6 Ideas to Explore

1. “The Kremlin on Sunday appeared to temper enthusiasm on the results of several days of peace talks in Miami, where American representatives met separately with Russian and Ukrainian officials in the latest round of negotiations aimed at ending Russia’s war with Ukraine,” The New York Times reported on Dec. 21. On Dec. 21 in Moscow, Kremlin foreign-policy aide Yuri Ushakov said that “most of the proposals discussed during negotiations with the United States had been put forth by Ukrainian and European representatives and were ‘rather unconstructive,’” according to NYT. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he is prepared to consider a withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from parts of the Donetsk region—something both the U.S. and Russia have been pressing Kyiv to accept—but insisted any pullback must be “mirror-like,” with Russian forces withdrawing by the same distance and the area becoming a special economic zone without heavy weapons or troops, according to Strana.ua.
2. “Ukrainian defenses are retreating faster than at any point since the start of war,” according to a Dec. 17 article in the Economist, entitled "Ukraine scrabbles for handholds against Russia’s massive assault." “Russia has assembled 160,000 troops [near Pokrovsk] and is pressing ahead,” the Economist warns. A bleak picture is developing in the Donetsk towns of Myrnohrad and Siversk, according to the Economist. “If the line now breaks, it won’t be a local setback,” a senior Ukrainian officer said. “Siversk is only the first domino. It will create a chain of panic,” according to the officer. The gloomy warning regarding the combat in Donbas contrasts with that of former Ukrainian marine Yevhenii Malik, who claims in The Washington Post that “Russia’s campaign continues to fail,” something U.S. Sens. Jeanne Shaheen and Mitch McConnell agree with, also writing in WP that “Russia is not winning” and “Putin cannot achieve a decisive victory.” Since Jan. 1, 2025, Russia has gained an average of 176 square miles per month, according to the Dec. 17, 2025, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Nov. 18–Dec. 16, 2025) indicates that Russian forces gained 215 square miles of Ukrainian territory in that period, an increase over the 169 square miles it gained over the previous four-week period (Oct. 21–Nov. 18, 2025), according to the card.
3. Donald Trump believes Vladimir Putin’s goal is a complete Russian takeover of Ukraine, according to Trump’s chief of staff Susan Wiles, quoted in Vanity Fair earlier this month. “The experts think that if he could get the rest of Donetsk, then he would be happy,” Wiles told Vanity Fair in August. But privately, Trump wasn’t buying it—he didn’t believe Putin wanted peace. “Donald Trump thinks [Putin] wants the whole country,” Wiles told this magazine. On Dec. 19, 2025, Reuters reported that U.S. intelligence still assessed that Putin seeks all of Ukraine and parts of former Soviet Europe, with Rep. Mike Quigley saying “the intelligence has always been that Putin wants more,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted, "I don't know if Putin wants to do a deal or Putin wants to take the whole country. These are things that he has said openly.” Some in Trump’s team do not seem to agree, however, with the view that Putin wants to conquer all of Ukraine. For instance, on Dec. 20, 2025, Trump’s DNI Tulsi Gabbard wrote on X that “The truth is that ‘US intelligence’ assesses that Russia does not even have the capability to conquer and occupy Ukraine, what to speak of ‘invading and occupying’ Europe.”
4. In a recent “Across the Aisle” podcast with John Ashford, political scientist and Harvard Kennedy School Professor Graham T. Allison argues that Trump’s way of thinking about the war in Ukraine has affected his selection of his key negotiators, who though inexperienced in terms of diplomacy, may bring fresh insights and opportunities to ceasefire negotiations in the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump has “decided that some combination of his personality and people who think in business terms—real estate deals, transactional logic—might find options that traditional diplomacy couldn’t,” Allison said. He commended Ukraine as a “society that has been crushed physically, but whose spirit, resilience and determination have inspired the world.” Yet, in spite of its resilience, “every month, Ukraine loses another couple hundred square miles,” Allison said citing estimates by RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. “At the current pace, it [Donbas] will be taken within the next year or so unless there’s an agreement,” Allison predicts.
5. During his Dec. 17 address to the Russian Defense Ministry’s board and a national call-in show on Dec. 19, Putin reaffirmed Russia’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and stressed Russia’s readiness to continue waging a conventional war in Ukraine, but also signaled conditional openness to negotiations of a peace deal with Kyiv. While describing claims that Russia may attack Europe as “nonsense” during the 4+ hour call-in show, Putin warned NATO against any attempt to blockade Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, saying such actions could trigger an “unprecedented escalation” that could grow into a “large-scale armed conflict.” Putin also confirmed the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus and stressed the central role of Russia’s strategic triad in nuclear deterrence, claiming 92% of this triad’s systems are modern. On Ukraine, Putin said Russia is ready to end the war through negotiations only if the “root causes” of the conflict are eliminated, reiterating demands that Ukraine abandon NATO ambitions. Putin also reiterated that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of principles that he outlined in his speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry last year. In the June 14, 2024, speech, he said Ukraine must withdraw from four of the regions partially occupied by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. In his comments on Putin’s Dec. 19 call-in-show, Russian journalist Vladislav Gorin argued that “the entire performance was aimed… at… Trump. By constantly repeating that Russia is winning and will fight until at least all of Donbas is under its control, while presenting Ukraine as the side ‘obstructing peace,’ Putin is trying to shape U.S. expectations about any Ukraine settlement and to lock in a deal that legitimizes Russia’s gains from the war,” Gorin argued.
6. EU leaders have abandoned a plan to fund Ukraine with €210 billion in frozen Russian assets, which the leaders of France, Germany and some other “Old Europe” countries have been pushing for months, thus failing what the New York Times described as an EU unity test. The decision not to tap the Kremlin’s frozen wealth is a big setback for Kyiv and its supporters in Europe, some of whom described last week as a “break or take” one, while advocating for the use of Russian assets. Instead of using these frozen assets, which European supporters have argued was essential for Ukraine to sustain its defense against Russia, the EU agreed to provide Kyiv with €90 billion ($101 billion), largely in loans, through 2027, financed by joint borrowing on capital markets backed by the EU budget. The deal—without which Ukraine was likely to default as early as next spring—provides a critical two-year financial lifeline. However, in practical terms, that still leaves Kyiv needing an estimated total of $50 billion per year in additional outside support simply to keep the state functioning, as well as to finance the procurement of drones, drone components and other military equipment. It is crucial to underscore that this is a loan, not a transfer of frozen Russian assets. As such, it adds to Ukraine’s already heavy debt burden rather than easing it, allowing the country to struggle on rather than stabilizing its finances. As reported above, the broader initiative Volodymyr Zelenskyy had been pressing—backed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, among others—to mobilize frozen Russian assets has, for now, failed. In its review of this failure, The Wall Street Journal wrote: "By Not Tapping Russian Assets for Ukraine, Europe Showed Its Fear.” The EU’s “half measure… showed how divided Europe remains over how boldly it is willing to confront Moscow,” according to WSJ.

NB: Due to Harvard University’s winter recess, the next issue of the Russia Analytical Report will be published Jan. 5, 2026. 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda¹

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

Monday, Dec. 15, 2025.

“Security Implications of North Korea’s Support for Russia’s War on Ukraine,” Elizabeth Wishnick, PONARS Eurasia, 12.15.25.

• “One of the unexpected developments in Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine has been North Korea’s involvement, marking the first time North Korean forces have fought overseas,” Wishnick writes.
• “North Korea has supplied millions of munitions and sent thousands of troops and workers to Russia, with soldiers earning the regime valuable hard currency and combat experience with modern weapons,” the article notes.
• “In June 2024, Russia and North Korea sealed a mutual defense pact, paving the way for North Korean deployments to Russia’s Kursk region and new labor contracts previously prohibited by UN sanctions,” Wishnick reports.
• “North Korean support has helped Russia sustain its war effort, while deepening the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and sparking security concerns in both Europe and Asia, especially for South Korea,” the piece concludes.
• “The Russia–North Korea partnership complicates conflict resolution in Ukraine, boosts North Korea’s leverage in Asia, and drives closer security coordination among the US, Europe, South Korea, and Japan,” Wishnick observes.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"How America and Iran Can Break the Nuclear Deadlock: Ending the Cycle of Hostility and Threats," M. Javad Zarif and Amir Parsa Garmsiri, Foreign Affairs, 12.22.25.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025
"Returning Russian POWs Pay Heavy Price for Choosing Surrender Over Death," Thomas Grove, The Wall Street Journal, 12.21.25.

• Russian commanders “admonish them to blow themselves up with a grenade before submitting to Ukrainian capture,” Grove reports; one former POW said other soldiers later asked why he hadn’t killed himself instead of being taken.
• Valery Vetoshkina of OVD‑Info told the Journal, “The country is at war… The state does not encourage voluntary surrender,” as salaries and bonuses are cut off for captured soldiers and “thousands are now in financial limbo.”
• After exchanges in Belarus, returning POWs are “isolated from their families for as long as a month” and interrogated by the FSB, the military prosecutor and the Investigative Committee; in one early test case, Roman Ivanishin was sentenced to 15 years for “voluntary surrender” and related charges after coming back in a swap.
• Former POW Pavel Guguyev said the FSB labels returned soldiers “lost trust” and that men sent back to the front are given “menial tasks that didn’t involve firearms, as they were no longer trusted,” adding, “They don’t let zeks go home… They use them like workers.”
• Grove notes that a Russian Defense Ministry paper argues “some of the provisions of the Geneva Convention don’t apply to Russian POWs, as the war is continuing,” and that the old Stalin‑era line “We have no prisoners, only traitors” “still rings true today” in how Moscow treats soldiers who chose surrender over death.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “How Russia’s Invasion is Impacting Ukraine’s Youth,” Bellingcat Investigation Team, 12.17.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025

“Trump Shouldn’t Give Ukraine NATO-Like Guarantees,” Andrew Day, The American Conservative, 12.16.25.

• “The Trump administration should avoid promising to fight a direct war with Russia in defense of Ukraine, argue advocates of U.S. foreign policy restraint. Mark Episkopos… says that such a promise would lack credibility. ‘The past 3.5 years have been an ongoing test of whether the West will go to war against Russia over Ukraine, and the answer has been a resounding no.’”
• “A non-credible security guarantee would fail to deter Russia. Yet if Russia, doubting the credibility of a U.S. guarantee, attacked Ukraine again, America would feel pressure to defend its client rather than lose face—possibly leading to a direct conflict between two nuclear superpowers… If Washington didn't come to Ukraine's defense, all of America's alliance commitments would come into doubt.”
• “Trump’s desperation for an agreement gives Kiev and European capitals leverage, since they can obstruct the peace process if he doesn’t accommodate their more hardline demands. Of course, by drawing closer to their position, the White House moves further away from Moscow’s—and likely also from any potential deal.”
• “For the first time I heard from the mouths of American negotiators… that America would engage in security guarantees for Ukraine in such a way that the Russians would have no doubt that the American response would be military if the Russians attacked Ukraine again,” Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk told reporters.
• “Offering security guarantees to Kiev may win applause in European capitals, but it doesn’t bring Moscow any closer to ending its war in Ukraine… Trump will have better luck if he pushes instead for ‘armed non-alignment’—a model of Ukrainian security that… details the military capabilities Ukraine needs to deter—but not threaten—Russia.”

“America does not trust Putin or Trump: Americans support increased military aid to Kyiv, have a low opinion of Trump's Ukraine policy, and doubt the likelihood of reaching a reliable agreement with Putin,” Re:Russia, 12.16.25.

