5 Ideas to Explore

1. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Dec. 15 that an agreement to end the Russia-Ukraine war is “closer now than ... ever” following two days of talks in Berlin involving U.S., Ukrainian, European and NATO leaders on a possible settlement. Commenting on the outcome of the talks between U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators, one U.S. officials said “they had reached agreement on 90% of the issues involved,” according to Reuters. On Dec. 14, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated readiness to drop NATO membership demands in exchange for Article-5-like guarantees, but insisted that a ceasefire must freeze forces in place rather than compel unilateral Ukrainian withdrawals as demanded by Russia, Financial Times reported. U.S. officials said Dec. 15 that the parties were close to a deal on security guarantees modeled on NATO’s Article 5. In fact, one U.S. official said Ukrainian and European counterparts were struck by how far the U.S. was prepared to go on security assurances—and believed that Russia would accept the arrangement, according to Axios. “What’s on the table is really the platinum standard for what can be offered. It would have to go before the Senate [for ratification], and President Trump is willing to do that,” a U.S. official said, according to FT. At the same time, U.S. officials told reports on Dec. 15  that it would be up to Ukraine to decide how to handle the territorial issue, but warned that the offer of Article-5 like guarantees won’t be on the table “forever.” Meanwhile, Russia has indicated it’s open to Ukraine joining the European Union as part of the deal.
   1. In spite of lingering disagreements on territorial issues, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described on Dec. 15 this moment as "the best chance since the beginning of the war,” while stressing that only Ukraine can decide whether to cede territory, according to Reuters.
   2. David Ignatius appears to share some of Merz’s optimism, writing in The Washington Post that the “outlines of a sustainable Ukraine peace deal inch into view,” and noting “the negotiating package involves three documents... the peace plan, security guarantees and an economic recovery plan.” As part of the agreed package, the U.S. would provide Article-5 security guarantees, and “land swaps are an inescapable part of the deal,” according to Ignatius.
   3. CFR’s Thomas Graham also believes that “the contours of a final settlement are visible, even if both sides vigorously deny it: a cease-fire along the line of contact without either country formally recognizing the other’s control of territory it considers its own.” According to Graham’s Foreign Affairs article, Ukraine would be adopting armed neutrality, with the possibility of EU accession but not membership in NATO; and no further NATO expansion eastward into the former Soviet space.
2. Washington Post reporters depict Ukraine’s energy system as nearing collapse under increasing Russian attacks. David L. Stern and co-authors describe Kyiv residents enduring up to 16-hour outages caused by Russia launching close to 5,000 drones and missiles in November, compared to 2,000 a month at the beginning of the year, including hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles targeted at power plants, transmission grid and gas infrastructure, according to WP. “We are, if not at the brink” of a complete blackout in the east of the country “then very close to it,” a European diplomat told this newspaper. To counter Russia’s “strategy of blackout warfare,” Gabriel Collins at Rice University and Igor Khrestin of the George W. Bush Institute propose a three-part strategy in their Foreign Policy article: deploy frozen Russian assets to buy personal generators plus grid-scale batteries and solar; expand “energy deterrence” by backing Ukraine’s DeepStrike campaign; and launch a long-term nuclear partnership by building AP1000 reactors in western Ukraine.
3. This year Ukraine’s partners worldwide have allocated less than $39 billion in military aid, according to a new report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, The Wall Street Journal’s editors wrote on Dec. 10. "While annual allocations of foreign military aid to Ukraine averaged roughly EUR 41.6 billion (about USD 48.5 billion) in 2022–2024, only EUR 32.5 billion (about USD 37.9 billion) has been allocated so far in 2025,” according to Kiel Institute researchers. “To reach previous levels, an additional EUR 9.1 billion (about USD 10.7 billion) would need to be allocated by year-end, requiring a monthly allocation rate more than twice as high as in recent months,” according to Kiel researchers, who predict that this year Europe won’t “offset the halt in U.S. support.” “Should the decline in international aid for Ukraine mean that Russia emerges as the victor, Europe would face a strategic threat and fiscal burden which far exceeds the costs of sustained support for Kyiv,” according to ECFR’s Leo Litra, who estimates that since July 2025, military assistance to Ukraine has decreased by approximately 43% compared to the previous six months.
4. RUSI’s Justin Bronk argues in Foreign Affairs that it is misguided to assume large-scale purchases of AI‑enabled drones will bolster U.S. defenses against China. He cautions that lessons drawn from Ukraine’s war—where small drones can cause up to 70% of battlefield casualties in some sectors—do not translate well to a potential U.S.–China conflict. Drone‑centric tactics thrive in conditions such as the absence of air superiority, and slow attrition, none of which would characterize an Indo‑Pacific confrontation, Bronk explains.
5. In “The Nuclear Dimension of a Ukrainian Peace Settlement,” ex-U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Cimbala of Penn State Brandywine argue that nuclear issues are dangerously sidelined in debates over ending the Russia-Ukraine war. To address this, Korb and Cimbala propose in their NI article four pillars for any postwar settlement: mutual abstention from explicit nuclear threats, a ban on nuclear deployments in Ukraine and occupied territories, extension of New START with transparency over tactical arsenals, and arms‑control frameworks that cover emerging nuclear technologies.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“North Korean Soldiers Return to Fanfare After Serving in Russia’s War With Ukraine,” Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, 12.13.25.

• North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, welcomed home specialized soldiers this week after a deployment in Russia’s war against Ukraine, honoring nine killed in action with his country’s highest medal, state media reported on Saturday.
• Kim Jong-un presided over a large ceremony in Pyongyang, hugging returning soldiers and awarding the country’s highest medal to nine killed in action, praising their “brilliant military exploits.”
• State media said up to 15,000 North Korean troops fought alongside Russian forces in Kursk, with additional deployments of 1,000 combat engineers and 5,000 military construction workers. North Korea has also sent Russia large shipments of artillery shells, missiles, and other weapons; in exchange, Russia reportedly provided fuel, food, and military technologies to Pyongyang.
• The ceremony and state coverage aim to bolster domestic support for Kim’s partnership with Russia, and South Korean officials estimate hundreds of North Korean casualties in the conflict.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“As peace talks grind on, Russia zeroes in on Ukraine’s power,” David L. Stern, Siobhán O'Grady, Anastacia Galouchka and Kostiantyn Khudov, Washington Post, 12.15.25.

• The Washington Post reporters write, “In Kyiv, residents are already going up to 16 hours per day without power and businesses are running largely on generators.”
• Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk said Russia “has launched close to 5,000 drones and missiles in November, compared to 2,000 a month at the beginning of year, including hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles targeted at power plants, transmission grid and gas infrastructure.”
• From October to December 2025, Russia “launched eight massive missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure,” according to Valerii Osadchuk, head of communications at Ukrenergo.
• The frequency of attacks reduced the time for repairs: after attacks in early December, “power workers managed to reduce the time of power outages in Kyiv to 2½ hours per day…But a major attack overnight on Dec. 5 critically damaged the grid again, and Kyiv’s power supply plummeted.”
• Officials warn, “We are, if not at the brink of a complete blackout in the east of the country, then very close to it,” and the grid “is still holding,” but “power supply will be unstable throughout the winter and even spring.”
• Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is now so degraded that “there are now restrictions on electricity throughout the country.”

“Russia’s Blackout Warfare Needs a U.S. Counter,” Gabriel Collins and Igor Khrestin, Foreign Policy, 12.11.25.

• “Russia is no longer simply attacking Ukraine’s grid; it is field-testing a strategy of blackout warfare,” Collins and Khrestin write.
• “This campaign is creating a blueprint for how modern great powers will try to cripple one another in future conflicts. Allied countries must therefore treat assisting Ukraine’s grid defense not as charity, but as an investment in their own future electricity security, which underpins so many critical dimensions of modern life,” Collins and Khrestin argue.
• “Helping Ukraine win the war for electricity is a critical battle—lasting peace requires victory on the grid front. Allied countries can provide this help at manageable cost and in ways that also directly facilitate enhancing their electricity resilience and security in a renewed era of great-power conflict,” Collins and Khrestin conclude.
  • “First, use frozen Russian assets to keep Ukrainians alive. It’s time for the world’s largest purchase of personal generators as well as more grid-scale batteries and solar panels to charge them.”
  • “Second, create a wider program of energy deterrence. Ukraine’s DeepStrike program—its retaliatory effort to send strikes deep into Russian territory—makes it increasingly clear to Russian officials that further strikes on Ukraine’s energy system will not be free of costs. ”
  • “Third, and finally, create a long-term nuclear partnership . Washington should also work with Kyiv to get several new AP1000 nuclear reactors built in western Ukraine. While this will not solve the electricity crisis of 2025, signing deals now and forging steel by 2027 would signal to Moscow that the West is committed to Ukraine’s energy security for decades. Fighter jets create a 25 year partnership, but nuclear reactors can anchor one for 60 years or more, making nuclear energy an essential component of great–power competition. ”

“Meet the Multinational Cast of Fighters Inside a Ukrainian POW Camp,” Alistair MacDonald and Ievgeniia Sivorka, Wall Street Journal, 12.10.25.

• There are representatives of “30 nationalities at this prisoner-of-war camp in western Ukraine where inmates come from countries as disparate as Togo, Sri Lanka, Italy and Slovakia.”
• “Ukraine and Russia each hold around 5,000 prisoners of war, according to a person familiar with the numbers…with over 10,000 combatants exchanged in that time.”
• “A cosmopolitan mix of convicts mingled in the camp’s exercise yards…a prisoner from Togo…inmates from the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan…Cubans…an Italian…Uzbekistan.”
• Frank Dario Manfuga of Cuba said: “After you are born in a country like Cuba, you choose Russia…Look at how bad life is in Cuba. With what the Russians paid I would be rich in Cuba, filthy rich.”
• Italians such as Gianni Cenni, Uzbeks like Korakhonov Khasan Tura-Ugli, and Russians like Vladislav Izovitov are among the inmates; Izovitov said, “We are just sitting here waiting,” and dreams of returning home to see his children.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Focused More on Power Outages, Ukrainians See U.S. Peace Push as Noise,” Kim Barker and Laetitia Vançon, New York Times, 12.12.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“America’s Drone Delusion: Why the Lessons of Ukraine Don’t Apply to a Conflict With China,” Justin Bronk, Foreign Affairs, 12.15.25.

