3 Ideas to Explore

1. Vladimir Putin still harbors hope that Donald Trump may initiate a new era in U.S.-Russian relations, even though the Russian leader doesn’t appear ready to change his stance on Ukraine, writes Tatiana Stanovaya of R.Politik. According to Stanovaya, Putin continues to insist that “Ukraine must be neutral (with ironclad guarantees)¹, ‘friendly’ (with a revised Constitution) and that it must recognize the five regions Moscow has annexed.” Meanwhile, another prominent Russian scholar of Kremlin policies, Alexander Gabuev of Carnegie Endowment, predicts in FT that “Russia’s foreign policy will be guided by anti-Americanism” because “the fight against the West has become the organizing principle of Putin’s regime and has created too many beneficiaries to be abandoned.” Putin himself stated in his remarks at the Valdai Club’s annual conference on Nov. 7 that he’s ready to hold discussions with the U.S. president-elect on stabilizing relations between Moscow and Washington, including the issues of Ukraine and strategic stability.² He also repeatedly heaped praise on China, when he described China as “our ally.”³
   1. “Even if the Ukrainians can be successful in the short term, and keep surviving through continued courage and ingenuity, they still have to figure out some modus vivendi with Russian power, which is adjacent to them and isn’t going anywhere. Ukraine has to win the peace,” according to Stephen Kotkin of Stanford’s Hoover Institution and Harvard’s Belfer Center. “If Trump is unable to bring significant pressure on Putin’s political regime, then the outcome is that Ukraine will be condemned to ... a war of attrition against a superior power,” Kotkin writes in FA.
   2. WP’s David Ignatius reminds us that the Trump’s campaign calls for negotiation to end the war in Ukraine constitute “an unlikely echo” of Gen. Mark A. Milley,who proclaimed in November 2022: "When there's an opportunity to negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize it.” “If Trump could engage President Xi Jinping in making peace in Ukraine, they both should share the Nobel Peace Prize,” Ignatius quotes Graham Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center as saying in his WP column.
   3. Ukraine has been building on Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “victory plan” for the incoming Trump administration, highlighting potential business deals, access to raw materials and troop deployments in an effort to sway the U.S. president-elect, according to FT. One idea in this plan is to replace some U.S. troops stationed in Europe with Ukrainian forces after the war. Another idea is to share Ukraine’s critical natural resources with Western partners, according to FT. In addition, Kyiv is looking to “appease the Trump camp” by replacing its ambassador to Washington, Oksana Markarova, according to FT.
2. Russian forces are advancing along multiple axes in the east and southeast of Ukraine, according to an assessment issued by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) on Nov. 11. In particular, Russian forces have advanced in the area where Ukraine’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions abut each other, according to ISW. Russian forces are also “successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar in the Donetsk Oblast to make tactically significant gains” south of the important town of Kurakhove as they aim eliminate the Ukrainian salient in the west of that eastern Ukrainian region, according to ISW. According to Ukraine’s OSINT group DeepState’s Nov. 11 assessment, “the situation around Kurakhove continued to deteriorate” as the “enemy continue[d] to implement its large-scale plan to envelop the city.” According to DeepState’s estimate, which is cited by WSJ, Russian troops seized 200 square miles of Ukrainian territory in October alone. DeepState’s estimate is close to that calculated by Russia Matters staff. Russian forces gained 206 square miles of Ukrainian territory in the period of Sept. 30–Oct. 31, 2024, according to an estimate by RM staff, which is based on data provided by ISW. Russian forces then gained 75 square miles in the week preceding Nov. 8, according to RM’s estimate.*
3. Putin has resumed his not-so-veiled threats that Russia may initiate use of nuclear weapons in response to the West’s efforts to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. “I have previously stated that we have reached red lines. The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians,” Putin said in his remarks at the Valdai Club’s annual conference on Nov. 7. RM’s tracking of Russian leaders’ nuclear rhetoric since Feb. 24, 2022, indicates that Putin had hinted that the threat of a strategic defeat of Russia may prompt him to use nuclear weapons on at least three other earlier occasions. He made these hints even though neither Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine nor its 2020 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence include an explicit reference to such a condition for use of nuclear weapons.⁴ In addition to Putin, his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov implicitly referred to this condition, as did, most recently, Lavrov’s deputy Sergei Ryabkov in an interview with Interfax on Nov. 9. These repeated references indicate that this condition may be introduced into the Basic Principles of Nuclear Deterrence, which spells out several scenarios for use of nuclear weapons and which Putin proposed amending on Sept. 25.⁵

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"How the War in Ukraine Could Go Nuclear—by Accident," William M. Moon, FA, 11.05.24.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"Why Is North Korea Sending Troops to Fight for Russia?", Fyodor Tertitskiy, Carnegie Politika, 11.07.24.

• “The involvement of North Korean troops fighting on Russia’s side in the war in Ukraine is unprecedented. Never before has North Korea launched a foreign military intervention, and such a momentous decision cannot fail to have serious consequences.”
• “So why has North Korean leader Kim Jong Un decided to risk sending military units to Russia now?”
  • “There are likely to be few short-term benefits for Pyongyang from sending troops. North Korea had already started receiving much-needed food, oil, and money from Russia as payment for supplies of ammunition.”
  • “Kim Jong Un seems to see lending troops to Russia as a long-term investment. Ever since the Soviet Union stopped providing economic assistance in 1990, Pyongyang has sought to turn back the clock to the “good old days” of the Cold War, when it could count on a significant inflow of Soviet resources. Until now, North Korea has been unable to achieve this goal—but with troops now apparently deployed in Ukraine, it looks closer than ever.”
  • “Pyongyang is cultivating closer relations with Moscow in the hope that the alliance between the two countries will endure even when the Kremlin no longer needs its help in Ukraine.”

For more commentary on this subject, see:

• "Xi's Balancing Act on Ukraine Disrupted by Putin-Kim Alliance," Bloomberg News, 11.05.24.
• "Kim Jong Un’s Risky Embrace of Russia Is About His Regime’s Survival," Timothy W. Martin and Dasl Yoon, WSJ, 11.04.24.
• "A Plan for Donald Trump on North Korea," Harry J. Kazianis, NI, 11.08.24.
• "What Does the Team Up with North Korea Tell Us About Russia?", Dimitar Bechev, NI, 11.07.24.
• "China Should Be Worried About North Korea," Oriana Skylar Mastro, FA, 11.12.24.
• "Can Donald Trump Disrupt the Russia-North Korea Military Partnership?", Ted Galen Carpenter, NI, 11.12.24.
• "Can Trump End the Russia-North Korea Alliance?", Matthew Kroening, FP, 11.11.24. 

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Kremlin-occupied Ukraine is now a totalitarian hell", The Economist, 11.10.24.

• “The identity of the [Russian] occupied territories [of Ukraine] is changing, fast. Some residents have always been pro-Russian. Now oppression, brainwashing and an exodus means that the balance has shifted further. Some 5-30% of residents in the occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions are pro-Russian, 20-35% are pro-Ukrainian while the rest, possibly more than half, “have a wait-and-see” attitude, according to Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre (NRC). “That is why,” says Nikolay Petrov, the author of a new report for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, “we should not believe in the idea that they are all suffering under occupation and waiting for liberators to come and free them.” 

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2024,” Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson and Frederick W. Kagan, ISW, 11.11.24.

• “Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast... ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.”
• “Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka.”
• “Russian forces have advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces.”
• “Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements... Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed about who was responsible for damaging the dam.”

Military aid to Ukraine:

"The West Must Stop Protecting Russia from the Consequences of its Actions," Volodymyr Ohryzko, Roman Sohn and Ariana Gic, RUSI, 11.04.24. 

• “The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option In fact, by refusing to shoot down Russian missiles and drones in NATO airspace; by refusing to implement a humanitarian military mission to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially its nuclear power plants; by drip-feeding military aid to Kyiv, withholding critically needed weapons and imposing restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russia; by stalling on NATO membership for Ukraine; and by accepting China’s say on the security of Europe, the West – and the US in particular – has already manifestly relinquished its leadership role in international relations.”
• “The self-defeating policy of risk aversion has also severely damaged the credibility of NATO’s own deterrence. NATO is projecting the image of a panic room, not that of an actionable force capable of providing security – even for its own members.”
• “The alarming lack of resolute political will in Western capitals to uphold the fundamental rules of global security is giving oxygen to Russia’s and its anti-Western allies’ ambition to reshape our world according to their oppressive vision. The West cannot isolate itself from the outcome of Russia’s war. This is no longer about ‘helping Ukraine’, but about the responsibility of Western governments to their own citizens to ensure a peaceful future.”
• “The West’s obsessive and unjustifiable avoidance of confrontation with Russia in fact increases the risk of direct engagement becoming the only option. For now, while the Ukrainian army maintains high combat readiness, NATO countries can still avoid a direct face-off with Russia by deploying their troops away from the frontline to help Ukraine protect civilian areas and critical infrastructure and deter invasion from Belarus or, potentially, Russia-occupied Transnistria in Moldova if Russia succeeds in subverting the pro-Western course of Chișinău.”
• “With North Korea sending troops to fight Ukraine, the West’s response to Russia’s war is a watershed moment for the future of humanity. Ukrainians shouldn’t be fighting alone to defend the rules-based order. Not fighting alongside Ukraine means helping Russia to achieve its nefarious goals. If the West fails to defend the universality of the values of freedom and justice in Ukraine, it will eventually find itself in the role of the global ‘minority', while the Sino-Russian alliance will be legitimized as the voice of the ‘global majority’ and proceed to impose its will over the entirety of the international system.”
• “The free world urgently needs leadership from both sides of the Atlantic to safeguard the vision of the rules-based order, where countries are protected from spheres of influence and oppressive domination. Rogue states breaking the foundational rules of global security and peace must face a commensurate response. The world needs united and devoted action to save Ukraine in order to save the world.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“In Defense of Sanctions,” Josep Borrell, FP, 11.11.24. 