• “In November, approval of Trump’s presidency fell to a new low in his second term, with 36% approving and 60% disapproving. Among all items on the current agenda, his Ukraine policy attracts the least support, with only 31% approving.”
• “Between 75 and 80% of those surveyed view Russia as an enemy and consider Ukraine an ally. More than 60% want Kyiv to win, and two thirds support arms deliveries to Ukraine, including Tomahawk missiles for strikes on Russian territory, as well as the provision of security guarantees akin to NATO’s Article 5.”
• “According to an Economist/YouGov poll, 42% of Americans believe the president is more likely to side with Russia, while only 22% think he takes a balanced position.”
• “Among those unfamiliar with the details, the net balance of approval for the 'peace plan' stood at minus 10 percentage points, while among those who learned its specifics it fell to minus 17. … Support among Republicans dropped sharply from 57 to 38% after exposure to the plan’s content.”
• “In August, 87% of Americans believed that Putin would violate any agreement concluded with Ukraine. Notably, exactly the same share of Ukrainian citizens believe that the Kremlin intends to use a 'peace agreement' merely as a pause before a renewed attack.”

Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025
"Ukraine scrabbles for handholds against Russia’s massive assault", The Economist, 12.17.25.

• “On Dec. 14th situation maps around the key railway town of Kupiansk in Ukraine’s north-east flipped from red to blue,” the author wrote.
• “A successful Ukrainian counter-attack had liberated most of the town, leaving pockets of Russians encircled,” according to the author.
• “Barely 1km from enemy positions, and just weeks after Vladimir Putin had declared the town to be his, the Ukrainian president challenged Kremlin claims to be winning the war,” the author wrote.
• “Above all it’s about creative thinking, a feel for the enemy, a sense of his rhythm,” a Ukrainian commander said, as the author reported.
• “The Kupiansk counter-attack is one of few bright points for Ukraine,” according to the author.
• “Yet Ukrainian defenses are retreating faster than at any point since the start of war,” the author wrote. A Ukrainian intelligence source told the Economist Russia’s fifth army is now “several weeks” ahead of its operational plan, advancing westward near the city of Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia province.
• “Russia has assembled 160,000 troops there and is pressing ahead,” the author believes.
• “If the line now breaks, it won’t be a local setback,” he said. “Siversk is only the first domino. It will create a chain of panic,” according to the author.
• “They are still exceeding their recruitment targets by 20-30%,” said a Ukrainian intelligence officer, the author wrote.
• “We are under pressure. But we have shown that when we are organized, we can beat them,” the author believes.

“Putin’s war propaganda collapses at the front line,” Yevhenii Malik, Washington Post, 12.17.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.²

• “Moscow may even argue that its gains in 2025 exceeded those of 2024. But most of these territories have no strategic value,” Malik argues. “The Russian military has not seized a single large or medium-sized city this year,” according to the author. “It has not captured a single key transportation hub,” according to the author. While Russia did not fully capture a mid-size city this year, Russia did capture Chasiv Yar, which CNN described as a “key” and “strategically important town” in the Donetsk oblast, in mid‑2025. Prior to the capture, Ukraine's military used Chasiv Yar as a “regrouping hub,” according to Kyiv Independent.  Chasiv Yar may have been described as a small town, but it “had industrial enterprises and a powerful transport hub, including a railway,” according to Texty.org.ua. And, this “strategically important hilltop city in the Donetsk region... was the last major Ukrainian defensive position standing between Russian forces and the larger urban centers of Kostyantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk,” according to The Moscow Times. In addition, as of mid-December, Russia controlled most of the Donetsk region’s Pokrovsk, which has been repeatedly described as a key transportation and logistics hub.
• “Russia has traded enormous manpower losses for meaningless territorial gains,” the author argues. Russia increased its control of Ukrainian territory by 0.77 % in 2025 (4,669 square kilometers since Jan. 1, 2025), according to ISW. Whether the capture of 4,699 square kilometers can be described as meaningless, casualties notwithstanding, is contestable.
• “2025 was supposed to be the year Russia transformed its mobilization advantage into meaningful military results. In practice, the opposite occurred: Despite throwing countless lives into the meat-grinder, the most intense battles produced only superficial tactical shifts.,” the author claims. “Russia’s campaign continues to fail,” according to the author. 

Thursday, Dec. 18, 2025
"How can Putin afford Russia’s war in Ukraine?," Tom Parfitt, The Times, 12.18.25.

• “Military spending in Russia almost tripled from 2021 to 2024, rising from 5.9 trillion rubles to 16.2 trillion rubles per year, and its share of state spending increased from 24 per cent to 40 per cent, at the same time as exports fell by 13.5 per cent,” Parfitt wrote.
• The author noted that “between 2021 and 2024, the average monthly salary of a Russian military factory worker increased by 70 per cent…while the annual salary and relocation funds of a contract soldier jumped sevenfold,” fueling consumption even as “many of the recipients also put their money into savings, reducing inflationary pressures.”
• Citing a PeaceRep study, Parfitt reported that “the Russian economy is substantially less able to finance the war than it was at the beginning of it in 2022,” with about “76 per cent of the NWF’s $148 billion pre-war liquid reserves…used up within the first three years of the war” as oil and gas revenues fall.
• He added that Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has now revealed that the “special military operation” alone “accounted for 5.1 per cent of GDP, or about 11.1 trillion rubles,” a level that will be “increasingly difficult to raise” amid “ruble strength, low oil prices and sanctions,” a combination Janis Kluge called “a toxic mixture for the Russian treasury.”

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

"US intelligence indicates Putin's war aims in Ukraine are unchanged," Jonathan Landay, Erin Banco and John Irish, Reuters, 12.20.25.

• “U.S. intelligence reports continue to warn that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not abandoned his aims of capturing all of Ukraine and reclaiming parts of Europe that belonged to the former Soviet empire,” Reuters reported, saying the assessments “largely align with the views of European leaders and spy agencies.”
• “The intelligence has always been that Putin wants more,” Representative Mike Quigley said, according to the article. “The Europeans are convinced of it. The Poles are absolutely convinced of it. The Baltics think they're first.”
• The reporters contrasted this with the Trump team’s position, noting that the intelligence “presents a starkly different picture from that painted by U.S. President Donald Trump and his Ukraine peace negotiators, who have said Putin wants to end the conflict,” even as those negotiators push Kyiv “to withdraw its forces from the small part of Donetsk they control as part of a proposed peace deal.”
• Reuters wrote that U.S., Ukrainian and European negotiators have reached “a broad consensus” on “robust U.S.-backed guarantees of Ukraine’s security against future Russian aggression,” but that “those guarantees hinge on Zelenskiy agreeing to cede territory to Russia,” according to one source—something the Ukrainian president has publicly ruled out.
• Some Trump officials themselves acknowledge Putin’s maximalist goals: Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “I don't know if Putin wants to do a deal or Putin wants to take the whole country… We know what they wanted to achieve initially when the war began. They haven't achieved those objectives,” a remark that, as the reporters note, underscores why U.S. intelligence still assesses that the Kremlin’s ambitions in Ukraine remain unchanged. Contrast this with the following: Tulsi Gabbard wrote on X on 12.20.25:“The truth is that ‘U.S. intelligence’ assesses that Russia does not even have the capability to conquer and occupy Ukraine, what to speak of ‘invading and occupying’ Europe.”

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025
"Russia isn’t winning. Putin wants to fool you," Jeanne Shaheen and Mitch McConnell, The Washington Post, 12.22.25.

• “After almost four years of fighting, Russia has lost about a third of its strategic bombers, and it continues to lose equipment at significantly higher rates than Ukraine. It is Russia that has borne more than 1 million casualties, dead and wounded, in grinding battles of its own making,” Shaheen and McConnell write.
• “Russians are paying an extraordinary economic price in pursuit of Putin’s lust for glory and blood. Russian oil and gas revenue have fallen more than 30 percent due to attacks on its energy infrastructure. … Roughly a quarter of Russian companies are now bankrupt or at risk. Russia cannot afford the war it is fighting, but it can prolong it,” the authors argue.
• “Putin may be playing for time, but he is not dragging out this conflict because it is his preferred tactic. He is dragging it out because he cannot achieve a decisive victory. He’s hoping that slow, grinding attrition will divide the West,” Shaheen and McConnell contend.
• “Abandoning Ukraine or granting Russia what it cannot win on the battlefield will not bring lasting peace. Putin wants more than Donbas — he denies Ukrainian sovereignty outright. And his ambitions extend to the Baltic states and other nations once held captive by the Soviet empire,” the senators warn.
• “If the U.S. and its allies want a negotiated end, the only proven, viable path is to strengthen Ukraine’s position, not to weaken it,” Shaheen and McConnell conclude, adding that “Kyiv is not losing, and Moscow is not winning. It is up to Washington to match Ukraine’s resolve with the clarity this moment demands.”

"How upbeat battlefield briefings are fueling Putin’s confidence," Anastasia Stognei and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 12.22.25.

• Since October, “Putin has received six briefings in public about the frontline—the most since the war began,” Stognei and Seddon note, adding that at three of them he appeared in military uniform, underscoring how heavily he leans on these updates to shape his view of the war.
• At his four‑and‑a‑half‑hour press marathon, Putin claimed that “our troops are advancing along the whole frontline. The enemy is retreating” and promised Russians they would “witness new successes … by the end of the year,” presenting the nearly four‑year‑old war as being firmly in Russia’s favor.
• The FT recounts that in August 2024, Valery Gerasimov told Putin that Russia had halted Ukrainian advances in the Kursk region “even as Ukrainian troops had already seized parts of the territory,” causing chaotic evacuations in which “some civilians lost their lives” — one example of what Keir Giles calls a “self‑sustaining loop of disinformation.”
• Stognei and Seddon highlight that the information gap is feeding into diplomacy: JD Vance warned in October 2025 of “a fundamental misalignment of expectations… where the Russians tend to think that they’re doing better on the battlefield than they actually are,” which, he said, has made reaching a peace deal with Kyiv significantly harder.
• Massicot estimates that the “casualties needed to take the remainder of Donetsk — which would be very high — don’t seem to bother him that much,” arguing that Putin has simply “lengthened the timeline to achieve his ultimate goal — subordination of Ukraine to Russia via political or military means,” rather than scaling back his objectives.

"Ukraine is leveraging its powerful – and cheap – new drone killers for air defense," Dmytro Zhyhinas, Derek Gatopoulos and Vasilisa Stepanenko, AP/The Washington Post, 12.22.25.

• The reporters describe Ukraine’s new interceptor drones such as the Sting as “a game-changing new weapon,” quoting the unit commander “Loi”: “Every destroyed target is something that did not hit our homes, our families, our power plants. The enemy does not sleep, and neither do we.”
• They note that nightly Russian strikes have forced Kyiv “to rewrite the air defense rule book and develop cut-price drone killers costing as little as $1,000,” with interceptors going “from prototype to mass production in just a few months in 2025.”
• Andrii Lavrenovych of General Cherry, which develops the Bullet interceptor, stresses the cost asymmetry: “The drones they destroy cost anywhere from $10,000 to $300,000…. We are inflicting serious economic damage.”
• Federico Borsari of the Center for European Policy Analysis calls these systems “a valuable addition to Ukraine’s — and Europe’s — anti-drone arsenal,” saying that “cheap interceptor drones have become so important, and so quickly, that we can consider them a cornerstone of modern counter-unmanned aerial systems… They realign the cost and scale equation of air defense,” while warning “it would be a mistake to see them as a silver bullet.”
• Looking ahead, the article notes that “defense planners in Ukraine and NATO expect the hyper-scaling of drone production on both sides of the conflict to continue in 2026,” with European plans for a layered “drone wall” and Lavrenovych arguing that “drones must become fully autonomous robots with artificial intelligence — as scary as that may sound — to help our soldiers survive.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

"Messy Compromise On Ukraine Leaves EU Looking Wobbly," Jeanna Smialek, The New York Times, 12.20.25. 

