Russia Analytical Report, April 21-28, 2025

5 Ideas to Explore

  1. Following criticism of the Kremlin from Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin announced a May 8–May 11 ceasefire by his armed forces, which have been making incremental land gains in Ukraine. “Any military operations will be ceased during this period” by the Russian side, Putin declared April 28.  However, speaking after Putin, Trump’s press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the Russian leader’s initiative was not enough. “He wants to see a permanent ceasefire,” she said of Trump, adding that he “remains optimistic he can strike a deal.” Putin made his proposal one day after Trump had a one-on-one meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of Pope Francis’s funeral ceremony, The Hill reminds us. Following that meeting in the Vatican, Trump wrote on Truth Social: “There was no reason for Putin to be shooting missiles into civilian areas, cities and towns, over the last few days. It makes me think that maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along, and has to be dealt with differently, through ‘Banking’ or ‘Secondary Sanctions?’ Too many people are dying!!!” Prior to threatening Putin with sticks, Trump offered him some carrots earlier this month, such as recognition from the U.S. that “Crimea went to the Russians,”1 and his view that Ukraine will never be able to join NATO. This month has seen members of the Trump team warn that Russia and Ukraine need to make progress toward peace in “days” or the U.S. may stop trying to mediate a deal. However, while issuing such warnings, they have avoided setting any firm deadline of the kind that Trump set himself when running for presidency (24 hours) or his Ukraine conflict envoy Keith Kellog did during the first month of Trump’s second presidential term (100 days). Such reluctance indicates the White House’s continued willingness to keep shifting deadlines in hopes of attaining a deal.2 For instance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on April 18 the U.S. will walk away from efforts to broker a Russia-Ukraine peace deal unless there are clear signs of progress “in a matter of days,” according to WP. Then Trump himself wrote on Truth Social on April 20, 2025, that he hoped Russia and Ukraine would “make a deal” that week. More recently, Rubio said on April 27 that it is this week that will be "very critical" for the talks, while Trump said on the same day that he wants a deal to end the Russia-Ukraine war in "two weeks or less.”*
  2. On the diplomatic front, Putin is saying Russia is ready to hold direct talks with Ukraine "without preconditions.”3 When it comes to the situation on the battlefield, however, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Armed Forces is ordering his troops to keep fighting as the defeat of Ukrainian forces is “closer.” “The complete defeat of the enemy in the Kursk border area creates conditions for further successful actions by our troops in other important sectors of the front, bringing the defeat of the neo-Nazi regime closer,” Putin told chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Putin gave his orders to Gerasimov via a video-link on April 26 after Russia’s highest-ranking military officer briefed his commander-in-chief that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) had been pushed out of the entire Kursk region.4 In his briefing, Gerasimov also became the first top Russian official to publicly acknowledge the role of DPRK troops in combat in the Kursk region, praising them for “professionalism, fortitude, courage and heroism in repulsing the Ukrainian invasion.”
  3. “The Russian-Ukrainian war completely changed the nature of warfare,” according to AFU’s ex-commander Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who offered his views on the subject at the recent U.K.-Ukraine Defense Tech Forum. “Whether you want to believe it or not, whether you have contracts for tanks or helicopters for the next 10 years or are still planning to sign them, the nature of military power has already changed,” he declared at the event, according to Ukrainska Pravda. In particular, “reconnaissance, strike drones and drones that served artillery fire, combined with a situational awareness system, made the battlefield completely transparent” within 10–15 kilometers from the line of contact, Zaluzhnyi was quoted as saying by this Ukrainian outlet. Going forward, military planners need to account for the increasing role of AI on the battlefield and the achievements in the sphere of electronic warfare, the general said. They also need to keep in mind that “cheap, high-precision, long-range unmanned systems” have been developed and that “civilian or dual-use technologies have reached such a level of sophistication that today they form the basis of combat capabilities,” according to the ex-commander. Zaluzhnyi is currently serving as Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.K., but he has been noted as a strong contender for the Ukrainian presidency if Ukraine holds elections, given Ukrainians’ trust in him.
  4. Rather than send troops to Ukraine, Europe should build a capability to deploy troops to wherever it is needed inside Europe to deter Russia,5 according to MIT’s Barry Posen. “Europe must organize what military planners call a ‘mass of maneuver’ that can quickly deploy where it is needed,” he wrote in Foreign Affairs. “Contrary to what is widely believed, Europeans have most of the military wherewithal needed to create such a force. The question is whether they have the will,” according to Posen’s article, entitled “How Europe Can Deter Russia: Deploying Troops to Ukraine Is Not the Answer.”
  5. If the aftermath of Soviet Russia’s intervention in Afghanistan is any guide, then the Russian Federation should expect a “surge in violence” once the Russian-Ukrainian war is over and “hundreds of thousands of war-traumatized citizens return home,” according to Andrei Okun’s article in Republic.ru. Even before the 1979–1989 intervention was over, its veterans, known as “Afghantsi,” were joining organized crime. “By the end of 1989 alone, 3,700 of them had been convicted of murder and robbery,” Okun writes. As many as 372,000 former “Afghantsi” suffered from alcoholism and drug addiction as the veterans sought relief from PTSD, according to Okun. "After three years of war, we are in a situation where the Russian authorities are practically not preparing for a potential social explosion. They are turning a blind eye because they chronically lack the ability to handle tasks that require a structural approach. As a result, once again, the rescue of the drowning falls to the drowning [people] themselves,” Okun concludes.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"The Other Nuclear Race," Juzel Lloyd, Foreign Affairs, 04.28.25. 

