6 Ideas to Explore

1. It took the Trump administration less than a week to acknowledge that one major reason why Russia was spared from the U.S. import tariffs, which Trump announced for about 90 countries on April 2, was the White House’s desire to avoid negative impact on talks with Russia and Ukraine. When asked on April 6 by ABC’s George Stephanopoulos why Russia wasn’t among the countries facing tariffs, White House Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett said: “There's obviously an ongoing negotiation with Russia and Ukraine, and I think the president made the decision not to conflate the two issues… They're in the middle of a negotiation, George, aren't they?” What Stephanopoulos then, however, failed to ask and Hassett didn’t answer was that, if Washington was, indeed, trying to avoid impacting the “negotiation with Russia and Ukraine,” then why was only Moscow spared from the U.S. tariffs, while Kyiv ended up with a 10% levy? It should be noted that Hassett’s explanation differs from explanations given by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt right after the tariffs were officially announced. Bessent told Fox News on April 2 that Russia was spared because the sanctions imposed on the country after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine mean that U.S.-Russian trade had effectively stopped, according to NYT, while Leavitt told Axios that Russia was left off the list because U.S. sanctions already "preclude any meaningful trade."¹ A RM blog post, however, disputed Bessent’s and Leavitt’s initial claims. First, low levels of trade didn’t prevent Trump from slapping tariffs on other countries. For instance, the U.S. exported $526 million worth of goods and services to Russia in 2024, while importing $3,007 million. In comparison, the volume of Angola’s trade with the U.S. ($2.6 billion in goods last year) was lower than America’s trade with Russia, but this African country still found itself subjected to a 32% import tariff. While differing from Bessent’s and Leavitt’s April 2 explanations, Hassett’s April 6 explanation was similar to that offered in RM’s April 3 blog post by Simon Saradzhyan.
2. The hope of a “Reverse Kissinger” remains “illusory” as “many analysts predict that Russia and China will continue their ‘no limits’ partnership, regardless of Trump’s blandishments,” according to WP’s David Ignatius. For one, Kurt M. Campbell, a former deputy secretary of state and now chairman of the Asia Group, sees the Xi-Putin bond “as intensely personal, nurtured over scores of meetings and a thousand hours of discussion,” Ignatius wrote on April 3. In fact, Putin sees Xi as a kindred spirit, according to Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council official now back at Brookings. Echoing Ignatius, Michael McFaul of Stanford University and Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University write in FA that hopes of another “Reverse Kissinger” represent a “delusion.” There is no division to exploit. “What unites Putin and Xi greatly outweighs what divides them,” and “Putin knows Trump cannot come close to offering him as much as Xi does,” they write. Moreover, “there are no parallel benefits to a U.S. partnership with Russia today,” they write.
3. If Trump were, indeed, to introduce secondary sanctions on Russian oil to try to press Russia into peace with Ukraine, that would generate a “lose-lose outcome,” Russian energy expert Sergey Vakulenko argues in a commentary for CEIP. Vakulenko sees several problems with such a “secondary” approach. “First, tariffs are… ill-suited to be used as tactical weapons in a mediation attempt to push a less willing party to the negotiating table,” he writes. “Second, the chain of action for this particular measure would be very long: to make the Russians do something, the weapon is not targeted at the Russians, nor at companies buying from the Russians, but at the buyer’s compatriots who export goods to America,” according to Vakulenko. “The worst part of it is that even if the secondary tariffs were to scare off buyers, it is still unclear whether the world can really afford to manage without Russian oil exports,” he warns.
4. Ukraine is holding strong defensively and improving its ability to reinforce its positions, though a full Ukrainian victory is unlikely, as is a collapse, according to NATO SACEUR Gen. Christopher Cavoli’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 3. Cavoli warned that U.S. aid to Ukraine is vital, especially for missile interception and intelligence. "It would obviously have a rapid and deleterious effect on their ability to fight," the general said when asked what would happen if the Trump administration were to refuse to provide military aid to Kyiv. Cavoli also acknowledged that Russia’s defense industry is outproducing the U.S. in categories such as tanks and shells.
5. Vladimir Putin wants no peace deal that doesn’t consolidate his illegal land grab, in the view of WP’s editorial board. Their argument follows from the Kremlin’s decision to effectively reject ceasefire proposal, according to WP editors. In addition, “as if to punctuate the Russian president’s disinterest in a peace deal, Putin this week moved to expand the size of his military, issuing a spring call-up for 160,000 men… from April to July—the highest number of conscripts since 2011,” according to WP’s editorial board. If Trump—who was last week reported to be running out of patience with Putin—is coming around to realizing the U.S. should be “firmly” on Ukraine’s side in the absence of Russia’s interest in a fair peace deal, “then it’s better late than never,” according to the WP editorial. According to experts at ECFR and Brookings, however, Trump’s team is uninterested in firmly siding with Ukraine, even though a majority of Americans wants it to be. In fact, “America is not looking to make the world safe for democracy, protect Ukrainian sovereignty or seek a new transatlantic balance in providing for European security. It is pursuing an aura of peace and a new deal with Russia,” according ECFR’s experts.
6. “Russia will likely seek to reassure the United States that it will not get involved if Washington enters a military standoff with Iran” over its nuclear program, according to Nikita Smagin, an expert on Iranian foreign and domestic policies. “As Russia can’t seriously hope to influence the outcome, it makes more sense to package its neutrality as a concession to Washington that might help the two sides reach a more wide-ranging agreement over the Ukraine war,” Smagin writes in a commentary for CEIP. Russia may remain officially neutral. However, in practice, if Russia is, indeed, helping the Houthis, would it not help (clandestinely) the Houthis’ main state ally, with which it has recently concluded a treaty on “comprehensive strategic partnership” and which supplies many of the attack UAVs Russia uses against Ukraine?*

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• “Everyone wants Europe's largest nuclear plant. Ukraine wants it back,” Siobhán O'Grady and Serhii Korolchuk, WP, 04.07.25. 

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Putting the Screws on the Partnership Between North Korea and Russia,” Choong-Koo Lee, WoTR, 04.01.25.

• As the war between Ukraine and Russia has raged on, cooperation has grown between Moscow and Pyongyang. Following the Russo-North Korean summit in September 2023, North Korea began providing large-scale military assistance to Russia, reportedly sending military equipment starting that month and deploying troops from October 2024. This has led to an economic recovery in North Korea. Since North Korea is leveraging its military cooperation with Russia to expand and enhance its own military capabilities, the United States and South Korea should employ a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economic tools to encourage a significant reduction in Russia’s military ties with North Korea both during and immediately after negotiations aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian War.
• Unless North Korea suspends nuclear and missile development, the United States and South Korea should employ coercive diplomacy to prevent Russian military aid from strengthening North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Enhanced multilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and NATO allies could tighten arms trade restrictions and sanctions enforcement against both Russia and North Korea. Further, prioritized intelligence sharing and targeted sanctions should specifically address high technology transfers, such as space, nuclear, and unmanned technologies, between Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Lastly, recognizing that these measures may not fully curb North Korea’s military advancements, the United States and South Korea should proactively bolster deterrence strategies, including missile defenses and readiness across ground, air, maritime, and undersea domains.
• Russia might continue a limited level of military exchange with North Korea to replenish its weapon stockpiles in the post-war period. However, Moscow is likely to shift its strategic focus from wartime necessities to post-war reconstruction, potentially adjusting its partnership with North Korea in line with its evolving strategic priorities, thereby placing less emphasis on strategic cooperation with North Korea. If this is realized, North Korea will no longer be able to rely comfortably on its partnership with Russia and may seek to improve relations with Washington and Seoul.
• Although North Korea outlined five modernization priorities for its conventional forces in December 2017, these efforts stalled in early 2020 as Kim Jong Un prioritized nuclear weapons development. However, given North Korea’s significant disadvantage in conventional capabilities compared to South Korea—particularly in naval and air forces—modernizing its conventional forces remains an urgent challenge. Bridging this gap would be nearly impossible without external military assistance.
• The current partnership initiative between Russia and North Korea extends to two key areas: expanding North Korea’s weapons production capacity and advancing military technology. Russia’s ammunition shortage prompted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang in July 2023. Shortly thereafter, North Korea escalated its military assistance, primarily supplying artillery shells… Experts estimated that North Korea may have covered at least half of Russia’s additional ammunition demand, supplementing Moscow’s domestic production.
• North Korea leveraged its military aid to Russia to strengthen its defense industry. As Pyongyang and Moscow established a supply chain for military production, Kim Jong Un intensified his focus on boosting North Korea’s arms manufacturing. During on-site inspections of defense factories, Kim repeatedly emphasized increasing the production of artillery shells, tactical missiles, tactical missile launchers, and strategic missile launchers. His directives signal that factories must meet these targets with tangible results. Moreover, he prioritized modernizing production facilities, implying governmental investment in acquiring advanced engineering equipment.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Will Moscow Help Washington ‘Solve’ the Iranian Problem?" Nikita Smagin, CEIP, 04.02.25.