• “After more than 16 hours of negotiations, leaders from across the 27-nation bloc had come up with a plan to finance a desperate Ukraine through 2027. It wasn't the plan that officials had been talking up for weeks. Instead, it was a messy compromise,” Smialek wrote.
• “A much more decisive signal could have been sent, and they failed to do that,” Mujtaba Rahman argued, as the author noted that “even the solution that eventually emerged was not a clear display of European unity. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will not participate in the compromise loan plan.”
• “The agreement will use the European Union's own budget to back the loan, instead of using the €210 billion worth of Russian state assets immobilized in Europe,” Smialek explained, adding that “by early Friday morning, it was clear that the frozen-asset plan itself was dead for now.”
• “There was a geopolitical purpose in the use of these reserves,” Rahman said, according to the author. “Yes, the assets are immobilized, but they will be more susceptible to pressure from the United States and Russia.”
• “Europe has sent a signal of weakness, one likely to resonate in both Moscow and Washington,” policy analyst Juraj Majcin warned, as Smialek reported, quoting him further: “Trump understands only power, like Putin does. We failed geopolitically.” 

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025

“A Reparations Loan for Ukraine?” The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 12.17.25.

• “Europe is considering a legal workaround to seize Russian assets, proposing a ‘reparations loan’ for Ukraine secured by more than $245 billion in frozen Russian funds held in the EU,” the Editorial Board reports.
• “The plan would involve borrowing $164 billion from Euroclear based on Russian assets and granting Ukraine an interest-free loan, with repayment only if Russia pays reparations after the war,” the article notes.
• “Belgium, where most of the funds are held, objects over legal and financial risks, while other EU members seek stronger guarantees to prevent Russia from reclaiming its assets through legal channels,” the article states.
• “Euroclear faces threats of Russian lawsuits and possible intimidation, while the maneuver raises concerns about the euro’s stability as a reserve currency and the precedent it may set,” the Editorial Board observes.
• “Despite legal complexities and opposition, the Editorial Board argues that Europe should act decisively on Russian assets to deter future aggression and strengthen support for Ukraine,” the article concludes.

Friday, Dec. 19, 2025

"By Not Tapping Russian Assets for Ukraine, Europe Showed Its Fear," Laurence Norman and Daniel Michaels, The Wall Street Journal, 12.19.25.

• “European leaders trying to help Ukraine stand up against Russia blinked,” Norman and Michaels wrote.
• “When the leaders failed early Friday in their bid to use Russian assets to fund Kyiv’s war effort, they displayed once again a split that has riven Ukraine’s backers since Russia invaded almost four years ago,” the authors observed.
• The reporters argued that the outcome “showed how divided Europe remains over how boldly it is willing to confront Moscow.”
• According to Norman and Michaels, the failure to tap the assets underscored “Europe’s fear of Russian retaliation and legal uncertainty over confiscating state funds.”
• The authors suggested that Moscow “will likely read the decision as a sign that its threats and pressure are working.”

"Another Half-Measure for Ukraine," Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 12.19.25.

• “If Russia does ever triumph over Ukraine, history will observe that Western Europe and the United States lacked the will to do more than half-measures to block the Kremlin’s imperialism,” the Editorial Board wrote
• “The nearly $105.5 billion loan for Ukraine will at least ease Ukraine’s looming cash crunch,” the editors acknowledged, but added that “this is nonetheless a half measure because Europe couldn’t agree to use some $245 billion in frozen Russian assets in Europe.”
• “This so-called reparations loan met fierce resistance from Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever, who feared Brussels could be left on the hook for billions of euros if anything went wrong,” the Editorial Board noted.
• The editors warned that “Russia had threatened retribution if the EU went ahead with the reparations loan, and one risk is that the Kremlin will conclude it succeeded with its intimidation.”
• “It’s hard to believe Vladimir Putin can wreak four years of bloody havoc in Europe and still may get his money back,” the Editorial Board argued, concluding that “Ukraine will have to make do with the loan and whatever weapons it can buy to survive.”

"Europe finds €90bn for Ukraine—but not from Russia," The Economist, 12.19.25.

• “A ‘reparations loan’ would recycle Russian assets frozen in the EU by sanctions into a €90bn funding package for Ukraine—intended to keep it armed and solvent for over a year,” the article explains, but notes that “at an EU summit on December 18th the bloc’s 27 national leaders could not agree on the reparations loan they had been discussing for weeks.”
• The author writes that “having failed to pull off the reparations scheme, the EU will instead jointly borrow €90bn and lend it on to Ukraine,” which “will ensure that the authorities in Kyiv do not run out of money in the early months of 2026, though more aid will be needed in around a year.”
• Still, “the EU’s failure to pull off the reparations loan after endless talks will be taken in Washington as extra evidence that the bloc is an impotent force whose discordant views can safely be ignored,” the piece warns, even though the plan “had the imprimatur of the bloc’s most powerful politicians,” from Ursula von der Leyen to German chancellor Friedrich Merz.
• According to the article, using the €210bn in frozen Russian assets “would have both given Ukraine the money it needs and delivered a financial blow to its invader,” whereas now “because the money will be borrowed against the EU budget, the bloc’s taxpayers will ultimately be on the hook for the €90bn,” with Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic opting out.
• The author highlights that the scheme “encountered bitter opposition from one country, Belgium, where the vast majority of the €210bn in frozen Russian assets are located,” and concludes that by failing to overcome Belgian objections and other political hesitations, “the EU has ended a terrible year by throwing away an opportunity” to fund Ukraine directly with Russian wealth and send “a strong message to the invaders.”

"EU avoids risky precedent in Ukraine aid deal," Molly O’Neal, Responsible Statecraft, 12.19.25.

• “In the early hours on Friday, they opted instead to extend a loan of €90 billion backed only by the EU’s own budget,” O’Neal writes, noting that the attempt to leverage frozen Russian assets for a ‘reparations loan’ to Ukraine “opened a breach within the EU that could not be overcome.”
• “Russian reserves held in EU banks amount to about €210 billion, of which €185 billion are held by Brussels-based depository Euroclear,” the author explains; Belgium and Euroclear, she adds, “saw this scheme as exposing them to unacceptable risks, including litigation by Russia or confiscation of frozen assets of European companies in Russia.”
• According to O’Neal, “the Trump administration reportedly urged EU members not to adopt the reparations loan scheme, because the U.S. may want Russia to authorize the use of some or all of its frozen assets in Europe to fund reconstruction in Ukraine as part of a peace settlement,” a stance that aligned some EU governments with Washington’s preferences.
• She reports that “because Euroclear underpins the position of the euro as a reserve currency, any action that amounted to confiscation of euro-denominated assets could harm confidence in the currency and raise borrowing costs of EU governments,” reinforcing legal and financial concerns about turning Russian assets into security for Ukraine aid.
• O’Neal concludes that the failure of the reparations-loan push “may well have damaged the EU’s ambitions to become a geopolitical actor on an equal footing with the United States, Russia, or China,” even as Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia ultimately “agreed not to obstruct an EU loan to Ukraine,” showing that conventional EU-backed financing “was never out of reach.”

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Seizing Russian Funds Was a Test That Europe Failed," Marc Champion and Lionel Laurent, Bloomberg, 12.19.25.
• "Europe needs strategic purpose matched with action," Editorial Board, Financial Times, 12.22.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025

"Is a Russia-Ukraine Peace Deal Finally Within Reach?" Paul J. Saunders and Andrew C. Kuchins, The National Interest, 12.16.25.

• “Saunders frames the moment cautiously, hesitating to describe the effort underway as a formal negotiating process. Kuchins still argues that recent developments look ‘more promising’ than in prior years. Among the most striking signals, he says, is the Kremlin’s decision to devote serious time and attention to the talks.”
• “Kuchins identifies three unresolved issues that will define any settlement: territorial concessions, security guarantees, and the fate of frozen Russian central bank assets held in Europe. On the latter, Ukraine faces a looming fiscal crisis, with projected deficits of $45 to $50 billion annually. Europe is reluctant to absorb these costs indefinitely.”
• “Kuchins pushes back against what he calls Europe’s growing ‘war hysteria,’ arguing that Moscow has paid an extraordinary price for limited gains. ‘They have taken over a million casualties for, frankly, not that much real estate,’ he says. The conflict will soon last longer than the Soviet Union’s war against Nazi Germany. Far from emerging stronger, Kuchins argues Russia is more isolated than at any point in its history, now overleveraged to China and cut off from decades of economic integration with the West.”

Friday, Dec. 19, 2025

Jake Sullivan’s remarks on Ukraine in “Is America Giving Away the Keys to AI Dominance?,” Jake Sullivan and John Finer, The Long Game Podcast, 12.19.25.

• “We’re going to put ourselves in the shoes of the Ukrainians as they consider whether to take this deal or not. And we’re going to put ourselves in the shoes of the Russians as they consider whether to take this deal or not,” Jake Sullivan said.
• Sullivan outlined the core offer as “an Article 5 like security guarantee, not NATO, but effectively a commitment from the United States and Europe to defend Ukraine if it’s attacked again,” plus “a pathway to the European Union for Ukraine” and “limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces, but at a high level, 800,000 standing person army.”
• He added that “Ukraine would give up the rest of the Donbass… fundamentally, they’d have to give up their own sovereign territory they currently control,” in exchange for “use of some Russian sovereign assets for rebuilding Ukraine and access to other investment so that Ukraine would be able to deal with its significant budget problems and with this gargantuan task of reconstruction.”
• “I do think in some ways that is the most positive version of the deal that is on the table from the perspective of the Ukrainians,” Sullivan said, while stressing that “all of this is subject to negotiation and pressure still at this point” and that “the Russians may just say, no way, we need more.”
• Sullivan noted that one contested element is “some form of standing European force on the physical territory of Ukraine as part of guaranteeing Ukraine’s future security,” acknowledging that he had initially left it out because “the Russians have so emphatically rejected that.”
• “I do not think Ukraine should take a deal at the point of a gun,” Sullivan argued. “I object to the whole process of so ostentatiously squeezing them, saying basically, you’re the weaker party, you have to give in. So I think this whole context is problematic.”
• Making the case a Ukrainian adviser might give for accepting, Sullivan said that “President Trump has a gun to our head, us being the Ukrainians,” warning that “America could cut off intelligence and weapons,” that “we could lose all of the Donbass and more on the battlefield over the coming months,” and concluding that “the deal could get worse rather than better… we should take it now rather than take the risk of waiting and actually having our situation deteriorate.”

"Why Trump's 'peace deals' keep unraveling," Keith B. Richburg, The Washington Post, 12.19.25.