• Bronk argues that assuming large-scale purchases of AI‑enabled drones will bolster U.S. defenses against China is misguided. He cautions that lessons drawn from Ukraine’s war—where small drones can cause up to 70 percent of casualties in some sectors—do not translate well to a potential U.S.–China conflict. Drone‑centric tactics thrive in conditions such as the absence of air superiority, slow attrition, and extended frontlines, none of which would characterize an Indo‑Pacific confrontation.
• He also notes that China is prioritizing traditional high‑end capabilities, including crewed combat aircraft, major warships, and advanced missile systems, and is on track to field roughly 1,000 J‑20 fighters by 2030. In contrast, the United States risks weakening its remaining advantage in these premium air and naval forces if it overemphasizes drone development; for example, the U.S. Air Force acquired only 48 F‑35As in 2025 while China’s advanced production accelerates.
• Bronk concludes that neither Russia nor Ukraine has gained decisive advantage from mass use of quadcopters and one‑way attack drones, and that even if the Pentagon builds similar swarms, they will not alter the United States’ eroding balance of power with China in the Indo‑Pacific.

“Europe starts learning how to shoot down drones,” The Economist, 12.14.25.

• The Economist reports, “Late on December 4th five drones appeared above the Île Longue naval base in Brittany, which houses France’s nuclear-armed submarines… Days earlier multiple drones flew to a spot at Dublin airport that would have been in the flight path of the plane carrying Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, had it not arrived early.”
• It notes, “European officials say they are not certain who has sent these drones, but in private they acknowledge that Russia is likely to be behind many of the incidents. The sighting in Dublin… was ‘suggestive of being part of an ongoing Russian-inspired hybrid campaign.’”
• The article explains, “Detection is difficult, since traditional radars filter out small, slow objects. ‘Passive sensors’ and active radars are being used, but attribution remains difficult as criminal groups and commercial drones are often involved.”
• It observes, “Hitting drones is challenging; jamming or spoofing is often used, but if that fails, nets, shotguns, and even rifles are employed—mostly with little success. Most countries have been slow to give police or military the authority to shoot them down.”
• The Economist concludes, “Authorities typically shut down airspace rather than risk accidents, making it easy for malicious actors to cause massive disruption; only recently have several European nations updated laws to more aggressively counter drone threats.”

“Inside Ukraine’s Daring ‘Operation Spiderweb’ Drone Attack on Russia,” James Marson, Annie Ng, Jane Lytvynenko and Serhii Bosak, Wall Street Journal, 12.09.25.

• “One of the most audacious covert operations in modern warfare almost fell apart when a Russian truck driver placed a panicked call to the Ukrainian who had hired him,” Marson et al. write.
• “Operation Spiderweb was planned by the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, targeting Russia’s massive bomber fleet, which was terrorizing Ukrainian cities,” the authors note.
• “On the morning of June 1, more than 100 drones emerged from cabins on the back of four trucks and swooped toward four Russian airfields,” Marson et al. state.
• “The drones were quadcopters, each able to carry four pounds of explosives, designed to fly autonomously toward the target airport, where a pilot in Kyiv would take over control,” the article explains.
• “By the time the assaults were finished an hour later, 41 Russian planes had been struck and damaged, at least a dozen of them irreparably, according to Ukraine’s tally,” Marson et al. write.
• “The operation elevated the global standing of the SBU, long maligned as a corrupt successor of the Soviet KGB shot through with traitors,” the authors add.
• “The following day, Russian authorities named [the Ukrainian coordinator] Tymofeyev as a suspect. He and his wife were already gone,” Marson et al. conclude.

Vladimir Putin’s remarks at the “Meeting on the situation in the special military operation zone,” Kremlin, 12.11.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Putin claimed, “The liberation of the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, and the Zaporozhzhia and Kherson regions, is proceeding steadily and in a coordinated manner, in line with your plans and those of the General Staff. The strategic initiative remains firmly with the Russian Armed Forces.” He asserted, “I note positive momentum across all sectors.”
• Regarding the operation in [Ukraine’s] Seversk, Putin praised Russian commanders and troops: “You said it, and you have it. A real man.…It became possible exclusively due to the well-coordinated efforts by the commanders of the group of forces, its units, the headquarters of all levels, which ensured meticulous planning of all the efforts, all combat actions, as well as resolving the issues of coordination and comprehensive support.”
• On frontline troops, Putin said, “The role of the personnel in general and of the junior commanders during the preparation, joint training and coordination of assault groups must be highlighted.”
• On Ukrainian positions, he claimed, “We are creating a security belt in the Ukrainian border areas in a planned manner. We also continue to liquidate the encircled enemy forces on the eastern bank of the Oskol River and in Dimitrov.…The Kiev regime actually dooms them to destruction, not allowing the Ukrainian forces blockaded in these areas to stop resistance and surrender.”
• Concluding, Putin stated to his commanders, “The advance…considerably contribute[s] to a new successful, I do not doubt it, advance in other areas, to the expulsion of Ukrainian forces from our territory and the restoration of peaceful life in Donbass.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Europe Is Failing Ukraine on Military Aid,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 12.10.25

• “As President Trump pushes for a negotiated end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Europe worries it’s being left on the margins. Yet if the Continent’s politicians want to be pivotal in the conversation about Kyiv’s future, why does a new report show lagging European military aid to Ukraine?” the editors ask.
• “Between Sept. 1 and Oct. 31, Europe allocated less than $5 billion in new military aid, ‘far too little to offset the halt in US support,’ says an analysis by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German research group,” the article notes.
• “This year Ukraine’s partners worldwide have allocated less than $39 billion in military aid, according to the latest tally, which runs through October. Barring an end-of-year surge, 2025 will be ‘the year with the lowest level of new [military] aid allocations ever for Ukraine since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion in 2022,’ says Christoph Trebesch, the head of Kiel’s Ukraine Support Tracker initiative,” the board cites.
• “The Kiel report also underlines the debate in Europe about using a ‘reparations loan’ to mobilize frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine. This money could go toward much-needed weapons,” the editorial adds.
• “Vladimir Putin respects strength. In his fashion, so does Mr. Trump. If Europe doesn’t want Russia to win, it has to act like it,” the board concludes.

“Fragile frontline: The consequences of declining military aid to Ukraine,” Leo Litra, ECFR, 12.08.25.

• “Russia’s renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine is beginning to yield results. Russia is laser-focused on taking the city of Pokrovsk and other settlements in the Donbas region. By seizing these well-fortified positions, its military can entrench more deeply into areas such as Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava or Zaporizhzhia, which have so far avoided active combat,” Litra writes.
• “Since July 2025, military assistance to Ukraine has decreased by approximately 43% compared to the previous six months,” Litra notes.
• “Should the decline in international aid for Ukraine mean that Russia emerges as the victor, Europe would face a strategic threat and fiscal burden which far exceeds the costs of sustained support for Kyiv,” Litra argues.
• “General Christopher Cavoli… has estimated that Russia is outgunning Ukraine at a ratio of 10:1—and Ukraine’s lack of ammunition, air defense and other military equipment is weakening its defense capability,” Litra observes.
• “The crisis facing the Ukrainian frontline is not one of resolve or capability, but a direct consequence of the 43% drop in military aid,” Litra concludes.

“Only Europe can save Ukraine from Putin and Trump—but will it?” Timothy Garton Ash, ECFR, 10.12.25.

• “Vladimir Putin has waged a full-scale war against Ukraine for nearly four years and this week threatened that Russia was ‘ready right now’ for war with Europe if need be,” Garton Ash writes.
• “US president Donald Trump has demonstrated that the US is ready to sell out Ukraine for the sake of a dirty deal with Putin’s Russia,” Garton Ash argues.
• “The old Polish rallying cry Nic o nas bez nas! (nothing about us without us!) must now go up from the whole of Europe,” Garton Ash asserts.
• “If, at their summit on December 18th, EU leaders agree a way to use the frozen Russian assets held in Belgium, the gaping hole in Ukraine’s budget can be filled for at least the next two years. Europe’s combined economy is 10 times the size of Russia’s. European defense production is being ramped up,” Garton Ash writes.
• “Europe can if it wills it,” Garton Ash concludes.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Europe faces do or die week on Ukraine and trade ambition,” Henry Foy, Financial Times, 12.15.25.

• Henry Foy writes, “The EU’s 27 leaders will sit down for a hugely consequential summit on Thursday that could decide whether Ukraine goes bankrupt and loses the war, and whether the EU has any trade ambitions left.”
• He explains, “Ukraine will go bankrupt without additional financial support. EU leaders are arguing over a ‘reparations loan’ for Kyiv raised against immobilized Russian state assets. The EU also needs to finalize its Mercosur trade agreement, or accept that it cares more about French farmers than economic growth and geopolitical relevance.”
• Foy notes, “Italy, Malta and Bulgaria joined Belgium on Friday in signaling queasiness about the loan. While they voted in favor of a preliminary step… all four countries urged the European Commission to ‘continue exploring and discussing alternative options,’” despite Ukraine’s looming financial crisis.
• He quotes a senior EU diplomat: “‘It’s time to stop talking and start doing... This is Europe’s moment and we’re either going to stand up and be counted, or prove to the rest of the world that we’re only good at talking, arguing, and dividing ourselves.’”
• He concludes, “A failure to reach an agreement on the Mercosur trade deal, 25 years in the making, would mark a further nadir in EU governance… ‘If we can’t agree on Mercosur we don’t need to talk about European sovereignty anymore,’ said another senior EU diplomat.”

“How to guarantee Ukraine’s ‘reparations loan,’” Stephen Paduano, Financial Times, 12.12.25.

• “As with many policy problems, guaranteeing the reparations loan will require an everything-all-at-once solution. This will mean layering national government guarantees, EU guarantees, and EIB guarantees… The EU has the money and mechanisms to make the reparations loan happen. It should do so without delay,” Paduano concludes.

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Brussels is finally flexing its muscle on Russian assets,” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 12.12.25.
• “Using Russian Assets to Help Ukraine Is Looking Like Europe's Least-Bad Option,” Laurence Norman, The Wall Street Journal, 12.10.25.
• "Will the EU’s Blacklisting of Russia Make a Difference?" Miles Kellerman, Project Syndicate, 12.12.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations:¹

“Ukraine and U.S. divided over territory after intense negotiations,” Barak Ravid and Dave Lawler, Axios, 12.15.25.

• “Two days of intense negotiations between Ukraine, the U.S. and European officials resulted in clear progress on security guarantees for Ukraine but left significant gaps on the issue of territory, U.S. officials told reporters on Monday,” Ravid and Lawler report.
• “U.S. officials said the sides were nearing an agreement on robust security guarantees for Ukraine, modeled on NATO’s Article 5, surprising both Ukrainian and European representatives,” the authors write.
• “A sticking point remains: the U.S. plan calls for Ukraine to pull back from some 14% of the Donbas region it controls—leaving Zelensky and American negotiators at odds,” the article notes.
• “A U.S. official maintained it would be up to Ukraine to decide on any territorial concessions, but warned that the generous security guarantees ‘will not be on the table forever,’” Ravid and Lawler add.
• “With ‘90%’ of issues resolved, further talks are expected this weekend ‘somewhere in the United States,’ said a U.S. official,” the piece concludes.