• An ideal outcome for Moscow would be if it were involved in a nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington—perhaps given the role of ensuring the implementation of such a deal. For this reason, the Kremlin has agreed to be a mediator in talks between the United States and Iran. The only problem is that these talks have not yet started because Iran has consistently refused to engage with Trump under threat of force. If this continues, there will be no need for Russian mediation, and a military scenario will become the most likely.
• There’s no way Russia will try to protect Iran from an attack: the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States and Israel would be too great. Even the mooted sale of Russian military equipment to Iran would have little effect on the course of such a confrontation. A few air defense units and fighter jets cannot save Tehran from the combined might of the United States and Israel. To even have a chance at properly protecting Iran, Russia would have to have spent many years supplying Iran with weapons.
• All of this means that Russia will likely seek to reassure the United States that it will not get involved if Washington enters a military standoff with Iran. As Russia can’t seriously hope to influence the outcome, it makes more sense to package its neutrality as a concession to Washington that might help the two sides reach a more wide-ranging agreement over the Ukraine war. A major crisis in the Middle East will not be resolved in Moscow; it will be resolved by the United States-Iran-Israel triangle. Russia is destined to remain on the sidelines.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see: 

• "To Bomb or Not to Bomb Iran Is Now the Question," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 04.04.25.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Peace in Ukraine Will Not Mean a Return Home, Russian Émigrés Say,” Nataliya Vasilyeva, NYT, 04.06.25.

• President Trump has said he trusts President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to abide by any peace deal on Ukraine they negotiate. Many Russians who fled the country in the early months of the war are not so sure. Nor do they have much faith that the conditions that drove them abroad — including a crackdown on any political dissent — will change anytime soon, whether Mr. Trump manages to broker a cease-fire or not. For the moment, those talks appear to have stalled since Mr. Putin rebuffed a proposal by Mr. Trump and Ukraine for a 30-day truce.
• “The war will be over when Putin is over,” said Pavel Snop, a real-estate agent from St. Petersburg who fled to Turkey three years ago. He added, “Putin is going to keep bargaining: But he’s bargaining not for his country and its citizens, but for sanctions relief for himself and his friends.”
• For the Kremlin, the future of some 800,000 Russians who fled their country after the invasion is a sensitive political and economic subject. Their existence is a stark reminder that many Russians opposed the war, or at least did not want to fight in it. The exodus of so many people, who tend to be highly educated and work in professional fields that are in high demand, has also been damaging for the economy, experts say.
• But even if they are homesick and struggling to put down roots elsewhere, many Russians abroad do not believe that the Kremlin will stop persecuting people for their anti-government stance no matter what happens on the battlefield in Ukraine.
• A survey conducted by the research project OutRush that surveyed some 8,500 Russian émigrés in more than 100 countries from July to November, before cease-fire talks began, showed that only a small share planned to move back to Russia if the war ended. While the survey is not representative of all Russian émigrés, it showed that about 40 percent of poll respondents said they would consider returning if they saw democratic changes in Russia. 

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Donald Trump dashes Ukrainians’ hopes of returning home,” Polina Ivanova, FT, 04.02.25.
• "The Prospect of War Has Turned Europe Into a Continent of Preppers," The Economist, 03.27.25.
• “How the Ukraine War Caused Extreme Environmental Damage,” Brendan Hoffman and Evelina Riabenko, NYT, 04.02.25.
• ​"Are Russia’s war emigrants heading home?" The Bell, 04.03.25. Clues from Russian Views.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

For FT’s visual guide to the war visit this page.

“Statement of General Christopher G. Cavoli, United States Army United States European Command,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 04.03.25.

• The United States today confronts the most challenging threats in the European theater since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine just entered its fourth year, and Russia remains willing to use military force to accomplish its geopolitical objectives. These include ambitions to expand its territorial control; broaden its influence regionally and globally; and diminish U.S. leadership and influence.
• Russia is actively conducting a destabilization campaign within Europe intended to create strategic dilemmas for the United States. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing effort to develop a massive military larger than its pre-war force, combined with its propensity to absorb military, political, and economic costs to achieve its strategic goals, indicate that Russia poses an enduring threat to the United States, our NATO Allies, and global security.
• This threat is intensified by Russia’s strengthened relationships with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Iran (Iran). Together, this group of adversaries seeks to undermine U.S. and Allied advantages and challenge our vital interests at home and abroad.
• Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated. In fact, the Russian army, which has borne the brunt of combat, is today larger than it was at the beginning of the war—despite suffering an estimated 790,000 casualties.
• Russian ground forces in Ukraine have lost an estimated 3,000 tanks, 9,000 armored vehicles, 13,000 artillery systems, and over 400 air defense systems in the past year—but is on pace to replace them all. Russia has expanded its industrial production, opened new manufacturing facilities, and converted commercial production lines for military purposes. As a result, the Russian defense industrial base is expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles this year. (Comparatively, the United States only produces about 135 tanks per year and no longer produces new Bradley Fighting Vehicles.) Additionally, we anticipate Russia to produce 250,000 artillery shells per month, which puts it on track to build a stockpile three times greater than the United States and Europe combined.
• Russian commanders still emphasize quantity and mass over skill and operational acumen. However, the poorly resourced and disorganized Russian forces we saw during the initial invasion have improved significantly. … The military has demonstrated its ability to learn from the battlefield, disseminate new concepts across organizations, and counter Ukrainian tactical and technical advantages.
• A conventional fight with Russia will be decided on land, and it would likely begin with a comparatively large Russian force positioned on a NATO border in order to negate traditional U.S. and NATO advantages in, and preferences for, long-range, standoff warfare. Therefore, NATO, including USEUCOM, must be postured to blunt Russia’s ability to rapidly mass numerically superior land forces.
• Once fully realized, ACE [U.S. Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment] is envisioned to support American and Allied aircraft with shared infrastructure in multiple locations throughout Europe, enabling our air forces to become more dynamic and survivable against our adversaries’ air and anti-air defense capabilities. This includes integrating U.S. and NATO command-and-control structures that provide early warning and detection against Russian conventional and nuclear-capable forces. Should Russia mobilize its conventional forces, the NATO Alliance will be able to activate its defense plans and respond with force. If NATO’s alert system detects Russian nuclear activity, USEUCOM provides an essential component of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that helps to guarantee our Allies’ security.
• [T]he United States and NATO need to continue to prepare to meet this [Russian] threat. USEUCOM is helping to prepare the Alliance by increasing European ownership of European security; prioritizing warfighting in everything we do; and building readiness to execute the defense plans. All of this requires U.S. leadership, continued investment in advanced capabilities, and a sustainable transition to an Allied-led defense in Europe. 

“Generals Testify on European and Africa Combatant Commands,” C-SPAN, 04.03.25.

Gen. Christopher Cavoli said in Q&A:

• Are the Ukrainians destined to lose? … There's nothing inevitable in war, and the Ukrainians are in very strong defensive positions right now and are improving weakly their ability to generate force and to reinforce those positions. It is hard sitting here right now to envision a major Ukrainian offensive that clears everybody, you know, out of every square inch of Ukraine, but likewise it's very hard to envision Ukraine collapsing and losing that conflict. I do not think there's an inevitability to a Ukrainian loss.
• There is a Ukrainian force that is holding on inside Kursk Oblast inside Russia. … They've got quite a bit of terrain. I'd give it to you in closed session, sir, and how many troops, but they've got a sizable force there, and they maintain a well defended piece of terrain there. They've also augmented it with some terrain. They recently captured just a few kilometers in Belgorod just south of there, so they've taken. They gave up some. Now they're taking it back.
• The Ukrainians on their side have assumed very strong defensive positions, well dug in and appear to have solved some of their manpower problems that were so, so acute last autumn. They've increased the pool of people available for mobilization. They've increased the pool of people available for voluntary recruitment, and they've done a good job squeezing people out of headquarters to the front.
• [Asked “If the administration withholds more material, spare parts, and particularly intelligence advice. What would be the effect on the Ukrainian forces?”] First of all, it would obviously have a rapid and deleterious effect on their ability to fight. Senator, the Ukrainians depend on us principally. Uniquely I should say for their high-end anti-aircraft systems, so the things that shoot down the ballistic missiles and the long range attack missiles that the Russians throw at them almost daily. That is mainly supplied by the United States. That would, that would have an obvious effect if the Russians, if the Ukrainians were not able to receive intelligence from us, they would struggle to target, especially in depth, operational level targets such as command post logistics areas and things like that.
• [T]here are a number of F-16s in [Ukraine]. There are a number of pilots in there. There are more F-16s prepared to be deployed in there. There are more pilots in the training pipelines, sir. … None of the F-16s has been from the U.S. though. They've mainly been from northern European countries.
• [I]f we divide Russia's rebuilding capability into two big blocks, personnel and equipment, I believe the personnel they'll be able to build as quickly as they want to. They continue to maintain a conscription. … It increased by 10,000 over last year, 160,000 this year. … They want to have an army of about 1.5 million. … They want to put a lot of it on the on the border of NATO in northeastern Europe. It'll take them a little bit of time to do that, but we're talking a couple of years.
  • Equipment—that depends on how much more they lose inside Ukraine, sir. They've lost a vast amount of equipment inside Ukraine. They started the war with some place near 13,000 tanks on active and in storage, and they're starting to approach near the end of that, near the end of the useful tanks in storage. … They have expanded their capability to produce some things artillery shells, cruise missiles tremendously and they're producing some things such as one way attack drones in prodigious numbers that they weren't even producing at all before the war. And I would characterize that capability as offensive.
  • In other words, they're not defending against a possible invasion from Ukraine. They are preparing for continuing offensive actions against Ukraine and possibly NATO allies if they are successful in Ukraine.

