6 Ideas to Explore

1. “There is talk behind closed doors” in Western capitals of a deal in which “Moscow retains de facto control over… one-fifth of Ukraine it has occupied—though Russia’s sovereignty is not recognized—while the rest of the country is allowed to join NATO or given equivalent security guarantees,” according to FT editors. “Under that umbrella, it could rebuild and integrate with the EU, akin to West Germany in the Cold War,” they write. Some of these discussions are echoed in Kyiv, according to Der Spiegel. “For the first time since the Russian invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian capital is seriously discussing scenarios in which the country foregoes the complete reconquest of its occupied territories, almost 20% of Ukrainian territory, for the time being,” this German outlet reports. According to Robert Kagan of Brookings, however, a stable peaceful resolution of the conflict is unlikely because Putin will assume that the West will keep arming Ukraine even if a deal is reached. “Unless something dramatic changes, this is a war that, like most wars, will be won or lost on the battlefield… Americans need to decide soon whether they are prepared to let Ukraine lose,” Kagan writes in WP.
2. Requests for more weapons and security guarantees by the West, which Volodymyr Zelenskyy is to refer to when briefing the Rada leadership on his victory plan on Oct. 16, have so far received a tepid response by the Biden administration, according to WSJ. In their comments on the plan, U.S. officials have pointed out that it repackages some of Ukraine’s earlier requests for arms and noted that members of NATO are divided about whether to offer Ukraine a formal invitation to join, WSJ reported. Ukrainians are increasingly exhausted by the war, and polls show an incremental increase in the number of Ukrainians prepared for negotiations, according to this U.S. newspaper.
3. The fall of Pokrovsk in Ukraine’s Donetsk region would leave the Ukrainian military without a key logistics hub for operations in eastern Ukraine, and it could serve as Russia’s gateway to conquering the rest of that region, according to Keith Johnson of FP. Moreover, “Pokrovsk’s fall could have an even more insidious impact on Ukraine’s ability to keep fighting: The city is the source of most of the coal used for the country’s steel and iron industry” which is the second-largest sector of the Ukrainian economy, according to Johnson. Without Pokrovsk’s mine, “the country’s remaining steel industry will be crippled,” according to The Economist.
4. “Russian forces proved more flexible and effective in the conduct of defensive operations in 2023 through a combination of maneuver and positional defense,” according to Michael Kofman of CEIP. Despite these adaptations, however, the Russian army’s assaults on Ukraine’s prepared defenses led to grinding battles. “The net effect was incremental Russian gains at high cost, as Russian forces proved unable to attain operationally significant breakthroughs when possessing quantitative advantages in manpower, materiel and munition,” according to Kofman. However, “[w]hat was true in 2023 may not hold for 2024, and beyond,” this leading expert on the Russian military finds in his CEIP piece, “Assessing Russian Military Adaptation in 2023.” Looking beyond 2023, Kofman finds Ukraine’s fall 2024 incursion into Russia’s Kursk region to be a success on the tactical level, but not “that successful” on the operational level “because if the primary goal was to shift significant Russian forces from their advances” in eastern Ukraine, “this did not take place,” Kofman told NYMag.
5. Since the first Western restrictions on Russian oil exports were introduced in 2022, Moscow has assembled a fleet of more than 400 tankers that are currently moving some 4 million barrels of oil a day beyond the reach of sanctions, according to FT’s investigation. Presently nearly 70% of the Kremlin’s oil is being transported on these shadow tankers, according to a separate investigation conducted by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute and reported by NYT. Russia has invested about $10 billion in developing its fleet of such shadow tankers. Commenting on the FT investigation, Harvard professor and RM principal investigator Graham Allison wrote on his X account: “For those who still imagine that Western sanctions are strangling Russia’s economy, the FT’s Big Read… masterfully illuminates how Russia is out-playing the US at the cat and mouse game of economic sanctions.”*
6. Without dedicated reintegration programs in Western countries for fighters returning from Ukraine, the risk of radicalization and violence appears “rather high,” according to Jean-François Ratelle of the University of Ottawa in his PONARS commentary. Western governments may think that most such fighters will not pose a security threat, but that view seems “short-sighted… because it… puts the focus on ideology rather than the broader context of the war and postwar experience,” Ratelle warns.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"How a Second Nuclear Disaster Was Avoided at Chernobyl in 2022," The Economist, 10.11.24.

• “In a new book Serhii Plokhy, a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard, offers a gripping, thriller-like account of [the 35-day Russian occupation of the Chernobyl plant].”
• “Russian forces continued to arrive at Chernobyl after February 24^th [2022]. Their morale was low, having expected a speedy victory against Ukraine. Many had little understanding or respect for the rules governing the plant. … Soldiers were frequently drunk and constantly looted the premises: they started with notebooks and phones, but moved on to computers, vehicles and radiation dosimeters.”
• “A cool-headed foreman told the Russians that if they thought they were in control of the plant, they were wrong. He pointed out the perils of being at the nuclear station and insisted that they obey Ukrainian safety regulations. The occupiers “now felt trapped, hostages in the place they had allegedly conquered.”
• “But Ukraine’s nuclear nightmare is far from over. After a fierce battle, on March 4th 2022 the Russians succeeded in taking control of Zaporizhia [NPP].”
• “Mr. Plokhy has come to believe that the risks of nuclear power outweigh the benefits. In particular, he argues that the world and its nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, are complacent about the dangers posed by acts of war against nuclear sites; he says that new legal and institutional safeguards are urgently needed. After reading this book, few will disagree.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“Frightening Thought: Russia Sharing Military Technology with North Korea,” Malcom Davis, NI, 10.12.24. 

• “The critical issue is not necessarily what North Korea can do for Russia but what Russia can do for North Korea, particularly in terms of sharing military and space-related technologies. Russia has little to lose and much to gain by removing any constraints on the sharing of advanced military capabilities with North Korea, given that it is now a global pariah after its renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022.”
• “Of particular concern would be the prospect that Moscow could share technical information and expertise on enhancing North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and its missile delivery systems.”
  • “Firstly, North Korea is very focused on building up a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, with which it could employ coercively against South Korea and Japan.”
  • “Secondly, Russia could choose to provide more advanced designs for warheads and provide North Korea with more sophisticated delivery systems that lead towards a second-strike capability based around submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).”
• “North Korea may also be seeking Russian assistance with space technology. North Korea’s efforts to develop a viable space launch capability have had numerous setbacks and failures, and there is already evidence that it has received some assistance in terms of rocket engine technologies.”
  • “Russia is developing a nuclear-weapons-based anti-satellite (ASAT) capability that, if deployed, would tear up the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and see a nuclear "sword of Damocles" in orbit. Consider the possibility that Pyongyang could work together with Moscow on such a capability for coercion and intimidation in a crisis.”
• “The critical issue is not necessarily what North Korea can do for Russia but what Russia can do for North Korea, particularly in terms of sharing military and space-related technologies.”

For more commentary on this subject, see: 

• “How Important is the New Russia-North Korea Treaty?” Stephen Costello, NI, 10.15.24. 

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Autocrats United: How Russia and Iran Defy the U.S.-Led Global Order,” Karim Sadjadpour and Nicole Grajewski, CEIP, 10.10.24. 

• “Despite their competitive national interests and lingering mistrust, the modern-day bond between Moscow and Tehran will not be broken easily. Notwithstanding America’s military and economic superiority, both countries believe the U.S.-led world order is vulnerable and ripe to be challenged. They also perceive America as afflicted with grave political polarization, which they’ve sought to accentuate.”
• “So long as Khamenei and Putin remain in power and continue to view the U.S.-led world order as both threatening and vulnerable, their partnership will likely endure. This partnership of defiance and mutual survival poses a significant challenge to global stability and Western influence.”
• “The relationship was not born through a deliberate strategy or a pure alignment of interests, but as a defensive mechanism against what both regimes perceived as existential threats to their survival. Unlike alliances rooted in shared values and mutual interests, the partnership between theocratic Iran and anti-Islamist Russia is defined by their contrasting values and often conflicting national interests. For the foreseeable future their relationship is held together by the strongest bond of all: a shared enemy.”

“Putin in Ashgabat: First meeting with the new Iranian leader,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Weekly Digest No. 35 (49) 2024, 10.13.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “On 11 October, President Putin participated in the international forum “Interconnection of Times and Civilizations – the Basis of  Peace and Development” in Ashgabat, the capital of  Turkmenistan.... The key highlight of the trip was Putin's first meeting with newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was also there at the forum.”
• “Putin's attendance at the forum was announced only on 7 October, with no prior information available. His meeting with Pezeshkian had originally been scheduled for the BRICS summit in Kazan on 22-24 October, where both sides  are expected to sign a bilateral strategic partnership agreement.”
• “Over the past two and a half years, cooperation between Russia and Iran has been primarily military. At the same time, the Kremlin is still reluctant to share military, space and especially nuclear technology with Iran. Deliveries of Su-35 aircraft have been delayed, confusing the Iranian side, as the Kremlin fears these weapons could  potentially be used against Israel.”
• “Notably, trade volume between Russia and Iran fell (Rus) by nearly 17 percent last year, underscoring the mistrust Russian businesses have toward their Iranian partners.”
• “Ruslan Suleymanov, a prominent Middle East expert, told R.Politik that Pezeshkian, who represents Iran's reformist camp, is unlikely to make significant changes to Iranian foreign policy, even if he wishes to... This continuity suits the Kremlin’s interests well.”

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Ukraine’s Waiting Game,” Keith Gessen, The New Yorker, 10.12.24.

• “When I went to Ukraine, in late March of 2022, Kyiv was under siege…The war was everywhere. On a recent trip to Kyiv, I found that the city had gone back to something like its former existence… The war was grinding on, brutally, in the east, but, if it weren’t for the billboards urging people to sign up for the Ukrainian Army, the striking lack of men of draft age on the street, and the very occasional air-raid siren (which everyone ignored), you would hardly have been able to tell.”
• “Spend a little more time in Kyiv and you start noticing the memorials. On Maidan, the central square downtown—formerly the scene of protests to overthrow corrupt regimes—thousands of small Ukrainian flags have been planted in memory of soldiers who’ve fallen in the fight against the Russian invasion… In the eight years of war before the full-scale invasion, about four thousand Ukrainian soldiers lost their lives; in the two and a half years since, the number of war dead is thought to be closer to eighty thousand.”
• “The National Museum of the History of Ukraine, nearby, closed on the morning of the invasion. Anton Bohdalov, [is] head of the museum’s department on the history of independent Ukraine… For Bohdalov, a former schoolteacher, creating a record of the war is important for future generations, but also for people in the present: foreign delegations who come to the city and Ukrainians from parts of the country that have not been as affected by the war… Bohdalov said he had himself become inured to the constant air-raid alerts. “It’s hard to explain to people from other places,” he said, but war had simply become part of everyday life.”
• “Ukraine is facing a severe demographic crisis. There are the soldiers killed in battle, and the civilian victims of war. There are the six million people who have left the country—for Europe, mostly, but also for Russia—and the three million or more who are living under Russian occupation, with unclear prospects for returning to Ukraine.”
• “Finally, there are the children who have not been born—in some cases because family members were killed or separated (most of the people who’ve fled to Europe are women and children), and in others because, understandably, this does not seem like a great time to have a kid. Until recently, men under twenty-seven were exempt from the draft, in part because the government wanted them to have children.”
• “My husband has done his part,” a woman named Olga, who is also thirty-six, said… It was a just war, and she was proud of her husband, a computer programmer, for fighting in it. She gestured to the couples strolling along Maidan on a sunny Saturday afternoon… “I want to be like them,” Olga said. “I want their men to replace our men.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Assessing Russian Military Adaptation in 2023,” Michael Kofman, CEIP, 10.08.24. 

