3 Ideas to Explore

1. Whether intentional or not, it was not too long before Ukraine’s recent setbacks on the front and corruption scandal were followed by Donald Trump’s message to Volodymyr Zelenskyy: accept the new U.S.-Russian peace proposal¹ by Thanksgiving or else.² Belfer Center director Meghan O’Sullivan told Bloomberg that expecting an agreement on the proposed deal, which some in Ukraine and Europe described as a capitulation and Volodymyr Zelensky described as a choice between dignity and a key ally, by the Thanksgiving is unrealistic. In fact, she found it “very hard to believe that a proposal this far-reaching could be hammered out in a way that would be agreeable, not just to the Russians and the Ukrainians, but to the Europeans in some fashion as well.” In Geneva on Nov. 23, Ukrainian and American negotiators cut some of the harshest terms from the original 28-point U.S.-Russian plan leaked last week but the core political and territorial concessions—especially in Donetsk—remain unresolved and still “highly favorable to Russia,” according to FT’s Christopher Miller. In NYT, RAND’s Samuel Charap argued that real progress towards Russian-Ukrainian peace requires structured, continuous diplomacy—not one-off ultimatums of the kind that Trump has sought to impose on Ukraine. Meanwhile WP columnist David Ignatius argued Trump’s approach is actually “realpolitik on steroids,” using Ukraine’s vulnerability to extract rapid concessions that could undermine European security and hand Putin gains he never achieved militarily. In fact, Ukraine “has no choice” but to engage the plan to avoid a cutoff of U.S. support, using talks to amend its most dangerous provisions, according to FT’s Gideon Rachman. When doing so, Volodymyr Zelensky need to keep in mind which choices can backfire and how, according to former Ukrainian Foreign Minister and Belfer Center senior fellow Dmytro Kuleba. “Agreeing to an unacceptable, extremely painful, package, just to halt the war—no politician will approve such a decision if he feels that the society is not ready to accept it. Accepting an agreement that will be rejected by the society would mean political, and unfortunately in our reality also physical, suicide for such a leader,” Kuleba told WSJ.
2. Retired Australian General Mick Ryan infers seven insights from the Russian-Ukrainian war, presenting them in a commentary for CSIS. For one, Russian drone evolution now surpasses Ukraine’s, making movement near the front even more dangerous, according to Ryan. He also stresses that while drones shape tactics, they cannot replace soldiers, and he identifies a new “battle triangle” of intelligence, operations, and electronic warfare. Ryan argues Russia currently holds a marginal lead in adaptation, with its efforts to “learn how to learn” now paying off. He credits Ukraine with a strong deep‑strike capability but warns that effective techniques can become obsolete within weeks. Ryan also highlights Russia’s ability to produce around 35,000 Shahed drones yearly, underscoring rapid Russian learning and adaptation. He concludes that Russia now holds multiple overlapping advantages while Ukraine lacks a clear theory of victory. Still, Ryan emphasizes Ukraine’s strengths and the essential role of sustained Western support.
3. Ukraine and Russia are entering a period of deep financial strain, according to Foreign Policy’s Cameron Abadi and Columbia University’s Adam Tooze. In their commentary for FP Abadi and Tooze argue that “While Russia continues to profit from oil sales to countries like China and India, Western energy restrictions are beginning to bite and could worsen if Congress passes additional measures,” they write. On Ukraine, the authors warn that Kyiv faces a severe budget shortfall for 2026, stressing that an expanding corruption scandal threatens to destabilize the government. Tooze cautions that corruption—“endemic under total war”—can erode aid and public trust. They conclude that both states face mounting financial pressure, though Russia’s crisis is less immediate.

U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“A nuclear meltdown at Zaporizhzhia would imperil the entire region,” Najmedin Meshkati, Financial Times, 11.17.25. 

• Meshkati warns that “Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship—a reckless gamble that began with its occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—has escalated into a crisis threatening the entire European continent.”
• He details how prolonged outages and the subsequent reliance on emergency diesel generators at ZNPP have left the plant operating “far exceeding design specifications,” with each day increasing “the probability of mechanical failure.”
• “Water levels at ZNPP’s cooling pond remain dangerously low,” writes Meshkati, creating “a compound risk of degraded emergency power and compromised cooling capacity”—a scenario reminiscent of Fukushima, except “caused by deliberate human action rather than natural disaster.”
• The author cautions that “a major incident at ZNPP would create an exclusion zone affecting agricultural production in Europe’s breadbasket, disrupt critical supply chains, trigger massive insurance claims and require hundreds of billions in clean-up costs”—economic shocks that “would dwarf Fukushima’s estimated $500 billion impact.”
• Meshkati concludes that “Putin is playing with nuclear fire—and it could burn Russia, Ukraine and possibly the entire region,” urging the UN Security Council to press for a temporary agreement to ensure nuclear plant safety and for Russian forces to evacuate the facility.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Shield the fields: How Europe can support Ukraine through a dark winter,” Alberto Rizzi, ECFR, 11.18.25.

• Rizzi warns that “continuous Russian attacks on [Ukraine’s] energy infrastructure have taken out roughly 55% of the country’s domestic gas production, forcing Kyiv to withdraw from its strategic storage and seek new imports via EU countries.”
• He notes, “Ukraine’s domestic gas production is essential for the country’s energy security and economic resilience,” arguing that “excessive reliance on imports is a vulnerability, especially in wartime.”
• “Putin aims to sap the Ukrainians’ will to fight by forcing the country to cut electricity and heating during the difficult winter months,” underscoring Russia’s use of energy warfare as a strategy to destabilize Ukrainian society.
• Rizzi calls for European states “to help Kyiv sign new agreements that will diversify its import sources” while also increasing “contributions to Ukraine’s air defense to effectively protect the country’s gas fields from Russia.”
• The article emphasizes that “Ukraine needs to secure a certain level of domestic extraction to maintain its ability to fight Russia,” and that European support—both in air defense and facilitating gas imports—is critical to Ukrainian resilience this winter.

“The Reconstruction Trap: The Next Failure in Gaza and Ukraine?” Emma Isabella Sage, RUSI, 11.20.25.

• Sage observes, “Given Russia’s apparent commitment to a forever war, Ukraine has been forced to carry out a piecemeal reconstruction as the war grinds on.”
• According to Sage, “Although the continuation of active hostilities poses the most immediate barrier to reconstruction in Ukraine, longer-term risks persist. Even in the event of a ceasefire, Russia would almost certainly revert to irregular and covert tactics.”
• Sage writes that, “Although corruption remains a challenge in Ukraine, there is no nationwide financing system sustaining pro-Russian insurgents. This is why Russia paid the separatist governments’ salaries in eastern Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion, underscoring their dependence on external support. Should proxy warfare re-emerge along the current front, it would require Russia to rebuild an insurgent ecosystem from the ground up, offering Kyiv a critical window for reconstruction.”
• “Ukraine approaches reconstruction with real economic advantages: solid fundamentals, integration into global markets, a growing start-up environment and strong investor interest driven by its accelerated path toward EU membership and a favorable reputation in the West,” Sage argues.
• Sage concludes, “Policy innovations and commitment to a democratic future, combined with donor discipline, are keeping Ukraine on solid footing… In both Ukraine and Gaza, an influx of cash without security, strategy or strong guardrails would only replicate the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan.”

“Russia must get no amnesty in any peace deal for Ukraine,” Gyunduz Mamedov, The Economist, 11.24.25  

• Mamedov, a former Ukrainian prosecutor now serving as a soldier, warns that the U.S.-Russian draft peace plan’s “full amnesty for wartime actions” would “entrench impunity and erode the foundations of the international legal order.”
• “Evidence means nothing if no credible criminal judicial process follows. History teaches that justice is usually the privilege of the powerful. More exactly, of the victors,” Mamedov writes, arguing against blanket amnesties for war crimes.”
• He highlights the “failure of deterrence,” noting that “Vladimir Putin is being allowed to flout ICC arrest warrants, flying to several foreign capitals,” and warns that “the very idea that a head of state under an active arrest warrant can move without consequence is proof that deterrence no longer works.”
• Mamedov calls for strengthening international justice mechanisms, suggesting “perhaps the best path would be to give the ICC power to try the crime of aggression,” and stresses that allowing amnesty would “only spawn other crimes.”
• He concludes that “the West must actively promote the standards it claims to defend,” insisting, “Declared values carry weight only when anchored in virtues: wisdom, courage and a genuine commitment to justice.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “In Russian-Occupied Mariupol, Everything Ukrainian Must Go,” Neil MacFarquhar, Milana Mazaeva, Anna Lukinova, New York Times, 11.23.25.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Seven Contemporary Insights on the State of the Ukraine War,” Mick Ryan, CSIS, 11.17.25.

1. Drone Issues: Saturation and Russian Evolution  

   • “Within 15 kilometers of the front line, vehicle movement is difficult to impossible.”  

   • “Russian innovation in drones probably now just outstrips that of Ukraine.”

2. The New Battle Triangle 

   • “Drones cannot replace a soldier holding ground.”  

   • “They talk of a new battle triangle with intelligence, operations, and drones and electronic warfare at the three points.”

3. The Adaptation Battle 

   • “Russia has moved ahead (marginally) in the tactical adaptation battle.”  

   • “It is very likely that Russian efforts to ‘learn how to learn better’… are now paying dividends.”

4. Long-Range Strike Operations  

   • “Ukraine has developed a robust deep-strike capability.” 

   • “New strike and penetration techniques that work one week can be out of date just a week or two afterwards.”

5. Ground-Based Air Defense 

   • “Russia can now produce around 35,000 Shahed drones per year.” 

   • “Russia is learning and adapting fast.”

6. Russia’s Contemporary Asymmetric Advantages  

   • “Russia continues to lead in systemic and strategic adaptation.” 

   • “This is the first time in this war that this many overlapping strategic and tactical asymmetries have favored Russia.”

7. War Strategy and Trajectory  

   • “There appears to be no obvious theory of victory… for Ukraine.” 

   • “Each strategy Ukraine has tried so far… has failed to produce a significant change in Putin’s will.”

• Conclusion: Ukraine still faces major challenges as Russia has recently gained advantages in manpower, drones, and battlefield adaptation, threatening Ukraine’s position. However, Ukraine retains important strengths—higher‑quality troops, interior lines, and growing European industrial support—and could still offset Russia’s tactical gains. Continued Western assistance remains essential to prevent Russian success and to safeguard broader European security.

“Iskander: An Improved Russian Missile Tests Ukraine’s Air Defense,” Sam Cranny-Evans and Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, RUSI, 11.18.25.

• Cranny-Evans and Kaushal report, “Ukraine’s ability to intercept the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missile with Patriot interceptors is deteriorating,” with some evidence pointing to “software upgrades which have allowed the Iskander to maneuver more effectively in its terminal phase.”
• The authors caution against relying on mean intercept rates, noting, “in just 4% of attacks, Ukraine has succeeded in intercepting most of the Iskander and Kinzhal missiles fired at it,” while “in 273 instances Ukraine’s air defenses did not intercept any Iskander or Kinzhal missiles.”
• They observe that “by 2025 there are no months with very high intercept rates (30% being the maximum achieved around Odessa),” and that “intercept rates against Iskander have been on a downward trend since around 2024.”
• RUSI highlights a possible explanation: “Russians are firing the missile on a steeper ballistic trajectory, shortening the reaction times for air defenders… [providing] the missile with greater kinetic energy as it descended towards its target, shortening a defender’s engagement envelope.”
• Cranny-Evans and Kaushal add, “claims that a software upgrade is at the heart of the Iskander’s effectiveness would be more consistent with improvements to decoys than a purely ballistic trajectory,” as new decoy technologies may be deceiving advanced interceptors like the Patriot PAC-3.
• The report also considers “coordinated salvos” and the mixing of missiles and drones in large-scale assaults, but finds that “battle management system saturation… is an unlikely explanation in this context,” as better interception rates are actually correlated with larger Iskander salvos.
• They conclude that “it is not yet possible to arrive at a conclusive answer to the question of why the rates of intercept against Iskander have seemingly declined,” but that a combination of trajectory changes and decoy improvements is likely at play.
• The authors stress, “the competition between missiles and air defense systems is a continuous process without a fixed end point,” and that “the very discontinuous nature of intercept data… must always be borne in mind”—with key lessons for NATO and allied planners studying Russian tactical missile evolution.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• Video: Serhii Plokhy in “Ukraine and Russia: Writing History in the Time of War,” Forum on Truth, Wolf Humanities Center, 11.19.25. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Don’t let a scandal undermine the defense of Ukraine,” The Economist, 11.19.25.

• The Economist calls the kickbacks and money-laundering scandal at Energoatom “fast becoming the worst crisis Ukraine’s president has faced since Russia invaded his country almost four years ago.”
• The editorial argues, “Though far less corrupt than Vladimir Putin’s Russia, [Ukraine] has a long history of sleaze,” but emphasizes that Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies “appear able to do their job” and “today’s revelations may end up strengthening them.”
• Zelenskyy “is not directly implicated, though all bucks stop at his desk,” and the magazine warns, “Mr Zelenskyy must do a much better job of fighting corruption to maintain morale at home and support abroad. And if the scandal were to render his position untenable, so be it…no leader is indispensable.”
• The Economist cautions that Western critics “have seized on the corruption scandal as proof that Ukraine is unworthy of support,” but insists, “viewed through a geopolitical lens, this scandal does not change anything…If Western support were to falter, the only winner would be Mr Putin.”
• The piece concludes, “Supporting Ukraine is not an act of selfless principle, but an exercise in hard-headed realism. The defense of Ukraine is the defense of Europe…The West must not let a nasty scandal blind it to the greater danger that looms from Moscow.”

“Ukraine’s arms deal with France faces major hurdles before it can be realized,” Samantha de Bendern, Chatham House, 11.19.25.

• Samantha de Bendern writes, “On 17 Nov., Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a letter of intent (not a binding contract) outlining Ukraine’s potential acquisition of French defense equipment over the next decade.”
• According to de Bendern, “The headline-grabbing part of the deal is Ukraine’s purchase of up to 100 Rafale F4 multirole fighter jets. This is the biggest order ever for the French high-tech fighter plane, a major (and cheaper) competitor of the U.S. F35 fighter jet.”
• De Bendern states, “Behind the grand political gesture, the deal changes nothing on the ground for Ukraine in the short term,” since Rafales “take four to six years to produce” and “no jets will come from existing French Air Force stocks.”
• De Bendern notes, “The deal’s total bill comes to roughly €25–35 billion over ten years. Ukraine has no budget for this,” and adds, “French financing of the deal is unlikely” due to “a budget deficit of 6%, a parliament unable to agree on a new budget, and the looming 2027 presidential election.”
• De Bendern concludes, “For there to be a long-term future for Ukraine, it needs weapons today… France’s gesture, while welcome as reassurance, does little to address Ukraine’s urgent battlefield needs.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 “Indispensable: Why Ukraine is becoming a fundamental part of the future European security architecture,” Kai-Olaf Lang, Céline Marangé, Susan Stewart, SWP, 11.18.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Ukraine and Russia Are Both Struggling to Finance Their War,” Cameron Abadi and Adam Tooze, Foreign Policy, 11.21.25.

• Abadi and Tooze explain, “Trump administration envoy Steve Witkoff has drafted the outline of a new peace deal between Russia and Ukraine—even as U.S. sanctions on two Russian oil companies went into effect recently. Congress is considering a new package of sanctions that could pass later this year.”
• On Ukraine’s finances, they note, “Ukraine, for its part, is facing a dire budget shortfall for next year. And a growing corruption scandal threatens to engulf the Ukrainian government.”
• The authors observe, “Are U.S. sanctions on Russia working? Moscow’s situation is better, but new sanctions could do serious damage.”
• Abadi and Tooze discuss, “While Russia continues to profit from oil sales to countries like China and India, Western energy restrictions are beginning to bite and could worsen if Congress passes additional measures.”
• They add, “Ukraine is heavily reliant on Western aid and faces increasing difficulty bridging its budget gap as Europe remains divided and U.S. support is uncertain.”
• Tooze analyzes the corruption challenge, arguing, “Corruption is an endemic risk under conditions of total war,” but warns that “it can severely undermine both foreign assistance and public support.”
• They conclude that both sides are under acute financial strain, but “Russia’s situation is less acute—though that could change if the West tightens the sanctions noose.”

