Russia’ s role in the order ought to be, and what Ukraine’s place ought to be. And this of course is also connected to a debate over the broader global order.” (Quincy Institute, 02.20.26)
• Nikolas Gvosdev, senior fellow for national security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute: “Ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, Putin has been consistent in what he "wants" from Ukraine: a government in Kyiv that is receptive to Russian interests. These include a Ukraine that does not deploy NATO infrastructure or personnel on its territory, does not compromise Russia's power projection capabilities into the Black Sea and the larger Mediterranean area, that does not obstruct Russia's ability to reach larger global markets, and most importantly, a Ukraine that does not put up barriers to separate itself from a larger Russian world space. What has changed over the years are the tactics.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Sumantra Maitra, senior fellow at the Center for Renewing America: “Vladimir Putin miscalculated Ukrainian resolve when he started the conflict, but now that he is in, he wants two things. One, to keep Ukraine out of NATO. … His second aim is to have a grand bargain with the U.S. and have a disunited European continent.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Kevin Ryan, visiting professor at Kyiv School of Economics and former Belfer Center senior fellow: “We may not know exactly when Russian President Vladimir Putin formed his world view that led him to wage war in Ukraine, but we know he had begun forming that view by 2007 when he spoke at the Munich Security Conference. One grievance which rang loud and clear then was NATO’s eastward expansion. Nearly two decades later in 2026, when Putin demands that any peace deal in Ukraine address the ‘root causes’ of the war, he most certainly includes NATO expansion. … [T]he fact is that Putin has seen his opponent as the U.S. and NATO from the very start. So, it should be no surprise that Putin’s ‘ultimate goal’ has more to do with breaking NATO and the U.S. than with breaking Ukraine.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.12.26) 
• Angela Stent, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute: “Putin, however, has made it altogether clear in his writings and speeches that his goal all along has been to subjugate Ukraine and install a Russia-aligned regime, because he does not believe that Ukraine has a right to exist as an independent country. To Putin, the Donbas territorial question is incidental to this but a good way to keep Trump and Witkoff busy.” (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)
• Angela Stent, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute: “When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s immediate aim was regime change in Kyiv and Ukraine’s subjugation to Russian domination. But Putin had much broader goals too. He viewed victory over Ukraine as the first step in undoing the post-Cold-War order which had deprived Russia of its Soviet republics and sphere of influence in Eastern Europe….Moscow’s victory over Kyiv would, he is convinced, start the process of dismantling an international order that he believes has ignored Russia’s national interests and belittled its position in the world.” (Brookings, 02.04.25)

2. Looking back, what you think of Putin’s decision to up the ante and stage full-fledged invasion of Ukraine – was it a strategic blunder or...? If one were to think in terms of cost-benefit, is the war a net loss or a net gain for Putin’s Russia and why?

• Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt: “By all reasonable standards, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a massive strategic failure. After four years and at the cost of substantially more than 1 million Russian casualties, Moscow controls slightly less than 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine, of which it already conquered 7 percent when it grabbed Crimea and the eastern Donbas in 2014. But Putin is in no mood to concede failure and accept a ceasefire. He’s counting on his army to succeed where it has failed so far, on the Trump administration to pressure Kyiv into accepting Russia’s core demands, and on the Europeans to get tired of the war and stop supporting Ukraine. As of now, none of Putin’s three avenues forward looks likely to succeed.” (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)
• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “It became a strategic blunder once Russia’s bid to seize Kyiv in a lightning strike failed.  Had this succeeded, many of the strategic downsides of a long war – including deepened dependence on China and a profound alienation of Europe – would have been less severe.  Four years of war, however, have resulted in an expanded NATO alliance, a major European remilitarization effort, a crippling of Russia’s ability to compete in an increasingly high-tech global economic arena, and a legacy of mistrust of Russia in the United States and Europe that poses genuine risks to strategic stability and will take many years to repair.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.13.26) 
• The Economist: “Vladimir Putin is caught in a vice of his own making. The chances are waning that his armies in Ukraine will produce something he can call victory…. His greatest hope may be that Ukraine, suffering grave manpower and equipment shortages of its own, will undergo a political crisis or begin to run out of fighters and weapons before Russia does. Yet Mr. Putin’s bet on a Ukrainian collapse has been a losing one for the past four years—and the odds are lengthening … Mr. Putin cannot give up the war, but the cost of carrying it on is rising. If his attempts to generate more combat strength only hollow out Russia further, that could lead to a crisis. If it doesn’t, Ukraine and Russia will be trapped in conflict.” (The Economist, 02.19.26)
• Kevin Ryan, visiting professor at Kyiv School of Economics and former Belfer Center senior fellow: “Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, in order to begin creating the buffer zone with the West, was a strategic blunder: a mistake that key Russians criticized even before it happened. For example, Retired Russian General Leonid Ivashov declared before the actual invasion, “The use of military force against Ukraine, first, would call into question the existence of Russia itself as a state; second, it will forever make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies. Thirdly, there will be thousands (tens of thousands) of dead young, healthy guys on one side and on the other, which will certainly affect the future demographic situation in our dying countries.” Ivashov’s prediction has largely proven true.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.12.26) 