“Developing nations may ... decide to source nuclear energy technologies from China and Russia. But they need to be able to make a real choice. The United States and its allies still have a chance to counterbalance China’s and Russia’s expanding influence over the nuclear energy sector. The stakes are rising daily: the decisions that Washington and its allies make now, in the early days of a new nuclear age, will dictate the direction of energy security, the global economy, and the shape of power for decades to come,” according to the author.

"If Politics Is Put Above Nuclear Safety, a New Chernobyl Is Not Far Off," Vladimir Slivyak, The Moscow Times (Russian Service), 04.26.25. (In Russian.)

"Almost 40 years after the terrible nuclear tragedy, we find ourselves in a situation significantly worse than could have been expected. The nuclear energy industry is now serving the political interests of the Kremlin, there is no oversight over it, which implies that nuclear safety interests are secondary ... It resembles the times when Chernobyl happened," according to the author.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

See summary of Vladimir Putin’s "Meeting with Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov," Kremlin.ru, 04.26.25 in the section on the military aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict below. 

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Don’t Rule Out a US-Iran Nuclear Deal Just Yet," Richard Haass, Project Syndicate, 04.25.25.

“Amid heightened geopolitical tensions, renewed talks between the United States and Iran may hold unexpected potential. Despite decades of hostility, Iran’s struggling economy and U.S. President Donald Trump’s quest for a legacy-defining diplomatic achievement could create the conditions for a deal,” the author writes.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"The Evolving Nature of Warfare Has Redefined the Fundamental Principles of Global Security: The Ukrainian Experience and the Emerging World Order," Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s speech at the U.K.-Ukraine Defense Tech Forum, Ukrainska Pravda, 04.25.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • “Whether you want to believe it or not, whether you have contracts for tanks or helicopters for the next 10 years or are still planning to sign them, the nature of military power has already changed. It's a pity that this is well understood in Ukraine, Russia, China but not at all understood in other places. … [T]he reformatting of the Euro-Atlantic security space … has begun.”
  • “The Russian-Ukrainian war completely changed the nature of warfare. One morning in the summer of 2023, when Ukrainian troops, using available doctrines and existing weapons, were overcoming enemy defense lines meter by meter, drones appeared in the sky, which caused the transformation of the entire architecture of the battle. Reconnaissance, strike drones, and drones that served artillery fire, combined with a situational awareness system, made the battlefield completely transparent. All this provided unlimited opportunities for delivering high-precision strikes at the tactical level.”
  • “Gradually, as in World War I, this war entered a stupor. Later, in 2024, the development of scientific and technological progress led to a situation where drones were no longer the only means of striking targets not only in front of the front line, but also in operational depth. This made it impossible to find any equipment, firepower or reserves beyond even the front line.”
  • “Precision strikes on logistics routes have become commonplace today. Moreover, such strikes are already part of the tactics of forcing out of positions. Thus, due to absolute transparency, a 10-15 kilometer zone of continuous death was formed in front of the front line. It is no longer surprising when a drone hunts not for a group target or an armored object, but even for an individual soldier. By the way, this zone is constantly expanding, as is the probability of being destroyed.”
  • “It is necessary to pay attention to the following:
    • “Development of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.”
    • “Decisions in the field of electronic warfare.”
    • “Development of cheap, high-precision, long-range unmanned systems.”
    • “Development and production of drones (robots) as a component of basic combat capabilities.”
    • “Civilian or dual-use technologies have reached such a level of sophistication that today they form the basis of combat capabilities.”

Vladimir Putin’s "Meeting with Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov," Kremlin.ru, 04.26.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Gerasimov:
    • “Today, we liberated the village of Gornal, the last populated area in the Kursk Region, from Ukrainian units ... The defeat of the armed formations of the Ukrainian armed forces that invaded the Kursk Region has thus been completed.”
    • “The enemy suffered significant losses during the operation.”
    • “I want to point out the participation of servicemen from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the liberation of the Kursk Region's border areas, who, in accordance with the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between our countries, provided significant assistance in defeating the invading group of the Ukrainian armed forces. Soldiers and officers of the Korean People's Army, carrying out combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, displayed high professionalism, fortitude, courage and heroism in repulsing the Ukrainian invasion.”
    • “Pursuant to your instructions, creation of a security zone in the border areas of Ukraine’s Sumy Region continues.”
  • Putin:
    • “The affair of the Kyiv regime has completely failed ... the successful actions by our troops in other important sectors of the front, bringing the defeat of the neo-Nazi regime closer.”
    • “The complete defeat of the enemy in the Kursk border area creates conditions for further successful actions by our troops in other important sectors of the front, bringing the defeat of the neo-Nazi regime closer.”

