Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

May 5, 2026, update:¹ RM’s analysis of ISW’s² data for the past four weeks (April 7–May 5, 2026) indicates that Russian forces lost 46 square miles of Ukraine’s territory during that period (double the size of Manhattan Island). In contrast, during the previous four-week period (March 10–April 7, 2026), Russia registered a net gain of 17 square miles of Ukrainian territory. During the past week (April 28–May 5, 2026), Russia suffered a net loss of 21 square miles, compared to 7 square miles (net), which it lost in the preceding week (April 21–28, 2026), according to ISW data. According to DeepState, that past week of April 28–May 5, 2026, saw the Russian armed forces advance in or near nine distinct Ukrainian settlements, while the Ukrainian armed forces conducted a sweep in two settlements in that period.

Territorial Control (figures as of May 5, 2026)³

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and change in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +29,124 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the U.S. state of Illinois).
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, that Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +45,749 square miles. About 20% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Pennsylvania.)⁴
• In the period of April 7–May 5, 2026: Russian forces saw a net loss of 46 square miles of Ukrainian territory, according to ISW data. During the previous four-week period of March 10–April 7, 2026, Russian forces registered a net gain of 17 square miles, according to ISW data.
• In the past week (April 28–May 5, 2026): Russia lost 21 square miles of Ukrainian territory, according to ISW data, following a 7 square mile loss during the previous week of April 21–28, 2026. In Russia, Ukraine’s foothold across the Kursk and Belgorod regions remained 4 square miles over the past week (April 28–May 5, 2026), according to ISW data, the same as the previous week (April 21–28, 2026). 
• According to RM’s measurements using ISW data, from May 6, 2025, to May 5, 2026, Russia captured 1,714 square miles (slightly bigger than the state of Rhode Island)—about 0.7% of Ukraine’s total territory of 233,062 square miles at the time of its independence in 1991.
• Russia’s average monthly gains for the past 12 months were 143 square miles.⁵

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–April 2026 (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War; click here for an interactive version of this chart). 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

• 1,000,000 Russian military casualties (killed and wounded), according to a late February 2026 estimate that a highly-informed former high-ranking Western official shared with RM.⁶
• 250,000-300,000 Ukrainian military casualties (killed and wounded), according to a late February 2026 estimate that a highly-informed former high-ranking Western official shared with RM.⁷

Civilian fatalities⁸

• Russia: 8,012 “peaceful residents... killed,” according to RF government.
• Ukraine: 15,578 “Ukrainian civilians” killed according to the U.N.

Military vehicles and equipment⁹

• Russia:¹⁰
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 14,023.
  • Aircraft: 361.¹¹
  • Naval vessels: 29.
• Ukraine:¹²
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,822.
  • Aircraft: 194.
  • Naval vessels: 42.

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • Internally displaced: 23,000, including 3,419 in the Kursk region.
  • 1,000,000 (0.7% of Russia’s 2022 population) left Russia for economic or political reasons in the first year of the full-scale war. Between 15% and 45% of those who had left have returned since then, so, between 550,000 and 850,000 people have not returned to Russia.
• Ukraine: 9,600,000 displaced Ukrainians, 22% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44,000,000, including:
  • Internally displaced: 3,700,000.  
  • International refugees: 5,900,000.

Economic impact¹³

• Russia’s cumulative economic growth in 2022–2025: 8%.
  • 0.9% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
  • Budget deficit for 2025: 2.6% of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01333 U.S. dollars. +13% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 13.7%.
• Ukraine’s cumulative economic growth (negative) in 2022-2025: -21.2%
  • 2% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
  • Budget deficit estimate for 2025: 18.5% of GDP.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02269 U.S. dollars. -32% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 21.9%.

Infrastructure

Check out RM’s timeline of infrastructure damage here.

