Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

Nov. 11 update: In the past week, Nov. 4–11, 2025, Russia has gained 59 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, an increase over the previous week’s gain of 34 square miles. In the past four weeks (Oct. 14–Nov. 11, 2025), Russian forces gained 165 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase over the 154 square miles these forces gained during the previous four-week period (Sept. 16–Oct. 14, 2025).¹ This week has seen Russian forces capture multiple settlements in the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast—including Novoe, Novouspenivske and Rivnopillia—and gaining over 15 square miles (40 square kilometers) in a single day in what DeepState analysts reportedly described as the largest daily territorial gain by Russian troops since the start of the year. These advances have brought Russian troops closer to this region’s settlement of Huliaipole, with growing risks that further gains could threaten key cities in this southern region.² Russian forces have also been advancing this week into the eastern towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, which they are "very likely" to seize, gaining ground in the eastern and southern parts of Pokrovsk while maintaining fire control over Ukrainian supply routes, which increases the risk of Ukrainian encirclement. Ukrainian counterattacks have reportedly slowed Russian gains in northern and western Pokrovsk, but severe Ukrainian manpower shortages and resource constraints may soon force a chaotic retreat,³ all while a new corruption scandal rocks Ukraine’s leadership.⁴ Additionally, Russia launched 98 ballistic missiles into Ukraine in October, a record since observations began in May 2023, with only 17 intercepted by Ukraine.

Territorial Control (figures as of Nov. 11, 2025)

Russian Advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia as of Nov. 11, 2025

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and change in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +28,697 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of the U.S. state of Iowa).
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +45,322 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)5
• In the period of Oct. 14–Nov. 11, 2025: Russian forces gained 165 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase from the 154 square miles it gained in the previous four-week period of Sept. 16–Oct. 14, 2025. Since Jan. 1, 2025, the average monthly rate of Russian gains has been 169 square miles.
• In past week (Nov. 4–11, 2025): Russia gained 59 square miles of Ukrainian territory (about half of Nantucket island)—an increase over the previous week’s (Oct. 28–Nov. 4, 2025) gain of 34 square miles.
• In Russia, Ukraine’s foothold across the Kursk and Belgorod regions remained at 4 square miles this week (Nov. 4–11, 2025), the same as last week.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–October 2025.(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

• Russia: More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli.6 50,000 missing.
• Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate by Zelenskyy.7 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

• Russia: 652 killed.⁸
• Ukraine:  14,383 (including 11,641 killed in territories controlled by the Ukrainian government and 2,742 killed in Ukrainian territories controlled by Russia).

Military vehicles and equipment⁹

• Russia: 23,353 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 13,563.  
  • Aircraft: 353.
  • Naval vessels: 22.¹⁰
• Ukraine: 10,386 lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,227.
  • Aircraft: 192.
  • Naval vessels: 35.¹¹

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions¹²

In October 2025

• Russia fired
  • 5,663 drones
  • 98 ballistic missiles
  • 161 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 4,574 drones
  • 17 ballistic missiles
  • 50 cruise missiles

Since September 2022

• Russia launched
  • 61,241 drones
  • 763 ballistic missiles
  • 4,207 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted
  • 41,268 drones
  • 159 ballistic missiles
  • 2,978 cruise missiles

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • Internally displaced: 5,000 as of August 2025.
  • 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
• Ukraine: 9.5 million displaced Ukrainians, 22% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44 million, including:
  • Internally displaced: 3.8 million as of September 2025.
  • International refugees: 5.7 million,13 as of September 2025.

Economic impact¹⁴

• Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 0.6%-0.9% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7%   of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01235 U.S. dollars. 5% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 14.5%.
• Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
  • 2% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02382 U.S. dollars. -29% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 24.6%.

Infrastructure

• Russia:  
  • A journalistic investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
  • As of early October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these strikes, according to Russian energy market data. (RM, 10.03.25)
• Ukraine:  
  • Some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 25 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied as of 2024.¹⁵
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Ukraine relied for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls, as of 2024.
  • Russia has damaged around 40% of Ukraine’s gas production facilities as of early 2025.
  • Ukraine's energy infrastructure is operating at only about one third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.
  • In October 2025, Russia was reported to have destroyed 60% of Ukraine’s gas production ahead of winter of 2025-2026. 

Popular support

• Russia: 61% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 74% support negotiated peace (along the current front line and backed by Western security guarantees)

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Endnotes

1. Since Jan. 1, 2025, average Russian monthly gains have been 170 square miles. As of Nov. 11, 2025, Russia controls 19% of Ukraine’s territory—an area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.
2. Sources used for this assessment: Korrespondent.net, 11.12.25; Ukrainska Pravda, 11.12.25; DeepState, 11.12.25.
3. Sources used for this assessment: Financial Times, 11.11.25; ISW, 11.10.25; ISW, 11.11.25; RBC.ua, 11.12.25; DeepState, 11.12.25.
4. For details of the scandal see, for instance, “Corruption Investigation Rocks the Ukrainian Government,” Kim Barker, New York Times, 11.10.25; “From Army To Zelenskyy, Ukraine's Corruption Scandal Rocks Country,” Ray Furlong and RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, RFR/RL, 11.12.25.
5. According to Ukraine's DeepState OSINT group's map, as of Nov. 11, 2025, Russian forces occupied a total of 115,413 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (44,561 square miles, almost equal to the total area of the U.S. state of Ohio), which constituted 19% of Ukrainian territory.
6. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
   2. 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
   4. More than 700,000, according to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
   5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
   6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
   7. 100,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war this year, NATO Secretary General Matt Rutte said in July 2025.
   8. 219,000 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukraine war, according to Meduza and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
   9. More than 50,000 inquiries have been submitted by Russians seeking missing soldiers through Ukraine’s "I Want to Find" project, according to Ukrainian media.
   10. Some 1 million in casualties, including 240,000 KIAs, according to British spy chief Richard Moore’s September 2025 estimate.
   11. Some 1,118,000 Russian soldiers killed and wounded, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense as reported by Ukrinform in October 2025.
7. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
   2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
   3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   4. 400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
8. This estimate was given by Russia’s Investigative Committee in March 2025. A July 2025 estimate by Russia’s Foreign Ministry put the total number of “peaceful residents” who were allegedly killed by “actions of the Ukrainian authorities and their armed formations” from early 2022 to June 2025 at “almost” 7,500.
9. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.  
10. Oryx is not updating losses of Russian warships as of January 1, 2025. According to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, since the war’s start, Russia has lost at least 10,000 ground combat vehicles, including more than 3,000 tanks, as well as nearly 250 aircraft and helicopters and more than 10 naval vessels.
11. Oryx is not updating losses of Ukrainian warships as of Jan. 1, 2025. Thus, this number excludes the Ukrainian Navy's reconnaissance ship, Simferopol, which was sunken by a Russian naval drone strike in the Danube River estuary on Aug. 28, 2025.
12. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport. Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
13. An October 2025 estimate by the U.N. puts the number of refugees from Ukraine in other countries at 5.75 million.
14. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. This count does not include the loss of the Ukrainian reconnaissance warship near the mouth of the Danube river where it was attacked by a Russian naval drone on Aug. 28, 2025.
15. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.

* This card was produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project’s researcher Quinn Urich.