"Fewer Soldiers, More Drones: What Ukraine’s Military Will Look Like After the War," Benjamin Jensen, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 04.28.25.

  • “Even if Ukraine has guarantees from Russia and foreign troops deploy to monitor any ceasefire, Kyiv cannot rule out future attacks and must maintain a larger military than before the 2022 invasion,” according to the author. “This force must balance the security needs of the state with the tremendous costs of economic reconstruction and repatriating refugees. Yet, the formations that guard Ukraine’s steppe frontier will look different than the composition of most European militaries due to three defining trends: (1) the rise of drone warfare; (2) demographic decline across Europe; and (3) the new missile age,” according to the author.
  • “To ensure that any ceasefire becomes a lasting peace, Ukraine will have to continue substituting drones for people and invest in a mix of layered air defense and long-range conventional precision strike. This force will need a deep strategic reserve that changes how free societies think about their reserve component and national service,” the author argues.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine:

"Ukraine Could Become Trump’s Afghanistan," Michael Allen, Wall Street Journal, 04.23.25.

  • “If President Trump wants to achieve a peace in Ukraine that lasts beyond his presidency, he should continue providing U.S. military assistance—at least until Europe is able to ramp up its support significantly,” according to the author. “The days of blank checks and $61 billion appropriations bills are over, but Russia’s capacity and intent to control Ukraine continue to grow. An abrupt cutoff could turn Ukraine into ‘Trump’s Afghanistan,’” the author writes.
  • The author argues that “Mr. Trump rightly describes the Afghanistan debacle as one of the most ignominious moments in U.S. history.” “Mr. Biden never recovered from it: His approval ratings tanked, and it left a stain on his presidency. Mr. Trump is also correct that in many ways the Russia-Ukraine conflict is ‘Biden’s war.’ But if he hastily cuts off assistance to Ukraine, and Russia advances westward, Mr. Trump will go down in history for making the same reckless mistakes as his predecessor,” according to the author.

​"Trump Could Seal His Peace Deal With a $50B Arms Sale to Ukraine," Marc A. Thiessen, The Washington Post, 04.25.25. 

“President Donald Trump's administration is negotiating trade deals with as many as 75 countries to increase their purchase of U.S.-made goods, according to the White House. Well, one country that is champing at the bit to purchase American goods is Ukraine, which has proposed to buy $50 billion worth of U.S.-made weapons to deter Russia. Trump should approve that arms sale as part of a final peace deal,” the author writes.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

 “The Race to Sanction Russia’s Growing Shadow Fleet," Robin Brooks and Ben Harris, Brookings Institution, 04.25.25. 

  • “Russia’s shadow fleet aspirations, ... have been counteracted by an aggressive sanctions campaign by Western nations,” the authors remind us. “Sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet are an especially important topic currently, because the U.S.—in an effort to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine—is offering to lift sanctions on Russia,” they write.
  • The authors offer several lessons, which they have inferred while studying Russia’s shadow tanker fleet.
    • “One ... this shadow fleet has steadily grown from less than 100 vessels in February 2022 to 343 vessels today.”
    • “Importantly, too, as the total number of tankers sanctioned by at least one entity has grown, so too has the number of tankers sanctioned by multiple Western entities. ... by March 2025, approximately half (49%) of sanctioned shadow fleet ships were sanctioned by multiple sanctioning authorities,” according to the authors.
    • “Overall, the data presented here suggest that tankers supplied by EU shipping companies, especially of Greek origin, were instrumental in aiding Russia’s quest to acquire a massive shadow fleet. However, aggressive actions in early 2025 by the EU, U.K., and U.S. successfully captured a large share of the shadow fleet,” according to the authors.

“Trump: Putin ‘tapping me along’ with Russia strikes on Ukraine,” Alex Gangitano, The Hill, 04.26.25.

  • “President Trump on Saturday said he thinks Russian President Vladimir Putin may be stringing him along after the latest deadly strikes on Ukraine, as the U.S. seeks to bring an end to the war in Eastern Europe.”
  • “‘There was no reason for Putin to be shooting missiles into civilian areas, cities and towns, over the last few days,’ Trump posted Saturday on Truth Social. ‘It makes me think that maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along, and has to be dealt with differently, through ‘Banking’ or ‘Secondary Sanctions?’ Too many people are dying!!!’”
  • “His post came as the president was traveling back to the U.S. following Pope Francis’s funeral in Rome and after he met briefly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The two leaders spoke ahead of the funeral, their first face-to-face interaction since the contentious Oval Office meeting earlier this year.”

"Trump tells The Atlantic that Putin would be ‘fine’ in peace negotiations," Amanda Friedman, Politico, 04.28.25.