• “When Russia started to prepare for its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe unambiguously told Russian President Vladimir Putin that, were he to invade the country, there would be serious consequences. Sanctions have been one of these main consequences: We at the European Union have already adopted 14 sanctions packages against Russia since February 2022.”
• “Putin’s Russia is behaving with a 19th-century style imperialist mindset, threatening its neighbors—most notably in Europe. However, this is not just about an existential threat to Europe’s security. Russia’s blatant violation of the United Nations Charter also threatens global peace.”
• “From energy and food security threats and the violation of the U.N.’s arms embargo on North Korea to military cooperation with Iran and the use of brutal paramilitary groups in African countries, Russia’s actions deliberately destabilize the global architecture for peace. If Russia were to succeed in Ukraine, it would open the door to the return of imperialist wars of aggression against weaker neighbors on every continent.”
• “We are not naive. We are well aware that, by themselves, sanctions are not a silver bullet, and they will not stop Putin from continuing his neoimperialistic aggression against Ukraine. Yet they have significantly weakened Russia’s war machine and made the continuation of the war more costly to the Kremlin. Sanctions impose a huge reputational cost for the countries and actors who violate them. In many places, they have demonstrated that actions against peace have consequences. All 193 U.N. member states have the obligation to preserve the international order based on the U.N. Charter. Faced with clear breaches of international law, the EU is ready to bear its share of responsibility for a just and orderly world by imposing sanctions on those who try to undermine it.”

“How western sanctions are squeezing Russia,” Martin Sandbu, FT, 11.07.24. 

• “How [in the case of Russia] can an economy that is still exporting more than it is importing — and still accumulating external surpluses of more than $50bn a year — be running up against real resource constraints? This is where sanctions matter. And while the sanctions on what Russia can sell are of course important, what matters most in constraining the government are the sanctions that make it harder for it to acquire resources it doesn’t generate at home. Remember it is imports, not exports, that expand a country’s ability to consume, including consuming resources for war.”
• “Three types of sanctions severely limit Russia’s ability to import and therefore to make use of its export earnings (including those saved up from earlier).”
  • “First and obviously, actual trade sanctions on dual-use and military goods and some services.”
  • “Second, and at least as important, are measures making it hard to pay for things it wants from abroad.”
  • “Third is the immobilization of Russia’s central bank reserves, which both hits the functioning of Russian foreign exchange markets and removes about $300bn of liquid assets from Moscow’s control.”
• “There is no doubt that these measures are having an effect.”
  • “We see this through the hard work Moscow is putting into trying to set up an alternative payment system.”
  • “We also see it in how Russia is returning to Soviet ways and resorting to barter.”
  • “To top it off, there is nothing that screams “resource constraints” louder than having to exchange your military technology knowhow for soldiers from a dirt-poor but heavily armed totalitarian dictatorship.”
• “So these sanctions are biting. They impose constraints in terms of real resources, in that it’s hard for Russia to import them from abroad, and in terms of financial decision making, in that they make it hard to fund the budget from fiscal savings accumulated from past budget savings.” 
• “Western policy is having significant economic and political effects, despite superficially positive accounting numbers for Russian GDP growth. These are levers western countries can work harder at little or no cost to themselves: by cutting off more Russian financial institutions, by wielding secondary sanctions (more) to discourage circumvention, by redirecting outright Moscow’s blocked central bank reserves for Ukraine’s benefit, and by speeding up the technological upgrading of the west’s cross-border financial architecture to pre-empt leapfrogging by Russia and its friends.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Trump Promised to End the War in Ukraine. Now He Must Decide How." Alexander Ward, WSJ, 11.06.24.

• “Donald Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine by Inauguration Day now puts him in a position of having to choose between competing proposals from advisers united by a common thread—a sharp break from President Biden’s “as long as it takes” approach to arming Kyiv.”
• “Throughout his campaign for the White House, Trump bashed Biden’s handling of Ukraine, warning that it made World War III more likely and that Kyiv fleeced the U.S. by obtaining weapons worth billions of dollars free of charge. He has said he could resolve the conflict quickly, bringing both sides to the negotiating table, but hasn’t revealed how he would do so. “I can’t give you those plans because if I give you those plans, I’m not going to be able to use them,” he said during the campaign.”
• “Trump hasn’t approved a specific peace plan, allies said, including how he would persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to sit at the same table and negotiate. While advisers have offered ideas, only the president-elect, in consultation with key aides, will decide how to handle the sensitive and high-stakes diplomacy, they said.”
• “Like in Trump’s first term, different factions are set to compete to influence the Republican’s foreign policy. More traditionally minded allies such as Mike Pompeo, the former secretary of state now in contention to lead the Pentagon, are likely to push for a settlement that doesn’t appear to give a major win to Moscow. Other advisers, particularly Richard Grenell, a top candidate to lead the State Department or serve as national-security adviser, could give priority to Trump’s desire to end the war as soon as possible, even if it means forcing Kyiv into significant concessions. The proposals all break from Biden’s approach of letting Kyiv dictate when peace talks should begin. Instead, they uniformly recommend freezing the war in place—cementing Russia’s seizure of roughly 20% of Ukraine—and forcing Ukraine to temporarily suspend its quest to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”
  • “One idea proposed inside Trump’s transition office, detailed by three people close to the president-elect and not previously reported, would involve Kyiv promising not to join NATO for at least 20 years. In exchange, the U.S. would continue to pump Ukraine full of weapons to deter a future Russian attack. Under that plan, the front line would essentially lock in place and both sides would agree to an 800-mile demilitarized zone. Who would police that territory remains unclear, but one adviser said the peacekeeping force wouldn’t involve American troops, nor come from a U.S.-funded international body, such as the United Nations.”
    • “We can do training and other support but the barrel of the gun is going to be European,” a member of Trump’s team said. “We are not sending American men and women to uphold peace in Ukraine. And we are not paying for it. Get the Poles, Germans, British and French to do it.”
• “Earlier this year, Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, who both served in Trump’s first White House, presented Trump with a blueprint that includes withholding weapons from Ukraine until Kyiv agrees to peace talks with Russia. Ukraine could still try to regain lost territory, but would have to do so through diplomatic negotiations.”
• “Zelensky, whose country is heavily dependent on the U.S. for military and financial assistance, could—more easily than Putin—be forced by Trump to negotiate, but the Ukrainian leader would have to contend with a public that views ceding territory as capitulation to Moscow.”
• “Trump has said that Ukraine’s survival is important to the U.S., but has repeatedly criticized Zelensky, calling him the “greatest salesman,” a stance that has worried some officials in Kyiv that a Trump-led U.S. might push for a settlement that favors Russia.”

"Ukraine, Europe, and the Art of the Deal," Luis Simón and Lotje Boswinkel, WotR, 11.08.24.

• “In the event of Trump pushing ahead with a peace deal for Ukraine, Europe should refrain from trying to prevent the deal from happening and focus instead on trying to influence the deal’s landing zone. Any such deal would entail some sort of trade-off between peace and territories.”
• “But the devil lies in the details, and there are many questions about what kind of peace and which territories should conform to the deal. Concretely, European efforts should focus on two key aspects: securing as much of Ukraine’s south as possible, and ensuring the deal is as sustainable as possible, ideally through the offer of NATO and E.U. membership to Ukraine. We have outlined the levers Europe could draw on to influence the deal’s landing zone. While Ukraine’s backers may have failed to carry through “for as long as it takes,” they would still have a chance to fight for an acceptable alternative.”

“Trump and the War in Ukraine,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Bulletin No. 19 (149) 2024, 11.11.24.

• “Trump’s election has made a strong impression on Putin, who, just two days after the vote, presented his sweeping vision of the new world order taking shape at the Valdai Forum. There is little doubt that Putin still harbors hope—unlike many in his circle—that Trump may initiate a new era in Russian-American relations.”
• “There is no sign that Putin is ready to change or reconsider his stance on Ukraine: he insists that Ukraine must be neutral (with ironclad guarantees), “friendly” (with a revised Constitution), and that it must recognize the five regions Moscow has annexed, including Crimea, as part of Russia. Putin remains unwilling to engage with Zelensky or agree to an unconditional temporary ceasefire.”
• “Putin’s attitude toward Trump is highly contradictory. On one hand, he believes there is an opportunity to reset relations, envisioning a new world order. On the other, he is ready for further escalation.”
• “In Ukraine, Putin’s strategy largely hinges on domestic shifts: societal fatigue, a collapse of the front, internal elite divisions, and leadership changes that might see figures willing to consider Russia’s terms for ending the war emerge. He aims to bargain rather than fight, but if that fails, he is prepared to continue aggression.”
• “Moscow believes the next move lies with the United States. Putin is awaiting a proposal or concrete steps, dismissing any rumored “plans” in the media. He may also consider a final offensive push, and, if it does not work out, is prepared for a prolonged conflict, whatever it may require.”

