Russia Analytical Report, April 15–21, 2025

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. With the 30-hour Easter ceasefire come and gone, Western and Ukrainian officials will re-convene in London this week to discuss a confidential document that contains “ideas for how to end the war in Ukraine by granting concessions to Russia, including potential U.S. recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and excluding Kyiv from joining NATO,” according to WSJ’s Michael Gordon and Alan Cullison. In the shorter-term the U.S. proposes freezing the frontline “while designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia as neutral territory that could be under American control,” according to these two journalists. While Russia won’t be sending a representative to the April 23 talks, which will bring together U.S., Ukrainian and European officials, Vladimir Putin signaled that he is prepared to explore a partial ceasefire even as he declared the Easter truce expired. “The proposal not to strike at civilian infrastructure facilities” should be a “subject for careful study,” he told Russian media on April 21. In his remarks to Russian journalists on that day Putin also, somewhat surprisingly, acknowledged that the Easter weekend ceasefire was partially observed by the Ukrainian side.1
  2. When asked about the pending expiration of New START, Alexey Arbatov, who is one of Russia’s most renowned nuclear arms control experts (if not the most renowned), warned that the U.S. and Russia “may find ourselves on the ladder of escalation to a nuclear war, from which it is almost impossible to jump off… without the New START treaty and the numerous preceding treaties and agreements, we would now find ourselves back in the nightmare days of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.” While New START cannot be extended as it is, the signatories could adopt “politically binding statements that the parties will not exceed the New START ceilings,” according to Arbatov. “There is another, more formal option. It is possible to use Article 15 of the New START Treaty and amend it to allow for its agreed extension for a five-year period more than once,” he proposed. In the meantime Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed doubts Russia needs a replacement for New START, at least for as long as the relationship with the U.S. is adversarial. “Americans... continue to label us an adversary… You can’t just cherry-pick one element from the New START Treaty—like the right to inspect each other’s nuclear facilities—and ignore the rest,” he asserted.
  3. CSIS’s dive into China-Russia military ties not only explores heavily-sanctioned Russia’s increasing dependence on China for supplies of “critical defense components,” but also reveals a shift in leadership roles in RF-PRC wargames. “As China’s military capabilities grow, CSIS analysts highlight a shift in leadership within joint drills—such as the 2021 Zapad/Interaction exercise where China led operations—signaling a potential role reversal with China as the senior partner in future engagements,” according to this U.S. think-tank’s April 2025 report, entitled "How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?"

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"New Nuclear Responsibility," John Pendleton, Ariel (Eli) Levite, and Toby Dalton, CEIP, April 15, 2025.

  • “Nuclear energy is facing a moment of truth. New technologies are exciting, but they face intrinsic and persistent challenges that will be tempting for stakeholders to kick down the road or expect someone else to handle. Deferring attention to these long-term requirements would be a mistake.”
  • “Chasing the next idea amid a rush to generate more power—without addressing the fundamental underlying challenges—could doom both individual and collective efforts. The coming decade may be the last chance to position nuclear as an anchor in an evolving energy mix.”
  • “Success requires that all stakeholders—governments, regulators, owners and operators, financers, and vendors—have a clear understanding of what responsible use of nuclear technology entails and have clear priorities for avoiding the types of safety, security, or proliferation incidents that could doom an inherently globally interdependent enterprise.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"Inside North Korea's vast operation to help Russia's war on Ukraine," Tom Balmforth and Mariano Zafra, Reuters, April 15, 2025.

  • North Korean Troop Deployment: Approximately 14,000 North Korean soldiers, including replacements, have fought alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, according to Reuters.
  • Massive Munitions Supply: North Korea has shipped 4–6 million artillery shells to Russia via 64 sea shipments (tracked by OSC) since late 2023, accounting for up to 70% of Russian artillery use. Deliveries include 152mm and 122mm shells, mortar rounds, ballistic missiles (148 KN-23/KN-24 missiles by 2025), and rocket systems, enabling Russia’s war of attrition, according to Reuters.
  • North Korean munitions allowed Russia to maintain artillery superiority, with some units relying entirely on them, according to Reuters.
  • Russia likely transferred missile technology to North Korea in exchange. North Korean ballistic missiles (initially inaccurate) improved in precision (50–100m accuracy by 2025). Russian artillery units integrated North Korean shells after testing, while North Korea gained real-war combat experience, according to Reuters.
  • The partnership, rooted in historical ties, deepened as both nations faced international sanctions. Russia’s reliance on North Korea highlights its isolation, while North Korea gains economic/political benefits. A new border bridge is planned to bolster logistics, signaling long-term cooperation. South Korea and allies fear enhanced North Korean military capabilities post-war, according to Reuters.