“Eucom, Africom Leaders Testify on Lethality, Global Deterrence,” Army Maj. Wes Shinego, Defense.gov, 04.03.25.

• Cavoli described his dual roles and detailed a streamlined command process in which he controls nuclear forces in Europe and, if ordered, deploys them under NATO's consensus, ensuring a rapid, lethal response. "We would want those under the command of a U.S. officer," he said, stressing the importance of American leadership in preserving this deterrent.
• Cavoli highlighted Russia's Arctic expansion, with new airfields enabling strikes across the polar cap — the shortest path to U.S. territory — and the Northern Fleet's attempts to penetrate the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap with submarine-launched cruise missiles threatening the Atlantic.

“Ukraine Has a Resource Far More Valuable Than Minerals: The Ukrainian military could become a truly devoted and grateful military ally for the United States for years to come,” Anton Drobovych, NI, 04.07.25. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

• With bold action from the new White House administration to assist Ukrainians in defeating the Russian occupying forces, the Ukrainian military, unmatched in Europe, could become a truly devoted and grateful military ally for the United States for years to come. If in previous years, Ukrainian troops assisted the United States, for example, in Iraq, out of respect, then if the American people help Kyiv achieve the greatest military victory since World War II, that gratitude may become unprecedented.
• Clearly, after the end of Ukraine’s war for independence from Russia, Ukraine will demobilize a significant portion of its soldiers. However, in order to continue deterring the Russians, Ukraine will maintain a large, capable, and modern army. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers, with vast experience in modern warfare, will return from the front and seek new employment. They could become a solid foundation for a new European army, replacing U.S. troops, who could return home or be deployed wherever America’s interests demand. But they could also form part of a completely new security component proposed by the United States, relying on Ukrainian allies and considering European interests, thereby strengthening the U.S. position in this part of the world with the most capable and dedicated forces... So if we’re looking at the tactical level and what’s being consumed the most at the front, Ukraine could probably sustain itself for quite some time, and we’d be seeing a steady degradation rather than any sort of sudden collapse. And even then, the jury’s out on how the fighting might unfold. But the impact would be visible over time, and I think one should not be too cavalier or hand-wave away the extent to which U.S. support and U.S. organization of military assistance writ large for Ukraine has been a significant contributor to Ukraine’s military efforts.
• Russian leadership has sought Ukrainian capitulation, which they can’t achieve on the battlefield. So instead, they’re trying to attain Western capitulation, to an extent. And here, they feel they have a stronger chance of getting a lot of what they want
• I think the one thing that Ukraine certainly has going for it beyond its own resilience is that Moscow has a strong tendency to overplay his hand and to get overly ambitious in these types of negotiations with the U.S.

"Why Ukraine Still Isn’t About to Lose," Michael Kofman’s interview with Benjamin Hart, New York Magazine, 04.07.25.

• If we go back to the fall [of 2024], things are looking quite a bit more grim. Russian forces were making accelerated gains on the ground, and they were taking more territory each month from July until November. Then their momentum slowed down considerably over the course of the winter. The first and foremost reason for this, from my point of view, was weather.
• So from late 2023 through ‘24, Russian forces focused on assault groups, detachments, and essentially a means of attacking that was difficult to exhaust, on the one hand, but on the other hand wasn’t conducive to making big breakthroughs. Ukrainian forces then adapted in a way that allowed them to compensate to a degree for the lack of infantry at the front line, but also specifically to counter how Russian forces were fighting.
• Ukraine is far less dependent on the West for day-to-day battlefield needs than it was in previous years.
• The honest answer is I don’t know if Ukraine is planning another offensive operation, but looking at the overall trajectory in this war, I think Ukraine’s focus is and probably should be stabilizing the front.
• There’s a reason why wars like this tend to go on well beyond the decisive phase of the war and negotiations may take months or years, if we look at historical cases. It’s very difficult to get society and elites, if they represent their society, to compromise. It is also exceedingly difficult to get leaders to make an agreement with a party they don’t trust, and to get them to agree to something that they don’t think actually answers any of the big questions for their country or won’t yield a solution to the war — especially if you’re not willing to offer security guarantees or anything else to backstop that arrangement.

Military aid to Ukraine:

"A European Reassurance Force for Ukraine: Options and Challenges," Ben Barry, Jonty Kennon, Douglas Barrie, Nick Childs, James Hackett, Henry Boyd, Jonathan Bentham, Dzaky Naradichiantama and Michael Tong, IISS, 03.31.25.

• The UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron recently announced their willingness to create a ‘coalition of the willing’ to safeguard a potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. A ‘reassurance’ or ‘deterrence’ force is a better frame for this discussion than a ‘peacekeeping force’, given that one of its tasks would be to respond to a potential Russian violation of a ceasefire agreement. Therefore, agreed response options in the event of a significant breach of a ceasefire would bolster the deterrent value of any deployment. Consequently, the force deployed would need to be credible to Moscow and the coalition resolved to act decisively in the event of a breach of the ceasefire.   
• The composition of such a force remains unclear, though both leaders have said a US ‘backstop’ is needed. This IISS analysis sets out three options for such a reassurance force and challenges that may be posed to their deployment:
  • A small-scale force with a deployed land component of a brigade of about 10,000 troops, supported by a limited air component and naval assets;
  • A medium-scale force based on a land component of a large division, with about 25,000 troops supported by larger air and maritime components; and
  • A large-scale force centered on a corps-sized land component of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops, supported by substantial air and maritime elements.
• In all three options, extra complications would arise should contributing states decide to impose national caveats on their participation, while agreed rules of engagement among all contributing states would also be necessary, as would agreement on acceptable levels of risk. Europeans could deploy a reassurance force, but without a US backstop, this would become progressively more difficult the larger the force became. At the same time, there is a clear risk that Russia might challenge the force, including by mounting armed attacks – either conventional, sub-threshold, or both.

“How Europe hopes to turn Ukraine into a ‘steel porcupine,’” The Economist, 04.06.25.

• The European Commission outlined a two-part “porcupine strategy” for Ukraine.
  • First, Europe would procure more munitions and weapons systems on Ukraine’s behalf, including crucial air-defense missiles.
  • Second, it would boost Ukraine’s own defense industry, which it calls “the most effective and cost-efficient way to support Ukraine’s military efforts”. T
    • The plan is the brainchild of Kaja Kallas, a former Estonian prime minister who is now the European Union’s top diplomat. She wants to double military aid to Ukraine this year, to €40bn ($44bn)..
• Unfortunately, Ms. Kallas’s plan fell apart at the European summit on March 20th. She was accused by some of failing to do the diplomatic groundwork to get leaders to agree in advance. Ultimately it was watered down: €5bn is to be spent on ammunition. Ms. Kallas is determined to revive the plan. If she fails, Europe will have thrown away the fastest, most effective way for Ukraine to defend itself.  

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine's 'Reassurance' Force Needs to Go Big — or Go Home," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 04.07.25.
• "Doing Resilience Better, With Less: The Cornerstone of the EU’s Eastern Policy Needs Rethinking," Ondrej Ditrych, EUISS, 04.01.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"The Kremlin Using Carrots and Sticks to Bring Back Western Companies," Vladimir Ruvinsky, MT/Russia.Post, 04.04.25.

• The hypothetical return of Western companies to Russia is a topic of considerable importance for the Kremlin. First, the idea was cultivated in the public space that many European and US companies are eager to come back. Then, a dealmaking posture was adopted: since you need Russia so bad and you are asking to be let back in, the Kremlin will decide which companies and on what terms.
• Overall, the departure of European companies from Russia was a strategic move, not a tactical one. The fundamental issues related to the war remain, and there are no signs that Europe intends to ease the sanctions regime. As long as this situation persists, who would invest in Russia? The Kremlin’s wish to import new Western technology remains, for now, just a wish.