3. When thinking which side is “winning” in the Russia-Ukraine war and what criteria should one use to ascertain that?

• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “Each side has achieved its primary goals. Ukraine will almost certainly survive as an independent state, albeit with less territory than before the invasion, a far smaller population, and major damage to its infrastructure.  Russia will prevent NATO from incorporating Ukraine and putting combat forces and infrastructure on Ukrainian territory.  Should the war continue for an extended period without a compromise settlement, Russia’s advantages in manpower and military production will increasingly undermine Ukraine’s ability to field effective forces and defend against air, missile, and drone strikes, eventually forcing it to sue for peace.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.13.26) 
• Max Bergmann and Maria Snegovaya of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS: “In short, Russia believes it is winning the war of attrition—and that it can overpower and outlast Ukraine. Should Russia conclude that it cannot fully “win” and that destroying Ukraine’s military and toppling Ukraine’s democracy is impossible, that does not mean that Moscow will sue for peace. Instead, a next-best option for Russia is likely a forever war, waged at a lower, more sustainable intensity, that would prevent Ukraine from joining the European Union or NATO. This means that the prospects of the Kremlin seeking any diplomatic breakthroughs are extremely low. The West needs to operate accordingly.” (CSIS, 09.30.25)
• Kevin Ryan, visiting professor at Kyiv School of Economics and former Belfer Center senior fellow: “Despite Putin’s strategic blunder, the Russian military is achieving tactical and operational successes. But those successes are not likely to balance out the strategic losses Russia has suffered: new NATO members Finland and Sweden, increased European defense spending, an economy overly dependent on military manufacturing, energy and financial sanctions, etc. As Chinese military strategist Sun Tsu declared 2500 years ago, 'There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.’” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.12.26) 