For coverage of the second day of the talks, also see: “Latest round of talks between Ukraine, US conclude as Trump seeks swift peace,” Stefanie Dazio and Aamer Madhani, AP News, 12.15.25. and “Peace deal gives Ukraine security guarantees similar to Article 5, official says,” Steve Holland, Jeff Mason, Reuters, 12.15.25.

“Ukraine offers to drop Nato membership demands,” Christopher Miller and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 12.14.25.

• Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Ukraine is “ready to give up on demands for Nato membership in exchange for security guarantees from the US and Europe,” seeking “Article 5-like guarantees …as well as security guarantees for us from our European partners and from other countries such as Canada, Japan and others.”
• US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have pushed Ukraine “to accept painful concessions, including ceding frontline territory to Russia.” Both sides rejected Trump’s proposal for all troops to withdraw from Donbas to create a “free economic zone” in territory now held by Kyiv.
• Zelenskyy emphasized, “If Ukrainian troops withdraw five to 10 kilometers, for example, then why should Russian troops not also withdraw deeper into the occupied territories by the same distance? … This is a question to which there is still no answer, but it is extremely sensitive and very heated.”
• Zelenskyy added, the “only fair and possible option” is “the sides stop where they are, and then try to resolve all broader issues through diplomacy. … We stand where we stand. That is precisely a ceasefire.”
• Russia has long demanded NATO halt its eastward expansion; Putin adviser Yuri Ushakov dismissed Ukrainian and European suggestions, stating Russia would have “sharp objections” if the US adopted them and “had not discussed a ‘Korean scenario’” of freezing the frontline.
• Zelenskyy confirmed Ukraine “had yet to receive a response from Washington to revised proposals sent earlier this week from Kyiv after consultations with European leaders.”
• Witkoff reported after Sunday’s 5-hour Berlin talks that the delegations “held in-depth discussions regarding the 20-point plan for peace, economic agendas, and more…A lot of progress was made.”

“Zelensky Attempts to Rewrite Trump’s Peace Plan Rather Than Reject It,” Anastasiia Malenko, Wall Street Journal, 12.14.25.

• “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with the help of his European allies, has carefully crafted a response to President Trump’s peace plan that essentially boils down to: Yes, but…
  • Zelensky is prepared to hold elections, but would need a cease-fire.
  • He says Russia can maintain some involvement in Europe’s largest nuclear plant, which it currently occupies, but Ukraine and the U.S. should be in control.
  • The size of Ukraine’s military can be capped, he concedes, but at its current size.“
    • The approach has enabled Zelensky to get on board with Trump’s vision of peace—but not at the expense of political credibility at home.” “We do not betray our country, do not surrender our independence, which is important, but we are constructive,” Zelensky told reporters Thursday.
• “Zelensky’s negotiating hand was strengthened this week by a successful Ukrainian counterattack in the city of Kupyansk, which Russia said it had captured last month.”
• “How the Ukrainian leader handles Trump’s demand for a quick peace will be a pivot point in Kyiv’s efforts to get an end to the war without bargaining away its sovereignty.”
• “Zelensky’s method of pressing partners on specifics, including about the mechanics of the implementation of the stickiest points, has allowed him to continue constructive conversations without folding on key issues.”

“The outlines of a sustainable Ukraine peace deal inch into view,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 02.12.25.

• “Here's a simple description of what peace should look like in Ukraine: a sovereign nation, its borders protected by international security guarantees, that is part of the European Union and rebuilding its economy with big investments from the United States and Europe,” Ignatius writes.
• “Trump's tilt toward the Kremlin in the National Security Strategy released by the White House last week has complicated negotiations. He seems to want to stand equidistant between a democratic Europe and an autocratic Russia... That evenhandedness between friend and foe makes no sense, strategically or morally – and it genuinely worries Europe,” Ignatius asserts.
• “U.S. negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff...seem to recognize that the best protection for Ukraine is a combination of binding security guarantees and future economic prosperity. And they know the package will fail unless Zelensky can sell it to a brave but exhausted country,” Ignatius notes.
• “The negotiating package involves three documents... the peace plan, security guarantees and an economic recovery plan,” Ignatius explains, adding that “Ukraine would join the European Union as early as 2027.”
• “The United States would provide what are described as 'Article 5-like' security guarantees to protect Ukraine if Russia violates the pact,” Ignatius writes, noting Kyiv wants a formal agreement signed and ratified by Congress.
• “Land swaps are an inescapable part of the deal, but Ukraine and the U.S. are still haggling over how the lines would be drawn...One way to finesse this issue is the Korea model – to this day, South Korea claims a legal right to the entire peninsula and North Korea asserts the same,” Ignatius observes.
• “The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, would no longer be under Russian occupation. Negotiators are discussing the possibility that the United States might take over running the facility,” Ignatius states.
• “The biggest mistake Trump can make is to insist that it's now or never. Diplomacy doesn't work that way, and good business doesn't, either. As Trump observed several decades ago, "The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. That makes the other guy smell blood, and then you're dead.”

“The Time to End the War in Ukraine Is Now: Trump Can Defy the Skeptics and Seal the Deal,” Thomas Graham, Foreign Affairs, 12.10.25.

• “The best deal each side can achieve is available now, not in six months or later,” Graham writes.
• He notes that Ukraine’s prospects worsen with every additional day of fighting, while Russia, though currently appearing more secure, has suffered massive losses—over a million killed or injured—for only limited gains. Meanwhile, the prolonged conflict causes Moscow to fall further behind major global powers such as the United States, China, and potentially India and Europe.
• According to Graham, the outlines of an eventual peace arrangement are already clear, even if both sides publicly reject them: a cease-fire along the existing front lines without legal recognition of territorial claims; Ukraine adopting armed neutrality—strong enough to defend itself but outside NATO—combined with a path to EU membership; and an end to NATO’s eastward expansion into the former Soviet republics.
• He emphasizes that U.S. involvement—especially Trump’s personal role—is crucial for conferring legitimacy on Russia as a major power and on Putin as a global actor.. “With one last effort, he [Trump] could once again defy his critics and end a conflict others thought intractable,” Graham concludes.

“Russia Doesn’t Want ‘Competitive Coexistence,’” Alexander J. Motyl, The National Interest, 12.11.25.

• “What should the United States do to end the Ukraine War and manage relations with Russia? The Council on Foreign Relations’ Thomas Graham, one of America’s top Russia experts, suggested in a recent article for this publication that the answer is not “containment,” but “competitive coexistence.” The proposal is intriguing, but ultimately unpersuasive, for a simple reason: it takes two to tango,” according to Motyl.
• “Ukraine, as Graham surely knows, could accept (and has accepted) many of his suggestions. The problem is, was, and will be Putin and his Russia. For them to accept anything smacking of Graham’s deal would mean political suicide. This means that as long as Putin remains in control, he and his regime must be treated as what they are and claim to be: implacable enemies with imperialist ambitions,” according to Motyl.
• “If and when Russia’s president goes—as he surely will one of these days—then and only then might competitive coexistence’s approach to ending the war work. Although even then, undue optimism may not be warranted. After all, Putin isn’t Russia’s only anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian imperialist,” according to Motyl.
• Motyl writes, “The best hope for a less implacably hostile Russia may therefore lie in the power struggle that is sure to erupt after Putin’s demise. We can’t predict whether the hard-liners or the soft-liners will win, but we can predict that their attention will be focused on the Kremlin rather than on the war. We can also predict that many of the Russian Federation’s constituent nations will take advantage of the ongoing instability and attempt to place as much distance as possible between themselves and Moscow. Although Graham may be right that the West can’t change Russia, Putin’s refusal to dance the competitive-coexistence tango could ultimately prove that containment’s assumptions were correct.”

"POLITICO's interview with Donald Trump," Politico, 12.09.25.

• [Which country, Russia or Ukraine, right now is in the stronger negotiating position?] Trump asserts, “Well, there can be no question about it. It’s Russia. It’s a much bigger country. It’s a war that should’ve never happened. Frankly, it wouldn’t have happened if I were president, and it didn’t happen for four years.”
• [Is Zelenskyy responsible for stalled progress on peace?] Trump claims, “Well, he’s gotta read the proposal. He hadn’t re … really, he hasn’t read it yet. … His people loved the proposal. … I think he should find time to read it.”
• [Do you think Ukraine should hold an election?] Trump replies, “Yeah, I think so. It’s been a long time. … They’re using war not to hold an election, but, uh, I would think the Ukrainian people would … should have that choice.”
• [Do you think Ukraine has lost this war?] Trump says, “Well, they’ve lost territory long before I got here. … It’s now a bigger strip. It’s a wider strip. But they lost a lot of land, and it’s very good land, too, that they lost. … You certainly wouldn’t say it’s a victory. I could show you a chart. It’s uh ... it’s a lot of land they lost.”
• [European Council President said the new US NSS is ‘largely consistent with Moscow’s vision’—do you think that’s a good thing?] Trump responds, “Well, I think he’d like to see a ... a weak Europe, and, uh, so you know, to be honest with you, uh, he’s getting that. That has nothing to do with me.”
• [Should NATO stop accepting new members? Was there an understanding Ukraine would not join NATO?] Trump says, “It was always, uh … long before Putin, uh, it was an understanding that Ukraine would not be going into NATO. This was long before Putin, in all fairness. And now they pushed … when, uh, Zelenskyy first went in and first met Putin, he said I want two things. I want Crimea back and we’re gonna be a member of NATO.”
• [Trump states, “This is not a war that should’ve happened. This is a war that would’ve never happened if I were president. … What a sad thing for humanity.”

“Behind the negotiating table to end the Russia-Ukraine war,” Fiona Hill speaks to Thomas Wright, Brookings Institution, 12.08.25.