“How to Use Russia’s Frozen Assets,” Brad W. Setser, Council on Foreign Relations, 11.21.25.

• Setser writes, “The European Union is considering proposals that would make much greater use of Russia’s immobilized reserves to finance Ukraine,” with a final decision potentially at the December European Council. All serious proposals “avoid outright confiscation… while mobilizing significant additional funds to cover the financing gap Ukraine faces in 2026 and 2027.”
• He details, “Around €260 billion ($301 billion) of immobilized Russian reserves have been identified… The bulk of those reserves—over €193 billion ($224 billion)—are held by a single Belgian custodian, Euroclear… Smaller sums are held by British, French, Japanese, Luxembourgeois, and Swiss custodians.”
• Setser explains, “It is now widely recognized that the funds from Russia’s frozen assets can be mobilized to help Ukraine without the direct seizure of the underlying assets.” Two main approaches are under consideration: using the proceeds as collateral for interest-free loans to Ukraine or investing them in reserve assets, with the interest funding Ukrainian support.
• He notes, “Current proposals aim to raise €150 billion ($174 billion)” to cover Ukraine’s financing gap, preferably using the full pool of €260 billion in frozen assets, not just those held at Euroclear. Mechanisms are being designed to minimize any risk to the euro’s status as a global reserve currency.
• Setser concludes, “Realistic, legally viable mechanisms exist…These mechanisms would be consistent with a strong commitment to the rule of law and have no additional impact on the euro’s role as the world’s second reserve currency… Decisive action is needed, and possible.”

Ukraine-related negotiations (in chronological order):³

Wednesday, Nov. 19, 2025

“Putin's Art of the Non-Deal,” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 11.19.25.

• Jenkins argues that “It's time to accept that Vladimir Putin likely believes any realistic end to the war in Ukraine on negotiated terms would endanger his rule. Such is the burden of a new U.S. intelligence finding that is circulating on Capitol Hill. Mr. Putin can't justify the deaths and waste so they must continue.”
• “As laid out on Friday by his Ukrainian frontman Viktor Medvedchuk in a TASS interview for Mr. Putin's domestic audience, Mr. Putin isn't interested in the partial annexation he still talks about. He requires total control of Ukraine,” according to Jenkins. He adds that demobilizing 700,000 traumatized soldiers would pose dangerous domestic risks for the regime.
• He highlights the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric: “One day it’s a chocolate-chocolate chip cruise missile, nuclear propelled and nuclear tipped… a giant torpedo to destroy a port not with a nuclear blast but… a radioactive tsunami,” arguing this posturing fails to impress the U.S. or NATO. • Jenkins concludes that, despite Russia’s tactical adaptation and dispersed defense industries, “Russia still hasn't given itself the forces to make decisive battlefield gains,” and that the real variable may be how long Russia’s internal economic and political system can “sustain without coming apart.”
• “Ukraine's resilience, and that of its supporters, is a variable. But NATO's collective gross domestic product still dwarfs Russia's. The other variable is the rate of internal economic and political deterioration Russia can sustain without coming apart. Typically, authoritarian regime fissures are hidden until they're not. Then there's the question: Is China willing to indulge Mr. Putin's forever war?” Jenkins asks.
• “Mr. Trump finds himself in Joe Biden's situation. He doesn't have a better choice than supporting Ukraine (albeit indirectly to appease his base) "as long as it takes" for something to change in Moscow,” Jenkins writes.

“‘Peace’ in Ukraine without Ukraine: You cannot impose a peace on Ukraine. But Trump thinks he can,” Ivo Daalder, Substack, 11.19.25.

• Daalder highlights concerns that Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, met Russian insider Kirill Dimitriev to negotiate a Ukraine peace plan that reportedly lacks meaningful Ukrainian or European input.
• Dimitriev boasts that “the Russian position is really being heard,” signaling a process Daalder calls “a disaster in the making,” since Russian aims are “unacceptable to Ukraine and to Europeans.”
• The plan claims to seek “lasting security to Europe, not just Ukraine,” but Daalder is skeptical, noting that negotiating such a framework only with Russia “doesn’t give me any confidence”—especially with Witkoff, who “doesn’t understand even the basics of European security.”
• Daalder criticizes Witkoff for previously misrepresenting security guarantees and for repeating Kremlin talking points, arguing that the envoy “has spent more time with the Russians than with Ukrainians and Europeans.”
• The most serious failing, Daalder contends, is trying to reach an agreement “without any Ukrainian or European involvement”—a strategy he calls a “fool’s errand,” insisting “you cannot impose peace, especially on a country that has been fighting for close to 12 years to maintain its independence.”
• The White House, Daalder warns, wrongly assumes it can “force Ukraine’s hand” and disregards European interests, quoting an official: “We don’t really care about the Europeans.”
• Daalder concludes there can be “no peace without Ukraine,” arguing any plan that excludes Ukraine or Europe’s decisive input is doomed to fail: “They will want a say—the final say—on their security, whatever Donald Trump, Steve Witkoff, or any other U.S. official thinks.”

“A terrible American-Russian proposal to end the war in Ukraine,” The Economist, 11.19.25.

• The Economist reports the plan “drafted without Ukraine’s knowledge by Donald Trump’s special representative, Steve Witkoff, and Vladimir Putin’s envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, appears to be little short of a demand for capitulation.”
• The 28-point proposal “envisages a reduction in the number of Ukrainian troops to just 40% of the current level… Ukraine would be required to cede yet more territory… barred from possessing several classes of weapons… No foreign troops would be allowed on Ukrainian soil… Ukraine would also be required to designate Russian as a second state language, and the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church…would be restored.”
• The demands are “far-fetched. Ukrainians see most of them as non-starters,” and military analysts “do not see Ukraine’s position as being so desperate that Mr Zelenskyy would need to agree to such punishing terms.”
• The article questions the provenance and motivation of the proposal: “It is also not obvious what the aim of devising such a plan might be beyond embarrassing Mr Zelenskyy at his moment of weakness… the timing suggests that some in America are using the corruption crisis to push Ukraine into unreasonable concessions.”
• “Mr Zelenskyy is said to have been frustrated with the results of the talks,” and faces internal political turmoil: “Many of his own MPs and officials are baying for blood, demanding he fire some of his most controversial lieutenants…A senior official describes it as Mr Zelenskyy’s ‘day of reckoning.’”

“Putin’s Unlikely Envoy to Washington,” Sam Skove and John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 11.19.25.

• Skove and Haltiwanger report that Kirill Dmitriev, described as “affable, Kyiv-born, and Stanford-educated,” has played a key role as “Putin’s messenger” in backchannel Ukraine peace negotiations with the Trump administration.
• Sergey Aleksashenko, a former deputy governor of the Bank of Russia, told Foreign Policy that Dmitriev is “charming, good at building relationships, and has demonstrated to Putin that he can deliver results.” However, Aleksashenko cautioned, “having Putin’s trust doesn’t mean that he can influence the Russian leader’s views.”
• Alexandra Prokopenko of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center said Dmitriev’s “special representative position carries no real authority within Russia’s executive power structure—a crucial point when assessing someone’s true clout.” She added Dmitriev is “more Putin’s ‘messenger’ than Russia’s ‘lead negotiator’ with the United States.”
• Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of R.Politik, emphasized, “it’s Putin himself, the Foreign Ministry, then the FSB and the Defense Ministry. So in this system, there is no place for Dmitriev.” She concluded, “only Putin decides.”
• Despite his business networks and media prominence, Skove and Haltiwanger write, “Dmitriev’s actual power within the Kremlin is murky, no matter how public he may be,” and his presence at the negotiating table “has reportedly irritated those who sit on the diplomatic side—most notably Lavrov.”

Friday, Nov. 21, 2025

“Ukraine, U.S. Relationship Tested As Trump Puts Zelenskiy on Deadline,” Interview of Meghan O’Sullivan, Bloomberg, 11.21.25.⁴

• Meghan O’Sullivan is Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice at Harvard Kennedy School. She was interviewed by Bloomberg on the Trump Administration’s most recent peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine War.
• Q: “I’m curious your thoughts on the [Russia-Ukraine War peace plan] ultimatum and whether next Thursday is real.”
  • MoS: “I find it very hard to believe that a proposal this far-reaching could be hammered out in a way that would be agreeable, not just to the Russians and the Ukrainians, but to the Europeans in some fashion as well. I personally, in diplomacy, am a big believer in putting hardcore ideas on the table as a starting point, but expecting that it could be resolved and that these issues could be negotiated by Thursday seems inconceivable to me.”
• Q: “The first question is, are the [Nov. 21, 2025] sanctions actually going to go into effect, do you think? And secondly, perhaps more importantly, do those sanctions work?”
  • MoS: “So, several questions there. One, are those sanctions going to go into place? I would say we don't know at this point… My guess is that there'll be some kind of suspension while [the peace proposal] is being worked out. [Sanctions] have had an effect, but they haven't been implemented very strongly… And the extent to which [tougher sanctions] will change [Putin’s] calculations on something that he sees as existential to his rule and to his legacy is another question.”
• Q: “We learned the president spoke with German Chancellor Merz a short time ago. Megan, I'm curious what Merz thinks of this, what Macron thinks of this, what Starmer makes of this deal.”
  • MoS: I think what we're seeing is the European leaders in private are probably very alarmed. But in public, I think they're taking the appropriate approach to say, let's see if we can come to an agreement that creates a just and lasting peace.”

“Former CIA Director William Burns addresses global state of affairs at Duke event,” Lila Cohen, The Chronicle, 11.21.25.

• On Russia, Burns said: “Putin believes that time is on his side. And I don't think today he's ready for a serious negotiation. He’s certainly ready for a capitulation.”
• Burns argued that while “economic pressure on Russia, combined with aid to Ukraine, could open up a path to negotiation,” Ukraine “would have to make difficult decisions,” and true security guarantees would require a “long-term commitment to Ukraine’s military to avoid a ‘repetition’ of the war.”
• On Russia’s internal situation, Burns remarked that Putin faces a choice between “guns and butter,” having “suffered over 1 million casualties and…daunting economic pain ahead.”
• Burns warned that public perceptions Russia can “outlast” the West are central to the Kremlin’s strategy, and he does not see Putin as seriously open to compromise—“only capitulation.”
• He concluded that future negotiations should pair continued support for Ukraine and sanctions with an emphasis on durable security arrangements and strong Western unity against Russian pressure.

“Trump’s hard-sell Ukraine deal is realpolitik on steroids,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 11.21.25.

• “To state the obvious: President Donald Trump and his negotiating team view stopping the Ukraine war as a business deal. Because Ukraine is in trouble militarily and politically, they think President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should “sell”—by making a quick pact with Russia to spare his military more casualties and perhaps save his presidency from scandal,” Ignatius wrote. “In this rush to “yes,” the future stability of Europe is secondary. This is realpolitik on steroids,” he wrote.
• Ignatius believes “Trump will live in infamy if he tries to force Ukraine to sell its sovereignty—its lifeblood, quite literally—to suit what he sees as America’s interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin began this catastrophic war. He should pay a price to settle it.”
• “Theoretically, Trump’s proposed framework might allow Ukraine to emulate South Korea, giving up territory after an armistice but prospering behind a secure line of control. The big difference is that, to keep that peace, U.S. troops have been based in South Korea for decades. The Ukraine deal has the opposite formula. It bans foreign troops, cuts the size of Ukraine’s army by about a third—and lasts only 10 years. A Korea-style deal would contain far better security guarantees,” according to Ignatius.
• “Most [of European leaders] are following the wait-and-see approach voiced Friday by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who said, “Ukraine must determine its future,” according to Ignatius.
• Ignatius believes that “One reason Trump is pushing so hard now is that Ukraine is in political turmoil, with Zelenskyy near his weakest point since taking office in 2019. He’s struggling with a corruption scandal.”
• “Let’s unpack Trump’s plan and a draft “security assurance framework” that accompanies [the peace proposal].”
  • “The most urgent amendment needed is an enforceable ban on Russia’s covert war against NATO. The United States should join its allies in demanding that if this hybrid war doesn’t stop, NATO will have no choice but to retaliate.”
  • “The status of Donetsk, a critical battleground in the war, is among the toughest negotiating issues. Trump’s plan proposes that Kyiv cede the roughly 25% of the region it now holds to become “a neutral demilitarized zone” from which Russian troops would be banned.”
  • “Putin began this war hoping to neuter Ukraine’s sovereignty and halt its move toward Europe, and the Trump peace deal would give him only partial success in that.”
  • “Ukraine would be eligible for European Union membership, and it would get “preferential access to the European market” in the meantime. Ukraine would have to forswear NATO membership, but it would get what the proposed security framework calls “security assurance modeled on the principles of Article 5” of the NATO treaty.”
  • “Ukraine would get help in postwar reconstruction, partly from $100 billion in frozen Russian assets that would be invested in Ukraine (with the United States, bizarrely, getting 50% of the profits). A Ukraine Development Fund, financed in part by the World Bank, would invest in high-tech industries.”
  • “Putin would get amnesty for his alleged war crimes. But Ukrainians would get postwar amnesty, too, which might prove useful for Zelenskyy if the corruption scandal widens.”
• Ignatius concludes: “As Ukraine and its European allies press to amend Trump’s plan, they should focus on preserving what Ukraine has won through its valor. It drove Russian troops back from the gates of Kyiv. It stood fast against aggression. Trump shouldn’t give Russia a victory it couldn’t achieve on the battlefield.”

“Will Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine Succeed?” Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, CSIS, 11.21.25.

• Jensen and Atalan write, “The only way Trump’s Ukraine peace plan can make any meaningful progress is if it serves as an opening gambit to start a larger peace negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The plan’s limited security guarantees should change to include third-party guarantees that extend beyond economic sanctions.”
• They warn, “Ukraine can survive not being in NATO. But it cannot survive as a sovereign state with a hollowed-out military and limits on the ability of European states to deter future Russian aggression.”
• The greatest challenge for any peace deal is commitment: “Neither side can know if the other party won’t take advantage of the pause in fighting to regroup and attack them in the future. Commitment problems are even more acute when one of the parties has a history of breaking deals. Russia has a track record of breaking past agreements.”
• According to CSIS expert data, “the imposition of severe military restrictions and territorial concessions on Ukraine… are effectively impossible for a sovereign Ukraine to accept voluntarily. In probabilistic terms, this is where the package is least likely to be accepted absent a dramatic Ukrainian military collapse or a major fracture in the Western coalition.”
• They conclude, “Trump’s plan is the start, not the end, of negotiations… 60% of all wars conclude through some form of compromise, especially when there is no clear path to battlefield victory,” but absent battlefield change, “Ukraine is likely to lose territory.”

“Is Trump’s Ukraine Peace Deal a Faustian Bargain?” Liana Fix, Council on Foreign Relations, 11.21.25. 

• Fix writes, “Trump’s proposal would cross multiple Ukrainian and European red lines,” including requiring Ukraine to cede control of Donetsk territory it still holds and internationally recognize it as Russian, “entirely unacceptable to Ukraine. It would surrender Ukraine’s most formidable defenses and hand over territory that neither belongs to nor has been conquered by Russia.”
• The plan also mandates “a reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces to 600,000 troops…a nonstarter for Ukraine, too,” making Ukraine vulnerable given Russia's larger population and manpower advantages.
• Fix notes, “The U.S. security guarantees in the proposal…are not what Ukraine hoped to see… Kyiv would have liked a promise from Washington that it would come to the defense of Ukraine in case of a renewed attack, similar to NATO’s Article 5.”
• She warns, “The plan would require NATO to enshrine in its statuses that it will never accept Ukraine as a member… and a general ‘no’ to NATO enlargement would amount to an unacceptable Russian veto over NATO policy beyond Ukraine.”
• Fix suggests that while some points—like the staged lifting of sanctions or use of frozen Russian assets—offer negotiation space, “the entire agreement is structured to work via incentives and carrots with Moscow, instead of sticks and punishment in case of violation. They are in no way reassuring for Ukraine, which has to accept territorial concessions and limitations on its military that are detrimental to the country’s ability to defend itself—or face the prospect of U.S. punishment.”