4. Do you think the sides can agree to a lasting ceasefire this year? How about a peace deal and what it’d look like?

• Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, fellow at Brookings Institution: “A ceasefire deal could conceivably emerge by this summer, in time for the July 7-8 NATO summit in Ankara, but it is unlikely to be brokered by Turkey. Much will hinge on how far Putin is willing to go in accepting the postwar security arrangements between Ukraine and the West. Territory also matters, of course. Russia’s slow advance in Donetsk can also allow Putin to claim some form of pyrrhic victory. After having ruined and conquered many of the major population centers in Donbas in a grinding war that has already cost too many lives, Moscow may conclude it is time to talk.” (Brookings, 02.17.26)
• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “If the United States has fundamentally altered its views of what Europe’s security order ought to look like… and has already decided that the unipolar moment… is already off the table. Then that in turn suggests that the possibilities for agreement, some sort of compromise, to end the war in Ukraine is possible. And here I think we have a situation where all parties actually have an incentive to try to find a compromise. (Quincy Institute, 02.20.26)
• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “The sides are unlikely to agree to a ceasefire without a broader peace settlement, as Russia has no incentives to allow Ukraine a respite in which to rebuild its forces.  But both sides each have strong incentives to find a compromise soon. Absent détente with the United States, Moscow will be uncomfortably dependent on China, and the Russians cannot solve their broader security problems with the West simply by conquering territory in Ukraine.  For Ukraine, a compromise could open a path toward European Union membership, economic reconstruction, and Western security assurances.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.13.26) 
• Max Bergmann and Maria Segovaya, of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS: “As of September 2025, Russia’s war in Ukraine has dragged on for three and a half years. Despite nine months of efforts by the United States to end the fighting, there remains no end in sight. Despite mounting economic, military-industrial, and demographic strains, the war remains sustainable for the Kremlin in the foreseeable future. Russia continues to believe it is winning the war of attrition and can eventually overpower and outlast Ukraine. (CSIS, 09.30.25)
• The Economist: “In fact, any peace plan is unlikely to satisfy Russia. The talks have a Potemkin quality, illustrated by the preposterous promise of a $12trn peace dividend, much of it to be shared between Russia and America. They are also unlikely to give Mr. Putin the territory he has been unable to take by force and which he wants in order to declare victory.” (The Economist, 02.19.26)
• James Gilmore, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: “In my view, the objectives of Russia and Ukraine are so diametrically opposed that it's not realistic to expect a breakthrough." (Radio Free Europe, 02.21.26)
• Sumantra Maitra, senior fellow at the Center for Renewing America: “Ukraine should at least consider the current boundaries as the international line of demarcation. Both sides should decide on a day of cessation of fighting, and then pull troops back five miles essentially creating a demarcation zone similar to the Korean War. Then negotiations can continue. The American side should threaten to walk away if that doesn't happen.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Owen Matthews, associate editor of The Spectator: “Despite Trump’s claim that Putin is ready to end the war, there is as yet no sign of any newfound spirit of compromise from the Russian side … On the practical side, it appears a 20-point peace plan that Kyiv and Brussels have been pushing – their attempt to supersede the 28-point document Washington had hammered out with Dmitriyev and Umerov – is going nowhere … The timeline of a final peace deal is uncertain – there are too many variables, too much noise. But the deal’s rough outline – territorial losses for Kyiv plus some kind of security guarantees from the West – is clear.” (The Spectator, 02.17.26)
• John Mearsheimer, R. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago: “There is no way you can negotiate a genuine peace settlement to this conflict. What you see taking place in these negotiations in places like Geneva is basically Kabuki Theater – its going nowhere. This war is going to be settled on the battlefield, and then you’ll get negotiations that lead to some sort of armistice, which means a frozen conflict moving forward…both sides have demands that are light-years apart…and neither side is willing to compromise…there’s no bargaining space.” (Quincy Institute, 02.20.26)
• Nicolai Petro, professor at the University of Rhode Island and Senior Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy: “Putin’s peace terms have been consistent since the outbreak of the war. They are: 1) a neutral and non-nuclear Ukraine that is not part of any military alliance; 2) a demilitarized Ukraine; 3) a denazified Ukraine. Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia is non-negotiable for Russia, though this need not be formally recognized by Ukraine, so long as it withdraws its troops from these regions.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Sergey Radchenko, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: “There are two issues here that lead to dramatically different interpretations of what Putin is after. One is that Putin is basically interested in the Donbas, and if the Ukrainians abandon the territory, then the war will end in some sort of a ceasefire. But there’s another interpretation. That is, Putin wants not just the territory but political control of Ukraine itself. In this sense, until he actually reaches that point, he will not end the war.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Sergey Radchenko, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: “Ukrainians have put too much faith in a promise of Western security guarantees. The West has not been willing to put boots on the ground to fight the Russians. And to imagine it’ll be willing to do that in the future is folly. I don’t see the United States guaranteeing anything at all, although Trump has been talking about NATO Article 5-style guarantees. I find it hard to believe it would be credible.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Sergey Radchenko, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: “So, what can actually guarantee Ukraine’s security? The answer is Ukraine’s own military. In the Istanbul talks back in 2022, the sticking point was what kind of army would Ukraine be allowed to have post-conflict. The Russians have been trying to restrict it because they know that is the real guarantee of Ukraine’s security.