"Trump's Ukraine Peace Plan Will Need a Lot of Preparatory Work," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 11.11.24.

• “With his dramatic reelection, Trump now has the power to destroy ... Ukraine’s economy and independence, as well European security. This, tragically, seems the most likely outcome — and yet he doesn’t have to. Trump doesn’t actually need to do much to ensure that he and Ukraine are in a stronger negotiating position after he’s inaugurated. For that he can thank US President Joe Biden, who’s said he’ll push through the rest of the $5 billion he authorized for Ukraine by the end of his term. That’s a surge of about $1.5 billion per month that Trump doesn’t even have to approve.”
• “All the incoming president needs to do is hold tight while he develops a clear plan to help stabilize the front, encourage Europe to overmatch the US effort and project a message of strength and commitment that his friend in the Kremlin takes seriously. It’s up to him. The Kremlin, Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang and US allies around the world will be watching his every move.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

•  "'Neither Approved by Moscow nor Kyiv': Why Trump's Ukraine Plan Is Doomed to Fail," Mikhail Khodarenok, Gazeta.Ru, 11.07.24. Clues from Russian Views. (In Russian.)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"An Alliance of America’s Greatest Foes Is Getting Tighter," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 11.08.24.

• “Call it whatever you want — “axis of autocracies,” “axis of upheaval” or even “axis of losers” — but the reality is that the US faces a thickening web of alliance-like ties among its greatest foes. At the center of those relationships is collaboration in making and wielding the tools of war.”
• “The revisionists aren’t simply trading in finished weapons; there is a deeper industrial integration underway. Tehran has built factories that produce Iranian drones on Russian soil. China has undertaken a gigantic effort to rebuild Putin’s defense industrial base by selling him microchips, machine tools and other components. North Korean workers may already be toiling on Russian production lines.”
• “More troubling, technology transfer is reaching new levels. Russia is reportedly aiding North Korea’s missile, satellite, and advanced weapons programs. Moscow and Beijing are engaging in joint development and co-production initiatives that grow more numerous, and more secretive, all the time.”
• “Making military integration among the Eurasian autocracies is making the world’s most disruptive states better armed and better informed about the realities of modern war. Given that this integration has repeatedly surged ahead far faster than Western analysts predicted, expect these relationships to keep developing in surprising, destabilizing ways.”

“Mistrust between Russia and the west will outlast the Trump era,” Alexander Gabuev, FT, 11.10.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “Desirable as it is that the shooting in Ukraine stops, the fundamental causes of the confrontation between Moscow and the west will remain. Trump’s victory has reconfirmed Putin’s view that the west is so politically unstable that policies can drastically change with every election cycle. Mistrust of the west will therefore persist, particularly as the Russian system becomes increasingly populated with veterans of the conflict and Putin plans to stay in power until at least 2036.”
• “So if Trump’s team tries to offer incentives to Moscow to lure it out of Beijing’s embrace, the Kremlin will gladly pocket any carrots that the US may dangle. But it will not do anything meaningful to rock its partnership with the giant neighbor, because China’s authoritarian communist system, and President Xi Jinping himself, will probably outlast Trump in the White House. If anything, any overtures from Trump may somewhat strengthen Moscow’s weakened hand in dealing with Beijing. Finally, the fracturing effect in Europe of Trump’s return and potential emboldening of populist right forces there is a natural gift to the Kremlin. So is the increased level of domestic polarization and inward focus in the US that the second Trump term will bring.”
• “The sad truth is that the fight against the west has become the organizing principle of Putin’s regime and has created too many beneficiaries to be abandoned any time soon. Trump or no Trump, Russia’s foreign policy will be guided by anti-Americanism for at least as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.”

Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Discussion Club meeting. “Vladimir Putin took part in the plenary session of the 21^st annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” Kremlin.ru, 11.07.24. Clues from Russian Views.   

• “We are witnessing the formation of a completely new world order, nothing like we had in the past, such as the Westphalian or Yalta systems. New powers are rising. Nations are becoming more and more aware of their interests, their value, uniqueness and identity, and are increasingly insistent on pursuing the goals of development and justice. At the same time, societies are confronted with a multitude of new challenges, from exciting technological changes to catastrophic natural disasters, from outrageous social division to massive migration waves and acute economic crises.”
• “There comes, in a way, the moment of truth. The former world arrangement is irreversibly passing away, actually it has already passed away, and a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order. It is irreconcilable, above all, because this is not even a fight for power or geopolitical influence. It is a clash of the very principles that will underlie the relations of countries and peoples at the next historical stage. Its outcome will determine whether we will be able, through joint efforts, to build a world that will allow all nations to develop and resolve emerging contradictions based on mutual respect for cultures and civilizations, without coercion and use of force. And finally, whether the human society will be able to retain its ethical humanistic principles, and whether an individual will be able to remain human.”
• “The peril lies in the imposition of totalitarian ideologies and making them the norm, as exemplified by the current state of Western liberalism.”
• “Moreover, there are international conflicts and confrontations fraught with the danger of mutual destruction. Weapons that can cause this do exist and are being constantly improved, taking new forms as the technologies advance.”
• “I have previously stated that we have reached red lines. The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians. Such blind faith in their own impunity and exceptionalism could lead to a global catastrophe.”
• “Unlike our counterparts, Russia does not view Western civilization as an adversary, nor does it pose the question of 'us or them.'”
• “History has not ended. On the contrary, it has entered a new phase.”
• “What conflict are we witnessing today? ... It is a conflict between the overwhelming majority of the global population, which wants to live and develop in an interconnected world with a great deal of opportunities, and the global minority, whose only concern, as I have said, is the preservation of its domination.”
• “In the emerging multipolar world, there should be no nations or peoples left as losers or feeling aggrieved and humiliated.”
• “Six principles ... ought to underpin relations as we embark upon a new phase of historical progression.”
  • “Firstly, openness to interaction stands as the paramount value cherished by the overwhelming majority of nations and peoples.”
  • “Secondly, we have consistently underscored the diversity of the world as a prerequisite for its sustainability.”
  • “Thirdly,...the new world can develop successfully only through the broadest inclusion.”
  • “Next, the key principle of security for all without exception is that the security of one nation cannot be ensured at the expense of others’ security.”
  • “My fifth point is about justice for all.”
  • “My sixth point is that we keep emphasizing that sovereign equality is an imperative for any lasting international framework.”
• “Russia’s role is certainly not limited to protecting and preserving itself. It may sound a bit grand, but Russia’s very existence guarantees that the world will retain its wide color gamut, diversity and complexity, which is the key to successful development.”
• “Russia is fighting for its freedom, rights, and sovereignty.”

Q&A with Vladimir Putin after his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club meeting. “Vladimir Putin took part in the plenary session of the 21^st annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” Kremlin.ru, 11.07.24. Clues from Russian Views.⁶