• “December hasn't been kind to President Donald Trump's global peacemaking efforts,” Keith B. Richburg writes, noting that “the setbacks show that in the complicated business of peacemaking, signing a ceasefire deal before the cameras is usually just the beginning.”
• “Changing the realities on the ground — and getting combatants to lay down their weapons — requires a more sustained level of follow-through and commitment,” according to the author, who adds that Trump’s interventions in Congo and along the Thailand–Cambodia border “defy quick and easy solutions.”
• “The Ukraine war is itself the product of entering into flimsy peace agreements and not following through,” Richburg argues, recalling that the Minsk accords “only brought the illusion of peace” and that, even years later, “Ukrainians spoke as if the war was still ongoing. And it was.”
• “All of the conflicts Trump is trying to solve have roots going back decades,” the author writes, emphasizing that “in all these conflicts, enmities run deep, and are passed on through generations” and “are not easily undone by handshakes in Washington, Kuala Lumpur or Cairo.”
• “Trump fancies himself a peacemaker and a dealmaker,” Richburg concludes, but “solving a war takes time, patient diplomacy and follow through,” and “announcing ceasefire deals is easy, but the people with the guns also have a say.”

“Results of the Year with Vladimir Putin,” Kremlin.ru 12.19.25.³ Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Putin said during the live Q&A: “We very much want and are striving to ensure that next year we can live in conditions of peace and without any military conflicts. We will seek to resolve all disputed issues through negotiations. But we must achieve the elimination of the root causes of the conflict so that nothing like this happens again in the future and peace is long term, strong and stable.”
• Putin said during the live Q&A : “President Trump is making serious efforts to end this conflict. As I have repeatedly said, he is doing this, in my view, absolutely sincerely. At the meeting with President Trump in Anchorage we coordinated and in practice agreed to his proposals. To say that we are rejecting something is absolutely incorrect and has no basis. The ball is entirely on the side of our Western opponents, above all the Kyiv regime’s leaders and their mainly European sponsors. We are ready for negotiations and to end the conflict by peaceful means.”
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “We are ready to work with … the United Kingdom, with Europe as a whole, with the United States—but on equal terms and with mutual respect. We are not demanding anything extraordinary. We simply insist on the fulfillment of the promises and obligations our Western partners themselves assumed. We were deceived: we were told NATO would not move eastward ‘not one inch,’ yet there were several waves of expansion.”
• Putin said during the live Q&A: “We see, feel and know about certain signals, including from the Kyiv regime, that they are ready to conduct some kind of dialogue. The only thing I want to say is that we are ready and want to end this conflict by peaceful means, on the basis of the principles I set out in June last year at the Russian Foreign Ministry, and by eliminating the root causes that led to this crisis.
• Putin claimed during the live Q&A: “Immediately after our forces drove the enemy out of the Kursk region, the strategic initiative passed completely into the hands of the Russian Armed Forces. Our troops are advancing along the entire line of contact: somewhere faster, somewhere more slowly, but everywhere the enemy is retreating. I am sure that by the end of this year we will still witness new successes of our Armed Forces and our fighters on the line of combat contact.”
• Putin said during the live Q&A: “As a result of active and effective actions by our troops, the enemy has apparently suffered very serious losses in its strategic reserves; they are practically exhausted. This is a very significant factor that, I hope, should push the Kyiv regime to resolve all disputed issues and end this conflict by peaceful means. Their reserves have practically run out.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A : “There will be no special military operations if you treat us with respect and take our interests into account, just as we tried to take yours into account. If you do not try to ‘cheat’ us as you did with NATO’s eastward expansion, if you do not simply ignore our security interests, then there will be no need for any operations.” Putin also said: “If anyone tries to create threats like a blockade of Kaliningrad Region, we will destroy these threats. Everyone must understand this and be aware that actions of this kind would lead to an escalation unprecedented up to now, would take the conflict to a completely different level and broaden it up to a large scale armed confrontation.”
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “The Secretary General of NATO says they must prepare for war with Russia. But can they read? Let them read the new U.S. National Security Strategy. The United States—the key NATO player—does not name Russia as an enemy there. Yet the NATO Secretary General is aiming the alliance at war with us. This shows an insufficient level of professional fitness for such a position.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “Are we planning to attack Europe? What nonsense. This is being done for domestic political reasons—to create the image of an enemy, to cover up the systemic mistakes many Western governments have made for years in economics and social policy.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “We have long proposed creating a new security architecture with the participation of the United States, Eastern European states and Russia, so that no one would be excluded and no one would be placed in a difficult position.
• Vladimir Putin claimed during the live Q&A: “We did not start this war. It was begun after the unconstitutional coup d’état in Ukraine in 2014 and the start of hostilities by the Kiev regime’s leaders against their own citizens in the southeast of Ukraine. After we were deceived over the Minsk agreements, we were forced to use the Armed Forces to end that war, which had been launched by Kiev with Western support.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “We once had cooperation with NATO, and at one time there was even discussion of direct membership of first the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation, in NATO. In both cases it became clear that we were not wanted there, while the promises on non expansion of NATO were ignored. The advance of military infrastructure to our borders naturally caused and still causes our legitimate concerns.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “If Europe wants to remain as an independent center of civilization, its future must be together with Russia. We naturally complement each other and, by uniting and complementing our capabilities, we would prosper instead of waging war with each other. If this does not happen, Europe will gradually disappear.”
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A: “As President Lukashenko said yesterday, Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed on the territory of Belarus. We regularly conduct exercises; the security of the Union State will, without doubt, be ensured.
• Vladimir Putin said during the live Q&A “Results of the Year with Vladimir Putin,” joking about rumors of weapons in space: “I will tell you, but this must remain strictly between us. It is our secret weapon, but we will use it only in the most extreme case, because we are against the deployment of any weapons in space in general.
• Vladimir Putin said at the live Q&A that more than 400,000 people signed military contracts in 2025, that the number of missing soldiers has halved, and that Russians have donated 83 billion rubles in support of the war.
• Putin said during the live Q&A “Results of the Year with Vladimir Putin,” commenting on Western seizures of Russian assets: “What is happening is not a theft – theft is a secret taking of property. Here they are trying to do it openly. This is robbery. But they cannot complete this robbery because the consequences may be very serious for the robbers themselves – up to undermining confidence in the euro zone and in the very foundations of the modern global financial order.

"Simultaneous Game: What Putin Said in His ‘Results of the Year’ Show," Vladislav Gorin, Carnegie Politika, 12.19.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Gorin writes that in his marathon “Results of the Year” show, Putin repeatedly insisted that “our troops are advancing along the whole line of contact” and promised that “by the end of the year we will still witness successes of our fighters,” portraying the nearly four‑year‑old war in Ukraine as going Russia’s way despite mounting costs.
• According to the author, Putin framed the campaign as a struggle for Russia’s “historical lands,” making clear that he will not agree to end the war “at least until all of Donbas is obtained,” and presenting control over the Slavyansk‑Kramatorsk agglomeration as a minimum precondition for any peace deal.
• Gorin notes that Putin tied his battlefield narrative directly to the peace talks Trump is pushing, arguing before the cameras that Ukrainian forces have “practically no strategic reserves left” and that Russia can “achieve what it wants by force,” while saying he is ready for “compromises for humanitarian reasons and out of respect for Trump personally.”
• The article highlights that, in leaks about the August Alaska summit with Trump, Putin’s maximal acceptable “compromise” was to limit formal claims to the parts of Donbas and the Azov coast already occupied and to swap Russian‑held areas of Kharkiv and Sumy for Ukrainian‑held parts of Donetsk—territorial concessions Kyiv and Zelensky still regard as unacceptable.
• Gorin concludes that the entire performance was aimed less at the Russian public than at one key foreign audience: Trump. By constantly repeating that Russia is winning and will fight until at least all of Donbas is under its control, while presenting Ukraine as the side “obstructing peace,” Putin is trying to shape U.S. expectations about any Ukraine settlement and to lock in a deal that legitimizes Russia’s gains from the war.

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

 “Geopolitical Risk, Rivalry, and Restraint w/Graham Allison, Ph.D.,” podcast, John Ashford, Across the Aisle, 12.20.25.

• “What do we know about Russia’s war in Ukraine? This has now gone on for more than three years, approaching four next February. Certainly more than a million casualties between the two sides, maybe two. Ukraine is a country where a quarter of the population is no longer living in the country. Its economy—about a third of it—has been crushed.”
• “We’re coming into winter now. The electrical system and the heating system are in dire condition. A million customers report being without power. In Kyiv, they have more hours of blackout than hours of electricity. This is a society that has been crushed physically, but whose spirit, resilience, and determination have shocked the world.”
• “I think the U.S. intelligence community, the British intelligence community, the Israeli intelligence community—everybody else—would have imagined Russia would have succeeded fairly quickly, given how strong its armies were in Ukraine in that first week. But they didn’t. Nonetheless, as the fighting has continued, Ukraine has simply lost a little more every month. We track this in a project here at Harvard, Russia Matters. We publish a weekly report card every Wednesday showing what happened in the last week and the last month. Every month, Ukraine loses another couple hundred square miles. It’s just every month.” “So now there’s roughly 2,500 square miles of Donbas—one of the provinces Russia has not yet seized—but at the current pace, it will be taken within the next year or so unless there’s an agreement. This is a horrifying situation.:
• “Trump repeatedly expresses the view that this is madness—people killing each other over something that shouldn’t have happened in the first place and where you can pretty much predict the eventual outcome. So why should another slice of people be killed over the next year?”Into this comes the diplomatic establishment, which has worked the problem in various ways. We have to look at the results and ask whether those approaches have succeeded. Trump has decided that some combination of his personality and people who think in business terms—real estate deals, transactional logic—might find options that traditional diplomacy couldn’t.”
• “Given the track record of the alternatives, trying something different is a reasonable idea. Witkoff is clearly an interesting and effective negotiator, as is Jared. Both have shown themselves to be imaginative about possibilities. That’s level one. Level two is that, historically, these issues have ninety-nine dimensions. They are extraordinarily complicated. Having the outline of a deal does not mean you have a deal. I don’t know enough about New York real estate to know whether you can agree in principle and leave the other ninety-nine layers to lawyers—but that’s why contracts are long and complicated.”

"Russia’s economy is struggling. But that won’t bring Putin to the negotiating table for years," Lauren Kent, CNN, 12.20.25.

• “The Russian economy has been dealing with growing headwinds this year: unruly inflation, a ballooning budget deficit – due in part to massive military spending – and shrinking revenues from oil and natural gas,” Kent writes, noting that the IMF expects inflation to average 7.6% in 2025, down from 9.5% in 2024.
• NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Russia is now spending “nearly 40% of its budget ‘on aggression’,” Kent reports, while SIPRI figures show that this military outlay “jumped 38% last year compared with 2023,” underscoring how rapidly the war share of state spending has grown.
• To finance this, “the burden on society has taken the form of a large increase in corporate and income tax rates, as well as a hike in the value-added tax (VAT),” Kent notes, describing how higher taxation is being used to plug a “ballooning budget deficit” driven by record defense spending.
• Russian casualties are estimated at “nearing 1 million people, with 250,000 of those dead,” according to a CSIS study cited by Kent, yet the Kremlin has “largely avoided the kinds of protests seen during the wars in Chechnya and Afghanistan,” in part because of generous pay and compensation.
• Wartime pay has dramatically reshaped income distribution: some types of workers in war‑related industries “saw their wages triple and in some cases quintuple between 2021 and 2024,” visiting scholar Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva told CNN, while Connolly added that “Russian soldiers today are paid more than any Russian soldier in the history of Russian soldiers,” making service far more lucrative than civilian work in many depressed regions.

Sunday, Dec. 21, 2025
"Russia Dismisses Reports of Progress in Ukraine Peace Talks," Anushka Patil, The New York Times, 12.21.25.