  • “Trump had told us that Vladimir Putin ‘is going to be fine’ in the Ukraine peace negotiations,” the Atlantic journalists wrote of their interviews with Trump. They said they spoke to Trump in March about Putin and then had another interview with the president in April.  “I’m trying to save a lot of lives in the world,” Trump told them. “You know, Ukraine and Russia — it’s not our lives, but it could end up in a Third World War.”

“Full Transcript of Donald Trump’s 100 Days’ Interview,” Time, 04.22.25.

  • [When asked: “You said you would end the war in Ukraine on Day One.”] “Well, I said that figuratively, and I said that as an exaggeration, because to make a point, and you know, it gets, of course, by the fake news [unintelligible]. Obviously, people know that when I said that, it was said in jest, but it was also said that it will be ended.”
  • [When asked: “Well what’s taking so long?”] “Well, I don’t think it’s long. I mean, look, I got here three months ago. This war has been going on for three years. It's a war that would have never happened if I was president. It's Biden's war. It’s not my war. I have nothing to do with it. I would have never had this war. This war would have never happened. Putin would have never done it. This war would have never happened. Oct. 6 would have never happened. Oct. 7 would have never happened. Would have never happened. Ever. You then say, what’s taking so long? Do you hear this, Steve? The war has been raging for three years. I just got here, and you say, what's taken so long?”
  • [When asked: “Do you think peace is still possible if Putin is President?”] “I think peace is possible. You say if Putin is still president? Yeah, if Putin is President. Can there be peace if Putin is President of Russia? I think with me as president, there's—possible, if very probable. If somebody else is president, no chance.”
  • [When asked if Putin can make peace:] “Yeah, I think Putin will. I think Putin would rather do it a different way. I think he’d rather go and take the whole thing. And I think that because of me, I believe I'm the only one that can get this thing negotiated. And I think we’re a long way. We've had very good talks, and we're getting very close to a deal. And I don't believe anybody else could have made that deal.”
  • [When asked: “Do you believe peace is possible if Zelenskyy is still President of Ukraine?”] “Yeah, I do. He is president now and I think we’re going to make a deal.”
  • [When asked: “Should Ukraine give up any hope of ever joining NATO?”] “I don’t think they’ll ever be able to join NATO. I think that's been—from day one, I think that's been, that's I think what caused the war to start was when they started talking about joining NATO. If that weren't brought up, there would have been a much better chance that it wouldn’t have started.”
  • [When asked: “Should Crimea go to the Russians? Should they get to keep Crimea?”] “Well, Crimea went to the Russians. It was handed to them by Barack Hussein Obama, and not by me. With that being said, will they be able to get it back? They've had their Russians. They've had their submarines there for long before any period that we're talking about, for many years. The people speak largely Russian in Crimea. But this was given by Obama. This wasn't given by Trump. Would it have been taken from me like it was taken from Obama? No, it wouldn't have happened. Crimea, if I were president, it would not have been taken.”
  • [When asked: “Would it be acceptable to you in a deal if Crimea and the four other regions that Russia has taken from Ukraine would be folded into Russia under a final accommodation?”] “If Crimea will stay with Russia—we have to only talk about Crimea because that's the one that always gets mentioned.”
  • [When asked: “You’ve talked about improving relations with Moscow. Are you pursuing negotiations with them on issues other than Ukraine? ... Like nuclear weapons stockpiles or testing?”] “No. … But if a deal has happened, I can see us doing business with Ukraine and with Russia as a country.”

​"Ukraine and Europe Can't Afford to Refuse Trump's Peace Plan," Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 04.24.25.

  • “The Trump administration's proposed Ukraine peace plan largely reflects common sense and acknowledges battlefield realities, including a ceasefire along current front lines,” according to the author.
  • “Ukraine has privately accepted that retaking Russian-occupied territories is unrealistic, and Russia shows signs of dropping some territorial demands,” according to the author.
  • “NATO membership for Ukraine remains highly unlikely due to opposition from multiple current NATO members, aligning with Zelensky’s earlier acceptance of neutrality with security guarantees,” according to the author.
  • “A key surprise in the Trump plan is the U.S. offer to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea, though this offer does not extend to Ukraine itself,” according to the author.
  • “Zelensky’s immediate rejection of Trump's proposal, particularly regarding Crimea, may damage Ukraine’s position with the Trump administration,” according to the author.
  • “Crimea’s unique historical and demographic situation gives some legal and moral grounds for different treatment compared to other Russian-claimed regions,” according to the author.
  • “The plan may bring peace if Russia accepts without additional demands; otherwise, Trump should blame Moscow for any failure and maintain U.S. support for Ukraine,” according to the author.

"Blinked (April 25, 2025)," Richard Haass, Home & Away (Substack), 04.25.25.