“Serious Sanctions Time for Russia,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 04.01.25.

• “President Trump told a reporter over the weekend that he’s “angry” at Vladimir Putin, and the Commander in Chief’s exasperation is welcome. The Russian dictator is stringing the President along over a 30-day cease-fire that Ukraine has already accepted. “If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine,” the President told NBC News, “and if I think it was Russia’s fault—which it might not be—but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia.” Under those so-called secondary sanctions, anybody buying oil from Russia “can’t do business in the United States.””
• “The apparent impetus for Mr. Trump’s ire was Mr. Putin’s recent remark about introducing “temporary governance in Ukraine,” as the press reported it. He also told a crew at a base in Murmansk that “only recently, I said that we would squeeze” Ukraine “into a corner, but now we have reason to believe that we are set to finish them off.” That doesn’t sound like the desire for peace that Mr. Trump has been claiming on Mr. Putin’s behalf. This isn’t a new refrain from Mr. Putin, who frequently portrays Ukraine’s government as illegitimate. If the former KGB man can’t swallow Ukraine by military force, he might settle for defenestrating Volodymyr Zelensky and setting up a satellite state with a sympathetic crony in charge. Belarus is the Putin model.”
• “Mr. Putin still shows no signs he’s serious about a peace negotiation, even the mere 30-day pause. He has demanded sanctions relief and wants to absorb territory his military doesn’t even hold today, which should be a nonstarter. Now would be a good time to put some force behind Mr. Trump’s warning.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin is stalling and Trump is angry. He should apply 'maximum pressure,'" Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 04.01.25.
• "US-Europe Divide on SWIFT Could Derail Ukraine Peace Talks," Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 04.07.25.

Ukraine-related negotiations:²

“Trump seems to see that Putin wants conquest, not peace,” Editorial Board, WP, 04.04.25.

• “President Donald Trump might finally, belatedly be coming to recognize what most observers have known for more than three years: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a brazen attempt to seize territory and topple a sovereign government. President Vladimir Putin wants no peace deal that doesn’t consolidate his illegal land grab.”
  • “Putin’s top officials made this much clear in recent days by rejecting White House proposals for a 30-day truce or a limited ceasefire in the Black Sea.”
  • “Meanwhile, the Russian military continues its attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure despite a mutual agreement to halt attacks on each other’s energy targets.”
  • “A visit to Washington this week by top Putin envoy Kirill Dmitriev — the first by a senior Russian official since the start of the Ukraine war — appeared to focus on future economic cooperation between Washington and Moscow, but it made little progress toward a truce to stop the fighting.”
  • “As for the proposed ceasefire, take the word of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, who told a Russian interviewer, “We take the models and solutions proposed by the Americans very seriously, but we can’t accept it all in its current form.” Moscow, he said, is interested only in an agreement that addresses what Russia considers the “root causes” of the conflict — that is, Ukraine’s desires to join the NATO and to exist as an independent country within its internationally recognized borders, free of Russian aggression.”
  • “As if to punctuate the Russian president’s disinterest in a peace deal, Putin this week moved to expand the size of his military, issuing a spring call-up for 160,000 men 30 and younger from April to July — the highest number of conscripts since 2011.” 

“The art of the peace deal: What the Trump administration wants from the Russia-Ukraine negotiations,” Célia Belin, Chris Herrmann, Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, ECFR, 04.03.25.

• The US is no longer after “victory” as defined by the Biden administration or Ukraine. It is uninterested in preserving Ukrainian territorial integrity or deterring aggression. It does not believe that Russian gains in Ukraine will embolden the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to threaten NATO in Europe. They view these topics as European and Ukrainian concerns, which have little to do with “making America great again.”
• But the Trump administration nonetheless has important goals in these negotiations. They want to be able to claim they brought peace to Ukraine, or at the very least, ended American involvement there. And they want a new geopolitical bargain with Russia that effectively trades away the US involvement in Ukraine for “extra-European” agreements with Russia on issues like arms control, the Arctic, Iran, North Korea and even China.
• The US kneecapped Ukraine’s military and intelligence capabilities to bring them to the table but offered Russia sanctions relief and economic incentives in exchange for a temporary ceasefire. It remains to be seen whether the carrot approach will work with Russia; regardless, it says a lot about what the US is trying to achieve. America is not looking to make the world safe for democracy, protect Ukrainian sovereignty or seek a new transatlantic balance in providing for European security. It is pursuing an aura of peace and a new deal with Russia.

“Ukraine Wouldn’t Be the First Country, or the Last, to Accept an Ugly Peace,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 04.06.25.

• Painful settlements after war pockmark the history of conflict. Some still shape the world. Korea has been divided for more than 70 years. After Chinese-backed forces seized large parts of the peninsula and fended off a counterattack by an American-led army, the combatants agreed to a cease-fire. President Eisenhower’s incoming secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, urged him to rip up the cease-fire, send troops northward across the demilitarized zone, and not stop “until we have shown, before all of Asia, our clear superiority by giving the Chinese one hell of a licking.” Eisenhower did the opposite.³ He concluded that no reasonable amount of force could change unfavorable conditions on the ground and agreed to make the cease-fire permanent. That has bitterly divided Korea and turned it into a global flash point, but it was the best the Americans could do at the time.
• In 1974 Turkey launched an invasion of Cyprus, calling it a “peace operation” necessary to defend the Turkish minority on the island. It established a client state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and has occupied part of the island ever since. Like Korea, Cyprus remains divided. Greeks, who are the majority on the island, have never accepted that. At last month’s Greek Independence Day parade in New York, one float was devoted to Cyprus. It showed a map of the island with blood dripping from the Turkish north. “Cyprus: 51 Years of Human Rights Violations,” read a sign above it. No one on the island is happy with the current situation, but at least all live in peace.
• For more than a year it has been clear that Ukraine will never return to its former borders. Crimea is in Russia’s hands and will remain so. The same is true for some regions in the eastern part of the country.... Battlefield realities mean that whatever peace accord is reached will be unfavorable to Ukraine. That will be ugly — not only because Ukraine will lose territory but because it will reward Russia’s military adventurism. The sooner an agreement is signed, however, the less ugly it will be.

"What Americans Believe About Ending the War in Ukraine," William A. Galston and Jordan Muchnick, Brookings Institution, 04.04.25.

• Americans remain strongly on Ukraine’s side rather than Russia’s. In five surveys, support for Ukraine averaged 59%, compared to just 3% for Russia.
• Similarly, they are far more favorable to Zelensky than to Putin. NBC found 46% of Americans had a positive view of Zelensky, with 32% negative. Putin’s positive ratings stand at 3%, his negatives at 84%.
• According to More in Common, 60% believe that Russia bears the main responsibility, with only 5% pointing to Ukraine, while 20% believe that the responsibility is shared. In the Chicago Council survey, 86% blamed Putin, compared to 33% for Zelensky. About three in 10 think that NATO and the U.S. played a role as well.
• The American people are closely divided on Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but with significant partisan divides. In five surveys, approval for Trump’s performance on this issue averaged 45%, with 49% registering disapproval.
• Support for continued aid to Ukraine has strengthened, but with continuing partisan splits. The latest Gallup survey found that 46% of Americans now believe that the U.S. is not doing enough to help Ukraine, up from 30% three months ago—and the highest level recorded since the war began. ... According to the most recent Economist/YouGov poll, fielded between March 22 and March 25, 2025, 49% wanted aid to continue at current or increased levels while 29% wanted aid to decrease or stop altogether.
• The partisan divide on Ukraine persists, however. The Economist/YouGov poll found that 78% of Democrats want to continue or increase military aid to Ukraine, compared to just 30% for Republicans.
• According to Gallup, 53% of Americans now support helping Ukraine regain lost territory, up from 48% in December. More in Common found 32% favoring aid for Ukraine until it regains the territory lost since the February 2022 Russian invasion, with an additional 24% supporting aid until Russia is pushed out of everything it has seized since the invasion of Crimea in 2014. According to the Chicago Council, only 19% would regard a peace agreement as acceptable if it allowed Russia to keep all the Ukrainian territory it now occupies.
• According to the March 2025 Harvard Harris survey, 70% of Americans favor negotiations. ....But skepticism of negotiations is widespread. By a two to one margin (56% to 28%), Americans fear that Russia is unlikely to honor a ceasefire. Even more (79%) are concerned that Russia would not honor the terms of a fair peace agreement. This sentiment matches the statements made by Zelensky about Russia not honoring agreements and breaking previous ceasefire deals. In this case, Americans’ skepticism of Russia mirrors Ukraine’s.
• There is a surprising amount of support for sending U.S. troops as peacekeepers if an agreement is reached. The More in Common survey found 45% support for sending U.S. military personnel to act as peacekeepers, 35% opposed, and 20% undecided. According to the Chicago Council, 57% would support using U.S. and NATO forces to enforce a ceasefire if Russia breaks it, and 56% would support sending U.S. and NATO forces to help Ukraine defend itself if Russia restarts the war after a ceasefire.
  • If the Trump administration treats this morally laden conflict simply as a matter of power and resources, it could pay a surprisingly high political price with the vast majority of Americans who have chosen Ukraine’s side.

