Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

June 9, 2026, update:¹ 

Data from Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group indicates that in the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) Russian forces endured a net loss of 1 square mile. In comparison, the previous four-week period (April 14–May 12, 2026) saw Russia make a net gain of 41 square miles. In the past week (June 2–9), Russian armed forces made a net gain of 6 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, according to DeepState, an increase over the reported loss of 10 square miles the previous week (May 26–June 2, 2026). In addition, DeepState reported in its daily map updates that Russian armed forces advanced near or in eight settlements during the June 2–9, 2026, period, while Ukrainian forces were not reported by DS to have made advances in that time.² In contrast, RM’s analysis of ISW’s data for the past four weeks (May 12–June 9, 2026) indicates that Russia lost a net of 91 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, and during the past week (June 2–9, 2026), lost 10 square miles of Ukrainian territory.³

Territorial Control (figures as of June 9, 2026)⁴

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and change in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory

Russian net territorial gains in Ukraine by month, May 2022–May 2026 (Based on data from DeepState; click here for an interactive version of this chart).

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–May 2026 (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War; click here for an interactive version of this chart). 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

• 1,000,000 Russian military casualties (killed and wounded), according to a late February 2026 estimate that a highly-informed former high-ranking Western official shared with RM.⁷
• 250,000-300,000 Ukrainian military casualties (killed and wounded), according to a late February 2026 estimate that a highly-informed former high-ranking Western official shared with RM.⁸

Civilian fatalities⁹

• Russia: 8,012 “peaceful residents... killed,” according to RF government.
• Ukraine:n 15,578 “Ukrainian civilians,” killed according to the U.N.

Military vehicles and equipment¹⁰

• Russia:¹¹
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 14,044.¹²
  • Aircraft: 380.¹³
  • Naval vessels: 29.
• Ukraine:¹⁴
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,884.¹⁵
  • Aircraft: 200.
  • Naval vessels: 42.

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions¹⁶

In May 2026:

• Russia launched
  • 9,539 drones
  • 32 ballistic missiles
  • 122 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 8,885 drones
  • 1 ballistic missile
  • 91 cruise missiles

Since September 2022:

• Russia launched
  • 109,434 drones
  • 1,001 ballistic missiles
  • 4,977 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 83,240 drones
  • 196 ballistic missiles
  • 3,576 cruise missiles

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • Internally displaced: 23,000, including 3,419 in the Kursk region.
  • 1,000,000 (0.7% of Russia’s 2022 population) left Russia for economic or political reasons in the first year of the full-scale war. Between 15% and 45% of those who had left have returned since then, so, between 550,000 and 850,000 people have not returned to Russia.
• Ukraine: 9,600,000 displaced Ukrainians, 22% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44,000,000, including:
  • Internally displaced: 3,700,000. 
  • International refugees: 5,900,000.

Economic impact¹⁷

• Russia’s cumulative economic growth in 2022–2025: 8%.
  • 1.1% GDP growth in 2025.
  • Budget deficit for 2025: 2.6% of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01389 U.S. dollars. +18% since the invasion.¹⁸
  • 3-year bond yield: 13.8%.
• Ukraine’s cumulative economic growth (negative) in 2022–2025: -21.2%
  • 2% GDP growth in 2025.
  • Budget deficit estimate for 2025: 18.5% of GDP.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.0227 U.S. dollars. -32% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 21.7 %.

Infrastructure

Check out RM’s timeline of infrastructure damage here.