  • “What is unfolding is tragic on multiple levels,” according to the author. “President Trump is right to seek a ceasefire in Ukraine, but he is sabotaging his own objective by the approach he, Vance, Rubio, and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff have selected, I expect it is no coincidence that Putin felt emboldened to escalate Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, unleashing a massive strike on Kyiv early Thursday morning,” the author writes.
  • “Negotiating a cessation of hostilities requires disabusing Putin of the notion that Ukraine will fall into his lap if he only fights on. That requires giving Ukraine enough military and intelligence support to defend itself both to bring about and sustain a ceasefire, not strong-arming Kyiv into accepting unreasonable concessions that will endanger its security and independence,” according to the author. 

"America is selling a Ukraine peace plan. No one is buying, yet," The Economist, 04.24.25.

  • “So far, no one has endorsed the American [peace] proposals,” The Economist reminds us. “Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said his country will never formally recognize Russia’s seizure of Crimea, prompting Mr. Trump to call him ‘inflammatory.’ But Russia has not yet accepted the plan either: Mr. Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, will visit Moscow soon to try and get Mr. Putin’s assent to it. European countries have been publicly silent, but will not want to undercut Ukraine,” according to the Economist.
  • “The big question is what happens next. If Mr. Trump does walk away, will he end arms supplies to Ukraine? Will he end intelligence-sharing? Will he unilaterally lift sanctions? Perhaps most vital, will he at least let Europe buy crucial weapons from America, especially Patriot air-defense systems, to give to Ukraine? As so often, no one has a clue,” according to the Economist.

​"The Terrifying Prospect of Trump’s Peace Plan for Ukraine," James Kirchick, The New York Times, 04.25.25. 

“After 11 years of grinding conflict, it’s entirely understandable that Mr. Trump wants to end this war. But he must not mistake a temporary cessation of hostilities — which is all that his proposal would achieve — with a just and lasting peace. Unless Ukraine is provided with an explicit security guarantee (which in all likelihood means NATO membership), Russia will just bide its time until the moment is opportune for it to invade again,” according to the author.

"Trump’s shameful Crimea ultimatum to Ukraine," The Editorial Board, Financial Times, 04.24.25. 

  • “Donald Trump’s ultimatum to Kyiv to accept a peace deal that includes US recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea makes a mockery of Washington’s supposed negotiation to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump’s election campaign boast that he could strike a peace deal in 24 hours beggared belief. So has the incompetence and cynicism of his administration as it scrambles to land a settlement at any price,” according to the FT.
  • “‘You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war.’ Historians dispute whether Winston Churchill said this to Neville Chamberlain over the 1938 Munich Agreement with Nazi Germany. But it risks becoming Trump’s political epitaph, unless Kyiv and its European allies can somehow persuade him to change course,” according to the FT.

"Ukraine’s fighters fear Russian attacks and Trump’s ceasefire," The Economist, 04.26.25. 

  • “The leaked American ceasefire proposal would end sanctions on Russia, freeze the front line and see America formally recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The intelligence officer, based in Kyiv, does not hide his disdain. ... On the front, though, the language is far less gung-ho. Soldiers are focused on killing Russians and staying alive rather than on high politics.”
  • “Russian forces are concentrating huge numbers of men to capture specific targets. Although up to 80% of those troops ‘are doomed,’ the sheer numbers thrown into the assault mean that some will get through. ... Toretsk ... has all but fallen.”

"Putin’s Unilateral Easter Truce Was Never Intended to Last," Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 04.23.25.  Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The Russian leader is not afraid of the United States giving up on its mediation efforts: events on the battlefield would in any case likely continue to develop in Russia’s favor as they have done for many months. But Putin clearly hasn’t decided whether to ditch Trump and his attempts to bring the war to an end, or whether to keep trying to manipulate the U.S. president,” according to the author.
  • “When all is said and done, Putin’s [Easter] truce led to a reduction in the fighting in Ukraine—albeit for just thirty hours. It also marked an intensification of Ukraine and Russia’s bizarre competition to show Trump they are each keener than the other to achieve a permanent peace deal,” according to the author. “Judging by Russian statements, the Kremlin believes that the Easter truce served its purpose. Either way, as long as a ceasefire in Ukraine is not implemented with obligations on both sides, or as a precondition for further negotiations, the Kremlin will retain the right to violate its terms,” he writes.