Iran and its nuclear program:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

RM Staff’s summary of “Sumy Before the Palm Sunday Attack; Will Russia's massacre finally cause Trump to say 'enough'?” Bernard-Henri Lévy, WSJ, 04.15.25.

  • The author writes that he has just returned from Ukraine’s Sumy, which Russian ballistic missiles have recently struck to kill 35 and injure 119. “Perhaps the slaughter in Sumy will be… one massacre too many. Perhaps it will provoke that planetary jolt we have been waiting for—many for three years, some for 11,” the author writes. “Perhaps even President Trump will say: Enough—they've toyed with me enough,” the author hopes.2

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Military aid to Ukraine:

RM staff’s summary of “Trump’s Ukraine Ceasefire Is Slipping Away,” The Economist, 04.15.25.

  • Trump’s promise to swiftly end the Ukraine war is faltering as Russia ignores ceasefire overtures and intensifies strikes, including deadly missile attacks on Sumy, according to the Economist. While Trump has criticized Russia mildly, he also blamed Ukraine for provoking war and resisted new military aid. Despite sanctions and tariff threats, U.S. support for Ukraine is warning: troops are withdrawing, aid is drying up, and engagement is minimal. Europeans are developing a “reassurance force” for Ukraine’s defense, but a ceasefire remains elusive. Trump’s envoy allegedly proposed ceding Ukrainian provinces to Russia—unacceptable to Kyiv. Europe must now boost military aid and financing to keep Ukraine viable, according to The Economist.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"What is the status of Russia’s frozen sovereign assets?" Alexander Conner and David Wessel, Brookings Institution, April 16, 2025. 

  • Roughly $280–330 billion of Russian sovereign assets remain frozen, mainly in the EU, with interest revenue helping fund a $50 billion G7-backed loan to Ukraine, the authors reminds us. Full asset seizure remains legally and politically contentious, though interest revenue is being redirected through mechanisms like the European Fund for Ukraine, according to the authors.
  • The U.S. has no clear seizure policy under the Trump administration, while the EU remains divided—some leaders support outright seizure, but others fear legal risks and financial retaliation, , according to the authors. Russia has condemned seizure threats and hinted at retaliatory moves, though it may be willing to forgo the assets under favorable peace terms, they wrote.
  • While the U.S. and Russia have sidelined Europe and Ukraine in early 2025 talks, actual use of frozen assets—whether to pressure Russia or entice concessions—requires EU and Ukrainian involvement. Falling interest rates and fragile EU consensus on sanctions pose risks to the long-term utility of these frozen funds, the authors warn.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Ukraine-related negotiations:

​"Kyiv Is On the Clock to Respond to Trump Plan to End Ukraine Conflict," Michael R. Gordon and Alan Cullison, WSJ, April 20, 2025. 

  • “Ukraine is under pressure to respond this week to a series of far-reaching Trump administration ideas for how to end the war in Ukraine by granting concessions to Russia, including potential U.S. recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and excluding Kyiv from joining NATO,” the two WSJ journalists report.
  • “The ideas were outlined in a confidential document presented by senior Trump administration officials to their Ukrainian counterparts in Paris on Thursday, according to Western officials. They were also shared with senior European officials at the daylong meeting,” according to the duo. “The U.S. is now waiting for Kyiv’s response, which is expected to come at a meeting of U.S., Ukrainian and European officials in London later this week.3 Then if there is a convergence among the American, European and Ukrainian positions, the proposals could be floated to Moscow,” they report.
  • “A U.S. move to recognize the Russian seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 would reverse a more than decade of American policy from both Democratic and Republican administrations,” according to Gordon and Cullison. “The ideas presented by the U.S. in Paris also include ruling out Ukraine’s membership in NATO. “NATO isn’t on the table,” Kellogg said in an appearance on Fox News Saturday,” according to the WSJ report.
  • “Yet another U.S. idea, Western officials said, calls for designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhia as neutral territory that could be under American control.”

“Trilateral Talks in Paris” by Tatyana Stanovaya in “Geopolitics and the Russian Budget; Russian-American Talks; Talks in Paris; Domestic developments,” R.Politik, 04.22.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “The next meeting [after last week’s meeting in Paris] between European, American, and Ukrainian representatives is expected to take place in London in the coming days. According to Keith Kellogg, participants aim “to lock it in”, referring to a short-term ceasefire. He stated that “we have got a pretty good” deal, although Rubio’s remarks about diminishing patience contradict these expectations. From the Russian perspective, no sustainable agreement is possible with the current Kyiv regime, and Rubio’s rhetoric appears more realistic, signaling preparations for a potential US withdrawal from the peace effort.”
  • “At present, the US strategy appears to have drifted towards coercing Kyiv into accepting some of the Russian terms, with the risk of ending Western security assistance to Ukraine and pressuring Europe to temper its hawkish posture, as well as offering incentives to Moscow. The US also remains not confrontational towards Russia, leaving the Kremlin hopeful that “normalization” talks will continue, regardless of the outcome of negotiations on Ukraine. It also creates more space for Russia to try to coalesce with the US to play against Europe as “pro-war” force”
  • “The current situation represents a pivotal moment in the war, as forthcoming developments may influence the extent of American engagement, the level of Western support for Ukraine, Putin’s attempts to engage with Trump, and Moscow’s broader efforts to achieve its objectives in Ukraine.”