• Russia estimates: 
  • An investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
  • As of October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these strikes, according to the Russian energy market data. According to Reuters’ November 2025, estimate, however, Russia's oil processing has actually fallen just 3% this year despite Ukraine's drone attacks.
  • In January 2026, Russia’s western border regions, such as the Belgorod Oblast, saw weeks‑long outages caused by Ukrainian strikes, with heating at only 50% capacity and thousands without power as of early February 2026.
  • Around 100,000 customers in the western Russian city of Belgorod were without running water on Feb. 9, 2026, after power surges caused by Ukrainian airstrikes, MT reported.
  • At least 40% of Russia's oil export capacity is at a halt following Ukrainian drone attacks on all three of Russia's major western oil export ports, including Novorossiysk on the Black ​Sea and Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea, as well as a disputed ​attack on a major pipeline and the seizure of tankers, according to Reuters calculations based ‌on market data on March 25, 2026.
    • Ukraine employed drones to pound Ust‑Luga and Primorsk oil terminals at least five times in 10 days, according to Reuters’ April 1, 2026 report. The attacks cut flows through these 2 Baltic ports to about a third of the previous week’s level and reducing Moscow’s oil income by more than $1 billion, Bloomberg claimed in a March 31, 2026, report, citing no one.
  • In late March-early April 2026 Ukraine intensified drone and sea‑drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure at Ust‑Luga, Primorsk and other Russian hubs. The strikes have damaged or destroyed about 20% of Russia’s refining capacity since early 2024, according to an April 7, 2026, assessment by The New York Times.
  • Oil industry sources estimate that in April 2026 Russia was forced to reduce oil production by roughly 300,000–400,000 barrels per day from first-quarter levels—the sharpest monthly drop in about six years—because of Ukrainian drone strikes on key ports and refineries and the suspension of Druzhba pipeline deliveries to Hungary and Slovakia, according to Reuters.
  • April 2026 saw at least 21 Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, export terminals, ships and pipeline pumping stations—the highest monthly total since December—cutting refinery runs to their lowest in over 16 years, according to Bloomberg. As a result Russia’s crude-processing rate fell to 4.69 million barrels a day, about 11–12% below early‑2026 levels and roughly 18% below 2021, according to Bloomberg’s estimate.
  • Recent months saw Ukrainian drones and missiles knock out about 10% of Russia’s refining capacity, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s May 19, 2026, estimate.
  • In April to mid-May 2026, Ukrainian armed forces hit 20 oil refineries and export terminals in Russia, according to a May 18, 2026, estimate published in FP.
• Ukraine estimates: 
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Some 90% of Ukraine’s thermal power generation was destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Some 50% of all of Ukraine’s hydropower installations were damaged and 40% destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Ukraine's energy infrastructure was operating at only about one third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.
  • In October 2025, Russia was reported to have destroyed 60% of Ukraine’s gas production ahead of the winter of 2025–2026. 
  • Ukraine's overall electricity consumption has fallen by around 30% since the launch of the Russian invasion, according to an October 2025 estimate.
  • ISW estimated in December 2025 that Russia’s strike campaign was close to splitting Ukraine’s power grid east–west, with eastern regions “at the brink” of blackout and Kyiv also at risk while Washington Post reported that Kyiv residents were facing up to 16 hours a day without power.
  • As a result of the Russian attacks, Ukraine’s available generating capacity has fallen from 33.7 GW at the start of the full‑scale invasion to about 14 GW as of January 2026, according to The Economist. The resulting outages have produced blackouts of several days in parts of Ukraine, The Economist wrote in January 2026.¹⁹
  • Russian attacks on Ukraine’s rail network “have caused $5.8 billion in damages since the start of the invasion,” according to a December 2025 report by WSJ.
  • Ukrainian energy provider DTEK’s CEO said in late January 2026 Ukraine has lost about 70% of its generation capacity and many civilians get only 3–4 hours of electricity daily, driving roughly 600,000 people to leave Kyiv, according to a Jan. 29, 2026, report by Istories. DTEK then said Russia’s Feb. 3 assault “dealt the most powerful blow to the energy sector since the beginning of the year,” WP reported.
  • From early October 2025 through mid‑January 2026, Ukraine’s intelligence service logged 256 drone and missile strikes on energy facilities: 11 on hydroelectric plants, 94 on thermal plants and 151 on substations. Ukraine’s energy minister Denys Shmyhal said on Jan. 16 that “there is not a single power plant in Ukraine that the enemy has not attacked” and that “thousands of megawatts of generation have been knocked out,” according to The New Yorker.
  • Every power plant in Ukraine has been damaged by Russian attacks, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.
  • At one point, about half of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings lost heating because of the Russian attacks over the last week, according to a February 2026 estimate reported by Financial Times.
  • Russia launched 15 large-scale strikes on Ukraine’s energy system between December 2025 and February 2026—over three times the average of the previous three winters—leaving Kyiv’s 3.5 million residents on average without power for about half of each day in January, according to a March report by The New York Times.
  • At least two-thirds of Ukraine’s energy production capacity has been destroyed, damaged or occupied by Russia since the fall of 2024, according to an estimate by Western military officials reported by Times of London in late February 2026.
  • Ukraine has restored 3.5 gigawatts of generating capacity at thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, and hydropower plants out of more than 9 gigawatts damaged by Russian strikes, First Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal told the Ukrainian parliament in mid-March 2026, according to a Korrespondent.net report.
  • Ukrainian energy expert Oleksandr Kharchenko estimated in March 2026 that restoring Ukraine’s full electrical and heating capacity would require years “In the best-case scenario, we will be able to restore maybe 30 or 40% of electrical capacity before next winter,” he estimated according to a New York Times March 30, 2026 report.
  • Energy blackouts, which have been caused by Russian attacks, have cut economic growth in Ukraine by 2.5 percentage points so far in 2026, according to a May 2026 estimate by the Economist.