• “Does the development of nuclear energy technologies spell more benefits or more negative consequences? Civilian nuclear technologies play a tremendous and highly important role in medicine, agriculture and transportation, and their role will continue to increase. ... At the same time, there are nuclear weapons. This creates major threats for humankind. The same is absolutely true of AI technologies. How is this regulated, and how do people use them? This is a good question.”
• “Clearly, climate change and global warming is what is happening. ... We in Russia know this first-hand because warming in our country is going at a faster pace than anywhere else around the world. Over the past 10 years, we have seen temperatures go up by 0.5 degrees, and even more – by 0.7 degrees – in the Arctic. We see this clearly. For a country with 60 percent of the territory in the permafrost zone, this factor has practical consequences.”
• “We must try to create a Eurasian security system. It is a vast continent. And Europe obviously can, and I believe that it must, become an integral part of this system.”
• “It is necessary to gradually revitalize the system of mutual trust. We can sit here talking about it all night, but this could be the first step towards creating a common system of Eurasian security.”
• “I think our friends from China are certainly with us today. There is nothing about domination in the Chinese philosophy. They do not strive for domination.”
  • “If the People’s Republic of China comes and helps these [Central Asian] economies, this means that their economic cooperation helps stabilize their domestic processes and statehoods, which is in Russia’s interests.”
• “Regarding relations between Russia and the Chinese People’s Republic, they have reached a historical high... the level of trust between Russia and China is at its highest point in recent history.”
• “We believe it [China] pursues an absolutely balanced policy, and China is our ally.”
• “Unfortunately, the United States adopted a double containment policy by trying to contain and deter both China and Russia. Why do they need this, considering that they have to focus on two fronts at the same time? Of course, it is clear that the United States views China’s growing economic might as a threat, a threat to their dominance.”
• “I think that everyone would win and there would be no losers if the United States, for example, changes course in the way it treats both Russia and China by moving away from its double containment policy towards a trilateral cooperation framework.”
• “In fact, domestic politics in the United States has been evolving towards more political infighting and more political tension with opponents and political rivals of the head of state using all kind of tricks to derail his [Trump’s] agenda.”
• “His [Trump’s] behavior when he faced an assassination attempt really impressed me. He turned out to be a courageous man.”
• “I  do not want to comment now on what was said during the presidential campaign, I think it was said consciously trying to win votes, but whatever. And what has been said in terms of trying to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis, in my opinion at least deserves attention.”
  • “If someone of them [leaders of Western countries] wants to resume contacts, I have always said and I want to say again: we have nothing against it. We are ready to resume our contacts and have discussions.”
• “[When asked to comment on prospects of strategic stability, given the pending expiration of New START:] We have never turned away from continuing dialogue on strategic stability. ... The United States has made it its goal to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. What does it mean to inflict a strategic defeat on a particular country? If it does not mean destroying that country, then perhaps it is about reducing it to an insignificant role. In that case, why do we need nuclear weapons? And yet, they say they want to engage in dialogue with us on strategic stability. How does that add up? ... Cooperation between Russia and China is a key factor in ensuring international stability in general but it also concerns strategic stability in the sphere of nuclear weapons. For years, we have been urged to “work with your friends in China” and get them involved in discussions about reducing their nuclear arsenals. In response, our Chinese counterparts have said, “What are you talking about? We have fewer carriers and warheads. What is there to reduce? ... [A]t the same time, we observe the nuclear arsenals of NATO countries, aside from the United States, expanding – specifically those of the United Kingdom and France. ... [H]ow can we overlook the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France? ... In terms of our capabilities, the number of carriers and warheads, and the quality of our modern weaponry, which we are enhancing – we are now on the brink of deploying our latest advancements... In general, we stand ready for dialogue. However, it is imperative that the other side approaches it with honesty, considering all facets of our relations. It is untenable to claim that while they aim to inflict a strategic defeat upon us, they simultaneously reassure their citizens, “Everything is fine, business as usual. Don't worry, don't give it a second thought.” It simply won't wash: a strategic defeat for us, yet they dismiss it as inconsequential. So, let us lay our cards on the table, engage in a calm, business-like discussion, free of double, triple, or indeed quintuple standards. We have suggested this numerous times. But each time we attempt to engage substantively, the conversation stalls. We shall see how the new administration will articulate its proposals, if any, on this matter.”
• “Our cooperation and friendship with China are not directed against any other country, including the United States. Our relations with China are focused on fostering the development of our countries and ensuring the security of nations. The same approach applies to our relationship with the United States. ... Regarding the possibility of restoring relations with the United States, we are open to it.”
• “If [Ukraine’s] neutrality is not achieved, it is difficult to imagine any kind of good unneighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine. Why? Because without neutrality, Ukraine will continue to be used as a tool in foreign hands, working against the interests of the Russian Federation. This would prevent the creation of the basic conditions needed to normalize relations, and the situation will become unpredictable. We would very much like to avoid that.”

“Horizons Debate – The Eagle Meets the Bear”, Ian Bremmer (IB) and Sergei Karaganov (SK), 11.04.24. Transcript by RM student associates Chris Conway and Dasha Zhukauskaite.⁷

“IB:  I do think we are in a period of geopolitical crisis,and it comes from transition a transition where the so-called rules of the global order are no longer aligned with the fundamental balance of power. Balance of power shifted. The rules, the institutions, the architecture haven't. That creates all sorts of geopolitical instability. Three big reasons for it?” 

• “First, after the Soviet collapse uh the Russians were not integrated into NATO, into the European Union, into the West. We can argue about who's responsible for that, but it didn't happen. Certainly, the Russians are not happy about it.”
• “Secondly, China was integrated into global architecture on the presumption by the West that as they got wealthier, they would become Americans, they'd become Democratic, they'd become capitalists.”
• “Finally, while those first two things were happening tens of millions of people in advanced industrial economies – especially my own United States – increasingly felt like they own leaders did not represent them.”

“SK: We are at the end of several historic periods.” 

• “One is dominance of the West which started approximately the 16^th century when West acquired military superiority on which it built the system of economic and cultural dominance which allowed it to siphon off world wealth in its order.”
• “The second, of course, major feature is the obvious game of the liberal capitalist World Order, of modern capitalism, [which] is going against nature and against the man or the person, the human. It has exhausted its usefulness.”
• “The third major period is the emergence because of the first process of civilization which had civilizations and countries which had been previously suppressed.”
  • “The world order which I envisage in 20 years if we survive would like cuisine in New York or in Moscow and both in I haven't been to New York for a decade and a half but remember that the cuisine has been I mean very diverse and excellent.” 

“[When asked “When did, in your opinion, the conflict in Ukraine start and why did it start?”]”

“SK: [On Ukraine] …we were too late to issue an ultimatum and waiting until late 2021. It should have been done much earlier. we should have moved much earlier.”

“IB: The Russians are not winning. … I mean almost three years in again the Ukrainians are the big losers here there's no question.  But secondarily I would argue that this has been a massive mistake by the Russian president who had reasons to believe that the West wouldn't care in 2022 the way they largely didn't care after 2014.”

“SK: Overall, the sanctions gave us … extremely positive effects.”

• “First of all, we got a rid of the fifth column.”
• “Second we getting we got rid of the comprador elite because of sanctions against Russian Russians abroad.”
• “Third we have energized our economy.”
  • “I'm happy to say that when I started the Eastern turn of Russia in the late 2000s with my colleagues we had 56% of our trade with Europe. Nobody believed what would happen in 15 years before. The war with the West and Ukraine in 15 years we achieved a diminishing of the role of the of the share of Europe in our trade to 30% and while our trade with the other world especially Asia grew.”
• “If our Western enemies decide to continue that War we should sooner or later cut them short. Of course, Ukraine would have to capitulate and be completely disarmed and if our Western neighbors would continue to support them well that would bring a lot of disasters to our Western allies we have written off Europe by the way thanks God. We also finished the 300 years journey of Europe.”

“IB:

• The Ukrainians can lose land, and they are losing land, but the capitulation of the Ukrainian Nation is something that I do not see: not after the thousands and thousands of deaths, the war crimes that have been committed and documented. This is something that I think will stick with the Ukrainians for generations …. I think capitulation is not on the agenda.”

“SK: 

• But actually, what has happened during the last decade and a half or a bit more  is that we forgot about the civilizing Force which helped us for avoid to avoid war for 70 years and that is nuclear insurance so we have to restore the value of nuclear deterrence as to the necessity of using nuclear purpose.”
• We have started to change our nuclear Doctrine, we will go we have started to climb the ladder of nuclear escalation, and people like myself are openly saying that if our European friends – well who call it friends again, enemies now – would not come to their senses, they will be devastated. Our American enemies, hopefully Partners, already are retreating because they have conserved more minds than Europeans. They have, Europeans are, simply mindless. They lost any sense of strategic intellect. The Americans are starting to understand that they are getting into high risk and starting to reach reason, I hope that will continue.”
• Europeans have started two Wars in one generation and now Europeans are driving ourselves towards the Third World War. They are suicidal.”

“IB:  I think that Sergei needs to be listened to in terms of the Russian perspective here because of course on nuclear weapons, that is the sole remaining superpower that Russia has. Their economy is roughly the size of Canada, it’s negligible on the global stage. … But nuclear capabilities of Russia remain world class and at very much American levels in some cases larger than US levels, capable of blowing up the world many times over…..I think that some significant strategic thinking about how to reduce that danger in ways that are sustainable for an evolving global order would be a very smart thing to do and that the Americans can't do that by themselves. The Americans should do that with the Chinese who also have an enormous amount at stake in the continuity of the present Global Order its interdependence its stability and in India and Europe and Japan and the rest–this needs to be a broader conversation, not just a NATO conversation, in my view.” 

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "The End of American Exceptionalism: Trump’s Reelection Will Redefine U.S. Power," Daniel Drezner, FA, 11.08.24.
• "How to Start World War III in 8 Easy Steps," Alexander J. Motyl, The Hill, 11.10.24.
• "Preventing the Next Pandemic: The Case for Strengthening Biological Warfare Prevention," Editorial Board, WP, 11.11.24.
• “Building Defense Capacity in Europe: An Assessment,” IISS, November 2024.
  • For materials from the IISS Prague Defense Summit 2024, click here.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“China-Russia Relations in the Arctic: What Are the Northern Limits of Their Partnership?", Abbie Tingstad, Stephanie Pezard and Yuliya Shokh, RAND, 11.08.24.