“Battlefield Conditions Impacting Ukraine Peace Negotiations,” Alex Vershinin, Russia Matters, 04.18.25.

  • The election of U.S. President Donald Trump changed U.S. policy toward Ukraine from “as long as it takes” to seeking a negotiated peace settlement. These negotiations will be driven by the battlefield reality. The side holding the biggest advantage gets to dictate the terms… Historically in many conflicts, peace negotiations lasted years, even as the war raged on, such as during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Thus, the balance of power, measured in resources, losses and quality of strategic leadership are critical to the outcome of negotiations.
  • With the U.S. increasingly seeing the war as a liability, Ukraine’s negotiating position is at risk of unraveling. Even with U.S. support, Ukraine’s battlefield position is deteriorating. Without U.S. support, Ukraine’s chances of battlefield collapse are vastly higher, even with continued EU aid.
  • The real question is: Can Ukraine gain an acceptable, if bitter, peace now, or will it keep fighting, risking a military collapse and a far worst Russian dictate later? 

The RM staff’s summary of “Trump’s Ukraine ceasefire is slipping away. The American president increasingly looks like Russia’s willing dupe,” The Economist, 04.16.25.

  • As Donald Trump’s self-imposed 100-day deadline to secure a Ukraine ceasefire nears, his approach appears increasingly favorable to Russia, according to the Economist. He appears to have no plans to provide additional military aid for Ukraine and is unwilling to condemn Russia’s missile strikes on Sumy and other Ukrainian cities, according to the Economist. Moreover, “some Trump aides say privately that they are “fed up” with Europe’s effort to strengthen Ukraine,” according to the Economist. . Trump’s reluctance risks cementing the war as his own, according to the Economist. Given that, Europe needs to expedite weapons transfers and financial backing, fearing stalled negotiations and prolonged conflict without decisive Western unity, according to The Economist.

The RM staff’s summary of "Is a Russia-Ukraine Cease-Fire Deal Slipping Away From Trump?" Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations, April 17, 2025.

  • The author writes: “It would be hard for Trump to significantly ramp up secondary sanctions on Russia given that he has already imposed 145% tariffs on the leading importer of Russian energy: China. Far more effective would be to open the spigot of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, which will soon dry up. Only when Putin is convinced that Ukraine can fight indefinitely and successfully will he have any incentive to bargain in good faith. But, as seen in Trump’s contemptuous comment about Ukraine wanting missiles, there is no sign that the president is rethinking his opposition to that aid. The likelihood is that, unless Trump reverses course and soon, any hope of bringing about a cease-fire in Ukraine in the near future will vanish.”

"Fyodor Lukyanov’s interview: ‘There is only one policeman in this process—the sheriff, who is called the President of the United States,’" Business FM, April 18, 2025. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • “There is a pretty impressive discipline in Trump’s team: his closest associates, his staff, do not allow themselves to do anything that is not in line with his line, that’s the first thing. Secondly, if you don’t just look at the news headlines, the whole context, the whole statement [by Marco Rubio on U.S. intention to exit peace negotiations if no progress is made in the upcoming days] is a little less harsh than it seems at first glance. He says that we need to understand, and if we understand, then we need to decide whether we are ready to go further. In principle, this is not a new statement, they have said something similar more than once in different forms... there is only one policeman in this whole process - the sheriff, who is called the president of the United States.”
  • [When asked what would happen if U.S. exited the negotiations] “Ukraine, I think, remains in the position it is in now. The United States will certainly not give it anything new… this is not very good for Ukraine, because then it can only count on military support from Europe, and Europe simply has limited capabilities… In this case, Russia could become the beneficiary, because Russia is not dependent on external suppliers, but overall the situation is very tense, because all the expectations of the previous period, several weeks, months, are being dashed, and we find ourselves back in the situation of an ongoing war.”