Popular support

• Russia: 60% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 61% support territorial compromises in order to end the war.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Drone supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Endnotes

1. NB: As readers of this card may have noted, we have periodically included assessments by Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState in our updates on changes in territorial control. Moving forward, we will be permanently including DeepState estimates in the introductory "update" section, the section on territorial control and the mini-card, so that readers can triangulate, just as they are able to do in other data sections of this product, such as the infrastructure and casualty estimates sections.
2. DeepState reported in the daily updates to its map during that period of June 2–9, 2026, that the Russian armed forces advanced near or in eight settlements, while Ukrainian forces were not reported to have made advances in that period: on June 2, Russian armed forces advanced near Pryvillia; on June 3, Russian armed forces advanced near Illinivka; on June 4, Russian armed forces advanced in Rodynske; on June 5, Russian armed forces advanced near Markove; on June 6, Russian armed forces advanced near Predtechyne; on June 7, Russian armed forces advanced near Kryva Luka; on June 8, Russian armed forces advanced near Zelene and Gulyaypole; on June 9, Russian armed forces advanced in Rodynske. 
3. The Economist estimated on June 9, 2026, that over the past 30 days, Ukrainian forces have recaptured roughly 95 square miles (247 square kilometers).  
4. RM’s map graphics incorporate publicly shared map features from ISW, ESRI, AParrish1 (European countries) and collab2021_Fleming (Black Sea). National flags indicate relative positions across frontlines only. The map key applies to all three map insets.
5. RM’s methodology sums three ISW map layers to arrive at its totals each week rather than two (specifically, RM adds “Claimed Russian control over Ukrainian territory” to “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory” and “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine”). 
6. Russia’s average monthly gain for the past 12 months is calculated using the same ISW data that is used in the “Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month” graph. However, in its May 2, 2026, Russian offensive campaign assessment, ISW warns that “comparisons of Russian gains this year with those of previous years when infiltration tactics were rarer thus are not straightforward, as Russian forces exert a significantly lower degree of control over infiltration areas than they do over seized areas.” This complicates inferences drawn from raw annual comparisons of changes in territorial control.
7. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
   2. Almost 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
   4. More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli. 84,568 missing, according to an April 2025 estimate by the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
   5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
   6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
   7. 219,000 Russian soldiers identified as killed in Meduza’s and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
   8. Some 1,000,000 in casualties, including 250,000 KIAs, according to then-British spy chief Richard Moore’s September 2025 estimate.
   9. Some 1,168,000 killed and wounded, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s December 2025 estimate.
   10. 1,100,000 casualties, according to ex-CIA director William Burns’ January 2026 interview in FT.
   11. 1,200,000 Russian military casualties (killed, wounded and missing) with as many as 325,000 killed between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.
   12. 1,000,000Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.
   13. 1,200,000 casualties, including killed and wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by Western officials reported by Bloomberg. The unnamed officials estimate that this casualty total includes 430,000 casualties in 2024 and 415,000 casualties in 2025.
   14. More than 200,000 identified as killed in a February 2026 estimate by Mediazona and BBC.
   15. 1,100,000-1,400,000 casualties, including 230,000–430,000 dead, according to a February 2026 estimate by The Economist.
   16. 1,200,000 casualties, including 325,000 killed, according to a February 2026 estimate by Wall Street Journal.
   17. Russia has suffered about 1,200,000 permanent losses, including more than 500,000 dead, according to an April 2026 estimate of Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service.