“Within What Borders Does Russia Recognize the New Territories?” Konstantin Remchukov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 04.20.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • "In recent times, as discussions continue about a ceasefire, truce, and even peace, the question increasingly arises: along which borders might Russia stop, in order to remain consistent with the letter of our Constitution? Territorial concessions, compromises, and trade-offs between parties to the armed conflict are being discussed in negotiations with American special envoy Steve Witkoff. And he is a key member of Trump’s team—critically important—because he shapes the U.S. president’s understanding directly," the author writes.
  • "Here’s what is known to the Americans about the constitutional status of the territories where hostilities are taking place. The Constitution of the Russian Federation does not define the borders of the four regions that were incorporated into Russia. (When they were admitted to the Russian Federation in October 2022, only their names as new federal subjects were added to the Constitution, without addressing the question of their borders.) The issue of the borders of these four new regions was resolved through specially adopted Federal Constitutional Laws (No. 5-FCL, 6-FCL, 7-FCL, 8-FCL)," according to the author.
  • "The texts of the FCLs concerning the admission of new regions into Russia unequivocally state that the borders of these new regions are determined by the actual lines that came under Russian control on the date of their admission into the Russian Federation—not by the administrative-territorial boundaries as defined by Ukrainian legislation," the author writes.
  • "What seems to me more significant is the information from a recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and Valery Gerasimov, during which the Chief of the General Staff reported that 99.5% of the territory of the Kursk Region had been liberated," according to the author.
  • "For Putin, it is clearly unacceptable to negotiate over the territory of the Kursk region. As of any agreement, it must be completely cleared. Once the final half-percent is liberated, this could mark the point at which troops can halt—wherever that news finds them," the author writes.
  • "It seems that Trump, thanks to Witkoff, understands this. And he is hoping that it all comes together by April 30, allowing him to proudly declare that he has completed his mission of peace within the first 100 days of his presidency," the author writes.

"Transcript: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 'Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan,'" CBS News, 04.27.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Trump is probably the only leader on Earth who recognized the need to address the root causes of this situation, when he said—said that it was a huge mistake to pull Ukraine into NATO, and this was a mistake by Biden administration, and he wants to rectify this.”
  • “We are really polite people, and unlike some others, we never discuss in public what is being discussed in negotiations. Otherwise, negotiations are not serious. ... We make serious proposals, and this is a process which is not supposed to be public until the end of it.”
  • [When asked: “Okay, so no deal is imminent?”] “I didn't say this. ... The—the negotiations continue, and until the end of the negotiations. We cannot disclose what it is about.”
  • “We are ready to reach a deal, but there are still some specific points- elements of this deal which need to be fine tuned.”
  • “We understand the impatience, because in- in American culture, you create expectations, and you ignite tension around those expectations. This does not help to do realpolitik.”
  • [When asked: “President Trump said Crimea is not even being discussed right now.”] “Yes, because this is a done deal. Russia- Russia do not negotiate its own territory.”
  • “Zaporizhzhia power nuclear power station is run by the Russian Federation state corporation called Rosatom. It is being under monitoring of the IAEA personnel permanently located on the site. And if not for the Ukrainian regular attempts to attack the station and to create a nuclear disaster for Europe and for Ukraine as well, the safety requirements are fully implemented and it is in very good hands.”
  • "If [the United States] is willing to get back to [arms control talks], we will see what are the conditions under which this might be possible."
  • “If American companies would like to come to a place [in the Russian market] which is not yet occupied, if they want to- to propose a project, a new project, on top of the previous business ties, of course, we will look into this. And if we found- if we find balance of our interests, I think it would be only natural to get into business together.”

"Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Brazilian newspaper O Globo," Russian Foreign Ministry, 04.28.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • "In our view, our American counterparts have begun to better understand Russia’s position on the situation around Ukraine. We hope this will help them in their dialogue with Kyiv and certain European countries. …We remain open to negotiations. But the 'ball' is not in our court. So far, Kyiv is not showing any willingness to negotiate."
  • "Our position on a settlement is well known."
  • "We proceed from the premise that Ukraine’s non-entry into NATO and its confirmation of a neutral and non-aligned status, in accordance with the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, is one of two foundations for a final settlement that meets Russia’s security interests."
  • "The second foundation is the overcoming of the consequences of the neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv, which came to power through the February 2014 coup, including its legislative and physical eradication of everything Russian — language, media, culture, traditions, and canonical Orthodoxy."
  • "It is imperative that the Russian ownership of Crimea, Sevastopol, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia be internationally recognized. All of Kyiv’s obligations must be legally formalized, have enforcement mechanisms, and be permanent."
  • "On the agenda are the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions, the cancellation of lawsuits and arrest warrants, and the return of Russian assets frozen in the West."
  • "We will also seek reliable security guarantees for the Russian Federation against threats created by the hostile activities of NATO, the European Union, and individual member states along our western borders."
  • "It is absolutely clear to us that building a multipolar world order requires expanding the representation of the Global South and East — meaning the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America — in the UN Security Council. We consider Brazil, which pursues an independent foreign policy course and is capable of making a substantial contribution to solving international problems, a worthy candidate for permanent membership in the UN Security Council."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“How Europe Can Deter Russia. Deploying Troops to Ukraine Is Not the Answer,” Barry R. Posen, Foreign Affairs, 04.21.25.

  • The author reminds us that “Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump began his effort to settle the war in Ukraine, European leaders have tried to assemble a military coalition capable of defending Kyiv,” but this proposal is “old-think” with European leaders “simply repackaging NATO’s 1990s Balkan peacekeeping model for Ukraine.”
  • Moreover, “The scheme depends on Trump’s support and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s acquiescence. And both of them have already rejected their appointed roles,” according to Posen. And “Even if Trump and Putin were to accept such a scheme, Europeans should not want to pursue it” because “The continent’s people face many potential threats from Russia, so it is foolish for them to tie down their readiest forces in garrisons across Ukraine,” according to Posen.
  • Instead, according to Posen, “Europe must organize what military planners call a “mass of maneuver” that can quickly deploy where it is needed.” “Contrary to what is widely believed, Europeans have most of the military wherewithal needed to create such a force. The question is whether they have the will,” according to Posen.