• Fiona Hill states, “The United States and Russia are taking a business-first approach to negotiations, which is unlikely to lead to a long-term solution to the conflict that prevents Russia from continuing its aggression.”
• Hill describes Putin’s tactics: “The style for Putin and for those people around him is really to try to tease out what other people are willing to offer, and then to see if he can get to make them go further… really not show your hands at all.”
• Hill warns, “the Russian military is suffering about 1,500 casualties a day while only making incremental gains on the battlefield—but Putin believes this is a temporary price worth paying… he thinks that the West will fold first.”
• Hill emphasizes, “for the stability of Europe and frankly for global security, some ironclad agreement that Russia is not going to continue this war [is needed]… we’re not going to basically reach that by this kind of haggling and talking about opening up all kinds of business opportunities for U.S. energy companies or, you know, other investors in Russia.”
• Hill says, “Ukraine’s best strategy is really to blunt the Russian offensive and to make it impossible for Putin to move any further forward, and to try to… work to put pressures on Russia in various ways with allies and partners that constrain Putin’s ability to pursue the war.”
• Hill warns that “a U.S.-led deal with Russia to end the war and quickly lift sanctions could… lead to quite a rift… with Europe,” suggesting it would be “delightful” for Putin to “see the U.S. and Russia dealing over the heads not just of Ukraine, but also of Europe and really kind of then putting Europe on the back foot.”

“A Flawed Path to Peace: The Weaknesses of the Proposed U.S.–Russia Framework for Ukraine,” Tanya Kozyreva, Belfer Center, 12.10.25. For RM’s hot take comparing the 28-point Russian-U.S. peace plan and the European/Ukrainian counterproposal, see Table 1 in RM’s  Russia Analytical Report, Nov. 17–24, 2025.

• “A recently leaked 28-point proposal from the U.S. government—developed in coordination with Russian input and now circulating among Kyiv, Moscow, and European capitals—has been put forward as a potential peace framework to end the war in Ukraine. Yet the proposed U.S.–Russia “peace deal framework” appears less aimed at ending the war in Ukraine than at reordering the global security landscape. That undertaking could take years, if not decades, and would require concessions not only from Ukraine and Russia but from NATO members and Ukraine’s other allies. Its complexity, vague, and open-ended language creates loopholes that invite broad interpretation and potential manipulation.”
• “The proposed peace deal framework, as drafted, questions Ukraine’s sovereignty and effectively holds the country hostage to negotiations on Putin’s long-term concern, NATO enlargement. It does not explain what constitutes “reliable” or “robust” guarantees for Ukraine, who would provide them, or on what timeline they would take effect. U.S. guarantees lack specificity, while guarantees from the EU and the coalition of the willing are not mentioned at all. The document also offers no sense of what happens if talks collapse, stall indefinitely, or are subverted by one side. Unresolved, these gaps introduce structural vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit (as it did under the Budapest memorandum), raising fundamental concerns about the plan’s underlying strategic intent and practical viability. This would make a near-term settlement neither achievable nor realistic. ”
• “A European counterproposal to the plan, drafted by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, addresses some of its most obvious inconsistencies. It still does not, however, resemble a Russia–Ukraine bilateral agreement to end the war. The text continues to incorporate matters that belong squarely to global governance, assigning “homework” to major international institutions such as the World Bank and even to blocs of states not party to the conflict, including the G8. For example, provisions on Russia’s reintegration into the global economy and prospective U.S.–Russia business cooperation lie entirely outside the scope of a peace settlement between Moscow and Kyiv. Including them not only exceeds the mandate of a bilateral agreement but also creates new leverage for Russia, effectively making Ukraine’s peace dependent on the success or failure of unrelated geopolitical business negotiations. In its current form, the proposal risks making peace in Ukraine contingent on long-term global processes that fall outside the scope of a war-ending agreement and remain beyond the control of Ukraine or its key partners. ”

"How to Know a Ukraine Peace Deal Is Real," Interview with Ursula von der Leyen, Politico, 12.11.25.

• In a POLITICO interview, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen states, “We’re working intensively towards a just and lasting peace. … This peace agreement should be such a solid peace agreement that it does not sow the seeds for the next conflict immediately.”
• She emphasizes the importance of “very robust security guarantees,” noting, “the most difficult topics are … territories… and the security guarantees,” which must “make sure that there is lasting peace.”
• Von der Leyen details ongoing efforts to use immobilized Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction, explaining, “we will secure the immobilization of the Russian assets … so that the cash balances can work for Ukraine.”
• She defends European unity and progress, arguing, “None of these challenges or none of these crises could have been managed by a member state on its own. … At 27, we can move mountains.”
• While acknowledging a changing partnership with the U.S. under Trump, von der Leyen affirms her transatlantic commitment: “From the bottom of my heart, I’m a convinced transatlanticist.… Let’s take pride in that. Let’s stand up for a unified Europe.”

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks on the Ukraine crisis,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12.11.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Lavrov said, “Our negotiations with the US President and his team are focused on…developing a long-term solution that addresses the root causes of this crisis,” which for Russia include “ceasing efforts to bring Ukraine into NATO” and “halting the Ukrainian regime’s campaign to eradicate all things Russian.”
• Reviewing diplomatic history, Lavrov blamed the West for not honoring the Minsk agreements, stating, “The West perceived these agreements merely as a stalling tactic…Their aim…was to bolster the beleaguered state of the Ukrainian armed forces, thereby preparing Ukraine for war against Russia.”
• On recent talks, Lavrov claimed, “We prepared and submitted our proposals to the Ukrainian side…This pattern confirmed that the Ukrainian regime is fundamentally unwilling to seek genuine solutions or agreements.” He insisted Russia has “never refused to talk,” citing work “to review the initiatives advanced by the United States.”
• He described current Western security proposals as “inherently pointless to discuss without our direct participation,” arguing they are “structured in a manner that effectively prepares for a future attack on the Russian Federation.”
• Lavrov concluded that “we are prepared to consider all credible proposals formulated within a collective framework to launch negotiations on fundamental, legally binding agreements,” but “Europe holds up the imagined threat of a Russian attack as a bogey…we stand by our words, whereas there is nothing but open warmongering on their part.”

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “The impact of a Russia-Ukraine peace deal,” Hakyung Kim and Robert Armstrong, Financial Times, 12.12.25.
• “Trump Wanted Ukraine to Cede Land to Russia. Ukraine Has Another Offer,” Michael D. Shear and Steven Erlanger, The New York Times, 12.12.25.
• “Ukraine struggles to cope with America’s destructive peace plans,” The Economist, 12.11.25.
• “U.S. and Ukraine Try to Break Impasse Over Peace Deal With Russia,” Laurence Norman, Anastasiia Malenko and Georgi Kantchev, Wall Street Journal, 12.14.25.
• “Europe Sees Trojan Horse for Russia in Trump’s Ukraine Plan,” Alex Wickham and Alberto Nardelli, Bloomberg, 12.13.25.
• "Give Ukraine Back Its Future," Chrystia Freeland, Project Syndicate, 12.15.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Trump embraces great power cooperation with China and Russia,” Dave Lawler and Zachary Basu, Axios, 12.12.25.

• President Trump’s first term opened the “age of 'Great Power Competition' with China and Russia,” but his second term is “actively working to end it,” challenging the bipartisan U.S. consensus that China and Russia are adversaries to restrain rather than partners to deal with, according to Lawler and Basu.
• According to the new National Security Strategy, “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country... Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”
• Trump’s administration has shifted away from confrontation, striking a trade truce with President Xi Jinping, backing off sanctions over cyber intrusions, and recently lifting a ban on Nvidia’s H200 chip exports to China, with the goal of “reinforcing U.S. dominance in designing the chips that power AI globally,” , according to Lawler and Basu.
• Trump’s Russia strategy similarly emphasizes accommodation and deal-making: his envoys are “pressuring Ukraine to cede the entire Donbas region to Russia” and have proposed a long-term economic cooperation agreement with Moscow in energy, tech, and other strategic sectors, , according to Lawler and Basu.
• This approach aligns with Trump’s calls to “bring Russia back into the G7” and with a new National Security Strategy that is “notably far less hostile to Russia than to the European Union, which Trump has cast as a 'decaying' project of the old liberal order,” the authors write.

“The Multipolar Mirage: Why America and China Are the World's Only Great Powers,” Jennifer Lind, Foreign Affairs, 12.12.25.

• “The world, in short, is bipolar. Many middle powers are influential actors within their regions, but only the United States and China exceed the great-power threshold,” Lind writes.
• “China today is already more powerful than the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. Modern China, then, is not just a great power but a superpower,” Lind argues.
• “In these early years of the bipolar era, competition between China and the United States is growing across every domain: trade, finance, technology, global governance, and military power,” Lind observes.
• “The increasingly influential role of middle powers, however, should not be confused with multipolarity, as none of these middle powers exceed the great-power threshold for economic and military power,” Lind notes.
• “The return of bipolarity means it’s time to remember—with regret and trepidation—the nature, intensity, and global reach of superpower competition,” Lind concludes.

“Trump’s Power Paradox: What Kind of World Order Does His National Security Strategy Seek?” Michael Kimmage, Foreign Affairs, 12.08.25.

• “For Trump, it is power, not principles, that makes the world go round,” Kimmage writes.
• “The order would not be American-led. It would not be the function of great-power competition or of civilizational clashes, and it would not be rules-based. It would issue instead from a dense network of personal relationships that supersede any alliances or any division of countries along the lines of democracy or authoritarianism,” Kimmage argues.
• “All too often in Trump’s brash strategy document, foreign policy is construed as nothing more than naked assertiveness, a means to the end of ‘an American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies,’” Kimmage observes.
• “The strategy advances the search for ‘strategic stability with Russia’ and blames European elites for standing in the way of peace,” Kimmage notes.
• “Resolving the conflict in Ukraine would demand not just flexibility but close coordination with allies and carefully plotted incentives to curb Russian aggression. This is incompatible with the project of imposing American-style conservatism on Europe,” Kimmage concludes.

“Putin Isn’t in It for the Money,” Chris Miller, Wall Street Journal, 12.11.25.

• “Vladimir Putin hasn’t accepted the Trump administration’s plan for peace with Ukraine, even though it’s highly favorable to Moscow’s interests,” Miller writes.
• “The administration misreads Mr. Putin’s interests. His economy is stable. His war aims are territory and imperial control. He doesn’t want our money. He wants Ukraine—a stepping stone toward remaking Russia’s great-power status,” Miller argues.
• “For nearly four years of war, the West has proved unwilling to cut his main source of export revenue, oil, fearing global price shocks of the type that intensified inflation in 2022,” Miller notes.
• “Real incomes are up by double digits since the war began. Unemployment is at record lows. Even assuming this data is massaged in the Kremlin’s favor, Russia’s economy clearly isn’t in crisis. Mr. Putin has no dire need for sanctions relief,” Miller observes.
• “The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had nothing to do with economics. The Biden administration threatened sanctions. Mr. Putin’s advisers told him war would be immensely costly. He went ahead anyway,” Miller writes.
• “The Trump administration’s offer of economic inducements misses the point. Russia doesn’t want a business deal, it wants Ukraine: a building block of Mr. Putin’s new sphere of control and a victory that could humiliate the West and demonstrate his great-power status. Mr. Putin will agree to a cease-fire only when he is convinced that he can’t win on the battlefield. ...Paying Mr. Putin for peace is precisely the wrong strategy,” according to Miller. 