"No One Believes Trump: In both Ukraine and Russia, citizens do not trust his peacekeeping initiatives, but hope to use them for their own purposes," Re:Russia, 03.28.25.

• According to Ukrainian sociologists, nearly four-fifths of Ukrainians support Trump’s initiative for a 30-day ceasefire.  However, most see this support as a tactical move aimed at unlocking American aid and demonstrating that it is not Kyiv but Moscow that rejects a truce. This perspective aligns closely with the negotiation strategy of Volodymyr Zelensky. Only one-fifth of respondents believe that a ceasefire could be a meaningful step toward ending the conflict. However, if the ceasefire were accompanied by some form of security guarantees for Ukraine, support would rise to over 60%.
• Around 80% of Ukrainian respondents reject the Kremlin’s ultimatum demands, such as abandoning Western aid or officially recognizing territorial losses. Additionally, a majority – though a much smaller one, at 56% – oppose Ukraine adopting a neutral, non-aligned status. Meanwhile, more than 80% believe that Ukraine should and can continue resisting aggression even if American aid is completely cut off, relying solely on European support.
• In Russia, according to surveys, public opinion on the ceasefire initiative is divided, with roughly equal groups supporting and opposing it.
• A nationwide telephone poll conducted by Russian Field from 13-20 March showed that 40% of Russians supported Trump’s 30-day ceasefire proposal, while 44% opposed it. Among young people, the ratio was 58% in favor versus 18% against, indicating a more anti-war stance and a greater perception of the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. In contrast, among those over 45, the ratio was reversed, with 33% supporting it, while 55% were against it. Notably, even among those who believe that Russia should move toward peace negotiations with Ukraine rather than continue military actions, only 62% supported the ceasefire. This suggests that the rest see it as an insufficient step.
• In general, attitudes toward Trump and his peace initiatives in both Ukraine and Russia appear pragmatic and largely similar: both sides hope to use the American 'peacemaker' for their own interests and fundamentally do not trust him. 

“Building on Jeddah: What Ukraine needs to do now,” Thomas Wright, Brookings, 04.04.25.

• Following a meeting with U.S. officials in Jeddah on March 11, the Ukrainian government’s support for a 30-day ceasefire helped to flip the script with the Trump administration after the disastrous Oval Office meeting between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. However, this respite is likely to be temporary. Ukraine and its allies inside the administration and in Europe need a plan for the next phase of negotiations. This next phase should focus on establishing Ukrainian sovereignty and independence as the primary and shared objective in any settlement and locking in the minimal levels of U.S. support needed for Ukraine to continue the war as long as negotiations continue.
• From Trump’s perspective, prior to the Jeddah meeting, the Russians were engaged in peace talks while the Ukrainians were insisting on U.S. security guarantees as a precondition and complaining that the Russians would never abide by a ceasefire. Trump blamed Ukraine and began to impose costs, including suspending bilateral intelligence cooperation and freezing arms shipments. Ukraine’s decision to support the 30-day ceasefire delivered a simple and clear message: Ukraine wants the war to end immediately without preconditions, while Russia is imposing demands that would be tantamount to Ukraine’s surrender. It worked. The United States turned intelligence cooperation back on, resumed the flow of arms, and praised the Ukrainians.
• Objectively, the primary diplomatic problem the United States needs to solve remains how to persuade Putin to accept something he currently opposes, namely, a free and sovereign Ukraine. In practice, it is unclear whether Trump recognizes that. While he recently acknowledged that the Russians are “dragging their feet,” Trump could respond by heaping pressure on Moscow. Alternatively, he could blame Ukraine for being unwilling to accommodate some of Putin’s demands, seeing it as an impediment to the broader U.S.-Russia partnership he says he is committed to pursuing.
• Zelenskyy was originally reluctant to offer an unconditional ceasefire. He insisted that Ukrainians needed to know that the war would not start again in a few months or a year. He believed that a ceasefire was a key bargaining chip to leverage with allies—one that should be used to extract the security guarantees needed for a just and lasting peace. The harsh reality, though, is that a just and lasting peace is no longer on offer. There is no prospect of the Trump administration agreeing to a U.S. security guarantee, either directly or by providing a credible backstop for European troops. European nations are committed to Ukraine—they are not going to lose interest if the war ends because they clearly understand that the Russian threat will persist and securing Ukraine’s future is a vital European interest.
• Sovereignty will also be a factor in any compromise on territory. It is highly likely that Russia will continue to occupy roughly 18% of Ukraine. That will be a difficult pill for Ukrainians to swallow, but they will likely accept a peace deal on those terms as long as it does not involve legal or political recognition, meaning that they can continue to seek the return of the territory by non-military means. Ukraine must also remain in control of its own political system, foreign policy, and free and fair elections without any imposed constraints from Moscow.
• If the United States ends its support for Ukraine, Putin will have no reason to end the war, but Ukraine is unlikely to collapse. Ukraine is not as reliant on the United States as it was in the first three years of the war. It has cranked up its own defense industrial base, producing drones and other weapons. European nations are doing more to support Ukraine’s security—for example, the Czech Republic has played a leading role in providing 155 mm munitions to Ukraine. Although Ukraine will continue to fight, it will face critical shortages. Its casualty rate will rise, and Russia’s will likely fall. Russia may make more territorial gains. If Russia somehow succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, the Trump administration will own Ukraine’s defeat, and Putin will be tempted to stoke other crises in Europe to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Why Putin Is Stalling Trump on Ukraine," Ian Garner, FP, 04.03.25.
• “It’s Time for Trump to Get Tough With Putin,” Dennis Ross, FP, 04.03.25.
• “Russia and Ukraine Adopt Similar Tactic With Trump: Make Nice and Take It Slow,” Isabel Coles, WSJ, 04.02.25
• "Everything About Ukraine Without Ukraine: Peace Negotiations in Trump’s Brave New World," Sabine Fischer, SWP, 04.03.25. In German.
• “Bulletin No. 7 (159) 2025: Russia-US Developments; Kirill Dmitriev in Washington; The Arctic Forum; Personnel Appointments, Ariston Returns," Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 04.08.25. Clues from Russian Views.
• “Ukraine Questions Value of Black Sea Truce With Russia,” Constant Méheut, NYT, 04.07.25.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"How the War in Ukraine Changed Russia’s Global Standing," Angela Stent, Brookings Institution, 04.02.25.

• When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s immediate aim was regime change in Kyiv and Ukraine’s subjugation to Russian domination. But Putin had much broader goals too. He viewed victory over Ukraine as the first step in undoing the post-Cold-War order which had deprived Russia of its Soviet republics and sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. He sees the Ukraine war as a battle between Russia, NATO, and the “collective West.” Moscow’s victory over Kyiv would, he is convinced, start the process of dismantling an international order that he believes has ignored Russia’s national interests and belittled its position in the world. Three years after Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin has yet to achieve these goals. But Russia has increased its influence in parts of the Global South and has allied itself with three revisionist powers—China, Iran, and North Korea—which share its commitment to a “post-Western” order.
• Is it possible that the United States might be willing at some point to agree with Putin that the world should be divided by the great powers into spheres of influence once again? It is unclear how China would be included in what would have to be a tripartite division, but with the current world order in disarray, anything is possible.
• Every U.S. president since 1992 has tried to reset relations with Russia, believing that, unlike their predecessors, they can find the key to a more constructive relationship with the Kremlin. Each of these reset attempts has ended in frustration and disappointment largely because the United States and Russia have fundamentally different understandings of the drivers of world policies. Trump, however, might break this mold, since his understanding of the drivers of global politics is more akin to that of Putin than to that of his predecessors as president.
• It would indeed be ironic if, three years after launching this brutal war with the devastating loss of life and property and the destruction of so much of Ukraine’s cultural and religious heritage, Putin emerges triumphant with a war economy in full swing, a largely quiescent population, and a seat at the table with the U.S. president.

​"Is the U.S. Prepared for What’s Coming? I Answered Your Questions," David Ignatius, WP, 04.07.25.