"How Ukraine could break the western alliance," Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 04.28.25. 

  • “The divergence in [U.S.’ and Europe’s] security visions now goes far beyond the question of how to end the Ukraine war. America’s allies have to face the reality that Trump is directly threatening the territory of two Nato members,” such as Denmark and Canada, according to the author.
  • “The Trump administration and its European allies now preach two conflicting visions of western values. The Vance-Trump vision is ethno-nationalist, culturally conservative and illiberal. The European one is internationalist and based on the law and liberal institutions,” in the author’s views.
  • The author concludes that “Europeans and Canadians now know that the U.S. is capable of electing Trump twice. They can no longer take American steadfastness for granted.”

"The Rise of Russian Civilizationism," Paul Robinson, Russia.Post, 04.28.25. 

“Historian Paul Robinson argues that the tensions between Russia and the West have taken on an ideological dimension, with Russia promoting a civilizationist approach as a means of legitimizing its position in the eyes of the non-Western world,” according to the author.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Competition in cyberspace: a distorted representation,” Julia Voo, Virpratap Vikram Singh, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 04.24.25.

  • “As more states increasingly leverage cyberspace to pursue their national objectives, investigative attention must shift beyond its current focus on a narrow set of prominent states to include all those shaping the physical, logical and virtual layers of cyberspace. Research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has identified at least 134 states and territories affected by disinformation operations and submarine cable disruptions, and at least 84 that are known to be conducting cyber operations and investing in submarine cables—activities that proactively shape the physical, logical and virtual layers of cyberspace.”
  • “The United States–Israel Stuxnet operation, reported in 2011, was a rare but notable example of a sophisticated, destructive cyber operation with tangible real-world effects; it infected Iran’s SCADA systems at its Natanz facility, resulting in the destruction of its uranium-enrichment centrifuges and delaying the country’s nuclear program. However, since cyber operations are most effective when undetected, publicly known incidents likely form just the tip of the iceberg.”
  • “While most cyber operations involve intelligence collection—an activity implicitly acknowledged as accepted state practice—the strategic implications of conducting such activities at today’s unprecedented scale and speed remain uncertain. More than 100 states and territories have been the target of disinformation operations by foreign or domestic actors.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Energy exports from CIS:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“How Trump Plays Into Putin’s Hands, From Ukraine to Slashing U.S. Institutions,” Peter Baker, New York Times, 04.26.25.

  • “If President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia drafted a shopping list of what he wanted from Washington, it would be hard to beat what he was offered in the first 100 days of President Trump’s new term,” according to the author. Among other things:
    • Trump has applied “pressure on Ukraine to surrender territory to Russia,” delivered the “promise of sanctions relief” and offered “absolution from invading Ukraine,” according to the author.
    • “Crimea will stay with Russia,” Trump said in an interview with Time.
    • Trump also “spared Russia from the tariffs that he is imposing on imports from nearly every other nation, arguing that it was already under sanctions. Yet he still applied the tariff on Ukraine, the other party he is negotiating with,” according to the author.
    • “Mr. Trump’s team is reportedly discussing whether to lift sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Europe, a project he has repeatedly condemned,” writes the author.
    • Trump also “moved to dismantle Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.”
    • “Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s new department restructuring plan likewise takes aim at offices that have aggravated Russia over the years,” according to the author.
    • “Mr. Trump has welcomed into his orbit people with ties to Russia’s efforts to shape American politics. Ed Martin, his interim U.S. attorney in Washington, appeared on RT and Sputnik, two state-run media outlets that spread Russian propaganda, more than 150 times, The Post reported.”
  • “What has been so striking about Mr. Trump’s return to office is how many of his other actions over the past three months have been seen as benefiting Russia, either directly or indirectly — so much so that Russian officials in Moscow have cheered the American president on and publicly celebrated some of his moves,” according to the author.