• “Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian military had made choices and trade-offs in its force design that positioned it poorly for the type of war it ended up fighting. These choices were compounded by the unworkable concept of operations being executed during the invasion and the political assumptions that drove it. For most of 2022, the Russian military struggled with the consequences of these decisions, its own shortcomings, and a structural manpower deficit. Initial adaptations yielded poor results in the prevailing operating environment. But, by late 2022, the Russian political leadership committed to a prolonged conventional war. The military began to demonstrate a capacity for learning and adaptation, enabled by Russia’s partial mobilization of 300,000 personnel, and increased defense-industrial production.”
• “During the second year of the war, Russian military leaders revised prior decisions on force structure, experimented with small unit tactics, adopted new technologies, and developed specialized assault detachments. Initially, mobilization stabilized the front lines and closed manpower gaps within the Russian armed forces, but it did not restore offensive potential to the force, which continued to demonstrate tactical rigidity and doctrinal inflexibility. Yet, the monthslong battle for Bakhmut, fought primarily by the Wagner Group, led to the systematic adoption of assault groupings, and expendable convict-staffed formations across the Russian military. This eventually resulted in new types of assault tactics, and units, with those practices expanding across the force.”
• “Russian forces proved more flexible and effective in the conduct of defensive operations in 2023 through a combination of maneuver and positional defense to halt Ukraine’s offensive. Russian units expanded significantly, integrated new types of formations, and mounted a doctrinally modified defense with successful use of support elements. Despite this, the Russian military remained committed to the concept of an active defense, defending forward and aggressively counterattacking in a manner that proved costly to the force. Ukraine’s offensive failed, but Ukrainian units were able to inflict significant losses to defending Russian forces over the course of four months.”
• “In the Russian military combined arms integration improved at the lower unit level, but could not enable maneuver by larger formations. Russian forces also adapted relatively quickly in employing uncrewed aerial systems and deploying new types of electronic warfare systems on the battlefield. By late 2023, they were increasingly capable of dynamic targeting at the tactical level, with better integration of reconnaissance, fires, and electronic warfare. Despite this evolution, the Russian military struggled to attain a decisive advantage in offensive actions. Fundamental problems in force quality persisted, with offensives largely relegated to small scale unit action, or costly mechanized assaults that failed to achieve breakthroughs. Despite tactical adaptations, assaults on prepared defenses led to grinding battles. The net effect was incremental Russian gains at high cost, as Russian forces proved unable to attain operationally significant breakthroughs when possessing quantitative advantages in manpower, materiel, and munitions.”
• “The Russian military continues to undergo periods of degradation and reconstitution. Operations provide new information from the battlefield for both sides. A given view of Russian military performance is not necessarily wrong, but needs to be mindful of context, and the period of war it is based on. What was true in 2023 may not hold for 2024, and beyond. Therefore, the conclusions here should be taken with the appropriate caveats, rather than as an attempt at a definitive account or an appeal to sole authority on this subject.”

“Ukraine War: Why Russia is in More Trouble Than It Looks,” Michael Kofman interviewed by Benjamin Hart, NYMag, 10.08.24.

• “My own view is that Russia has enjoyed a materiel advantage and the overall initiative for the past year. That advantage hasn’t proven decisive, at least not sufficiently enough to enable operational-size breakthroughs. But Russian forces have been steadily pressing the Ukrainian military in Donetsk and in other parts of the front—for example, by Kupiansk. And despite the costs, as you mentioned, both to materiel and personnel, they’ve been making fairly steady incremental gains.”
• “[Re: Pokrovsk] I think it will become the site of one of the next major battles... I think one of the main outstanding questions is to what extent can the Ukrainian military stabilize the front and exhaust the Russian offensive over the course of this fall and winter.”
• “[When asked “How important was that delay in terms of explaining Ukraine’s position now?”] I would say it was a very significant factor, but not the only one. I want to draw your attention to ... interrelated factors that more or less are causal of how we ended up to where we are today.”
  • “The first is of course a delay in the package from September of 2023 to the middle of spring of this year.”
  • “That said, the Ukrainian leadership dithered on mobilization and took an exceedingly long time to begin addressing the issues of manpower and a lack of fortifications at the front from fall of last year to approximately this spring.”
• “Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk has, from my point of view, increased the cone of uncertainty as we look out on the prospects over the course of this winter and next spring.”
• “From my point of view, the Kursk operation was a bold gamble. It tactically was a success and not only did it improve morale, but, at least for a period of time, it changed the conversation... From a more operational perspective, I don’t think Kursk was that successful, because if the primary goal was to shift significant Russian forces from their advances in and around Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, this did not take place.”
• “Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025.”
  • “First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.”
  • “It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up.”
• “A cease-fire agreement with Russia is unlikely to be worth the paper it’s written on. And as long as Vladimir Putin’s in power, he’s likely to continue to seek the Ukraine’s destruction. So one thing we should consider is that there’s a fair chance that how this war ends, or more accurately pauses, is likely to lead to a third war.”
• “It’s important to not just seek a cease-fire or an agreement for agreement’s sake, because it may not resolve either Ukraine’s concerns or the West’s concerns more broadly when looking at the future of European security. That said, since 2023 and the failure of Ukraine’s summer offensive, I think there’s been a very observable drift in both American and western strategy writ large in this war, and a lack of good answers on how to achieve war termination on favorable terms for Ukraine, or to put more simply, how they even effectively compel Russia to arrive at the negotiating table.”
• “[On Putin’s proposals to amend language on use of nuclear weapons in Russian strategic documents:] The declaratory policy is not a defense-planning document, nor is it something that Putin will remotely care about if it ever comes to making such decisions. In short, this is primarily about signaling and posturing more than anything else.”

“Ukraine Faces a Double Threat if Russia Takes Pokrovsk,” Keith Johnson, FP, 10.11.24. 

• “Pokrovsk, a once-vibrant city of 80,000 people, is the object of a Russian encircling move that began in July and is creeping within miles of the city as every day passes. The city has served as a key logistics and transportation hub for Ukrainian military operations in eastern Ukraine and is the gateway to conquering the rest of Donetsk Oblast—and potentially on to even bigger prizes such as Dnipro, Ukraine’s fourth-largest city before the war.”
• “But Pokrovsk’s fall could have an even more insidious impact on Ukraine’s ability to keep fighting: The city is the source of most of the coal used for the country’s steel and iron industry, once the backbone of the Ukrainian economy and still its second-largest sector, though production has fallen to less than one-third of its pre-war levels. That metallurgical coal is needed to produce pig iron, which is what feeds the majority of Ukraine’s old steel furnaces and a significant chunk of its industrial exports. A healthy steel industry also pays a big share of Ukraine’s tax take, helping fund an economy that operates hand-to-mouth these days.”
  • “Without steel plants, the Ukrainian economy will die. It is a very, very important part of the economy,” said Stanislav Zinchenko, chief executive of GMK Center, a Ukraine-based industrial consultancy.”
• “The city’s loss “would be operationally significant, but much depends on the price that the Ukrainian military exacts” from Russian forces in the upcoming battle, said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The most important consideration is that it opens up a path for Russian forces to push further north and west.”
• “If the city does fall, and Russian forces retain momentum, it could serve as a springboard for further Russian advances, Kofman said, because it would then be used by Russian forces and it would be harder to establish a new line of defense to protect the remaining Ukrainian industrial base further west. “Once Pokrovsk is lost, until Pavlohrad, there are fewer suitable areas to anchor a line of defense,” he said.”
• “If Russian forces do get to the west of Pokrovsk, there will be another concern beyond the open road to Dnipro: the risk to Ukraine’s main source of metallurgical coal, which is mined nearby, even during wartime.”

“Russia continues to advance in eastern Ukraine. But it is encountering growing problems, The Economist, 10.10.24.

• “Now that the excitement of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk two months ago has faded, the prevailing narrative has reasserted its grip. Ukrainian forces are retreating in the face of steady, if costly, Russian advances across the front line in the Donbas, thanks to Russia’s vast superiority in troop numbers and firepower.”
• “The Ukrainian decision last week to pull its forces out of Vuhledar, a staunchly defended bastion that lies on the hinge of the eastern and southern fronts, has added to the gloom about the country’s prospects. The retreat was ordered to prevent their encirclement by the Russians. President Volodymyr Zelensky praised the decision, saying that protecting the lives of the soldiers who had given “heroic service” was “more important than any buildings”. Not that there were many buildings left. Vuhledar, like other towns Russia has taken, is a sprawling, shattered ruin.”
• “A similar situation appears to be developing to the north in Toretsk, a front-line city that Russian forces have been advancing towards, village by village, since August, pulverising everything in their path with glide bombs. On October 8th, a spokeswoman for the Ukrainian forces in the city reported that “The fighting is taking place in Toretsk itself, the situation is unstable, literally every entrance is being fought for.” Though Vuhledar was not of great strategic significance, Toretsk, which is on a hilltop, could be used to obstruct Ukrainian supply routes behind the lines.”
• “On the other hand Russia has not made much progress in taking Chasiv Yar, some 40km to the north of Toretsk, and appears to be stuck by the canal on the eastern side of the city. It is also making heavy weather of its bid to take control of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub that sits on a triangle of road and rail links and which is the main focus of its offensive efforts. In August there was much talk of the imminent fall of Pokrovsk. But the pace of the Russian advance has noticeably slowed, with few territorial gains in the past three weeks.”
• “Despite fears expressed in some quarters of a Ukrainian collapse, there is no sign of one. Ukraine’s approach is to concede some ground while inflicting maximum casualties and equipment losses on Russia and preserving its own forces to fight from newly fortified lines. It is also questionable how much longer Russia can continue to lose more than a thousand men a day, despite huge signing-on bonuses for new recruits.”
• “There are also signs that Russia’s advantage in artillery has been declining, even as it increasingly depends on unreliable North Korean munitions. Earlier this year Russia was firing ten times as many shells as the Ukrainians. But according to Ukrainian sources, the gap has now closed to 2.5:1.”
• “For all the current despondency about Ukraine’s prospects, Russia is far from achieving its main aim: of gaining control over Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which make up the Donbas region, by the end of this year. And despite setting the goal of driving Ukrainian forces from Kursk by the start of this month, it now looks as if that will take much longer and require substantially greater forces than Moscow has so far been able to commit.”
• “The battle where Russia is unambiguously succeeding, says Nico Lange, a former chief of staff in Germany’s ministry of defence, is in the “information space.” 

“Putin doesn’t have enough troops to defeat Ukraine and defend Russia,” Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council, 10.10.24. 

• “Moscow is experiencing mounting manpower issues.”
  • “In recent months, the Russian military has reportedly been forced to dramatically increase the bounties on offer to new recruits. According to investigative Russian news outlet Vyorstka, those who do agree to sign up to fight in Ukraine are now often in very poor health, with the average age of volunteers rising from forty at the start of the invasion to around fifty.”
  • “Other signs that Putin is being forced to scrape the bottom of the barrel to replenish the depleted ranks of his army include recent reports that sailors from Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, have been withdrawn from naval service and deployed to Ukraine as infantry.”
  • “Russia is also in the process of passing new legislation that will allow defendants to sign military contracts and avoid prosecution. Tens of thousands of Russian prisoners have already been released from jail to fight in Ukraine.”
  • “Meanwhile, as Ukrainian troops crossed the border into the Kursk region in early August, they found that most of the Russian defenses in the border zone were manned by young conscript troops who were soon surrendering in large numbers.”
    • “This does not mean that the Russian military is on the brink of collapse, of course. On the contrary, Putin has recently unveiled ambitious plans to further expand the size of his army to one and a half million soldiers, a move that would make it the second largest in the world after China. He can also announce a further round of mobilization if necessary, but this could potentially fuel domestic unrest and convince thousands of young Russians to flee the country.”
• “Crucially, the Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk region has ... demonstrated that Putin’s overextended army is far more vulnerable than the Kremlin would like us to believe.”

“Foreign Fighters in Ukraine Pose Growing, Unaddressed Threat to Western Security,” Jean-François Ratelle, PONARS, 10.07.24. 