• The joint U.S.–Ukrainian statement said the delegations had held “productive and constructive” meetings in Miami and that discussions focused on the “further development of a 20-point plan” to end the war.
• Patil writes that the plan “was put forth by Ukraine this month in an effort to push back against a proposal from Mr. Trump that called on the Ukrainians to cede more land,” and that it is “unlikely to be accepted by Russia.”
• After meeting Kirill Dmitriev, Steve Witkoff said: “Russia remains fully committed to achieving peace in Ukraine. Russia highly values the efforts and support of the United States to resolve the Ukrainian conflict and re-establish global security.”
• On Sunday in Moscow, Kremlin foreign-policy aide Yuri Ushakov “said that most of the proposals discussed during negotiations with the United States had been put forth by Ukrainian and European representatives and were ‘rather unconstructive,’ TASS reported,” Patil notes.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• Video: “On GPS: Antony Blinken on how to stop Putin’s war in Ukraine,” Fareed Zakaria, CNN, 12.21.25
• "Sergey Radchenko on Ukraine Peace Negotiations," podcast interview, CSIS, 12.12.25. (published 12.18.25)
• "Ukraine’s Peace Deal Is Stuck on Territory for Good Reason," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 12.17.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Monday, Dec. 15, 2025

Trump’s Dated Strategy Is Putting Us on a Path to World War III, Greg Grandin, New York Times, 12.15.25.

• “The White House offers a vision of the world carved up into garrisoned spheres of competing influence…The heart of the [National Security Strategy] report is a pledge to ‘reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American pre-eminence’,” Grandin writes.
• Trump’s version of the Monroe Doctrine goes beyond the Western Hemisphere, aiming to lock out China, extract resources, restrict migration, and allow the U.S. to act unilaterally “where and when” it pleases globally.
• The administration has stepped up military and political intervention throughout Latin America, including unprecedented buildup in the Caribbean and aggressive measures against Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and others.
• Grandin argues that adopting this exclusionary, balance-of-power logic mirrors the world order before both world wars—when competing “doctrines” and spheres of influence led to escalating confrontation.
• “Trump’s renewal of the Monroe Doctrine comes at a similarly precarious moment... This ideal of a world organized around a multifront balance of power... means there will most likely be more confrontation, more brinkmanship, more war,” Grandin concludes.

"A vision and policy agenda for a safer world," Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings, 12.15.25.

• “Visionary thinking about how to build a more stable and secure world flourished in the aftermath of the Cold War, but has largely stalled over the last dozen years in the United States,” O’Hanlon writes, arguing that “today’s transnational dangers are too great to let strategic imagination be crowded out by traditional great-power rivalries.”
• The author contends that “some of the immediate causes of those rivalries are, in principle, addressable, if policymakers engage them creatively and energetically,” and that “restoring something close to the low likelihood of war that was seen in the 1990s is essential.”
• O’Hanlon lays out a core plank of his agenda as the need to “mitigate or resolve major territorial disputes in strategically significant regions,” including “designing a security architecture for Eastern Europe that protects Ukraine while lowering tensions with Russia,” and “encouraging Taiwan and China to explore a mutually acceptable formula for a commonwealth-style arrangement that permanently preserves Taiwanese autonomy.”
• He further argues that the world must “reduce the risks posed by advanced technologies—artificial intelligence (AI), modern microbiology, and nuclear weapons—through arms control and other collaborative means,” proposing “new international safety tools—such as societal verification—to monitor and regulate AI and microbiology technologies.”
• According to O’Hanlon, the vision must also “redouble efforts to reduce global poverty and improve governance,” which he frames as “broadly promoting human dignity,” a goal he believes “may attract broader international support than more culturally charged and Western-oriented appeals to ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights.’”

“After a Generation of Peace, Europe Tells Its People to Prepare for War,” Max Colchester and Bertrand Benoit, Wall Street Journal, 12.15.25.

• “European security officials now regularly broadcast a message nearly unimaginable a decade ago: Get ready for conflict with Russia… a profound psychological shift for a continent that has rebuilt itself after two world wars by trumpeting harmony and joint economic prosperity,” Colchester and Benoit report.
• In speeches, leading figures like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and NATO’s Mark Rutte warn that if Ukraine falls, Russia may not stop, and that Europe faces the possibility of war on the scale endured by previous generations.
• This urgency is intensified by fears that Trump could push Ukraine into accepting a lopsided peace, freeing Russia to refocus against Europe, and that a more isolationist U.S. might not come to Europe’s aid in a crisis.
• Security chiefs warn that Russia has already begun covert “gray zone” warfare against Europe—cyberattacks, sabotage, airspace intrusions—and are urging higher defense spending, the return of conscription, and large-scale military exercises.
• Governments across Europe are raising military budgets, war-gaming rapid deployment scenarios, and reinstating voluntary service, with NATO members boosting defense spending targets to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 as officials warn sacrifices may be required to deter Putin.

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025

"Susie Wiles, JD Vance, and the ‘Junkyard Dogs’: The White House Chief of Staff on Trump’s Second Term (Parts 1–2)," Chris Whipple, Vanity Fair, 12.16.25.

• “I asked Wiles what she makes of the president’s affinity for Russian president Vladimir Putin, who seems to have cast a spell over Trump since he first ran for president,” Chris Whipple wrote, noting that Wiles recalled Helsinki by saying, “I thought there was a real sort of friendship there, or at least an admiration. But on the phone calls that we’ve had with Putin, it’s been very mixed. Some of them have been friendly and some of them not.”
• Describing who shapes Russia and Ukraine policy for Trump, Whipple reported that “Vance, Rubio, and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s all-purpose special envoy, and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, an informal adviser, have been running Trump’s foreign policy since the departure of National Security Advisor Mike Waltz,” a configuration Wiles said she was “not horrified by.”
• On Trump’s televised clash with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Whipple wrote that “the president and Vance berated Ukraine’s leader on worldwide television,” and that Wiles later reflected, “If we had it to do over, I wouldn’t have cameras, because it was going to end that way,” which she presented as the culmination of “a bad sort of sentiment all the way around” from Zelenskyy’s side.
• Explaining how Trump views Putin’s war aims, Whipple recounted that “Trump’s team was divided on whether Putin’s goal was anything less than a complete Russian takeover of Ukraine,” with Wiles saying, “The experts think that if he could get the rest of Donetsk, then he would be happy,” but adding that, privately, “Donald Trump thinks he wants the whole country.”
• Asked whether that assessment was accurate, Whipple wrote that Rubio pointed to Russia’s rejection of ceasefire ideas: “There are offers on the table right now to basically stop this war at its current lines of contact, okay? Which include substantial parts of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, which they’ve controlled since 2014. And the Russians continue to turn it down. And so… you do start to wonder, well, maybe what this guy wants is the entire country,” Rubio told him.
• Whipple noted that in Wiles’s West Wing office “is a photograph of Trump and Vladimir Putin standing together, signed by Trump: ‘TO SUSIE YOU ARE THE GREATEST! DONALD,’” an image that, according to the author, symbolizes the importance of Trump’s personal relationship with Putin in the current U.S.–Russia dynamic.
• Reflecting on Trump’s broader war posture, Wiles insisted to Whipple that “I cannot overstate how much his ongoing motivation is to stop the killing,” saying that in this second term “stopping the killing wasn’t his first thought. It’s his first and last thought now,” even as Trump has pursued hard‑line positions toward Ukraine’s leadership and embraced closer dealings with Moscow.
• At the same time, Whipple reported that Trump had already abandoned hopes for a Ukraine ceasefire before his August summit with Putin in Alaska: “In the walk-up to the August summit with Putin in Alaska, Trump had publicly sought a ceasefire in Ukraine…. But in fact, Trump gave up on a ceasefire before the Anchorage meeting began,” highlighting the fragility of U.S. mediation efforts.
• Summing up the stakes, Whipple wrote that “Trump’s second term has been more consequential than his first,” and that on Russia and Ukraine he could either “leave office as a transformational president” who reshaped NATO and the European security order—or “pursue reckless vendettas, shred democratic guardrails, and end up in the crosshairs of Democrat-led investigations,” with Wiles potentially “the thin line between the president and disaster.”

“The Imperial Trap: Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Lessons of Failed Conquests,” Jeffrey Mankoff, War on the Rocks, 12.16.25.

• “The growing consensus that Ukraine is losing ground has shaped ongoing ceasefire talks, but lost in the narrative is that Russia, too, faces mounting political, social, and economic pressures reminiscent of its history of failed imperial wars,” Mankoff writes.
• “From the Crimean War to Afghanistan, Russian defeats have often resulted from underestimating opponents, ignoring Western intervention, and overextending a fragile economy—dynamics repeating in Ukraine even as Russia adapts militarily and circumvents some sanctions.”
• “Despite battlefield gains, Russia’s long war is deepening strategic dependence on China, amplifying ethnic and elite tensions, and risking economic destabilization as defense spending becomes unsustainable and casualties mount,” the article finds.
• “Even if a ceasefire is reached, the Kremlin will face the challenges of selling a costly compromise to the public, reintegrating traumatized veterans, and winding down a mobilization economy—while sanctions, elite infighting, and chronic stagnation persist.”
• “Mankoff concludes that, while autocratic Russia has claimed time is on its side, history suggests its system is ill-equipped for prolonged wars of attrition—a dynamic that may eventually force Moscow into uncomfortable concessions, as in past imperial conflicts.”

“‘Collective Security’ Is on Life Support,” Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 12.16.25.

• “If collective security means a system in which the world’s major powers renounce using force to alter the status quo and agree to unite to stop any country that violates this pledge, then it is not dead for one simple reason: It was never alive.”
• The article points to the ongoing war in Europe: “The tendency for states to join forces against external threats can also be seen in the way that the United States and much of Europe rallied to support Ukraine after Russia invaded in February 2022. But it also explains why China and North Korea have given Russia considerable support as that war has dragged on.”
• Walt notes divisions within Europe, writing: “In Europe, for example, some states see Russia as a relentless aggressor seeking to rebuild its former empire and dominate the European continent, while others do not share this alarmist view.”
• “Even these more modest forms of collective security are not that effective and are becoming less so, which will make the world of the future more dangerous than the recent past.”
• “The final and most effective form of collective security—which is more accurately described as ‘collective defense’—is a military alliance… But even these arrangements… do not always prevent war because deterrence sometimes fails.”
• “We cannot count on similar predictability and stability today because there is much less consensus on which states pose the greatest threats or how best to respond to them… What this means is that U.S. and European strategic interests are diverging, which will inevitably weaken NATO even if the alliance remains formally intact.”
• “Collective security may not be dead, but it is certainly not in good health.”

"Building Europe’s ‘drone wall’: Embracing and scaling cheap defensive technologies," Gabriella Calder, European Leadership Network, 12.16.25.