Vladimir Putin’s remarks during the "Meeting with Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov," Kremlin.ru, April 19, 2025. Clues from Russian Views. Putin said:

  • “The situation along the line of contact is clear, it is progressing favorably for us and the Russian forces are steadily advancing their positions. Please report separately on the border area, the Kursk and the Belgorod regions as soon as combat action to clean up these territories is completed.”
  • “Today is the eve of Easter… Guided by humanitarian motives, the Russian side announces an Easter ceasefire from 6 pm today to 12 am Monday. I hereby order all military operations ceased for this period. We assume that the Ukrainian side will follow our example. At the same time, our troops should be prepared to repel possible ceasefire violations and provocations by the enemy, as well as any aggressive acts on their part.”
  • “Our decision on the Easter truce will demonstrate whether the Kiev regime is sincere, ready, willing and able to comply with the agreements, to participate in peace negotiations aimed at addressing the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis. For our part, we have always been ready to move in this direction and strongly welcome the aspirations of the United States, President [of the United States] Trump, our Chinese friends, the President of the People's Republic of China, the BRICS countries and all supporters of a just and peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.”

Vladimir Putin’s "Answers to Journalists’ Questions," President of Russia, April 21, 2025. ^Machine-translated

  • [When asked: has the Easter truce ended?] “Hostilities have resumed, we said so from the very beginning, when we declared the truce. We always have a positive attitude towards truces, which is why we came up with such an initiative. Moreover, we are talking about the bright Easter days. This is a holiday for all Christians, this is how it turned out these days: for Catholics, and for Protestants, and for Orthodox Christians. That is why we have always said that we have a positive attitude towards any peace initiatives. We hope that representatives of the Kyiv regime will have the same attitude towards this.”
  • “In general, in general, we are seeing a decrease in combat activity on the part of the enemy. This is true. These are the assessments, including of the commanders of our groups. Nevertheless, there were almost five thousand violations, 4900. Of these, six attacks and 90 attempts at airborne UAV strikes, I think 400 artillery shellings. But in general, there was still a decrease in activity. We welcome this and are ready to look at the future.”
  • “As for the proposal not to strike at civilian infrastructure facilities, this needs to be sorted out… This is all a subject for careful study. Perhaps bilaterally, as a result of dialogue. We do not rule this out.”
  • “The fact that the Pope passed away precisely during Easter —I do not know about Catholics, but Orthodox people have such an understanding, there is such an internal tradition, a traditional understanding that if the Lord calls a person to himself during Easter, this is a special sign that the person did not live his life in vain, did a lot of good for people, and the Lord calls him to himself during these festive Easter days.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

The RM Staff’s summary of "The Russia That Putin Made," Alexander Gabuev, FA, April 17, 2025.

  • Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a major turning point in global affairs, according to the author. While Ukrainians suffered the most immediate and devastating impact, the war also brought deep and lasting changes to Russia itself—changes that many outside observers may underestimate. Putin has redefined Russia’s identity around conflict with the West, making it a central pillar of national policy and society, according to the author. Additionally, the invasion has significantly strengthened Russia's ties with China—developments that won’t simply disappear with a cease-fire or a diplomatic reset, Gabuev writes. Europe was caught off guard by the recent shift in U.S. leadership—and it will be equally unprepared if there's a sudden change in Russia's leadership unless the West starts thinking more seriously about its post-Putin relationship with Russia according to the author.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

​"How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?" Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, and Gavril Torrijos, ChinaPower Project, CSIS, April 2025. 

  • According to the CSIS authors, Russian arms sales have played a pivotal role in modernizing China’s military, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s, when over 80% of China’s imported weaponry came from Russia.
  • The CSIS authors observe that military ties have been strained by China’s repeated theft and reverse engineering of Russian defense technology, with over 500 cases of IP infringement alleged by Russia’s defense firm Rostec between 2002 and 2019.
  • More recently, due to Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine, Russia is increasingly reliant on China for critical defense components, with CSIS experts observing that this growing dependency may enhance Beijing’s leverage in acquiring sensitive Russian technologies.
  • Russian-Chinese joint military exercises have surged in frequency and scope since 2003, serving as a key pillar of China-Russia cooperation and allowing China to gain operational experience and signal deterrence, particularly toward the U.S. and its allies, according to the CIS authors.
  • As China’s military capabilities grow, CSIS analysts highlight a shift in leadership within joint drills—such as the 2021 Zapad/Interaction exercise where China led operations—signaling a potential role reversal with China as the senior partner in future engagements.

“Could the Tariff War Become a Real Hot War?” Graham Allison, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 04.17.25.

  • Could President Trump’s unprecedented tariff war against China stumble into a hot war with bombs exploding on American and Chinese soil? The good news is that most tariff or economic wars have not become hot wars. The bad news is that some have.
  • As Washington Post columnist Max Boot’s op-ed Monday notes, this issue is explored at length in Destined for War: Can the U.S. and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? My book was published 8 years ago in 2017 just as President Trump entered the White House for the first time. Over the weekend, Boot emailed me to ask about what I had written. In a lively back and forth, he and I agreed that we were both hearing eerie echoes of earlier cases in which economic conflict ended in bloody war.
  • Among the cases that I’ve studied, the most troubling analogue is the U.S.-Japanese confrontation that began with economic sanctions targeting imports of scrap metal and aviation fuel to Japan. This then escalated to limits on raw materials including iron, brass, copper, and finally, oil. And as Boot notes: “It was the oil embargo that threatened to strangle the Japanese economy that led Japan to its desperate gambit of attacking the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.”