• “Although the Ukrainian government claims to have recruited over 20,000 foreign volunteers, current independent estimates suggest that only a few thousand may have actually heeded Zelensky’s call.”
  • “Volunteers from across the post-Soviet region—in particular, Chechnya, Belarus, and Georgia—comprise most of the foreigners currently fighting for Ukraine, with many joining preexisting militias (formed in 2014-2015 and later integrated into Ukraine’s army). Their long-standing ties with the Ukrainian military, combined with their strong anti-Russian stance, have made them a lethal force and threat to Russia.”
  • “Westerners with military experience have joined the Ukrainian International Legion and the Georgian National Legion, as well as national-based groups like the French-Canadian Norman Brigade. Motivated primarily by geopolitical and humanitarian concerns, they have demonstrated a generally less intense ideological commitment than their non-Western counterparts.”
• “Despite the anti-Kremlin stance and positive view of the West shared by both Western and non-Western fighters, their experiences in Ukraine, the fluid operational context, and the situation in their home countries make them susceptible to radicalization and violence in different ways post-war. Understanding the unique challenges faced by each group is crucial for developing strategies to mitigate the long-term security risks for Western nations.”
  • “For Western fighters, who are generally free to return home without facing prosecution—unless they are implicated in war crimes or crimes against humanity—reintegration represents a complex and challenging process. Indeed, this is a blind spot in the Ukraine war and the social policies of Western governments. ... Without dedicated reintegration programs in Western countries for fighters returning from Ukraine, the risk of radicalization and violence appears rather high.”
  • “In the case of non-Western fighters, such as Belarusian and Russian citizens, individuals who have fought for Ukraine face prosecution in their home country and the inability to renew their travel documents—in other words, they have nowhere to go after the war. ....The inability to return home, combined with the lack of valid travel documents, may push fighters to seek asylum in Western countries.”
• “The prevailing Western approach suggests that Western governments believe that most foreign fighters will not pose a security threat after the war. This approach seems short-sighted, however, because it again puts the focus on ideology rather than the broader context of the war and the postwar experience. From both a counterterrorism and international crime perspective, the Western contingent in Ukraine represents an intelligence blind spot. Moreover, the lack of reintegration programs, together with the ambiguous legal status of many foreign volunteers, creates a conducive environment for terrorist organizations to recruit this generation of skilled fighters.”

“Four Ways Ukraine's Drone Innovations Are Changing Warfare; Aerial craft can intercept Russian spy drones, plant mines and spew molten metal,” Isabel Coles, WSJ, 10.12.24.

1. “Drone-on-drone warfare: Ukraine uses drones to combat Russian reconnaissance drones, reducing the effectiveness of Russia's surveillance and artillery.”
2. “'Dragon's Breath': A drone that deploys thermite to burn through enemy cover, exposing Russian troops hiding in tree lines.”
3. “Weaponized drones: Drones like the "Queen of Hornets" are equipped with grenade launchers and are being tested with rifles, allowing for attacks while avoiding jammers and reducing the need for close combat by infantry.”
4. “Mother ship drones: Larger drones, like the Vampire, carry smaller drones or heavy loads, expanding capabilities such as resupplying troops and laying mines behind enemy lines.”

For more reporting on issues relevant to this subject, see: 

• “Inside Kursk, Ukrainians Hope for a Path to Victory,” Oz Katerji, FP, 10.08.24.
• “With Vuhledar lost and another Ukrainian stronghold in danger, Russia could take southern Donbas by year’s end,” Meduza, 10.09.24.
• “The Russian Army Faces an Uncertain Everything,” Nick Reynolds, NI, 10.14.24.
• "The use of EDTs in Ukraine could offer lessons for military strategies in South Asia," Rizwana Abbasi, ELN, 10.11.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Ukraine Faces Bleak Winter as Russia Ramps Up Assaults, U.S. Support Trickles In; President Zelensky pleads for more arms and other assistance to help end the war on favorable terms, but Biden administration is skeptical,” James Marson, WSJ, 10.14.24. 

• “The war in Ukraine is barreling toward the end of its third year, with Russia pursuing relentless offensives despite heavy losses and Western leaders groping for a strategy to end the conflict. With Western weapons deliveries limited and slow, Ukraine is facing a bleak winter. Its outnumbered and outgunned military is slowly but steadily losing ground on the main eastern front, trying to exact a heavy toll on Russia while minimizing its own losses. Russian missile-and-drone attacks targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure are overwhelming the country's air defenses, forcing rolling blackouts across the country that could worsen in winter.”
• “On visits to European capitals and the U.S. in recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested more weapons and security guarantees as part of what he has dubbed a "victory plan" aimed at ending the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. The Biden administration, which has drip-fed weapons to Ukraine for fear of provoking Russia, has given a tepid response. U.S. officials have said that Zelensky's plan repackages some earlier requests, and noted that members of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization are divided about whether to offer Ukraine a formal invitation to join.”
  • "We're going to have to sit down with the Ukrainians and kind of work through what can you actually do, versus what do you have on this list," Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Wednesday.”
  • “Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said the plan was a detailed strategy encompassing military, economic, political and diplomatic steps necessary to compel Russia to end its war. Among them is a request for more long-range missiles, known as ATACMS and Storm Shadow, and permission to fire them at military targets deep inside Russia. Podolyak said that could change Putin's calculus by increasing domestic pressure, as well as weakening Russia's front-line forces. The U.S. has so far declined to grant permission, fearing Russia would view it as a major escalation.”
• “Ukrainian front-line units are struggling with a lack of basic equipment, including armored vehicles and artillery, and shortages of troops. Ukraine's government isn't mobilizing anyone under age 25 to prevent demographic collapse, and more social turmoil, while military draft officers have been checking papers and handing summonses on the street, including outside a recent concert in Kyiv by one of Ukraine's most popular bands.”
• “On the home front, Ukrainians are increasingly exhausted by the war, and polls show an incremental increase in the number prepared for negotiations. But that doesn't mean they are ready for concessions. Fewer than one in 10 would be prepared to surrender any territory to Moscow to end the war, according to an August survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a Kyiv-based think tank.”
• “Russian forces endured the deadliest month of the war in September, according to U.S. analysts. Western intelligence assessments put losses at 1,200 dead and injured a day. Military advances are achieved mainly through costly ground assaults by infantry units that are packed with convicts drawn from jails by the offer of a pardon and a salary of the equivalent of more than $2,000 a month.”
• “John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now a professor of warfighting at the U.S. Army War College, said that, given Trump's pledge to resolve the conflict, "Putin's hope for a relatively easy victory hinges on a Trump win." Until then, he said, "Russia continues to be willing to absorb casualties that make no operational or strategic sense."

“Finland warns of increasing Ukraine fatigue among distracted west,” Henry Foy, FT, 10.15.24. 

• “Western states are tiring in their support for Ukraine and increasingly hoping for some form of conflict resolution, Finland’s foreign minister has warned, as she urged her colleagues in western states to redouble their efforts to help Kyiv. “It’s real,” Elina Valtonen said of western fatigue. “And increasingly so.”
• “She said the ongoing conflict in the Middle East had diverted both attention and resources, and for example dominated discussions at the recent UN General Assembly last month. “These two conflicts are, of course, very much linked, but for us Europeans it would be important to realize that if we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, then essentially we end the credibility of our deterrence,” she said.”
• “There is support for Ukraine, but what is sufficient? That is the question,” she said. “Quite many [countries] would like to think, since especially with the war waiting in the Middle East, it would be great if we found an answer to this war that Russia is waging.” Valtonen said western countries also needed to tighten up sanctions designed to hurt Russia’s economy, particularly Moscow’s growing “shadow fleet” of uninsured oil tankers used to circumvent restrictions on lucrative crude oil sales.”

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Secondary sanctions against Russia's partners abroad: from definition to facts,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club, 10.14.24.^ Clues from Russian Views.

• “Secondary sanctions have become one of the key political risks for foreign partners of Russian business. The risk of secondary sanctions often forces companies from non-Western countries to avoid cooperation with Russian partners. At the same time, the very concept of secondary sanctions seems vague. It has acquired not only and not even so much a legal or political character, as a psychological one.”
• “It is interesting that companies from post-Soviet countries relatively rarely fall under secondary sanctions. This may be due to both the lack of production facilities of interest to Russia and the specifics of the financial infrastructure – there are no financial hubs similar to the UAE in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, a significant number of companies that have fallen under secondary sanctions are based in unfriendly countries – Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Cyprus and others. This pattern is due to the fact that these companies are used as intermediaries for deliveries to Russia. In general, secondary sanctions are usually imposed against small companies, although not all of them are one-day firms.”

“Europe Expands Its Sanctions Reach,” Maria Shagina, FP, 10.07.24.

• “Until recently, Washington was the primary user of secondary sanctions. However, … European allies that previously rejected the use of extraterritorial sanctions have suddenly discovered their merits.”
• “In response to Moscow’s persistent evasion of sanctions imposed since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the European Union and Britain have quietly strengthened their regulations, introducing measures with extraterritorial effects. While these measures lack the teeth of true secondary sanctions, a gradual European shift toward Washington’s more expansive approach to sanctions is becoming evident.”
• “Russia’s successful circumvention of Western sanctions—especially export restrictions intended to keep military and dual-use technology out of Russian hands—has forced Europe to reassess its approach to sanctions enforcement. Since many critical items procured by Russia are of Western origin, European regulators are now focusing on the main weak spot in EU export controls: Western companies’ subsidiaries in third countries, which were left free to trade with Russia through middlemen, since sanctions only affected their parent companies at home.”
• “In response, the EU introduced a “no-Russia” clause, requiring EU companies to prohibit the reexport of critical goods to Russia when dealing with third-party business partners. Its most recent sanctions package—the 14th since the start of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—requires non-EU subsidiaries that are owned or controlled by EU companies to make “best efforts” to ensure compliance with EU sanctions.”
• “The EU is also considering targeting financial institutions that facilitate the diversion of battlefield items to Russia. The aim of targeting foreign banks—as opposed to foreign subsidiaries—is to curb flows from Southeast Asia, where countries are producers and not just transit points.”
• “In the never-ending cat-and-mouse game of sanctions evasion, it is an arduous task for regulators to stay one step ahead. Ever so gradually, Britain and the EU seem to be coming to the conclusion that forcing companies to be liable for the end use of their goods is a better way to play the game.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Ukraine’s shifting war aims. Kyiv is not being given the support it needs to regain the upper hand over Russia,” Editorial Board, FT, 10.07.24.

• “Ukraine is going into its third winter of war with the mood darker than ever. In the east, its troops are losing ground to the grinding advance of their Russian adversaries — albeit at vast cost to Moscow’s forces. With half its power generation shattered, Ukrainians face spending hours a day without light or heat in the coldest months. In Washington and some western capitals, meanwhile — and in the corridors of Kyiv — the mood is shifting: from a determination that the war can end only with Russia’s army driven from Ukraine, to the reluctant recognition that a negotiated settlement that leaves the bulk of the country intact may be the best hope. Yet Kyiv is not being given the support it needs even to achieve that scaled-back goal.”
• “Grappling simultaneously with an escalating Middle East war, even some western capitals that previously insisted on the need to defeat Russia’s Vladimir Putin militarily are recalibrating their goals. Some Kyiv officials, too, fret in private that they lack the personnel, firepower and western support to recover all territory seized by Russia. There is talk behind closed doors of a deal in which Moscow retains de facto control over the roughly one-fifth of Ukraine it has occupied — though Russia’s sovereignty is not recognized — while the rest of the country is allowed to join NATO or given equivalent security guarantees. Under that umbrella, it could rebuild and integrate with the EU, akin to West Germany in the cold war. This scenario relies, however, on ambitious assumptions.”
  • “One is that the US and its allies must be prepared to offer NATO membership or the necessary guarantees, when they have so far been reluctant to grant Kyiv a binding path into the alliance. It would require a huge and costly deployment of forces by the US and its partners — and leave them on a cold war-style tripwire.”
  • “A second assumption is that Russia’s president can be induced to negotiate and accept such a scenario.”
• “Whether the goal is outright victory or bringing Russia to the table, western allies need to strengthen Ukraine’s hand.”
• “We cannot yet know how the war will end. But it is within the west’s power — and interest — to help Ukraine regain the upper hand over its foe.”

“Ukraine before its third winter of war; A country is bleeding out,” Ann-Dorit Boy, Fedir Petrov and Alexander Sarovic, Der Spiegel, 10.13.24. Translated from German with use of machine translation. 