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• Kevin Ryan, visiting professor at Kyiv School of Economics and former Belfer Center senior fellow: “How will this war end? The good news is that Russia and Ukraine are once again at the negotiating table. The bad news is that the current situation on the battlefield does not give Ukraine leverage to force a ceasefire, and the people of Ukraine need a ceasefire more than the people of Russia. The most encouraging sign for an end to the war is that Russia finally has the opponent it wants at the table – the U.S. The U.S. has significant influence in this situation. It can dangle sanctions relief, investment opportunities, normalized relations and more in exchange for Russian agreement to end the war. In fact, the U.S. and Russia have been talking openly about such steps. From the beginning Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has done a remarkable job keeping Ukraine’s interests on the table. At times he has clearly shifted President Trump’s thinking. But ultimately, the current U.S. administration is more interested in an end to the war than what kind of end. The question for Ukraine will be whether they will accept the terms supported by the U.S. and Russia. The conflict in Ukraine is a battle within Putin’s larger war with the West – a war that many in the U.S. administration don’t believe exists. A ceasefire could give relief to Ukraine but it will not end Russia’s war against the West. It will only shift the battlefield.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.12.26)
• Mykhailo Soldatenko, attorney in Ukraine and New York and doctoral student at Harvard Law School: “U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated desire to negotiate an end to the war—combined with Ukraine’s apparent readiness to consider potential talks with Russia—makes an armistice or ceasefire a realistic scenario in 2025… Bearing in mind Russia’s strategic objectives, simplistic “land for peace” proposals are unlikely to lead to a permanent cessation of hostilities as they are directed at Moscow’s secondary, not primary, interests… Considering that Russia launched its full-scale invasion in blatant disregard of the Minsk Agreements, there is a strong argument that an armistice would just give Russia time to rearm and plan another attack. Therefore, in any renewed negotiations Kyiv and its partners should focus on two issues: security commitments and a ceasefire management framework.” (Carnegie Endowment, 02.10.25)
• Angela Stent, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute: “So far, we see little sign that the Trump administration is willing to apply any pressure on Putin. Since the start of negotiations, Putin has intensified the bombardment of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and other civilian targets. This brutal war will only stop when he no longer believes he can win. And that would require the United States, along with Europe, to ratchet up direct and indirect sanctions on Russia’s energy sector and intensify the pursuit of its shadow tanker fleet, depriving the Kremlin of the needed revenues to continue the war. A sanctions bill with overwhelming bipartisan support has been languishing in the U.S. Senate for months, awaiting Trump’s permission to hold a vote. Unless we see these and other changes in Washington, the war could continue for the foreseeable future." (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)
• Olga Usenko, Ukrainian legal market analyst: “The war in Ukraine could end in several ways, but the implications of these outcomes for sovereignty, stability, and the European and global security order vary widely. Historical models show that outcomes which erode agency, concede territory without credible guarantees, or rely on weak deterrence tend to perpetuate long-term vulnerability. Conversely, settlements anchored in strong external commitments and preserved sovereignty tend to produce more durable equilibria. At the same time, the analysis underscores the vulnerability of any settlement that depends disproportionately on sustained U.S. engagement, particularly given signals of strategic retrenchment and political variability. This reinforces the need for a more European-led, institutionalized security architecture, capable of providing durable guarantees even as U.S. commitments fluctuate … Ukraine’s future security trajectory and its place within the Euro-Atlantic architecture will be determined by the strategic quality of peace, not merely the cessation of hostilities. The decisive question is not when the war ends, but what kind of order follows it.” (Small Wars Journal, 12.22.25)
• Kurt Volker, former Special Representative for Ukraine: "These negotiations are not going to go anywhere." (Radio Free Europe, 02.21.26)
• Jack Watling, senior research fellow at RUSI: “Showing Russia that Ukraine can sustain its resistance while expanding the costs on the Kremlin is the only path towards a settlement on durable terms…. Under current conditions, however, it is more dangerous in both Kyiv and the Kremlin to stop fighting… The Russians, meanwhile, are maintaining a maximalist position. The Russians believe they can sustain the war into 2027 and perceive the ongoing process of negotiations as a vehicle for driving a wedge into the transatlantic alliance… Europe is rearming, but it is taking time, such that many European states feel a sudden ceasefire on unfavorable terms would expose the continent to grave risks. The White House wants a ceasefire quickly to pave the path towards renewed economic engagement with Russia … The US and EU are therefore diametrically opposed in their objectives ... Russia is likely able to maintain its current rate of recruitment, despite the punishing rate of casualties inflicted by Ukrainian fires, although a higher proportion of those brought into the force are mobilized reservists or coerced rather than volunteers. If Russia is making steady or accelerating gains the Kremlin will sustain the effort. If progress slows significantly, Putin’s perception of his prospects may shift as political risks at home expand." (RUSI, 02.23.26)
• Andriy Zagorodnyuk, chairman of the Centre for Defense Strategies and a former Ukrainian defense minister: “Russia’s war against Ukraine has consistently defied expectations … Today, a new expectation is taking hold: The war is ripe for a negotiated settlement… But like other expectations before it, this one rests on a misunderstanding of the war’s underlying dynamics. The central issue is not just the balance on the battlefield. Rather, it is the nature of the Russian regime and the war’s rapidly changing character … Ending the war without achieving its strategic objectives would directly threaten Putin’s regime… There are no realistic indications that the Kremlin is remotely willing to abandon its goal of subjugating Ukraine, nor is there any trust that Russia would uphold its commitments.” (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)