• “To what extent might China and Russia form partnerships in the Arctic region, and what factors might limit the development of their relationship? Although the United States has had Russia as a maritime neighbor in the Arctic since 1867, the growing presence of China in the region as a Russian partner has led to a rare situation in which two competitive — and potentially hostile — states are in very close proximity to North America.”
• “In this paper, the authors evaluate Russia's and China's activities in the Arctic and these activities' implications for nations with Arctic interests. The authors consider China's decades-long interest in the Arctic, its growing and possible future economic activities, and the existing and proposed collaborations that Beijing has sought with Arctic countries to realize its goals.”
• “The authors propose four scenarios for Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic that represent possible directions for evolution by 2035. Key factors that will shift this evolution in one direction or another include economic and broader geopolitical factors. The authors ultimately conclude that China's attention to the Arctic — in the context of its vastly broader economic security plans — rests on continued regional stability and that whether China engages with other Western Arctic countries may ultimately determine what the real limits are for a Sino-Russian friendship in the Arctic. Western policies that focus on differences between Russia and China may ultimately be more successful in shaping the Arctic's future than those that emphasize their similarities or friendly interactions thus far.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

Interview: “Sergey Ryabkov: We know Trump from his previous time in power. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister spoke about the prospects for dialogue with the United States in connection with Trump's return to power,” Interfax, 11.09.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “[Commenting on Trump’s victory:] I think that the [Russian] President’s detailed speech at [the] Valdai [Club’s annual conference] confirmed, in fact, the line that we have been adhering to for a long time. Namely: declarations, statements, promises, some signals are, of course, important. ... But actions are needed, and we will give assessments based on the specific actions of the future [U.S. presidential] administration.”
• “I think that some of the messages from his [Trump’s] side regarding a super-fast settlement of the situation in Ukraine are nothing more than rhetoric, nothing more than a way to attract additional attention to himself during the pre-election period. It is clear that there can be no simple solution to this problem. ... And the path that we propose to follow is the only realistic one, it was defined during the [Russian] President’s speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 14 and subsequently repeatedly outlined and specified, including in his speech at Valdai. The American administration should take these signals very seriously - both the outgoing administration and the next one.”
• “[On U.S.-Russian strategic stability discussions:] [T]here is currently no reason to talk about resuming not only negotiations, but simply a dialogue with Washington on this topic. At Valdai, the President spoke about our readiness to conduct a dialogue on strategic stability, but he explained in great detail the logic by which this will not happen outside the international context. As you remember, there were also references to the growing, improving nuclear potential of the closest European allies of the United States, NATO allies. There were specific, absolutely clear signals from our side [with regard to U.S.] attempts of the first Trump administration to seat China at the negotiating table, along with us. And politically, nothing has changed - they [Americans] are still telling us that they want to inflict a strategic defeat on us. How can we conduct a dialogue on strategic stability in conditions when strategic defeat has been doctrinally elevated to the goal of policy in the Russian direction? That is, defeat and stability are incompatible things even from the point of view of formal logic. ... But once again: if the future administration in Washington for some reason begins to change its approaches and become more receptive to what we explain ..., then the situation can of course be re-evaluated and we can see to what extent this will be in our interests.”
• “[When commenting on what the interviewer described as the “revision” of Russia’s nuclear doctrine:] This process will be completed. The President of the Russian Federation, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, will undoubtedly make decisions that will mean an improvement in the conceptual foundations of our activities in this area. I would like to note once again that we are talking about adjusting not the Military Doctrine, but the Basic Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence. ... I would call [these principles] a sub-doctrine act. This document initially sets out the parameters and conditions that specify the basic scenarios laid down in the [2014] Military Doctrine.”
• “What is happening now is that the conclusions and results of the analysis of the situation, which is, is developing in relations with the West and with regard to the special military operation, is being reflected in the basic principles of state policy in the sphere of nuclear deterrence. Namely, the Western group [of countries]  are acting as if impunity has no limits and is if they can go up the ladder of escalation to infinity, until Moscow falters and Moscow loses its nerve. This is a deeply erroneous idea, it is dangerous. Its origins are in the absolute conceit of these people [in the West] and in their conviction that no one, as they claim, will ever be able to counter them on anything, and that ultimately, they will impose their own will on everyone, and above all on their geopolitical rivals, in this case in the form of Russia. This is a dangerous trend. Therefore, there are different ways to stop it. There are certain actions of a material nature, including, among other things, the improvement of our nuclear arsenal, there are also wargames and training events, and there are doctrinal aspects [of Russia’s response] . And in this case, we are talking about the fact that, by all indications, the moment is approaching when the Basic Principles of State Policy will reflect the possibilities for resorting to the nuclear option under certain circumstances that fit into the basic scenarios, which I have mentioned, but which do not today appear to us to be purely abstract and hypothetical. Rather they appear to be related to the current phase of the most acute crisis in our relations with the USA, NATO, the West as a whole, and to the situation, including that is unfolding around the SVO [special military operation]. But after the document appears in its final form, all this will be, as they say, in reality. Everyone will understand everything.”
• “[When asked if preparations are being made for a Trump-Putin “contact”:] There is no preparatory work in terms of coordination, matching schedules, or any more specific planning of the format of such contact.”
• “[When commenting on U.S.-Russian prisoner exchanges:] By the way, that exchange can be attributed, perhaps, to several, literally isolated episodes of our relations with the United States in recent years, when it was really possible to solve a problem, untie a certain knot, and not accumulate even more difficulties and not tighten this knot tighter ... the topic remains on the agenda.”
• “As for the situation in Ukraine, the exchange of signals over closed channels is periodically carried out. ... We have literally isolated episodes when such an exchange of signals led to certain results, from our point of view, important, necessary and positive. ... It cannot be said that the communication lines are cut off and there is no dial tone [including communications on military and political issues].”
• “[When asked if Russian leadership is ready to hear Trump out if he proposes ways to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:] This is certainly true. We approach any ideas proposed by countries in this area with the utmost care, responsibility and attention. ... If the American side gives any signals that they have ideas on how to move forward in the area of ​​settlement, rather than in the area of ​​further pumping the Kyiv regime with all kinds of aid in the expectation that ultimately this will lead to the same strategic defeat of Moscow, then we will undoubtedly do our utmost to analyze this and develop a response.”
• “[When asked to comment what, in addition to confiscation of Russia’s assets frozen by the West, could prompt Russia to consider breaking off diplomatic relations with the U.S.:] Dramatic and further escalatory actions leading to a complication of the situation on the line of combat contact.”

"Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of Hybrid Wars", Andrey Sushentsov, Valdai Club, 11.11.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “Today, Moscow is sending clear signals about its readiness to take decisive measures in response to the opportunistic behavior of the United States and Western countries. For example, Russia has begun to revise its nuclear doctrine. In recent months, we have seen very significant military demonstrations - in particular, Russian missile carriers visited the Western Hemisphere. Russian strategic nuclear assets were found off the coast of Cuba and Venezuela. These maneuvers were carried out with deliberate demonstrativeness in order to emphasize that the United States is not invulnerable. It is also important to keep in mind the fact that Moscow and Beijing continue to strengthen cooperation in the military sphere. This summer, Russia and China carried out joint patrols of the northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea near the coast of Alaska. In early September, large-scale naval exercises "Ocean-2024" took place in the waters of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic Seas, in which the Russian fleet took part together with the Chinese naval forces.”
• “With each new step up the escalation ladder, tensions between Russia and the West grow. The situation is becoming especially acute against the backdrop of statements by Western politicians. Thus, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said that if the Ukrainian front collapses, NATO may be forced to directly intervene in the conflict. Crossing this "red line" could radically change the strategic situation, to the point that the conflict will reach a completely new level, with unpredictable consequences for Europe and the world as a whole.”
• “In this context, one should also take into account the fact that Russia has a wide range of tools, in addition to nuclear weapons and other military means, to protect national interests and achieve its goals. An important dimension of the current crisis in relations between Russia and the West outside the military-political sphere is the struggle in the area of ​​ideas regarding how the new international system will work. Indicative in this regard is the analysis of the materials of the meetings of the UN General Assembly, demonstrating that in the issue of perception of the current crisis in the dyad "Russia - West", the world majority is inclined to accuse the West of being the initiator of this crisis. Such a perception is entirely consistent with our interests and contributes to the growth of an important resource of constructive interaction with allies and partners.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Energy exports from CIS:

"Sanctions Are Sinking Russia’s Flagship Gas Project", The Economist, 11.07.24.

• “The West’s economic weapons are missing their target. Last month Russia exported near-record volumes of oil, at a decent price. But there is one exception. After shutting its main gas pipeline to Europe in 2022, Russia had hoped that Arctic LNG 2, an ultra-modern export facility, would open big new markets. Yet last month the plant suspended operations until next summer, for want of ships and buyers. Sanctions are nipping it in the bud.”
• “Sanctions on Arctic LNG are stricter than those targeting Russia’s oil exports, which do not stop non-Western buyers purchasing the stuff. They are also easier to enforce: the global fleet of LNG tankers is much smaller than the oil-carrying one, and it can dock at only a few specialized ports. That makes transgressions easier to spot, notes Anne-Sophie Corbeau of Columbia University. And punishing them comes at a smaller cost: from 2025 onwards, lots of new LNG is expected to come from outside Russia, notably America, which should keep global prices down. Sanctions on Arctic LNG are working largely because America wants them to work. How long that lasts depends on the geopolitical whims of its next president.” 

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• "Embracing an All-of-the-Above Strategy for Energy and Economic Development", DJ Nordquist, CEIP, 11.01.24.”

Climate change:

“The Trump shadow hanging over Baku,” Editorial Board, FT, 11.12.24.