• “Ukraine is entering its third winter of war, and it could be the hardest. The government in Kyiv is considering bitter compromises with Russia for the first time.”
• “The optimism inspired in many in the country by the Ukrainian advance into Russian territory near Kursk in August has evaporated, although the Ukrainians continue to occupy parts of the region. The country, it seems, has fallen back into the gloomy state of mind of the war of attrition with the slow, apparently unstoppable advance of the Russians.”
• “Western supporters will not abandon Ukraine any time soon. But there is also little to suggest that the partners will make Kyiv strong enough for successful offensives with massive new arms deliveries. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is currently traveling through Europe again, would like a big boost to force the Russian ruler to the negotiating table. But it does not look as if this dream will come true.”
• "Whether it's Trump or Harris, the Americans will slowly but surely withdraw," a senior Ukrainian official in Kyiv told SPIEGEL in confidence. Overall, he sounds pessimistic. "The prognosis is poor," he says. He is worried about the morale of some of the troops. "People don't really want to fight anymore." He is also worried about the tensions between people. "The injustices of war could tear society apart."
• “For the first time since the Russian invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian capital is seriously discussing scenarios in which the country foregoes the complete reconquest of its occupied territories, almost 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, for the time being. The official admits that they had a false idea of victory. "We believed that victory must be the unconditional surrender of Putin's Russia." But it cannot be done without concessions. "A deal must also be advantageous for Russia," he says soberly.”

“Are Americans ready to give up on Ukraine?” Robert Kagan, WP, 10.15.24.

• “As the war in Ukraine continues to drag on with no obvious good end in sight for Ukrainians, folks who are not Ukrainian have begun talking about and yearning for a negotiated settlement.”
• “The Ukrainians ... are being urged to abandon the romantic path of hopeless resistance and pursue the heroic path of realism. But if they do, what is to stop Russia from taking the rest of Ukraine whenever it is ready? ... Advocates of a negotiated settlement with territorial concessions by Ukraine do not deny this danger and attempt to address it in various ways. All seem to assume the postwar Ukraine will have full access to American and NATO weaponry, training and other forms of military assistance, and substantial reconstruction aid.”
• “The key issues in any actual talks, in addition to drawing a new de facto Ukrainian border, will concern the size of the Ukrainian military and the nature of its relationship with the United States and NATO.”
• “The common assumption is that the Ukrainians are the biggest obstacle to such a settlement because they refuse to give up on the territory they have lost. That's wrong. If the United States and NATO wanted to force Kyiv to accept it, they could.”
• “But what about Vladimir Putin? ... There are two reasons Putin might acquiesce to the kind of agreement outlined by Pompeo and others [Former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, in what he calls, “A Trump Peace Plan for Ukraine,” would provide Ukraine $100 billion from a special NATO fund and an additional $500 billion worth of U.S. “lend-lease” loans to purchase weaponry].”
  • “One is that he has no intention of abiding by it because he assumes that the United States and NATO will not, in fact, continue arming and protecting Ukraine, regardless of what the agreement allows.”
  • “That is the only other reason Putin would accept such a deal — if he believed that his army was about to crack.”
• “Whoever wins the coming presidential election...is likely to face an intransigent Putin sticking to his current demands, which amount to the end of Ukraine's sovereignty.”
• “The present course, in short, is unlikely to lead to a stable settlement, and certainly not the kind of peace agreement that advocates of talks assure us is possible. This is not one of those "win-win" situations. Unless something dramatic changes, this is a war that, like most wars, will be won or lost on the battlefield. We are not going to be rescued by a peace deal. Americans need to decide soon whether they are prepared to let Ukraine lose.”

“The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine,” Tim Willasey-Wilsey, RUSI, 10.14.24.

• “What would a betrayed Ukraine look like? At least it would retain some 82% of its territory. A guilty West would doubtless provide aid to rebuild infrastructure. It might be given a pathway to eventual EU membership (unless that option had been bargained away at the negotiating table), but joining the Western club may have lost its appeal at that point. Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchs would re-emerge from hibernation. The old post-Soviet cynicism would replace the youthful enthusiasm of the Maidan generation. There would be antagonism towards those returning from abroad after avoiding the fight, and – of course – thousands of grieving families.”
• “This should have been Europe’s war to manage. In spite of decades of discussion about European defence, it proved too convenient to rely on US largesse. This made Europe a prisoner of US electoral factors. It also caused Europe to shirk the difficult decisions that helping win the war entailed: the big increases in defence expenditure, the 24-hour working in ammunition factories, the hikes in food and energy costs and the political risks such as seizing frozen assets. What remains now for Europe is to secure a place at the negotiating table and to argue for NATO membership for Ukraine as part of any settlement. Failing that, the West will have years to repent the betrayal of the courageous Ukrainians, whose only crime was their wish to join the Western democratic order.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Zelenskiy denies it, but ceasefire talks to end the war in Ukraine are underway,” bne IntelliNews , 10.14.24.
• "What Would Victory in Ukraine Look Like?," Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate, 10.08.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“The world according to Kamala Harris,” Alec Russell and Felicia Schwartz, FT, 10.08.24.

For Harris’s views on Russia/Eurasia see RM’s compilation.

• “As for Ukraine, Harris has delivered robust speeches in support of Kyiv. She would continue to provide what it needs to be in a good position at a negotiating table, say people privy to her thinking, although officials in Kyiv believe she would follow the Biden policy in not allowing them to use American missiles to hit targets deep in Russia.”
• “Barring a sudden reversal of Russian forces, she would not push for a swift settlement as Trump says he would do. “The vice-president believes that rewarding Russian aggression would send a message round the world that you can invade a country without paying the price,” says one aide.”
• “But the mood in Washington has shifted in recent months as Russia has made advances on the battlefield. There is a widespread sense that a Harris administration would ultimately be in favor of negotiations and winding down the war, however difficult it might be to provide the requisite security guarantees to ensure Ukraine’s survival.”
• “The failure of America and its allies to persuade much of the world to join them in backing Ukraine’s cause has underlined a recent phenomenon: the rise of so-called middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia who see an opportunity to play off America against China. The Biden administration has been increasingly aware of the need to do more to win such countries over. But this has been undermined by what many in the global south see as America’s hypocrisy in condemning Russia while standing by Israel as it bombards Gaza.”
• “Harris would intensify the courtship of non-aligned states, her allies say. This chimes with the thinking of David Lammy, Britain’s new foreign secretary, for whom improving ties with the global south is a priority. “We tend to focus on the conflicts in Gaza and the Ukraine,” he told the Financial Times. “But we could be talking about the conflict in Sudan or about Yemen.”
• “When we talk of America and the west we leave out the two-thirds of the world that I think would rather be with us because they see how draconian China and Russia are, and they know our technology is better,” Senator Mark Warner, who worked with Harris on the Senate intelligence committee, says.”
• “Whatever her vision, with wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and other crises lying in wait, her challenge as ever in the Oval Office would be seeing beyond the daily brief.”

“Why the U.S. Presidential Election Matters for Ukraine,” Paul B. Stares and Molly Carlough, CFR, 10.09.24.

• “The U.S. presidential election in November could have a profound effect on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and by extension, the future of European security. Presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump have distinctly divergent views on the war that reflect their different visions for U.S. foreign policy. Given the stakes involved, it is important to understand where they land on the major policy questions.”
• “Harris has broadly indicated she would continue to pursue the policy objectives of the Joe Biden administration, namely to help Ukraine defend and restore its sovereignty against Russian aggression while reducing the risk of direct North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement in the war with Russia. Conversely, Trump has been vague about the level of future U.S. support for Ukraine if reelected. He has twice publicly refused to commit to backing a Ukrainian victory over Russia. In combination with his close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his statements have raised fears that he will pressure Ukraine to reach a settlement to end the conflict on terms that would favor Russia and compromise long-standing U.S. foreign policy principles.”
• “However, in a post on his social media platform Truth Social in April 2024, Trump wrote that Ukraine’s survival is not only important to Europe, but also to the United States. Additionally, Trump’s previous administration enacted several measures to curb Russian aggression, including levying numerous sanctions and providing Ukraine with lethal military aid. It is conceivable, therefore, that a second Trump government could dodge the dire outcomes that many people fear, though these cannot be precluded.”
• “Harris is committed to supplying further military and financial assistance to Ukraine, in keeping with the Biden administration’s current policies. She has repeated the administration’s adage that the United States will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” and was the figurehead for the Biden administration’s announcement of $1.5 billion in additional aid to Ukraine at the Swiss peace summit this year. In private meetings with Zelenskyy in recent months, she also reportedly sought to assuage concerns that U.S. support could decline due to increasing Republican opposition in the U.S. Congress.”
• “In general, Trump advocates that any aid for Ukraine should come from U.S. allies in NATO. Since his first term, Trump has called for NATO members to reach, and even exceed, the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for military spending included in the alliance’s mandate. He has often accompanied such demands with threats to withdraw the United States from the alliance, notably saying at a campaign rally in February that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” if NATO members do not contribute more to military spending.”
• “Trump has publicly declared Putin’s terms for peace—that Ukraine would have to renounce its NATO ambitions and cede the four Russian-occupied territories, including Crimea—unacceptable, but it remains to be seen whether he will maintain this position. Vance, for instance, has been vocal that any peace deal would require “significant territorial concessions by Ukraine.” [A]fter meeting with Zelenskyy in Washington on September 26, Harris condemned any peace deals involving the annexation of Ukrainian territory and denial of Ukrainian membership in security alliances as “proposals for surrender” rather than peace.”

“The most dangerous moment since the Cold War,” Fareed Zakaria, WP, 10.11.24.

• “As tensions spiral in the Middle East, keep in mind that this is only one of three arenas in the world where revisionists are trying to upend the international order. In Europe, a war continues to rage, and in Asia, a perilous new dynamic is at work. Taken together, they define the most dangerous period internationally since the end of the Cold War.”
• “There are increasing indications that this "axis" of revisionist powers is coordinating and helping one another. The Economist points out that this "quartet of chaos" — China, Iran, North Korea and Russia — is actively swapping weapons, supplies and, most importantly, know-how. Tehran and Pyongyang supply Moscow with drones while Moscow shares information with Tehran on how to jam drones and disable GPS systems. It sends seized Western military weaponry to Tehran so that it can analyze the kits. The U.S. government estimates that 90 percent of Russia's microelectronics imports and 70 percent of its machine tools now come from China, much of this being dual-use, meaning it can be used to make weapons.”
• “The United States and its allies must try to thwart these efforts at coordination. But this will require that they themselves be unified. Allied governments should try to drive wedges between these countries, which have long histories of suspicion and tension among them. China, in particular, is somewhat unlike the other three nations. Those rogue regimes actively seek to foment instability, largely because they have little to lose from disorder. China, on the other hand, benefits immensely from trade and interdependence. It has risen to power thanks to globalization and peace, guaranteed by the current international system. China's assistance to Russia shows that Beijing is willing to unsettle the world order but not necessarily upend it.”
• “The last time the United States faced an alliance of hostile powers — during the Cold War — it effectively sowed discord within the Communist world, maintaining good relations with countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania and, above all, dividing China from the Soviet Union. But in a Washington that today sees the world in black and white, I wonder whether we have the diplomatic skill and acuity to pursue a sophisticated strategy like that one.”

“Vladimir Putin’s spies are plotting global chaos. Russia is enacting a revolutionary plan of sabotage, arson and assassination,” The Economist, 10.13.24. 

• “We’ve seen arson, sabotage and more: dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness,” said Ken McCallum, the head of MI5, Britain’s domestic security and counter-intelligence agency, in a rare update on the threat posed by Russia and the GRU, its military-intelligence agency. “The GRU in particular is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets,” he said on October 8th.”
• “Russia’s war in Ukraine has been accompanied by a crescendo of aggression, subversion and meddling elsewhere. In particular, Russian sabotage in Europe has grown dramatically. “The risk level has changed,” Vice-Admiral Nils Andreas Stensones, the head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, said in September. “We see acts of sabotage happening in Europe now.” Sir Richard Moore, the chief of MI6, Britain’s foreign-intelligence agency, put it more bluntly: “Russian intelligence services have gone a bit feral, frankly.”
• “The Kremlin’s mercenaries have squeezed Western rivals out of several African states. Its hackers, Poland’s security services said, have tried to paralyze the country in the political, military, and economic spheres. Its propagandists have pumped disinformation around the world. Its armed forces want to put a nuclear weapon in orbit. Russian foreign policy has long dabbled in chaos. Now it seems to aim at little else.”
• “What Putin is trying to do is hit us all over the place,” argues Fiona Hill, who previously served in America’s national security council. She compares the strategy to the Oscar winning film: “Everything Everywhere All at Once.”
• “Russia is [not] an unstoppable. It is increasingly a junior partner to China. Its influence has slipped in some countries, such as Syria. It does not always back up its own proxies—dozens of Wagner fighters were killed in an ambush by Malian rebels, aided by Ukraine, in July. And Russian subversion can be disrupted, says Sir Richard, by “good old-fashioned security and intelligence work” to identify the intelligence officers and criminal proxies behind it. The fact that Russia is increasingly reliant on criminals to carry out these acts, in part because Russian spies have been expelled en masse from Europe, is a sign of desperation. “Russia’s use of proxies further reduces the professionalism of their operations, and—absent diplomatic immunity—increases our disruptive options,” says Mr. McCallum.”
• “Russian meddling is intended to put pressure on NATO without provoking a war. “We also have red lines,” says Ms. Hill, “and Putin is trying to feel those out.” But if he is truly driven by a revolutionary spirit, convinced that the West is a rotten edifice, that suggests more lines will be crossed in the months and years ahead.”