• “On September 10th, around 20 unarmed Russian Gerbera drones entered Polish airspace,” Calder wrote, noting that “multi-million-dollar capabilities, including missiles fired from Patriot air defense systems and F-35s, were used to intercept drones worth no more than $10,000 USD each.”
• “Counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) are a weak spot in NATO’s current European air defense posture,” the author argued, adding that “member states along the frontline with Russia lack the capabilities to create anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones over their airspace.”
• Calder observed that “under its current EU framing, the drone wall project would be too broad and costly in scope to meet the key priorities,” and believes that “any initial configuration of the European drone wall should prioritise acquiring C-UAS for Eastern Flank countries first.”
• “Ukraine has been required to develop and inexpensively produce high quantities of interceptor drones to respond more effectively to the repeated attacks,” the author wrote, highlighting that a domestic ‘drone wall’ built by Atreyd now uses “radar-triggered first-person view (FPV) drones” whose interceptors “cost no more than a few thousand dollars each and can be reused if launched but not detonated.”
• According to Calder, the U.S.-developed Merops system—“integral to the EDFL’s first stage”—has already been used by Ukraine “to down over 1,000 Shahed drones, achieving a 95% success rate,” and she concludes that while Europeans are wary of dependence on Washington, “benefitting from American training now will prepare them to shoulder the burden of continental defense more independently in the future.”

Friday, Dec. 19, 2025

"The old new Cold War is dead. Long live the new old Cold War: The political logic of Trumpian strategy," Adam Tooze, Chartbook, 12.19.2025.

• Tooze notes that Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy “blandly describes a world of great power bargaining” with Russia and China, emphasizing “stabilizing relations with Russia,” even as Moscow wages a large‑scale war in Ukraine—marking a sharp break from the more confrontational “new Cold War” framing of Trump’s 2017 and Biden’s NSS.
• In this new document, the ideological heat is “reserved for … Europe,” while Russia is treated as a partner for “spheres of influence” deals, a shift that implicitly accepts continued Russian domination of parts of Ukraine and undercuts the traditional U.S. posture of defending Europe’s security order born from the Cold War.
• By downplaying Russia as a systemic adversary even after its nuclear threats over Ukraine, Tooze argues, the 2025 NSS recasts the U.S.–Russia relationship as transactional rather than normative, raising questions about how Washington would respond to further escalation in Ukraine or to Russian nuclear brinkmanship.
• He highlights that MAGA strategists “see the traditional image of America held by Atlanticist centrist Europeans as part of the problem,” and that their open alignment with Europe’s far right risks fracturing the pro‑Ukraine, pro‑NATO consensus that has underpinned Western deterrence—including the credibility of extended nuclear guarantees.
• In Tooze’s reading, the Trump team is trying to “wind the clock back to the 1950s” in Europe while accepting great‑power carve‑ups elsewhere, but unlike in the old Cold War, it does so without a stable hegemony at home—creating a volatile context in which U.S. nuclear and Ukraine policy are increasingly driven by domestic culture war rather than a coherent grand strategy.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

• “China’s escalation dominance over Trump, “Edward Luce, Financial Times, 12.17.25.
• "U.S. Strategists Keep Getting France’s Defeat Wrong," Alan Allport, Foreign Policy, 12.18.25.
• “Europe Is Missing Its Moment: It’s Time to Finally Reform—or Risk Irrelevance,” Douglas Rediker and Heidi Crebo-Rediker, Foreign Affairs, 12.17.25.
• "Too Early, Too Alone: France Prepares for Russia as U.S. Withdraws," Laura Kayali, Politico, 12.21.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

Thursday, Dec. 18, 2025

“China and Russia Bolster Their ‘No Limits’ Alliance,” Seth G. Jones, Wall Street Journal, 12.18.25.

• “China and Russia are deepening cooperation and taking aggressive actions with significant consequences for the U.S. and its allies,” Jones writes.
• “Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China has increased exports to Russia of dual-use goods, helping Russia triple missile production and supporting its war effort,” the article notes.
• “Russia has assisted China with advanced submarine propulsion and agreed to supply military equipment relevant for a potential Taiwan invasion, including amphibious vehicles and airborne systems,” Jones reports.
• “Joint military activities have expanded, with approximately 100 combined exercises conducted between 2017 and 2024, along with joint patrols near Japan, South Korea, Alaska, and Taiwan,” the article states.
• “Despite some mistrust—such as Chinese concern over Russia’s closer military ties with North Korea—China and Russia are growing closer politically, economically, and militarily, united by a desire to weaken U.S. influence,” Jones concludes.

Missile defense:

•  No significant developments.

Nuclear arms: 

Also see Putin’s remarks at MoD and his live Q&A elsewhere in this digest.

Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025
"Sergei Karaganov: time is on Putin’s side in Ukraine," Ahmed Maher, Al Majalla, 12.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This individual is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “For humanitarian and religious reasons, we have fortunately not used the absolutely necessary instrument in our arsenal: nuclear deterrence,” Sergei Karaganov told Al Majalla, stressing that so far Russia has “mentioned it as a deterrence” only.
• Karaganov warned that if Europe and the U.S. do not back off, “then we will have to use nuclear weapons, and the war will stop. But I have to underline that nuclear weapons will only be used when it becomes necessary as a deterrence,” framing nuclear use as a tool to end the conflict on Russian terms.
• He claimed that Russia is at “war with Europe on Ukrainian territory” and argued that the conflict will end only when Moscow “restores our territories in eastern and southern Ukraine and when Europe is excluded from the peace negotiations,” insisting that “time is on Mr Putin’s side.”
• Dismissing casualty estimates, Karaganov said Western figures for Russian losses are “a gross over-estimation” but added that Ukrainians are “losing two or three times more,” while insisting this does not mean Russia is “victorious,” since “killing your brothers is not exactly a victory.”
• On diplomacy, he argued that Washington has already begun to disengage: “The Americans started to retreat from this war during the Biden administration,” and rejected the idea that Trump’s 28‑point peace plan primarily serves Russian interests, portraying the United States as having unleashed a conflict that will ultimately escalate “to nuclear levels” if mishandled.

Thursday, Dec. 18, 2025

“The ‘New’ Nuclear Age Is Not New,” Paul Bracken, RUSI, 12.18.25.

• “A recent example is the claim that we live in a ‘new nuclear age.’ But it is not clear what is new about this new age. Nine countries now have the bomb. Everything points to this number increasing. This is new, I suppose, since the number 9 is larger than 5 or 7. But the claim is that we have moved into a brand-new world and that the U.S. needs to rethink every aspect of nuclear weapons. But an 80-year-old weapon is not exactly new.”
• “Overemphasizing the amount of change is a characteristic of our age… when it overlooks what has not changed, we get into trouble. A new world is not disconnected from issues that have been around for a long time.”
• “Escalation prone conflicts are an example of what has not changed… In the Cold War the U.S. used nuclear rhetoric, alerts and missile launches to raise the threat of escalation… Today, Putin threatens escalation in Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons. He moves weapons into Belarus. Similarly, the Twelve-Day War with Iran was about preventing Tehran from getting a nuclear escalation option.”
• “Colin Gray and this author preferred the term second nuclear age to describe this world, to underscore the point that a lot has not changed, along with things that have. The term has even more going for it. ‘Second nuclear age’ re-positions the Cold War as Act I of a drama. We are now in Act II, a second nuclear age.”
• “The international order has been made up of nation states for 500 years. It is not likely to change in the next 20… Nuclear weapons are baked into this order even more than in the Cold War because more countries’ security depends on them now.”

"What’s New for Nukes in the New NDAA?," Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, Federation of American Scientists, 12.18.25.

• “The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) paints a picture of a Congress that is working to both protect and accelerate nuclear modernization programs while simultaneously lacking trust in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to execute them,” Knight-Boyle writes.
• The author explains that Section 1632 “inserts the requirement [to deploy at least 400 ICBMs] into Title 10 of the United States Code,” and further “prohibit[s] the Air Force from maintaining fewer than the current number of 450 ICBM launch facilities,” entrenching pro‑ICBM policy more deeply than in past NDAAs.
• “Despite the fact that the Pentagon’s FY26 budget request requested no discretionary funding for the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), the NDAA authorized $210 million for the program,” Knight-Boyle notes, adding that the act “speeds up the SLCM-N’s deployment timeline by two years” by requiring “limited operational deployment” by September 30, 2032.
• According to the author, the FY26 NDAA also “initiates and accelerates the development of new nuclear weapons by creating a new NNSA program … the rapid capabilities program,” which is tasked with developing “new and/or modified nuclear weapons on an accelerated, five-year timeline” instead of the traditional 10–15 years.
• Knight-Boyle argues that “numerous provisions in the new NDAA reflect a lack of trust by Congress in DOD and DOE’s ability to execute and deliver nuclear modernization programs,” pointing to detailed reporting mandates on the B–21 bomber and other systems as evidence of “an increased effort by Congress to micromanage nuclear modernization programs,” even as it “authorized nearly $30 billion in spending for select nuclear weapons programs in FY26 alone.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025
“Europe and the geopolitics of AGI: The need for a preparedness plan,” Maximilian Negele, Daan Juijn, Afek Shamir, David Janků, Bengüsu Özcan, Lisa Soder, Lucia Velasco, Max Reddel, Michiel Bakker, Lorenzo Pacchiardi, et al., RAND Corporation, 12.16.25.

• “Artificial general intelligence (AGI) has moved from speculation to the center of political debate. This report examines arguments that AGI could emerge in the near future and considers what such a development would mean for Europe,” Negele et al. write.
• “Empirical trends and expert judgement suggest that it is plausible that AGI could emerge between 2030 and 2040 or even earlier, though uncertainty remains substantial,” the authors note.
• “The emergence of such systems could reshape economic growth, military capabilities and international stability, while intensifying competitive and coercive dynamics among nations,” the report finds.
• “Yet Europe currently lacks sufficient strategic awareness of frontier AI progress, lags on key measures of competitive positioning and holds only limited leverage in the AI value chain,” Negele et al. warn.
• “The President of the European Commission should urgently commission an ‘AGI Preparedness Report,’ led by a high-authority figure, to outline a European agenda for prosperity, security, and stability in the coming AGI era,” the report recommends.5

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025

"Putin Backed Witkoff in His Unlikely Diplomatic Ascent—Release of American prisoner, Saudi foray bolstered Trump's 'dealmaker'," Joe Parkinson, Rebecca Ballhaus, Drew Hinshaw, Thomas Grove, Benoit Faucon and Yaroslav Trofimov, The Wall Street Journal, 12.20.25. 

• “Vladimir Putin was interested in meeting Witkoff — so interested that he might consider releasing an American prisoner to him,” the authors report, noting that “there was just one thing: Witkoff would be expected to come alone, without any CIA handlers, diplomats or even an interpreter.”
• “Ten months later, Kellogg is out and Witkoff and Dmitriev, two businessmen with strong personal connections to their respective presidents, are sketching a new economic and security order for Europe,” the article explains, adding that “it is hard to pinpoint a moment in history when businessmen have held such direct sway over matters of war and peace.”
• “Today, those structures are virtually absent,” the reporters write of traditional U.S.–Russia channels. “America has had no ambassador in Moscow since June. There is no assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. Witkoff has declined multiple offers from the CIA for a briefing on Russia.”
• “One question is whether Putin has embraced this new channel of businessmen-diplomats out of a sincere desire to negotiate peace—or whether the former KGB officer in the Kremlin is leading an elaborate deception,” the authors observe, quoting former diplomat Boris Bondarev’s warning that “for Putin, the war is more than a worldly matter, it's something sacred, something he must do, and that's why he sees Trump as a very simple guy.”
• Describing Witkoff’s style, the reporters note that he “likes to tell skeptical Ukrainians that once they settle, he could unlock $800 billion in reconstruction money—a flood of investments four times the Marshall plan,” and that he calls himself “a dealmaker,” saying, “it means putting yourself in the other party's shoes and figuring out how to help him get political space to do this deal.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Monday, Dec. 15, 2025

“War on Screens: The Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine in Russian State Media,” Anton Shirikov, PONARS Eurasia, 12.15.25.