• “The annual UN climate COP conference has begun in Azerbaijan’s capital of Baku beneath a menacing cloud. Once again, the world’s richest country will be led by a leader actively opposed to fixing one of the world’s most intractable and existential problems.”
• “Trump’s campaign team has said he will again pull the US out of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which he announced in 2017 and formally did in late 2020, only to watch Joe Biden restore membership in early 2021.”
• “No country followed the US out then and there is no sign of any exodus forming now, so far. But Trump advisers hope the incoming president will this time pull the US out of the Paris Agreement’s parent treaty, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change — a harder-to-reverse step that would deal a much deeper blow to international collaboration. That prospect is expected to taint a central task in Baku, where envoys are due to agree a new finance goal to help poorer countries deal with a hotter climate.”
• “Wealthy nations struggled to meet on time an earlier target of $100bn a year first formally agreed in 2010. Negotiating a larger goal on the eve of a potential US Paris pullout is a steep ask. Ultimately, Trump is unlikely to kill off the COP process nor bring the energy transition to a halt. But the EU and China must be ready to help fill a US void. Further delay in a climate shift that is already going at a dangerously glacial pace is something the world cannot afford.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

"What a Trump Presidency Means for the Russian Economy", Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 11.08.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “There will be no immediate impact on the Russian economy from Trump’s election. To a large extent, Russian markets are shielded from international turbulence by Western sanctions, and minimal economic ties. However, Trump may have an indirect effect on Russia’s economy simply because of the huge rule the U.S. plays in the world.”
• “If U.S. import tariffs are increased, then this will accelerate global fragmentation and likely see other countries coalescing into trading blocs. It will mean a further deterioration of U.S. relations with China, and maybe even several rounds of tariff wars. For Russia, this would mean slower economic growth. If all U.S. trading partners respond in kind to U.S. tariffs, by 2028 the overall damage to global GDP will be 0.5%, Bloomberg reported. If trading partners do not respond, the global economy will suffer less (but Chinese GDP growth would still be about 0.4% less). This all translates into lower demand for Russian exports, particularly crude oil, oil products and metals.”
• “Trump’s policies might also hit Russian oil producers from another direction. Throughout his campaign Trump has called on producers to drill as much oil as possible – an approach that could end up increasing global supply, and depressing prices.”
• “In addition, if we do see tariff wars, it will lead to a temporary spike in container shipping prices (as producers rush to move goods before the measures come into force). For Russia, this could mean an increase in import costs (on top of the effects of a stronger U.S. dollar).”
• “Lower oil prices, a stronger U.S. dollar and more expensive imports are all bad news for the Russian economy. But Trump’s election also opens up the prospect of Putin cutting a deal with Trump to end the war in Ukraine, and potentially easing sanctions. The Moscow Exchange index rose briefly on Wednesday, lifted by hopes of a ceasefire. The Russian ruble also strengthened.”

Elections interference:

"Russia’s Election Meddling: Farce After Tragedy," Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 11.09.24.

• “We're not done with Russian election meddling. The last days of the 2024 race were perfectly lousy with accusations, almost as if the Russian government had decided to cut out the middleman and phone up the FBI to report directly what it was up to next.”
• “Luckily, the Trump victory was too broad to support tendentious claims that Russia caused it. This despite what the Times calls the Kremlin's new 'brazenness,' which Russia didn't 'bother to hide.'”
• “Our own intelligence officials were so foolish and corrupt that discussion of them must be suppressed to preserve relations between the public and the U.S. intelligence establishment. Their effect on our electoral outcomes and domestic harmony dwarfs anything Russia did.”

Reactions to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election:

"Trump and the Future of American Power", Q&A with Stephen Kotkin, FA, 11.08.24.

"The Right Way for Trump to Play Peacemaker", David Ignatius, WP, 11.08.24.

• “Negotiating a just settlement in Ukraine is the most delicate challenge. The Biden administration wouldn't touch negotiations, maintaining that only Ukraine could decide on peace terms. But since Kyiv's offensive stalled last year, Ukrainians have known this moment was coming.”
• “Trump will insist on talks. That would be disastrous if he plans a diktat that forces Ukrainian concessions to secure a fast peace. But it Trump wants to appear strong - and not in Putin's pocket - he would demand security for Ukraine so that it can thrive after any settlement. South Korea, West Germany, Finland and Austria all made compromises to satisfy belligerent neighbors - and went on to spectacular prosperity. Trump's goal should be security guarantees that allow postwar Ukraine to succeed as a member of the European Union.”
• “If Trump wanted to try something creative, he would engage China in this bid. Zelensky badly wants Chinese involvement as a check against future Russian actions. The Biden administration talked of getting Beijing involved but made little progress. "If Trump could engage President Xi Jinping in making peace in Ukraine, they both should share the Nobel Peace Prize," says Graham Allison, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School.”
• “Trump's call for negotiation to end the war in Ukraine is an unlikely echo of Gen. Mark A. Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a frequent target of Trump's attacks. In November 2022, to the consternation of the Biden White House, Milley proclaimed: 'When there's an opportunity to negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize it.'”
• “A final reason to encourage Trump as a peacemaker is that he has long expressed deep concern about the danger of nuclear war. Allison, who co-wrote the classic study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, "Essence of Decision," has gathered a compendium of Trump's antinuke comments: "The single biggest problem the world has is nuclear armament, nuclear weapons," Trump said during a 2016 debate with Hillary Clinton. "Nuclear weapons are the biggest problem we have," he repeated at a town hall event last December. He offered this emphatic warning during his debate with Harris. 'We're going to end up in a third world war. And it will be a war like no other because of nuclear weapons.'”
• “Many aspects of a Trump presidency could be ruinous for the United States - and good citizens need to guard against such dangers. But much of the public backed Trump because it saw him as a tough leader who could make peace. In that, he deserves support - but also a demand that he protect American interests in whatever negotiations lie ahead.”

"Ukrainians put on brave face after Donald Trump’s victory," Christopher Miller and Max Seddon, FT, 11.06.24. 

• “Trump ... has blamed the Ukrainian president for starting the war. Trump has also claimed that he would end the conflict “within 24 hours” after taking office.”
  • “I know Zelenskyy very well, and I know [Russian President Vladimir] Putin very well, even better,” Trump told Fox News in July. “I would tell Zelenskyy, no more. You got to make a deal,” he said, adding that he would turn to Putin and threaten to give Kyiv “a lot” more aid in order to broker an agreement.”
• “Ukrainian officials ...sought to put on a brave face and position themselves as supporters of Donald Trump who they portrayed as the leader who could forge peace with Russia. But hiding behind the veil of support was “a lot of anxiety” about the US’s continued support for Kyiv once the new president took office, said a former minister.”
• “President Volodymyr Zelenskyy congratulated Trump on his “impressive election victory” even before the electoral count was tallied. The Ukrainian leader expressed hope that the Republican would play an important role in ending the war. ...Zelenskyy’s response to Trump’s re-election was echoed by senior politicians in Kyiv who believe the Republican is capable of reinvigorating the west’s approach to Russia’s war.”
  • “Feeling OK, lots of challenges but definitely new dynamics coming,” David Arakhamia, head of Zelenskyy’s parliamentary group told the Financial Times.”
  • “Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European integration, echoed that sentiment, saying that “Trump can definitely organize” more political momentum in Kyiv’s favor.”
  • “Oleksandr Merezhko, another MP in Zelenskyy’s party, who chairs the parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said he was “cautiously optimistic” about Trump. “He wants to be a successful president and success means that Ukraine should become for him a success story, not a story of failure,” he said.”
  • “A Ukrainian military adviser said he was “more pessimistic” than the political leaders expressing support for Trump. “But some people think that his out-of-the-box approach will be actually the only one capable of some result,” he added.”
  • “An adviser to the Ukrainian government said he feared that Trump “may push the whole world into the era of chaos”. 'It might be a moment of truth for Europe, the UK to step up and be the adults in the room. But they may not be up to that task.'”
  • “Serhiy Fursa, a Ukrainian political analyst, said the return of Trump meant “the world once again turned the wrong way”. “Putin celebrates, Orban celebrates, [Elon] Musk opens champagne. Today is a holiday for a lot of very unpleasant people,” he said.”

“Ukraine seeks to win over Trump with natural resources and troop proposals,” Christopher Miller, Max Seddon and Henry Foy, FT, 11.12.24. 

