I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

“The ABCs of Russian Military Power: A Primer for the New Administration,” Michael Kofman, The National Interest, 02.02.17: The author, a specialist in security issues in Russia and the former Soviet Union, writes that Russia’s military turnaround “is not a temporary bounce.” Russia’s firepower is concentrated in its ground force. It can react quickly and establish superiority in the event of “any contingency on its borders,” but its lack of an operational reserve means that it cannot “occupy large amounts of land or replace combat losses in offensive operations.” However, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria have shown that “at current readiness levels [Russia] is more than sufficient to take on any former Soviet Republic on its borders, and even engage a peer adversary like NATO in a short-term high-intensity fight.” While the U.S. and Russia are matched and competitive in terms of nuclear power and cyber capabilities, Russia’s lack of allies is a weakness. The U.S. therefore needs to concentrate on getting a better sense of itself and figuring out what it wants from Russia in order to negotiate from strength. Reestablishing credibility as an ally that is able and willing to meet its commitments is also necessary. “Today, Moscow … may treat any U.S. diplomatic efforts as negotiating from a position of necessity much more so than strength. That should not be a discouragement from pursuing diplomacy, but it is an unfortunate reality any policymaker must deal with.” For the new U.S. administration, strength and credibility should be part of a larger coherent strategy for dealing with Moscow.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

•  No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Why Russia Might Not Want a Deal with Trump,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 01.31.17: The author, a scholar of U.S.-Russia relations, writes that Harvard professor Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” is a useful way of thinking about foreign policy decisionmaking. Putnam's idea argues that world leaders are constrained on the international stage and in their negotiations with other leaders by their domestic political systems. While there has been little to suggest objections from Moscow to a rapprochement, there are powerful players in Russia’s foreign policy who “might mitigate against any rapid shift in relations.” In addition, Russia has “learned to live with” Western sanctions, had some economic recovery and successfully privatized part of Rosneft, strengthening the argument of “those arguing against making any premature concessions or capitulations to the Americans.”

“What Vladimir Putin Could Explain to Donald Trump,” Jack Matlock, Jackmatlock.com, 01.31.17: The author, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, hopes that Russian President Vladimir Putin can help sway U.S. President Donald Trump away from some of the stances he took during his election campaign. In particular, Putin could steer Trump towards supporting the Iran deal and advise Trump on fighting terrorism without attacking Islam and Muslims. The author argues that while sanctions are doing more harm than good, Russia needs to end the conflict in Ukraine for its own sake. The author calls on the two leaders to cooperate on non-proliferation and to approach problems facing both nations with “a spirit of common purpose rather than of rivalry.”

“Give Trump a Chance With Putin to Make a Case for Cooperation,” David S. Foglesong, The Star-Ledger, 02.06.17: The author, a professor of history, writes that “a poisonous fog of paranoia and hysteria clouds Russian-American relations even as presidents Trump and Putin have expressed interest in cooperation.” While the grievances of both sides are grounded in reality, they have been over-inflated and exaggerated to the point where they obstruct real opportunities for strategic collaboration. While Putin can work with Trump while paying little mind to domestic backlash, Trump faces more difficult prospects. The author highlights the actions former leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev took to end “Cold War I” amidst similarly heightened tensions. Trump needs to “vigorously make the case for cooperation,” because when the U.S. and Russia work together, many things can be achieved.

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary.

China:

• No significant commentary. 