“Putin’s Already Won,” Michael Hirsh, Foreign Policy, 12.11.25.

• “He appears to be succeeding in his larger goal of dividing and weakening what is loosely called the ‘West’—the nations that make up NATO. And this is a large part of what the Russian dictator has been trying to achieve in the first place, many Russia watchers say,” Hirsh writes.
• “Since Trump’s election, there’s been increasingly rancorous disagreement not only between the United States and Europeans but within the Trump administration and the Republican Party itself about how to resolve the war. Not so in Russia, where surveys consistently show support for the war among Russians has remained fairly stable at 70 percent to 80 percent,” Hirsh notes.
• “Taken together, the convergence of these factors may well mean that Vladimir Putin has already won,” Hirsh concludes.

”Thomas L. Friedman Says We’re in a New Epoch. David Brooks Has Questions,” Thomas L. Friedman and David Brooks, The New York Times, 12.12.25.

• On Russia’s war in Ukraine, Friedman argues: “Sometimes that globalization system will actually restrain behavior. Putin will invade Crimea, but he might not go to Kyiv. China will threaten Taiwan, but they won’t actually invade. And sometimes you’ll burst through that system, but my real framework is that it’s a tension between the two” (globalization and culture/identity).
• Friedman repeatedly ties the conflict in Ukraine to a broader quest for dignity, humiliation, and “home.” He says: “For me, the two most powerful emotions driving human beings are one: humiliation and dignity… That’s really what I was covering, whether it’s about China or Russia or Palestinians or anything else.” The war in Ukraine is framed through this lens of identity and belonging.
• Brooks and Friedman both discuss how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is both a product of the new era’s rapidly shifting technological, cultural, and political context, and a more classic great-power, dignity-driven struggle: “That’s why I changed my business card back in 2015 from New York Times Foreign Affairs Columnist to New York Times Humiliation and Dignity Columnist. I felt that’s really what I was covering, whether it’s about China or Russia or Palestinians or anything else.” (Friedman)
• On the international response: Friedman highlights global “interdependence” and the polycrisis concept, seeing the war as indicative of a world where “every problem now that needs solving is at a planetary scale—governing A.I., nuclear weapons, climate—and therefore, every solution will have to be at a planetary scale.” The Ukraine war cannot be separated from these wider forces and crises.
• Both warn that the war in Ukraine and the West’s internal and external challenges are “not just the problem of this administration, but it is a big part of the problem.” Friedman concludes: “If we stay on this trajectory where this administration is taking us… three more years of this, we’re not going to make it. Because I do live by the bedrock view… we can survive anything, as long as our institutions survive basically intact. But if we lose our institutions… the ability to rebuild out of this is going to be extremely difficult.”

“Why Many Underestimated Russia’s Invasion Risk,” Aybars Tuncdogan, War on the Rocks, 12.08.25.

• “Many analysts and observers underestimated the likelihood of invasion in part because they modeled Russia as a typical state in which checks from domestic elites significantly constrain the leader,” Tuncdogan argues.
• “By February 2022, Putin had been in control… for more than two decades. In this time, he progressively purged, replaced, and remodeled elite groups, ensuring loyalist predominance,” Tuncdogan writes, explaining how elite dissent became costly, coordination among dissidents difficult, and Putin’s personal latitude expanded for high-risk moves.
• “Entrenchment did not reduce the objective risks for Russia, but it did lower the personal and political costs Putin faced if the gamble went wrong and made it easier for his false optimism to survive unchallenged,” he observes, stressing that over time, elite pressure on Putin diminished as power became more personalized.
• “An entrenched leader like Putin typically sits at the center of an echo chamber, as his subordinates and associates have strong incentives to flatter his views and filter out inconvenient information,” Tuncdogan notes, linking personalized rule to strategic misjudgments.
• “The core lesson that leader entrenchment matters is generalizable beyond the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” Tuncdogan concludes. He recommends treating leader longevity and the consolidation of power as risk multipliers when assessing the likelihood of conflict or other high-stakes decisions.

“The Challenges to Europe’s Security Go Beyond Trump’s Lack of Support,” Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 12.10.25.

• “Europe, stranded between the United States and Russia, faces its second epoch-changing event of the past few years,” Erlanger writes.
• “President Trump’s main goal is not peace in Ukraine but rapprochement with a Russia that is actively trying to undermine NATO and the European Union, which would jeopardize Europe’s security,” Erlanger asserts.
• “For the first time since the end of World War II, America is not on our side on a matter of war and peace in Europe,” said Norbert Röttgen, a senior legislator in the conservative party of Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany.
• “NATO commanders consider 2029 a deadline for developing credible conventional deterrence against Russia, but worry that Moscow may test the alliance’s cohesion before then,” Erlanger notes.
• “The highly ideological document [Trump’s national security strategy] accuses mainstream European governments of subverting democracy and inviting ‘civilizational erasure,’” Erlanger writes, adding that the administration signals its determination to “‘cultivate resistance’ in Europe by working with its political soul mates across the continent.”
• “It’s a moment of truth for Europe,” Mr. Röttgen said. “The technocrats don’t like it and for good reasons, but this is a moment of political will to stay relevant, not of legal niceties.”
• “Europe must prepare to fight a war on its own because Mr. Trump may decide not to support it, a senior European official said,” Erlanger states.

“Fuel, fear and falsehoods: Defending Europe and Ukraine from Russia’s hybrid energy war,” Leonardo De Agostini and Caspar Hobhouse, EUISS, 12.10.25.

• “While these ‘terror attacks on the energy grid’, in the words of HR/VP Kaja Kallas, continue, the Kremlin is simultaneously waging its hybrid war on the EU: targeting critical infrastructure, launching drone incursions and conducting massive disinformation campaigns,” De Agostini and Hobhouse write.
  • “Russia’s energy disinformation forms part of a broader strategy that weaponizes the energy sector for both physical and hybrid attacks,” De Agostini and Hobhouse observe.
  • “The weaponization of energy and information has long been central to Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox,” De Agostini and Hobhouse argue.
  • “Russia has been able to exploit these societal frictions with targeted disinformation campaigns: blaming EU governments’ policies for rising prices and natural hazards while fueling climate skepticism and extremist movements,” De Agostini and Hobhouse note.
  • “The strongest card the EU can play is to prove that energy independence, powered by an electrified economy and locally generated energy, is the most effective antidote to Russian interference in the energy system,” De Agostini and Hobhouse conclude.

“Reading Trump’s National Security Strategy: Europe through a distorted lens,” Carl Bildt, ECFR, 12.09.25.

• “The document does not contain a single hint of criticism of Russia and its blatant war of aggression against Ukraine,” Bildt notes.
• “Within 48 hours of the National Security Strategy announcing that Europe is facing ‘civilizational erasure,’ Christopher Landau, the deputy secretary of state, proclaimed on X that the policies of the European Union... are driving the continent towards ‘civilizational suicide,’” Bildt observes.
• “Although not stated outright, the document’s formulations imply that ‘strategic stability with Russia’ is part of the solution,” Bildt writes.
• “Whether Europeans will welcome America’s offer of ‘managing European relations with Russia’ is highly doubtful,” Bildt cautions.
• “We are not going ‘extinct’, and we are certainly not about to commit ‘suicide’. We remain a magnet in a turbulent world. By any broad measure, no other region on our Earth provides a better quality of life to a large share of its population than Europe,” Bildt concludes.

“Transatlantic rupture: Relations between the US and Europe crumple further over Trump’s national security strategy and pressure on Ukraine,” Ben Hall, Financial Times, 12.13.25.

• The new Trump administration national security strategy is sharply critical of the EU and ratchets up U.S. pressure on Ukraine to accept unfavorable terms, prompting outrage among European leaders, according to Hall.
• Hall writes that European governments have mostly tried engagement and diplomacy to moderate President Trump, but divisions are deepening, with experts and officials calling the new U.S. stance a “declaration of political war on the EU.”
• Trump’s approach, critics argue, favors “survival of the fittest” international relations and aims for “strategic stabilization” with Russia, potentially involving pressure on Kyiv to cede territory, according to Hall.
• The document’s inconsistencies and aggressive values have provoked fears of further U.S.–EU rifts, with some analysts warning that American commitment to NATO could be conditional on European acquiescence to U.S.–Russia deals over Ukraine.
• The article highlights three flashpoints: EU regulation of U.S. tech firms, American support for Europe’s populist right, and—most seriously—Washington’s insistence that Kyiv accept Russian influence as the price of peace, according to Hall.

“More reasons for America’s friends to plan for the worst,” The Economist, 12.11.25.

• The Trump administration’s newly released national security strategy (NSS) “once again left many policymakers, especially in Europe, in a panic,” The Economist writes.
• The document “declares the West’s greatest threat to be ‘mass migration’” and pledges support for populist-right parties in Europe, while notably omitting any mention of Russia as a threat.
• The strategy signals a willingness to revive business ties between Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, including resumed European purchases of Russian energy—a prospect European leaders view skeptically.
• America’s approach to Asia under the NSS appears vaguer than in 2017, showing a focus on commerce and diplomacy with China but leaving allies uncertain about Washington’s long-term intentions.
• “Asked about the NSS on December 8th, Mr Trump at times appeared unfamiliar with its contents,” The Economist notes, concluding that U.S. allies “cannot depend on anything that they are told ... better for America’s friends to plan for the worst.”

“Reflections on Trump’s National Security Strategy,” Michael Froman, Council on Foreign Relations, 12.12.25.

• Froman writes that Trump’s National Security Strategy “marks a notable departure from the more anodyne manifestos of past administrations,” rejecting “permanent American domination of the entire world” in favor of a strategy that is “equal parts muscular and restrained, pragmatic yet ideological.”
• He highlights the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” which requires “pliant and aligned governments in Central and South America,” and predicts a reallocation of U.S. resources “from other regions—the Indo-Pacific, European, and Middle Eastern theaters—to this one.”
• Froman observes that China is only “mentioned by name for the first time about two-thirds of the way through the document,” while “Russia is seen less as a revisionist power than as an issue the Europeans have an existential concern about,” and the United States’ role is that of a mediator, not a direct party.
• He notes the strategy’s “ultimate triumph of economic—or commercial—interests and tools,” describing “openly transactional economic dealmaking” as a key organizing principle, but warns this approach underplays “the tradeoffs of a global trade war.”
• Froman concludes that Trump’s strategy “embraces a world in which stability is maintained by a ‘balance of power’ and the logic of ‘flexible realism’…The quiet part has been said out loud and is being acted upon with great haste.”