• “North Korea's intervention was an escalation -- but also a sign of weakness in Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to generate forces.”
• “If Russian leader Vladimir Putin continues to refuse to negotiate in good faith, will President Donald Trump hit him with more sanctions -- or will he walk away? For someone [Trump] who is supposedly "pissed off" [with Putin] he hasn't done much.”
• “I think that the whole Ramstein process now has to be Europe-led.”
• “In the US administration, I think the two key players here are likely to be Steve Witkoff, the president's emissary to Putin, and Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general.”
• “I worry that the manpower situation is still inadequate for this long war of attrition. Ukraine wants to save its young men (under 25) so it will have a demographic future. But if this war goes on, I think they will have to reach down much younger to get enough soldiers.”
• “Historians will look at this process and ask: Was Trump deliberately trying to undermine U.S. power in Europe?”
• “I think NATO will survive, but as you say, in a more European-led form.”
• “Pressing Europe to actually liquidate Russian assets and give the money to Ukraine--say, $50 billion for every day Putin delays a full ceasefire--would be pressure. So would cutting off transshipment of equipment that feeds the Russian war machine via Turkey and Hong Kong.”
• “Russia is in long-term decline. It's dependent on a commodity whose price is falling sharply; its economy is a mess. It has lost more people in Ukraine than in all wars since 1945 combined. But this is Russia. It endures. And, frankly speaking, as the Russians like to say, I don't see any sign whatsoever that Russians are rising against Putin.”

"Trump’s destruction of global alliances," The Editorial Board, FT, 04.04.25.

• "One of the great advantages that the U.S. has over China or Russia is that it has a global network of allies, created over the long term. Countries like Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada and Britain have often had doubts about the wisdom of particular U.S. policies. But they have stuck with America because they believed, in the last resort, that their alliances were based on a firm bedrock of shared interests and values."
• "The tariff war launched by the U.S.—combined with the often hostile language of the Trump administration—has shaken that trust to the core. Mark Carney, the new prime minister of Canada, says that the U.S. is “no longer a reliable partner.” Friedrich Merz, the next chancellor of Germany, has called for Europe to “achieve independence” from America. Anthony Albanese, the Australian prime minister, says the Trump administration’s tariffs on Australia are “not the act of a friend.”"
• "The U.S. president has profoundly changed the Republican party and the image of America itself. In a matter of days he has undone trusted global relationships that have taken decades to build. The task of reviving such trust, even after Trump is no longer in office, will be gargantuan—if it is possible at all."

"How World Order Changes," Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate, 04.01.25.

• [A]fter World War II, states created the United Nations, which defined only wars of self-defense as legitimate (unless otherwise authorized by the Security Council). To be sure, when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and occupied its territory, he claimed that he was acting in self-defense against the eastward expansion of NATO. But most UN members voted to condemn his behavior, and those that did not – such as China, North Korea, and Iran – share his interest in counterbalancing American power.
• A world order may become stronger or weaker because of technological changes that alter the distribution of military and economic power; domestic social and political changes that alter a major state’s foreign policy; or transnational forces like ideas or revolutionary movements, which can spread beyond governments’ control and alter public perceptions of the prevailing order’s legitimacy.
• After WWII, the US accounted for half of the world economy, but its military power was balanced by the Soviet Union, and the UN’s normative power was weak. With the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the US enjoyed a brief “unipolar moment,” only to overextend itself in the Middle East, while permitting the financial mismanagement that culminated in the 2008 financial crisis.
• Believing the US was in decline, Russia and China changed their own policies. Putin ordered an invasion of neighboring Georgia, and China replaced Deng Xiaoping’s cautious foreign policy with a more assertive approach. Meanwhile, China’s robust economic growth allowed it to close the power gap with America.
• Relative to China, American power did decline; but its share of the world economy has remained at around 25%. As long as the US maintained strong alliances with Japan and Europe, they would represent more than half the world economy, compared to a mere 20% for China and Russia.
• Will the Trump administration maintain this unique source of America’s continued power, or is [Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat] right that we are at a turning point? The years 1945, 1991, and 2008 were also turning points. If future historians add 2025 to the list, it will be a result of US policy – a self-inflicted wound – rather than any inevitable secular development.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Transatlantic Split Over Russia Leaves Japan Between a Rock and a Hard Place," James D.J. Brown, Carnegie Politika, 04.07.25.
• "Ten Weeks That Shook the World," Edward Luce, FT, 04.01.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Trump bets on a ‘Reverse Kissinger’,” David Ignatius, WP, 04.03.25.

• “Behind President Donald Trump’s shake-up of the global military and economic order is a big but deeply flawed idea: He appears convinced that a newly powerful United States can pull Russia away from China—and become the power broker between Moscow and Beijing.”
• “Beyond Thursday’s Wall Street wipeout, the bigger danger might lie in Trump’s policies toward Russia and China. He believes that making Moscow a partner in a Ukraine peace deal will create three spheres of influence—with the United States playing balancer between Russian and Chinese power.”
• “This hope of a “Reverse Kissinger,” as the strategy is often described, might be illusory. Many analysts predict that Russia and China will continue their “no limits” partnership, regardless of Trump’s blandishments. Meanwhile, the U.S. might severely damage its alliances in Europe and Asia as nations there doubt America’s willingness to deter Russian and Chinese power.”
  • “Kurt M. Campbell, a former deputy secretary of state and now chairman of the Asia Group. He sees the bond between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping as intensely personal, nurtured over scores of meetings and a thousand hours of discussion. If Trump thinks he can control that dynamic, he is mistaken, Campbell argues.”
• “Even as Trump woos Putin, he also “wants to make a big deal with China,” argues Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council official now with the Brookings Institution. He sees Xi as a kindred spirit.”
• “Here’s where the United States’ long-standing allies in Europe and Asia get nervous. If Trump is seeking a three-way division of influence among Russia, China and the U.S., these smaller countries risk ending up out in the cold. America’s promise of nuclear “extended deterrence” could become unreliable—forcing allies to build their own nuclear weapons or seek new alliances.”

"China and Russia Will Not Be Split," Michael McFaul and Evan S. Medeiros, FA, 04.04.25.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Are China and Russia on a Collision Course in Africa?" Jessica Moody, FP, 03.31.25.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

"U.S. Allies and Adversaries Are Attempting Nuclear Deterrence without Weapons—Will It Work?" Matthew Fuhrmann, WoTR, 04.07.25.

• Latent nuclear deterrence—using nuclear programs without assembled weapons to gain international influence—has been a feature of world politics for decades, and it remains so today. Yet not everyone who embraces this strategy succeeds. The countries best positioned to gain influence without arms are those that have an enrichment or reprocessing capacity and a restrained nuclear program. Combining the most sensitive dual-use nuclear technology with restrained political intentions is a recipe for maximizing the odds of success.

"To Eurasia with Intellectual Freedom," Sergei Karaganov, Russia in Global Affairs, 03.31.25. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• A geopolitical and geoeconomic earthquake is shaking the world. Thanks largely to Russia, the West’s centuries-old military-based dominance is ending. New countries are rising, and previously suppressed civilizations are recovering. While these developments are welcomed by the majority of nations, the West’s desperate counterattack, to reverse the natural course of history, poses the risk of conflict and even world war.
• The international community should seek a peaceful transition to the new world order by strengthening nuclear deterrence and establishing new institutions of global governance. The West has to accept a more modest role in this new order, where Greater Eurasia will play a key role. The most important task for Eurasian nations is the decolonization of consciousness―overcoming the habit of viewing the world through the lens of Western perspectives and one-sided outdated theories.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Chinese No-First-Use: A Strategic Signaling Device, Diplomatic Tool, and Dogmatic Reality," Benjamin Hautecouverture, FRS, 04.04.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• “Syria Is Trying to Get Up With a Boot on Its Neck,” Natasha Hall, NYT, 04.02.25.

Cyber security/AI: 

"Putin’s AI Blunder Is a Gift to Opponents," Arthur McFarlane, FT, 04.01.25.

• "Russia is ranked 31st in the world in AI capacity by Tortoise Media’s Global AI Index, behind every major economy and even small countries like Portugal, Norway, Ireland and Luxembourg.
• For Russia’s rivals, a window is opening for a deterrence-by-denial strategy.
  • By depriving Russia of access to the advanced chips required for AI, we can deny it a key strategic enabler and deter it from future aggression.
  • Second, Ukraine’s allies should encourage further emigration from Russia’s tech sector. Visa schemes could be set up to facilitate the flight of AI-literate graduates from Russia to the west.
  • Lastly, Russia’s AI trajectory should be communicated to anti-Putin individuals within the Russian regime. "

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Trump Weakens U.S. Cyberdefenses at a Moment of Rising Danger,” David E. Sanger and Nick Corasaniti, NYT, 04.05.25.
• "America’s AI Iron Curtain," Soňa Muzikárová, Project Syndicate, 04.03.25.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Trump’s Secondary Sanctions on Russian Oil Are a Lose-Lose Proposition," Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 04.07.25.