• “Ukraine has been building on its “victory plan” for the incoming Trump administration, highlighting potential business deals, access to raw materials and troop deployments in an effort to sway the famously transactional US president-elect.”
• “Ukraine’s allies in Europe and the US, including senior Republicans, have offered advice on how to best frame proposals that incentivize close co-operation with Kyiv rather than cutting off critical aid to the country, according to Ukrainian and European officials.”
• “Two of the ideas were laid out in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “victory plan” with Trump specifically in mind, according to people involved in drawing it up. The proposals were later presented to Trump when the Ukrainian president met him in New York in September.”
  • “One idea would replace some US troops stationed in Europe with Ukrainian forces after the war.”
  • “The other — first devised by Republican senator Lindsey Graham, a Trump ally, according to people involved in designing Zelenskyy’s “victory plan” — suggests sharing Ukraine’s critical natural resources with western partners.”
    • “Separately, business leaders in Ukraine are also talking with the government about offering Trump “investment screening” powers, allowing him to essentially choose who can do business in the country. One person involved in the planning described the idea as 'ABC — anybody but China.'”
• “Kyiv is also looking to appease the Trump camp by replacing its ambassador to Washington, Oksana Markarova, according to people with knowledge of the situation. Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson demanded Makarova’s sacking after she organized a visit for Zelenskyy to a US ammunition plant in September that was attended only by Democrats. Dmytro Kuleba, the former foreign minister, was offered the position but declined, the people said. Kuleba, the embassy in Washington and the foreign ministry in Kyiv did not comment.”
• “Dmitri Trenin, a research professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, said Russia would be “open for dialogue” if Trump came up with 'something that fits with the Russian idea of eliminating the roots of the Ukraine problem for Russia.'”

“Trump’s Return as a New Chapter,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta/Russia in Global Affairs, 11.06.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (Russia in Global Affairs is affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• “The outcome of the US elections will not transform the world. The processes that did not begin yesterday will not end tomorrow. But the American vote has become an important indicator of long-term changes.”
• “The era when Washington was confident that it needed to manage world affairs (and, naturally, in its right to do so) is ending.”
• “The conflict [over Ukraine] has turned into a fateful battle for the principles of the world order. ... In addition, the battle has become a test of the real fighting potential of all parties, including the West under American leadership.”
• “It is important... that the intentions of Trump and his allies - a turn toward America’s strictly understood mercantile interests and a move away from ideologization - are in line with the general direction of the world. This does not make the US a convenient or even more pleasant partner for other countries, but it does give hope for a more rational approach.”
• “Trump continues to talk about "deals," which he usually understands in a simplified way. The Republicans around him believe in the strength and power of America, though not for governing the entire world, but for imposing their conditions where it is beneficial to them. What will come out of all this, no one will say yet. But there is a feeling of a page turned and a new chapter beginning. First of all, because of the bankruptcy of those who wrote the previous one.”

“What Trump’s Victory Means for the Rest of the World,” Timofey Bordachev, Valdai Club/RIAC, 11.08.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.) 

• “For international politics, Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election means an increased likelihood of minor crises and upheavals, but a reduced likelihood of a general war and a dramatic outcome for all of humanity. Which is good news, because the US’s position in the world is itself a source of trouble for the rest of the world. And therefore, minor upheavals are inevitable.”
• “In the opinion of the vast majority of observers, a direct military clash between Russia and the US could now be the result not of intent, but of a tragic coincidence and simple human stupidity.”
• “Trump and his team are certainly not a gift. And they can significantly complicate the implementation of plans not only for Russia, but also for many other states. In some cases, this is a problem for our foreign policy, and in others, it is of no significant importance.”
• “It has become clear to everyone that the Americans are running out of resources (if not out of them at all) that they can share with others. And they need to somehow ensure that their own development goals are achieved. The desire of many countries to act independently from the dictates of the West is not a fight against it, but a battle for their own future in changing circumstances. Under the “new” Trump, the Americans will definitely not be able to spend more on bribing other countries of the world, they will give even less and demand more energetically. And this means that the strategy of independent development will gain more and more supporters.”
• “The events in the United States are bad news for the People's Republic of China, Russia's closest strategic partner. In ... Trump will make economic competition with China tougher, start new trade wars and will seek to force Beijing into some kind of honorable capitulation. For Russia, the danger here could be represented by both a sharp escalation of the Chinese-American rivalry and a forced retreat of the PRC under the pressure of Trump and his team. China is equally ill-equipped for a direct (or indirect via Taiwan) military clash with the US, and in some ways even fears it.”
• “Serious internal changes in America do not mean that the US will loosen its control over its satellites in the European Union. But now this control may turn out to be much less soft, more demanding than before.”

"Why Volodymyr Zelensky May Welcome Donald Trump's Victory", The Economist, 11.07.24.

• “On paper, Donald Trump’s return to the White House looks like Ukraine’s worst nightmare. America’s incoming president has consistently refused to condemn Vladimir Putin’s invasion. He appears to admire the Russian dictator’s style of rule. He once tried to blackmail Ukraine by withholding military assistance. So it comes as quite a surprise—and as an indication of just how bad things have become in the country in recent months—to learn that many senior officials were hoping for a Donald Trump victory. Faced with the choice of continued bare life-support or a wildcard president who would rip up the rules and almost certainly cut aid, they were prepared to gamble.”
• “President Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to endorse the victory, and in fulsome terms. “We look forward to an era of a strong United States of America under President Trump’s decisive leadership,” he wrote on X (formerly Twitter, and now run by the pro-Trump billionaire Elon Musk). This was not just spin. In private, his staff have become increasingly frustrated by what they describe as the Biden administration’s “self-deterrence”, the habit of fearing escalation with Russia to the point of paralysis, and a growing gap between the rhetoric of “standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes” and actions that suggest the opposite.”
• “America’s refusal to grant Ukraine permission to use its long-range missiles for strikes inside Russia, its chronic delays in supplies of military aid (even the package already approved) and its inability to offer solid security guarantees are increasingly seen as weakness and hypocrisy. Mr. Trump’s victory, however, could offer Mr. Zelensky a way out of what looks like a bloody deadlock at best, defeat at worst.”

For more commentary and analysis on this subject, see:

• "Putin Won’t Get Any Guarantees from a Trump White House," Anatol Lieven, UnHerd, 11.10.24.
• “Gloomy Russia Billionaires See Little to Cheer in Trump’s Win,” Bloomberg, 11.12.24.
• "Russia and U.S. Elections,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik, 11.11.24.
• “‘We have won’: Russians envision new global system with Trump victory,” Robyn Dixon and Catherine Belton, WP, 11.07.24.
• "Why Ukraine Is Ready to Gamble on Trump," Luke Coffey, FP, 11.08.24.
• “Ukrainian Soldiers Say Trump's Peace Push Could Come With a Huge Cost: A quick conclusion to the war at this point in the conflict would likely leave Kyiv with the rough end of the deal,” Jane Lytvynenko and Isabel Coles, WSJ, 11.08.24.
• “What top Zelensky advisor Mykhailo Podolyak expects a Trump presidency will mean for Ukraine,” Meduza, 11.11.24.
• "What Will Trump's Election Mean for European Security?", ELN, 11.08.24.
• "Foreign Policy Implications of Trump’s Return and Germany's Coalition Collapse," Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, DGAP, 11.08.24.
• "From Memes to Windows. How the US Approach to the Ukrainian Crisis Will Change Under Trump," Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.11.24. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.) (In Russian.)

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"How the Kremlin’s Rotation of Governors Guarantees their Loyalty", Nikolai Petrov, Russia.Post, 11.12.24.

• “The latest round of gubernatorial appointments shows that, more than two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the Presidential Administration has fully overcome the shock. The domestic political situation, though not back to the old norm, has stabilized.”
• “Candidates for regional head posts are being selected more carefully than before – the Kremlin is trying to avoid risky steps while acting proactively and with a long-term view. We are seeing a kind of personnel solitaire being played, with each replacement looking well thought out and, at first glance, effective.”
• “In recent years, the Kremlin has managed to turn the regions into divisions of a huge corporation. Regional leaders are interchangeable with federal bureaucrats, and the Kremlin constantly rotates them, thus guaranteeing their loyalty.”

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• "Can Russians Learn to Recognize Propaganda? Understanding of Media Bias Amid the Ukraine War," Anton Shirikov, PONARS Eurasia, 11.12.24.
• "How Antidepressants Have Become a Lifeline in Russia," Rustam Alexander, Russia.Post, 11.08.24.
• “The Kremlin, in Need of Workers, Calls on Pensioners," Vladimir Ruvinsky, Russia.Post, 11.11.24.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Despite Everything: How and Why Russia Remains an Actor in the Horn of Africa", Ivan Klyszcz, PONARS Eurasia, 11.04.24.

• “This brief has presented three explanations for why Russia has chosen to maintain and increase its engagement in the HoA [Horn of Africa] despite its limited resources and bigger priorities of Ukraine and Europe.”
  • “A shifting power balance, combined with enduring concerns over trade routes, might be shaping Russia’s perception of the region as open to engagement.”
  • “Authoritarian consolidation among the governments of the HoA and their marginalization from institutions led by democratic states might also be a factor, owing to the Kremlin’s preference for authoritarian partners.”
  • “Finally, Russia’s identity as a major power with a special path in the world might create an affinity for non-Western states that also make conspicuous claims about their “ancient” cultures, such as Ethiopia.”
• “These explanations are not mutually exclusive and might reinforce each other. The upshot is that Russia represents an engaged yet limited actor in the HoA. A factor that might change the trajectory of Russia’s engagement with the HoA is China’s shifting position on the continent. In particular, China’s economic deceleration might lead Beijing to lean more on fora such as BRICS to sustain its continental ambitions, including in the HoA. In turn, its relationship with Russia in Africa might shift, too, moving from a loose division of labor to either competition—especially where opportunities are scarce—or synergy, with Beijing potentially leaning on Moscow’s presence to compensate for its loss of capacity. Ethiopia’s BRICS membership might end up facilitating the latter as the forum increases the opportunities for contact and dialogue on regional affairs among Chinese, Ethiopian, and Russian officials.”