"Five Signs That the U.S. and China Will Go to War," James Stavridis, Bloomberg, April 16, 2025.

  1. Cyberattacks
  2. Aviation Pressure on Taiwan
  3. South China Sea Operations
  4. Chinese Naval Construction
  5. Tariff and Trade Conflict

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published

Missile defense:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

RM staff’s summary of “Arms Control Is Not Dead Yet,” Rose Gottemoeller, FA, 04.14.25.

The author argues that President Trump must seize this moment in the sphere of nuclear arms control. Even if Senate approval for a binding nuclear treaty with Russia or China is unlikely, strategic political agreements could still curb arms races. His influence over Congress might ease obstacles., the author argues. Crucially, Trump must address how his tepid support for European and Asian allies fuels their debates on nuclear proliferation, the author argues. Trump should reaffirm America’s extended nuclear deterrence, assuring allies they need not pursue their own weapons. By stabilizing alliances and halting adversarial arms buildups, he can mitigate global nuclear risks decisive, according to the author.

"Russia Is Playing Along With Trump’s Hopes for a Rapprochement," Nathaniel Reynolds, CEIP, April 15, 2025.

  • Even if forecasting of escalation of nuclear risks “were useful for nothing more than underscoring uncertainty, it would have real value. However, we believe, albeit very tentatively, that it can provide useful qualitative insights. For example, our results highlight two areas that have probably received insufficient attention as part of risk-reduction efforts: nuclear alerting and escalation after nuclear first use,” according to the authors.
  • Moreover, forecasting offers two other benefits, according to the author.
  • “First, as many others have noted, it can help analysts to understand why they disagree. Specifically, our exercise revealed important disagreements about the most likely pathways of escalation, the effect of the nature of the initial crisis on subsequent escalation dynamics, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the controllability of escalation after first use. It was less useful in understanding why participants disagreed so strongly about the overall likelihood of escalation. In theory, this deficiency could be addressed by decomposing any given step in our escalation ladder into a series of pathways and estimating their probabilities. In practice, while potentially valuable, this process would be difficult and time-consuming—too time-consuming, certainly, for a one-day workshop that aimed to explore an escalation ladder that began with a crisis and ended with nuclear strikes against a U.S. state.”
  • “Second, forecasting can raise “red flags” by identifying differences between qualitative expectations and quantitative assessments. For example, it highlighted the tension between participants’ statements that it was difficult to predict how a crisis might escalate and their assessment—inferred from probability estimates—that if escalation occurred, it was likely to proceed along the principal pathway. In the event of such a difference, there is no a priori way of knowing whether the quantitative assessments or qualitative expectations are more reliable; instead, the point is simply that further research is needed.”

"Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Kommersant," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 14, 2025.

  • [When asked “Washington and Moscow already reached common ground?”] “The answer is no.”
  • “Bringing our dialogue with President of the United States Donald Trump back to normal is a natural thing to do.”
  • [When asked: “What will happen after the New START Treaty expires in February 2026? Do you think there is still time to develop a replacement? Or are we headed for an arms race?”] “Why would we need one? President Vladimir Putin has said clearly that we will never allow ourselves to be dragged into another arms race.” [When then asked “So, will there be some sort of unilateral restraint?”] Why would there be? We have our own policy, and we know how to ensure our country’s defense capability, even if the global strategic landscape remains unchanged. Despite the apparent normalization of relations with the Americans, they continue to label us an adversary in their official doctrinal documents and in public statements, even call us an enemy. That hasn’t stopped. You can’t just cherry-pick one element from the New START Treaty—like the right to inspect each other’s nuclear facilities —and ignore the rest, just as you can’t do that with the UN Charter. The very first lines of the treaty state that it was only possible to conclude the agreement on the basis of mutual respect, equal security and the recognition of the interdependence between strategic offensive and defensive systems.”
  • “The Trump administration suggested discussing this issue in a trilateral format that would involve China. They haven’t proposed anything to us. And we won’t be the ones proposing anything either, because we are not the ones who dismantled the arms control framework, including New START Treaty.”
  • “We are self-sufficient. We have everything we need. We know how to maintain our defense capability. If the Americans feel that their nuclear arsenal is becoming outdated, especially in comparison to our modernized weapons, then perhaps they are the ones interested in closing that gap. We haven’t received any proposals to that effect.”