• What Trump and the Congress bill’s co-lead Senator Lindsey Graham are suggesting is not to punish individual companies for buying Russian oil, but the entire country where a company operates. If the bill is adopted, then punitive duties will be levied on all exports to the United States from the country where the Russian oil was purchased.
• This is the antithesis of selectively applied sanctions. There might also be hopes for a positive side-effect: wouldn’t it be nice to wage a trade war and earn money from it, instead of spending on the costly administration of fine-tuned sanctions? There are several issues with this approach.
  • First, tariffs are rather blunt and long-term measures, ill-suited to be used as tactical weapons in a mediation attempt to push a less willing party to the negotiating table.
  • Second, the chain of action for this particular measure would be very long: to make the Russians do something, the weapon is not targeted at the Russians, nor at companies buying from the Russians, but at the buyer’s compatriots who export goods to America.
  • Third, tariffs as a tool have diminishing returns. How are these punitive tariffs supposed to work? Will they be applied in addition to those announced on April 2?
• The worst part of it is that even if the secondary tariffs were to scare off buyers, it is still unclear whether the world can really afford to manage without Russian oil exports. The proposed measure is effectively an invitation to Russia to play a game of chicken against the world economy. What if Moscow really does stop all oil exports?
• The loss of oil revenues would create many problems for the Russian economy, but would not bring it to its knees immediately. The ensuing global fuel shortage might be partially alleviated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but would certainly make itself felt. It would still inflict enough pain to create defectors prepared to run the risk of U.S. wrath, driven by the need to meet their fuel requirements—or by profit opportunities.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:⁴

“Why Was Russia Spared from Trump’s Tariffs?,” Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 04.03.25.

• Import tariffs, which U.S. President Donald Trump slapped on about 90 countries on April 2 and which some of America’s previously friendly neighbors described as attempts to make their economies “collapse,” had some surprise omissions. One of them has turned out be Russia, which made many wonder why. To hear U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent explain it, Russia was spared because the sanctions imposed on the country after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 mean that U.S.-Russian trade had effectively stopped, according to NYT. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt offered a similar explanation, telling Axios that Russia was left off the list because U.S. sanctions already "preclude any meaningful trade."
• But low levels of trade didn’t prevent Trump from slapping tariffs on other countries.1 For instance, the U.S. exported $526 million worth of goods and services to Russia last year, while importing $3,007 million, with America’s deficit in this bilateral trade totaling $2,481 million that year, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. In comparison, the volume of Angola’s trade with the U.S. ($2.6 billion in goods last year) was lower than America’s trade with Russia, as was the deficit ($1 billion), but this African country still found itself with a 32% import tariff.
• So, low levels of trade don’t quite explain why Russia was spared. Perhaps the structure of U.S. imports does? As NYT’s Anatoly Kurmanaev has reminded us, Russia is a Top 3 supplier of fertilizer to the United States. However, Russia’s share in U.S. imports of this commodity has not exactly been game-changing; Russia accounted for 16% of $9.97 billion worth of fertilizer that U.S. imported in 2023.
• Perhaps there has been another factor in the confluence of drivers of Trump’s decision to spare Russia from the tariffs. It could be that Trump still harbors hopes that, despite having stalled so far in the negotiations on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin may eventually agree to implement Trump’s vision of first embracing a temporary but full ceasefire, and then using that halt to negotiate a permanent cessation of hostilities.
• Whatever the reasons, Trump’s decision to spare Russia has not been lost on Russia’s ruling elite. Moreover, some top members of that elite, such as Dmitry Medvedev, could not help gloating over how some of America’s traditional allies were reeling from Trump’s tariffs, while Russia was untouched. Russian markets also, arguably, welcomed the omission of Russia from the trade war, with the Moscow Exchange and RTS indices rising by 1.1% after opening on April 3.

"Trump’s tariffs mean long-term pain for Moscow," The Bell, 04.04.25.

• The White House said Russia was not hit with tariffs because there was no trade between the two countries due to the Western sanctions imposed as a result of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But that's not quite true. In 2024, exports of Russian goods to the U.S. totaled $3.27 billion (the lowest in more than 30 years), and the U.S. exported $526 million worth of goods to Russia. These are tiny numbers when it comes to U.S. trade, but, for example, Lesotho, an African kingdom with a population of 2 million, sells even less to the U.S. —about $2 billion worth of goods a year —but was hit with a 50% tariff.
• If we apply the formula Trump used to determine the size of tariffs on trading partners, then Russia should have been hit with a 40% tariff (based on 2024 numbers). That said, in the last pre-war year of 2021, the two countries enjoyed almost equal trade —which would have meant Russia was hit with a 10% tariff.
• It's possible that Russia’s absence from the list could be a deliberate move by Trump to gain leverage over President Vladimir Putin in the ongoing Ukraine peace talks between the two countries. But the trade volumes at stake are so insignificant that they are unlikely to influence the Kremlin, particularly while sanctions remain in force.

"Today's U.S.-Russia détente is unlike those of the past," Hanna Notte, FT, 04.03.25.

• "A potential U.S. détente with Moscow today will not be like that in 2009. Steeled by years of confrontation, and convinced that it enjoys geopolitical tailwinds, Russia will not give up just anything in hope of future reciprocity. Still, entertaining the U.S. in a drawn-out reset promises great rewards. At a minimum, Russia buys time to win against Ukraine on the battlefield. At best, Trump ushers in a world order more amenable to Russia, while Putin cheers him on from the sidelines."

"Tariff Flywheel: A New-Old U.S. Trade Strategy," Pavel Kanevsky, RIAC, 03.31.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• There was no doubt that tariff policy would become one of the pillars of the U.S. trade strategy. Already in 2024, Trump outlined the possible parameters of new duties—from 10% to 60% on all imports. In February 2025, universal 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum from all countries of the world were established and came into force in March.
• The White House administration has not yet reached the promised 60% tariffs on Chinese imports. Since February, waves of retaliatory tariffs have begun from China, Mexico, Canada and the European Union.
• The main goal of Trump's tariff policy is to increase pressure on world economies to increase exports of American products. Trump prefers to act first and then enter into negotiations with puzzled and sometimes shocked counterparties. In poker, this is called the "maniac strategy," when a player acts as aggressively as possible.
• Retaliatory tariffs imposed by China, Canada and the European Union have already had a negative effect on 7.7 million jobs in the United States. Washington does not have much time to find a more optimal formula for international tradepublications.

Tariff explainers and reaction to tariffs:

• “Quick Take: ​President Trump's Liberation Day," Robert N. Stavins, Wendy R. Sherman, Rana Mitter, Jeffrey Frankel, Karl Kaiser, Linda Bilmes, and Jennifer Lerner, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 04.02.25.
• "Five Things to Know About Trump’s Tariffs," James M. Lindsay, CFR, 04.04.25.
• "What to Know About Trump’s Tariff Authority, Its Cost, and What Comes Next," Clara Fong and Diana Roy, CFR, 04.04.25.
• “'Liberation Day' Tariffs Explained,” Barath Harithas, Kyle Meng, Evan Brown, and Catharine Mouradian, CSIS, 04.03.25.
• "Trump’s Threats and Tariffs Are a Global ‘Kill Switch,'" Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 04.04.25.
• “Why Trump’s Tariffs Are Dangerous for Russia (A Risky Scenario),” Editorial Board, iStories, 04.07.25. In Russian

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• "A Trump-Putin Alliance, for All to See," Vladimir Kara-Murza, WP, 04.01.25.
• "My Fellow Republicans, We Must Stand Up to Putin," Don Bacon, NYT, 04.01.25.
• “What Ovechkin Awoke in D.C.,” Marc Fisher, WP, 04.06.25.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Household well-being under sanctions: Insights from the Russian longitudinal monitoring survey,” Sinikka Parviainen and William Pyle, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies, March 2025.

• The findings presented in this brief would have surprised commentators who anticipated adverse economic and social consequences from the unprecedented war-induced sanctions. Subjective well-being and financial security have improved on average… [I]ndividuals were significantly more likely to report being satisfied with their lives and economic conditions in 2023 than in pre-war years, a pattern consistent with the rising wages brought on by increased government spending and a labor market constrained by wartime mobilization and demographic pressures.
• Ethnic Russians and those living in military-industrial regions, in particular, have experienced notable gains in well-being, reversing pre-war disparities in subjective life assessments.
• However, these improvements have not been uniformly distributed. Elderly Russians and residents of Rostov Oblast, the closest RLMS region to the war zone, have seen declines in well-being, highlighting the uneven burden of war and economic restructuring.
• [W]hile income growth has contributed to increased financial buffers, it has not translated into increased consumption of durable goods. Instead, uncertainty about the future and restricted access to foreign products have led households to prioritize savings over some forms of spending.
• Contrary to expectations that economic hardship might generate public discontent, the war years have coincided with rising optimism among many Russians. The combination of higher incomes and tighter political control may help explain why public support for the regime has remained robust despite high casualty figures.
• Looking ahead, it is possible that the apparent gains in well-being that we observe in 2022 and 2023 are vulnerable to economic imbalances and pressures that may result from continued fighting… Future waves will be essential to track whether current trends hold, reverse, or give way to new patterns of economic and social adaptation.