“Ukraine needs to work with Trump's ugly peace proposal,” Damir Marusic, Washington Post, 11.21.25.

• Marusic writes, “The plan’s full text… reveals a framework for getting to a decent, if unjust, peace. It's ugly stuff, and Ukrainians are understandably still in shock. But the plan is not necessarily the disaster depicted in much Western media.”
• He explains, “Ukraine would have to give up all of Donbas, including territories that Russia has not yet captured; it would have to enshrine in its constitution that it would not join NATO; and it would have to cut the size of its armed forces from between 800,000 and 850,000 to 600,000… But the plan vaguely states that Ukraine would receive ‘reliable security guarantees,’ and that should Russia invade, there would be a ‘coordinated military response.’”
• Marusic notes that “an adviser close to Zelenskyy told me he saw Witkoff’s proposal as an opportunity—a starting point for hammering out a workable deal,” and that “the most painful part will be the territorial concessions. Though Zelenskyy has not publicly said so, many around him have long known that such concessions are inevitable.”
• He warns, “A burgeoning corruption scandal is threatening to weaken [Zelenskyy] dramatically…Many of the peace deal’s provisions would require difficult votes, and some, like territorial concessions, would require a nationwide referendum. An unpopular Zelenskyy would struggle to make the sale.”
• Marusic concludes, “For the deal to work, security guarantees would need to be explicitly spelled out, and the Trump administration should listen carefully to what the Ukrainians say they need—and be ready to be generous… The least-bad scenario is that Ukraine cedes territory while gaining meaningful means to repel a future attack.”

“Trump’s world view: cynical, self-interested and money-grabbing,” The Editorial Board, Financial Times, 11.21.25.

• The FT editorial board writes, “The true cynical, money-grabbing and self-interested nature of [Trump’s] world view was laid bare,” citing his “glorification of deals worth up to $1tn” with Saudi Arabia and his dismissive response to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi: “things happen.”
• On the Ukraine peace proposal, the board observes, “The Trump administration’s 28-point plan lays bare that such thinking was hopelessly naive. Its authors have clearly learned nothing in the past year. Their proposals call on Ukraine to cede territory it still controls and reduce the size of its army in return for no clear security guarantees from the west.”
• The editors highlight the business angle: “The plan depicts peacemaking as a juicy business opportunity for America; $100 billion of frozen Russian assets would be invested in U.S.-led efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s shattered economy—with America receiving 50% of any profits.”
• “The clear impression is that Trump wants an agreement as soon as possible and at just about whatever cost to Ukraine,” the editorial argues, “enabl[ing] him to claim another peace deal as part of his obsessional quest for the Nobel Peace Prize.”
• The FT board notes, “The blueprint has not met all Russia’s wishes: the territory occupied by Russia would still formally be part of Ukraine; Moscow was pushing for a demilitarized vassal state. Trump may reverse course again, though each time he pivots to Moscow he encourages Putin to hold out for more.”
• Quoting President Zelenskyy, the editorial notes, “Ukraine faced an agonizing choice between losing its dignity and losing a key ally.”
• The editorial concludes, “America is making no pretense that it aspires to be a ‘shining city on a hill’ as Ronald Reagan liked to say. Rather it is happy to hang up a sign saying it is open for business with anyone—especially when deals are in play.”

“Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council,” President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 11.21.25.Clues from Russian Views. 

• When asked about Trump’s proposed peace plan, Putin said, “President Trump’s peace plan to resolve the situation in Ukraine was discussed before the meeting in Alaska, and during this preliminary discussion, the American side asked us to make certain compromises, to show, as they said, flexibility… Despite certain complicated issues and difficulties, we nevertheless agree with those proposals and are ready to show the flexibility they asked for.”
• Putin stated, “All our friends and partners of the Global South… every single one of them supported these possible agreements.”
• He continued, “However, we can see that there is a certain pause from the American side… connected with Ukraine’s de facto rejection of the peace plan proposed by President Trump. I believe this is precisely why a new version has emerged, essentially an updated plan consisting of 28 points.”
• Putin said, “We have received this text through… channels with the U.S. administration. I believe it could also serve as a foundation for a final peace settlement. However, it is not being discussed in detail with us… The U.S. administration has so far been unable to secure consent from the Ukrainian side, as Ukraine is opposed to it. Apparently, Ukraine and its European allies continue to entertain the illusion that they can inflict a strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield.”
• He concluded, “If Kiev refuses to discuss President Trump’s proposals and declines to engage in dialogue, then both they and their European instigators must understand that what happened in Kupyansk will inevitably occur in other key areas of the front.… We remain ready for peace negotiations and for resolving issues through peaceful means. However, this, of course, requires substantive and meaningful discussion of all aspects of the proposed plan. We are prepared for this.”

“Lukyanov: It’s unclear how all 28 points of the Ukraine peace plan could be implemented,” Fyodor Lukyanov, RG.ru, 11.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Lukyanov writes, “At first glance, it’s unclear how all 28 points of the alleged peace plan for Ukraine could be implemented… the status of the document hasn’t been confirmed. There are even some comical aspects,” such as “the extension of START-1, which actually expired back in 2009.”
• He jokes about the “remarkable proposal to return Russia to the G8—surely the ultimate dream of the Russian people: to sit at the same table with Ursula von der Leyen, and if lucky, with Emmanuel Macron himself!”
• Lukyanov describes the plan, if real, as “an astonishing hybrid.” It contains “classic elements of diplomacy from earlier periods, when it was normal to redraw borders, impose quantitative and qualitative limits on military potential, and directly infringe on sovereignty.”
• He observes “a trade-broker approach,” designed for the benefit of the arbiter who will act as ‘an honest broker’ in the literal sense—‘taking a hefty commission for mediation’—and “the conscious disregard of supposedly accepted norms, which only get in the way.”
• Lukyanov concludes, “How all that’s described in the 28 points could possibly be implemented is totally unclear. But the real processes are now like this: templates are flying apart, international law and all ‘orders’ are being upended by the diplomatic creativity of the new era.”

“‘Make Them Talk to Each Other’,” Kati Marton, Foreign Policy, 11.21.25. 

• Marton writes, “Three decades ago, the Dayton Accords ended Bosnia’s savage civil war. Amid ongoing bloodletting in Ukraine and the Middle East today, this success offers enduring lessons in the very human nature of diplomacy.”
• She observes, “What I observed in Dayton was not the made-for-media performances of heads of state in gilded chambers. It was actual diplomacy, the hard work of spending long days and nights in the company of very bad people—those who start wars and can consequently end them.”
• “Diplomacy is a human enterprise that takes time and absolute focus. The diplomats’ familiarity with the warring parties’ personalities and their nations’ histories are essential to success,” Marton recalls, adding that “negotiators who approach peacemaking with a knowledge base drawn merely from recent headlines are doomed to fail.”
• Marton describes her first diplomatic assignment from Holbrooke: “‘Make them talk to each other,’ was my first assignment from my new husband,” referring to bringing together Slobodan Milosevic and Alija Izetbegovic, who “slipped into calling each other ‘Slobo’ and ‘Alija’… the two enemies were now talking to each other!”
• She reflects, “You must forge peace with those who lit the flame of war, but they shouldn’t stick around when the war is over… When Milosevic started another war in Kosovo in 1998, NATO responded forcefully. And, by encouraging internationally monitored elections in Serbia, Washington ultimately helped set the stage for his ouster.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “The U.S. Plan: an analysis,” Sergey Radchenko, Substack, 11.21.25.
• “"Peace plan" for Ukraine: "Vladimir Putin will never give up on conquering Ukraine," observes Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research,” BFM TV, 11.22.25. In French.
• “Pacifier of 28 points,” Boris Bondarev, MT/AFP, 11.22.25. Machine translated.

Saturday, Nov. 22, 2025

“7 Experts on How to Actually End the War in Ukraine,” Serge Schmemann, New York Times, 11.22.25.

• Ivan Krastev argues that “All we can realistically hope for in 2026 is a cease-fire, not a comprehensive peace deal,” as “Mr. Putin will agree to a cease-fire only if it serves his war objectives: to destabilize President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s power in Ukraine, trigger internal strife and deepen divisions within the Western alliance.”
• Samuel Charap urges that beyond Trump’s episodic, high-profile efforts, “a real negotiation process” is needed: continuous, structured, and largely confidential diplomacy, with empowered negotiators and mediators “required to identify trade-offs, understand the space for compromise and… gain the modicum of confidence in one another’s intentions needed for peace.”
• Pavlo Klimkin insists that “Anything short of… bold and effective Western security guarantees for Ukraine will not produce a sustainable or durable peace—for Europe or for Russia,” and that “a plan for ending Russia’s aggression cannot be the project of a limited group of politicians and diplomats.”
• Angela Stent asserts, “Sanctions are not enough. Ukraine needs to be able to purchase more weapons to convince Mr. Putin that he will not win on the battlefield… The first step to ending the fighting is a cease-fire. But without robust support from the West to deter Putin from resuming the war, his determination to subordinate Ukraine will remain.”
• Alina Polyakova calls for “a maximum pressure campaign on Russia to force Mr. Putin to the negotiation table, coupled with an effective defense and deterrence plan led by Europeans,” including “supplying long-range missiles, implementing sanctions, tapping frozen Russian funds, and increasing defense spending.”
• Sergey Karaganov (Moscow) claims, “the war will not really end until the core problem—the aggressive expansion of the Western military-political alliance—is resolved, and Ukraine is fully demilitarized and neutral. If not, the war will restart sooner or later. And then it could assume a nuclear character.”
• Stephen Sestanovich argues that to make peace last, Western backers must go beyond mere “security guarantees” and create a lasting “network of political, economic, military, social, even cultural relationships and institutions” akin to those that kept the Cold War peace, warning: “If they flourish, Ukraine will succeed—and the peace will last.”

“Zelenskyy may never have faced a more agonizing choice,” David Ignatius, Washington Post, 11.22.25.

• Ignatius wrote: "Ukraine's sovereignty can never be compromised. That would open the floodgates in Europe," one key [U.S.] official told me Saturday. "We don't want to see a collapse of Ukraine," he explained, describing that as the "second coming of Yugoslavia," whose breakup in 1991 began a decade of regional strife. Critics of the Trump peace bid argue that it would reward Moscow and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty in precisely the way the officials I spoke with claim they want to avoid.”
• Ignatius wrote: “The official said that contrary to some reports, the Trump administration was "100%" committed to continued U.S. intelligence support for Ukraine. The 28-point plan was "aspirational" and open to negotiation, he claimed. Trump's public comments have not been so reassuring. He spoke Friday of a Thanksgiving deadline, but denied Saturday that the 28 points were a final, take-it-or-leave it offer.”
• “What prompted this peace bid, the officials told me, was a sense that recent reversals on the battlefield in the Donetsk region and a corruption scandal in Kyiv have brought Ukraine to an inflection point. Russia, meanwhile, is feeling growing economic pressure and might prefer to end the war rather than fight on for the two years that might be necessary to take Donetsk completely,” according to Ignatius.
• “The model for Trump's Ukraine effort is his successful push for a ceasefire in Gaza… . Turkey played a key role as an intermediary with the Ukrainians, just as it did with Hamas in the earlier talks.”
• “This negotiating drive began nearly a month ago, when U.S. officials started developing a new framework in consultation with Russian, European and Ukrainian contacts.”
• “According to the U.S. officials, Umerov said in the Florida meeting that Zelenskyy might be ready to compromise on the crucial issue of swapping land in Donetsk for a peace deal, which has been a Russian demand. Umerov also said that Ukraine might be willing to cap its army at 600,000, the officials said.”
• Ignatius wrote that “U.S. envoys recognize that security guarantees are the critical issue in getting Ukrainian and European support. Russia won't budge in its opposition to European troops in Ukraine as a "deterrence force" after a ceasefire. Instead, U.S. officials have considered offering the Tomahawks to Ukraine as an alternative.”
• “Because of Ukraine's political instability, U.S. officials included a proposal for national elections in Ukraine within 100 days after an agreement is signed… They [U.S. officials] also added a clause providing postwar amnesty, at Ukraine's request”
• “The draft agreement calls on Ukraine to withdraw from the roughly 25% of Donetsk it now holds, meeting Russia's key demand. To reassure Ukraine that it would be secure behind the ceasefire line, the U.S. draft agreement says this withdrawal zone should be demilitarized. A U.S. official told me Saturday that, in addition, the U.S. and its allies would help Ukraine build a security "wall" along the ceasefire line, using advanced technology.”
• “Zelenskyy's initial reaction to the new peace initiative had been to propose instead a ceasefire for energy-infrastructure targets. … the Russians responded that this approach was a "nonstarter," an official told me,” Ignatius wrote.
• Ignatius concluded: “Zelenskyy now confronts the most agonizing choice of his presidency. If he says yes to giving up Donetsk, some Ukrainians will never forgive him. If he says no, this tragic war will continue. For all Zelenskyy's courage, he may never have faced a more agonizing moment.”

“Ukraine has no choice but to engage with U.S. peace plan,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 11.22.25.

• Rachman writes that Trump is pressuring Ukraine to accept a peace deal negotiated directly with Russia, giving Kyiv until Thursday to decide on a plan that requires ceding territory and restricting its sovereignty.
• He outlines three scenarios: Ukraine rejects the plan and risks a total cutoff of U.S. aid; negotiates to amend the plan with European and American support; or the proposal collapses due to its flaws.
• “A complete cut-off in U.S. aid would leave Ukraine in a bleak and dangerous situation,” especially since Kyiv still depends on American intelligence and munitions.
• Given these risks, Ukraine has “reluctantly accepted the Witkoff-Dmitriev proposal as a basis for negotiations,” aiming to modify its worst elements rather than accept it as-is.
• He concludes, “The American plan entails huge risks for Ukraine. But—if it is taken as a starting point, not the finished product—it could yet be a route to end the war on terms that Ukraine can accept.”

“Zelenskyy has never been more vulnerable. Trump just upped the pressure.” Siobhán O'Grady, David Stern, Serhiy Morgunov, Kostiantyn Khudov, and Lizzie Johnson, Washington Post, 11.22.25. 

• The authors report, “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is facing a stunning challenge to his presidency as major corruption allegations rock the wartime leader's innermost circle just as Washington ramps up pressure for him to agree to an unfavorable peace deal.”
• “The White House is pushing Kyiv to sign on to its new proposal—a draft of which would force Ukraine to make major concessions long seen as unacceptable to the country, including ceding territory to Russians and significantly reducing the size of the Ukrainian army—by Thanksgiving or losing all U.S. support for the country.”
• Lawmakers and analysts say Zelenskyy’s only path to regain trust is to “overhaul the system that allowed such corruption to persist unchecked and restore power to a parliament his administration has sidelined.”
• The public outrage is intense: “The country’s ruling elite may have lined their own pockets as they sent troops to die in the name of democracy and Western values,” fueling disbelief that “a small pool of powerful people have profited from a war that is killing so many of their fellow citizens.”
• Key parliamentary voices and allies from Zelenskyy’s own party are calling for the dismissal of powerful presidential aide Andriy Yermak, as pressure mounts for a broader government reboot and anti-corruption clean-up.
• Zelenskyy “has not been accused of personal participation in the scheme,” but “must present a plan…on how to move forward from the corruption scandal without further dividing the country,” and enact real change to preserve legitimacy.
• The piece concludes that for Zelenskyy to “survive the crisis and regain the trust of the country…he must ‘show that something has been resolved, that the government has been rebooted without elections.’”

“Trump Presents Ukraine With a ‘Very Tough Choice’,” Sam Skove and John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 11.21.25. 