“We may find ourselves on the ladder of escalation to a nuclear war” Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexey Arbatov on the possible collapse of the arms control system,” Kommersant, 04.17.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • [When asked about the pending expiration of New START]—“This worries me very much. For more than half a century, the dialogue on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and the dozen treaties that have been concluded on this issue during this time have become the “supporting structure” of the entire system of nuclear arms control in the world. Without this structure, the entire system will be shaken and will eventually inevitably fall apart. Meanwhile, this system was one of the main instruments developed by mankind to prevent a nuclear war. And it is now crumbling before our eyes. Another instrument was diplomacy, that is, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and crises. This track is also now in a deep dead end.”
  • [When asked “And what are the consequences of the absence of arms control treaties?”] “[We] may find ourselves on the ladder of escalation to a nuclear war, from which it is almost impossible to jump off… without the New START treaty and the numerous preceding treaties and agreements, we would now find ourselves back in the nightmare days of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis… Extending this treaty is formally impossible… But it is possible to adopt politically binding statements that the parties will not exceed the New START ceilings… There is another, more formal option. It is possible to use Article 15 of the New START Treaty and amend it to allow for its agreed extension for a five-year period more than once.”
  • [When asked to comment on the fact that Trump... has stated several times that he would like to discuss nuclear weapons with Russia and China] “ On what basis do the U.S. want to involve China in negotiations in this format? China is still significantly behind Russia and the U.S. in the nuclear potential… Let [the U.S.] finally offer something concrete. Simply repeating "let's involve China" is a long-playing record, everyone is tired of it.”
  • [When asked to comment on whether and how to involve France and Great Britain in nuclear arms control]. “One could think about a series of bilateral agreements: Russia-France and Russia-Great Britain. Or a trilateral one: Russia and two European countries. Within the framework of such formats, France and Great Britain could agree to limit their nuclear weapons in exchange for limitations on certain Russian weapons. This is the only way to hope to resolve these issues.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Russia populates chatbots with lies. Any bad actor could game AI the same way," Joseph Menn, WP, April 20, 2025.

  • “Russia is automating the spread of false information to fool artificial intelligence chatbots on key topics, offering a playbook to other bad actors on how to game AI to push content meant to inflame, influence and obfuscate instead of inform.“
  • “Experts warn the problem is worsening as more people rely on chatbots rushed to market, social media companies cut back on moderation and the Trump administration disbands government teams fighting disinformation.“
  • “Earlier this year, when researchers asked 10 leading chatbots about topics targeted by false Russian messaging, such as the claim that the United States was making bioweapons in Ukraine, a third of the responses repeated those lies.”

"​Asking AI How to Respond to a Foreign Policy Decision," Yasir Atalan, Benjamin Jensen, and Ian Reynolds, CSIS, April 17, 2025. 

  • “AI models have built-in biases that factor into their decisionmaking. These biases should be mitigated before integrating them into foreign policy processes.
    • 1. CSIS Futures Lab research indicates that some widely used models (e.g., Llama 8B, Gemini 1.5, and Qwen2) choose escalatory responses in the benchmark study, compared to models like Claude, GPT, Llama 70B, and Mistral, that chose a decrease in conflict intensity. These discrepancies likely stem from differences in training data and fine-tuning practices.
    • “2. All eight large language models (LLMs) recommend more escalatory responses for the United States, United Kingdom, and France, while offering fewer recommendations for escalation to China and Russia.”
    • “3. To safeguard decisionmaking, governments and agencies must invest in comprehensive evaluation frameworks and institute routine audits of AI models. Adopting tools like Futures Lab’s CFPD-Benchmark can help identify and correct these biases before deployment—ensuring that AI supports strategic objectives while minimizing unintended risks.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Energy exports from CIS:

"Putin's War Economy Can't Escape Trump's Trade Blitz," Georgi Kantchev and Alan Cullison, WSJ, April 20, 2025.

  • Russia dodged "Liberation Day" tariffs, but Moscow is still perilously exposed to President Trump's trade war for one reason: oil,” Georgi Kantchev and Alan Cullison write in WSJ. “The industry is both the engine of the Kremlin's economy and its primary source of vulnerability; oil and gas make up around a third of state-budget revenues,” they write.
  • “Global crude prices slumped this month and remain volatile after tariff-fueled recession fears gripped the market. Russia's benchmark Urals blend is hovering under $55 a barrel[4], far below the target in this year's budget of around $70. Analysts say that if prices remain low, the Russian economy will face a hard landing, in which case they project the budget deficit would nearly double this year,” according to Georgi Kantchev and Alan Cullison.
  • "If the oil price stays down, they will feel the pinch, and they are already beginning to feel the pinch," Elina Ribakova, a nonresident senior fellow at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economic told WSJ. "If this continues, they will face a guns versus butter situation."