“‘Time of Heroes’ Program: How the Kremlin is Going to Re-Adapt War Veterans to Civilian Life,” Ben Noble and Nikolai Petrov, Russia.Post, 04.07.25.⁵

• The headline goal of the program remains to form a new elite from those who have fought in the war against Ukraine. In February 2024, Vladimir Putin referred to ‘warriors’ as part of the ‘real elite’ of Russia.
• It is too early to talk about any successes of the three dozen newly appointed participants from the program. But both the rush to appoint them and the nature of the posts they have received—such as advisory roles and posts relating to patriotic education—indicate that the Kremlin does not expect any real bureaucratic achievements from them.
• Neither the war on Ukraine itself nor its ‘heroes’ are popular in Russian society. That explains past electoral disappointments for veterans, which we have discussed before. And that might make people question the wisdom of trying to get them elected in the future.
• The Kremlin takes seriously the challenges posed by mass de-mobilization—of many thousands of tired, angry, weapons-trained, and possibly disturbed men returning to civilian life. There are already cases of military personnel returning and immediately committing violent crimes. The scale of this threat is not currently large, but it would likely spike with a cessation of hostilities and the return of veterans.
• The federal-level ‘Time of Heroes’ program and its regional equivalents are one component of the Kremlin’s planning for de-mobilization, along with broader adaptation and rehabilitation programs. But the scale of the task is enormous. And it suggests the Kremlin will not allow a large wave of veterans to return to civilian life in Russia any time soon.

“A Prison Death Highlights an LGBTQ Crackdown in Russia,” Nataliya Vasilyeva and Alina Lobzina, NYT, 04.01.25.

• “One night in December, [police] officers stormed the apartment of the [men-only travel] agency’s owner and tied him up, he later told a court… Mr. Kotov said the officers pressured him to “confess” that he was running a travel agency aimed at gay people, which he denied. The officers kept beating him, he said, and told him: “No trips for gays.” A few weeks later, Mr. Kotov, then 48, was found dead in his prison cell.”
• “Mr. Kotov’s death reflects an increasingly harsh crackdown in Russia on the rights of LGBTQ people that has accelerated since the start of the war in Ukraine. President Vladimir V. Putin has portrayed the new restrictions—and the war—as part of a broader battle to maintain “Russian traditional values.””
• “In November 2023, the Russian Supreme Court designated the “international LGBTQ movement” as an “extremist organization” on par with the likes of Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. Under laws targeting extremist groups, gay rights activists, their lawyers or others involved in efforts to support LGBTQ people could face jail sentences of six to 10 years… At least 12 criminal inquiries on the LGBTQ extremism charges were initiated last year, according to the Russian prisoner rights advocacy group OVD-Info.”
• “State media has also been bombarding Russians with messaging about the virtues of heterosexual families with children. Earlier this year, Mr. Putin issued an order for his government to come up with a strategy to promote families with multiple children.”
• “Since the Kremlin introduced the first anti-gay bill in 2013, the number of Russians who think gay people should not have the same rights as others has increased from 47 to 62%, according to the independent pollster Levada.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “The Red Sweater in the Window: How to Regard Alexander Ovechkin’s Great Record—He’s in Putin Team, After All,” Alexander Polivanov, The Moscow Times, 04.07.25.

Defense and aerospace:

• "How Russia Is Growing Its Military in the Ongoing War with Ukraine," Peter Suciu, NI, 04.03.25.
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

"Russia’s army is being subordinated to its security services," The Economist, 04.03.25.

• “The [Russian] security services’ prominence in the [Ukraine-related] negotiations carries two messages, argues Andrei Soldatov, an intelligence expert living in exile. One is that Mr. Putin sees the negotiations as a stage in his military operation rather than a path to ending the war. The other is that the spooks have been rehabilitated: the disastrous invasion is now presented as a success.”
• “Those doing the fighting may disagree. Russia’s army has made almost no progress in two years. At least 200,000 soldiers are dead and 600,000 wounded, says Britain’s defense ministry. Yet the army must confront not just Ukrainian forces, but its own country’s security services. The FSB’s military counter-intelligence force, heir to Stalin’s infamous SMERSH, is the largest and fastest-growing directorate, says Mr. Soldatov. Its job is to watch the armed forces, curb the influence of popular generals and prevent political self-organization. The scale of purges evokes the Soviet era.”
• “Many countries’ armed forces have strained relations with their spy agencies, but in Russia they can be deadly. Mr. Putin mistrusts his army, particularly given its thinly veiled resentment at the start of the war. A few days before the invasion Leonid Ivashov, a retired general often used by the general staff to voice its opinions, warned that the use of force against Ukraine would be a disaster. As the blitzkrieg failed, Russia’s main journal of military theory implicitly blamed the FSB. Soldiers did not understand its goals or their roles. “Instead of flowers… the rear columns of our troops were met with civilian resistance,” it wrote.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Who Is Viktor Bout, Really?" Cathy Scott-Clark, FP, 04.04.25.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Ukraine:

“‘I Hope Trump Won’t Deceive Us’: Ukrainians Are Wary of U.S. Minerals Deal,” Kim Barker and Oleksandra Mykolyshyn, NYT, 04.06.25.

• In a major mining region of Ukraine, President Trump’s proposal to collect profits from mineral wealth is meeting with a mix of skepticism and weary acceptance.⁶

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"The Window for an Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal Is Closing," Olesya Vartanyan, CEIP The Moscow Times, 04.03.25.

• Yerevan and Baku still lack diplomatic relations, meaning all communication takes place through third-party nations. Turkish officials have made it clear that the reopening of the border depends on Armenia reaching an agreement with Turkey’s strategic ally, Azerbaijan. In mid-March, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced they had finalized a peace treaty, raising hopes of an end to their dispute.
• The current draft of the peace treaty focuses solely on establishing diplomatic relations—in other words, renouncing territorial claims, ceasing legal disputes, and withdrawing foreign peacekeeping missions.
• Baku’s latest demand is that Armenia amend its constitution to remove a reference to the country’s Declaration of Independence.
• Stronger ties with Turkey could help Armenia deepen its alignment with the European Union and reduce its dependence on Russia.
• If Baku and Yerevan wait too long, they may squander one of the best opportunities for a settlement they have ever had.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Prospect of Ukraine Ceasefire Heralds Russia’s Return to the South Caucasus," Alexander Atasuntsev, CEIP, 04.03.25.
• "Russian Won’t Be Kyrgyzstan’s Lingua Franca for Long," Haley Zehrung, FP, 04.04.25.

Footnotes

1. While the U.S. imposed no new tariffs on Russia, Russia’s stock market still kept sliding on April 7 as did prices of Russia’s Urals oil in line with global trends. The Moscow Exchange (MOEX) Russia Index, which tracks 43 of Russia’s largest publicly traded companies, lost 8.05% over the week—its worst performance since late September 2022, when markets were rattled by the Kremlin’s announcement of mass mobilization for the war in Ukraine, according to MT. “Russian stocks are falling, but I don’t see any crazy drama or huge turnover here,” said Yevgeny Kogan of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, MT reported April 5.
2. In his latest comments on the Ukraine conflict, Trump said April 7: “We are talking to Russia. We would like them to stop. ... I don’t like the bombing, the bombing goes on and on, and every week thousands of young people being killed." (Kyiv Independebnt, 04.07.25)
3. For Graham Allison’s 03.27.25 take on how Trump can emulate Eisenhower’s ending of the Korean war, see: “To End the Ukraine War, Trump Should Think Like Ike,” Graham T. Allison, NI, 03.27.25.
4. While U.S. imposed no new tariffs on Russia, its stock market kept sliding on April 7. The Moscow Exchange (MOEX) Russia Index had dropped 3.91% on that day, marking its 14th consecutive day of losses, according to MT. “Russian stocks are falling, but I don’t see any crazy drama or huge turnover here,” said Yevgeny Kogan, an investment banker and professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Last week Russia’s stock market suffered its worst week in more than 2 years with the market capitalization of companies listed on the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) fell by 2 trillion rubles ($23.7 billion) over just two days, MT reported on April 5.
5. The authors discuss the developments since the launch of ‘Time of Heroes’ program over one year ago. The Kremlin appears to take seriously the challenges posed by mass de-mobilization—of many thousands of tired, angry, weapons-trained, and possibly disturbed men returning to civilian life.
6. Ukraine will send a team to Washington next week to begin negotiations on a new draft of a deal that would give the U.S. access to Ukraine’s valuable mineral resources, Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko told The Associated Press. (WP, 04.06.25)The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo: AP File Photo.