“This alliance has become transactional. Here’s how to repair it,” Editorial Board, Washington Post, 12.14.25.

• The Editorial Board writes, “The Trump administration recently published a strategy document more critical of democratic Europe than America’s authoritarian adversaries, and scorned allies responded by throwing an equally unhelpful fit. Can Atlanticists on both sides…repair the rift, or will they let a small but vocal minority see through one of the greatest unforced errors in diplomatic history?”
• The board notes, “In the Trump era, the transatlantic alliance is becoming increasingly transactional, driven more by mutually beneficial exchange than shared values. Trump exaggerates his frustrations, but he has done more to reset the alliance than tear it down.”
• They argue, “Europeans are indeed geopolitically ‘weak,’ as Trump said…for decades, American presidents have politely pleaded with allies to share more of the burden. They agreed but made little real progress on rebuilding their underfunded militaries.”
• The editorial warns, “This kind of inconsistency gives credibility to voices inside Europe that would prefer replacing the American alliance with closer ties to countries like China or even Russia. Trump’s blind spot is believing his fellow populists in Europe would make better allies than the centrist status quo.”
• The board concludes, “Savvy European leaders need to make use of this moment not to join the anti-American chorus but to goad their societies to accept difficult reforms. Their rallying cry should be patriotism, calling people to a common defense against a threat many already feel in their bones.”

“Russia is ‘exporting chaos,’ new head of Britain’s spy agency MI6 warns,” Charles Clover, Financial Times, 12.14.25.²

• Charles Clover reports, “Britain’s new head of MI6 will accuse Russia of exporting ‘chaos’ and warn that the threat posed by Moscow will persist until Vladimir Putin is ‘forced to change his calculus’, in her first public remarks since taking office.”
• He explains, “Blaise Metreweli, who took the top job at the spy agency in June, will… call Russia an ‘aggressive, expansionist and revisionist’ adversary… ‘The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in the Russian approach to international engagement,’ she will say.”
• He notes, “Metreweli, a former head of technology at MI6… will also talk about the need for the agency to invest in technology in addition to its traditional focus on agent recruitment. ‘Mastery of technology must infuse everything we do,’ she will say.”
• Clover adds, “In a separate speech, Britain’s new chief of defense staff Sir Richard Knighton will also call for a ‘whole of society approach’ to defense… ‘The Russian leadership has made clear that it wishes to challenge, limit, divide and ultimately destroy Nato.’”
• Clover concludes, “The remarks reflect the unease among European intelligence and defense officials about the future security of the continent as the US… has limited support for Ukraine and tried to pressure President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to give in to key Russian demands to secure peace.”

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Trump Wants to Carve Up the World. It’s a Blueprint for Disaster,” Greg Grandin, New York Times, 12.15.25.
• “How Europe Lost: Can the Continent Escape Its Trump Trap?” Matthias Matthijs and Nathalie Tocci, Foreign Affairs, 12.12.25.
• “Research in Ukraine and Russia Shows Trump’s Mediation Efforts Have Only Sown More Discord,” Elena Koneva, Russia.Post, 12.11.25.
• “Former U.S. Army Europe commander Ben Hodges on why a Russia-friendly peace plan would ‘guarantee’ an attack on NATO,” Meduza, 12.10.25.
• “Exploring Opportunities for European Rearmament Through Ukraine’s Experience and Indo-Pacific Partnerships,” Kateryna Olkhovyk, Olena Bilousova, Marta Bukhtiiarova, IISS, 12.11.25.
• “Europe's center is barely holding—and Trump plans to blow it apart,” Tim Ross, Politico, 12.12.25.
• “Trump Despises Europe. We Can’t Ignore That Anymore,” Max Hastings, Bloomberg, 12.10.25.
• “NATO Enlargement Was a Good Idea, Until It Wasn’t,” Tobin Harshaw, Bloomberg, 12.10.25.
• “America’s Eyes Are on the Wrong Hemisphere,” Michael McFaul, Wall Street Journal, 12.12.25.
• “Trump’s Business Model Is to Break Europe,” Majda Ruge, Foreign Policy, 12.15.25.
• “A Post-war Europe Based on Collective Security That Includes Both Ukraine and Russia,” Tom Sauer, IGREC, December 2025.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

“We Might Regret Golden Dome’s Greatest Ambition,” Andrew Facini and Mallory Stewart, War on the Rocks, 12.11.25.

• “The most likely impact of Golden Dome is to incentivize America’s adversaries to double down on such destabilizing behavior by further developing long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic systems, undersea platforms, and even space-based offensive weapons systems,” Facini and Stewart write, warning that strategic missile defense could escalate the arms race.
• “Space-based interceptors would be completely ineffective against threats that stay within the atmosphere or exist undersea—cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and drones,” they note, underlining that adversaries can exploit these gaps with cheaper, more effective weapons.
• “Washington’s adversaries may find themselves reaching for more cost-effective means of attaining their objectives—to the point where the United States may find itself ensnared in a perverse process of self-cost imposition,” the authors argue, describing how the cost-exchange dynamic traditionally favors offense over defense.
• “Limiting the expansive space-based interception component of Golden Dome would save the United States not just a great deal of money, but also from evaporating the critical diplomatic capital necessary to find sustainable new pathways towards strategic risk reduction,” Facini and Stewart suggest, urging arms control engagement.
• “Mutual vulnerability is here to stay—whether we like it or not… Rather than seeking exemption from it, the United States should engage more directly with its potential adversaries on this front and use all possible leverage to craft a more stable and secure base from which to navigate future conflict,” they conclude, advocating for diplomatic approaches over technologically-assured exemption.

“‘Golden Dome’ and the Illusory Promise of Invulnerability. US Missile Defense under Trump: Risks and Opportunities for Europe,” Liviu Horovitz and Juliana Süß, SWP, December 2025.

• “The current US administration plans to protect the entire territory of the United States against any potential air or missile attack. The focus is on deploying large satel­lite constellations capable of detecting and intercepting long-range missiles shortly after launch. Even if only a fraction of this ambitious plan is likely to be implemented, it is probable that there will be progress in missile defense during the coming years. For Germany and Europe, the risks and potential benefits – especially with regard to space-based US missile defense – are difficult to assess at the current time. However, Europe can maintain the largest possible room for maneuver by avoiding an open confrontation over Trump’s plans.”

Nuclear arms:

“The Nuclear Dimension of a Ukrainian Peace Settlement,” Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Cimbala, The National Interest, 12.13.25.

• Korb and Cimbala write, “an important aspect of conflict resolution is receiving little or no attention, at least publicly. That aspect is the issue of nuclear weapons and their significance in the post-war behavior of Russia, Ukraine, and NATO.”
• They note, “President Putin’s repeated invocation of the nuclear menace likely helped to deter the United States and NATO from providing Ukraine with some of their long-range and state-of-the-art missiles that could have inflicted decisive strikes on the vitals of the Russian military establishment and economic infrastructure.”
• The authors warn, “Of particular concern is the asymmetrical relationship between Russian non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons deployed or readily available and those deployed or readily available to the United States and its NATO allies,” which “creates a possible gap in deterrence stability under exigent conditions of nuclear blackmail by Russia.”
• “Since NATO is a multinational consultative body that requires unanimous agreement among member states before engaging in nuclear first use or retaliation, it could not maintain a convincing nuclear deterrent,” they argue.
• Korb and Cimbala recommend that “the post-war agreement…should establish at least four protocols,” including abstaining from explicit nuclear threats, prohibiting nuclear weapons deployment in Ukraine or Russian-occupied territories, extending New START with transparency for non-strategic nukes, and including next-generation nuclear weapons in arms-control talks.

"A New Age of Nuclear Proliferation?" Mohamed ElBaradei, Project Syndicate, 12.15.25.

• Mohamed ElBaradei writes, “For the first time since the end of the Cold War, nuclear arsenals are growing, and the weapons themselves are becoming more lethal, more diverse, and more vulnerable,” citing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “nuclear saber rattling over Ukraine” as a primary example of escalating threat.
• ElBaradei argues, “Arms-control talks have stalled, and most agreements have expired or become hollowed out,” highlighting that only one major U.S.-Russia treaty (New START) remains—and it is set to expire, leaving unchecked Russia’s and America’s strategic arsenals.
• He emphasizes, “All nine nuclear-weapon states are doubling down by ‘modernizing’ their arsenals,” with Russia and the U.S.—which together hold almost 90% of global warheads—leading renewed modernization and deployment, while engaging in increasingly confrontational nuclear rhetoric.
• ElBaradei points out, “Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev...warns that a ‘defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war may trigger a nuclear war,’” reflecting Moscow’s willingness to link nuclear risks to the outcomes in Ukraine and conventional conflicts.
• He concludes, “The message is that, if you want the ultimate security guarantee, you must have the bomb; and that if you do have it, you can get away with murder. Ukraine, a country that agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees, understands this all too well”—underscoring Russia’s role in reversing global nonproliferation norms.

“Gender backlash in disarmament and arms control: Safeguarding progress amid rising resistance,” Jana Baldus, European Leadership Network, 12.10.25. 

• Jana Baldus writes, “Efforts to strengthen gender equality and embed gender perspectives in multilateral disarmament and arms control are facing unprecedented pressure,” especially due to recent political shifts such as the Trump administration’s resistance to gender, diversity, or inclusion initiatives.
• She notes, “Anti-gender narratives have fueled opposition to gender-inclusive language and intensified the contestation of gender equality policies in multilateral disarmament and arms control diplomacy.”
• Baldus finds, “Resistance by even a small number of powerful states could erode hard-won gains,” warning that if the backlash goes unaddressed, there is a risk of failing to tackle the gendered impacts of weapons violence and of eroding normative commitments to gender equality.
• She argues, “Undermining gender perspectives would not only weaken the legitimacy of multilateral processes; it could also trigger broader setbacks for humanitarian and human-centric approaches and further marginalize underrepresented voices.”
• Baldus proposes a two-track strategy: “countering the gender backlash through protective action and active diplomacy,” and “building long-term resilience by embedding gender perspectives and strengthening networks of like-minded states and civil society.”