Ukraine:

“The Ukraine-Russia Conflict: A Way Forward,” Matthew Rojansky, The National Interest, 02.01.17: The author, director of the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center, writes that “the future stability and prosperity of Donbas, Ukraine and Europe still rests with the difficult task of managing and resolving the conflict through negotiations among the key actors involved.” Per the lessons taught by World War I and II, security in Europe should be of particular interest to the U.S. The increasing economic and humanitarian costs of the Russia-Ukraine conflict should also be of concern, as should Ukraine’s sovereignty. The conflict’s resolution would be in the interest of U.S. relations with both Ukraine and Russia. As a leading actor in the response to Russia’s military intervention, the U.S. needs peaceful resolution of the conflict in order to preserve “a broad range of mutual interests” with Russia. The U.S. should continue to play a central role in the conflict’s management: “It is lack of trust, combined with uncertain political will, that has delayed any decision on a new ‘road map’ for implementing Minsk II.” This is where Washington can help, such as by suggesting that “each step of a new road map” be overseen by “capable third parties.” The U.S. can also increase Moscow’s incentives to follow through with the new road map by “linking each step to specific sanctions relief.” Total cessation of violence is also imperative. A “special status law” for the Donbas region is necessary before free and fair elections can occur. This will lay the groundwork for rebuilding infrastructure, reestablishing economic life and resettling the region. An end to the “‘zero sum’ narrative in and around Ukraine” is also vital for long-term conflict management. “Washington should have no illusions that Russia will abandon its newly acquired territory, nor that Ukraine will accept nominal financial payment or other compensation to surrender its legitimate and sovereign rights.” Instead, the U.S. will likely pursue “long-term nonrecognition” with regards to Crimea. While the likelihood of the conflict’s resolution is low, Washington needs to stay aware of opportunities for resolution due to what is at stake: U.S. interests, relations with Russia and Europe and global security.

“The Flare-Up in Ukraine is Not Just About Putin,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.02.17: The author, a journalist, writes that the recent flare up in eastern Ukraine is due to both Moscow and Kiev trying to achieve their political goals in a world recently shaken up by U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy approach. The fighting is not a major military push by Russia, but rather Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to gauge the West’s reaction to renewed fighting. If the reaction is weak, he will “try to provoke Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko into a rash military advance.” Poroshenko, on the other hand, is seeking to keep the West sympathetic to Ukraine. The fighting in Avdiivka makes this an inopportune time for Trump to lift sanctions on Russia, something Poroshenko dearly wants to prevent. However, for Putin, establishing a pro-Russian government in Kiev is of more importance than removing sanctions. While a military strike without popular support in Ukraine would be risky, “a retaliatory strike and subsequent withdrawal, like in Georgia in 2008, would be quite a different matter,” allowing the Ukrainian political balance to shift in a less anti-Russian direction. Where Poroshenko has backed himself into a corner with a position that rejects any possibility of compromise with Moscow, Putin can afford to wait for “the desperate Ukrainian president to go too far in trying to enlist Western support.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Decline, Not Collapse: The Bleak Prospects for Russia’s Economy,” Andrey Movchan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02.02.17: The author, a senior researcher with the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes that Russia’s economy in 2017 should hold neither positive nor negative surprises. In the coming years, Russia’s banking system will be “the weakest link” in its economy, but other vulnerable parts “could also experience catastrophic changes.” The Kremlin has chosen short-term solutions for managing its economy over long-term development. Restrictions to “capital flow abroad” could be possible, but unlikely to occur before Russia’s 2018 presidential elections. Public opinion shows that future changes to the economy will likely “make economic transactions in the country less sophisticated and more inefficient.” Although the near future looks like “a case of managed decline,” there remains “a smaller possibility of a more serious economic breakdown or collapse.”

“How Can Russia Reverse its Negative Demographic Trend?” Pavel Aptekar, The Moscow Times/Vedomosti, 02.01.17: The author, a historian, writes that there is some good news regarding Russia’s demographics. The birthrate in Russia has risen between 2007 and 2015 from 1.42 children per woman to 1.77, higher than Europe’s 1.58. The maternity capital program, which provided monetary incentives for couples to have more children, did cause more families to have a second child, according to a study by the Higher School of Economics. However, the program “did not change the entrenched Russian preference for smaller rather than larger families.” The number of women of childbearing age is also in decline, with today’s 12.3 million 18 to 30 year old women dropping to 10.5 million in 2020, and falling further thereafter. The study concludes “that only an increase in targeted support” can help the government’s demographic policies succeed.

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.