The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Feb. 18, 2026

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive

Feb. 17, 2026, update: RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Jan. 20–Feb. 17, 2026) indicates that Russian forces have gained 127 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (area slightly larger than Martha’s Vineyard) during that period, an increase over the 63 square miles it gained over the previous four-week period (Dec. 23, 2025–Jan. 20, 2026). Meanwhile, according to the most recent ISW data, Russian forces actually lost 19 square miles in the period of Feb. 10–17, 2026. As ISW claimed on Feb. 15, “recent Ukrainian tactical counterattacks have reportedly liberated multiple small settlements along the Yanchur and Haichur rivers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions” in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. In recapturing the land, the Ukrainian forces took advantage of a Starlink shutdown for Russian forces, according to AFP. According to a site that publishes data by Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, however, Russian forces actually gained 6.6 square miles in the period of Feb. 10–17, 2026. DeepState itself referred to no liberation of Ukrainian settlements in the updates on its site for that period. Although DeepState did say in its updates that Ukrainian forces cleared “enemy infiltration” near Bilytske, Prymorske and Lukianivske in that period, this OSINT group also reported that Russian forces occupied Bondarne on Feb. 10 and Rivne on Feb. 15.

Territorial Control (figures as of Feb. 17, 2026)1 

 

Report Card*

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

  • Since Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +29,191 square miles. 13% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the U.S. state of Illinois).
  • Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, that Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +45,816 square miles. About 20% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Pennsylvania.)2
  • In the period of Jan. 20–Feb. 17, 2026: Russian forces gained 127 square miles of Ukrainian territory (area slightly larger than Martha’s Vineyard). Russia’s average monthly gains for the past 12 months were 175 square miles.
  • In the past week (Feb. 10–17, 2026): Russia lost 19 square miles of Ukrainian territory (a little less than the area of Manhattan Island), according to ISW. According to a site that publishes data by Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group, however, Russian forces actually gained 6.6 square miles in the period of Feb. 10–17, 2026.
  • In Russia, Ukraine’s foothold across the Kursk and Belgorod regions was 4 square miles over the past week (Feb. 10–17, 2026). 
  • According to RM’s measurements using ISW data, from Feb. 18, 2025, to Feb. 17, 2026, Russia captured 2,102 square miles (slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Delaware)—about 0.9% of Ukraine’s total territory of 233,062 square miles at the time of its independence in 1991.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–January 2026 (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

  • 1,200,000 Russian military casualties (killed, wounded and missing) with as many as 325,000 killed between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.3
  • 500,000–600,000 Ukrainian military casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.4

Civilian fatalities5

  • Russia: 7,254 killed (7,175 in 2022–2025, 79 in 2026)
  • Ukraine: 15,954 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment6

  • Russia: 24,099 lost. 
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 13,887.
    • Aircraft: 361.7
    • Naval vessels: 29.
  • Ukraine: 11,380 lost.
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,596.
    • Aircraft: 194.
    • Naval vessels: 42.

 Citizens displaced

  • Russia:
    • Internally displaced: 5,000 as of August 2025.
    • 1,000,000 (0.7% of Russia’s 2022 population) left Russia for economic or political reasons in the first year of the full-scale war. Between 15% and 45% of those who had left have returned since then, so, between 550,000 and 850,000 people have not returned to Russia.
  • Ukraine: 10,600,000 displaced Ukrainians, 24% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44,000,000, including:

Economic impact8

  • Russia’s cumulative economic growth in 2022–2025: 8%.
    • 0.9% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
    • Budget deficit in 2025: 2.6% of GDP.
    • Russian ruble: 0.01303 U.S. dollars. 11% since the invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 14.7 %.
  • Ukraine’s cumulative economic growth (negative) in 2022-2025: -21.2%
    • 2% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
    • Budget deficit estimate for 2025: 18.5% of GDP.
    • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02313 U.S. dollars. -31% since the invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 22%.