• Skove and Haltiwanger report, “Ukraine faces a difficult decision in the days ahead as the Trump administration pushes the country to embrace a 28-point peace plan that would see it make major concessions to Russia—including relinquishing control of territory that Russian forces don’t currently occupy.”
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Friday, “Right now, Ukraine may find itself facing a very tough choice. Either the loss of our dignity or the risk of losing a key partner. Either the difficult 28 points, or an extremely hard winter—the hardest yet—and the dangers that follow.”
• “The Trump administration has reportedly warned that Ukraine could lose U.S. intelligence and military assistance if Zelenskyy doesn’t accept the peace proposal,” the authors note, adding that President Trump “wants Kyiv to agree to the deal by Thanksgiving Day, giving Ukraine little time to negotiate.”
• According to reporting, “The Trump administration’s 28-point peace proposal would give Russia much of what it has sought, including limits on Ukraine’s military size, political concessions by Ukraine, and ‘de facto’ U.S. recognition of Russian control over Crimea and the Donbas—including territory that is still under Ukrainian control.”
• The plan also reportedly includes a U.S. security guarantee modeled on NATO’s Article 5, but Skove and Haltiwanger caution, “If a deal is reached and it amounts to little more than Trump offering his signature or issuing an executive order… any security guarantees offered to Ukraine would carry little weight.”
• Zelenskyy and EU officials were caught by surprise, with top EU diplomat Kaja Kallas saying, “the pressure should be on the aggressor,” and noting Europe was not previously informed of the effort.
• The pressure comes as “Zelenskyy is dealing with a corruption scandal while Russia is simultaneously considered to be on the verge of seizing the city of Pokrovsk—which, if captured, would mark the most significant victory for Russian forces since the seizure of Avdiivka in early 2024.”

“Donald Trump’s peace plan would be bad for Ukraine, Europe and America,” The Economist, 11.22.25.

• The Economist editorializes that “the 28-point peace plan that America is hawking around as a basis for ending the war in Ukraine is so poorly put together, so vague, unbalanced and impractical that, in a more normal world, it would never have seen the light of day—and once leaked it would have been quietly dumped.”
• The plan, they write, “blocks Ukraine from launching a missile at Moscow or St Petersburg, but nowhere else in Russia, and puts no limits on Russian strikes at all… Russia is rewarded for halting its invasion, by keeping all the territory it has seized and more that it has not… and by being given relief from sanctions and generous opportunities to make money.”
• The authors argue, “the details prescribe a future for Ukraine that will be deeply insecure… Ukraine must cap its army at 600,000 troops, whereas Russia faces no limits. No NATO troops can be stationed on Ukrainian territory… an end to European plans…to station a ‘reassurance force’ there.”
• The piece warns, “the plan richly rewards Mr. Putin’s aggression. That is an incentive for him to strike Ukraine again, and it gives Russia’s president money and time to rebuild the armies he needs to realize his long-term goal of threatening and coercing the countries along Russia’s border, from the Arctic to the Black Sea.”
• According to the editorial, “the plan for Ukraine makes its ‘guarantee’ entirely dependent on the whim of Mr. Trump, and the pledge is not even going to be backed by America’s Congress,” while “America will be paid for agreeing to support Ukraine.”
• “The proof this plan is a bad deal is that it is really an ultimatum. Just ask yourself, if it offered Ukraine salvation, why would Mr. Trump have to force it on Mr. Zelenskyy? If America’s European allies thought it was wise, why would they now be scrambling for a way—any way—to stall it?”
• The Economist concludes, “the current American plan is dangerous not just for Ukraine but for Europe; so its leaders must now move from indignation to action… The struggle would be desperate and the bill would be high, but far lower than the cost of defending NATO against the aggravated threat from Russia should Ukraine crumble.”

“Trump officials' meeting with Russian in Miami spurs questions about Ukraine proposal,” Erin Banco, Gram Slattery, Reuters, 11.22.25.

• Banco and Slattery report that Trump administration officials—including envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—met in Miami in late October with sanctioned Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev to draft a controversial 28-point Ukraine peace plan, raising concerns among U.S. officials and lawmakers.
• The meeting resulted in a plan that reportedly favors Russian interests and calls for major Ukrainian concessions, including ceding territory, and has caused confusion and criticism within Washington, European capitals, and Ukraine itself.
• White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt said the plan aims to “reflect the realities of the situation, and to find the best win-win scenario, where both parties gain more than they must give,” but U.S. officials admitted that senior administration and State Department figures were not fully briefed beforehand.
• Critics, including Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Republican senators, warn the plan could force Ukraine to “give up its lands to one of the world’s most flagrant war criminals,” and dispute that it represents a real pathway to peace.
• The participation of Dmitriev, who remains under U.S. sanctions, and Kushner in the talks—without a full interagency process—has drawn skepticism, with some U.S. officials noting previous Russian attempts to use diplomatic backchannels, including with Kushner in Trump’s first term.

“Trump pressures Ukraine to accept peace deal: Early analysis from Chatham House experts,” Chatham House, 11.22.25.

• Orysia Lutsevych writes, “The 28-point plan looks like a brainchild of the Kremlin. It takes all the Russian official goals of its so-called ‘special military operation’ and presents it to Kyiv as the American peace plan. It resembles more a demand for capitulation.”
• Lutsevych notes, “Kyiv will engage with this plan. Ukraine negotiators will try to course correct. This could only work if Zelenskyy presents a joint position backed by the European ‘coalition of the willing’. They will take it point by point and either reject or modify. There will no wholesale deal.”
• Keir Giles argues, “There is no peace process. This is not negotiations over peace: it is the transmission of surrender demands from Russia with the active facilitation of the United States… The text says Ukraine must not strike Moscow or St Petersburg, but has no such prohibition on Russia striking Kyiv.”
• Giles warns, “Will Russia try to occupy Ukraine later if the plan is approved? Yes… the whole point of the military aspects of the surrender terms [is] to leave Ukraine defenseless for when Russia decides it is ready to have another go.”
• Marc Weller highlights, “According to the plan, all of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk ‘will be recognized as de facto Russian.’… According to the draft, these areas would also be ‘internationally recognized as territories belonging to the Russian Federation.’”
• Weller concludes, “The draft text provided by the U.S. is not expertly drafted, leaves room for endless confusions and disputes, and cannot really serve as an agreement the sides could sign. Evidently, further negotiations will be required. As the present version seems to have been negotiated between Russia and the U.S. alone, and is accordingly slanted towards Russia, Ukraine must be entitled to argue for, and achieve, changes.”
• He adds, “Under Ukrainian law, it is explicitly prohibited to make changes to the Constitution of Ukraine while martial law is in effect. The proposal also demands fresh elections in Ukraine within 100 days of concluding the agreement… Elections cannot take place under martial law.”

Sunday, Nov. 23, 2025

“Putin’s Win-Win: Take a Russia-Friendly Peace Deal, or Fight On,” Paul Sonne, New York Times, 11.24.25  

• Sonne reports that Trump’s new 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, drafted with Russian input, is “heavily weighted toward the Kremlin.” Most of its provisions reflect Putin’s demands, including capping Ukraine’s military and banning NATO membership.
• President Putin is “standing back as Ukraine and Europe scramble to negotiate changes.” Sonne writes: “For the Russian leader, a Kremlin-friendly peace plan… would be a win. So would a failed process that leads Mr. Trump to pull remaining support for Ukraine and further antagonize European allies.”
• Putin said the plan could be a foundation for a settlement after “substantive and meaningful discussion, or Russia could keep pressing its case… through armed confrontation,” adding, “More Ukrainian cities will fall to Russian troops, ‘perhaps not as quickly as we would prefer, but inevitably.’”
• Russian negotiators have already “dropped their initial demand that Ukraine hand over the entirety of the four regions that Moscow ‘annexed’ in 2022,” seeking instead Ukrainian withdrawal from what remains of Donetsk, which would become a “demilitarized zone” recognized as Russian land.
• Sonne quotes analyst Stefan Meister: “Putin’s calculation is he hopes that Trump gets frustrated with Zelenskyy and backtracks with any kind of support, and if there is no intelligence sharing or long-range missiles, the Europeans can’t replace it… Ultimately, Mr. Putin ‘wants to break Ukraine.’”

“U.S. peace plan: what could Ukraine compromise on?” Christopher Miller and Ben Hall, Financial Times, 11.24.25  

• Miller and Hall report the U.S. 28-point peace plan for Ukraine is “highly favorable to Russia,” breaching Kyiv’s red lines and “sidestepping European security concerns,” making it extremely challenging to revise into something Ukraine and its allies could accept.
• The plan would require Ukraine to give up its “fortress belt” of frontline towns in Donetsk, establishing a “neutral demilitarized buffer zone” that—if breached—would leave central Ukraine exposed; the plan calls for “de facto” recognition of Russian occupation, which, according to Marc Weller of Chatham House, “is more favorable to Putin” than “de facto Russian control.”
• The plan offers Ukraine only vague “security guarantees,” banning NATO membership and foreign troops, while not specifying “concrete steps” for Western defense; Zelenskyy has said strong, actionable guarantees are “essential to any peace deal.”
• On frozen Russian assets, the plan would override the EU’s €140 billion reparations scheme: “Washington would take $100 billion for a U.S.-Ukraine investment vehicle that would deliver half its profits to the U.S.,” while Europe adds another $100 billion and the rest goes into a U.S.-Russia venture, angering European leaders like Germany’s Friedrich Merz.
• The proposal includes a blanket amnesty for both sides, which Oleksandra Matviichuk called “the main disappointment,” and critics say this would make EU reparations legally “impossible”; the plan also suggests capping Ukraine’s army at 600,000, “an unacceptable breach of its sovereignty,” according to EU leaders, and offers no reciprocal reduction for Russian forces.

“Ukraine peace plan shrinks after Geneva talks, but still no deal,” Siobhán O'Grady, Ellen Francis, Robyn Dixon, Washington Post, 11.24.25  

• O'Grady, Francis, and Dixon report that the controversial U.S. 28-point peace plan “was down from 28 points to 19 by Monday,” after “frenzied meetings in Geneva” between senior American and Ukrainian officials; however, “the foundation continued to be based on the original American proposal—not on a separate European draft.”
• Oleksandr Bevs, adviser to President Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, wrote, “The 28-point plan in the form in which everyone saw it, no longer exists. Some points were removed, some were changed. Not a single remark from the Ukrainian side was left without a response.”
• European officials, who “fear being sidelined,” submitted their own amendments—raising Ukraine’s allowed armed forces cap, requiring negotiations on territorial exchanges to start from the line of contact, and guaranteeing that “borders cannot be changed by force.”
• “We are not on board,” said one European diplomat about the U.S.-led talks, adding: “We are trying to get on board, but it is being met for the moment with some rejections from Americans.” Another diplomat described the process as having “mystery around the current phase of negotiations.”
• Zelenskyy said Monday that Ukraine was “coordinating steps with the U.S.” to seek “a compromise that strengthens us rather than weakens us,” while also insisting, “Borders cannot be changed by force. Criminals must not remain unpunished. They must answer for the war they started.”

“Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Peace Plan Is a Step Forward,” Emma Ashford, Foreign Policy, 11.23.25  

• Ashford writes, “The White House’s new plan might fail, but the alternatives to a peace process are worse. For all of the dysfunction of Trump’s attempted peace process with Russia, almost everyone else has given up on anything better than the horrifying status quo in Ukraine.”
• She argues that former President Biden’s “as long as it takes” strategy for Ukraine ran out of steam: “Ukraine was unable to achieve the stunning military successes envisaged by many Western planners; there was little to no agreement in the West on how policymakers would know that the time had come to negotiate; and public support for continued aid to Ukraine began to decline almost immediately.”
• “Trump’s new peace plan is substantially more detailed than prior attempts, and begins to address some of the key issues for both sides. The plan, however, has been greeted harshly by European governments—and by pro-Ukrainian voices in Washington. One U.S. senator described it over the weekend as a Russian ‘wishlist’; European governments were quick to deem it unacceptable. The plan is actually a step forward, though.”
• Ashford observes, “For Ukraine, there is both good and bad in the draft. High-level caps on Ukraine’s armed forces—and no apparent restrictions on weapons—are a win, though the territorial concessions are relatively harsh… Even Kyiv has been cautiously quiet about the deal, rather than vocally critical.”
• She concludes, “Trump’s peace overtures, however imperfect, are the only option that actually could achieve a better outcome than the status quo. But if the White House can’t get its act together and build a more robust peace process that can survive both public scrutiny and the actual rigors of cease-fire mechanics, then even this slim hope may fail.”

“Ukraine survives another crisis with Donald Trump: A deal in Geneva salvages relations with America. It might not last,” The Economist, 11.23.25.  

• The Economist reports that Ukraine, facing collapsing front lines and a domestic corruption scandal, was pressured by the Trump administration into accepting a heavily pro-Russian 28-point peace plan but talks in Geneva produced “unexpected progress” and a temporary reconciliation.
• Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the Geneva session “probably [the] best meeting and day we’ve had so far in this entire process,” while Zelenskyy aide Andriy Yermak said, “we are moving forward to the just and lasting peace.”
• The leaked 28-point plan, delivered by Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, included “the surrender of fortified territory in Ukraine’s Donbas region… a reduction of the Ukrainian army to 600,000 soldiers… and a constitutional change to permanently exclude NATO membership.” It also allowed frozen Russian assets to fund joint American-Russian projects and offered only a weak U.S. security guarantee.
• The plan’s exposure “has exposed confusion, rivalry and incompetence within the Trump administration,” with Rubio himself at one point telling senators it was a Russian document before reversing: “he posted on the X social-media platform that the plan was, after all, ‘authored by the U.S..’”
• The Economist concludes, “Even if a more Ukraine-friendly deal gets past Mr. Trump, it will almost certainly be blocked by Russia; and any deal acceptable to Russia is likely to be voted down by an increasingly skeptical Ukrainian parliament. All this may bring another crisis soon. But for Mr. Zelenskyy, every day of survival will feel like a victory.”

“For Hobbled Zelenskyy, Defying Trump Is Safer Than Yielding—Ukrainian public’s firm stance on war makes a deal favoring Putin political suicide,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 11.24.25.  

• Trofimov argues that although President Zelenskyy is politically weakened by a corruption scandal, “this very vulnerability makes him even less likely to yield to the Trump administration,” as Ukrainian public opinion overwhelmingly rejects the 28-point peace plan as capitulation.
• “No Ukrainian president—and especially not a weakened Zelenskyy—has a mandate to agree to anything like this. If he does, he would not be president anymore when he comes home,” said Nico Lange, a former senior German defense official.
• Dmytro Kuleba, former Ukrainian foreign minister, said, “Agreeing to an unacceptable, extremely painful, package, just to halt the war—no politician will approve such a decision if he feels that the society is not ready to accept it. Accepting an agreement that will be rejected by the society would mean political, and unfortunately in our reality also physical, suicide for such a leader.”
• The plan’s “key demand to give up cities that Russia doesn’t control” is viewed as political suicide for any Ukrainian leader and as “just a step to strengthen the enemy, a pause to rearm Russia,” according to Andriy Zagorodnyuk, former defense minister.
• Trofimov concludes: “While the overall trajectory remains negative for Ukraine, this is not a military that is on the verge of being defeated, or facing a loss of cohesion. They are fatigued, they are exhausted, but they are still determined to fight on.”

“Trump’s Ukraine Peace Effort Devolves Into Chaos Over Conflicting Stories,” Rachel Oswald and John Haltiwanger, Foreign Policy, 11.23.25. 

• Oswald and Haltiwanger report that confusion erupted after several senior senators said Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the 28-point peace proposal as “Moscow’s wish list” and not a U.S. product, only for Rubio and the State Department to later insist, “This plan was authored by the United States, with input from both the Russians and Ukrainians.”
• Sen. Mike Rounds stated, “He [Rubio] made it very clear to us that we [the United States] are the recipients of a proposal that was delivered to one of our representatives. It is not our recommendation. It is not our peace plan. It is a proposal that was received [from Russia] … and we did not release it. It was leaked.”
• Rubio insisted in a post on X, “The peace proposal was authored by the U.S. It is offered as a strong framework for ongoing negotiations. It is based on input from the Russian side. But it is also based on previous and ongoing input from Ukraine.”
• Sen. Angus King said, “I think it is fair to say that this document represents the Russian position. It has now been presented to the Europeans and to the Ukrainians, and they are going to review it and come back.”
• Republican critics were outspoken: Sen. Roger Wicker wrote, “Ukraine should not be forced to give up its lands to one of the world’s most flagrant war criminals in [Russian President] Vladimir Putin.” Sen. Mitch McConnell accused Trump officials of being “more concerned with appeasing Putin than securing real peace,” while Sen. Thom Tillis declared, “We should not do anything to make him feel like he [Putin] has a win here. He is a murderer. He is a rapist. He is a thug. He invaded a sovereign nation.”

Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, 11.23.25.