“How the next president can be a ‘cheap hawk,’” Michael O’Hanlon, The Hill, 10.09.24.

• “When Newt Gingrich was asked about his views on defense spending back in the mid-1990s, at a time when people still cared about the federal deficit, he said, “I’m a hawk — but I’m a cheap hawk.” It was such a good line that I borrowed it for a book title the following year. And it is time we collectively return to it.”
• “There are voices clamoring for very big increases in defense spending. These views are understandable, given the return of an angry and revanchist Russia, the rise of China, ongoing provocations from a nuclear-minded Iran and a nuclear-capable North Korea, and other security challenges. But neither presidential candidate has gone so far as to specify what kind of defense buildup, small or large, they might favor.”
• “To break the logjam and obtain the kind of increases in defense spending that the global environment now requires, we need to be specific. Sweeping calls for the U.S. defense budget — now at about $850 billion — to return to Cold War levels when measured against GDP are unrealistic and unneeded, especially with federal deficits so big ($1.8 trillion in 2024, CBO has just reported).”
• “With Russia, the simplest long-term solution would involve stationing real American combat power in the Baltic states, NATO’s most exposed eastern flank. The idea would again be to discourage a rapid enemy assault, in this case perhaps against the eastern parts of Estonia and Latvia (where Russian speakers Putin has claimed the right to “protect” are). Adding one Army brigade combat team and a combat aviation brigade (centered on attack helicopters) to the standing Army force structure for this purpose would cost about $5 billion a year after bases were built. These would be modest but serious and self-sufficient elements of American combat power.”
• “Altogether, assuming that we actually added these forces to the standing military, the average annual costs of the new force posture would total around $25 billion a year more than currently projected. Initial costs would be somewhat higher as equipment was purchased, but longer-term costs would average out in this range.Yes, that is a lot of money on top of the $850 billion-plus a year we already spend on defense. But at about 3 percent of the current Pentagon budget, it still fits under the label of “how to be a cheap hawk.”

“Give Ukraine NATO Membership. Peace Depends on It,” William B. Taylor, NYT, 10.11.24.

• “Many allies now support NATO membership for Ukraine, including France, Britain, Poland, the Baltic States, the Nordic nations and most of Central and Eastern Europe. Several more indicate that they will not stand in the way. Again, Germany will be key. Then Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey will have to be convinced. With sufficient commitment and determination, it can happen.”
• “Russia may not be happy with Ukrainian NATO membership. But this is not about pleasing Russia. This is about lasting peace and security. Moscow does not get a veto.”
• “Meanwhile, NATO should take interim steps to begin incorporating Ukraine into the alliance. The Ukrainian ambassador to NATO should be made an ex officio member of the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's main decision-making body, with a guaranteed seat at the table for every meeting. A senior Ukrainian officer should be invited to participate in meetings of the NATO Military Committee. Ukraine should be invited to contribute troops to the Joint Expeditionary Force, a British-led multinational formation whose members are all NATO allies. Most important, the alliance should invite Ukraine to begin membership negotiations immediately, so that when the conflict ends, Ukraine will be instantly ready to formally join.”
• “Europe will not be secure -- and will not be whole and free -- until Ukraine is in NATO. Ukraine will not agree to end the war without it. The United States is key and must show sustained, persistent and creative leadership. With confidence and strength, and a lot of hard work on all sides, Ukraine can become a member of NATO. For peace in Europe, it must.”

“The West Could Never Understand How Important Ukraine Was in Russian Public Opinion,” interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs/Standard. 10.09.24. Clues from Russian Views. (RiGA is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “The first thing to be said is that this war is a catastrophic tragedy for both nations, for both peoples. It has elements of a civil war, elements of a confrontation between two nation states, and a huge part of this is the international context and Western influence. At the end of the day, we have an absolutely disastrous outcome with two very close nations killing each other, and for reasons which – one beautiful day in the future – are not likely to be seen as sufficient.”
• “Russia made a lot of terrible mistakes. And I think the beginning of this campaign was a disaster, because of a total misreading of the enemy, of the opponent. But to say that peaceful Ukraine was attacked by aggressive Russia is a very big simplification – to put it mildly. The situation by 2022 was unfortunately very much primed for a big war.”
• “On the Russian side, you can hear views that this conflict is of an existential nature. So we need to have a clear victory, in order to push the West towards the need to accept Russian interests. On the Western side we have basically the same thing, but the mirror image: that Russia should be delivered a significant defeat in order to save and strengthen the rules-based world order. From my point of view, both positions are too far to one side or the other to be realistic. On the Russian side, I don’t expect such a huge victory that would reshape the whole of European geopolitics. And on the American side, on the Western side, I don’t see how any outcome of this conflict – even if it’s a relative success for the West and Ukraine – will stop the biggest thing that’s happening: the objective trend toward the erosion of the American-centric international system.”

“Putin’s Greatest Weakness: To Break the Kremlin’s War Machine, the West Must Exploit the Grievances and Fears of Ordinary Russians,” Peter Pomerantsev, FA, 10.11.24.

“Transcript: Germany’s ‘deplorable’ divide on the Ukraine war,” Gideon Rachman talks to Norbert Röttgen, FT, 10.10.24.

• “GR: Norbert Röttgen [a member of the foreign affairs committee of the German parliament and author of a new book called “Democracy and War”] believes that the Scholz government has not followed through on its rhetoric [on responding to the Russian threat] and that its inaction is putting Germany and Europe in danger. When we met in Berlin, I asked him to justify his claim that the outcome of the war is at the core of Europe’s destiny.”
• “NR: It is the core because what we experience is the return of war . . . of land war to Europe. It is the end of the longest peace period Europe had enjoyed and experienced. And the very question which Putin has put on the table is: will war remain in Europe?”
• “NR: [Western] support has proven to be insufficient. We are sending too little, often too late, and sometimes not at all, like Germany in the case of the cruise missile Taurus. And this has, of course, military consequences. What is now the military situation is characterized by a superiority of Russia regarding ammunition, weapons. Ukraine is running out of weapons and ammunition. And as a consequence of that, might start to run out of people, of soldiers. Now, we have to say that Russia has gained the upper hand, not in terms that Russia is able to conquer raids, that is, of Ukrainian territory, but it’s creeping forward permanently and has gained the upper hand. So it’s a very highly critical military situation.”
• “NR: Two of the three coalition parties — the Liberals and the Green party — would support more delivery of weapons to Ukraine but the chancellor has the upper hand.”
• “NR: It’s [my party is] unanimously supporting more weapons and ammunition delivery. We are supportive of the delivery of the Taurus cruise missiles. So this CDU-CSU has really a clear stance on this for doing more, of course, out of solidarity for Ukraine. But first and foremost, I would even say it, out of a sober analysis of our own interests, if this war is not stopped in Ukraine, war will prevail and war will extend and it will come closer to us. So we are not just giving it to Ukraine out of solidarity in order to support them, but it is our own interest that is at stake.”

For more commentary on this subject, see: 

• "Wars Are Not Accidents," Erik Lin-Greenberg, Foreign Affairs, 10.08.24.
• "The Myth that Foreign Policy Doesn’t Matter in Presidential Elections," Andrew Payne, Foreign Affairs, 10.03.24.
• “Kamala Harris Is Mum on Foreign Policy for a Reason,” Andreas Kluth, Bloomberg, 10.10.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The Beijing-Moscow Axis Is Much Stronger This Time Around,” Jo Inge Bekkevold, FP, 10.08.24. 

• “In December 1949, China’s paramount leader, Mao Zedong, traveled to Moscow for his first state visit abroad. The two-month visit culminated with Mao signing a 30-year friendship treaty with his Soviet counterpart, Joseph Stalin. However, this quasi-alliance only lasted about one decade. In 1961, Beijing officials denounced Soviet communism as the work of “traitors,” and an undeclared Sino-Soviet border war erupted in 1969. Later, in 1971, China switched sides by aligning with the United States.”
• “A similar collapse of Sino-Russian ties and switch of alignment seems much less likely today. When Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted in March that Russia’s relationship with China was at its “best,” he was not expressing mere propaganda. It is actually true. Indeed, by comparing today’s Sino-Russian ties to the past Sino-Soviet alignment along five key factors… it becomes obvious that the Beijing-Moscow axis is stronger today on all accounts.”
  • “First and foremost, the Beijing-Moscow axis now rests on a more solid geopolitical foundation.”
  • “Second, whereas Soviet economic and technical aid dominated the Sino-Soviet friendship phase, Beijing and Moscow have formed an economic relationship over the course of the past decade that builds on the complementary nature of their economies.”
  • “Third, ideology mattered during the Cold War… it is difficult to imagine ideological differences leading to a breakdown of Sino-Russian relations today.”
  • “Fourth, leadership matters in foreign policy, and the dialogue between the top leadership in Beijing and Moscow is much stronger today than it was during the Cold War.”
  • “Fifth, the institutional links between China and Russia are both wider and deeper today than during the Cold War.”
• “The United States was only able to play the China card against the Soviet Union because of the Sino-Soviet split one decade earlier, with Beijing perceiving Moscow as a considerable security threat. The Sino-Soviet alliance unraveled from within—and not because the United States applied outside pressure or offered an irresistible deal. While the Sino-Russian relationship is unlikely to ever be perfectly stable, it is difficult to see anything like the Sino-Soviet breakdown threatening their alignment. In stark contrast to the Cold War, the current Beijing-Moscow axis rests on a solid geopolitical foundation with strong economic ties, freedom from ideological friction, strong relations between the two countries’ leaders, and a well-established web of bilateral and institutional links.”

For presentations at the Valdai International Discussion Club and the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University as part of their “Stability and Potential: Russia and China on the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” conference on Oct. 14–15, see here. (In Russian and Chinese.)

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Russia Ambassador Exits U.S. With Warning of 'Nuclear Catastrophe,’” Tim O’Connor interviews Anatoly Antonov, Newsweek, 10.10.24.