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

"Between The New Trump and The Old Putin: The U.S. administration's economic opportunism is forcing Europe to rethink its geo-economic and energy strategy," Re: Russia, April 12, 2025.

Climate change:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Russia Is Playing Along With Trump’s Hopes for a Rapprochement," Nathaniel Reynolds, CEIP, April 15, 2025.

  • “In its first 100 days, the administration of President Donald Trump has flipped previous policy toward Russia on its head. It’s broken Russia’s previous isolation from the West in hopes of securing a ceasefire in Ukraine and a better U.S. relationship with Moscow. It’s taken a coercive and transactional approach to Kyiv, putting the future of U.S. support to Ukraine’s security in doubt. And it’s hinted at a broader retrenchment from Europe, helping plunge the transatlantic partnership—which has been the bedrock of U.S. strategy toward Russia and its Soviet predecessor for the past eighty years—to new lows.”
  • “Russia may find its window of opportunity closes quickly if it antagonizes Washington on Ukraine or takes a strategic misstep that sours relations. In this scenario, the Kremlin could find itself in circumstances resembling the first Trump administration, when a frustrated Moscow could not advance ties. Or Russia may succeed in weakening U.S. influence in Ukraine and Europe, only to find the outcome is not what it hoped. The war in Ukraine already created the very thing Putin feared—an aggrieved and capable neighbor right on its border. Now expectations of U.S. retrenchment are sparking new discussions in Europe about how to take more responsibility for security, unearthing arguments in Germany and Poland on obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Even if Putin succeeds, more dangerous times for Russian security may await.”

“Overview of Key Trends” in “Geopolitics and the Russian Budget; Russian-American Talks; Talks in Paris; Domestic developments,” Tatyana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 04.22.25. Clues from Russian Views.

  • “Regarding the war itself, there have been a number of developments, most notably what can be described as a geopolitical cooling. Vladimir Putin handed Steve Witkoff Russia’s finalised “proposals”—Russia's demands for peace. While these were received with some understanding by Trump, their likely rejection by Ukraine, combined with Washington’s limited capacity to pressure Kyiv into capitulation, has led to the realisation that a settlement may not be achievable. This, however, does not appear to endanger the broader Russian-American effort to normalize relations. The two sides conducted another prisoner swap and continue discussions on diplomatic matters and cooperation in other areas, such as the Iran nuclear program. The United States appears to be seriously considering pulling out of trying to settle the Ukraine conflict, while Russia remains determined to continue hostilities for “as long as it takes”. Russia's recent strike on Sumy illustrates Putin’s lack of restraint in pursuing his objectives.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

​"Russia’s economy is cooling down," Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, April 18, 2025. 

  • “There are several signs of a slowdown in Russia’s economy:”
    • “Seasonally-adjusted inflation (SAAR) came in at 7.1% in March, while the three-month average was 8.3%, against 12.9% in the fourth quarter of 2024.”
    • “Weekly inflation points to a steady slowdown. In the second week of April prices rose 0.11%, bringing total inflation so far in April to 0.27%. At the same time, we saw the biggest weekly decline in price indices for non-food goods over the past year.”
    • Credit dynamics are significantly down on levels seen in the first three quarters of 2024, due to higher interest rates hitting borrowing and the planned withdrawal of macroprudential benefits for banks. “
    • “The sell-off on global financial markets in March and April had a cooling influence on investment in Russian assets.”
    • “The ruble is up almost 20% against the U.S. dollar since the start of the year.”
    • “The first quarter saw productive capacity utilization fall across the whole economy from 81% to 79%, with the greatest declines in construction, trade and logistics.”

• “After three years of militarizing its economy, Russia is facing a slowdown. It’s currently looking like a soft slowdown, with no crash landing and a smooth moderation in the pace of growth. But we’re not talking about a transition to a prosperous peacetime economy. Russia’s economic model is not being rebuilt, it’s simply running out of steam.”

“Why Russia Isn’t Doomed,” Mathew Burrows, and Collin Meisel, NI, 04.19.25.

The authors write:

  • “Most forecasts of Russia’s Future project the same scene: Russia is caught in endless conflict with the West or will soon be absorbed by China. However, Russia has other options created by the shift of economic power from Europe to Asia, the curtailment of Western ties owing to the Ukraine War, climate change, the opening of the Arctic, and its own renewable energy potential. Publics and governments in Asia and the Global South also welcome a stronger Russia.”
  • “Potential is one thing, achievement is another. Without peace, the young, educated, and skilled Russians who left at the outset of the Ukraine War may not return in sufficient numbers to renew Russia’s former tech excellence. Continuing hostilities with the West and a growing defense budget will also drain resources for any Russian transformation. The gains, however, could be significant with a new Russia pivoting to the East and reaping economic opportunities from climate change and a more favorable geopolitical environment. Success in developing a normal relationship with the United States and the West would reopen the door to international finance and technology, but not enough to ensure that a new Russia will abandon its challenges to the West.”