• Trump wrote: The war between Russia and Ukraine is a violent and terrible one that, with strong and proper U.S. and Ukrainian leadership, would have never happened. It began long before I took office for a second term, during the Sleepy Joe Biden administration, and has only gotten worse. If the 2020 presidential election was not rigged & stolen, the only thing the Radical Left Democrats are good at doing, there would be no Ukraine/Russia war, as there wasn’t, not even a mention, during my first term in office. Putin would never have attacked!”
• Trump wrote: “I inherited a war that should have never happened, a war that is a loser for everyone, especially the millions of people that have so needlessly died. Ukraine “leadership” has expressed zero gratitude for our efforts, and Europe continues to buy oil from Russia. The USA continues to sell massive amounts of weapons to NATO, for distribution to Ukraine (Crooked Joe gave everything, free, free, free, including “big” money!). God bless all the lives that have been lost in the human catastrophe!”

Monday, Nov. 24, 2025

“U.S. and Ukraine draft new 19-point peace plan but defer biggest decisions,” Christopher Miller, Financial Times, 11.24.25.  

• Sergiy Kyslytsya, Ukraine’s first deputy foreign minister, said the newly drafted plan “bore little resemblance to the earlier leaked version of the peace proposal that had caused uproar in Kyiv,” concluding, “Very few things are left from the original version.”
• On the most sensitive provisions from the initial 28-point U.S. plan, Kyslytsya stated that “the most contentious points—including territorial issues and relations between Nato, Russia and the U.S.—[were] placed in brackets for Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to decide.
• Kyslytsya reported that provisions such as “a 600,000 cap on Ukraine’s army” and “a blanket amnesty for potential war crimes” from the original draft were removed or reworked in the new negotiations
• “They agreed the Ukrainian army number in the leaked version [of the peace plan draft]—whoever authored it—was no longer on the table,” said Kyslytsya, adding that “the military will continue to discuss the arrangements.
• On the amnesty provision, Kyslytsya noted the team “reworked (it) in a way that addresses the grievances of those who suffered in the war.”
• “The fundamental achievement in Geneva is that we managed to preserve a workable partnership and dialogue with the Americans,” said Kyslytsya, but stressed: “We should not be driven by excitement or hype, but by responsibility and the complexity of the issues.”

RM Staff’s Selective Compilation of Russian reaction to the U.S.-Russian 28-point proposal and to the European counterproposal, 11.24.25.

• Kremlin / pro‑Kremlin figures insist the plan must reflect Russia’s maximal demands, ridicule Ukraine and the West, reject territorial concessions, and frame Russia as open to peace only on its own terms, with the underlying expectation of maintaining or expanding gains.
• Opposition analysts see Putin as maneuvering, not compromising—seeking a weakened Ukraine, preserving options to resume war, and manipulating any peace process.
• Z-pro-war bloggers see it as a trap.
• Kremlin / pro‑Kremlin voices:
  • Vladimir Putin, Russian president
  – Frames Trump’s proposal as a foundation for peace but blames Ukraine and the West for blocking it.
  – Signals supposed “flexibility” while warning that Kupyansk‑style setbacks will occur elsewhere if Ukraine refuses talks.
  – Maintains Russia’s conditions and narrative of Western “illusions” about defeating Russia, vows to fight if Ukraine refuses the proposal.

• Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and Security Council deputy chair
– Uses insults and ridicule; dismisses Ukrainian leadership.
– Reinforces a line of contempt, not negotiation.

• Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund
– Focuses on controlling the information narrative (who leaked what).
– Suggests the U.S. plan now includes “full amnesty,” portraying Russia as cooperative and others as dishonest.

• Alexei Chepa, State Duma deputy
– Says any plan must satisfy all Russian demands, including vague “root causes” that historically mean dismantling Ukrainian sovereignty and NATO alignment.

• Fyodor Lukyanov, establishment foreign‑policy analyst (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy)
– Treats the leaked plan as unrealistic and unserious, mocks provisions like extending START 1 and returning Russia to the G8.

• Sergei Karaganov, senior Russian foreign‑policy strategist
– Says a ceasefire is possible but real peace requires solving the “core problem”: Western expansion and a fully demilitarized, neutral Ukraine.

• Georgy Bovt, pro‑Kremlin political commentator
– Notes that Putin’s comments do not imply agreement with the U.S. plan.
– Emphasizes Russia’s stance that every next proposal should be worse for Ukraine than the previous one.

• Opposition‑minded analysts (critical of Putin):

• Abbas Gallyamov, former Putin speechwriter and opposition political analyst
– Argues Putin is not seeking real peace.
– Believes Putin is “banking on a resumption of military hostilities.”
– Says the plan would leave Ukraine defenseless, while Putin could later cite “violations” (for example, excluding pro‑Russian candidates) as a pretext to restart the invasion.

• Tatiana Stanovaya, independent political analyst (R.Politik founder)
– Says Putin’s strategy assumes Ukraine will steadily weaken.
– Believes Putin thinks that “whatever happens,” he will be able to extract what he wants.
– Interprets Moscow’s posture as confident, tactical, and long‑term rather than conciliatory.

• Vladimir Pastukhov, exiled opposition‑minded political analyst and legal scholar
– Argues the European edits to Trump’s plan were done in a “Leninist” way: formal correctness but substantive distortion.
– Views the process as political theater—mock compliance masking unchanged maximalist Russian positions.

“‘Putin found himself like a wolf with his tail frozen in the ice:’ Political analyst Aleksandr Morozov on three factors that will change the military-political situation in 2026,” Republic, 11.24.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Morozov argues the U.S.-Russian 28-point memorandum is “not a draft agreement, but a list of ideas for prolonged discussion,” and says the Kremlin “will use it to sow division within the coalition supporting Ukraine, rather than seriously seeking a settlement.”
• He contends “the Kremlin will not end the war on Trump’s terms, will not suffer imminent military defeat, and will not break Ukraine’s resistance,” predicting instead a “long war of varying intensity” further entrenching Putinism and Russia’s isolation.
• Morozov says after Putin rejected Trump’s ceasefire proposal, Russia’s elites must now adjust to “a new, more difficult economic situation,” where dependence on China deepens and enforcement of sanctions, especially on shadow energy exports, “could have catastrophic results for Russia in three to five years.”
• He identifies three key factors likely to change the situation in 2026: 1) “a surge in drone warfare and Russian hybrid attacks—including diversification, blackouts, and cyberattacks”; 2) “potential escalation if U.S. sanctions move from traditional sanctions to a full embargo on Russian oil and gas”; 3) “the Kremlin possibly trying mass mobilization and reframing the Ukraine war as a sacred patriotic struggle, which could destabilize the regime.”
• Morozov concludes that Putin’s political options have sharply narrowed, with the long war “ultimately unsustainable”—and any prospect for change, either a turn to peace or deeper crisis, will depend on elite decisions rather than public protest or openness to outside proposals.

“U.S. works on a peace deal with Ukraine and Europe, but how will Putin respond?” Alexander Baunov, Meduza, 11.24.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Baunov writes, “Ukraine and the United States have agreed on ‘most points’ of the peace plan—details will be discussed in person by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump. In addition, the United States will coordinate with European countries on points that directly concern them. Only after this will American negotiators go to persuade Russia ‘with carrot and stick.’”
• According to Baunov, Putin acknowledged the plan but “recognized it as ‘his brainchild, but only partially.’” Baunov continues, “In it, developing the genetic-biological metaphor, there are distinct traces of DNA from Donald Trump and, in negligible quantities, other participants. But the main resemblance was obvious.”
• Baunov explains Putin’s stance: “He makes it clear this is not a Russian plan and not even the plan agreed in Anchorage. It is a text that has been changed without Russia’s participation.” Baunov adds Putin’s words that Russia received the American proposals “before Alaska and showed flexibility during the Anchorage meeting.”
• Baunov notes, “The fact the current draft is public means, for the Kremlin, that it should not be changed for the worse from Russia’s point of view: ‘Having seen the 28 points, everyone should understand that proud Russia will no longer be bending in plain sight.’”
• Finally, Baunov concludes, “Putin is suggesting Ukraine and the West choose not between different versions of peace, but between Russia achieving its goals by military means, or—if a negotiated approach is added—at least fewer people will die.”

“The case against—and for—Trump’s Ukraine plan,” Ishaan Tharoor, Washington Post, 11.24.25.

• Tharoor reports that Trump’s 28-point Ukraine peace proposal “crosses several red lines for Ukraine,” requiring Kyiv to cede territory, reduce its military, forswear NATO ambitions, and accept no major Western security guarantees.
• President Zelenskyy described the dilemma: “either the loss of dignity or the risk of losing a key partner,” and noted it was “the most difficult choice” since the start of the war.
• Trump told reporters, “He’ll have to like it. And if he doesn’t like it, then they should just keep fighting, I guess,” later adding that Zelenskyy could “accept the deal or continue to fight his little heart out.”
• European leaders and Ukrainian officials have sharply criticized the plan, with the EU’s Ursula von der Leyen warning that restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces would leave it “vulnerable to future attack,” and former U.S. Ambassador Bridget Brink calling the plan “unthinkable for Ukraine and [one that] undermines U.S. national security.”
• However, some observers like Anatol Lieven argue the plan might eventually look acceptable: “An agreement that leaves three quarters of Ukraine independent and with a path to EU membership would in fact be a Ukrainian victory, albeit a qualified one.”

Peace in Ukraine—In Our Time?” Dr Greg Mills, RUSI, 11.24.25  

• Mills writes, “On the face of it, President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan for Ukraine could have been written less by a well-meaning Chamberlain than Vladimir Putin himself,” highlighting that the proposal “crosses several red lines for Ukraine,” including ceding the Donbas, cutting the army, and abandoning NATO ambitions “without the same demands of Russia.”
• The plan’s economic terms are controversial: “The U.S. would receive 50% of the profits from $100 billion in frozen Russian assets invested in U.S.-led efforts to rebuild Ukraine,” while “Europe is… to add $100 billion towards Ukraine's reconstruction and presumably American profit.”
• Mills notes the diplomatic flaws: “Europe is treated as a tool of American foreign policy, not as a mutual and equal actor,” and critic Ivo Daadler calls it “delusional… this plan isn’t serious. It’s insulting.”
• On security guarantees, Mills observes, “Point 10 details the ‘U.S. guarantee,’ noting that ‘the U.S. will receive compensation for the guarantee.’ As Daalder put it, ‘this smacks more of a protection racket than a security guarantee.’”
• He concludes, “War usually ends when both sides are exhausted… but not tired enough to accept such terms, an act which could see Zelenskyy evicted by popular protest,” adding, “The first version of Trump’s plan does not prevent [renewed war] from happening again. It guarantees it.”

Russia-Ukraine: Comparing US-RF Peace Proposal With  European Counterproposal,” Simon Saradzhyan, 11.24.25.⁵

As Table 1 below demonstrates, Ukraine could have agreed with Russia on 15 of the 28 points outlined in the U.S.-Russian peace proposal (as described by Axios on 11.20.25). Of 3 issues which I think Ukraine and Russia had low chances of agreeing on as of the AM hours of 11.23.25, it is the disagreements on territorial arrangements that appeared to be most difficult to reconcile. Of course, this point became somewhat moot after Europeans first presented their counterproposal (as described by Reuters on 11.23.25) and then teams of Ukrainian and American negotiators, led by Yermak and Rubio, held what they described as productive negotiations on the purported peace deal in Geneva in PM hours of 11.23.25. They reportedly agreed to drop 9 of 29 points in the U.S.-Russian proposal, including the clause for a ceiling on the personnel strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, according to reports in Western and Ukrainian media. In the 18 remaining points, it is the clause on Ukrainians ceding control of the part of the Donetsk region, which they continue to control, that remained unresolved as of PM hours of 11.23.25. It has also become known that these 18 points also include a point on amnesty, which Ukrainian negotiators reportedly insisted upon and U.S. negotiators agreed to adjust and keep. As of 11.24.25 it remained unclear what the rest of the clauses in the new 18-point plan are. I would hazard a guess that most of these surviving points can be addressed in a bilateral document whereas the points which ended up being dropped probably require multi-lateral legal frameworks to serve (e.g. NATO-Ukraine-Russia or EU-Ukraine Russia (e.g. sanctions on Russia and Ukraine’s membership in EU).

Table 1: Comparing clauses in the US-RF proposal with those in the European counterproposal:

Color code: Green =  currently agreeable; Red = currently not agreeable; Black = unclear.

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “The Wrong Wat to Peace in Ukraine,” Timothy Snyder, Project Syndicate, 11.24.25.
• “Support, tolerate, reject: The Russian response to Trump’s Ukraine peace plan,” Anton Barbashin, European Council on Foreign Relations, 11.24.25

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The End of the Longest Peace? One of History’s Greatest Achievements Is Under Threat,” Graham Allison and James A. Winnefeld, Foreign Affairs, 11.21.25  

•  Allison and Winnefeld argue that the period since 1945 has been “the longest period without a war between great powers since the Roman Empire,” a remarkable—and fragile—achievement secured by conscious effort, nuclear deterrence, diplomacy, and the postwar international order.
• They emphasize the continued absence of nuclear use and successful nonproliferation (“Today, 185 states have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty forswearing nuclear weapons. Remarkably, only nine countries have nuclear arsenals”), but warn this era could end—especially if Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or major states such as South Korea move toward independent arsenals, according to the authors.
• The “long peace” was created and preserved through Cold War dynamics, the “moderation of ideologies,” economic interdependence, creative diplomacy, and U.S. leadership building institutions like NATO and the Marshall Plan, according to the authors.
• Allison and Winnefeld warn that the peace is threatened by amnesia about the true costs of great-power war, the rise of new competitors like China, “a multipolar world” caused by the erosion of U.S. economic predominance, and domestic political dysfunction and division within the United States.
• They conclude that sustaining peace will require a new “surge of strategic imagination and national determination,” and urge Americans not to take the absence of war for granted: “To sustain the exception that has allowed the world to experience an unprecedented period without a great-power war will require… collective action to prevent—or more accurately, postpone—the next global convulsion.”

“Trump’s New Ukraine Policy Is Old Hat,” Fareed Zakaria, Foreign Policy, 11.21.25. 

•  Allison and Winnefeld argue that the period since 1945 has been “the longest period without a war between great powers since the Roman Empire,” a remarkable—and fragile—achievement secured by conscious effort, nuclear deterrence, diplomacy, and the postwar international order.
• They emphasize the continued absence of nuclear use and successful nonproliferation (“Today, 185 states have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty forswearing nuclear weapons. Remarkably, only nine countries have nuclear arsenals”), but warn this era could end—especially if Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or major states such as South Korea move toward independent arsenals, according to the authors.
• The “long peace” was created and preserved through Cold War dynamics, the “moderation of ideologies,” economic interdependence, creative diplomacy, and U.S. leadership building institutions like NATO and the Marshall Plan, according to the authors.
• Allison and Winnefeld warn that the peace is threatened by amnesia about the true costs of great-power war, the rise of new competitors like China, “a multipolar world” caused by the erosion of U.S. economic predominance, and domestic political dysfunction and division within the United States.
• They conclude that sustaining peace will require a new “surge of strategic imagination and national determination,” and urge Americans not to take the absence of war for granted: “To sustain the exception that has allowed the world to experience an unprecedented period without a great-power war will require… collective action to prevent—or more accurately, postpone—the next global convulsion."

“Ukraine is teetering. Why return to a failed policy?” Fareed Zakaria, Washington Post, 11.21.25.  