• "Washington is continuing a dangerous discussion about the possibility of giving Ukrainians a permission to strike deep into Russian territory with Western long-range missiles… They refuse to take into account the clear warnings of the President of the Russian Federation that a 'green light' for such attacks would mean NATO's direct involvement in the conflict," Antonov said, "with all the following conclusions on our part."
• “Antonov accused U.S. think tanks of responding to "reasonable" publications with "poisonous commentaries about the harm of any conversation with 'the Russians'" and said that U.S. politicians prefer "to listen to 'hawks.'" Rather than seeking peace, they discuss "creating hostilities between the Slavs, encouraging the killing of people, and intensifying military escalation," he argued. "All this only confirms that the political elites have set themselves the task not just to defeat Russia but to preserve the old world order, based on the rules favorable to NATO countries," Antonov said. "We want to change this obviously outdated state of affairs. We want our security interests to be taken into account."
• "In America, there is an unwillingness to recognize that over the past few decades, the West, led by Washington, has been rejecting Moscow's outstretched hand of cooperation again and again," Antonov said. "Year after year, it has been militarily 'exploiting' European territory, conducting waves of NATO expansion to the East… It has organized color revolutions and anti-constitutional coups," he said, "increasingly encircling Russia in a hostile 'ring,' and as the 'decisive battering ram' it chose Ukraine." Antonov said that the Pentagon has gone so far as "to study the outcomes of using nuclear weapons on the agricultural sector of Eastern Europe, including Russia," including "modeling a global nuclear war scenario that will lead to the destruction, as Americans think for some reason, of only agricultural farms."
• "Such simulations were actively conducted during the Cold War years," Antonov said. "It is noteworthy that even the American military started to contemplate a nuclear conflict… At the same time, they mistakenly believe that this catastrophe will only affect Europe and Russia," he added. "This is extremely short-sighted. America will not be able to sit it out across the ocean. A global nuclear catastrophe would affect everyone." Now, Antonov said, "The objective maximum task at this stage is to prevent the ties between two great powers and permanent members of the Security Council from finally plunging into an uncontrolled nosedive… Russia, as a responsible state, is not interested in such an extremely dangerous development of the situation," he said. "We convey this idea to our interlocutors and the general public in America on a regular basis. We try to put it explicitly that an insatiable desire to achieve strategic victory on the battlefield over Russia is simply impossible."
• "We stay clear-eyed and understand that in the current circumstances, there is little chance for people who may assume power in the United States not to ultimately find themselves under the dense influence of the 'deep state' and corporate structures that are Russophobic towards Russia," Antonov said.
• "The main sobering message that is now required to avoid fatal mistakes is to stop and cease the openly hostile policy towards the Russian Federation," Antonov said. "Recognize that our country has national interests and a legitimate right to ensure the safety of its citizens, to have its own alternative viewpoint and the opportunity to share it with anyone who is interested in hearing it."

“Is Russia Lowering Its Threshold to Use Nuclear Weapons?” Alexander Golts, Russia.Post, 10.08.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “It is no coincidence that immediately after the aggression against Ukraine started, Putin began threatening Western countries with nuclear weapons… [however] nuclear blackmail was failing to produce the desired result, so something more than the verbal threats from Putin was obviously needed to effectively intimidate the West.”
• “An attempt to back up the threats was this year’s three-stage, three-month-long nonstrategic nuclear exercises, which were the subject of an unusually large amount of attention from Russian propaganda. Yet they too failed to have the effect that Moscow apparently expected.”
• “The reason for their failure is obvious—ultimately, the exercises boiled down to rather routine training of troops in the use of nuclear weapons delivery systems, specifically tactical missiles and combat aircraft. Moreover, Moscow did not risk using actual nuclear weapons in the maneuvers, opting for dummies painted red. This was recorded by American intelligence.”
• “The Kremlin’s nuclear threats may be intended to delay U.S. decisions, such as allowing Ukrainian long-range strikes.”
• “There is a concern that Russia may conduct nuclear tests, returning to Cold War-style nuclear deterrence.”

“Five Years without the INF Treaty: Lessons and Prospects,” Alexander Chekov, Russia in Global Affairs, October/December 2024. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affilaited with the Russian authorities.)

• “Further developments concerning regional missiles will depend primarily on U.S. decisions. As in the early 1980s, Washington may pursue ambitious political objectives through symbolic deployments. However, the strategy aimed at achieving major changes in the regional and global strategic balances also promises significant gains.”
• “In reality, the symbolic and military components of the new U.S. deployments will be closely intertwined. The U.S. is unlikely to believe that its objectives can be achieved solely using weapons that Russia and China do not view as threats. Whether the symbolic or military component predominates will be indicated by the scale and geography of deployments. If they consist of a limited number of conventional missiles threatening select high-value targets, then they will play mainly a ‘symbolic’ role. However, if the U.S. deploys hundreds of nuclear missiles and launchers, creating the possibility of total in-theater escalation dominance and threatening the main Chinese and/or Russian strategic forces, this would represent the ‘military’ scenario. A key problem is that the U.S. can escalate the pressure by gradually increasing the ‘military’ component.”
• “However, as Washington ascends this ladder, it should not overlook the wide spectrum of possible Russian and Chinese countermeasures, ranging from counter-deployments to changes of national nuclear doctrines. The threat posed by new American missiles, especially if deployed to the Asia-Pacific region, could stimulate Russian-Chinese military cooperation. Discussions about an emerging military alliance may be preliminary, but new grounds for such developments will emerge. In this regard, it is useful to recall the West German saying from the 1980s: “The shorter the range, the deader the Germans.” Interestingly, these words came from the conservatives, who only a few years earlier had advocated for greater cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Realization of militarization’s consequences can prompt such shifts in perception.”
• “All this creates certain conditions for minimizing the unfolding arms race. It is quite possible that moderate behavior will prevail during new deployments, allowing each side to claim success without major shifts in the existing military-strategic balance. The U.S. will be able to claim that it has improved its escalation management capabilities and built closer security ties with its allies. Russia and China, having refrained from exaggerating the threat, can say that they have taken effective countermeasures. Given the risks associated with greater escalation, this outcome may be the best for all parties.”

"Overall, there is a disbelief that the conflict will result in a nuclear war," Interview with Executive Director of the Center for Russian Studies at East China Normal University Liu Jun, Kommersant, 10.15.24.^

• “The Russian government is very responsible, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is a very rational person. … [H]e looks at issues related to nuclear weapons very deeply and very thoughtfully. Yes, he makes adjustments to the doctrine, but this does not mean that nuclear weapons will be used.”
• “Most Chinese believe that the Russian government is very responsible and do not believe that Russia will ever use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the changes (in the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation) did not cause any particular concern in China. Rather, it was perceived as another verbal reminder that Russia is, after all, a nuclear power.”
• “During the Cold War, the U.S. also caused a split between China and the USSR, and for some time we distanced ourselves. But this did not happen because of the US, but because of our own bilateral contradictions. Now the U.S. will not be able to divide us: China and Russia are not allies, but we have normal bilateral relations. We have contradictions and problems, but we can resolve them ourselves.”
• “Russia and the DPRK have every right to develop bilateral relations.

“An award for Japanese survivors reflects new global concerns,” Steven Erlanger and Anton Troianovski, NYT, 10.11.24.

• “The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Japan’s atomic bomb survivors comes amid concern about the potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Asia.”
• “In announcing the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee expressed its fear that the “taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons was under threat, without identifying any countries in particular. But the committee’s decision follows intermittent threats by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia about using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and after he said last month that he would lower the threshold for his country’s use of those weapons.”
• “The nuclear powers are modernizing and upgrading their arsenals,” the Nobel committee said in announcing Friday’s prize. “New countries appear to be preparing to acquire nuclear weapons; and threats are being made to use nuclear weapons in ongoing warfare. At this moment in human history, it is worth reminding ourselves what nuclear weapons are: the most destructive weapons the world has ever seen.”
• “[M]any analysts and officials believe that the most urgent risk stems from the war in Ukraine, where one nuclear superpower, the United States, is sending sophisticated weapons to back the country’s defense against the world’s other nuclear superpower, Russia.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Cyber Transparency and the Restoration of U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability,” Hunter Behrens, War on the Rocks, 10.14.24. 

• “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought the risk of nuclear escalation back to the forefront of popular fears and policy concerns. With the onset of renewed great power competition between the United States and the Russian Federation over the last 20 years, strategic stability between these nations has suffered a catastrophic degradation and is now at its most perilous position since the end of the Cold War. This has been exacerbated by both Russia’s and America’s acquisition of advanced offensive cyber capabilities. These novel cyber weapons are creating more ambiguity, eroding trust and transparency, and have fundamentally redefined the state of strategic relations between the world’s two nuclear superpowers. These developments in the cyber domain are directly challenging key tenets of strategic stability, such as second-strike integrity and mutually assured destruction.”
• “How can the world’s leading nuclear superpowers step back from such a precipice, especially in the present circumstances? Diplomatic engagement on strategic stability with the Russian Federation can help diminish the specter of nuclear escalation and conflict. Specifically, the United States and Russia could draw from the long and successful history of implementing confidence and security-building measures within the nuclear sphere to address the current crisis within the cyber domain.”
• “Political will in both Moscow and Washington will be necessary to make progress toward restoring transparency in cyberspace that is critical to rebuilding the strategic relationship. With no end in sight to the Russo-Ukrainian War, it is hard to imagine any viable path forward for a novel bilateral cyber confidence-building measure agreement. This is especially true, given that recent cyber operations during the conflict have only served to worsen the escalatory spiral. However, as history shows us, technological advances and novel offensive capabilities—especially when possessed in parity—can often create an impetus for change and solutions.”
• “Given the state of affairs and both nations’ positions, an inevitable negotiated settlement to the Ukraine conflict could be the ideal moment to pursue a novel cyber confidence-building measure agreement as part of a broader agreement that could also see the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty extended beyond 2026.”
• “Russia will be eager to ensure its constructivist status as a guarantor of global stability and the nuclear order is upheld in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Russian leadership has also expressed its interest in the past of including cyber and space provisions into future arms control agreements.”
• “Simultaneously, the United States will be keen to restore strategic stability after a prolonged period of increased nuclear escalation, as well as lower the risk of any incidents with Russia should the relationship with China further deteriorate.”
• “The United States is confronting changed geostrategic realities and multiple crises around the globe. Blazing a new path forward toward restoring cyber transparency through the application of confidence-building measures could do more than rehabilitate the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship—it could serve as a symbol of responsible world governance at a time when the globe is in a high degree of conflict and upheaval. This could set a precedent for potential follow-on negotiations with China, should the nation ever choose to join arms control negotiations. Should China refrain from participation, a comprehensive U.S.-Russian cyber arms control agreement could lay the groundwork for a 21st-century détente, which could be crucial should America find itself in a future existential battle with China. Just as détente and its associated measures defused tension and prevented nuclear escalation in the Cold War, such an approach could potentially yield much fruit for American foreign policy and the Asia pivot in the decades to come.”

Energy exports from CIS:

"How Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ gets its ships," Tom Wilwon, FT, 10.10.24.  

• “In May last year an ageing tanker loaded with Russian oil dropped anchor two nautical miles off Denmark’s coast after its engine failed, leaving it without power for six hours. Built in 2005, the Canis Power was already well past her best and in the shipping industry the incident was viewed as a warning. Like other vessels in the so-called shadow fleet that transports Russian oil, the ultimate owner of the elderly ship was unknown. Had the incident resulted in a collision or a spill of its 300,000 barrels of oil, it was unclear who, if anyone, would have covered the costs.”
• “Since the first western restrictions on Russian oil exports were introduced in December 2022, Moscow has assembled a fleet of more than 400 such vessels currently moving some 4mn barrels of oil a day beyond the reach of the sanctions and generating billions of dollars a year in additional revenue for its war in Ukraine.”
• “Western governments have responded by imposing restrictions on individual shadow fleet vessels—Canis Power was added to UK and EU sanctions lists in June. But the use of offshore corporate structures has meant western officials have struggled to identify who owns the tankers, how they were acquired or who oversees their operations.”
• “Corporate records and correspondence reviewed by the Financial Times lift that veil of secrecy for the first time. The FT’s investigation shows how Russia’s Lukoil used its shipping arm to finance a 74-year-old British accountant called John Ormerod to acquire the Canis Power and at least 24 other second-hand tankers between December 2022 and August 2023, at a total cost of more than $700mn.”
  • “Together, the 25 ships have transported some 120mn barrels of oil from Russia since they were originally acquired by Ormerod. At a conservative estimate of $60 a barrel that would amount to $7.2bn in exports.”
• “The complex set of arrangements shows how Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer, was able to fund the acquisition of a fleet of vessels while hiding its involvement from public view.”
• “It is not alleged that the transactions have broken any laws.”

“Russian Oil Flows Through Western ‘Price Cap’ as Shadow Fleet Grows,” Alan Rappeport, NYT, 10.14.24. 