• Russia estimates: 
  • An investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
  • As of October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these strikes, according to the Russian energy market data. According to Reuters’ November 2025, estimate, however, Russia's oil processing has actually fallen just 3% this year despite Ukraine's drone attacks.
  • In January 2026, Russia’s western border regions, such as the Belgorod Oblast, saw weeks‑long outages caused by Ukrainian strikes, with heating at only 50% capacity and thousands without power as of early February 2026.
  • Around 100,000 customers in the western Russian city of Belgorod were without running water on Feb. 9, 2026, after power surges caused by Ukrainian airstrikes, MT reported.
  • At least 40% of Russia's oil export capacity is at a halt following Ukrainian drone attacks on all three of Russia's major western oil export ports, including Novorossiysk on the Black ​Sea and Primorsk and Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea, as well as a disputed ​attack on a major pipeline and the seizure of tankers, according to Reuters calculations based ‌on market data on March 25, 2026.
    • Ukraine employed drones to pound Ust‑Luga and Primorsk oil terminals at least five times in 10 days, according to Reuters’ April 1, 2026, report. The attacks cut flows through these 2 Baltic ports to about a third of the previous week’s level and reducing Moscow’s oil income by more than $1 billion, Bloomberg claimed in a March 31, 2026, report, citing no one.
  • In late March-early April 2026 Ukraine intensified drone and sea‑drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure at Ust‑Luga, Primorsk and other Russian hubs. The strikes have damaged or destroyed about 20% of Russia’s refining capacity since early 2024, according to an April 7, 2026, assessment by The New York Times.
  • Oil industry sources estimate that in April 2026 Russia was forced to reduce oil production by roughly 300,000–400,000 barrels per day from first-quarter levels—the sharpest monthly drop in about six years—because of Ukrainian drone strikes on key ports and refineries and the suspension of Druzhba pipeline deliveries to Hungary and Slovakia, according to Reuters.
  • April 2026 saw at least 21 Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, export terminals, ships and pipeline pumping stations—the highest monthly total since December—cutting refinery runs to their lowest in over 16 years, according to Bloomberg. As a result Russia’s crude-processing rate fell to 4.69 million barrels a day, about 11–12% below early‑2026 levels and roughly 18% below 2021, according to Bloomberg’s estimate.
• Ukraine estimates: 
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Some 90% of Ukraine’s thermal power generation was destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Some 50% of all of Ukraine’s hydropower installations were damaged and 40% destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Ukraine's energy infrastructure was operating at only about one third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.
  • In October 2025, Russia was reported to have destroyed 60% of Ukraine’s gas production ahead of the winter of 2025–2026. 
  • Ukraine's overall electricity consumption has fallen by around 30% since the launch of the Russian invasion, according to an October 2025 estimate.
  • ISW estimated in December 2025 that Russia’s strike campaign was close to splitting Ukraine’s power grid east–west, with eastern regions “at the brink” of blackout and Kyiv also at risk while Washington Post reported that Kyiv residents were facing up to 16 hours a day without power.
  • As a result of the Russian attacks, Ukraine’s available generating capacity has fallen from 33.7 GW at the start of the full‑scale invasion to about 14 GW as of January 2026, according to The Economist. The resulting outages have produced blackouts of several days in parts of Ukraine, The Economist wrote in January 2026.¹⁴
  • Russian attacks on Ukraine’s rail network “have caused $5.8 billion in damages since the start of the invasion,” according to a December 2025 report by WSJ.
  • Ukrainian energy provider DTEK’s CEO said in late January 2026 Ukraine has lost about 70% of its generation capacity and many civilians get only 3–4 hours of electricity daily, driving roughly 600,000 people to leave Kyiv, according to a Jan. 29, 2026, report by Istories. DTEK then said Russia’s Feb. 3 assault “dealt the most powerful blow to the energy sector since the beginning of the year,” WP reported.
  • From early October 2025 through mid‑January 2026, Ukraine’s intelligence service logged 256 drone and missile strikes on energy facilities: 11 on hydroelectric plants, 94 on thermal plants and 151 on substations. Ukraine’s energy minister Denys Shmyhal said on Jan. 16 that “there is not a single power plant in Ukraine that the enemy has not attacked” and that “thousands of megawatts of generation have been knocked out,” according to The New Yorker.
  • Every power plant in Ukraine has been damaged by Russian attacks, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.
  • At one point, about half of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings lost heating because of the Russian attacks over the last week, according to a February 2026 estimate reported by Financial Times.
  • Russia launched 15 large-scale strikes on Ukraine’s energy system between December 2025 and February 2026—over three times the average of the previous three winters—leaving Kyiv’s 3.5 million residents on average without power for about half of each day in January, according to a March report by The New York Times.¹⁵
  • At least two-thirds of Ukraine’s energy production capacity has been destroyed, damaged or occupied by Russia since the fall of 2024, according to an estimate by Western military officials reported by Times of London in late February 2026.
  • Ukraine has restored 3.5 gigawatts of generating capacity at thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, and hydropower plants out of more than 9 gigawatts damaged by Russian strikes, First Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal told the Ukrainian parliament in mid-March 2026, according to a Korrespondent.net report.  
  • Ukrainian energy expert Oleksandr Kharchenko estimated in March 2026 that restoring Ukraine’s full electrical and heating capacity would require years “In the best-case scenario, we will be able to restore maybe 30 or 40% of electrical capacity before next winter,” he estimated according to a New York Times March 30, 2026  report.

Popular support

• Russia: 64% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 61% support territorial compromises in order to end the war.