• Zakaria writes, “President Donald Trump has a new Ukraine policy. It’s the same as his old Ukraine policy—force Kyiv to make more concessions and hope that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be satisfied, take the deal and set the stage for Trump to get his Nobel Prize. It hasn’t worked before, and it won’t work now. Worse, it comes at a moment of critical vulnerability for Ukraine.”
• He describes how “Pokrovsk, an industrial and rail hub in Eastern Ukraine, is teetering,” with Russian forces “close to encircling the area, leaving just a 10-kilometer corridor through which Ukraine can supply what remains of its defense,” and noting that “Russian forces in the sector outnumber the Ukrainians 8 to 1.”
• Discussing Russia’s endurance, Zakaria observes, “Russian budget data suggests about 29,000 people signed military contracts per month from January to September…Moscow is losing more troops than it recruits—yet using increasingly lucrative pay packages, it is replacing its losses fast enough to sustain the campaign.”
• He argues, “Ukraine cannot replicate that mercenary strategy. Over 110,000 AWOL cases were registered in the first seven months of this year… Ukraine mobilizes around 30,000 people per month, yet only a third are fit to fight.”
• Zakaria warns, “What is causing or at least massively compounding this crisis is the collapse of external support. The United States has effectively halted direct large-scale military aid…Europe promised to fill the gap. It has fallen short… Ammunition supplies lag behind battlefield needs.”
• “Ukraine remains critically short of the long-range systems required to strike deep into Russian territory—particularly to hit oil infrastructure, the lifeblood of Russia’s war economy,” Zakaria explains. He notes, “Money is also running out. The International Monetary Fund says Ukraine will need at least $65 billion in external financing through 2027, assuming major hostilities end by late 2026—an increasingly unlikely scenario.”
• Zakaria concludes, “Russia's strategy has always been to outlast the West, believing that the U.S. and Europe would tire of this conflict. That belief is being reinforced not by Moscow's victories, but by the West's internal divisions and dysfunctions. Without a course correction, America may soon preside over the first negotiated defeat of a modern democracy at the hands of an aggressive autocracy in the heart of Europe.”

“The surreal 45-day trek at the heart of Nato’s defense,” Laura Pitel, Alice Hancock, Steven Bernard, and Sam Learner, Financial Times, 11.18.25.

• Pitel et al. recount how Europe still struggles with “crumbling bridges, mismatched rail gauges and labyrinthine bureaucracy” as it plans how to move armies eastward—a process that would take “roughly 45 days” under current conditions to bring forces from western ports to the alliance’s eastern flank.
• The authors highlight the urgency: “The aim… is to bring that down to five or even three days,” requiring upgrades to bridges, tunnels, roads, and railways, notably through priority projects like Rail Baltica and a €500 billion German infrastructure plan.
• They note that “military mobility is an essential component of effective security and defense,” but planners must address obstacles such as narrow rail gauges, collapsed bridges, complicated customs rules, and Cold War-era infrastructure.
• General Alexander Sollfrank warns that credibility of NATO’s deterrence “depends on detailed and credible planning” and a system in which “every element must work ‘like a Swiss watch’”—from the speed of political decision-making to logistics on the ground.
• The article concludes that “we have to think the unthinkable,” with military and EU officials pressing forward with harmonized standards, private sector support contracts, and plans for fast cross-border moves—measures they see as essential to countering Russian threats and restoring credible European defense.

“Transcript: Europe’s triple shock—Putin, Trump and Xi,” Gideon Rachman and Timothy Garton Ash, Financial Times, 11.20.25.

• Garton Ash states, “I’m absolutely sure that we are at the beginning of a new era. It begins on the 24th of February 2022 with Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine… The return of full-scale interstate war, now, well into its fourth year in Europe… clearly defines this as a new era.”
• He highlights the war’s origins: “This war has been going on since 2014, we should have said, aha, we know this from history. This is a declining empire which wants to strike back. And we have to do more about it.”
• Reflecting on Western policy, he says, “If we’d had a more decisive response, particularly after 2014, we might not be in this mess,” referencing limited action after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
• Discussing Angela Merkel, Garton Ash remarks, “On all the big issues… Russia becoming dependent on cheap energy and not responding strongly enough to the aggression in 2014, wrong. Becoming too dependent on China, wrong… So that I think history will say that on all the big issues. She actually got it wrong.”
• On Russia’s economic resilience, he observes, “We throw the kitchen sink in sanctions at Russia and the Russian economy, at least until recently, it’s been doing pretty well because they had all these other partners.”
• Garton Ash warns, “Clearly we are going to face a…neo-imperialist, angry authoritarian Russia for many years and probably decades to come. And clearly we can no longer absolutely rely on the United States for our defense.”
• He concludes, “The politics we need are European, but the politics are still national… Can we do what we’ve done in the single market and indeed in the currency and get to a European-scale policy while recognizing that the politics will continue to be national democratic politics?”

“How Russia Is Using Hybrid Warfare in Europe Against Ukraine's Allies,” Kati Pohjanpalo and Jordan Robertson, Bloomberg, 11.19.25.

• Pohjanpalo and Robertson write, “Russia is waging two wars. The first is the live-fire conflict in Ukraine, the second a more covert affair targeting countries that support the government in Kyiv,” using tactics that “range from state-on-state cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda, to more visible tactics such as arson, sabotage and airspace incursions.”
• “This dual strategy, known as hybrid warfare, marries unambiguous brute force with acts of stealth and subterfuge designed to undermine the security and wellbeing of another nation,” the authors note, highlighting a recent explosive attack on a Polish railway line—“probably the most serious act of sabotage in the country since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,” according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
• “Western intelligence officials say Russia has a strategy to systematically undermine elections and influence public opinion in countries that support Ukraine, via social media and paid agents on the ground,” with deepfake videos and cyberattacks targeting political processes in Romania, Moldova, and beyond.
• Pohjanpalo and Robertson write, “Incursions of drones and piloted combat aircraft into North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries have become more common since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,” along with GPS jamming, weaponized migration, and sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region.
• “Several nations, including Russia, China, the U.S. and Iran, engage in cyberwarfare… Russian intelligence orchestrated a comprehensive espionage and hacking campaign in the former Soviet republic of Georgia between 2017 and 2020,” and Russian cyberattacks have repeatedly targeted both Ukrainian and Western critical infrastructure since 2022.

“Europe Had Better Start Winning,” Gabrielius Landsbergis, New York Times, 11.18.25.

• Landsbergis writes, “In this neighborhood, a foreign minister understands the importance of deterrence very well. Building alliances and maintaining partnerships with other democracies is not a matter of preference but of survival. We rely on collective defense… And we know that if that system breaks down, we will be among the first victims of its violent replacement.”
• He argues, “President Trump is changing those rules. As he re-evaluates old relationships and forms new ones, it's becoming clear that nothing succeeds with him quite like success. When longtime allies like Europe and NATO make overtures to him citing precedent, shared history or ideals, those appeals do not resonate. But, as Ukraine has shown, the sheen of a winner does appeal to the president. If Europe wants a better relationship with Mr. Trump, it should start acting like a winner.”
• On Ukraine’s evolving strategy, Landsbergis notes, “Ukraine's army continued to incorporate drones and robotics, made every few yards of the Russian advance on the front line as painful and costly to Russia as possible… and, importantly, it started to take the fight to Russia.”
• He highlights, “At the end of [August], there were reports that Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil refineries had reduced Russian oil production by at least 17%; by October, some reduction estimates were as high as 40%. The strikes put additional strain on an already struggling Russian war economy and brought the war home to ordinary Russians.”
• According to Landsbergis, “Ukraine's bold moves might have had another benefit, too: They helped Mr. Trump warm to Ukraine's cause. After this string of military gains, his tone, when talking about Mr. Putin, started to sound chillier. He was less likely to describe him as 'very savvy' and at one point wrote on social media that he was 'absolutely CRAZY.'”
• Landsbergis notes, “Europe has spent the year announcing plans. There are plans to rearm… and some (notably Germany) [have taken] the first real steps…But the full extent of Europe's cease-fire plan for Ukraine under discussion appears to be to freeze the front line, giving everything east of it to the Russians and making ‘as long as it takes’ sound like a promise made with an asterisk.”
• He concludes, “Europe, instead, should take a leaf from Ukraine's book: by ramping up deterrence to levels that actually deter. That means arming ourselves and showing that we are prepared to fight for our values and our land… By taking action, Europe might find that it can achieve two things: show Mr. Putin that he cannot easily get away with transgressions against Europeans, and remind Mr. Trump why Europe is worth backing.”

“Russia’s shadow war: How the Kremlin uses sabotage to wear down Europe,” Piotr Arak, Atlantic Council, 11.22.25  

• Arak argues that Russia has “expanded the battlefield into the daily life of European societies,” using sabotage—including railway bombings, arson attacks, and drone disruptions at major airports—to wear down Western unity and create a sense of vulnerability “without crossing the threshold that would trigger a formal NATO response.”
• Recent sabotage in Poland on the railway to Ukraine is one example of a broader uptick in low-cost, difficult-to-attribute operations “designed to sow distrust and panic inside Western societies,” often carried out through “a fragmented, semi-outsourced approach” using gig-economy recruitment, cryptocurrency, and encrypted messaging.
• After the expulsion of Russian intelligence officers across Europe, “the Kremlin adapted,” using remote recruitment of locals and migrants for sabotage: this reduces exposure, lowers costs, and “exploits existing local tensions.”
• Arak identifies three Kremlin objectives: (1) the West’s lack of meaningful deterrence encourages escalation; (2) attacks induce “a profound psychological effect” despite little military value; (3) eroding Western support for Ukraine by linking the war to domestic insecurity and fueling anti-Ukrainian narratives.
• He concludes that Europe’s response remains mostly defensive; and urges a “common framework for hybrid deterrence,” joint investigations, faster attribution, and societal resilience—“Russia is waging a long, low-cost pressure campaign… Now is the time for Europe to develop and use countermeasures to deter Russia’s hybrid threats and bolster societal resilience.”

“Europe’s two wars: The danger of the comfort zone,” Nicu Popescu, European Council on Foreign Relations, 11.24.25  

• Nicu Popescu argues that while Europe’s attention is fixed on the kinetic war in Ukraine's “kill zone,” it faces a simultaneous and potentially more destabilizing “second war”—a Russian hybrid campaign targeting the heart of Europe’s “comfort zone.”
• He describes the “kill zone” as the perilous front in Ukraine where neither side achieves dominance and innovation with drones is a Ukrainian lifeline, but warns that “as a kinetic struggle unfolds in the kill zone, a second war is engulfing Europe. This one is hybrid, insidious and often invisible.”
• Popescu cautions that European complacency, such as assuming security based on GDP or defense spending comparisons, ignores the asymmetric nature and historical effectiveness of hybrid warfare: “David did not beat Goliath with superior swords… the Taliban has not spent more on weapons than the U.S. military.”
• Russian hybrid tactics now include sabotage of railways, drone incursions into European and accession-country airspace, financing operations with cryptocurrency, and running major disinformation campaigns, with Popescu noting, “Moscow is aiming for the political destruction of NATO and the EU. By eroding trust between member states, sowing economic instability and undermining democratic institutions, it seeks to fragment European unity.”
• He warns Russia’s ultimate objective is to undermine European solidarity to a degree that, “… key countries veto invoking collective defense clauses such as Article 5 of NATO or Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty. This would, of course, be catastrophic.”
• Popescu urges Europe to prioritize investment in asymmetric defense—drones, cyber defense, rapid-response capabilities—and to “consider hybrid threats as seriously as the kinetic destruction in Ukraine’s ‘kill zone.’”
• He concludes, “Europe’s future depends on it acknowledging the reality: that the war raging in Ukraine is accompanied by a second, more silent, war against its unity and values. This war on Europe will continue and is likely to intensify—especially if Ukraine is forced into losing.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “Risk, Rivalry, and Restraint: Lessons from Jake Sullivan at Dartmouth,” Alexander C. Koch, Der Atlantic Report, 11.19.25.
• “Is This Ukraine’s Turning Point?,” Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer, The Long Game (podcast), 11.22.25.
• “Fiona Hill: 'The U.S. is giving Russia tremendous influence over Europe',” Piotr Smolar, interviews Fiona Hill, Le Monde, 11.23.25. In French.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“BRICS Is Missing Its Chance: United by Trump’s Hostility, but Too Divided to Seize the Moment,” Oliver Stuenkel and Alexander Gabuev, Foreign Affairs, 11.18.25.

• Stuenkel and Gabuev observe that “Moscow… sees advantage in the chaos that the Trump administration has sown,” pushing Russia to strengthen ties with BRICS to “withstand the Western sanctions pressure and to erode U.S. global dominance in finance and technology.”
• Stuenkel and Gabuev note, “Trump’s return to the White House presented Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opening to improve, if not normalize, relations with Washington,” but Moscow remains wary as Trump continues to threaten sanctions and apply pressure.
• According to the authors, for Beijing, the upheaval in the U.S.-led order “presents an opportunity to leverage financial services that are not controlled by the United States, develop tools to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar, and facilitate trade in alternative currencies.”
• Stuenkel and Gabuev argue that despite shared interests, “BRICS is not ready to seize the moment,” with the bloc hamstrung by “internal contradictions, divergent national interests, and a deep mistrust of one another’s geopolitical ambitions,” including debates over de-dollarization and China’s leadership aspirations.
• The authors conclude that while Trump reminds BRICS members why the bloc matters, “expansion has only magnified those challenges,” and divisions ensure BRICS “will continue muddling through… but falling well short of becoming the basis of a new model of global governance.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• Video: “China's leverage over the U.S. and the future of the China-Russia relationship,” Alexander Gabuev, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 11.19.25
• “The New Soft-Power Imbalance: China’s Cautious Response to America’s Retreat,” Maria Repnikova, Foreign Affairs, 11.19.25.  

Missile defense:

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• “How the United States Can Address Its Shortage of Missile Interceptors,” Ankit Panda, Mackenzie Eaglen, and Tom Karako, War on the Rocks, 11.19.25. 

Nuclear arms:

“Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests,” Zuzanna Gwadera, IISS, 11.20.25  

• Gwadera reports that Russia conducted successful tests of two “novel nuclear-weapons delivery vehicles”—the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle—in October 2025, demonstrating progress just months before New START is set to expire.
• “On Oct. 21, 2025, Russia conducted a successful test flight of the Burevestnik (RS-SSC-X-09 Skyfall)… the missile flew for about 15 hours using its nuclear-powered engine to a distance of 14,000 kilometers… performed ‘all specified vertical and horizontal maneuvers’ that would evade air defenses,” according to Russian officials.
• Poseidon was launched from a submarine and “transitioned to nuclear propulsion”; it is capable of “reaching depths of up to 1,000 m and speeds of up to 185 km/h,” can carry nuclear or conventional warheads, and will be deployed on the Khabarovsk submarine, which can reportedly carry six Poseidons.
• Gwadera writes, “Burevestnik’s stealth and range, as well as Poseidon’s operational depth, are design features intended to help overcome or completely avoid traditional defenses… However, these developments, and any corresponding countermeasures, will invite reciprocal responses and thus accelerate both arms-race and crisis-stability.”
• New START does not cover Burevestnik and Poseidon; Russia’s Deputy FM Ryabkov dismissed including them as “purely theoretical,” and Putin announced further ambitions for new nuclear-powered missiles capable of hypersonic speeds, emphasizing Russia’s continued drive for advanced missile capabilities.

“Putin’s Nuclear Offer: How to Navigate a New START Extension,” John Drennan and Erin D. Dumbacher, Council on Foreign Relations, 11.19.25  

• Drennan and Dumbacher warn, “The United States should not fall for Putin’s gambit to undercut Ukraine. Before agreeing to an extension, it must secure greater verification guarantees and a commitment to further negotiations.”
• Putin has proposed a one-year extension of New START, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, as it will otherwise expire in February 2026; Trump has said an extension “sounds like a good idea,” but the White House “does not appear to have a clarified position yet.”
• The authors argue that “accepting Putin’s offer of a bonus year of New START is only worthwhile if it provides an avenue for deeper, ongoing dialogue that could result in a timelier and more appropriate standard for both U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.”
• They argue the U.S. should insist on “a partial return to New START’s verification regime, and to reaffirm the treaty’s non-interference commitment,” and that “any Russian offers have to be met with skepticism,” especially if the Kremlin tries to “link bilateral nuclear arms control to U.S. and European support for Ukraine.”
• Drennan and Dumbacher conclude, “While a continuation of New START could inject some stability into the bilateral relationship, the United States should not trade Ukraine’s independence for unverified Russian promises about its nuclear weapons. 

“Don't Look Away From the Bomb,” Spencer Cohen, New York Times, 11.21.25.