Infrastructure

  • Russia estimates: 
    • An investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
    • As of October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these strikes, according to the Russian energy market data. According to Reuters’ November 2025, estimate, however, Russia's oil processing has actually fallen just 3% this year despite Ukraine's drone attacks.
    • In January 2026, Russia’s western border regions, such as the Belgorod Oblast, saw weeks‑long outages caused by Ukrainian strikes, with heating at only 50% capacity and thousands without power as of Feb. 4. 
    • Around 100,000 customers in the Russian city of Belgorod were without running water on Feb. 9 after power surges caused by Ukrainian airstrikes on the local power grid forced two pumping stations to go into emergency shutdown, MT reported on Feb. 9.
  • Ukraine estimates: 
    • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
    • Some 90% of Ukraine’s thermal power generation was destroyed as of May 2025.
    • Some 50% of all of Ukraine’s hydropower installations were damaged and 40% destroyed as of May 2025.
    • Ukraine's energy infrastructure was operating at only about one third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.
    • In October 2025, Russia was reported to have destroyed 60% of Ukraine’s gas production ahead of winter of 2025–2026. 
    • Ukraine's overall electricity consumption has fallen by around 30% since the launch of the Russian invasion, according to an October 2025 estimate.
    • ISW estimated in December 2025 that Russia’s strike campaign was close to splitting Ukraine’s power grid east–west, with eastern regions “at the brink” of blackout and Kyiv also at risk while Washington Post reported that Kyiv residents were facing up to 16 hours a day without power.
    • As a result of the Russian attacks, Ukraine’s available generating capacity has fallen from 33.7 GW at the start of the full‑scale invasion to about 14 GW as of January 2026, according to The Economist. The resulting outages have produced blackouts of several days in parts of Ukraine, The Economist wrote in January 2026.9
    • Russian attacks on Ukraine’s rail network “have caused $5.8 billion in damages since the start of the invasion,” according to a December 2025 report by WSJ.
    • Ukrainian energy provider DTEK’s CEO said in late January 2026 Ukraine has lost about 70% of its generation capacity and many civilians get only 3–4 hours of electricity daily, driving roughly 600,000 people to leave Kyiv, according to a Jan. 29, 2026, report by Istories. DTEK then said Russia’s Feb. 3 assault “dealt the most powerful blow to the energy sector since the beginning of the year,” WP reported.
    • From early October 2025 through mid‑January 2026, Ukraine’s intelligence service logged 256 drone and missile strikes on energy facilities: 11 on hydroelectric plants, 94 on thermal plants and 151 on substations. Ukraine’s energy minister Denys Shmyhal said on Jan. 16 that “there is not a single power plant in Ukraine that the enemy has not attacked” and that “thousands of megawatts of generation have been knocked out,” according to The New Yorker.
    • Every power plant in Ukraine has been damaged by Russian attacks, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.
    • At one point, about half of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings lost heating because of the Russian attacks over the last week, according to a February estimate reported by Financial Times.

Popular support

  • Russia: 61% support peace negotiations.
  • Ukraine: 26% “believe in the success of the [peace] negotiations [with Russia].”

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

  • Ammunition supply
  • Foreign military aid
  • Force generation
  • Military leadership
  • Training
  • Morale
  • Control of strategic locations
  • Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

 

Endnotes

  1. Production note. RM’s map graphics incorporate publicly shared map features from ISW, ESRI, AParrish1 (European countries) and collab2021_Fleming (Black Sea).
  2. RM’s methodology sums three ISW map layers to arrive at its totals each week rather than two (specifically, RM adds “Claimed Russian control over Ukrainian territory” to “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory” and “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine”). 
  3. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
    1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
    2. Almost 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
    3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
    4. More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli. 84,568 missing, according to an April 2025 estimate by the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
    5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
    6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
    7. 219,000 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukraine war, according to Meduza and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
    8. Some 1,000,000 in casualties, including 240,000 KIAs, according to then-British spy chief Richard Moore’s September 2025 estimate.
    9. Some 1,168,000 killed and wounded, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s December 2025 estimate.
    10. 1,100,000 casualties, according to ex-CIA director William Burns’ January 2026 interview in FT.
    11. 1,000,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.
    12. 1,200,000 casualties, including killed and wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by Western officials reported by Bloomberg. The unnamed officials estimate that this casualty total includes 430,000 casualties in 2024 and 415,000 casualties in 2025.
  4. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
    1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate. 35,000 missing.
    2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
    3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
    4. 100,000 killed, according to Zelensky’s April 2025 estimate.
    5.  400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
    6. 73,000–140,000 killed, according to The Economist’s July 2025 estimate.
    7. 140,000 killed, according to BBC’s December 2025 estimate.
    8. 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s February 2026 estimate.
  5. RM cannot verify casualty figures.
  6. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.  
  7. Oryx has not updated tallies of either Russian or Ukrainian lost aircraft and naval vessels since Jan. 7, 2026.
  8. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. This count does not include the loss of the Ukrainian reconnaissance warship near the mouth of the Danube river where it was attacked by a Russian naval drone on Aug. 28, 2025.
  9. Earlier, a different estimate of Ukraine’s generating capacity and damage to it was provided by RM and CSIS: as of 2024, some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.

* This card was produced by RM staff.