• “Almost two years since an oil “price cap” was enacted, nearly 70 percent of the Kremlin’s oil is being transported on “shadow tankers” that are evading the restrictions, according to an analysis published by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute, a Ukraine-based think tank.”
• “Russia’s success at circumventing the sanctions imposed by the Group of 7 nations has allowed it to continue to finance its war against Ukraine. The effectiveness of the price cap has been marred by loose enforcement of the policy. Officials in the United States and Europe have tried to balance their goals of crippling Russia’s economy while keeping oil markets well supplied to prevent price spikes.”
• “The challenges underscore the limitations that the world’s advanced economies have been facing as they attempt to intervene in global energy markets to try to hasten an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
• “The Kyiv School of Economics Institute, which has argued for tougher sanctions on Russian oil, noted in its report that Russia’s shadow fleet poses a threat to the world’s oceans because the tankers are often poorly maintained and not properly insured.”
• “[Russia] has invested about $10 billion in developing its fleet of shadow tankers, which are often unmarked, allowing it to sell much of its oil above the cap level. According to the Kyiv institute, in the first half of this year more than 75 million barrels of Russian oil every month were transported on ships that are on average 18 years old.”
• “A report by Lloyd’s List Intelligence this month found that record volumes of Russian oil products were carried in September on tankers that are part of its shadow fleet or that have already been sanctioned for violating the price cap.”
• “A U.S. official who requested anonymity to discuss the Biden administration’s thinking said that it was not surprising that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has found ways to evade the sanctions over time and that the “price cap coalition” is continuing to work with the shipping and finance industries to enforce the policy. In addition, the official said, the fact that Russian oil prices remain depressed relative to oil sold by producers from other countries, and that Mr. Putin has had to spend billions of dollars to circumvent the cap, has made the policy a success.”
• “The Kyiv institute is pushing for Western countries to crack down on Russia’s sanctions evasion.”

For more commentary on this subject, see: 

• "Most of Europe is fine without Russian gas," Lucia Mackenzie and Gabriel Gavin, Politico, 10.08.24.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Trump on Russia: In His Own Words,” RM Staff, RM, 10.10.24.

• “Former U.S. President Donald Trump has had many opportunities to comment on U.S.-Russian relations, Russia itself and America’s policies toward it. This review, last updated ahead of Trump’s first official bilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, catalogues, with a few exceptions, Trump’s public statements on Russia from his early days as a contender for the Republican nomination in the 2016 presidential race through his second presidential bid up to September 2024.”
• “Across all issue areas related to Russia, we can observe three thru-lines in Trump’s statements since 2018: first, Trump believes his personal relationships with world leaders, including Putin, grant him both insights and bargaining leverage others—including military, diplomatic, economic and scientific elites—do not possess; second, that U.S. domestic and foreign policy is best viewed as fundamentally transactional, or “pay to play” (as highlighted by his comments regarding NATO members and U.S. support); and finally, as highlighted by prominent Russia expert and his own former Russia adviser, Fiona Hill, Trump’s susceptibility to being manipulated by the “strong men” world leaders he claims to respect, Putin in particular.”

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s new budget is a blueprint for war, despite the cost,” Alexandra Prokopenko, FT, 10.07.24. 

• “Contrary to global expectations—and even the Russian government’s own projections—the Kremlin now plans to increase defence spending by 22.6 per cent compared with this year, a staggering 58 per cent rise from the original budget drafted in late 2023. This signals that Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine remain as entrenched as ever. Far from scaling back, the Russian president appears willing to absorb rising costs in his fight, which he views as existential to his regime’s survival.”
• “The numbers are stark: added together, defence and national security spending will now surpass 8% of Russia’s GDP and account for 40% of all federal expenditure, the highest levels since the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
• “Russia is entering a period of military strategic reconstruction that could last up to eight years, according to my colleague Dara Massicot.”
• “However, the resources Putin can muster are not unlimited. By pouring more money into defence, the Kremlin is exacerbating existing economic imbalances.”
• “Two major constraints loom over Putin’s economic strategy: a shrinking workforce and the weight of international sanctions.”
• “Putin faces an unsolvable trilemma of simultaneously maintaining a balanced financial system, meeting social obligations and sustaining defence spending at current levels.”
• “With co-ordinated efforts from across the west—chiefly the increased enforcement of sanctions, resulting in ever-increasing transaction costs for Russia—the time when Putin will be forced to make tough choices can be brought forward.”

“Putin’s Children. Why Younger Russians Are Not Rebelling—and What It Means for the Future,” Andrei Kolesnikov, FA, 10.15.24. 

“Alexei Navalny’s Prison Diaries,” Alexei Navalny, The New Yorker, 10.11.24.

• “January 17^th 2022: Exactly one year ago today I came home, to Russia. I didn’t manage to take a single step on the soil of my country as a free man: I was arrested even before border control. The hero of one of my favorite books, “Resurrection,” by Leo Tolstoy, says, “Yes the only suitable place for an honest man in Russia at the present time is prison.” It sounds fine, but it was wrong then, and it’s even more wrong now.”
• “The authorities… are afraid not of honest people but of those who are not afraid them. Or let me be more precise: those who may be afraid but overcome their fear. There are a lot of them too. Having spent my first year in prison, I want to tell everyone exactly the same thing I shouted to those who gathered outside he court when the guards were taking me off to the police truck: Don’t be afraid of anything.”
• “The only thing we should fear is that we will surrender our homeland to be plundered by a gang of liars, thieves, and hypocrites. That we will surrender without a fight, voluntarily, our own future and the future of our children.”
• “I knew from the outset I would be imprisoned for life—either for the rest of my life or until the end of the life of this regime. Regimes like this one are resilient, and the most foolish thing I could do is pay attention to the people who say, “Lyosha, sure, the regime is going to last at least another year, but the year after that, two at most, it will fall apart and you will be a free man…” The truth of the matter is that we underestimate just how resilient autocracies are in the modern world.”
• “Here are the techniques I worked out [to survive indefinite imprisonment]… The first is frequently found in self-help books: Imagine the worst thing that can happen, and accept it… The second technique is so old you may roll your eyes heavenward when you hear it. It is religion.”
• “January 17^th 2023: I said it two years ago, and I will say it again: Russia is my country. I was born and raised here, my parents are here, and I made a family here: I found someone I loved and had kids with her. I am a full-fledged citizen, and I have the right to unite with like-minded people and be politically active. There are plenty of us, certainly more than corrupt judges, lying propagandists, and Kremlin crooks.”

“What We Can Learn from Alexei Navalny’s Courage in Prison,” David Remnick, The New Yorker, 10.11.24.

• “Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader and anticorruption campaigner, saw the darkest version of his future plainly. “I will spend the rest of my life in prison and die here,” he writes in his diary, in an entry from March of 2022. He had returned to his home country a little more than a year before, after surviving an assassination attempt at the hands of the Russian security services.”
• “Like many dissidents before him, Navalny cultivated what he called a “prison Zen…:” “The important thing is not to torment yourself with anger, hatred, fantasies of revenge,” he writes, “but to move instantly to acceptance. That can be hard.” Throughout his diary… Navalny writes with a fierce moral clarity about the inhumanity of Vladimir Putin’s regime, and about the power of its opposite force—the humanity of his fellow-countrymen.”
• “It’s impossible to read Navalny’s prison diary without being outraged by the tragedy of his suffering, and by his death, in February, in a prison camp north of the Arctic Circle. Yet, again and again, we read an exhortation to live bravely in the face of cruelty. “Don’t be afraid of anything,” Navalny insists. “This is our country and it’s the only one we have.”

“Attacks on Gay Rights Push Russia’s LGBTQ Community Into the Shadows,” Ann M. Simmons, WSJ, 10.13.24.

• “The space for LGBTQ Russians has drastically narrowed. An entire generation who thought they would be free to live their lives as they saw fit are now left with a difficult choice—leave if they can, or go back to living in the shadows. “The queer community in Russia in general is more scared and moving back into the closet,” said Alla, a lesbian from the Urals city of Yekaterinburg.”
• “Homosexuality has long been viewed with suspicion in Russia. The country remains deeply conservative despite some earlier signs of loosening. Legislation outlawing anything portraying same-sex relationships has multiplied in recent years.”
• “But over the past year there has been a flurry of new measures affecting the community, the most severe of which was the Russian Supreme Court’s decision last November to declare what it vaguely called “the international LGBT movement” an illegal extremist organization. In the first use of the new law, the owner, art director and administrator of Pose bar, known for its drag shows, were arrested in March, sending a wave of fear rippling through the gay community. All three are still detained, with one under house arrest, as the investigation continues.”
• “They face up to 10 years in prison in a case that has reverberated across the LGBTQ community. It is a matter of trying to stay alive, said Maxim Olenichev, a Russian human-rights lawyer, who has worked on LGBTQ rights cases and is now based at an undisclosed location outside of Russia. In 2019… Roman Edalov, 47, was fatally stabbed in Moscow after he and his partner were verbally abused by a drunk man who screamed antigay obscenities before attacking them, according to a report at the time from Human Rights Watch. It could have been put down to a random act of street violence if it weren’t for the way the jury acquitted the accused, saying that he deserved leniency despite committing the crime.”
• “A May 2024 report from the European branch of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association found that Russia had dropped to last place out of 49 European countries in terms of respect for the rights of LGBTQ people. Since the beginning of the year, Russia’s state censor, Roskomnadzor, has restricted access to, or blocked, more than 26,000 internet pages where LGBTQ content was published, the state news agency TASS reported in July. “Queer people face refusals when applying for jobs, bullying, harassment in the workplace or educational institution and illegal dismissal, exclusions from educational institutions,” said Denis Oleynik, executive director at ComingOut, an organization that provides legal, psychological and social support to LGBTQ people in Russia.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Oleg Itzhoki: That We Do not See Financial Repressions Yet Means that the Situation in the Russian Economy is not yet Pre-Crisis,” Tatyana Rybakova, Republic.ru, 10.10.24. In Russian.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"War in the Middle East: To Be Continued," Andrey Kortunov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta/RIAC, 10.13.24. Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

“How will the dynamics of the Middle East crisis unfold in its second year? Let's propose a few strictly preliminary assumptions.”

• “The war will be long. There is no reason to hope that the hostilities will cease or even be paused within the next few weeks or even months.”
• “The war will be hybrid. The conflict will likely continue to unfold on two levels (non-state and state), which will make its resolution even more difficult.”
• “The methods of armed conflict will be asymmetric. It can be assumed that Israel's adversaries will increasingly resort to guerrilla warfare, targeted sabotage operations, and terrorist acts (including lone suicide bombers) in the coming year to somehow compensate for the technological superiority of the Jewish state.”
• “The Palestinians will remain divided.”
• “Israel will remain united.”
• “The impact of global public opinion on the course of the war will be minimal.”
• “Most Arab countries will continue to maintain neutrality.”
• “The United States will support Israel under any circumstances.”
• “Iran’s stability will not be undermined.”

“All of this means that, in the near future, the realistic goal of the international community will not be a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, but rather the prevention of its further escalation. Apparently, this is the key in which Russian and Iranian presidents discussed Middle East issues in Ashgabat. In the very near future, Israel will make its next move, and the ball will once again be in Iran's court. Tehran’s decision will determine whether it will be possible to avoid another major war in the much-suffering region of the Middle East.”

"‘The West Must Think About How Not to Hand Over the Global South to Putin and Xi,’” Fyodor Lukyanov interviewed by Business Online, 10.08.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “A significant transformation of the international system is underway, happening fairly quickly. The start of the special military operation became a substantial catalyst. The BRICS summit in Russia is another milestone. The fact that many important countries are gathering in Kazan, despite all attempts to limit and isolate Russia, is telling. What is happening is important for Russia, but not just for it. Current developments show that Western policies have a limited effect, which in itself is significant.”
• “The second important point is that this will be the first summit that aims to demonstrate how BRICS can function beyond its original configuration, which consisted of a limited number of countries of roughly equal scale.”
• “BRICS will become a truly powerful and influential force, especially as an environment and a large community, at the moment when it manages to devise mechanisms for mutual settlements without the involvement of the dollar. This is currently the most important instrument of political power for the Western world.”
• “The topic of Ukraine will undoubtedly be discussed at the BRICS summit, but I don’t think we should expect any initiatives… For now, all sides, primarily Ukraine, believe that achieving goals must be pursued militarily. Therefore, I believe all discussions about peace plans can be set aside for now.”
• “[When asked whether it's possible for Turkey to be both in NATO and in BRICS]: I believe it’s impossible. This is a case where there’s a limit to flexibility, because BRICS theoretically allows for a fairly broad degree of partner autonomy, but NATO does not. Since NATO doesn’t allow it, BRICS won’t need to either. So, it’s very simple.”