   18. 352,000 identified as killed in Meduza’s and Mediazona’s May 2026 estimate.
   19. 1,100,000-1,500,000 killed and wounded, according to Economist’s May 17, 2026, estimate.
   20. Nearly 500,000 Russian soldiers are estimated to have been killed since 2022, Anne Keast-Butler, top British intelligence official has said in a May 2026 estimate. 
   21. Some intelligence reports indicate that a staggering 1,200,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since February 2022, according to a May 2026 FT article.
8. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate. 35,000 missing.
   2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
   3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   4. 100,000 killed, according to Zelenskyy’s April 2025 estimate.
   5.  400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
   6. 73,000–140,000 killed, according to The Economist’s July 2025 estimate.
   7. 140,000 killed, according to BBC’s December 2025 estimate.
   8. 500,000–600,000 Ukrainian military casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.
   9. 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.
   10. 500,000–600,000 killed, wounded or missing, according to a February 2026 estimate by RFE/RL.
   11. Ukraine has suffered about 500,000 “permanent losses,” according to an April 2026 estimate of Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service.
   12. The Ukrainian military has suffered somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, according to Western estimates, reports a May 2026 FT article.
9. RM cannot verify military or civilian casualty figures or equipment losses estimated by various sources cited in this card.
10. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html. 
11. As of May 6, 2026, Oryx revised the total numbers of military vehicles and equipment lost by Russia down from 24,487 as of April 29, 2026, to 23,650. As of May 19, 2026, Oryx reported this total number at 23,439. This number rose to 23,556 as of June 3, 2026; however, this figure is still lower than the figure from early May. Oryx did not explain on its site how the number of lost vehicles and equipment could have decreased with time. We have therefore refrained from publishing the updated numbers in the main body of this card’s text until Oryx clarifies this revision.
12. The number of tanks and armored vehicles lost by Russia was reported by Oryx as 14,023 as of May 6, 2026, according to the May 6, 2026, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As of May 13, 2026, Oryx reported the number of tanks and armored vehicles lost by Russia as 14,012. As of June 10, 2026, this number had increased to 14,044. 
13. Oryx did not update tallies of either Russian or Ukrainian lost aircraft and naval vessels from Jan. 7, 2026, to May 18, 2026. Aircraft tallies were updated on May 19, 2026, while naval tallies were not.
14. As of May 6, 2026, Oryx revised the total number of military vehicles and equipment lost by Ukraine down from 12,050 as of April 29, 2026, to 11,219 as of May 6, 2026. As of May 19, 2026, Oryx reported this total number at 11,253. This number rose to 11,397 as of June 3, 2026; however, this figure is still lower than the figure from early May. Oryx did not explain on its site how the number of lost vehicles and equipment could have decreased with time. We have therefore refrained from publishing the updated numbers in the main body of this card’s text until Oryx clarifies this revision.
15. The number of tanks and armored vehicles lost by Ukraine was reported by Oryx at 5,822 as of May 6, 2026, according to the May 6, 2026, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As of May 13, 2026, Oryx reported the number of tanks and armored vehicles lost by Ukraine as 5,834. As of June 10, 2026, this number had increased to 5,884.
16. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec. 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport. Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
17. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. 
18. The Russian ruble was the world’s best‑performing currency against the U.S. dollar in Q2 2026, gaining about 12% since early April to around 72.6 per dollar, its strongest level since early 2023. (Meduza, 05.19.26)
19. Earlier, a different estimate of Ukraine’s generating capacity and damage to it was provided by RM and CSIS: as of 2024, some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.

* This card was produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project’s researcher Quinn Urich.