“Nuclear weapons are weapons of peace.” Sergey Karaganov spoke with Svobodnaya Pressa, 12.08.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This individual is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Right now the point is that we need to restore an ideological core. Great countries are not built without an ideological backbone. When they lose it, they quickly perish. There are many such examples, including in Russian history. Our task now is to create an ideological foundation for our society. It should not come ‘from below’ — it must be proposed by the ruler or the elites.”
• “Russia — and all of humanity — now faces a gigantic task that we have not yet fully understood. It is the idea of creating a new socio‑economic system for the development of the world.”
• “The special military operation is helping us purge the comprador elite and their servants — the ‘demons’ of Dostoevsky, of which we had a huge number.”
• “I was in wild fury when we began the special military operation at least three years late, and without activating our main trump card — nuclear deterrence. For reasons unclear to me, we still have not used it.”
• “And we must also recognize that our reference points have changed. Our ‘European journey’ has ended… the centers of innovation today are China, India, and the Arab world. Now we simply need to understand where and how we should move.”
• “China is Russia’s military‑political partner and, de facto, an ally — at least for the next 10–20 years. After that, we’ll see… Belarus and the DPRK are Russia’s allies. In general, allies are expensive and usually not very reliable.”
• “[When asked: The United States has announced it is resuming nuclear tests. What will our response be?] I am very pleased they did this, because for several years I have advocated restoring nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons are a barrier against humanity’s self‑destruction. For seventy years this worked, but over the last twenty years, primarily in the West, it stopped working. People stopped fearing war; they lost the fear of God. And therefore one direction of my work is to restore humanity’s fear of war. In scientific terms, this is called ‘the credibility of nuclear deterrence for intimidation,’ so that people once again begin to fear war and value peace.”
• “[When asked: Should our country pursue reductions in strategic nuclear weapons?] Under no circumstances! On the contrary, the issue is increasing armaments. We can negotiate with our American and Chinese partners about how and what to do in this direction. Nuclear weapons are weapons of peace and a factor restraining conventional arms. Nuclear weapons have a huge number of functions. One of them is preventing a nuclear arms race and preventing conventional wars. But nuclear weapons have now lost that function. I advocate restoring it.”
• “Nuclear deterrence in world politics and in people’s minds can be achieved by increasing nuclear capability — perhaps first through nuclear testing, and then, in the most extreme case, through its use, so that people finally understand what they are dealing with.”
• WWIII “can be avoided, but for that we must restore the ‘peacekeeping function’ of nuclear weapons.”
• “[When asked: Am I correct in understanding that the United States will not be the potential initiator of a Third World War?] Not at all. Events show that the catalyst for a new world war is Europe — more precisely, the European elites who are driving the world toward war. This has happened many times in history. That is why we are now working with the new elites of the new nuclear powers to restore the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons are weapons for maintaining peace.”

“Nuclear Policy Must Learn to Live With Disagreement,” Amy J. Nelson, Foreign Policy, 12.11.25.

• “After U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent, ambiguous remarks about the possibility of resuming nuclear testing, one of the country’s oldest security debates feels newly alive—and just as contentious,” Nelson writes.
• “The divide between nuclear policy camps is not just ideological; it is epistemic. Competing factions rely on different logics and ideas about what constitutes ‘safety,’” Nelson observes.
• “To move forward, the field must learn from other sectors that have found ways to act amid deep disagreement. The domains of climate governance, artificial intelligence policy, and global health are all marked by uncertainty, value conflict, and divergent worldviews. Yet these communities have learned to transform disagreement into frameworks for collective action—even if temporarily,” Nelson argues.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“One year after Assad’s fall, Meduza asks political scientist Hanna Notte about the state of Russian–Syrian relations,” Meduza, 12.08.25.

Cyber security/AI: 

"China and America Must Get Serious About AI Risk," Jake Sullivan, Project Syndicate, 12.15.25.

• Jake Sullivan notes that in November 2024, “US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made their first substantive joint statement about the national-security risks posed by AI. Specifically, they noted that both the United States and China believe in ‘the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons.’”
• He emphasizes, “Russia had opposed similar language in multilateral bodies. Because bilateral talks with the US on AI and nuclear security would open daylight between Russia and China, progress on this front was not a foregone conclusion.”
• Sullivan explains that “it took more than a year of negotiation” to arrive at this joint statement, and calls the outcome “significant, because it demonstrated that the two AI superpowers can engage in constructive risk management even as they compete vigorously.”
• He warns, “As the US and Chinese militaries increase their use of AI – shortening decision loops and altering deterrence frameworks in the process – the risk of AI-powered systems inadvertently triggering a conflict or catastrophic escalation will grow.”
• Sullivan concludes, “Now, as the momentum behind AI development and deployment...gathers pace, the US and China need to build on this foundation by pursuing sustained, senior-level diplomacy on AI risks, even as each strives for the lead in the AI race. They must do so because the risks of AI are real and only growing.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Oil Prices Have Fallen: Next year, Russia is very likely to have to live with oil prices in the range of $40–45 per barrel,” Re: Russia, 12.08.25.

• The article reports, “oil and gas revenues fell by one third year on year, to 530 billion rubles. Over the first 11 months of 2025 they declined by 22%,” exposing “Moscow’s weak position in the ongoing negotiations over the terms of a peace agreement with Ukraine.”
• “The sharp fall in oil and gas revenues reflects two and a half factors… First is the general decline in oil prices. The average Brent price over the first 11 months was 13% lower than a year earlier. Second is sanctions pressure, which has intensified… amplified by the ruble’s strengthening by more than 20% over the year.”
• “The expected federal budget deficit has increased fivefold, from the originally planned 1.2 trillion to 6 trillion rubles, or from 0.5% to 3% of GDP.”
• “Trump’s sanctions on Russian oil” have caused “discounts [that] increased sharply after the new sanctions were introduced” so that “the tax reference price for Russian oil has fallen to $45 per barrel, which corresponds to levels last seen during the Covid lockdown period.”
• “Shipments of Russian seaborne crude have so far declined only marginally. However, up to half of current cargoes do not have a specified destination,” and “the volume of contracts concluded in November for deliveries to India reached only 60% of the monthly average for 2025. Market participants believe the volume in December could fall by another half.”
• The piece explains, “Brent fell from $79 per barrel in January to $64.5 in November, with an annual average of $69.5, which is 13% lower than in 2024,” and “the actual Urals price has fallen to multi-year lows… the average price for November was $45 per barrel. This is the lowest since November 2020.”
• The analysis forecasts, “as most forecasts suggest, Russia’s oil and gas revenues in 2026 will experience another substantial decline,” and concludes, “if so, Russia will, with high probability, face an actual oil price of about $40–45 per barrel in the coming year.”

“Russia’s First Oil Export to Afghanistan Via the Iranian Railways: a Closer Look,” Sophia Nina Burna-Asefi, RUSI, 12.12.25.

• “Russia reportedly exported 5,000 tons of diesel fuel by rail for the first time to Afghanistan via the semi-built Khaf-Herat railway in the first week of December 2025,” Burna-Asefi writes.
• “This development comes a few weeks after the first freight train carrying Iranian-exported diesel arrived at Roznak station in Herat province via the Khaf-Herat railway line,” Burna-Asefi notes.
• “For Russia, cooperation within the International North-South Multimodal corridor is becoming an important format of network cooperation between Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and the wider Central Asia region. They are becoming the basis of Russia’s networked foreign policy and foreign economic strategy,” Burna-Asefi observes.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“U.S. Blueprint to Rewire Economies of Russia, Ukraine Sets Off Clash With Europe,” Joe Parkinson, Benoit Faucon, and Drew Hinshaw, Wall Street Journal, 12.10.25.

• Parkinson, Faucon, and Hinshaw report: “The U.S. blueprint has been spelled out in appendices to current peace proposals that aren’t public but were described to The Wall Street Journal by U.S. and European officials. The documents detail plans for U.S. financial firms and other businesses to tap roughly $200 billion of frozen Russian assets for projects in Ukraine—including a massive new data center to be powered by a nuclear plant currently occupied by Russian troops.”
• “Another appendix offers America’s broad-strokes vision for bringing Russia’s economy in from the cold, with U.S. companies investing in strategic sectors from rare-earth extraction to drilling for oil in the Arctic, and helping to restore Russian energy flows to Western Europe and the rest of the world,” the authors write.
• European officials are quoted as comparing the proposals to “an economic version of the 1945 conference where World War II victors divvied up Europe.” One says, “It’s like Yalta.” Another official referenced “President Trump’s vision of building a Riviera-style development in Gaza” as a parallel.
• As Parkinson, Faucon, and Hinshaw note, one U.S. official involved in the talks states: “Our sensibility is that we really understand financial growth,” and claims “the pot could grow to $800 billion under American management.”
• The authors write, “European officials say they fear the U.S. approach would give Russia the reprieve it needs to rev up its economy and make itself militarily stronger,” and note that Chancellor Merz told allies he was “skeptical about the U.S. proposals.”

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Russian economy in 2025: Between stagnation and militarization,” Elina Ribakova and Lucas Risinger, Atlantic Council, 12.12.25.

• Ribakova and Risinger write, “the bill is not yet coming due for the Kremlin’s war economy,” as “costs have mounted but remain manageable.” Russia’s 2025 GDP growth is projected at just 0.5–1%, while inflation remains over 7%.
• They note, “Slowing growth, depressed oil prices, harsher sanctions, and high inflation are the key macroeconomic challenges that the Kremlin and CBR face in late 2025.” Oil revenues—formerly Russia’s chief economic pillar—have dropped by more than 20% year-on-year.
• They identify three structural shifts: “an external sector pivot from West to East, a clear prioritization of guns over butter, and a convergence of regional economic trends.” Defense expenditures are now about 9% of GDP, and military spending has crowding-out effects on consumer welfare.
• The authors warn, “With the current oil market glut, however, it is feasible to impose sanctions on Russian oil majors without spiking global prices.” The new price cap and oil sanctions could reduce Russia's energy export earnings by $15–20 billion in 2025–2026.
• They emphasize, “The Trump administration’s punitive measures against China and India for their support of Russia… have thus far largely been half-hearted and inconsistently applied,” undermining the sanctions regime. More than 50% of Russia’s imports now come from China, up from 25% pre-war.
• “Reducing Russia’s industrial production for its war can and should be accomplished in various ways,” including tougher export controls, targeting Chinese and North Korean supply chains to Russia’s military-industrial complex (North Korea is estimated to supply over half of Russia’s artillery shells), and expanding sanctions to currently unsanctioned entities like Rosatom and Roscosmos.
• Ribakova and Risinger conclude, “Whether by hitting Russia’s military-industrial capacity or its energy revenues, the United States and its European allies can surely hinder Russia’s ability to continue prosecuting its war against Ukraine economically,” but “what is less clear… is whether the political will exists to do so.”

“Russia is not as resilient as it wants you to think” The Economist, 12.10.25.

• “In reality, Russia’s situation is far less comfortable. Its army’s progress is bloody and slow. Its economic problems are mounting. The public mood on the war has soured, an oddly important factor in Mr. Putin’s dictatorship, which relies on the perception of massive support to ensure obedience,” The Economist writes. “Over the past year oil and gas revenues have fallen by 22%. The economic momentum from a vast increase in military spending has stalled. The budget deficit is nearing 3% of GDP.”
• “Russia receives little foreign investment and cannot borrow on international markets... The Kremlin spends half its budget on the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security and debt service,” The Economist reports.
• “The number of those saying their well-being was deteriorating was triple those saying it was improving. It is now at the highest level since the start of the war,” The Economist notes, citing sociologist Vladimir Zvonovsky.
• “The perception of what is dominant has flipped. In May 2023 Russians thought by a margin of 57% to 39% that most people in their inner social circle supported the war. In October 2025, in contrast, they thought by a margin of 55% to 45% that those in their inner circle mostly opposed the war or were evenly divided,” The Economist observes.
• “A recent survey by Levada, an independent pollster, found that only 40% of Russians see [veterans] as war heroes; the majority see them as threatening, or as victims,” The Economist reports.
• “Fully 88% of [one survey group] said they wished for the war to end and for the focus to shift to social and economic issues. But only 47% expected Mr. Putin to achieve that,” The Economist highlights.

“With an army of yes-men, how Putin’s world turned into an echo chamber,” Mary Ilyushina, Washington Post, 12.13.25.

• “The generals say all goals of the war will be achieved. The economists say despite the pressure the economy will outlast Ukraine’s. Even President Donald Trump says that Russia is much stronger and Kyiv has no cards left to play in the war,” Ilyushina writes.
• “Hearing only reassurance, it is little wonder that President Vladimir Putin sees no reason for real concessions on Ukraine. From the vantage point of the Kremlin, the war is going according to plan.”
• Boris Bondarev, a Russian diplomat who resigned in 2022, states: “One of the invasion’s central lessons had to do with something I had witnessed over the preceding two decades: what happens when a government is slowly warped by its own propaganda.” He adds, “The war is a stark demonstration of how decisions made in echo chambers can backfire.”
• “By the time Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it had become unimaginable for any senior official to oppose any of Putin’s decisions in public,” Ilyushina reports, citing the televised Security Council meeting where each official endorsed Putin’s war plans while any dissent, such as Dmitry Kozak’s, was kept off-air.
• Bondarev observes, “My colleagues in the Kremlin repeatedly told me that Putin likes his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, because he is ‘comfortable’ to work with, always saying yes to the president and telling him what he wants to hear. Small wonder, then, that Putin thought he would have no trouble defeating Kyiv.”

“Does Russian Feminism Have a Future?” Nadezhda Azhgikhina, The Nation, 12.10.25.

• Azhgikhina writes, “Julia Ioffe’s new book, Motherland…reminds American readers that a vast country of 145 million people has other residents beside Vladimir Putin. This is unquestionably important.”
• She observes, “In essence, [Ioffe] repeats the claim of du Plessix Gray, which is perplexing, and not just for a Russian reader,” and laments the narrative’s gaps and “allegiance to the stereotypes transmitted via mass media.”
• Quoting sociologist Olga Zdravomyslova: “Three projects for the emancipation of women in Russia—pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and post-Soviet feminism—were cut short due to historical factors. Yet each…was important for the life and self-perception of the country.”
• Azhgikhina notes, “As of this year, women make up 45 percent of all entrepreneurs, are included in the Forbes list of billionaires, and hold high level positions not only in the service sector, but also in finance and the oil industry. Most importantly, people’s mindsets have changed.”
• She concludes, drawing on Zdravomyslova again: “As for the future of feminism in Russia…perhaps young feminists will start all over again, disregarding the past. But it could be different.”

“The Unclosed Curtain: Russia's uncensored public sector abroad suffers financial losses but retains its audience in Russia” Re:Russia, 12.09.25.

• “Despite expanding censorship, funding difficulties and audience burnout, the sector of Russian relocated media showed notable resilience in 2025,” Re:Russia reports.
• “The main problem for Russian uncensored media remains unstable financing. While their core audience is located in Russia, the user support available to them comes almost exclusively from the diaspora,” Re:Russia notes.
• “In the face of mounting obstacles, blocking measures and an unfavourable environment, Russian uncensored media have not only maintained but increased their audiences both inside Russia and abroad. Their function remains twofold. On the one hand, they are a vital information channel for domestic audiences. On the other hand, they serve as a source of information on Russia for the outside world,” Re:Russia concludes.

Defense and aerospace:

• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Russia is weakened, but its influence in the Middle East should not be underestimated,” Nikolay Kozhanov, Chatham House, 11.12.25.

• “A widespread, but misleading, assumption holds that Moscow’s current weakness signals its inevitable retreat from the region. In reality, Russia has deepened its entrenchment,” Kozhanov writes.
• “After 2022, under pressure from sanctions and military overstretch, its strategy became more low-cost, yet increasingly agile. Russia tends to avoid engaging in high-risk initiatives unless absolutely necessary.”
• “The Kremlin has elevated its ‘do-more-with-less’ approach to a new level, relying on diplomacy, selective coercion, and targeted partnerships rather than major military deployments.”
• “Russia amplifies the visibility of its diplomatic engagements, creating the impression of indispensability even when its actual material footprint is limited. ... Even without Syria as an operational hub, Russia preserves a mediatory or ‘spoiler’ capacity in regional crises.”
• “For Western policymakers, the lesson is clear: Russia’s weakness should not invite complacency. A diminished Russia can still be a disruptive and strategic spoiler. ... Unless the US and Europe sustain engagement and maintain unity, the Kremlin will continue turning its own weakness into the West’s vulnerability.” 

“Eurasian Security Architecture: Origins, Core Principles, and Prospects for Evolution,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 12.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Timofeev explains, “The idea of new security architecture in Eurasia is becoming a key concept in Russia’s foreign policy,” first outlined by Putin in February 2024 and subsequently discussed with leaders of China and India as well as within the Union State of Russia and Belarus.
• He argues, “Modern-day international relations remain largely an anarchic system…almost every country faces a particular set of threats originating from other countries or coalitions of countries, terrorist or criminal groups, or man-made or natural factors.”
• Timofeev observes, “Different strategies for adapting to security threats…range from attempts at hegemony and dominance…to alignment with stronger players up to and including the dissolution of one’s own sovereignty into the interests…of one’s allies,” resulting in “hierarchical security systems.”
• He contends that today’s value-based competition is gaining complexity: “Whereas in the past it was a clash of two modernist and rationalist ideologies…today the battle revolves around value systems of a different nature and origin,” with “postmodern simulations of ideologies” and “archaic pre-modern frameworks and local nationalist movements” involved alongside modernity.
• Regarding military developments, Timofeev writes, “A new revolution in the military art is in full swing…it shows itself vividly in the Ukraine conflict, but goes much deeper than the spheres directly affected by hostilities in Ukraine.”
• He stresses that the international system features “hybrid use of various methods of rivalry,” noting that “communication, surveillance, data collection and processing, and information management particularly through the use of AI technologies play a critical role in these configurations.”
• Timofeev concludes, “Russia is in the epicenter of rapid changes in international politics. It is a unique player, which, by virtue of its geographic location, is present in several key regions of the planet that form the extremities of the Eurasian continent.”

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “December 7, 2025: Putin Visits India,” Andy Kuchins and Chris Monday, Russia Decoded, 12.07.25. Podcast.
• “The Dayton letter and spirit: Key to peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Sergey Lavrov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 12.14.25. Clues from Russian Views.

Ukraine:

“The war in Ukraine is reaching its endgame,” Owen Matthews, The Spectator, 12.12.25.

• Matthews writes that “the outline of the peace deal that will eventually end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is emerging as the US leans on Kyiv to abandon key red lines,” with Zelensky conceding the need for new elections and floating a national referendum on Donbas.
• Zelensky said, “The Ukrainian people must answer the territorial question … yes, I support elections,” and reportedly told MPs to draft laws to allow voting during martial law.
• The author notes, “the Kremlin has demanded that Ukraine surrender the remaining 20 percent of Donetsk province,” presenting voters with a “Sophie’s choice: to fight on indefinitely or buy peace at the price of abandoning even more land to the enemy.”
• Matthews reports that Zelensky described an American plan where “Ukrainian troops leave part of Donetsk, Russian troops stay out and the area becomes a ‘free economic’ or ‘demilitarized zone,’” with mutual pullbacks and monitors on the ground.
• He concludes that “with talk of elections and a demilitarized zone now on the table, the war’s endgame has taken a significant step towards its conclusion,” but warns the core jeopardy is “Putin’s maximalist demands that Ukraine return to Moscow’s sphere of influence.”

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• Video of “A fireside chat with Minister Denys Shmyhal," Head of the Ukrainian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Aspen Security Forum, 12.10.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views. 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See this link/these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Central Asia Has a Drug Problem, and It Is Growing Worse,” Bruce Pannier, FPRI, 12.05.25.
• “Can the West Bump Russia Out of Central Asia?” Giorgio Cafiero, National Interest, 12.09.25.
• “Russia Sees the Former Soviet Union as a ‘Fiefdom,’ Moldova’s Foreign Minister Says,” Sam Skove, Foreign Policy, 12.12.25.
• “Transnistria Reemerges as an Obstacle to Moldova,” Vladimir Solovyov, Carnegie Politika, 12.12.25.
• “Strategic Directions for Building Sustainable Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Zaur Shiriyev and Philip Gamaghelyan, Carnegie Endowment, 12.04.25.

Endnotes:

1. A late‑November to mid‑December 2025 KIIS nationwide survey finds that 72% of Ukrainians would approve a peace plan freezing the front lines with security guarantees (without recognizing occupied territories as Russian), while 75% reject a plan involving Ukrainian troop withdrawal from Donbas, army restrictions and no concrete security guarantees; only 9% expect the war to end by early 2026. (KIIS, December 2025)
2. See “MI6 chief says UK faces threat from Russia’s desire to export chaos,” Jill Lawless, AP/Washington Post, 12.15.25. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Formatting and hyperlinking in this product assisted by AI.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, talian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, front row from left, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, Dick Schoof,Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, back row from left, stand together in the chancellery in Berlin, Germany, Monday, Dec. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Markus Schreiber, Pool)