Defense and aerospace:

  •  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

  • No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Pope Francis Dies: Pontiff Mourned by Leaders Seeking a Link to His Legacy," Donato Paolo Mancini, Bloomberg, April 21, 2025.

  • “Pope Francis, 88, died in Rome on Monday morning. He’d been hospitalized for about five weeks with severe pneumonia and left hospital in March.”
  • “Global leaders paid tribute and sought to associate themselves with the legacy of the late Pope Francis, highlighting his role in key global conflicts at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.”
  • “Russian President Vladimir Putin also expressed condolences, saying the pope actively promoted dialogue between the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, as well as constructive cooperation between Russia and the Holy See,” according to a statement from the Kremlin.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Ukraine:

“Power is being monopolized in Ukraine," The Economist, April 16, 2025.

  • Despite Ukraine’s impressive strides in building its domestic defense industry and reducing reliance on Western military support, concerns are mounting over increasing political centralization under President Volodymyr Zelensky, according to the Economist. The country now produces drones and missiles at scale, contributing significantly to its war effort against Russia. Yet major challenges remain in areas like missile defense and troop mobilization, according to the Economist.
  • Criticism of Zelensky has become difficult, especially after Donald Trump labeled him a dictator, causing Ukrainians to rally behind their leader, according to the Economist. However, opposition figures like Petro Poroshenko have been sidelined through opaque legal maneuvers, and civil society activists are being harassed. Some fear Ukraine is moving toward autocracy, with power concentrated in the hands of unelected presidential advisers.
  • The Economist warns this consolidation of power may erode Ukraine’s democratic resilience. Zelensky’s government increasingly views dissent and investigative journalism as threats, weakening the pluralism that once defined Ukrainian politics.
  • As Olexiy Honcharenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament, told the Economist: “We have demonstrated that a small democracy can resist a larger autocracy and turn itself into a porcupine. But a small autocracy can be swallowed by a larger one.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"After Ukraine, Putin May Spring for Central Asia," David Kirichenko, NI, April 15, 2025. The author writes:

  • “If Vladimir Putin is permitted to claim victory in Ukraine or strike a peace deal that effectively reduces it to a vassal state, he is unlikely to stop there. Now in his seventies, with his imperial ambitions slipping out of reach, Putin may grow more reckless in pursuit of his legacy.”
  • “The Kremlin elite may believe that, once Ukraine is under its control, they will have an opportunity to turn their attention to Central Asia and revive Russia’s imperial project. Despite the cost, Moscow intends to drag the world back into the nineteenth century.”
  • The RM staff’s summary of “Russia’s Hidden Empire,” Alexander Cooley, FA, 04.16.25.” Russia’s regional influence in post-Soviet states has proved far more resilient than many Western observers anticipated,” the author writes. “Three years into the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s strategy to pursue a war of attrition and wait for Western unity to crack appears to be vindicated,” according to the author. Russia has engaged in cultivation of security, legal, and economic networks in these former Soviet republics. The governments of these republics now repurpose these ties for their own gain, transforming the area into a laboratory for innovative integration rather than a decolonizing space, he writes.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see the following items on sites where they were originally published:

Footnotes

  1. Last week saw Donald Trump and Marco Rubio warn on the U.S. will walk away from efforts to broker a Russia-Ukraine peace deal unless there are clear signs of progress in the next several days, according to Reuters and WP. Trump said Rubio was "right in saying" that the U.S. wants to see the Russia-Ukraine war come to an end. Asked how to identify how many days that would be, Trump said, "No specific numbers of days, but quickly, we want to get it done,” according to NBC.
  2. Ukrainian authorities insisted Russian forces targeted civilians in the strike on Sumy, but an Ukrainian soldier described to WP how he was sitting at a military medal ceremony in a university building basement Sunday when two Russian ballistic missiles tore through the surrounding area in Sumy. Ukrainian government also fired Volodymyr Artiukh from the post of the Sumy Oblast governor following the strikes.
  3. According to people familiar with the matter, the U.S. is likely to hold talks in London on Wednesday with Ukrainian and European officials as President Donald Trump pushes for a deal to halt Russia’s full-scale invasion, according to Bloomberg.
  4. “Russia’s Economy Ministry has lowered its forecast for oil prices this year in an update for its baseline scenario, reflecting the latest trends on global oil markets. Per the new scenario, Brent crude will average $68 per barrel, down from $81.7 per barrel in the September 2024 scenario,” according to an April 21, 2025 article in Oilprice.com.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Photo credit: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service photo via AP, File.

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