• “Propaganda, one of the Kremlin’s key tools in peacetime, has become even more aggressive since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,” Shirikov writes, based on an advanced machine learning analysis of Channel One’s television coverage.
• “Kremlin-controlled media have doubled down on war reporting, embedding messaging about victories and Russia’s global role within familiar narratives, while sacrificing softer, consumer-relevant news to justify the invasion and reaffirm their core pro-Putin audience.”
• “Through ‘reaffirming propaganda,’ state TV selectively amplifies national pride, military heroism, and collective achievements, normalizing the war as an extension of Russia’s successes and identity,” the memo finds.
• “The result is less informative and less diverse coverage; war-centric cheerleading may help the regime rally loyalists, but risks alienating moderates and reducing long-term news relevance, even among Kremlin sympathizers,” Shirikov warns.
• “Despite minor adaptations for audience fatigue, Russian state propaganda has proven robust, making critical counter-narratives or independent journalism difficult to promote—though overreliance on prowar messaging could weaken state media competitiveness if the conflict drags on,” the analysis concludes.

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025

"How Far Will the Kremlin Take Its Internet Crackdown?," Maria Kolomychenko, Carnegie Politika, 12.16.25.

• “Since May 2025, Russia has been regularly blocking mobile internet all over the country,” Maria Kolomychenko wrote, noting that “there are currently an average of 2,000 such shutdowns a month—more than in the rest of the world combined in 2024.”
• The author observed that “whitelists were devised to prevent a public backlash by giving people access to shopping platforms and social media,” but that “many fear these whitelists could end up becoming the rule, rather than the exception,” especially since “there is no official procedure for applying, and so far, the only private companies that have been included are those with impeccable Kremlin connections.”
• Kolomychenko explained that “the use of whitelists has not only failed to solve the problem of access to internet services during mobile internet blackouts; it has spawned a fear that the authorities will never restore full internet access—even after the end of the war,” adding that “the speed with which Russia is introducing new internet restrictions means such fears should not be dismissed.”
• According to the author, Roskomnadzor “has proved skeptics wrong by acquiring the technical know-how to block online content,” having made sites such as “YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and Viber” inaccessible and blocking “nearly 2.5 million other websites, including those of independent media outlets and opposition parties,” while also targeting VPNs.
• Kolomychenko believes that “while it’s unlikely that whitelists will become the default online experience for Russians anytime soon,” the authorities’ readiness to deploy them shows “that the parameters of what is possible when it comes to online repression have shifted,” and that their emergence means “the Kremlin retains the option of implementing them at any moment.”

"Civic Myth, Imperial Reality: Putin’s Political Nationalism," Olga Irisova, Kennan Institute, 12.16.25.

• “Being Russian is increasingly defined by citizenship, attachment to the state, and a declared feeling of Russianness,” Irisova writes, adding that this shift “makes the category more elastic for newcomers and for residents of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories” while also making it “easier to weaponize against dissenters.”
• According to the author, Levada Center data show that “the ethnic markers of Russian identity slipped,” while civic and emotional markers grew: “‘Respect for Russia’s political institutions and laws’ rose from 81 to 90%… and ‘feeling Russian’ climbed from 89 to 95%, the highest since tracking began in 1996.”
• “Russia’s state-run media have promoted a model of civic Russian identity, in which political loyalty is the decisive test,” Irisova argues. “If you show allegiance, you are ‘one of us;’ if you fall short, you are an outsider,” a model that both stretches “Russianness” for annexation and migration purposes and “supplies an off-the-shelf ideology for excluding dissenters from the national community.”
• The author notes that this vision is codified in the new Nationalities Policy Strategy, which defines the Russian nation via “civic unity,” meaning recognition of state sovereignty and territorial integrity: because annexed Ukrainian territories are treated as Russian, “any Russian citizen who rejects the annexation… fails to ‘recognize the territorial integrity’ of the state” and thus “falls outside the strategy’s definition of the Russian nation.”
• Irisova concludes that Putin’s political nationalism “has built an identity surprisingly resistant to demographic and ethnic pressure, but it rests on one brittle pillar: sustained public trust in the current political order,” warning that if that trust cracks, “the whole edifice of ‘Russianness’ could unwind in months,” with long-marginalized ethno‑nationalist currents reappearing quickly.

Thursday, Dec. 18, 2025

“The Putin Confidant Who Pushed Back Against the War,” Anton Troianovski, New York Times, 12.18.25.

• “Dmitri N. Kozak, a longtime close aide to President Vladimir V. Putin, broke ranks by opposing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to associates,” Troianovski reports.
• “On the second day of the invasion, Kozak refused Putin’s order to demand Ukraine’s surrender, telling Putin he was willing to be arrested or shot for his noncompliance,” the article notes.
• “Kozak, who helped manage key Kremlin projects since the 1990s, had advocated a diplomatic solution and warned of negative consequences such as stronger Western unity and NATO expansion,” the article says.
• “After his dissent, Kozak was sidelined from Ukraine policy but remained inside the Kremlin, where he continued to pursue informal contacts and proposed liberalizing reforms, including judicial independence,” Troianovski writes.
• “Kozak’s private criticism reflected broader elite unease with the war, but with his resignation in September 2025, Putin’s ruling circle grew even less tolerant of dissent,” Troianovski concludes.

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025

"Russia’s economy keeps driving its war, but it could break in 2026," Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon, The Washington Post, 12.22.25.

• Belton and Dixon report that new U.S. sanctions mean Moscow is “forced to accept ever steeper discounts of more than $20 per barrel of oil with its Urals blend at $35, much less than the $69 price the 2025 budget was initially drafted with.”
• They write that “oil and gas revenue critical for the budget are set to fall by 49% in December compared with the previous year… pushing the budget deeper into deficit even as military spending has climbed to a record high, reaching $149 billion in the first three quarters of this year.”
• On monetary policy, the authors note that the central bank “was forced to raise interest rates to record highs of more than 20%” to tame inflation, and that rates are “now down to 16%,” levels that have “eaten into company profits and cash reserves.”
• Energy analyst Craig Kennedy tells them that lending to the defense sector “makes up nearly a quarter of overall corporate ruble loans and totals just over $202 billion,” calling it “a big black pool of poorly regulated, opaque debt, and it’s sitting in the middle of the banking system.”
• Gazprom, once “the cash cow of the Russian economy, racked up a net loss of $12.9 billion last year,” Belton and Dixon write, adding that its cash reserves “stood at $27 billion” in early 2022 and “now total only $6 billion to $8 billion,” while the company appears to have taken on “more than $20 billion in additional debt.”
• Rosneft, they note, “reported a 70% drop in its net profit to $3.6 billion for the first three quarters of this year compared with the previous year,” even before the latest blocking sanctions.
• For ordinary Russians, Belton and Dixon cite Sberbank data showing that consumers cut spending “on clothing by 8.7%… on household goods by 8.8%, and on health and beauty by 5.9%” in early December year‑on‑year, while Rosstat figures show unpaid wages “had almost tripled year-on-year, reaching more than $27 million,” with “more than 26,000 complaints” filed to the labor agency in 2025.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How Russia’s economy changed in 2025," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 12.20.25.
• "Nails and buckwheat as a mirror of the economy: citizens' behavior reveals their panicked mood," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 12.18.25.
• "Ransoming political prisoners: the price of the issue and the question of price," Boris Bondarev, The Moscow Times, 12.16.25.

Defense and aerospace:

Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2025

Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Collegium, Kremlin.ru, 12.16.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• “Our troops are confidently advancing forward. This year alone, more than 300 populated localities have already been liberated.”
• “I would like to note as well our North Korean combat comrades.”
• “We know that behind the Kyiv regime stands the potential of the countries that are members of the world’s largest military‑political bloc, NATO. Large‑scale military assistance continues uninterrupted; advisers, instructors, mercenaries are being deployed, and intelligence data are being transferred.”
• “This year, the Navy received new submarines, including the strategic missile carrier Knyaz Pozharsky, as well as 19 surface ships and vessels. Successful tests were conducted of the Burevestnik strategic cruise missile of unlimited range and the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle. Thanks to nuclear propulsion, these systems will remain unique and unmatched for a long time, ensuring strategic parity, security, and Russia’s global position for decades to come. We will continue refining and improving them, but they already exist. By the end of the year, a medium‑range missile system with the hypersonic Oreshnik missile will be placed on combat duty. Its first .... use took place last November.” Putin referred explicitly to nuclear weapons and deterrence at least 13 times in his 2024 address to the MoD Board. The 2025 address contained 7 such occurrences.
• “In Europe, people are being instilled with fears of an inevitable clash with Russia — allegedly that it is necessary to prepare for a major war.”
• “We continue to advocate building mutually beneficial and equal cooperation with the United States and European states, and the formation of a unified security system across the entire Eurasian region. We welcome the progress that has emerged in dialogue with the new U.S. administration. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the current leadership of most European countries.”
• “What do I want to emphasize here, and what tasks should be set in the sphere of military development, including taking into account the dynamics along the line of contact?”
  • “First—the objectives of the special military operation will undoubtedly be achieved. We would prefer to do this and eliminate the root causes of the conflict through diplomacy. If the opposing side and its foreign patrons refuse substantive dialogue, Russia will achieve the liberation of its historical lands by military means. The task of creating and expanding a security buffer zone will also be consistently pursued.”
  • “Second—work to modernize the Armed Forces must continue at a high pace and with high quality, primarily within the framework of the new State Armaments Program for 2027–2036, which is currently under development. Of course, a priority for us is the improvement of strategic nuclear forces. As before, they will play the main role in deterring aggression and maintaining the balance of power in the world.”
  • “Third—the Russian army must continue to remain at the forefront of technological progress. This means accelerating the introduction of robotics, information technologies, new materials, and expanding the use of artificial intelligence technologies in command‑and‑control systems and autonomous combat complexes.”
  • “Fourth—it is important to equip the orbital constellation with next‑generation spacecraft. As a result, the troops must receive high‑speed and secure communications channels. The quality of intelligence support and precise navigation data will improve.”
• “...President Trump says that if he had been president at the time, nothing like this would have happened. That may well be true. The previous administration deliberately brought matters to armed conflict. Everyone believed that Russia could be destroyed and dismantled in a short period of time, and European “piglets” eagerly joined this effort in hopes of profiting from the collapse of our country. As has now become obvious, all of these destructive plans against Russia have completely failed.”
• “The main outcome of the special military operation is that Russia has regained full sovereignty. Russia has become sovereign in every sense of the word, including thanks to the participation of the Armed Forces.”
• “Our army has become entirely different. This concerns command and control, tactics, strategy, equipment, and the functioning of the defense‑industrial complex. It also concerns the strategic component: our nuclear shield is more modern than that of any official nuclear power. No other nuclear country has such a level of modernization. We are acquiring new means of destruction and new weapons that have no analogues anywhere in the world, including Avangard, Burevestnik, and others.”
• “We have always said—and I say it again today—that we are ready to negotiate and resolve all problems that have accumulated in recent years by peaceful means. The U.S. administration demonstrates such readiness, and we are engaged in dialogue. I hope the same will occur with Europe, if not with current political elites, then inevitably as political elites change.”