• Cohen writes, “President Vladimir Putin of Russia has the dangerous habit of threatening the rest of the world with nuclear war when he isn't getting the geopolitical respect he thinks he deserves. This keeps happening as he drags on the war in Ukraine.”
• He notes, “The threats began as soon as the invasion started. It was Feb. 24, 2022, and Mr. Putin sent his troops into Ukraine, warning the West that a response would face consequences ‘such as you have never seen in your entire history’—an opaque nuclear threat.”
• Cohen warns, “His repeated nuclear blackmail over the coming days, months and now years has helped raise the risk of nuclear war to the highest in decades. If he acted, even if he lobbed a single tactical warhead into Ukraine, the effects would be catastrophic: Tens of thousands of people, if not far more, would die. The global economy could tank. And the nuclear taboo, which has held tenuously since 1945, would end.”
• He observes that “Ever since the end of the Cold War, filmmakers in Hollywood have mostly averted their gaze from the gruesome reality of nuclear devastation… our task and perhaps our only hope to not destroy ourselves is ‘imagining the real’—that is, to confront the grotesque reality of nuclear death head on.”
• Cohen asserts, “Just last month, President Trump confusingly called for a restart in nuclear testing to match that of China and Russia. The only problem? Neither country explosively tests nuclear weapons, nor have they for three decades, same as the United States.”
• On nuclear war’s portrayal, he writes, “The real-life effects of the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have mostly remained undepicted in American film… [but] efforts to depict the aftermath of those American bombs… have at times triggered criticism that doing so is somehow unpatriotic.”
• He concludes, “That confrontation with reality is what we need to prevent the past from turning into our future.”

“‘The fact that the dialogue has stalled does not mean it has stopped:’ Russian Ambassador to Washington Alexander Darchiev on the prospects for relations with the U.S.,” Kommersant, 11.19.25.

• With regards to nuclear tests Darchiev says, “The situation is paradoxical. The American administration has not yet provided official explanations… whether President Trump meant real nuclear tests with the detonation of a nuclear warhead—which would finally bury the already greatly eroded arms control regime—or tests of new delivery systems.”
• He notes, “This fogging over such a crucial issue of international security and strategic stability does not contribute to mutual trust and makes one doubt the responsible approach of the American side.”
• According to Darchiev, in the U.S., “the potential resumption of nuclear testing is sharply criticized not only by Trump’s political opponents but also within the professional community: experts warn of the serious negative consequences of such a step.”
• He adds, “Claims that Russia and China are supposedly testing nuclear weapons, and therefore America must keep up, are unsubstantiated.”
• Darchiev maintains, “Such maneuvers by the current administration are motivated by the desire to ensure U.S. military superiority. In Moscow, however, they are taken calmly in light of the breakthrough and unparalleled new weaponry created in recent years, reliably ensuring our country’s security.”
• On dialogue, he affirms, “We have never refused honest and equal dialogue on this vitally important area, provided strict observance of Russian national interests.”
• Darchiev reflects, “The significance of the first personal meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump after Trump’s return to the White House lies in the fact that both leaders talked as equals, trying to identify points of convergence in interests. The fact that dialogue then stalled does not mean it stopped. Contacts continue at various levels, requiring patience and perseverance.”
• On Ukraine, Darchiev points to an enduring obstacle in relations: “The State Department categorically refuses to talk about the return of six de facto confiscated Russian diplomatic properties, linking the start of any serious conversation on this topic to a settlement in Ukraine that suits the U.S.,” and he notes that “the American side responds to proposals to resume direct air service, suspended since the start of the special military operation, in much the same way.”
• He concludes that, despite setbacks and ongoing ‘irritants’ in the relationship—including visa restrictions, sanctions, and the impasse over Ukraine—“the main thing is not sidelined: both sides must persistently work toward restoring a sense of normalcy in their agenda—including on arms control and strategic questions.”

“Nuclear testing: unwise, unnecessary and unwelcome,” Julia Berghofer, European Leadership Network, 11.20.25.  

• Berghofer warns that the renewed debate over nuclear testing introduces “a new level of brinkmanship” and risks weaponizing the testing moratorium in great-power competition. She calls nuclear testing “unwise, unnecessary and unwelcome.”
• “Since 2019, radical voices have been calling for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing to strengthen deterrence,” with think tanks and officials on the Trump team advocating abandoning the CTBT moratorium, despite its risks for international security.
• U.S. concerns about Russian and Chinese adherence to the ‘zero-yield’ nuclear test standard are regularly cited, but Berghofer notes that “hydronuclear tests are relatively unimportant—especially for advanced nuclear states,” and provide no clear strategic benefit to the U.S..
• She argues the CTBT and testing moratorium benefit U.S. and global security, limiting China’s ability to modernize its arsenal and preventing proliferation risk: “If such norms were to erode… the U.S. has nothing to gain from an increasing number of nuclear weapons possessors worldwide.”
• Berghofer urges European states, especially the UK and France, to speak clearly against nuclear testing, warning: “Trump has paved the way for a highly detrimental development, and Russia will certainly not hesitate to further escalate the situation. The international community must speak out about the dramatic consequences of a possible collapse of the testing moratorium.”

“America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear: Selective Proliferation Will Strengthen the Global Order, Not End It,” Moritz S. Graefrath and Mark A. Raymond, Foreign Affairs, 11.19.25.

• Graefrath and Raymond argue that “Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine” and the looming expiration of New START have revived anxieties about “the abiding destructive potential of nuclear weapons and reanimated fears of their use.”
• The authors note, “Encouraging Germany to develop its own nuclear weapons would finally create the kind of self-sufficient Europe that enables an American exit,” stating that only a German deterrent could deter Russia and allow the United States to shift its focus elsewhere.
• They suggest that current Russian “favorable conditions for revisionism” are a direct consequence of “gaps that have led Russia to see more favorable conditions for revisionism and that could lead China to make a similar calculation.”
• The article maintains that proliferation among responsible, allied states “would help prevent further erosion of the rules, norms, and institutions of the post-1945 order, including the norm against conquest”—specifically constraining Russian threats to European and global security.
• Graefrath and Raymond conclude, “Selective proliferation sacrifices some U.S. influence, but only in exchange for the objective it was designed to achieve in the first place”—namely, denying Russia and China opportunities to coerce or dominate their neighbors.

“State Department deleted records about risk of inadvertent nuclear war,” Nate Jones, Washington Post, 11.14.25.

• Jones reveals that in January 2025, the State Department deleted 15 pages from a Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) digital volume—specifically records concerning the 1983 Able Archer scare, which brought the U.S. and Soviet Union close to nuclear conflict.
• The excised records documented how “Able Archer 83 resembled an actual nuclear attack so closely that parts of the Soviet military made preparations for nuclear war,” and included warnings from the Defense Intelligence Agency that the exercise “brought the United States closer to nuclear war than most realized.”
• Removal of the pages followed Freedom of Information Act litigation by the author and others, but in contrast to legal norms of academic transparency, the State Department declined to provide public explanation and amended other historical footnotes to obscure what was missing.
• Jones underscores that the removals are “unprecedented,” quoting former Historical Advisory Committee chair Richard Immerman: “the quiet alteration of histories would call into question the integrity of the volumes” and raise doubts about whether they are “thorough, reliable and accurate.”
• The article situates the episode in a political context: in April 2025, the Historical Advisory Committee overseeing FRUS was abruptly dismissed by the Trump administration, hampering oversight and increasing fears that “future censorship of Foreign Relations volumes” is more likely.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare: And America's Defenses Aren't Ready,” James P. Rubin and Darjan Vujica, Foreign Affairs, 11.19.25.

• Rubin and Vujica note that “Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine” and the spread of AI-enabled deepfakes and fake personas have “reanimated fears” about information warfare and the destabilization of Western democracies.
• The authors argue, “Disinformation is not a new problem, but the introduction of AI has made it significantly easier for malicious actors to develop increasingly effective influence operations and to do so cheaply and at scale,” with Russia and China pioneering state-backed campaigns.
• They highlight that “the rise of AI has opened the competition to a much wider array of combatants,” moving information warfare from the era of “state-controlled media outlets… and swarms of bots” to one of “hyperpersonalized, relentlessly adaptive, and cheap” AI-driven influence.
• Rubin and Vujica point out that “AI-powered disinformation can not only threaten but also invalidate the fundamental processes of democracy,” citing as an example a Russian-linked operation that manipulated Romania’s 2024 presidential election with deepfakes and AI-generated bot campaigns.
• They warn that after some progress under Biden, “the second Trump administration has cut or severely weakened the government offices responsible for identifying and countering foreign malign influence and disinformation campaigns”—including the Global Engagement Center—leaving the U.S. “woefully unprepared to handle AI-powered attacks” by Russia and other adversaries.

“AI Journey international conference,” Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 11.19.25.

• Putin emphasized Russia’s need for “complete range of its own generative artificial intelligence technologies and products,” declaring, “We cannot allow critical dependence on foreign systems. For Russia, this is a question of state, technological, and, one could say, value sovereignty.”
• He stressed, “National language models…must be trained and fully overseen by Russian specialists at every stage,” and called for a national plan integrating generative AI “across industries and regions of the country.”
• Putin revealed that by 2030, Russia aims for AI to contribute over 11 trillion rubles to GDP, tasking the Government and regions to “formulate a national plan for the implementation of generative artificial intelligence.”
• He highlighted, “Products developed on the basis of this plan must be integrated across all key industries by 2030,” and ordered that “the pace of introducing these technologies in the regions should become a key indicator in the annual digital transformation ranking.”
• Putin warned against excessive regulation: “Attempts to impose overly strict regulation on artificial intelligence have slowed down the development of new products and ideas…. we must not follow this path and repeat other countries’ mistakes.”
• He asserted, “We must ensure the stability and independence of the national digital infrastructure…to guarantee data sovereignty, so that user information remains within the borders of Russia,” including a program for building data centers powered by both traditional and nuclear energy.
• Putin concluded by linking AI to education and values, insisting, “We must make significant efforts, including the creation of national platforms based on our own foundation, our own intellectual framework, our traditional values, our history, and so on… It is our traditional values that answer those questions… I say that without any irony.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“The Impact of U.S. Sanctions and Tariffs on India’s Russian Oil Imports,” Vrinda Sahai, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.20.25.

• Sahai writes, “After a steady rise for nearly three years, India’s imports of Russian crude oil declined significantly in November 2025. This followed sanctions by the United States on Russian energy companies and the imposition of substantial reciprocal tariffs on India, including duties on Russian oil purchases.”
• She notes, “On Aug. 27, 2025, the U.S. imposed a 25% duty on India’s Russian oil purchases on top of the 25% reciprocal tariffs… Sanctions on Russian companies Rosneft, Lukoil, and their subsidiaries were announced on Oct. 22, taking effect on Nov. 21, 2025.”
• The market response included “an 8% increase in global Brent crude oil prices,” raising India’s annual oil import expenditure by $6–7 billion and increasing operational costs for Indian refiners.
• Sahai explains, “Indian refineries are likely to reduce reliance on discounted Russian oil” and are shifting orders toward suppliers in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United States, part of a “balancing act” between their economic and diplomatic interests.
• She concludes, “New Delhi is following an economy-first approach, where entirely weaning off Russian oil will not be pragmatic. However, for Washington, the decline in Indian imports of Russian oil is a critical checkpoint to further bilateral trade talks.”

“America’s Toothless Sanctions on Russian Oil: As Long as Beijing Keeps Buying, Moscow Won’t Feel the Pain,” Erica Downs and Richard Nephew, Foreign Affairs, 11.24.25.  

• Downs and Nephew argue that new Trump administration sanctions on Russian oil will “do little to push China into significantly reducing its purchases,” because “China bought almost half the oil Russia exported in 2024, evading Washington’s existing restrictions in the process.”
• The authors write that the U.S. “does have the power to change Beijing’s calculus” by threatening access to the U.S. financial system but note that both the Trump and Biden administrations have so far put other priorities—such as trade and rare-earth minerals—ahead of pressuring China to reduce Russian oil imports.
• Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has refused to commit to reducing Russian energy imports, asking, “If China does not import oil and gas from Russia, how could it meet its demands and ensure the need of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people?”
• The authors contend that U.S. sanctions enforcement has targeted only minor players—“mosquitoes”—and suggest the U.S. should “prioritize sanctioning Chinese financial institutions that do business, however indirectly, with Rosneft and Lukoil” to increase pressure on Beijing.
• Downs and Nephew conclude that unless Washington “gets serious about enforcement”—even if it risks upsetting financial ties or the broader U.S.-China relationship—“China will continue to downplay the significance of U.S. threats—both when it comes to Russia and in general.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Russia’s economic slowdown bites harder,” Alexandra Prokopenko and Aleander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.22.25.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Where Does The Road Paved with Tax Maneuvers Lead? Increasing the tax burden in 2025 will not save the budget from a record deficit of 3% of GDP. Will it help in 2026?” Re:Russia, 11.14.25.

• Re:Russia reports that despite government efforts to cut spending in October 2025, “the accumulated deficit for the first 10 months increased to 4.3 trillion rubles (1.9% of GDP),” as both oil/gas and non-oil/gas revenues underperformed amid a sharp economic slowdown.
• Non-oil and gas revenues in 2025, even with “a substantial increase in the fiscal burden, will exceed last year’s figure by roughly 10% or slightly more,” but much of this simply “reflect[s] general price rises in the economy,” not true revenue growth.
• By October, oil and gas receipts were “21% lower than in 2024,” and with new U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil triggering a sharp drop in Indian and Chinese purchases, “the double blow of lower volumes and deeper discounts could reduce receipts by 25% in total.”
• “Discounts on Urals relative to Brent have nearly doubled, from $11–12 to $19–20,” with Urals recently dropping to $50.3 per barrel, 26% below the forecast in the latest 2025 budget—a level “almost guaranteed” to worsen the deficit further.
• “Given that revenues for the ten-month period cover only 88% of actual spending,” the Ministry of Finance would need to cut end-of-year spending by 18% compared to late 2024 to stay within the plan—a move the report calls “practically impossible,” foreshadowing a deficit “beyond 3% of GDP.”
• New tax increases for 2026 are intended to raise an additional 1.4 trillion rubles, but “even this result is far from guaranteed” as experts warn higher VAT could “reduce demand, sales volumes, and ultimately tax collection.”
• With “the current fiscal frenzy” of inventing ever more quasi-tax exactions, economists warn that this approach “can provide only a short-term boost to revenues, followed by long-lasting negative consequences,” especially as the economy faces “stagnation or recession.”
• The article concludes that Russia risks falling into a “vicious circle of chronic public-finance deficits and chronic private-sector stagnation,” as rising fiscal pressure, sanctions, and economic slowdown combine to undermine future growth and stability.

“How Sergey Kirienko Is Battling the Siloviki,” Olga Churakova and Roman Anin, iStories, 11.19.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Churakova and Anin argue that Kiriyenko, Putin’s longtime domestic policy chief, “is not in control of the situation with ‘foreign agents,’” as the Justice Ministry acts autonomously and the designation has spiraled far beyond targeting the opposition—now ensnaring pro-government figures and business leaders.
• According to sources, “since the start of the full-scale war, the number of arrests of officials has grown almost threefold,” including people from Kiriyenko’s own inner circle, with the siloviki “act[ing] autonomously”—often without even notifying the Presidential Administration.
• Kiriyenko’s “Time of Heroes” program, meant to elevate war participants into government, has stumbled: “You can’t deploy former combatants like that, they’re completely unsystematic, only a handful are capable of adequate work in the public sector,” admits a senior Duma official, with far fewer than planned making the cut.
• Amid rumors of Kadyrov’s poor health, Churakova and Anin describe Kiriyenko as “not strong enough” to install his own candidate as Chechnya’s next leader, facing rivalry with the FSB and other “clan leaders” jockeying for influence as succession and resources become more contested.
• The article concludes that in Russia’s corridors of power, “decision-making has become far less institutionalized,” with one Kremlin source declaring, “we’re reaching a point where there are no rules… no one is protected and no amount of proper behavior or good connections guarantees anything. For anyone. Absolutely anyone.”