5. How has the experience of Ukraine reshaped global thinking about deterrence, especially for Taiwan, Baltics and other frontline regions facing revisionist authoritarian powers?

• George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute: “Unfortunately, Russia’s invasion has deepened the conviction in the West that diplomatic engagement with adversaries is tantamount to appeasement and is counterproductive.  The notion that some conflicts arise from the “security dilemma” – defensive measures perceived by others as threatening – has been lost in Western discourse about the war.  A compromise settlement could resurrect the concept of “indivisibility of security,” a principle enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and Charter of Paris that has received too little attention in the West but is central to a pragmatic balance between deterrence and diplomacy over such matters as Taiwan and the Baltics.” (Exclusively interviewed by RM staff on 02.13.26) 
• Chrystia Freeland, economic advisor to the President of Ukraine, former deputy prime minister of Canada and senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: “Russia is formidable. Russia is menacing, but come on, Ukraine has an economy the size of Nebraska. And for nearly four years, Ukraine has basically held doff Russia by itself… So I would say to Europeans, come on, guys, the Russian economy is the size of the Italian or Canadian economies…Europe is significantly dependent on the United States, but its not that dependent. And if the Ukrainians can hold off Russia, surely the Europeans would be able to do it too.” (Financial Times, 02.19.26)
• Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at Chatham House: “Since 2022, Russia’s war, covert operations in Europe, and demands for a larger sphere of influence have focused attention on a possible Russian attack on a NATO member. If Europe is better prepared for this contingency today, it is primarily due to the efforts of a small band of front-line states urgently improving their own defenses, rather than the European hinterland seeking to catch up… The three Baltic states and Poland are investing heavily in border fortifications, drawing on lessons from Ukraine that Russian forces must be slowed at the start of any incursion. All four, plus Finland, have withdrawn from the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines (which Russia never signed), gaining an additional tool to delay Russian movement … Europe as a whole has not stepped up. Its security in the short and medium term will rely on coalitions of the willing and able.” (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)
• Philip H. Gordon, Sydney Stein, Jr. Scholar at Brookings Institution: “There is little reason to believe any guarantees offered by the Trump administration [to Ukraine] would in fact be credible … President Donald Trump has questioned even NATO’s formal Article 5 mutual defense guarantee, saying it ‘has many definitions’ and only applies to allies that ‘pay their bills’ … With no consensus to support actual NATO membership for Ukraine, some have talked about “NATO-like” guarantees for Ukraine, but the guarantees in question are not “like” NATO’s Article 5, which is backed up by a treaty, an integrated military command, forward-deployed U.S. troops, and a long history. Credible U.S. security guarantees from Trump are not really on the table. The best way to make Ukraine secure is to help it build and maintain credible deterrent forces of its own.” (Brookings, 02.17.26)
• Anna Grzymała-Busse, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings Institution: “While their views differ on aid to Ukraine and the extent of the Russia threat, Eastern and Central Europe states agree that the United States is an indispensable partner, even if an increasingly unstable (and even infuriating) one. NATO, led by the United States, remains the only game in town… There is much greater agreement about the United States (unstable) and NATO (indispensable) … yet despite the seething criticisms and anxiety about American reliability and trustworthiness, no alternative exists for the foreseeable future.” (Brookings, 02.17.26)
• Sumantra Maitra, senior fellow at the Center for Renewing America: “The rules-based order was never orderly, nor rules based, and we are now back in a world of imperialism, spheres, conquests, and great powers. That is a result of structural realities, such as multipolarity, relative power gap between powers, tech advancement and offense dominated battlespace, and surplus elites having no jobs, fueling populism.” (Responsible Statecraft, 02.23.26)
• C. Raja Mohan, distinguished professor at O.P. Jindal Global University's Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies: “The fear of abandonment by the United States is nudging allies and partners to beef up their own defense capabilities and explore greater collaboration, whether with or without Washington conducting the Eurasian orchestra. Each in his own way, Biden and Trump have accelerated the emergence of an increasingly interconnected Eurasian geopolitical theater …Europe is also rebooting security partnerships with major Asian partners … A shift in Washington’s strategy and the prospect of improved U.S. ties with Russia and China will increase the incentive for deeper cooperation between Europe and Asia.” (Foreign Policy, 02.20.26)

Photo: Floodlights shine over the graves of the fallen soldiers as people lit candles on the eve of the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion in Lviv, Ukraine, Monday, Feb. 23, 2026. (AP Photo/Mykola Tys) 

The opinions expressed in herein are solely those of the individuals quoted.