Andrei Belousov’s remarks at “Expanded meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry Collegium,” Kremlin.ru, 12.16.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• “Ultimately, what was obvious from the very beginning has been confirmed: the collapse of Ukraine’s defenses is inevitable.”
• “Overall, as a result of the successful actions of the Joint Group of Forces this year, the combat potential of Ukraine’s armed forces has been reduced by one‑third. They lost more than 103,000 units of weapons and military equipment, including about 5,500 of Western manufacture — nearly double the 2024 figure. At the same time, Ukraine’s security forces lost nearly 500,000 personnel. More than 70% of thermal power plants and over 37% of hydroelectric plants supplying the military‑industrial complex and armed forces were disabled. Ukraine’s energy capacity has been reduced by more than half, directly affecting its ability to resist.”
• “A key component of our battlefield success is the stable manning of the Armed Forces.”
• “At the same time, next year it is necessary to complete efforts to eliminate shortages in electronic warfare assets, especially at the tactical level — including surface‑to‑air missile systems, radar stations, and counter‑battery warfare systems.”
• “Political and diplomatic efforts are underway to resolve the so‑called Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, we clearly see attempts by European leaders and the Kyiv regime to avoid resolution, seeking to prolong the conflict in order to maximally weaken our country. Simultaneously, NATO has begun accelerated preparations for confrontation with Russia in the 2030s, creating real prerequisites for continued military action in 2026.”
• “During the special military operation, the nature of warfare has changed significantly. Several such features can be identified this year.”
  • “First feature — a significant increase in the use of unmanned aviation for reconnaissance and fire missions. Next year, the formation of unmanned systems forces must be completed, transitioning from isolated tasks by groups and crews to integrated joint operations within units and formations.”
  • “Second feature — attempts by the enemy to slow the pace of our advance by creating a so‑called drone line. At the beginning of the year, the enemy employed an average of 1,500 long‑range UAVs per month; from May onward, this number increased to 3,700. The effectiveness of our air defense in repelling these attacks averages 97%.”
• “The North Atlantic Alliance continues to build up coalition forces, actively preparing for the deployment of medium‑range missiles, updating nuclear munitions, modernizing air and missile defense, and altering mobilization systems. The speed of troop transfers to the eastern flank is increasing, including plans to introduce a so‑called military “Schengen.” Military expenditures are rising sharply. NATO’s annual budget now totals $1.6 trillion and will grow to $2.7 trillion as spending rises to five percent of national GDPs. All of this indicates NATO’s preparation for military confrontation with Russia by the 2030s. It is not us who are threatening—we are the ones being threatened.”
• “In response to significant threats to military security, modern and high‑technology Armed Forces are being built. I will focus on the most important points.”
  • “First—special attention is being given to the development of strategic nuclear forces, the key element of deterrence against aggression. This year, the Borei‑A‑class nuclear submarine Knyaz Pozharsky armed with Bulava missiles entered service. Construction continues on two more submarines of this type. The Aerospace Forces received two Tu‑160M strategic bombers. The Strategic Missile Forces continue re‑equipping with the Yars missile system. As noted by Vladimir Vladimirovich, by year‑end the mobile ground‑based Oreshnik medium‑range missile system will be placed on combat duty.”
  • “Second—organizational changes are being implemented to enhance command, mobility, and autonomy of combined‑arms formations. This year, five divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments were formed; next year, four more divisions, 14 brigades, and 39 regiments will be formed.”
• “The most important issue is equipping the Armed Forces with modern weapons and equipment. This year, parameters of the State Armaments Program for 2027–2036 were finalized. The new program is based on four core principles.”
  • “First—clear prioritization. High‑priority systems include those that will shape the future innovative profile of the Armed Forces: strategic nuclear forces, space assets, air defense systems, communications, electronic warfare and command systems, unmanned and robotic systems, and weapons based on fundamentally new technologies.”
  • “Second—structuring the program based on required future combat capabilities of the Armed Forces rather than on the sheer number of weapons and equipment, as was done previously. For example, in strategic nuclear forces, this includes the ability to overcome a potential adversary’s missile defense.”
• “Special attention must be given to the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies within the troops.”

Monday, Dec. 22, 2025 
"Starlink in the crosshairs: How Russia could attack Elon Musk's conquering of space," John Leicester, AP/The Washington Post, 12.22.25.

• Intelligence from two NATO services says a Russian “zone-effect” anti-satellite weapon would “seek to flood Starlink orbits with hundreds of thousands of high-density pellets, potentially disabling multiple satellites at once,” Leicester reports.
• Russia “views Starlink in particular as a grave threat,” the findings indicate, because “the thousands of low-orbiting satellites have been pivotal for Ukraine’s survival… used by Ukrainian forces for battlefield communications, weapons targeting and other roles,” Leicester writes.
• Brig. Gen. Christopher Horner of Canada’s Space Division called such a system “not implausible,” saying that if reports about a nuclear space weapon are accurate, “it wouldn’t strike me as shocking that something just short of that, but equally damaging, is within their wheelhouse of development.”
• Horner warned that an attack with pellet clouds would “blanket an entire orbital regime and take out every Starlink satellite and every other satellite that’s in a similar regime,” adding, “I think that’s the part that is incredibly troubling.”
• Space-security specialist Victoria Samson was skeptical: “I don’t buy it. Like, I really don’t,” she said, arguing that using such a weapon “would effectively cut off space for them as well. I don’t know that they would be willing to give up that much.”

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia’s Smuggled Grain Finds New Market in Saudi Arabia,” Bellingcat Investigation Team, 12.12.25.

Ukraine:

Wednesday, Dec. 17, 2025

"Ukraine’s Regional Shift: Realignments in Wartime and Beyond," Mariya Levonova and Balázs Jarábik, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12.17.25.

• “Russia’s full-scale invasion has reshaped Ukraine not only in geopolitical terms but also in its internal structure,” Levonova and Jarábik write, arguing that “understanding and managing this internal realignment must therefore underpin all reconstruction planning, from transport and energy infrastructure to housing, social services, and investment policy.”
• “One of the most profound and lasting consequences of Russia’s war has been the collapse of Moscow’s cultural and linguistic influence in southeastern Ukraine,” the authors note, pointing out that the share of Ukrainians identifying Russian as the language they use at home “nearly halved between 2020 and 2025,” a shift they describe as “a deeper political and cultural realignment.”
• “The war has profoundly reshaped Ukraine’s fiscal geography, exacerbating preexisting imbalances and producing new forms of territorial inequality,” Levonova and Jarábik explain; Kyiv, with 8% of the population, “generated 39% of all city-level revenues,” while “small towns saw their revenues collapse by as much as 45% in 2024 compared to the previous year.”
• According to the authors, “Ukraine faces a significant labor shortage that threatens the country’s postwar economic recovery,” with employers identifying mobilization and migration as key drivers; yet “businesses are emerging as first responders to this population crisis,” increasingly hiring women in traditionally male jobs, people with disabilities, IDPs, older workers, and veterans.
• Levonova and Jarábik conclude that “Ukraine cannot afford to trade unity for centralization, nor resilience for inequality,” warning that “rebuilding the country around a few thriving metropolitan centers while much of its territory remains depopulated, underfunded, and disconnected is a recipe for trouble down the road,” but arguing that “if managed with clarity and realism, recovery could lay the foundation for a more balanced, cohesive state.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Monday, Dec. 15, 2025
“Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and U.S. Strategic Interests in Central Asia,” Eric McGlinchey, PONARS Eurasia, 12.15.25.

• “The presence of Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in Central Asia has been foundational to advancing United States strategic interests in three critical ways: articulating Washington’s vision, countering disinformation, and providing open-source intelligence,” McGlinchey writes.
• “Despite official statements, Central Asians rarely receive U.S. policy messages directly; VOA and RFE/RL serve as critical tools for conveying U.S. policy in local languages, reaching millions via YouTube channels even amid official blockades,” the article notes.
• “VOA and RFE/RL are among the most effective tools for countering Russian-origin disinformation and promoting fact-based reporting on sensitive topics such as terrorism and LGBTQ+ rights in the region,” McGlinchey explains.
• “Their local journalism provides crucial insights into terrorism, migration, Russia’s war on Ukraine, and Central Asia’s political economies, serving as Washington’s most robust source of open-source intelligence for the region,” the memo concludes.
• “Eliminating the U.S. Agency for Global Media, as proposed by President Trump, would diminish the U.S. ability to counter anti-American disinformation, reduce policy influence, and degrade vital information-gathering capabilities in Central Asia,” McGlinchey warns.

Friday, Dec. 19, 2025
"Afghanistan–Tajikistan Border Clashes Pose a Dilemma for Moscow," Temur Umarov, Carnegie Politika, 12.19.25.

• “A new escalation is under way on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” Temur Umarov wrote, noting that attacks on a joint Chinese–Tajik gold mine that killed five Chinese nationals have “turned a chronic problem into an acute one” for Dushanbe and Moscow.
• The author explained that Tajikistan “rushed to position itself as the main adversary of the Taliban regime” after 2021, but that this hard line has become “increasingly difficult to sustain” as the war in Ukraine absorbs Russian resources and the West grows more pragmatic toward Kabul.
• Umarov stressed that responsibility for the recent attacks “is far from clear,” suggesting they may stem from local actors and warlords rather than a centralized terrorist campaign, and that Chinese facilities are frequent targets simply because “almost all the infrastructure in remote parts of Tajikistan is built and run by Chinese companies.”
• According to the author, Moscow now faces “few good options”: sending troops to the border “would entail serious risks,” potentially exposing Russian weakness if attacks continue, while also provoking domestic backlash from Russians who resent further deployments abroad during the Ukraine war.
• Umarov concluded that “the Kremlin will likely try to limit its involvement,” perhaps through symbolic deployments or joint exercises, but will “seek to avoid involving any troops in joint patrols on dangerous stretches of the border,” which would leave Russia carrying the financial and political risks while Tajikistan retains local influence.

"Kazakhstan Is Latest Country Set to Pass ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law as Homophobia Spreads Across Former USSR," Rustam Alexander, Russia.Post, 12.19.25.

• “Kazakhstan is poised to become the latest post-Soviet country to adopt a so‑called ‘gay propaganda’ law,” Rustam Alexander wrote, arguing that this reflects “a broader regional trend of weaponizing homophobia for political gain.”
• The author observed that “legislation modeled on Russia’s 2013 ‘gay propaganda’ law has spread across the former USSR,” and that such laws “do not merely restrict public discussion of LGBT issues; they stigmatize queer people as a threat to children and the nation.”
• Alexander noted that Kazakh politicians are presenting the bill “as a defense of ‘traditional values’,” but he stressed that “these campaigns are top‑down projects driven by elites seeking to shore up their legitimacy, not organic expressions of public morality.”
• According to the author, “rights groups warn that the new law would have a chilling effect on health education, media, and civil society,” since any material “that presents same‑sex relations neutrally or positively could be branded ‘propaganda’.”
• Alexander argued that “the drift toward Russian‑style cultural conservatism shows how illiberal ideas radiating from Moscow still shape the region,” even as some governments try to distance themselves from Russia’s foreign policy.

Endnotes

1. In this issue, items in individual sections are arranged chronologically.
2. Yevhenii Malik is a former Ukrainian marine who was held in Russian prisons from 2022 to 2024. He is now at the Kyiv School of Economics.
3. Here and elsewhere entries from Kremlin.ru are machine-translated. Putin’s remarks remained partially translated by the Kremlin as of 11:00 am on Dec. 21, 2025, but are being updated.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Formatting and hyperlinking in this product were assisted by AI.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: An engineer collects FPV drones of "General Cherry" company at the workshop in Ukraine, on Dec. 4, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)