  “The Deathonomics of Putin’s War,” Alexey Kovalev, Foreign Policy, 11.17.25. Clues from Russian Views

• Kovalev describes the rise of so-called “black widows”—women who quickly marry expendable Russian soldiers to claim substantial state death benefits—a phenomenon that “cannot be understood outside Russia’s wartime economic transformation.”
• He notes that “in today’s Russia… an individual soldier’s death [has] turned into an attractive source of wealth and advancement,” with government payouts as high as “13 million rubles (around $160,000),” life-changing sums in impoverished regions.
• According to Kovalev, this “macabre marketplace” is the result of “a system that has weaponized poverty,” in which “military death benefits” serve as “insurance against regional economic extinction” and incentivize both arranged marriages and criminal fraud.
• Kovalev observes that “the Kremlin’s demonstrated indifference to deep poverty and demographic collapse” has created “a new middle class of Russians whose prosperity is fully dependent on perpetual war,” including families of the dead, local businesses, and criminal networks.
• He concludes, “the black widows phenomenon reveals a state-engineered moral catastrophe: Russia’s entire periphery has been deliberately impoverished—and then offered a single path to survival, the commodification of death,” exposing the systemic rot at the heart of Putin’s war economy.

Defense and aerospace:

• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

“In His Tightest Corner Yet, Will Zelenskyy Rise to the Occasion?” Cassandra Vinograd, Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 11.23.25

• Vinograd and Kramer report that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy faces intense pressure after the Trump administration delivered a U.S. peace proposal that many Ukrainians and Western allies see as overly favorable to Russia, requiring Ukraine to make major concessions or risk losing U.S. support.
• The 28-point plan, coupled with recent Ukrainian battlefield losses and a domestic corruption scandal implicating Zelenskyy’s associates, has put Zelenskyy’s government in its most precarious position since the 2022 Russian invasion.
• Despite these challenges, the peace proposal has inadvertently shifted public focus away from the corruption scandal, allowing Zelenskyy to rally support at home and abroad by framing the moment as an existential threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and dignity.
• Zelenskyy has responded by securing joint statements of support from the EU, Britain, Canada, and Japan, who have all demanded revisions to the U.S. plan and argued it would leave Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian aggression.
• The article notes Zelenskyy’s reputation for political resilience, stressing how he has previously leveraged crises to unite the nation, boost faltering Western aid, and frame himself as Ukraine’s only credible wartime leader.
• Analysts caution, however, that Zelenskyy’s future depends not only on navigating the U.S.-driven negotiations with Trump but also on addressing mounting public anger over corruption and government accountability.

“Zelenskyy Must Restore Trust Amid Ukraine’s Corruption Scandal,” Oleg Sukhov, Carnegie Politika, 11.20.25  

• Sukhov writes that Ukraine’s largest wartime corruption scandal has “undermined the Zelenskyy administration’s approval rating and legitimacy just as Ukraine faces accelerating Russian advances on the front line.”
• The scandal involves major figures from Zelenskyy’s inner circle, including Timur Mindich and former Deputy PM Oleksiy Chernyshov; efforts by Zelenskyy to “end the independence of NABU and SAPO… triggered the first large-scale protests since the full-scale invasion.”
• Public and Western backlash forced the government to reverse its position and restore the anti-corruption agencies’ independence, demonstrating that “Ukraine’s pluralist political culture has survived the wartime concentration of power in Zelenskyy’s hands.”
• Attempts by the SBU—the security service loyal to Zelenskyy—to undermine anti-corruption investigators continue, with critics warning this is “a classic case of shooting the messenger,” and any further crackdown could worsen Ukraine’s legitimacy crisis.
• Sukhov concludes, “Without such necessary decisions, Ukraine’s stability and its very survival may be jeopardized”; suggested remedies include firing key controversial advisers and officials, empowering anti-corruption agencies, or even forming a national unity government that includes respected opposition figures.

“Zelenskyy Under Siege as Corruption Case Shatters Ukraine’s Wartime Unity,” Andrew E. Kramer, New York Times, 11.19.25. 

• Kramer reports a “sprawling investigation into a multimillion-dollar kickback scheme” has implicated close associates of Zelenskyy, “jolting the country’s politics back to life and weakening the Ukrainian president at home as pressure on the battlefield intensifies.”
• He observes that “opponents who had lain low are coalescing into the first major anti-Zelenskyy movement since the invasion began,” including anti-corruption agencies, opposition parties, activists, and media, accusing Zelenskyy’s wartime cabinet of being “unprofessional and corrupt.”
• Kramer notes Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau alleges Zelenskyy’s former business partner, Timur Mindich, “organized the scheme, in which at least $100 million was stolen… through kickbacks to contractors,” while the episode has fueled outrage as Ukrainians endure “hourslong electrical blackouts after recent Russian missile and drone attacks.”
• Zelenskyy has responded by asking for the resignation of two ministers and announcing reforms, but critics and opposition politicians call these “not enough to convince Ukrainian society that something really changed, not something cosmetically.”
• The scandal threatens Zelenskyy’s already fragile parliamentary majority and risks “returning to a norm… of presidents deadlocked with an opposition-controlled chamber,” with analysts warning internal divisions “could be exploited by Russia” as the war continues.

“A huge corruption scandal threatens Ukraine’s government,” The Economist, Nov 17, 2025. 

• The Economist reports that a “huge corruption scandal is turning into Ukraine’s biggest crisis since Russian tanks bore down on Kyiv in early 2022,” with President Zelenskyy “floored” by the scale of the charges against close associates and pressured to “purge his most controversial lieutenants in order to save himself and the state.”
• Investigators, using secret recordings, uncovered a scheme to embezzle at least $100m from Energoatom; “detectives found a golden toilet bowl in an apartment belonging to Timur Mindich, a former business partner and close associate of the president,” who fled Ukraine hours before being detained.
• The probe, led by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, faced official pushback: “the president’s office began to put pressure on the anti-corruption bodies,” and Zelenskyy’s party rushed through a bill curbing their independence—a move reversed only after “huge public protests.”
• The article notes the scandal’s double blow: at home, “risk[s] encouraging cynicism and leading more soldiers to desert” with stretched front lines, while abroad it “makes it harder for Ukraine to ask for the aid it needs to keep going,” with European allies expressing “concern about the political fallout.”
• The Economist concludes the crisis “probably cannot be contained without a broad and politically painful reset”; with five arrests so far and calls for a government shakeup, the fate of Zelenskyy’s administration may hinge on how the next phase of the investigation unfolds.

“This threat from within Ukraine is as dangerous as Russian missiles,” Andi Hoxhaj, Washington Post, 11.19.25.

• Hoxhaj writes that “a $100 million corruption scandal at Energoatom… has exposed deep structural weaknesses within Ukraine’s government and institutions,” with kickbacks for contracts allegedly linked to advisers of ex-ministers and figures close to President Zelenskyy.
• He warns, “While Russia targets Ukrainian energy infrastructure, unscrupulous actors are siphoning off funds meant to reinforce the very sector under missile fire. In wartime, corruption is not just a failure of governance; it poses a strategic threat.”
• The author stresses, “Misallocated resources compromise critical infrastructure, demoralize soldiers and civilians, and weaken Ukraine’s credibility as it seeks to maintain international support,” putting at risk Western aid and EU membership prospects.
• Hoxhaj notes the urgency: “Ukraine has robust anti-corruption laws and institutions, but the fight against graft is weakened by constant political interference,” with attempts to curtail agency independence sparking the largest protests since the war began.
• He cautions that Western partners, especially “the Trump administration and U.S. lawmakers skeptical of providing further aid,” may see the Energoatom case as “proof that Ukraine cannot responsibly manage wartime resources”—while Hungary and other EU members see it as evidence Kyiv isn’t ready for the bloc.
• The columnist argues, “The Energoatom scandal should be a pivotal moment,” exposing “deep institutional weaknesses: opaque procurement practices, politicized oversight of state-owned enterprises and inadequate protections and independence for investigators.”
• Hoxhaj calls for reforms including “public disclosure of major contracts, competitive bids as the default, and clear visibility into subcontracting chains,” as well as “judicial capacity… strengthened, particularly through expansion of the High Anti-Corruption Court.”
• He concludes, “Ukraine cannot fight a war on two fronts. Defeating Russia will require not only courage on the battlefield but also a relentless fight against corruption and a firm commitment to the rule of law at home,” warning that “corruption is as dangerous as Russian missiles.”

“Europe Is Selling Ukraine a Pipe Dream,” Paul Hockenos, Foreign Policy, 11.18.25.

• Hockenos observes that the “corruption scandal engulfing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government” has overshadowed the EU’s recent praise for Ukraine’s accession progress, highlighting just how much “further to go” Kyiv has than EU reports let on.
• While the EU gave Ukraine high marks and “lauded Ukraine for advancing key reforms,” Hockenos notes that the commission’s “praise grew thinner when it came to the rule of law, public administration reform, and democratic institutions,” warning that “recent negative trends… must be decisively reversed.”
• Despite official optimism, he underscores that “the prospect of full EU membership is wishful thinking” so long as Ukraine is at war, with parts of its territory occupied by Russia and major challenges remaining—not just reforms but the fundamental need to “push Russia back beyond its borders.”
• Across Europe, enthusiasm for enlargement is low, with France, Hungary, Slovakia, and even many Polish citizens skeptical of Ukraine’s membership, and the current EU “hasn’t inducted a new member since 2014,” making promised timelines seem increasingly unrealistic.
• Hockenos concludes that Europe’s promises look “particularly thin in light of its inability even to guarantee Ukraine’s financing for 2026 and beyond,” arguing that unless the reality of war, finances, and public skepticism is addressed, “selling Ukraine a pipe dream” risks breeding frustration and political backlash both inside Ukraine and across the EU.

“A Shadow War in the Global South: Are Kyiv’s Operations in Africa Paying Off?” Sam Bowden, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11.20.25.

• Bowden writes, “Ukraine has conducted intelligence operations versus Russian military contractors and other regime-related targets across Africa and the Middle East… demonstrated the remarkable agility and boldness of Kyiv’s intelligence services in attacking vulnerable parts of the Kremlin’s sprawling security apparatus.”
• He notes a dilemma: “Unfortunately, these operational successes contrast starkly with the ongoing struggles of other parts of the Ukrainian government responsible for public diplomacy campaigns and the development of economic initiatives…Such well-intentioned initiatives have thus far proved unsuccessful at countering Russia’s decades-long diplomatic engagement on the continent.”
• Bowden observes, “The value of Ukraine’s targeting of Russian interests in Africa lies primarily in the realm of public relations, not tactical utility. But the persistence of such attacks suggests that Kyiv will continue to look for ways to punish Russia beyond the front line, even in the event that the war eventually ends or a durable ceasefire takes hold.”
• He warns, “Ukrainian covert action against Russian PMCs often is tantamount to Kyiv inserting itself into African conflicts with little care for regional dynamics or complexities…this scenario is risky for Kyiv, as it has the potential to make Ukraine appear to be just another foreign power capitalizing on African instability, and raises the possibility of an open-ended shadow war.”
• Diplomatically, Bowden underscores, “Russia’s state-backed propaganda apparatus amplifies pro-Kremlin narratives and disinformation across the entire continent,” whereas Ukraine’s efforts “focus on emphasizing the threat Russia poses to African partners…[but] the success of Ukrainian outreach to Africa has been limited at best.”
• He concludes, “Ukraine should not… let that impulse to oppose Russia overwhelm its ability to engage in authentic relationship-building with African nations…Otherwise, it risks failing to achieve its goals in Africa both as a partner to other nations and as a disruptor of Russian interests.”
• Bowden cautions, “Freewheeling score-settling and targeting of Moscow’s security personnel across the continent is unlikely to provide a comparable payoff” to a more diplomatic, partnership-focused approach.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“I was in solitary for 5 years. The world I'm reentering is sobering.” Sergey Tihanovski, Washington Post, 11.21.25

• Tihanovski recounts that “If not for President Donald Trump’s unorthodox diplomacy, I would not be writing these words. An unexpected June meeting in Minsk between Lukashenko and Gen. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, led to my release after almost five years in solitary confinement.”
• He reflects on Ukraine, writing, “In Europe, the Biden administration's management of the war in Ukraine has been hesitant and reactive. Aid came too little, too late; weapons were drip-fed, and Ukraine was repeatedly told not to hit targets inside Russia. The result is a war of attrition that Ukraine cannot win on the battlefield—but could still win diplomatically.”
• Tihanovski urges, “Winning that peace demands creative statecraft and a clear strategy. The United States must rediscover the mix of deterrence and engagement that once defined successful American leadership. It would be fair for Europe to shoulder more responsibility for its eastern frontier, especially while the U.S. is overstretched elsewhere. But without American leadership, Europe still struggles to act with unity or resolve.”
• He observes, “For too long, the West has treated Belarus as a gray buffer between Russia and NATO—a small country of limited consequence. That complacency has been one of the Kremlin's greatest strategic gifts… Imagine for a moment that, in 2020, when the Belarusian people flooded the streets demanding change, the West had been prepared—with a coherent strategy, resources and the will to act. Had Belarus not been abandoned to Lukashenko's repression, Putin would have faced a political awakening on his own border—one that could have reshaped the balance of power in Eastern Europe before the first Russian tank rolled into Ukraine.”
• Advocating for a new approach, Tihanovski writes, “First, we must adjust the goals. They have to be realistic… Cold War-era Finland offers a model. Finland managed to maintain freedom under pressure and reach one of the world's highest living standards. Its neutrality was not appeasement; it was containment by other means. A neutral Belarus—free, sovereign and nonaligned—could serve everyone's interests.”
• He continues, “Second, we must reinvent the opposition. It must learn to think in terms of power, not victimhood. Lukashenko is not immortal. Power in Belarus will shift—perhaps soon, perhaps unexpectedly. When it does, the direction of that change will depend on who is ready to act first.”
• Tihanovski concludes, “The window of opportunity will open again, as history always does. When it does, the U.S. must be ready to lead, to seize the chance to turn Belarus from a gray buffer into a stabilizing bridge on Europe's frontier. The cost of hesitation would be measured not only in lost influence, but in the further unraveling of the order America once built.”

Footnotes

1. According to Axios, the 28-point Ukraine proposal emerged from an improvised backchannel effort conceived by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff on an Oct. 22 flight from the Middle East, where Kushner—fresh off his self-styled Gaza diplomacy—tried to replicate his earlier “draft-a-deal-and-force-momentum” approach. Within days, they met sanctioned Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev in Miami and, drawing on supposed “understandings” from the Trump-Putin Alaska summit, produced the initial draft that Trump quickly blessed—despite Kushner’s lack of Ukraine experience and his checkered record of overconfident deal-making in Palestine. The plan then accelerated into a formal proposal only after Kushner, Witkoff, and Army Secretary Dan Driscoll briefed Ukrainian officials, triggering global shock once its sweeping concessions and rushed rollout became public.
2. While Mr. Trump has said he wants Ukraine’s response to the peace plan by Thursday, he has left open the possibility that the deadline could be extended “if things are working well,” NYT reported on 11.23.25.

3. Full texts of the purported peace plan drafts, as presented to Ukrainian side, can be accessed here (Axios). Full text of the European counterproposal can be accessed here (Reuters). Full Text Of The U.S. Draft Proposal For A Ukraine Security Guarantee,  as reported by Barak Ravid of Axios is available at this link. Joint statement on U.S.-Ukraine meeting is available here. Full text of Leaders’ statement on Ukraine, European Council, 11.22.25 is available here.

4. Meghan O’Sullivan also featured in the following item: “Trump Offers a Ukraine Peace Plan the Kremlin Can Love," David E. Sanger” The New York Times, 11.22.25. “It’s easy to forget that Europeans are now invested in the largest military in Europe—Ukraine’s,” said Meghan O’Sullivan, a Harvard professor who served in the Bush administration. “They are the most battle tested, the more technologically adept. And this proposal jeopardizes all that.”
5. This is an evolving draft. Suggestions welcomed.
6. According to a 11.20.25 Axios article, it would be a “security assurance modeled on the principles of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, adapted to the circumstances of this conflict and the interests of the United States and its European partners,” in what one U.S. official described as a “big win” for Zelenskyy. Also, the full text of so-called “Ukraine security assurance framework,” which is reportedly packaged with the U.S. proposal, states “This Framework establishes the conditions for an armistice between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and provides a security assurance modeled on the principles of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”According to the Wall Street Journal, however, in addition to the 28-point plan, a separate draft U.S. document, which lays out security guarantees, doesn’t commit the U.S. to provide direct military assistance.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Photo credit: Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP.