3 Ideas to Explore

1. In an effort to shape the public’s views of the Biden team’s legacy, Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan have offered their takes on their handling of some of the key challenges of the past four years, including the nuclear risks associated with Russia’s war against Ukraine. When commenting on that conflict, both confirmed previously reported U.S. government assessments that Vladimir Putin considered using nuclear weapons when his forces were being beaten back in the east and south of Ukraine in the second half of 2022. “Even if the probability went from 5 to 15% [at the time], when it comes to nuclear weapons, nothing is more serious,” Blinken told FT.¹ To dissuade Putin from using nukes, the Biden administration, among other things, reached out to Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, both of whom agreed to warn the Russian leader against using nuclear weapons and did so, Sullivan told WP’s David Ignatius. Blinken confirmed the success of the outreach: “We have reason to believe that China engaged Russia and said: ‘Don’t go there,’” Blinken told FT.² In addition, one of Sullivan’s aides also offered a nuclear explanation for why the Biden administration did not exploit Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in 2023: “If Putin thought we were using Prigozhin to undermine his regime, who knows the nuclear risk?" recalled Tom Wright, one of Sullivan's top NSC advisers.
2. To reduce the chances of the U.S.-Russian standoff over Ukraine escalating to dangerous levels and increasing chances of a nuclear war, the Biden administration has successful employed a “salami-slicing” strategy, according to Michael Poznansky of the U.S. Naval War College and William Wohlforth of Dartmouth College. The duo explain the success of this gradual approach by arguing that “the very act of subtly altering the status quo creates ambiguity about whether the United States has indeed stepped over a redline and, over time, can even shift the status quo well beyond what Putin would have tolerated had the same aid been provided all at once.” However,  “the irony is that Washington’s salami-slicing strategy has now become a victim of its own success,” the two political scientists write in FA. “The absence of major escalations in Ukraine has led critics to argue that the Biden administration should have been bolder and abandoned the very gradualism that likely helped prevent escalation in the first place.”
3. Vladimir Putin appears to be disappointed that Russia’s military successes have not yet forced his enemy to the negotiating table, according to Tatiana Stanovaya of R. Politik. “Indeed, the outlook for Putin is not taking shape to his advantage: there is nobody with whom he can do business in Europe; Trump is only looking for an easy win; and Ukraine continues to insist on NATO membership and security guarantees,” Stanovaya argues in a commentary for CEIP.³ Still, negotiations with Putin are worth a shot and Donald Trump’s team should avoid pitfalls when pursuing them, such as turning the talks into a U.S.-Russian exercise or expecting a success in less than a year, according to RAND’S Samuel Charap, writing in FA. Should such talks commence, Trump’s team must aim for a “secure and sovereign Ukraine,” according to CFR President Michael Froman and CFR Senior Fellow Charles Kupchan. “Anything short of that outcome would embolden adversaries [and] split the Atlantic alliance,” they write in a commentary for Project Syndicate. That Putin’s team members may not be particularly upbeat in their current forecasts of attaining favorable outcomes at the negotiations table follows from recent comments on the prospects of U.S.-Russian talks on the conflict made by some of Moscow’s top diplomats, including Sergei Lavrov and Vasily Nebenzya. The Kremlin’s discontent with the leverage it has vis-à-vis possible negotiations is partially reflected in its directives to continue offensives along significant parts of the front. These offensives keep yielding results on the ground. As reported in the previous issue of our news digest, Russia gained 227 square miles of territory (589 square kilometers, roughly the size of 10 Manhattan boroughs) in December. While struggling to stop the Russian offensives in Ukraine, the Ukrainian top brass have claimed they’ve resumed their own offensive in Russia’s Kursk region.⁴ The Ukrainian military-political leadership have also recently claimed battlefield innovations. The latter demonstrate how the country’s military-political leadership is becoming more imaginative in finding ways to sustain support for its fight and discourage conclusions that Ukraine has been losing on the battlefield.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Iran and its nuclear program:

"Trump's Return Sparks Concerns Over Iran Nuclear Deal," David Sanger, NYT, 12.24.24. 

• "“The change you’re going to see is more focus on Iran,” Michael Waltz, whom Mr. Trump has designated as his national security adviser, said in November on CNBC. “Maximum pressure, not only will it help stability in the Middle East, but it’ll help stability in the Russia-Ukraine theater as well, as Iran provides ballistic missiles and literally thousands and thousands of drones that are going into that theater.”"
• "It is very possible that Mr. Trump will make a show early on of massing a military force designed to strike the Iranian facilities — and then enter a negotiation. ... But striking a deal that goes beyond the Obama-era accord that Mr. Trump dismissed as useless would be difficult."
• "Iran may be willing to make a tactical retreat, but it has never been willing to shut down all of its facilities. And it is unclear, at least for now, how much risk Mr. Trump is willing to take to achieve that goal."          

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“A long nightmare of repression awaits Ukraine’s occupied lands,” Tony Barber, FT, 12.26.24.

• "The state-sanctioned removal of children points to a central aim of Russian policy in the occupied areas — the systematic eradication of Ukrainian identity. One route to this goal is to seize people’s homes and make it impossible for them to regain them unless they acquire Russian passports. Another is to declare homes ownerless and move Russian settlers into them. A third is to Russify the education system and use Roskomnadzor, Russia’s internet censor, to block independent Ukrainian websites."
• "Few occupied areas have been more rigorously Russified than Crimea. And of the people there, few have been treated more mercilessly than the Crimean Tatar minority. Some 250,000 lived in Crimea at the start of the century, but about 20,000 left the peninsula for mainland Ukraine after the 2014 annexation. Another 10,000 went abroad after the 2022 invasion to avoid conscription into Russia’s armed forces. In a newly published book about the Crimean Tatars, the British scholar Donald Rayfield describes Russia’s actions since 2014 as “the last stage of an ethnic genocide.”"
• "It is the last stage because, in 1944, Stalin deported the entire Crimean Tatar population from its homeland (many returned in the 1980s and 1990s). Tens of thousands died en route to central Asia and Siberia. Similar horrors were inflicted on Poles, Balts and other minorities. Memories of these crimes explain why many central and eastern Europeans, including Ukrainians, abhor the idea of leaving Putin in control of areas seized since 2022."

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:⁵

"‘There Are Four Possible Scenarios’: Military Outcomes of 2024 and Predictions for 2025," Nikolay Mitrokhin, Republic, 12.26.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• There are four possible scenarios [for Ukraine's future]: optimistic, pessimistic, grim, and catastrophic.
• In 2024, Russia largely turned the land war in its favor...Ukraine now faces the threat of losing two-thirds of the Zaporizhzhia front, a potential Russian assault on the relatively large city of Pokrovsk, and the possibility of Russian forces reaching Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the city of Zaporizhzhia in 2025.
• Airspace strikes have become the second most significant battlefield this year. In this conflict between Russia and Ukraine, relative parity has been observed, with a slight advantage for Russia.
• However, Ukraine has decisively defeated Russia in the Black Sea. By employing unmanned maritime drones (UMDs) and launching strikes with Western missiles, Kyiv forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet and FSB ships to abandon the western and central parts of the Black Sea, retreating from their usual harbors in Crimea toward Novorossiysk and Abkhazia.

·  The central issue on the home front for both sides in 2024 was mobilization and other methods of replenishing forces at the front line. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) faced severe shortages of motivated soldiers, a mobilization crisis, and widespread desertion, officially affecting one-seventh of the army. Russia has enough reserves of armored vehicles suitable for restoration at factories to last at least another year. 

·  For the UAF, the quality of military management at all levels has become a significant issue on the home front.

·  It is becoming increasingly clear that the war's potential resolution will follow Russian-American (or American-Chinese, involving Russia and the EU) negotiations, with outcomes Ukraine and the EU will have to accept. However, there is no guarantee that the parties will reach an agreement, and the war may not end in 2025, potentially continuing until Russia achieves some of its objectives or, conversely, is exhausted.

“Mobilization, Peacemaking and Deterrence in Ukraine,” Simon Schlegel, International Crisis Group, 12.17.24.

• For any outcome of the war short of Ukrainian capitulation and demilitarization, Kyiv will need a substantial standing army and the capacity to build up rapidly.
• For men and women to join the army voluntarily and for conscripted men to stay in it, Ukraine’s armed forces must become a more attractive employer. Their first priority should be transparent regulations on when soldiers have the right to demobilize and a fair system of rotation, so that frontline stints come with a clear end date.
• But none of this will be adequate until Kyiv improves its soldiers’ survivability through better training. So far, its record has been mixed.
• Finally, if it is to withstand an adversary with far greater resources, Ukraine must employ its people more effectively. By better employing the data it collects on conscripts, the army could help align mobilization with recruits’ skill sets, ensuring they are assigned to roles they are suited for.
• With U.S. military support likely to dwindle, it will fall to Europe to take over a larger share of responsibility in equipping and training Ukrainian troops so that they are a credible deterrent.
• With enough Western ammunition and weapons at the frontline it will become far more feasible for experienced frontline soldiers to rotate out and pass on their experience to others in the rear.
• Among the most important things Ukraine’s backers can do is use their leverage – economic, security and political – to get Russia to the negotiating table and convince it to accept a well-armed Ukraine that continues to receive support from its backers.

"How Suicide Drones Transformed the Front Lines in Ukraine," C.J. Chivers and David Guttenfelder, NYT, 12.31.24. 

• “In the past, attacking an armored vehicle with such a warhead typically required a soldier to risk exposure to take a hasty shot with a rocket-propelled grenade, sending a projectile at almost 1,000 feet per second that may not hit the vehicle at all. Weaponized FPV drones have created a new way.”
• “FPV drones blended the power of anti-tank projectiles, the range of mortars and the accuracy of sniper fire, but with an added feature: aerial agility.”
• “''I found that 90 percent of the Russian equipment that was destroyed by Ukraine was destroyed by drones,'' said Serhii Sternenko, a young Ukrainian lawyer, prominent YouTuber and impassioned drone advocate.”
• “In late 2023, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine announced an ambition never before heard in the history of war. Ukraine, he said, would provide its forces with one million FPV drones in the next calendar year.”
• “Manufacturing and fielding one million FPV drones a year required sweeping changes to national policy.”
• “With drone production an urgent national priority, much of the country was involved, from civilians assembling drones at home to volunteers like Sternenko, who continued to organize drone purchasing and distribution and to help spur innovation, including with night-vision cameras and classified adaptations that allow specialized FPV quadcopters to pursue high-flying Russian surveillance drones.”
• “The million-drone goal also required newly specialized soldiers to fly and maintain them, and tactical adaptations at all levels. To manage such shifts, in June 2024 Ukraine established a new armed service, the Unmanned Systems Forces, and appointed Col. Vadym Sukharevsky to lead it … In an interview in Kyiv, Sukharevsky discussed plans. He said his forces had about 2,000 drone specialists as of autumn and would have 10,000 by the end of 2025.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Where Is Russia Finding Fresh Soldiers? Wherever It Can," Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva, NYT, 12.31.24.
• "How Russia's Military Has Changed Ahead of 2025," Ellie Cook, Newsweek, 12.29.24.
• “A Russian general's killing in Moscow points to a worrying trend,” Max Boot, WP, 12.19.24.  

Military aid to Ukraine:

“The Ukraine War in Team Biden’s Rear-View Mirror,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 01.02.24.

• Jenkins’ opinion essay features an imaginary final briefing from outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to assembled staff at the Pentagon cafeteria.
  • “Vladimir Putin just passed his 1,000th day in a Ukraine war that was supposed to be over in three… Mr. Putin can’t draw on a bottomless reservoir of men willing to enlist for a fat signing bonus plus family death benefits. He’s losing them at a rate of 1,500 a day, faster than he can sign them up. If Ukraine’s lines were to break tomorrow and its troops to flee, they wouldn’t run far because nobody would be chasing them.”
  • “The war suits us, I’m sorry to say to my Ukrainian friends… An outcome in which Russia is thoroughly defeated in its attempt to subordinate Ukraine is not on our agenda, however much I think we could have outbid Mr. Putin and shown him he couldn’t afford to continue.”
  • “My final advice, remember Pearl Harbor. In 2023, thanks to technical means, the U.S. was able to trace a Chinese spy balloon back to its point of origin as it drifted over the U.S.. What if a similar balloon were hidden in a shipping container, shuffled through several ports, launched from sea at night? China’s balloon had a payload of 2,000 pounds. A nuclear-tipped glide bomb weighs a lot less; launched from 60,000 feet, it could hit any target in a 100-mile radius. Alternatively, a nuclear warhead detonated at 60,000 feet could knock out electronics over several U.S. states.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine Needs a New Sales Rep for Trump and the GOP," Jim Geraghty, WP, 01.05.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

"Are Russian Sanctions Working? Debate Takes New Urgency With Trump," Patricia Cohen, NYT, 01.02.25. 

• “Mr. Trump has stated, “I want to use sanctions as little as possible.””
• “The idea that economic sanctions could bring a quick end to the war was always more a product of hope than a realistic assessment, said Sergei Guriev, a Russian economist who fled the country in 2013 and is now the dean of the London Business School. A better measure of success, Mr. Guriev said, is to ask whether sanctions hampered Moscow’s ability to wage war effectively. And the answer to that, he and several other analysts argue, is yes.”
  • ““Imagine a world where sanctions were not introduced,” Mr. Guriev said. A world where Russia’s foreign commerce was not severely limited and it had access to all of its frozen foreign reserves. “It’s very clear that sanctions did cause problems for Putin, did reduce the amount of resources in his pocket and, therefore, saved lives in Ukraine,” he said. Without them, he added, Russia might have even won the war by now.”
• “Yet if sanctions have achieved more than some might have imagined, they have had less impact than many people had hoped. Over time, Russia, with enormous help from China, found several ways to blunt their impact by expanding trade with other countries, exploiting loopholes and evading the law.”
• “Jeffrey Schott, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, said Moscow was able to sell too much gas and oil at too high a price. “Sanctions have been applied with one arm tied behind your back,” he said. Piecemeal sanctions and the often listless enforcement of them have also made the economic noose around Russia’s neck looser than it could have been, Mr. Schott and other critics say.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine Backers Make Last-Ditch Effort to Seize Russian Assets,” Keith Johnson, FP, 12.16.24.

Ukraine-related negotiations:

“Bellicose Putin Guarded About Prospect of Peace in Ukraine,” Tatiana Stanovaya, CEIP, 12.23.24. 

• Putin appears disappointed that Russia’s military successes have not yet forced his enemy to the negotiating table. Not only does Putin have no one to talk to in Europe, there is no one in Ukraine either—where he considers President Volodymyr Zelensky and all his appointees to be illegitimate. In essence, Putin put forward two suggestions that would be acceptable to Moscow.  If negotiations begin now, then Ukraine can be represented by the Ukrainian parliament—the Verkhovna Rada—and its speaker; if they start further down the road then Russia would be ready to deal with a new Ukrainian president. But Moscow will not negotiate with Zelensky.
• Nor did Putin express any particular enthusiasm at the prospect of negotiating with Trump. He said he hadn’t spoken to Trump for four years, and was cautious about the prospects of any future contact with the White House. He repeated that a solution to the conflict in Ukraine was only possible on the basis of an aborted 2022 peace deal negotiated in Istanbul, and that it would have to take into account the facts on the ground. Putin appears to be concerned that Trump is so focused on a ceasefire that he might end up ignoring the root causes of the war
• The Russian president is likely also doubtful whether Trump’s plans are realistic. As Ryabkov said recently, Trump is giving “contradictory signals” based on principles that “do not align” with Russian interests. Possibly, Putin believes Trump has yet to establish his position. But the more time passes, the clearer it becomes that Trump and his team are not interested in a comprehensive discussion about Ukraine’s future, let alone negotiations about major security issues.
• Putin himself said that he is not eager to seek an end to the fighting in Ukraine because a ceasefire—even if it lasted for just a few days—would only give Ukraine a chance to consolidate its position. And why would Russia, which currently enjoys the upper hand on the battlefield, agree to such a thing?
• Indeed, the outlook for Putin is not taking shape to his advantage: there is nobody with whom he can do business in Europe; Trump is only looking for an easy win; and Ukraine continues to insist on NATO membership and security guarantees. It does not bode well for Putin’s ultimate goal, which is less about conquering Ukrainian territory and more about triggering the collapse of the Ukrainian state and the ruling elite. For the moment, Russia’s military successes are not sufficient to deliver such an outcome. Instead, Russia has to settle for seizing small chunks of Ukrainian territory at huge economic and human cost.

“A Pathway to Peace in Ukraine,” Samuel Charap, FA, 12.24.24. 

"Supporting Ukraine Is in Trump’s Interest," Michael Froman and Charles A. Kupchan, Project Syndicate, 12.30.24. 

• As Trump tries to push Ukraine and Russia toward a ceasefire, he should recognize that it is in his own political interest (as well as America’s national interest) to continue providing significant support to the Ukrainians, and only to accept a deal that produces a sovereign, secure Ukraine.... if Putin knows that US aid will flow to Ukraine for the indefinite future, he will understand that he can’t win, making it much more likely that he will engage in sincere efforts to end the war.
• A subjugated Ukraine would be a victory not only for Russia, but also for China, Iran, and North Korea. With these countries supporting Russian military aggression, the war represents the first joint venture of an emerging Axis of Autocracies. If Trump loses Ukraine, he will further embolden America’s enemies and cast doubt on US strength and the durability of its alliances. A bad deal for Ukraine is a bad deal for Trump.
• Trump should accept only a settlement that ensures that the roughly 80% of Ukraine that is still under the control of the government in Kyiv emerges as a sovereign and secure success story. That outcome will require a commitment to provide Ukraine, for years to come, with the arms and financial assistance it will need to defend itself and rebuild its economy.
• The front line on the battlefield is likely to become the new border between a rump Ukraine and the roughly 20% of the country occupied by Russian forces. But Russia is unlikely to leave it there. Putin could well demand Ukrainian neutrality and limits on the size of its armed forces – just as he did in 2022. Trump must understand that these conditions are non-starters
• Trump needs to understand that he cannot strike a deal with Putin without getting America’s European allies on board. Whether he likes the European Union or not, he needs a strong, secure, and unified Europe as a capable ally. At a time when many countries are questioning US leadership and flirting with alternative alignments, the US and its European allies must remain in lockstep
• Trump is right to try to end the war and stop the death and destruction. But he should launch that effort with eyes wide open about how challenging it will be to get a deal that leads to a secure and sovereign Ukraine. Anything short of that outcome would embolden adversaries, split the Atlantic alliance, and constitute a grievous failure of US diplomacy. And it would all happen on Trump’s watch.

“America Needs a Maximum Pressure Strategy in Ukraine,” Alina Polyakova, FA, 12.31.24.

“How to secure an acceptable deal for Ukraine,” Editorial Board, FT, 01.05.25. 

• “The fear in Europe is that Trump might prioritize a rapid agreement as an early trophy of his presidency. He has mooted forcing Kyiv into talks by threatening to cut off US aid. Without pressure on Moscow too, however, this would almost certainly amount to bowing to Russia’s demands, including neutrality and demilitarization for Ukraine.”
• “The perils of such a deal are obvious. A badly weakened rump Ukraine might slide back into Moscow’s orbit, or succumb to a further Russian assault later.”
• “An alternative deal is at least conceivable, far harder to achieve but much better for Ukraine and its allies. It would seek to ensure that, while Russia might retain de facto control of some territory in Ukraine — however repugnant that prospect might be — the rest would be able to rebuild, join the EU and prosper. There are two central challenges to realizing such a vision.”
  • “One is forcing a recalcitrant Putin to the table with a preparedness to compromise.”
  • “The second challenge is that any deal enabling the rest of Ukraine to rebuild would have to be backed by security guarantees robust enough to deter Moscow from future attacks.”
• “Neither a “bad” ceasefire nor a long continuation of a ruinous war with dwindling hope of restoring Ukraine’s integrity is an attractive option. An acceptable deal would be complex to attain and costly to underpin. Shouldering those costs now, however, might avoid much greater costs down the line.”

"As another Trump presidency nears, Ukraine’s army is on the defensive," Isabelle Khurshudyan and Serhii Korolchuk, WP, 01.04.25.

• “Ukrainian soldiers said they have grown frustrated with their own government in Kyiv, criticizing what has been a slow and disjointed mobilization campaign. Many also said they had to invest their own money or were dependent on civilian volunteers for equipment such as drones and the vehicles they drive near front-line positions because they couldn't rely on the government for essential equipment.”
• “"When I just got into the army, the situation was bad," said Oleksandr, a 27-year-old infantry soldier in the 35th brigade. "But now, for a new person, the situation is so bad that I don't judge anyone who's deserting."”
• “Though Ukraine's former military chief, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, called for mobilizing 500,000 people in 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected that number as too high. Ukrainian and Western officials estimate that Kyiv ultimately drafted about 200,000 recruits. Zelensky has also turned back suggestions from the White House to further lower the conscription age to 18.”
• “"Let's be honest, the situation now is worse than at the start of the full-scale invasion," said 33-year-old Taras, a captain and company commander in the 35th brigade. "What can we negotiate now? We can only nod our heads and agree to their demands, and what they will demand is obviously going to be something that we don't like."”
• “Ukrainian forces can typically fend off the first assault waves, soldiers said. But the Russian strategy is based on overwhelming its enemy with greater numbers to eventually break through once their probes have identified where Ukraine has gaps in its defenses.”
• “Ukraine's most acute personnel shortages are among infantry - the soldiers needed to stand in the forward-most positions."

“’Diplomatic rudeness is becoming habitual,’ Sergei Lavrov emphasizes important elements in relations with Ukraine, the West and Syria,” Kommersant, 12.26.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• I really hope that Mr. Trump’s administration, including Mr. Kellogg (Keith Kellogg, appointed by the US President-elect as Special Representative for Ukraine. — Kommersant), will delve into the root causes of the conflict. We are always ready for consultations, ready to confirm once again, if someone does not understand our repeatedly and extremely clearly stated position: we are open to any negotiations, if the negotiations are on the essence, on the root causes and principles that President Putin spoke about in June of this year.
• The first step to restore contacts with Russia should be taken by the US, which broke them off after the start of [the special military operation]
• So far, all we hear is talk about the need to come up with some kind of truce, and it is not particularly hidden that this truce is needed in order to buy time to continue pumping Ukraine with weapons, so that they can get themselves in order, carry out additional mobilization, and so on ... A truce is a road to nowhere. We need final legal agreements that will fix all the conditions for ensuring the security of the Russian Federation and, of course, the legitimate security interests of our neighbors, but in a context that will secure the impossibility of violating these agreements in an international legal manner.
• Regarding the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government... the president [Putin] said very clearly on the direct line that the Ukrainians must sort this out themselves in order to bring the situation in Kyiv into line with the Ukrainian constitution. For this, of course, if they want to have a legitimate president, they need to hold elections. In the meantime, according to the constitution, as Putin explained, only the Verkhovna Rada and, accordingly, its chairman have legitimacy.
• As for the egoism of the West, the new head of EU diplomacy Kaja Kallas spoke very demonstratively, demanding that Syria stop cooperating with Russia ... such diplomatic rudeness is becoming commonplace.

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with 60 Minutes television program,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.25.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• Everyone thinks the arrival of the Trump Administration will change things. There is much speculation about this going on. As I earlier mentioned, we have no illusions. There is a fairly robust bipartisan consensus in Washington on supporting the Kyiv regime. US doctrinal documents describe our country as an adversary that needs to be “strategically defeated.”
• President Vladimir Putin’s June 14 speech at the Foreign Ministry... contains a demand to fulfill what has been repeatedly agreed upon over many years: demilitarization of Ukraine (which is a direct violation of the agreements that NATO will not “gobble up” an increasing number of countries to the east and approach directly the border of the Russian Federation), and respect for the obligations under the UN Charter, including with regard to human rights, language and religious rights among them. Can these truly be called conditions? This is the bare minimum of what any normal member of the international community must do.
• We will not be satisfied with a truce. We need reliable and legally binding agreements aimed at eliminating the root causes of the conflict, addressing problems such as common security in Europe, NATO expansion, the European Union’s recent decision to become an appendage of the North Atlantic bloc, in fact, erasing all differences between these organizations, and above all, upholding the rights of the people living in these territories who have supported reunification with the Russian Federation.
• We have never initiated a discussion regarding what should be done with nuclear weapons and whether they can be used. On the contrary, it was at Russia's initiative that in 2021, first at the level of Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden, and subsequently among the leaders of the entire G5 nuclear-armed states – the permanent members of the Security Council – the 1987 Gorbachev-Reagan principle was reaffirmed: there can be no victors in a nuclear war, thus it should never be instigated. This was a Russian initiative. ... Any other proposals or similar remarks, suggesting the possibility of nuclear conflict, have emanated solely from Western capitals.
• Recently, Pentagon generals have openly deliberated on the potential for "limited nuclear strikes" with the Russian Federation, with the intention to ensure they emerge victorious from such an "exchange."
• In any event, we are not interested in escalating the issue of nuclear weapons usage risks. ... I would caution against testing our patience and resolve to defend our legitimate national interests by all available means. Vladimir Putin elaborated on this during the Direct Line and in previous addresses. We trust that those with ears will listen, and those with minds will comprehend.

"Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Interview with TASS News Agency," Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.30.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• Judging from numerous leaks and Donald Trump’s interview with Time magazine on December 12, their idea is to suspend hostilities along the line of contact and transfer responsibility for confrontation with Russia to the Europeans. We are not happy, of course, with the proposals made by members of the Trump team to postpone Ukraine’s admission to NATO for 20 years and to station British and European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. ... What we need is reliable and legally binding agreements that would eliminate the root causes of the conflict and seal a mechanism precluding the possibility of their violation.
• As for our warnings that we would refuse to accept Ukraine’s NATO membership regardless of the territorial factor, as far as we can judge, there is a lack of unity among NATO members on this matter.
• As for the future of Russian-US relations, we are ready to renew the political dialogue which Washington terminated after the start of the special military operation, if the United States is ready for this. Since it was the Americans who cut it off, it is for them to make the first move.
• We are closely monitoring the developments in Syria. It would be premature to make far-reaching conclusions regarding them now. However, it can be said that one of the reasons for the aggravation of the situation there was the former government’s inability to meet the fundamental demands of the people amid a drawn-out civil conflict. ... Washington, which has effectively occupied the resource-rich north-eastern part of Syria and is putting serious sanctions pressure on Damascus together with a coalition of its satellites, bears a great deal of blame for this. This line for strangling the Syrian economy stirred up social discontent.

"The Ukrainian Crisis in 2025: Why Trump's Return to Power Won't Lead to a Resolution," Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 01.04.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The primary objectives for the Trump administration remain unchanged: to prevent a loss of trust from allies in U.S. security guarantees, maintain Ukraine within its sphere of influence as leverage against Russia, and block any normalization of relations between the EU and Russia. ... Russia, on the other hand, seeks to prompt the U.S. to seriously reconsider the structure of European security, which is currently based on NATO dominance, and to remove Ukraine from the Western sphere of influence. The irreconcilable interests of Russia and the U.S. make a swift and comprehensive resolution of the Ukrainian crisis highly unlikely.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Winning the War by Winning the Peace in Ukraine,” David Ayer and Michael Hewitt, NI, 12.19.24.
• “Will European Troops Enforce a Cease-Fire in Ukraine?” Franz-Stefan Gady, FP, 12.20.24.
• “Europe Should Embrace Peace Between Russia and Ukraine,” Andreas Umland. NI, 12.25.24.
• "Europe needs a coalition of the resolute,"  Léonie Allard and Elie Tenenbaum, Atlantic Council, 12.20.24.
• “Toward A New European Post-War Security Architecture,” Abdulla Ibrahim, NI, 12.20.24.
• “Putin Sends Trump a Ukraine Message,” Editorial Board, WSJ, 12.23.24.
• "Will 2025 Be a Repeat of 1938 for Europe?" Tim Willasey-Wilsey CMG, RUSI, 01.06.25.
• “What You Think You Know About Ukraine Is Probably Wrong,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 12.27.24.
• "Putin Modifies Rhetoric on Ukraine – but Peace Still far off," Sergei Shelin, Russia.Post, 12.26.24.
• "Strategic Deadlock: The Collapse of the Western Coalition Supporting Ukraine and the Growing Number of Proponents of a 'Quick Peace' Result in a Paralysis of Political Will," Re: Russia, 12.27.24.
• “Putin’s Setbacks Are Cold Comfort for Europe,” Joschka Fischer, Project Syndicate, 12.30.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"The strategist in the hurricane. As national security adviser, Jake Sullivan often had to improvise — and weigh some very imperfect responses," David Ignatius, WP, 01.05.25. 

• When President Joe Biden chose Jake Sullivan to be his national security adviser in November 2020, he touted him as a "once-in-a-generation intellect with the experience and temperament for one of the toughest jobs in the world."
• Russia began a retreat that accelerated through 2022. This was a tactical triumph for Ukraine, but it led to the war's biggest crisis. As the Kremlin panicked, it considered desperate options. U.S. intelligence analysts began warning that June that, as Russian lines collapsed, Moscow was preparing possible use of tactical nuclear weapons to save its forces.
• The Ukraine crisis deepened on Oct. 23 when then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made an urgent call to his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin. Shoigu claimed that Russia had intelligence that Ukraine was preparing to use a "dirty bomb." Maybe his call was a pretext, or maybe Putin really believed the Ukrainians were about to go nuclear. U.S. intelligence analysts warned that it was a "coin flip" whether Russia would use tactical nukes to avert defeat.
  • And third, the White House reached out to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Burns shared U.S. intelligence documenting Russia's "active consideration" of using tactical nuclear weapons with the head of China's Ministry of State Security, a senior official told me. Xi took the United States' secret warnings seriously. He sent a message to Putin and warned him against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, three knowledgeable sources said.
• Sullivan and his colleagues decided that the risk of failure in meddling in Russian politics was too high - and that a successful Prigozhin might be even worse than Putin. "If Putin thought we were using Prigozhin to undermine his regime, who knows the nuclear risk?" recalled Tom Wright, one of Sullivan's top NSC advisers.

"The Real Risks of Escalation in Ukraine," Michael Poznansky and William C. Wohlforth, FA, 01.03.25.

"‘The Interview’: Antony Blinken Insists He and Biden Made the Right Calls," Lulu Garcia-Navarro, NYT, 01.04.25. 

• "Six months after Afghanistan, Russia invaded Ukraine. That was February 2022. I remember that moment as being terrifying. How close were we to direct conflict? Look, there’ve been different moments where we had real concerns about actions that Russia might take, including even potentially the use of nuclear weapons. That very much focused the mind. But I think throughout we’ve been able to navigate this in a way that has kept us away from direct conflict with Russia. Now Russia is engaged in all sorts of nefarious activities, so-called hybrid attacks of one kind or another, whether it’s in cyberspace, whether it’s acts of sabotage, assassination. Those things are happening. They’re happening in Europe. And this is something that we’re working very closely on with many of our partners. But in terms of direct conflict, I don’t think we’ve been close, but it’s something that we’ve had to be very, very mindful of."
• "So first, if you look at the trajectory of the conflict, because we saw it coming, we were able to make sure that not only were we prepared and allies and partners were prepared, but that Ukraine was prepared. We made sure that well before the Russian aggression happened, starting in September and then again December, we quietly got a lot of weapons to Ukraine to make sure that they had in hand what they needed to defend themselves, things like Stingers, Javelins that were instrumental in preventing Russia from taking Kyiv."
• "It’s unlikely that Putin will give up on his ambitions…So what’s going to be critical to make sure that any cease-fire that comes about is actually enduring is to make sure that Ukraine has the capacity going forward to deter further aggression."

“What to expect in 2025,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 12.26.24.

• "I thought we’d round up where we are in world affairs [at the end of 2024] with three of my favorite pundits. Alexander Gabuev is head of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center based in Berlin. Jeremy Shapiro’s the director of the Washington office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. And Karin von Hippel is director of the Royal United Services Institute here in London. Last year’s been hugely turbulent in Ukraine, the Middle East, Europe and the United States. So what can we look forward to in 2025?"
• Alexander Gabuev:
  • "Even if there is no deal inside on Ukraine, which I think is problematic, because I don’t see any reasons why the Kremlin would climb down from some of its maximalist demands for how this war should end, the level of incoherence in Trump’s White House and the transpiring second-order effects in the transatlantic relationships and in relationship between the US and Ukraine is definitely something to celebrate."
  • "Everybody I’m talking to who is somewhat close to where this black box of Kremlin decision-making is says there are no indication that Mr. Putin has climbed down from very high bar of his ultimate goal for this war, eradicating a sovereign independent Ukraine. Time out for the war that gives Russia a pause for maybe four years as Trump is in White House to rearm... Russia would love to have a timeout, provided that in the meantime, Ukraine will not be able to get stronger."
• Jeremy Shapiro
  • "I think there’s a much greater chance of escalation in Ukraine or maybe not in Ukraine, but really in the Russia-west conflict. I think we’re in a very dangerous moment there where the Russians certainly perceive quite a bit of escalation coming from the west in recent weeks and months."

“Farce then tragedy: Russian views of the West and what they mean for Ukraine,” Kadri Liik, ECFR, 12.20.24. 

• Russia’s leaders often claim that the US is a declining power and that a post-American world is growing ever-nearer. They assert that its European allies are bellicose and mercurial, but also fragmented and powerless.
• Where Moscow greeted Trump’s first election in 2016 as the emergence of a partner in forging that new order, such hopes have since dissolved. Russia’s leaders now largely see him merely as a harbinger of that American decline.
• These factors will shape Vladimir Putin’s calculus in Ukraine. Despite sanctions pressures, Russia’s president acts as if time is on his country’s side. He appears to be trying to lock in its advantage, which bodes poorly for the incoming president’s attempts to forge a settlement.
• The near-collapse of the US-Russia arms control system makes talks more difficult, and means any further crises in the relationship could escalate quickly.

“Putin’s Point of No Return. How an Unchecked Russia Will Challenge the West,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman, FA, 12.18.24.

“How Might the Kremlin Test NATO’s Collective Defense?” Joe Morley-Davies, RUSI, 01.03.25. 

• The Kremlin could exploit gray-zone tactics to probe NATO’s collective defense.
• Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and hybrid warfare are likely methods.
• Russia may seek to instigate 'minor incidents' below the Article 5 threshold.
• The Kremlin could target specific member states to 'fracture NATO unity.'
• Proxy conflicts near NATO's borders could be used as 'testing grounds.'
• Risks of escalation are highest in 'the Baltics or the Black Sea.'
• NATO must maintain 'cohesion and clarity' in its deterrence messaging.
• Building resilience in member states is essential to counter these strategies.
• Investing in hybrid threat responses is 'increasingly important.'
• Proactive measures are required to 'mitigate risks' from Kremlin actions.

“Answers to media questions. Following the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council Meeting Vladimir Putin answered the questions of Russian journalists,” Kremlin.ru, 12.26.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• The well-being of the Russian people, the standard of living, and stability is what matters most.
• [When asked There are increasing statements and conjectures abroad – both from political analysts and officials – suggesting that the conflict in Ukraine might be resolved as early as next year. Everyone is curious about how this might unfold, and there is speculation from the Trump team]: As the saying goes, “From your lips to God’s ears.” We are indeed working towards ending the conflict.
• It is no secret that President Biden [that]... in 2021 suggested postponing Ukraine’s NATO membership for 10 to 15 years, as it was not ready at that time. To which I replied sensibly, “Well, it is not ready today, but you will prepare it and accept it.” In the grand scheme of history, this is merely a fleeting moment. What difference does it make to us whether it happens today, tomorrow, or in 10 years? I am not acquainted with the statements from the President-elect’s future team. But if this is true, what’s the difference between the current administration’s position and the proposals you’ve just mentioned? There is no difference whatsoever.
• [When asked “Some are anticipating Oreshnik to take off and land, for instance”:] You see, we always respond in kind. If certain weapons are used against us, we employ the same in return. For instance, they launched a strike by five to seven ATACMS systems. Did you hear the announcement made yesterday or the day before? The Russian Armed Forces responded with a comprehensive strike – 240 or 221 strikes, something of that sort, using precision long-range weaponry.
• If necessary, and we determine the need for more powerful medium-range weapons, we will undoubtedly use them. However, we are not in a rush. It is not a secret, and we are not concealing it, as I have previously mentioned – we do not currently have many Oreshnik systems. However, we possess them, and not just one system. We are not in a hurry to deploy them, as these are powerful weapons, designed to address specific challenges. We have commenced serial production and will manufacture the required quantity. We will position some on Belarusian territory. Our approach is methodical. However, we do not exclude the possibility of deploying them today or tomorrow if such a need arises.
• [When meeting Putin during a recent visit to Russia, Slovak leader Fico said] that if it comes to talks, they would be happy to make their country available as a venue for such talks. We are not against it if it comes to that. Why not? Slovakia has adopted a neutral stance. From our point of view, their position is neutral, which is an acceptable option for us. ... Yes, indeed, he [Fico] said that in case the talks focus on peaceful settlement. I want to emphasize that Mr. Fico – he may disagree with the Ukrainian leaders, someone else, or the European Union where they are unable to come to terms on certain things, but he was mainly talking about peaceful settlement in Ukraine. He was, as they say, “pushing hard” for it. So, I am not sure what kind of complaints Europe or anyone else may have with regard to him
• As for energy supply agreements, we have always stood for such supplies, for depoliticizing economic matters. We have never refused to supply energy to Europe... They [Ukrainians] are eating from Europe’s hand because Ukraine cannot continue to fight – let alone exist without Europe’s support. But they have decided to punish Europe by terminating the contract on transit of our gas to Europe, where the situation is becoming difficult with gas prices running at about US$500 per 1,000 cubic meters.

“The World Awaits Change,” Andrei Kortunov, Izvestiya/RIAC, 12.27.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The impatient anticipation of change was evidenced, in particular, by the results of numerous elections held over the past 12 months in various parts of the world. In total, more than 1.6 billion people came to the polls, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, supporters of the status quo lost their positions.
• Pessimists will certainly say that abandoning the status quo in itself does not solve any problems, and long-awaited changes, as the experience of the last years of the Soviet Union showed, are not necessarily changes for the better. The replacement of cautious technocrats with irresponsible populists often backfires on those who have been most vocal in their criticism of the tired status quo. Optimists will argue that the thoroughly rusted structures of state machines everywhere are in need of radical modernization, and will add that the costs that inevitably follow from the desire to preserve the existing state of affairs at all costs clearly exceed any risks associated with attempts to change this state of affairs.
• In the outgoing year, the UN Security Council was able to adopt only 12 resolutions, primarily of a humanitarian nature, which clearly demonstrates the decline in the effectiveness of this global governance body (for comparison, in 2000 the UN Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including the most important decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa). At the same time, in 2024, the persistent search for new formats of multilateral cooperation continued, including the mechanisms of the BRICS group, which gathered for the first time at its XVI summit in Kazan in a new expanded format.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “How America First will transform the world in 2025,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 12.27.24.
• “As Putin presses his hybrid war, Europe presses the ‘snooze’ button,” Lee Hockstader, WP, 12.19.24.
• "Can American Abandonment Help Europe?" Arancha González Laya, Camille Grand, Katarzyna Pisarska, Nathalie Tocci, and Guntram Wolff, FA, 01.06.25.
• "Putin Plus Trump Spell Trouble for European Security," Gideon Rachman, FT, 01.06.25.
• "How to Respond to Russia's Hybrid War on the West," Max Boot, WP, 12.31.24.
• "Finland's Seizure of a Tanker Shows How to Fight Russian Sabotage," The Economist, 12.15.24.
• "Russia's Cable-Cutting Could Threaten Europe's Whole Energy Supply," Elisabeth Braw, FP, 12.30.24.
• “The Earth’s Axis of Resistance,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Kommersant/Russia in Global Affairs, 12.26.24 Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian.) (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
• "How Europe Cripples Its Defenses: ESG Rules and Left-Wing Critics Stymie Defense Financing and Investment," Editorial Board, WSJ, 12.29.24. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report to Congress, 12.18.24.

• PRC leaders continue to believe that global trends, especially the perceived U.S. decline, are generally conducive to their long-term interests and, at the close of 2023, saw the “new period of turbulence and transformation” as “posing new strategic opportunities” in China’s development.
• Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to test the strength of Russia and China’s strategic partnership, Beijing has sought to preserve its close ties with Moscow while promoting its own image as a responsible great power, maintaining its “neutrality” in the war.
• The PRC’s extensive military relationships with Pakistan and Russia… support partnerships it considers key to success in strategic competition
• In Europe, Beijing and Moscow have jointly called for a shift away from the continent’s Western-led security apparatus toward a Eurasian-led security architecture. However, Beijing probably will struggle to pursue this aim in Europe due to its tacit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Beijing was largely unresponsive to international criticism over its support to Russia.
• The PRC almost certainly is applying lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine toward countering what it perceives as a U.S.-led containment strategy.
• Though it is a partner to the DPRK and Russia, Beijing has publicly distanced itself from Moscow and Pyongyang’s growing defense cooperation, referring to it as a strictly bilateral matter.
• Beijing has sought to balance its support to Moscow’s defense industry while avoiding reputational or economic costs resulting from its assistance. Beijing has parroted Russian narratives when they align with China’s criticism of the United States and has refrained from condemning its conduct or referring to Moscow’s invasion as a “war.” 

“The China-Russia relationship and threats to vital U.S. interests,” Patricia M. Kim, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Angela Stent, and Tara Varma, Brookings, 12.16.24.

• China’s continued economic and diplomatic support for Russia enables the latter to sustain its war of aggression in Ukraine.
• China and Russia are weakening the underpinnings of American leadership on the world stage and core elements of the existing rules-based international order.
• China and Russia’s deepening military alignment poses a challenge to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
• China and Russia’s strategic partnership will persist as long as each continues to see the United States as its principal adversary.
• The United States is limited in its ability to engineer a Sino-Russian split. Neither Beijing nor Moscow can be wholly co-opted or punished into submission.
• Chinese and Russian interests are not fully aligned. While Beijing and Moscow share the aim of eroding Washington’s global influence and its alliance networks, the two states have fundamentally different strategic outlooks. As the world’s second-largest economy and largest trading state, China has a far greater stake than Russia in regional and global stability… Moscow, on the other hand, has no interest in serving as a junior partner to Beijing and seeks to expand its freedom of strategic maneuver, as evidenced by its outreach to Iran, North Korea, and India, among others… Despite their pronouncement of a “no limits” partnership, mistrust and rivalry run deep in the Sino-Russian relationship.
• Beijing benefits from its respective bilateral ties with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, but it has no interest in joining or endorsing a four-way “axis.”
• The United States’ key objectives for the China-Russia partnership should be to prevent the further deepening of this relationship and to actively counter Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to undermine U.S. global leadership and support for the rules-based international order. To advance these objectives, the Trump administration should:
  • Recognize the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia’s partnership as well as their respective ties with Iran and North Korea, without overstating the degree of their alignment and joint coordination.
  • Keep open channels of communication.
  • Signal to Beijing that its interests are better served by sharply limiting its support for Russia.
  • Take the competition for hearts and minds in the Global South seriously. 

“What Are the BRICS Good For?”, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate, 01.02.25.

• So, what is the BRICS good for? As a means of escaping diplomatic isolation, it is certainly useful to Russia. As a diplomatic device for projecting leadership of the developing world, it also has been useful to China. As a channel through which to counterbalance China, it has its uses for India. And as a modest stage for touting national development, it has sometimes been useful to Brazil and South Africa. But do these functions make it a new fulcrum of world politics? I think not.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “How Elon Musk and Taylor Swift Can Resolve U.S.-China Relations,” Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 12.17.24.

Missile defense:

"The Next Steps in Missile Defense," Richard Weitz, The National Interest, 01.03.25. 

• Chinese and Russian leaders perceive hypersonic weapons as providing their countries with critical strategic and operational capabilities.
• The United States needs a well-constructed plan to parry these hypersonic threats—seeing and tracking fast maneuvering gliders in the upper atmosphere is only half the problem. The United States also needs to shoot them down. Congress has established a deadline for the United States to field an initial hypersonic interceptor capability by the end of this decade. The Pentagon is accordingly building the first system optimized to attack hypersonic gliders. Though a novel capability, this Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) leverages proven technologies that the Navy has used to shoot down hundreds of missiles and drones in the Middle East.
• Meanwhile, proposals to divert the limited funding to build a “gap-filler” terminal interceptor with constrained capabilities have arisen to provide patchwork protection until the GPI is deployed. Though terminal interceptors shielding a few critical sites could help build a layered defense, funding for any gap filler should supplement rather than divide the budget for the GPI, which will protect a much wider area.
• The GPI program also has built-in burden sharing. The Japanese government is allocating $368 million to support its development through a Cooperative Development agreement with the United States and other means. The president and Congress should leverage these matching funds to support a rigorous GPI development, testing, and deployment program.

Nuclear arms:⁶

"Antony Blinken: ‘China Has Been Trying to Have It Both Ways,’" Demetri Sevastopulo, FT, 01.03.25.

• “Blinken says the U.S. was “very concerned” because Putin seemed to be at least considering the nuclear option. “Even if the probability went from 5 to 15%, when it comes to nuclear weapons, nothing is more serious.” But nuclear weapons were also one of the few issues where China may have helped the U.S., despite Beijing’s support for Russia. “We have reason to believe that China engaged Russia and said: ‘Don’t go there’,” he says. He adds that a similar dynamic may have occurred when the U.S. told China that Putin was planning to put a nuclear weapon in space.”
• “The presence of North Korean soldiers fighting with Russians against Ukraine has further underscored how conflicts in one region have implications for nations in other parts of the world. Giving another example, Blinken stresses that Chinese groups are still providing Russia with critical materiel to help it rebuild its defense industry base.”
• “Blinken has repeatedly lambasted China for allowing companies to send dual-use items with both civilian and military applications to Russia. The flow of trade has not fallen, so I ask why the administration has not taken actions with more teeth.”
• “He stresses that Putin has suffered a “strategic defeat” and that NATO is bigger and more resourced than ever. Without mentioning Trump’s criticism that Europe must do more, he says U.S. allies have provided $150 billion in addition to the $100 billion from Washington. “I don’t think anyone can complain that they haven’t done their fair share.” He also pushes back on suggestions that the Biden administration dragged its feet in providing weapons, saying it had to take into account a range of factors such as whether Ukraine could operate and maintain the systems.”

“How impossible is the risk of nuclear escalation in Ukraine?” Janice Stein, BAS, 12.20.24. 

• There is… no compelling logic that supports the use of even a single tactical nuclear weapon. What conditions could change that logic?
  • Russia could face a situation where its forces are being pushed back and out of Ukraine. Putin faced a version of that scenario in the autumn of 2022 when Ukraine’s armed forces were pushing the Russian army back. It was then that the CIA issued the estimate that there was a 50% chance that Russia would use a nuclear weapon.
  • What about a scenario in which Putin uses a nuclear weapon because of a technical miscalculation? Experts have long warned that miscalculation could occur if nuclear and conventional forces and their command-and-control structures are integrated. As nuclear weapons are modernized and, in some cases, become smaller, integration is becoming more frequent. However, all these scenarios deal with conventional wars between large nuclear powers that escalate to a nuclear confrontation. In Ukraine, Russia is not at war with another nuclear power. It is difficult to see how these scenarios of escalation through technical miscalculation would be relevant. Political miscalculation, another type, can occur when a leader miscalculates the consequences of the use of a nuclear weapon to demonstrate resolve. Could Putin make this kind of miscalculation in the weeks before or shortly after President Trump is inaugurated? A scenario might go something like this.
  • Conflicts tend to intensify as the parties anticipate negotiation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, deeply alarmed by the prospect of an imposed ceasefire, tries a “Hail Mary pass” to break the stalemate on the battlefield. To do so, he decides to use almost all his drone and missile forces in a coordinated attack on the front and behind the lines in Russia. Inevitably, some of the missiles get through, causing Russian forces to retreat, even temporarily, and significant casualties among Russian civilians. Ukrainian intelligence services also assassinate two or three other key Russian generals far behind the lines to show their long reach, as they did when they brazenly killed Gen. Igor Kirilov in Moscow this week. The Russian public is furious and military bloggers stoke the fury, calling for a fierce response. An outraged Putin then gives the order to detonate a tactical nuclear weapon.
• Even though Putin never appeared to approach a decision to use a nuclear weapon, he manipulated the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter NATO from supplying weapons to Ukraine. This strategy failed again and again. The United States and its Western allies supplied Ukraine with increasingly more sophisticated equipment over time despite the “nuclear noise.” They judged Putin’s intentions not by what he said but by the larger context in which he was making his thinly veiled threats designed to coerce. They took him seriously only once when Russian forces were in retreat. Context always matters, even when the threats are nuclear. Putin now has the unenviable reputation of someone who bluffs. This reputation can only encourage NATO to continue to call his bluff in the future. But one day Putin may not be bluffing. If leaders do not pay attention to context, they may well miss the “signal” that, this time, Russia is serious about using a nuclear weapon to coerce an adversary.

“A Reliable Pilar for Russia's Security and Sovereignty,” interview with commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia Sergei Karakaev, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12.17.24. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• The implementation of the planned measures to re-equip the units and military units of the Strategic Missile Forces has made it possible to ensure the share of modern missile weapons at the level of 88% and to give the Strategic Missile Forces grouping new capabilities to perform nuclear deterrence tasks. At the same time, in the mobile grouping of the Strategic Missile Forces, this figure already reaches 100%.
• The ratio of deployed carriers in the stationary and mobile groups of the Strategic Missile Forces is approximately equal. In the future, it is planned to generally maintain such a quantitative state of carriers and warheads of the groups, which will allow the Strategic Missile Forces to perform the entire spectrum of diverse nuclear deterrence tasks and participate in the so-called retaliatory and counter and retaliatory actions of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of Russia.
• Current realities and the military-political situation have led to the need to update the nuclear policy of our state. The document [2024 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence] clarifies the conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons, expands the category of states and military alliances in relation to which nuclear deterrence is carried out, and stipulates that aggression by any non-nuclear state against the Russian Federation with the support of a nuclear power will be considered as their joint attack, including against the Republic of Belarus. Under these conditions, the Strategic Missile Forces, as before, will continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them in readiness to deter a potential enemy from aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.
• The Russian Federation informs the American side no less than 24 hours in advance of any planned launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States of America shall also provide similar information. Such notification shall indicate the planned launch date, launch location, and warhead impact area.” Given that Russia had earlier disclosed that it had notified U.S. of the pending launch of Oreshnik, it might be that the U.S. learned the area where the warhead would land 24 hours in advance, which was plenty of time to inform the Ukrainian side.
  • An important event in the history of the Strategic Missile Forces was the combat testing of the medium-range missile system "Oreshnik…" Over the past 10 years, 21 missile regiments have entered combat duty, 16 of which have the mobile ground missile system "Yars." Over the past five years, 11 missile regiments have been introduced into combat composition.
  • In order to implement the decision of the President of the Russian Federation, announced in October of this year, on the preparation of serial production of the new medium-range missile system [Oreshnik], a decision is being developed on the creation of new [RVSN] formations and the determination of their deployment locations.
• The United States continues to search for and implement additional ways to neutralize the capabilities of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces. Today, further steps have been taken by deploying new anti-missile systems in Poland and gradually expanding their information segment… The Strategic Missile Forces have proposed a number of military-technical measures that would allow the effectiveness of the prospective U.S. missile defense system to be reduced to a sufficient degree and ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of the assigned tasks.
• [When asked about New START:]At present, until Feb. 5, 2026, it is planned to ensure that the number of warheads with nuclear weapons is maintained at the level established by the treaty limitations, which does not exclude the possibility of an increase in the number of warheads on deployed carriers in response to similar actions by the United States. So Russia claims to continue to observe New START limits just like U.S. claims to.
• It should be noted that automation of the process of control of strategic weapons on combat duty has been implemented since the beginning of the development of the Strategic Missile Forces. At the same time, today's automated combat control system, intended primarily for the guaranteed delivery of combat orders to weapons, is precisely automated, but not automatic, and for now [sic] the presence of a human is mandatory in it. At the same time, we must not forget that in the hands of missilemen are strategic nuclear weapons of enormous destructive power, requiring constant human attention, excluding their unauthorized use. “For now” could be interpreted as veiled threat that Russia may automate nuclear retaliation. However, Russia has already been reported to operate the Perimeter (Dead Hand system) that supposedly does that since Soviet time. This could be yet another attempt to unnerve U.S. and its allies.

“‘A deeply alarming situation has developed,’ Deputy Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergei Ryabkov on the situation in the sphere of strategic (in)stability,” Kommersant, 12.27.24.

• [When commenting on a statement by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, who recently said that “the topic of arms control is a thing of the past:”] Today, a deeply disturbing situation has developed, when after the destruction of a whole series of agreements, a poorly controlled environment has emerged and such conditions have arisen in the security sphere in which the implementation of some of the remaining agreements has become counterproductive for Russia… Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Army General Gerasimov… of course had every reason to state that today the topic of arms control in relations between Russia and the United States and Russia and the West is becoming more of a part of history.
• As of today, a large-scale head-on conflict between nuclear powers has not yet broken out and none of them has had to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, which generally indicates that deterrence continues to work.
• In particular, this document [the new edition of the "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence"] contained a very serious signal to our opponents. It is multifaceted, and I am sure that specialists on the other side are at least concerned about this signal. We would like to expect that it will be adequately perceived [in the West.]
• The objective reality is that the United States is actively moving towards deploying land-based INF missiles in Europe, and has already deployed them in the Asia-Pacific region… President Putin has repeatedly stated that the creation of additional missile threats for U.S. and our allies will inevitably be followed by a proportionate response. It is on this principle that the joint decision of the Russian and Belarusian leadership regarding potential deployment schemes for the newest medium-range missile system "Oreshnik" is based.
• [When asked to comment on calls by some members of Trump’s team to resume nuclear testing] President-elect Trump took a rather radical position in his first presidential term regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty… I would simply like to say in this regard that the international situation is currently extremely difficult, American policy in various aspects is currently extremely hostile towards us… Therefore, the optionality of our actions in the interests of ensuring security and the range of possible measures, events that should materially implement this, and also send politically appropriate signals, in addition to what professional practitioners are considering, this range does not contain any exceptions. We are considering the entire range of possible steps.

 “Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov to ‘Russia Today,’” Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.29.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

[On New START, INF and nuclear arms control in general]

• Until the Americans abandon their current anti-Russian course, we will not conduct any negotiations with them on arms control. This does not mean that Russia will not implement a number of measures to maintain an acceptable level of predictability in the nuclear missile sphere on a voluntary basis, which is what we are doing. In particular, we continue to adhere to the quantitative restrictions on the relevant weapons provided for by the START Treaty. In addition, Russia's unilateral moratorium on the deployment of land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF) remains in effect. Some other steps are also being taken.
• However, as we have repeatedly stated, the relevance of these measures directly depends on how much they meet our interests. We assess the situation based on an analysis of the destabilizing actions of the U.S. and NATO in the strategic sphere and, accordingly, the evolution of the threats that arise from them. Today it is obvious that, for example, our moratorium on the deployment of INF missiles is already practically unviable and will have to be abandoned. The U.S. arrogantly ignored warnings from Russia and China and in practice moved on to deploying weapons of this class in various regions of the world.
• The recent test of the latest hypersonic medium-range system "Oreshnik," carried out by us in combat conditions, convincingly demonstrated our capabilities and determination to implement compensatory measures.

• What will happen after February 2026, when the START Treaty ceases to exist, we do not see any reason to guess now. A lot can still happen in the coming year. So at this stage it would be premature, and unwise, to announce our possible moves in this sensitive area. 

  [On a possible repetition of the 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision:] We have repeatedly indicated that we may only be interested in comprehensive work to reduce the potential for conflict with an emphasis on eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions in the area of ​​security. These include, first of all, NATO's long-term expansion to the east. This is what largely provoked the Ukrainian crisis and continues to pose a threat to Russia's security. Issues of arms control could also hypothetically be discussed, but only as one element of a broader agenda.

  [On negotiations to end the Russian-Ukrainian war:] Our country's position on the settlement is well known and remains unchanged. We are ready for negotiations, but they must be aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and take into account the real situation "on the ground."

• Russian President V.V. Putin clearly outlined our fundamental approaches in his speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, as well as during a press conference on the results of the year on Dec. 19. In particular, this concerns the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, ensuring its non-aligned, neutral and non-nuclear status, eliminating long-term threats to Russia's security emanating from the West, including NATO expansion. Kyiv must take on specific obligations to ensure the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens and, of course, recognize the territorial realities enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
• Implementation of the specific proposals formulated by the head of state will help put an end to the conflict and reach comprehensive, long-term, fair and legally binding agreements. This is the only way to achieve lasting peace.
• Kyiv and the West have begun discussing the possibility of some kind of ceasefire and armistice in order to gain a respite and, during it, increase the military potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and then resume efforts to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. Of course, this is a dead end. A road to nowhere. There can be no doubt about this.
• [On new strategic treaty with Iran:] The new “big” treaty, the text of which has long been prepared and agreed upon by the parties, is comprehensive, long-term and “all-weather” in nature, and in this sense does not require any adjustments.
• The treaty is intended to legally consolidate the unprecedented progress in bilateral relations achieved in recent years and record their entry into the level of strategic partnership.
• The signing of the agreement, which we expect to take place during the next high-level contact soon, will open up additional opportunities for further expansion of Russian-Iranian partnership in priority areas.
• [On Syria:] Undoubtedly, the change of power and the change in the situation "on the ground" are making certain adjustments to the Russian military presence in Syria. This is not only about preserving our bases or strongholds, but also about the conditions for their operation, maintenance and provision, interaction with the local side. These topics could become the subject of negotiations with the new Syrian leadership.

“Absence of Control over Arms,” Elena Chernenko, Kommersant, 12.27.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• The new Russian nuclear doctrine (its official title: "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence") has dropped the mention of "arms control." In the previous version of the doctrine, which was in effect from June 2020 to November 2024, this term appeared twice… Russian officials have also been mentioning this concept [arms control] much less frequently this year… [and even] less of the concept of "disarmament."
• Judging by the statements of Russian officials, there is a growing conviction in Moscow that only the threat of nuclear escalation is holding the United States and its European allies back from crossing Russia's last "red lines."
• It is already clear what issues Moscow and Washington will face in the foreseeable future in any case. Two of them will have to be resolved one way or another as early as 2025.
  • The first concerns medium- and shorter-range missiles… Taking into account the timeline announced by the U.S. and Germany and Vladimir Putin's statements about the prospects for deliveries of the latest Russian strike systems to Belarus, it turns out that the issue of medium- and shorter-range missiles will be resolved in 2025: either Russia and the U.S. will reach some kind of agreement on restrictions on the deployment of such systems, or an arms race will begin between them in this segment again, as it was during the Cold War.
  • The second issue, which the parties will have to deal with in one way or another in 2025, concerns the expiring START.
• These two issues, of course, do not exhaust the bilateral agenda in the area of ​​strategic stability. Problems will certainly also be created, for example, by the growing confrontation in space and cyberspace.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "How Russia Is Undermining the Non-Proliferation Regime," Andreas Umland, The National Interest, 12.14.24.
• “Nuclear Eurowinter: Nuclearization of the Euroarctic,” Philipp Petrosyan, Russia in Global Affairs, 12.19.24. (In Russian.)
• “Nuclear Weapons Are Not a Fact of Life ,” Beatrice Fihn, NYT, 12.26.24.
• "On the Brink of a New Arms Race: Russian Nuclear Blackmail and China's Nuclear Build-up Trigger a New Era of Nuclear Competition," Re: Russia, 12.23.24.
• Also see, "Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with 60 Minutes television program,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.25.24. Clues from Russian Views, in the “Ukraine-related negotiations” section.

Counterterrorism:

"The Islamic State Is a Franchise Now," Clara Broekaert and Colin P. Clarke, FP, 01.03.25. 

• There is no silver bullet solution to managing the threat posed by terrorism. After all, it is a tactic and as such cannot be defeated in the traditional sense, as if it were an army or a nation-state. Sound counterterrorism means kinetic measures such as drone strikes and special operations raids but also a comprehensive approach to dealing with root causes and grievances, whether those are socioeconomic, religious, ethnonationalist, or otherwise. In many ways, the Islamic State’s model of outsourcing its terrorism in the West to lone actors with a litany of grievances is the group’s realization of its long-sought playbook. It also makes focusing on root causes more important. In the case of Jabbar, reporting suggests that he struggled, like many others, with reintegrating into civilian life after leaving the military.
• Counterterrorism in the modern age must be viewed through a broad, multifaceted lens, addressing both high-tech and low-tech threats in tandem. While the proliferation of advanced technologies—such as drones, encrypted communications, and bombs—requires a sophisticated and coordinated response, we must not overlook the enduring threat posed by more primitive methods such as vehicle ramming attacks and stabbings. Consequently, a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy means dismantling the technological infrastructure that enables terrorist groups to communicate and operate across borders while simultaneously fortifying the physical and societal barriers that mitigate the risk of simpler, brute-force tactics.
• Only through a balanced approach that spans the full spectrum of technology used in attacks can we ensure the safety and resilience of our communities against the ever-evolving, blinking-red landscape of terrorism. As the Islamic State ramps up its operations overseas, taking advantage of power vacuums from Syria to Somalia, it will also accelerate its propaganda and media operations, leading to more of its followers seeking to conduct attacks in its name.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "A Terrorism Resurgence," David Leonhardt and Desiree Ibekwe, NYT, 01.06.25. 

Conflict in Syria:

“Putin Chose Ukraine Over Syria,” Alexander Baunov, FA, 12.26.24. 

“Russia’s Abrupt Setback in Syria Creates Headaches for Putin,” Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 12.20.24.

• "Syria once served three goals for Russia
  • First, since Russia was internationally isolated after it annexed Crimea in 2014, its military presence in Syria pushed the United States, Israel and Turkey, and the region at large, to engage diplomatically with Moscow. Its naval presence at Tartus, including three large warships and a submarine, forced NATO military planners to take notice.
  • Second, it showed authoritarian leaders around the world that Russia could shore up their regimes with overwhelming force. Its carpet bombing of opposition positions in Syria helped to preserve Mr. al-Assad's rule.
  • Third, Syria—a geographic pivot point in the region—created a vital logistics hub, a warm-water port on the Mediterranean and an air base to ferry weapons and ammunition to Russian forces in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East.
    • Those goals are now all in jeopardy."

“Change of power in Syria and the burden of the great powers,” Andrei Kortunov, NG.ru, 12.22.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• If we leave aside political rhetoric, the interests of the great powers regarding post-Assad Syria largely coincide.
  • Firstly, no one is interested in the disintegration of Syria into several mini-states.
  • Secondly, none of the responsible players can benefit from the transformation of Syria into a new major hotbed of political extremism and international terrorism in the very center of the Arab world.
  • Thirdly, it is in everyone’s interest to prevent the restoration of chemical weapons potential.
  • Fourth, there is a common interest in ensuring that the vast and diverse arsenals of conventional weapons accumulated by the participants in the long-running civil war do not fall into the hands of irresponsible extremist groups, whether inside or outside the country.
  • Fifth, it is important for everyone to rule out the prospect of a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.
  • Sixth, everyone would like to hope that the new political regime in the country will be inclusive.
  • Seventh, it is in everyone’s interest to prevent a new wave of migration from Syria.
  • Eighth, there is a common interest in post-Assad Syria continuing the process of returning to the family of Arab states that has already begun.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin’s Humiliation in Syria Reverberates in Russia," Amy Knight, WSJ, 12.15.24.
• "How Should the U.S. Navigate the Syrian Minefield?," Ariel Cohen, NI, 12.31.24. 

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Trump’s Ambitious Oil Plans Will Not Derail Russia," Sergey Vakulenko, FT, 01.06.25. 

• “Russia does not have many sources for continuing oil production growth: most new projects have been mothballed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia might even struggle to maintain a plateau once it eats through the inventory of the approximately 1 million-barrel-a-day spare capacity that was taken offline under OPEC+ agreements.”
• “But it would not cost much for Russia to maintain a manageable decline of 2–3% a year. By some estimates, the average cost of producing, processing and transporting the oil to export terminals from the existing wells in today’s Russia is $11–$12 a barrel, and $17 a barrel with drilling and development costs within existing fields.”
  • “It’s true that the country’s trade balance would suffer in such a situation: a $10-a-barrel change in the export price translates to $25 billion a year, but that is less than 7% of total Russian exports and even less than the annual current account surplus now.”
  • “Nor will the hoped-for 3 million barrels per day of additional U.S. production be enough to replace the 7 million currently exported by Russia.”
• “Since the beginning of the war, the west has managed to put a dent in Russia’s oil revenues, but it is now struggling to reduce them further. So far, Trump and his associates have not produced a plausible breakthrough strategy for the short to medium term. It is accordingly wise to design plans and strategies regarding Russia around the assumption that its oil revenues remain quite resilient and cannot be drastically reduced.”

“Europe Somehow Still Depends on Russia’s Energy,” Paul Hockenos, FP, 01.03.25. 

• Despite far-reaching cutbacks that have transformed global energy markets—and the European Union’s pledge to terminate all energy deals with Russia by 2027—the continent still maintains multifarious links to the Russian energy sector.
• EU countries, led by Germany, have done much to truncate their Russian energy dependencies… [but] countries across the bloc are still buying energy supplies from Russia and thus paying straight into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war chest.
• In 2024, the EU imported a record 16.5 million metric tons of LNG from Russia, surpassing the 15.2 million in 2023.
• Russian gas imports are Europe’s most glaring failure, with Russia still making up 18% of all EU natural gas imports as of late 2024.
• Politico reported that behind Slovakia’s protestations are its handsome earnings from the 'reselling and transit of Russian gas' through Ukraine—around $1.5 billion a year.
• According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, 'The EU’s imports of oil products from the three main Indian refineries running on Russian crude increased 58% in the first three quarters of 2024 compared to the same period last year, widening the EU’s refining loophole.'
• Almost 20% of Europe’s imported raw uranium hails from Russia and another 23% is of Kazakh origin, where Rosatom, a Russian nuclear energy corporation, pretty much runs the show.
• Given the humanitarian tragedy in Ukraine and the war’s geopolitical ramifications, Europe should expedite the formulation of clear guidelines and earlier deadlines for phasing out all types of Russian energy imports.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “To Shorten the War in Ukraine, Tighten Oil Sanctions for Real,” Editorial Board, Bloomberg, 01.02.25.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The best of the exes,” Alena Miklashevskaya, Kommersant, 12.30.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• The most important achievements of the 39th President of the U.S. [Jimmy Carter] were the 1978 Camp David Accords, which reconciled Israel and Egypt and lifted the blockade of Israel, and the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement with the USSR (what is now called SALT II) in 1979.
• All of these achievements were foreign policy. There were no breakthroughs within the country. Things even got worse… However, the successes on the world stage also ended. The USSR sent troops to Afghanistan. In Iran, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized. Its employees became hostages of the new Iranian authorities. The operation to free them, sanctioned by President Carter, failed. Eight American soldiers were killed.
• Jimmy Carter left the presidency at the age of 56. His approval rating was one of the lowest among all U.S. presidents. But the politician still had a lot of energy, strength and desire to work and change life for the better. No longer limited by the rigid framework of his position, he rushed into human rights, mediation and charitable activities.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "After Putin: Could a Modern Khrushchev Reshape Russia-West Relations?" Marvin Kalb, The Boston Globe, 01.04.25.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Russia is very quickly moving towards the need to introduce a planned economy," Andrey Movchan, Republic.ru, 12.20.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. 

• A completely monstrous combination of external and internal circumstances would have to be in place for the collapse [of the Russian economy].
• Russia, as a market economy, which has a lot of natural resources, is quite well protected from collapse by both marketability (that is, the fact that most goods and services have market pricing, which is what creates flexibility) and natural resources
• At the same time, if we talk about the Russian economy "good" or "bad," we usually mean whether the growth of citizens' well-being is stable and dynamic or not. If we evaluate it on such a scale, we would have to say that there has been no growth since about 2013. Therefore, the economy should be rated "bad." There is no growth, despite the fairly high cost of raw materials and the great wealth of the country as a whole.
• In English, this is called crony capitalism. That is, roughly speaking, the capitalism of friends. And Russia was an absolutely classic example in this sense. Crony capitalism exists exactly like this. It stagnates, it does not develop in terms of technology, it is characterized by a large outflow of capital from the country, growing inequality, the absence of normal growth in median incomes and production efficiency.
• The war [of Russia against Ukraine] brought [Russia] four serious changes to the economy.
  • The first is sanctions. Sanctions, in my opinion, are not the key drivers of changes in the Russian economy for the worse. Sanctions are mainly irritating, force us to increase costs, slow down processes, worsen logistics—all this is harmful, but not "fatal." Russia has learned to get from the East everything that it received from the West. Sometimes literally. That is, Russia receives the same Western goods through the East. The global financial system no longer worries Russia much—it has learned to work without it. This system works for the sale of minerals, and Russia does not need anything else. And paradoxically, the sanctions have benefited Russia because they have sharply limited the outflow of capital from the country.
  • Second, the military budget has grown by 4–5% of GDP, some estimate a little less, some estimate a little more… Is it painless for the economy or not? Relatively painless. It does not lead to a severe crisis, as you can see for yourself. In the long term, this is, of course, harmful, because the restructuring to a military economy leads to the fact that an increasingly larger percentage of the economy is not multiplicative—does not generate new economic value.
  • That is, today, looking at the Russian economy, we can see growth. But this growth is unnatural, it occurs due to financial injections into the military economy and the production of state military orders.
  • The third and fourth problems are the outflow of personnel and resources… A lot of programmers, engineers, scientists, doctors have left. And it wasn't just the unemployed, homeless, and alcoholics who went to the front. All sorts of people went to the front. And people who worked for civilian industry retrained for military contracts… The direct consequence of this situation is the growth of inflation.
• It must be understood that with such a really high rate, with such inflation, with such a weak stock market, which has fallen catastrophically over the past 15 years (look at Gazprom), with such high investment risks and with such a shortage of personnel in the non-military sector, Russia is very quickly moving towards the simple necessity of introducing a planned economy due to the fact that the market economy will stop working. When I say "quickly," I don't mean 2025. We need to look at the horizon of 2030–2035.

“Russia’s Economic Gamble: The Hidden Costs of War-Driven Growth,” Alexandra Prokopenko, CEIP, 12.20.24. 

• Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian economy has repeatedly defied expectations. Predictions of a double-digit contraction never materialized. On the contrary, GDP grew by 3.6% in 2023 and an expected 4% in 2024: rates that both developed and developing nations might envy. Key indicators like GDP growth, household income, and low unemployment have become President Vladimir Putin’s trump cards. He brandishes them to the West as proof that sanctions are ineffective, and presents them to partners in Asia and Africa as evidence of Russia’s sound economic policies and the resilience of its development model. Chinese officials are apparently convinced, having reportedly established an interagency commission to study Russia’s economic model.
• Yet this image of resilience is deceptive. Over the past two years, Russia’s economy has operated like a marathoner on fiscal steroids—and now those steroids are wearing off. Growth is slowing, key sectors are cooling, and the arguments underpinning Putin’s claims of economic “invulnerability” are unraveling. The Kremlin faces the mounting challenge of sustaining the war effort and funding social and infrastructure programs. Simultaneously maintaining low inflation and a stable ruble is proving increasingly unsustainable. Without significant course corrections, the current momentum may falter within a year. By 2026–2027, the fiscal and social challenges now on the horizon could fully metastasize into a crisis.
• A sudden collapse akin to the 1990s is unlikely: the government still has the resources to maintain a minimum level of order and control. However, we are already witnessing a largely irreversible turn toward economic stagnation. Continued reliance on the military sector and a mobilization-driven model will trap Russia in a “stagnation trap” characterized by low growth and chronic internal imbalances.

"Serious changes can only be caused by a military defeat of the Putin regime," Igor Eidman, Republic.ru, 12.22.24.

• Domestic policy in Russia directly depends on foreign policy, that is, on the course of the war and the hybrid confrontation between the Putin regime and the West. The fact is that I do not believe in any possibility of changes within the country that are not connected with the situation outside. For example, with a military defeat, with a defeat in a hybrid war. I do not believe that suddenly the people will rise up and overthrow Putin. And some serious changes can only be caused by a military defeat of the Putin regime.
• This year, unfortunately, the regime has stabilized. It is neither shakily nor shakily coping with economic challenges, with sanctions
• As for next year. If the Putin regime starts to suffer some defeats and problems again, which could be connected, for example, with the failure of the war freeze and with the possible increase in aid to Ukraine from the West, then this will inevitably hit the stability of the regime. At the same time, I want to note: I do not believe in the war freeze. I believe that, first of all, Putin himself, the Kremlin itself will not agree to this, because their demands are too ambitious, categorical, they are trying to talk to both Ukraine and the West in the language of ultimatums. Trump's idea that a deal can be made with Putin is pure utopia.

“The reluctant consensus: War and Russia’s public opinion,” Maria Snegovaya, Atlantic Council, 12.17.24.

• Altogether, even in the period when the Putin regime was much less repressive, more than half of respondents in Russia consistently favored military action against neighboring states. It is hardly surprising that state-led propaganda was able to raise these numbers to 70–80% after February 2022. Conversely, no alternative robust evidence (such as large-scale protests within Russia or cities hosting large concentrations of the Russian diaspora) has emerged to cast doubt on these conclusions
• Altogether, various approaches suggest that one can generally trust Russian public opinion data, albeit with some reservations. Specific feelings that underlie the war support—such as resignation, acquiescence, or avoidance—might be up for debate. But the very fact that the war is embraced by a majority of Russians, and that it has become part of Russia’s “new normal,” is not.
• The cognitive difficulty among Russia watchers and members of the exiled liberal community to accept that reality is more puzzling. After all, why should Russians not support the war, given the years of state-led indoctrination, the legacy of Soviet beliefs, the lack of alternative narratives in the public sphere, and more pragmatic considerations such as adaption and avoidance of cognitive dissonance?

“Eastern Turn 2.0, or the ‘Siberianization’ of Russia,” Sergey Karaganov and Ilya Kozylov, Russia in Global Affairs, 01.01.25.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Thanks to its cultural and historical code, Russia is well adapted to the new world. In order to effectively use the emerging opportunities and confront challenges, the country needs a qualitatively new turn to the East, which takes the limited and primarily foreign economic results of the previous stage to another level. It is extremely important, however, that this turn be directed not so much outward—towards Eurasia, but inward. It is time to return to our own historical roots and restore our identity as a great Eurasian power.
• What is needed is not only a new foreign policy strategy, but also a deep internal transformation, which would include moving the center of economic and cultural development to the east of the country. This strategy, which is proposed to be called "Eastern Turn 2.0" or "Siberianization of Russia," involves the integration of Siberia from the Urals to the Far East into a single system that will become the support of Russia's future in a changing world.
• One of the key elements should be stimulating the resettlement of the population from the European part of Russia, including new regions, to the Ural and Siberian territories.
• One of the approaches may be attracting labor migrants from Asian countries, primarily such as the DPRK, as well as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
• For a strategic turn to the East, Russia needs a third capital—a Siberian one. The new center, located, perhaps, in the Novosibirsk region, Krasnoyarsk, or even in the historical heart of Siberia—Tobolsk, can become not only an administrative and economic, but also a cultural focus, close to Asian partners. The new development of Siberia, or the Eastern Turn 2.0, is a grandiose complex project that requires significant political will, consolidation of resources and awakening both in the elites and in the entire Russian nation of the passionate spirit that made Russia great. By joining forces, it is time to force the ruling elite to do what is necessary—to accelerate the shift of the center of spiritual, value, human, economic development of Russia to where it is determined to be by history, God and the modern world—to the Urals and all of Siberia.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "The End of Euphoria and Manual Control: Economic Outcomes of 2024 and the Key Challenges for 2025," Re: Russia, 12.26.24.
• "As Russia Wobbles, Its Leader Swaggers," Mary Ilyushina, WP, 12.31.24.
• “Activist [Vladimir Kara-Murza] Released From Russian Prison Went Right to Work,” Valerie Hopkins, NYT, 12.27.24.
• "Headlines From an Alternate Reality," Meduza, 01.04.25. 

Defense and aerospace:

Text of the speech [of Andrei Kokoshin] at the forum "Return of the Narratives of the Past" of the Faculty of World Politics of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, Nov. 29, 2024, RIAC, 12.18.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Having analyzed dozens, if not hundreds of such forecasts, I can say with confidence that the outstanding political and military forecast of Friedrich Engels about the future pan-European war (which became a world war), which was made 28 years before the fateful year of 1914, can be considered unsurpassed at all times. Engels predicted the nature of the war, its duration and, perhaps most importantly, its political results. What was Engels' amazing forecast based on? ... On his deep and comprehensive knowledge of world history.
• It is no exaggeration to say that without an extensive and solid scientific and historical foundation there can be no truly successful political science research, especially predictive studies of political processes and phenomena. Due to this, creative cooperation between political scientists and historians, as well as the "cultivation" of political scientists from among historians, seems extremely important.
• Providing a historical basis for predictive research is also very important from the point of view of finding adequate historical analogies. But it should be remembered that a simplified use of historical analogies can lead to very serious errors in forecasting.
• Depending on the time range of forecasts, it is necessary to establish the depth of historical research on which forecasts of the corresponding range should be based. It seems that the depth of the "reference" historical research should be no less than 15 years for a short-term forecast (horizon up to 5 years); no less than 30 years for a medium-term forecast with a 10-year range and no less than 45 years for a long-term forecast of 15 years or more. An even more difficult task is to forecast for 20-30 years. Here it is necessary to operate even longer-term historical categories with a period of 100 years or more.
• There is no other teacher except history for diagnosis and forecasting. But it is far from easy even for an advanced researcher to extract from it the necessary, relevant lessons.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

"The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered," Samuel Ramani, FP, 12.31.24.

• Even if Africa does not turn its back on Russia, Assad’s fall has forced the Kremlin to admit to some hard truths about its capacity for military power projection in global theaters. Ruslan Pukhov—an expert at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technology, a leading Russian defense think tank—wrote that “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority for effective forceful intervention outside the former USSR, and it can act there, in fact, only with the indulgent permission of other strong powers and for as long as they allow it.”
• This scenario could encourage Russia to place more emphasis on soft power and hybrid warfare in its struggle for influence in Africa.
• Where Russian forces are already entrenched, Kremlin-aligned commentators are also evaluating the merits of expansive military interventions in the global south. Fyodor Lukyanov, an editor at the journal Russia in Global Affairs, quipped that former U.S. President Barack Obama’s depiction of Russia as a “regional power” should no longer be viewed as an insult because “global powers are leaving the stage, because carrying such a burden is not only difficult, but also unnecessary.”
• This line of thinking could encourage Russia to strengthen its partnerships with key African regional powers in the hope that they might do Moscow’s bidding by proxy.
• Though Russia’s ability to engage with Syria’s new leaders remains uncertain, Assad’s ouster has greatly diminished its confidence and power-projection capacity in Africa. The geopolitical spillover from the recent events in Syria extends well beyond the Middle East.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Why Russia Is Not a Great Power in Africa,” Will Brown, FP, 12.19.24.