“The Paths of Russian Militarism,” Andrei Tsygankov, Russia in Global Affairs, October/December 2024. 

“Three kinds of Russian militarism:

• “Many of Russian militarism’s objectives stem from the need to ensure the security of Russians as a people. Throughout their history, Russians have had to protect their physical survival, national borders, way of life, and ideological and cultural values.”
• “After defense, the second kind of Russian militarism seeks to uphold international order through coalitions to preserve the status quo.”
• “Finally, the third kind of Russian militarism seeks to facilitate the country’s development by securing access to markets, resources, and territories.”
• “There is a common belief among Russian social scientists that militarism creates more problems than solutions, especially in the long term. Militarists are often correct about possible military solutions, but they often fail to consider the conditions and scenarios details of the eventual civilian transition. Both sides may be correct, under certain conditions, which require thorough study. Global political, military, and economic uncertainty necessitates a rejection of non-negotiable certainties and a search for complex strategic solutions.”
• “An armed conflict is a temporary solution that cannot displace the whole range of long-term foreign-policy and state-building objectives. Russian state-building remains historically unfinished. Because of international competition, Russia has often had to rely on militaristic decisions, leaving civilian projects for later.”

For more analysis and/or commentary on this subject, see: 

• “A Race for the Global South or a Battle for the World Majority: Russia’s Prospects,” Konstantin V. Bogdanov, Boris E. Frumkin, Irina Ya. Kobrinskaya, Russia in Global Affairs, November/December 2024 issue. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
• “Russia’s Radical Othering in the Global Academic Discourse,” Olga A. Baysha, Kamilla D. Chukasheva, Russia in Global Affairs, November/December 2024 issue. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
• “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions following the 19th East Asia Summit, Vientiane, October 11, 2024,” Russian MFA’s official site, 10.11.24. 

Ukraine:

“Why Russia is trying to seize a vital Ukrainian coal mine. Without it, the country’s remaining steel industry will be crippled,” The Economist, 10.13.24. 

• “The Russians are now barely eight kilometers from Pokrovsk’s eastern outskirts. But they have more than this strategic road and rail junction in their sights. The jewel in Pokrovsk’s crown is a huge modern mine 15 minutes’ drive to its south-west. Just outside the village of Udachne, it towers over the surrounding fields.”
• “When Ukraine lost half of Donbas in 2014 to Russian-backed separatists, the loss of mines there meant a loss of 80% of its coal deposits. And in 2022, during the siege of Mariupol, the city’s two steel plants were destroyed, devastating Ukraine’s steel industry. One of them, Azovstal, became internationally famous as Ukrainian troops staged a last-ditch defence there.”
• “Pokrovsk’s mine is far from being a rickety old Soviet relic. It opened in 1990 and now belongs to Metinvest, a company owned by Rinat Akhmetov, one of Ukraine’s richest men… it is widely believed that for the Russian leadership, targeting Mr. Akhmetov’s assets has, apart from undermining the Ukrainian economy, the added benefit of revenge. Until 2014 the oligarch was a key political and economic player in Donbas and Ukraine, and the Kremlin doubtless believed he would side with its separatists and with Russia.”
• “Along with its associated plants and administration buildings, the Pokrovsk mine group employs 6,000 people, of whom some 1,000 are currently serving in the armed forces. It is the largest coking-coal mine in Ukraine. Its coal, used for smelting iron ore, is vital for the country’s remaining steel industry. This year Metinvest hoped to mine 5.3m tons of coal there. In 2023 Ukraine’s steel plants produced 6.2m tons of crude steel. In 2021 though, before the loss of the two Mariupol plants, Ukraine had produced 21.4m tons. In 2021 Ukraine was the world’s 14th largest steel producer but last year it had tumbled to 24th.”
• “According to Andriy Buzarov, an analyst, the Russians do not even need to take the mine to throttle Ukraine’s remaining steel industry. As they advance, they will try to cut its power supply and shell the main road that takes its coal west to the remaining steel plants. They will then do the same at another smaller coking-coal mine 18 kilometers north of Udachne at Dobropillia, he thinks.”

“No one but Moscow gains from Polish-Ukrainian tensions. Disputes over historical memory reflect Poland’s post-populist politics and Ukraine’s emergence,” Jarosław Kuisz, FT, 10.10.24.

• “Only recently, a sharp dispute was said to have arisen in Kyiv between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski. According to media reports, which have not been denied, Zelenskyy demanded, among other things, the delivery of MiG-29 fighter jets. In turn, Sikorski demanded a solution to the problem of the exhumation of some tens of thousands of Poles murdered by Ukrainians in the Volhynian massacre during the second world war.”
• “The ensuing non-diplomatic brawl was only one link in a chain of acrimonious incidents…  These frictions are all the more surprising given the result of last year’s parliamentary elections in Poland. After eight years, the national populist Law and Justice (PiS) party was replaced in power by a coalition led by Donald Tusk, a former premier who had embodied Polish-Ukrainian friendship by helping to organize the Euro 2012 event. The past few weeks prove that the war is changing us all, Poles and Ukrainians alike. So what is happening?”
  • “First, the Polish government is operating under post-populist conditions.”
  • “Second, compared with 2012, the war brought an end to the era of the “junior partner” in bilateral relations. To the world’s surprise, Ukraine not only stopped Vladimir Putin’s blitzkrieg, but dared to send troops into Russian territory… When peace comes, Ukraine will claim a greater role in the region.”
• “Where two fight, the third benefits” is the conventional saying. Moscow has not ceased to be a threat to the region. Unfortunately, recent wrangles prove that such geopolitical clichés, however true they may be, are quickly forgotten by some politicians.”

“Trump and Zelensky have more in common than you think,” Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 10.15.24.

• “It might have come as a shock to the anti-Ukraine right, but Donald Trump made clear during his recent meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky that he not only likes the Ukrainian president but also credits Zelensky with saving him during his first impeachment. "He was like a piece of steel," Trump said, standing with Zelensky at Trump Tower on Sept. 27. "He said, 'President Trump did absolutely nothing wrong.' He said it loud and clear. And the impeachment hoax died right there… He was a piece of steel. He gave a very honest straight answer, and that really ended, essentially ended, the impeachment hoax. And I appreciated that."
• “The two men have much more in common. Indeed, Zelensky is in many ways a Ukrainian Trump.”
  • “Like Trump, Zelensky is a political outsider, a TV star who built a multimillion-dollar media empire before becoming president of his country.”
  • “Like Trump, Zelensky gave up a lucrative career to serve his country.”
  • “Like Trump, Zelensky took aim at the "deep state."
  • “Like Trump, Zelensky has inflicted unprecedented punishment on Russian President Vladimir Putin.”
  • “Like Trump, Zelensky understands leverage.”
• “If Trump can help Zelensky secure a just and lasting peace, then Zelensky can finally get back to the job he was elected to do: confronting the Ukrainian "deep state" and making Ukraine great again.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Election showdown in Georgia. Few expect a free and fair contest in a country whose ruling party displays pro-Russian and anti-democratic tendencies,” Tony Barber, FT, 10.12.24. 

• “In Tbilisi, which I visited this month, the political mood is ominously tense and polarized. Georgia’s October 26 parliamentary elections are set to be the most consequential for the mountainous south Caucasus country since it emerged in 1991 as an independent state out of the ashes of the Soviet Union.”
• “At first sight, it seems that Georgia faces two possible futures: creeping authoritarianism and alignment with Russia if the ruling Georgian Dream party stays in power, or democracy and a pro-European path if the opposition wins and takes office. However, this black-and-white picture oversimplifies what is an altogether more complicated story.”
  • “To portray the election as a straightforward contest between tyranny and freedom, or Russia and the west, is to overlook key features of Georgia’s political trajectory over the past three decades… In this commentary for the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, Markus Greisz hits the nail on the head. He identifies three long-term issues that have plagued Georgia since independence:”
    • “One issue is the deep political and societal polarization;”
    • “Another is the tendency of all Georgian governments to turn authoritarian.”
    • “A third issue is the seemingly paradoxical simultaneous popular support for both the EU and Georgian Dream, which frustrates western leaders and calls into question whether Georgians actually understand what EU membership would entail.”
• “The opposition fears Georgian Dream's victory would bring the country closer to Russia and undermine its fragile democracy.”
• “Moscow views Georgia as part of its rightful sphere of influence, and tensions over Russian control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain.”
• “The election is marred by Georgian Dream’s control of election commissions, vote manipulation, and intimidation of opposition activists.”
• “Possible outcomes range from peaceful transition to protests or violence if Georgian Dream manipulates or refuses to concede the election.”
• “The future of Georgia is very much in the balance.

“COP29 and the greenwashing of Azerbaijan. The UN climate conference is again being hosted by an authoritarian petrostate,” Editorial Board, FT, 10.13.24. 

• “Azerbaijan’s hosting of COP29 next month means the climate conference is being held for the third year running in an authoritarian state with a dubious human rights record, and for the second year in a petrostate… after Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan—where the autocratic Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father as president in 2003—also seems to hope hosting the event can greenwash its reputation.”
• “This year’s COP takes place only 14 months after Azerbaijan chose to resolve by force a three-decade territorial dispute with neighboring Armenia. In a lightning strike, Azerbaijani troops seized Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian-populated enclave inside its borders. Russian peacekeepers largely looked away. The province’s entire Armenian population of more than 100,000 was driven out. At least 23 Armenian political prisoners are still being held in Azerbaijan.”
• “Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s prime minister, has made several concessions in the hope of securing a deal to normalize relations with Baku, notably recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity—including Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, Azerbaijan was only awarded COP29 after Armenia lifted a veto in return for the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war. But Yerevan has accused Baku of repeatedly delaying signing a largely agreed peace deal.”
• “Worryingly, after Russia’s Vladimir Putin visited Baku in August, Moscow signaled support for Baku’s ambitions to create a land corridor linking Azerbaijan to an Azerbaijani exclave, Nakhchivan, that borders Turkey. This would run across southern Armenia and in effect block its border with Iran, a key supply route. Many in Yerevan fear Aliyev has not dropped military ambitions towards Armenia itself, which he calls “Western Azerbaijan.” Baku officials deny such intentions.”
• “Allowing countries such as Azerbaijan to host global events can in theory shine a spotlight that forces autocrats to behave better. But Aliyev, who won a stage-managed fifth election victory in February, seems unfazed… Domestic rights defenders estimate the country has around 300 political prisoners.”
• “Azerbaijan, which has pledged a “COP of peace,” should live up to that spirit by signing a peace deal with Armenia before it begins. International governments and attendees should use the opportunity to press the host country on its democratic record. They and the UN’s climate arm must ensure rights are respected during the conference. And reforms are badly needed to tighten the process of awarding COPs—and the obligations of the hosts.”

“Summit of the CIS Heads of State,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Weekly Digest No. 35 (49) 2024, 10.13.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• “In late September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated (Rus) that Russia had proposed a trilateral meeting, Armenia and Azerbaijan at the head of state level, but this meeting has not materialized. Instead, the two leaders had a brief informal conversation and each met with Putin individually. On 8 October, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov commented (Rus) that a trilateral meeting did not occur because the idea “was not supported by someone”, a statement clearly aimed at Armenia. In the wake of Azerbaijan’s successful takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, demarcation and delimitation processes have stalled, while key transport routes remain blocked.”
• “A major point of contention is Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia remove from its constitution’s preamble a reference to Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, which includes a clause on “Armenia’s reunification with Nagorno-Karabakh.” Armenia has indicated it will consider amending its constitution only after a peace treaty is signed.”
• “After the summit, it emerged that the leaders of Armenia Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia had agreed that Russian border guards would withdraw from the Armenian-Iranian border by 1 January 2025—less than three months away.”
• “Moscow is signaling its willingness to transition to more explicitly pragmatic relations with Yerevan, accepting Armenia’s increasing distance and closer ties with the West, provided Armenia maintains its partnership with Russia in other areas. This move will facilitate Russia’s rapprochement with Baku, which Putin is prioritizing as more strategically important at this time.”

For more analysis on this subject, see: 

• “Start of [Moldova’s] Formal Accession Negotiations with the EU,” Stefan Meister, DGAP, 10.07.24. 

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^ Machine-translated.

Slider photo by AP Photo/Marko Ivkov.