​"‘Challenges and Threats at Sea for Russia Are Increasing,’" Nikolai Patrushev, Kommersant, 04.21.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “We have no plans to get involved in a naval arms race. At the same time, it should be noted that there is intense competition between the United States and China in the naval sphere today.”
  • “Russia’s position in the Arctic today is very strong, and in many respects we have a reserve that no one else in the world has. Take, for example, the unique icebreaker fleet.”
  • “By the way, today we see the prerequisites for resuming international cooperation in the Arctic. Normal interaction in the development of the Arctic was considered by the first administration of Donald Trump as a promising direction for the development of the dialogue between Moscow and Washington. It is possible that this time the United States will pay attention to this region and show interest in jointly solving the problems that have accumulated there. And there are many of them - strengthening the atmosphere of trust, economic projects, developing transport potential, protecting ecosystems and much more.”
  • “Russia and the United States, as great powers, historically bear a special responsibility for the fate of the world. And the experience of past decades or even centuries shows that in the most difficult, critical moments our countries have always managed to overcome their differences. I think that today the first step could be a joint appeal to this historical experience, which could serve as a symbolic basis for restarting the Russian-American dialogue.”
  • [In addition to the meeting of Soviet and U.S. troops on the Elbe River on April 25, 1945,] there are many more episodes [of U.S.-Russian interaction]. [WWII] Arctic convoys, lend-lease—all these are excellent examples of how Russia and the United States can cooperate despite their differences. But we can also recall lesser-known examples. In my opinion, a magnificent, but undeservedly forgotten page in Russian-American history is the North American Expedition of the Russian fleet in 1863. …it was the Russian Empire that decided to support Washington and the legitimate government of Abraham Lincoln by sending two powerful squadrons to both coasts of the United States.”

“Trump wants to emulate Putin and govern US in 'a similar fashion', [Trump’s] former national security adviser [Fiona Hill] says,” SkyNews, 04.24.25.

  • “Fiona Hill told Sky News' The World With Yalda Hakim that the US and Russian presidents both shared the same view of the world as being "divided up among three major powers; Russia, the US and China, with very clear spheres of influence."
  • "This is the first time we've had a US president who wants to emulate the Russian leader in some way, who wants to create a hyper-personalized presidency, who wants to basically govern his own country in a very similar fashion, very top down without any checks and balances," she said.
  • "He's always wanted to sit down with Vladimir Putin and sort out all of the difficulties in the bilateral relationship, everything from nuclear issues and nuclear arms reduction—there's all kinds of economic and business deals that Trump himself and his immediate circle are very interested in.”

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Time Bomb: Russia Faces a Surge in Violence After Hundreds of Thousands of War Traumatized Citizens Return Home," Andrei Okun, Republic, 04.28.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some 'Afghantsi' (veterans of the Afghan war) quickly integrated into criminal organizations. Groups made up of Afghan war veterans appeared in Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Krasnoyarsk, and other cities. But the most capable gang was based in Tolyatti."
  • "The war [post-Soviet Russia’s intervention in Afghanistan] left a noticeable imprint on the psyche of its participants. According to veteran organization data cited by Kommersant, 372,000 former 'Afghantsi' suffered from alcoholism and drug addiction to varying degrees. By the end of 1989 alone, 3,700 of them had been convicted of murder and robbery."
  • "Research confirms that PTSD is one of the main mental disorders among veterans, with pronounced symptoms occurring in about 30% of cases. This is actually a significant proportion, especially considering that even by the most conservative estimates, 700,000 Russians have passed through the Ukrainian front. Therefore, we can say that roughly 200,000 men will face PTSD. With these figures in mind, it is not so much the explosive growth of street crime that should cause concern (which, under current Russian conditions, is unlikely), but rather the rise in domestic violence."
  • "After three years of war, we are in a situation where the Russian authorities are practically not preparing for a potential social explosion. They are turning a blind eye because they chronically lack the ability to handle tasks that require a structural approach. As a result, once again, the rescue of the drowning falls to the drowning themselves."

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Friends with Limits: The Future of Russo-Indian Defense Ties," Daniel Markey and David Brostoff, War on the Rocks, 04.25.25.

  • Under Trump “Clearly, weaning India off Russian arms purchases will be a lesser priority for the United States, even if the White House will undoubtedly seek more defense deals of its own with New Delhi. Does this mean that Russo-Indian defense ties are poised for takeoff, or will India continue to steer the relationship into ‘managed decline?’ Neither,” according to the authors.
  • “Instead, Russo-Indian defense ties are headed for a future of managed equilibrium. This is because the relationship is dictated mainly by the interests of these two countries themselves, which often lie beyond Washington’s influence,” they write. “The more U.S. policymakers appreciate both the floor and the ceiling of Russo-Indian defense ties, the better they will be at anticipating the likely trajectory of this geopolitical pairing that is only likely to become more important in the decades to come,” according to the authors.

Ukraine:

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Footnotes

  1. Updating reporters on April 27, Trump said he believes Zelenskyy is willing to give up Crimea to Russia as part of a peace deal—despite Kyiv's previous rejections of any such proposal, according to BBC.
  2. Meanwhile, European officials interviewed by FT speculated that European and Ukrainian officials fear Trump is on the brink of walking away from the talks, potentially using minor progress in talks as an “excuse” to say his job is done.
  3. In the Kremlin’s latest comments, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on April 28 that “The Russian side has repeatedly signaled its readiness to begin negotiations with Ukraine without any preconditions.”
  4. However, according to an April 29 report by Ukrainian media, citing OSINT DeepState, the AFU continues to control 29 square kilometers of territory in Russia’s Kursk region.
  5. When referring to “Europe,” the author appears to be referring to European countries, which are members of EU and/or NATO.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP.

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