Ukraine:

“How the War in Ukraine Has Changed Ukrainians,” Anton Grushetskyi and Volodymyr Paniotto, FA, 12.30.24.

“Does Trump want Putin to get Ukraine's $26 trillion in gas and minerals?” Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 12.19.24.

• "Ukraine is not only the breadbasket of Europe; it is also a mineral superpower, with some of the largest reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals in the world. Of the 50 strategic minerals identified by the United States as critical to its economy and national security, many of which are quite rare yet key to certain high-value applications, Ukraine supplies 22."
• "kraine possesses the largest reserves of uranium in Europe; the second-largest reserves of iron ore, titanium and manganese; and the third-largest reserves of shale gas - as well as large deposits of lithium, graphite and rare earth metals, according to a 2022 report by the Canadian geopolitical risk-analysis firm SecDev. These minerals are essential to the production of vital goods ranging from airplanes, cellphones and electric vehicles to steel and nuclear power."
• "The question for the president-elect is: Does he want Russia and China to get that treasure trove of natural resources? Or does he want to develop them with Ukraine to the benefit of the American people?"

“Ukraine is winning the economic war against Russia,” The Economist, 12.18.24.

• “Ukraine’s economy at large has reinvented itself to navigate wartime realities. It remains one-quarter smaller than in 2021. Yet for the first time since 2022, the start of the all-out invasion, it is healthier than its enemy’s in some key respects. Ukraine’s central bank forecasts GDP to grow by 4% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025. The currency is stable and interest rates, at 13.5%, remain near their lowest in 30 months. Contrast that with Russia, where rates should soon hit 23% to arrest the ruble’s fall, banks look fragile and GDP is set to grow by just 0.5–1.5% in 2025.”
• “[Ukraine’s] measures, together with Western aid, have prevented Russia from robbing Ukraine of the resources and morale it needs to keep fighting. Now a [new] phase is beginning, during which the country’s economy faces its biggest threats yet: acute shortages of power, men and money.”
  • “Take power first. In 2022 and again this spring and summer, Russia relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s grid. Despite continuous repairs, the country can count on less than half of the 36 gigawatts (GW) in generation capacity it could tap before the war.”
    • “Coping strategies and ongoing repairs will contain the country’s average power deficit to 6% of total demand in 2025 and 3% in 2026, says Andriy Pyshnyi, the governor of Ukraine’s central bank.”
  • “The second problem—and the thorniest—is the lack of labor. Since 2022 mobilization, migration and war have caused the workforce to shrink by over a fifth, to 13 million people. Demand is strong: the number of job openings has reached 65,000 a week, up from 7,000 during the first weeks of the war—but the average opening attracts only 1.3 applications, compared with two in 2021.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Reconfigurations in the Post-Soviet South. Dynamics and Change in Eurasia,” Andrea Schmitz and Franziska Smolnik, SWP, December 2024.

• The ongoing reconfiguration in Eurasia has many vectors. It is not an entirely recent phenomenon, nor does it affect the region uniformly. The changing status of Russia is one common denominator, the future shape of which will depend on how Russia emerges from its war against Ukraine. Even if Russia continues to claim a hegemonic position and represents an important power to reckon with for all the Eurasian coun­tries, the post-Soviet South is emancipating itself. While they themselves seek to inten­sify bilateral relations with third countries, external players, in particular China and Türkiye, have increasingly actively pursued their own interests in the region. Türkiye in particular seems to aspire to the role of an alternative regional hegemon on the basis of historical and linguistic ties.
• This has changed the horizons of the Eur­asian countries, with the post-Soviet aspect slowly fading and the region becoming part of multiple arrangements and imaginaries, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Organization of Turkic States, even the Middle East. The EU has strengthened rela­tions with Central Asia and in particular the South Caucasus through its connectivity policy, Partnership and Cooperation Agree­ments, the Eastern Partnership and especial­ly the association and (most recently) inte­gration tracks. Yet it is not necessarily seen as the partner of choice. For most of the region’s governments—and depending on developments in Georgia, perhaps ultimately all of them—Brussels is but one vector among others. It is thus an option for diver­sification rather than a gravitational force.
• For one, the EU lacks a track-record as a security actor, notably when it comes to hard security. While the EU’s military sup­port for Ukraine constitutes a dramatic departure from earlier policies, it is highly unlikely to serve as a blueprint for broader engagement in the Eurasian space. Second, the EU’s proclaimed hallmarks of democracy, liberal values and a market economy based on rule-of-law are not regarded as attractive in most of Eurasia, in particular on the part of political and economic elites who see comprehensive reforms as a threat to their power base. Rather than providing opportunities for the EU to expand its re­lations with the Eurasian states, the current reconfiguration processes tend towards authoritarian regionalism.
• Brussels must take these shifting conditions and its partners’ perceptions of the EU—both at the level of leadership and society—into account when crafting its own policies towards the region and indi­vidual countries. The current processes do not automatically signal shrinking scope for interaction. But productive engagement –let alone effective policy convergence—will become more challenging. It will re­quire a more coherent approach towards individual countries and sub-regions within Eurasia. To this end, the EU’s expectations vis-à-vis Eurasia will need to be revisited—and possibly readjusted. This must begin with a sober assessment of the EU’s own position, its instruments and the resources it is willing and able to invest. Such a review should be guided by a holistic view and integrated assessment in a rapidly changing environment.

“Georgia on your mind. Keep the Caucasus safe from Russia,” The Economist, 12.18.24.

• “As the protests and thuggery persist, a crisis looms [in Georgia]. Georgia’s next president must be chosen by an electoral college consisting of the parliament plus regional representatives. Ms. Zourabichvili, whose term is due to end on December 29th, says that this parliament is illegal and refuses to stand down until it is replaced by a body that was elected fairly. Meanwhile the college, dominated by Georgian Dream, has chosen a new president, a former Manchester City footballer, in a vote with only a single candidate.”
• “How should the West respond? Ms. Zourabichvili needs support for her brave refusal to hand her office to Russia’s choice. Those who back democracy should continue to recognize her, not her rival, as president. In addition, sanctions should be imposed on those responsible for the violence and for cooking the election. Some countries, including America, Ukraine and the Baltic states, have made a start, with travel bans on a few top officials, and in some cases on Mr. Ivanishvili, who holds no government position. These could be reinforced by reaching further down the power structure (to cover those who run the state media, say), as well as extending them to the subjects’ families. Those most responsible should have their assets frozen.”
• “Two big omissions from the list of those imposing personal sanctions stand out. One is Britain. Like many other countries, it has halted most forms of official co-operation, but that hits mainly the innocent. The other is the EU. This week its impressive new foreign-affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, proposed a list of people for sanctions, but her move was blocked by the vetoes of Hungary and Slovakia, both led by apologists for Mr. Putin.”

“Leaving the ‘Post-Soviet’ Behind: Redefining Armenia’s Deterrence Strategy,” Anahide Pilibossian and Leonid Nersisyan, RUSI, 12.17.24.

• Armenia’s new deterrence strategy must be based on realistic diversification, which includes an array of partners including those mentioned above and Russia. While the Russian base in Gyumri remains, its presence provides—rightly or wrongly—a perceived protection against Turkish involvement in a renewed Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Without stronger guarantees from other security partners, a more radical departure from this emerging, diversified architecture can only occur if regional tensions decrease significantly, such as through a mutually acceptable peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or normalization of relations with Turkey. However, given current political trends, this scenario appears unlikely in the short term.
• In the economic sphere, Armenia’s dependency on Russia is more pronounced. Russia has long-term concessions in Armenia’s strategic sectors, including railways, nuclear power, natural gas distribution and wheat. For Russia, since 2022, economic relations have become the preferred instrument for maintaining its influence in the region. While Armenia has complied with Western sanctions against Russia and banned exports in categorized products, its Eurasian Economic Union membership has been advantageous. In light of geopolitical shifts and the reality of its geography, Armenia requires a long-term economic reconfiguration to avoid overreliance on a single partner and underinvestment in its resources. This economic diversification will likely necessitate support from European and Arab partners. The Armenian government has thus promoted its ‘Crossroad for Peace’ initiative, advocating connectivity as an agenda for cooperation with all its partners, including Moscow, Ankara, Tbilisi, Tehran and Brussels.
• Armenia has successfully reduced its security dependency on Russia over the past two years by engaging a broader range of partners while simultaneously bolstering its national military capabilities. Nonetheless, regional imbalances persist, necessitating greater deterrence measures against Azerbaijan and continued efforts to lessen Armenia’s dependence on Russia. While the changes in Armenia’s security architecture are evident, substantial and equally delicate work based on realistic diversification is required in the economic domain.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Russia has a history of downing passenger planes—and covering it up,” Max Boot, WP, 12.27.24.
• “The West Cannot Afford to Neglect Georgia’s Fight for Freedom," Laura Linderman, NI, 12.15.24.
• "Georgia Shows Why U.S. Policy in Eurasia Is Dangerously Outdated," Anna Ohanyan, FP, 12.24.24.
• "The West Cannot Afford to Neglect Georgia’s Fight for Freedom,” Laura Linderman, NI. 12.20.24.
• "Reconfigurations in the Post-Soviet South: Dynamics and Change in Eurasia," Andrea Schmitz and Franziska Smolnik, SWP Comment, 12.19.24. 

Footnotes

1. That Putin considered use of nukes at the time has been previously reported. NYT reported last March that  “under a singular scenario in which Ukrainian forces decimated Russian defensive lines and looked as if they might try to retake Crimea — a possibility that seemed imaginable that fall — the likelihood of nuclear use might rise to 50 percent or even higher.” Additionally, Washington Post associate editor Bob Woodward wrote in his 2024 book that at one point in Fall 2022, Biden’s national security team believed there was a 50% chance that Putin would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That was a striking assessment that had skyrocketed up from 5% and then 10%, Woodward was quoted in August 2024 as writing in his book.
2. Blinken also commented on these nuclear risks in his interview with NYT: “[T]here’ve been different moments where we had real concerns about actions that Russia might take, including even potentially the use of nuclear weapons. That very much focused the mind.”
3. Both Stanovaya and Alexander Gabuev of CEIP believe Putin’s ultimate war goal remains the subjugation of Ukraine. Some of Ukraine’s own soldiers would disagree with Stanovaya’s assessment of how poorly things have been going for the Russian side in the realm of potential negotiations. "Let's be honest, the situation now is worse than at the start of the full-scale invasion," a company commander in Ukraine’s 35th brigade told WP. "What can we negotiate now? We can only nod our heads and agree to their demands, and what they will demand is obviously going to be something that we don't like."
4. Prominent Russian pro-war Telegram channels, such as RVvoenkor and Rybar, confirmed that Ukrainian forces launched offensives on Jan. 5 and then on Jan. 6, but claimed that they produced no gains.
5. This week Kyiv launched a fresh offensive in the Russian Kursk Oblast. (NI, 01.05.24)
6. Also see “The strategist in the hurricane. As national security adviser, Jake Sullivan often had to improvise—and weigh some very imperfect responses," David Ignatius, WP, 01.05.25, in the Great Powers section above.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.

Slider photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP, File.