"Ideological Agenda of Russian Information Influence in Africa," Olena Snigyr, FPRI, 11.08.24.

• “[T]he effectiveness of Russian information influence in African countries is largely determined by Russia’s ability to draw upon the legacy of Soviet-African relations and to adapt to the unique information environment of each nation, leveraging its sentiments and weaknesses. Russia’s information influence in Africa serves its long-term foreign policy objectives, aiming to integrate African societies into a shared perspective on global order and history. These operations not only spread disinformation but also introduce elements of a renewed Russian ideology that stands in opposition to Western democracies.”

“Answers to questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov during the closing ceremony of the ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 11.10.24.⁸^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “One of the tasks we have outlined, which was clearly voiced in all bilateral meetings with my friends, is the need to move away from dependence on global mechanisms controlled by Western "colleagues". We have all already seen (we have talked about this a lot) that "globalization", which has been advertised to us for many decades as an ideal way of functioning of the global economy, is being destroyed by the West itself. The global economy is fragmenting. The reason is illegal sanctions, abuse of the dollar. One of my friends said today that there is also such a phenomenon as the "weaponization" of payments. All this is interconnected.”
• “Africa still mainly sells raw materials, and the added value is realized elsewhere, primarily in Western factories and markets. This is unfair.”
• “We are currently witnessing a wave of opposition to neocolonialism, which consists of trade, economic, and financial practices that prevent the countries of the continent from fully managing their rich natural resources.”
• “I think you watched the speech of Russian President V.V. Putin at a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, where he spoke on this matter: “We have no contradictions with virtually any African country. The level of trust and mutual sympathy is high. First of all, because in the history of our relations with the African continent there has not been any shadow.”

"The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan: Another Russian Attempt to Regain Diplomatic Status," Janko Šćepanović, PONARS Eurasia, 11.04.24.

• “Overall, the presence of [country] leaders [at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan] hardly comes as a surprise and does not signal a marked improvement in Russia’s diplomatic posture. If anything, as a status-seeking great power, Russia should be expected to engage in high-level diplomatic activity and summitry. Meanwhile, it has been on a damage-control mission since it invaded Ukraine and was diplomatically sidestepped by many states.”
• “The reality is that, more than two and a half years into the Ukraine war, Putin is restricted in his travel abroad by an arrest warrant issued for him by the International Criminal Court in March 2023. While Russia does not recognize the court’s jurisdiction, some of its BRICS partners do, and are obliged to arrest him. Putin had to skip the 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa because of this issue and has announced that he will miss another G20 meeting—scheduled for November 2024 in Brazil (he did not travel to the G20 meeting in Indonesia in 2022)—supposedly so as not to undermine and disrupt 'the routine work of this forum.'”
• “This highlights Russia’s inability to fully compensate for its lost membership in Western-led fora with non-Western ones and effectively maintain its previous high diplomatic visibility. Despite his repeated claims about the declining influence and importance of the “collective West,” Putin does not deny its relevance or even his desire to mend the broken ties. When asked at the Kazan summit whether he missed engaging with his Western counterparts, he replied that Russia had never refused contact and dialogue or ruled out a restoration of relations with the West.”
• “What the presence of so many delegations in Kazan underscores is the growing global allure of BRICS, with outsiders showing continued interest in cooperating with its members, not just Russia. Other states that were represented at the summit sought to affirm their already-expressed interest in joining the association in the near future. Their interest—Turkiye is but one example—is driven by the opportunity to solidify ties with global economic superpower China and a rapidly growing India and attract more investment from them. While Russia as a host played its part in providing an agreeable venue for the multilateral meetings, the heralding of the recent BRICS summit as Russia’s return to the grand diplomatic stage is premature and misses the many challenges that Moscow still faces to restore the status it enjoyed before February 24, 2022.”

"When Did Russia Decide That Borders Could Be Moved?", Dmitri Kartsev, Ost-West/Carnegie Politika, 11.04.24.

• “Today, when Putin calls Ukraine an “artificial state,” he is largely projecting Russia’s own problem onto it. After all, the considerations that produced Russia’s current borders aren’t exactly transparent. Many parts of Russia could easily have become full-fledged republics themselves and therefore independent states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had not only handed Crimea to Ukraine (a fact mentioned regularly in Kremlin propaganda), but also stripped Karelia of union republic status, which is less often remembered. If Khrushchev had not done so, the region’s fate could have been completely different.”
• “To overcome anxieties about its own “artificiality,” Russian propaganda manipulated the term “historical Russia,” refashioning a weak position into a strong one and legitimizing the right of modern Russia to dispute the borders of any territory previously belonging to Muscovite princes, Russian czars, and Soviet general secretaries.”
• “Is there a similar meaningful component to the Russian leadership’s fears that could be removed without harming other countries and peoples? Unlike the Nazis, the modern Russian elite did not pursue redrawing others’ borders as a key objective. Rather, many factors seem to have led it to settle on revisionism. That gives hope that, in different circumstances, there might be other ways for Russia to conquer the fear of its own “artificiality.” One of those ways might be a referendum—or, more likely, more than one—on who wants to remain part of Russia and in what form.”

For more commentary and analysis on this subject, see: 

• "The BRICS Summit 2024: An Expanding Alternative," CFR, 11.07.24.

Ukraine:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift," Leonid Nersisyan and Sergei Melkonian, War on the Rocks, 11.05.24.

• “The United States and the European Union should recognize that a more independent and militarily capable Armenia is a cornerstone of regional security in the South Caucasus. The West can counterbalance Russian influence and mitigate Azerbaijani threats by increasing military support and granting Armenia access to critical technologies. This will not only support Armenia’s sovereignty but also contribute to a stable and prosperous region.”
• “In the current geopolitical landscape, Russia and Azerbaijan strongly oppose Armenia’s defense choices. Azerbaijan has actively opposed France and India, including supporting separatist movements in French Overseas Territories and strengthening ties with Pakistan. Baku has also threatened Armenia, accusing it of militarization. It is pushing for the creation of the so-called Zangezur corridor. As Article 9 of the November 2020 statement is the last option for Russia to have a presence in communication, Yerevan is facing double pressure from Moscow and Baku.”
• “Increased Western involvement in Armenia’s military reforms and procurement is essential to stabilizing the South Caucasus region and preventing Moscow from regaining control. Armenia’s active rearmament could eventually lead to at least a partial balance of power with Baku, limiting Azerbaijan’s ability to apply unilateral military pressure. This shift lays the groundwork for long-term peace.”
• “After restoring its military capacity, Armenia can independently control the communications running through its territory. The United States and its Western allies should support Yerevan more, particularly in granting access to dual-use and military technology and providing training opportunities beyond peacekeeping operations.”

Footnotes

1. In his most recent comments on this subject, Putin made the following remark at the Valdai Club’s annual conference on Nov. 7: “If [Ukraine’s] neutrality is not achieved, it is difficult to imagine any kind of good neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine.”
2. In his Nov. 7 remarks at the Valdai Club conference, Putin mentioned “USA” and “United States” at least 50 times, while mentioning “China” and “PRC” 47 times,
3. This was not the first time Putin has referred to China as an ally in public this fall. Putin declared that “The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are allies [soyuzniki] in every sense of the word” during his visit to a school in Russia’s remote Tuva region. “We must do everything to maintain its level and status both within the country and with … our main partners and allies, including such a large and promising country … as the People’s Republic of China,” he said during his Sept. 2 stopover in Tuva on his way to Mongolia. As recently as last year, Putin denied plans to establish “some kind of a military-political alliance” with China, as did some of his top aides on earlier occasions (though some of them described the bilateral relations as being superior to that of allies). Moreover, Putin and Xi Jinping signed off on a declaration in March 2023 that said their countries are not in a “military-political alliance” [soyuz] insisting that the bilateral relations are superior to “such a form of interstate interaction.”
4. The closest, perhaps, Russia’s 2014 and 2020 documents come to this condition is their assertion that Russia can initiate use of nuclear weapons when the very existence of the Russian state is threatened.
5. The U.S. declaratory policy, which is formulated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, is vaguer than these scenarios. “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies and partners. The U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners,” according to NPR-2022.
6. With new media guidelines, the Kremlin seeks to make Putin’s Valdai Club speech into the foundation of a Russia-defended “new world order,” Meduza’s Andrei Pertsev wrote in reference to Putin’s speech at the Valai Club conference. The Putin administration’s coverage guidelines frame his Valdai Forum speech as “the event of the year in the realm of ideas and meaning” and depict the president himself as “a major global leader” spearheading the “doctrine of a new world order,” according to guidelines issued by the Kremlin to state media and obtained by Pertsev.
7. For the debate organizers’ summary of the debate, see: “Bremmer vs. Karaganov: Global Order and Ukraine Conflict Take Center Stage at Horizons Debate,” Horizons, CIRSD, November 2024.
8. For the text of Putin’s address to this conference, click here. (In Russian.)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Anton Shtuka.