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Drone supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Endnotes

1. According to the updates DeepState posted on its website, on April 28, Russian forces advanced near Berestok; on April 29, Russian forces advanced in Rodynske and near Nykanorivka, while Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a sweep in Rodynske and near Vilne; on April 30, Russian forces advanced near Synkivka, Pryvillia and Andriivka-Klevtsove; on May 1, Russian forces advanced near Riznykivka; on May 2, Russian forces advanced near Berestok and Ivanopillya; on May 3, Russian forces advanced near Andriivka-Klevtsove; on May 4, there was no update; and on May 5, Russian forces advanced near Pishchane and in Rodynske.
2. On May 2, 2026, ISW posted a note in its “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2026.” The note said: “ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW’s previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance. ISW is now assessing monthly advances using the last day of the previous month to the last day of the month in question (e.g., comparing data from Dec. 31 to that from Jan. 31 in order to calculate Russian advances in January). ISW previously calculated Russia’s monthly rate of advance using data from the first day of the month in question to the first day of the next month (e.g., comparing data from Jan. 1 to that from Feb. 1 in order to calculate Russian advances in January, which inappropriately included Russian advances from Feb. 1 in the January calculation). ISW has also removed backend data artifacts in our mapping layer data that created errors in some of our area calculations.”
3. Production note. RM’s map graphics incorporate publicly shared map features from ISW, ESRI, AParrish1 (European countries) and collab2021_Fleming (Black Sea).
4. RM’s methodology sums three ISW map layers to arrive at its totals each week rather than two (specifically, RM adds “Claimed Russian control over Ukrainian territory” to “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory” and “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine”). 
5. Russia’s average monthly gain for the past 12 months is calculated using the same ISW data that is used in the “Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month” graph. However, in its May 2, 2026, Russian offensive campaign assessment, ISW warns that “comparisons of Russian gains this year with those of previous years when infiltration tactics were rarer thus are not straightforward, as Russian forces exert a significantly lower degree of control over infiltration areas than they do over seized areas.” This complicates inferences drawn from raw annual comparisons of changes in territorial control.
6. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
   2. Almost 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
   4. More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli. 84,568 missing, according to an April 2025 estimate by the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
   5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
   6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
   7. 219,000 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukraine war, according to Meduza and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
   8. Some 1,000,000 in casualties, including 250,000 KIAs, according to then-British spy chief Richard Moore’s September 2025 estimate.
   9. Some 1,168,000 killed and wounded, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s December 2025 estimate.
   10. 1,100,000 casualties, according to ex-CIA director William Burns’ January 2026 interview in FT.
   11. 1,200,000 Russian military casualties (killed, wounded and missing) with as many as 325,000 killed between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.
   12. 1,000,000Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.
   13. 1,200,000 casualties, including killed and wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by Western officials reported by Bloomberg. The unnamed officials estimate that this casualty total includes 430,000 casualties in 2024 and 415,000 casualties in 2025.
   14. More than 200,000 identified as killed, according to a February 2026 estimate by Mediazona and BBC.
   15. 1,100,000-1,400,000 casualties including 230,000–430,000 dead, according to a February 2026 estimate by The Economist.
   16. 1,200,000 casualties, including 325,000 killed, according to a February 2026 estimate by Wall Street Journal.
   17. Russia has suffered about 1,200,000 permanent losses, including more than 500,000 dead, according to an April 2026 estimate of Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service.
7. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate. 35,000 missing.
   2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
   3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   4. 100,000 killed, according to Zelenskyy’s April 2025 estimate.
   5.  400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
   6. 73,000–140,000 killed, according to The Economist’s July 2025 estimate.
   7. 140,000 killed, according to BBC’s December 2025 estimate.
   8. 500,000–600,000 Ukrainian military casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.
   9. 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.
   10. 500,000–600,000 killed, wounded or missing, according to a February 2026 estimate by RFE/RL.
   11. Ukraine has suffered about 500,000 “permanent losses,” according to an April 2026 estimate of Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service.
8. RM cannot verify military or civilian casualty figures or equipment losses estimated by various sources cited in this card.
9. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.  
10. As of May 6, 2026, Oryx revised the total numbers of military vehicles and equipment lost by Russia down from 24,487 as of April 29, 2026, to 23,650. We have therefore refrained from publishing the updated numbers until Oryx clarifies its downward revision.
11. Oryx has not updated tallies of either Russian or Ukrainian lost aircraft and naval vessels since Jan. 7, 2026.
12. As of May 6, 2026, Oryx revised the total number of military vehicles and equipment lost by Ukraine down from 12,050  as of April 29, 2026, to 11,219. We have therefore refrained from publishing the updated numbers until Oryx clarifies its downward revision.
13. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,” https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. 
14. Earlier, a different estimate of Ukraine’s generating capacity and damage to it was provided by RM and CSIS: as of 2024, some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.
15. For a useful March 2026 NYT chart on customers without power in Kyiv in October 2025-February 2026, follow this link.

* This card was produced by RM staff.