Russia Analytical Report, July 15-22, 2024
6 Ideas to Explore
- Joe Biden’s decision to drop out of the U.S. presidential race and support his VP Kamala Harris has Russian influentials divided on whether a Democrat can defeat the GOP’s Donald Trump in November, according to RM’s review of commentary by Russian influentials on this development. Boris Mezhuev, a Moscow-based political scientist, told pro-Kremlin conservative analytical portal Vzglyad in reference to Harris: “I think her prospects can be described as positive. The gap in ratings with Donald Trump is only a few percent.” According to Russian foreign policy veteran Sen. Alexey Pushkov, however, “in the battle for the presidency, Trump defeated Biden ahead of schedule.” Pushkov’s colleague, and deputy chairman of the Russian Senate, Konstantin Kosachev, also believes Trump is more likely to win. Interestingly, Vladimir Pastukhov, an opposition-minded Russian political scientist, concurs, assessing that Harris’s chances of defeating Trump are slim, while U.S.-based opposition-minded Russian scholar Konstantin Sonin is less pessimistic, putting chances of Harris winning at 50/50.
- “Russia’s war against Ukraine ... is an example of conventional deterrence failure that, as the fighting grows in terms of economic costs and societal destruction, invites an eventual expansion to nuclear war,” Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Cimbala warn in their article for NI. To prevent such an expansion, “sooner or later, the military stalemate in Ukraine will have to give way to negotiations and a peace agreement—however distasteful such a deal might be to hardliners on all sides,” the duo argues.
- Although Ukrainian forces are being slowly pushed back in some places along the front, the country's overall military strategy is a good one, Gen. Christopher Cavoli argued in his remarks at the Aspen Security Forum last week. “The Ukrainians right now for these past few months have been focused on defending what they have in the east, denying Russia the free use of Crimea and southern Ukraine to attack the rest of Ukraine, preserving their access to the Black Sea and generating force,” according to this U.S. general as cited by Politico. “I think that they’ve got a great strategy. It is just a matter of prosecuting it. The key part is the force generation,” said Cavoli, who serves as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR also predicted that “at the end of a conflict in Ukraine, however it concludes, we are going to have a very, very big Russia problem.” “We are going to have a situation where Russia is reconstituting its force, is located on the borders of NATO, is led by largely the same people as it is right now, is convinced that we're the adversary, and is very, very angry,” Cavoli said, according to VoA.
- Dara Massicot of CEIP reminds us that in the course of the war, Russia has taken extraordinary measures to stabilize manpower levels, such as lowering recruiting standards, expanding benefits and using convicts to fill its ranks. “Russia will likely need to continue some of these policies to recruit and retain personnel after the war ends,” according to Massicot’s RAND study entitled, “Russian Military Wartime Personnel Recruiting and Retention 2022-2023.”
- After initial success, Western energy sanctions on Russia are stalling out, according to FP’s Keith Johnson. For one, Russia has found a reliable way to sidestep the West’s price cap of $60 a barrel on its crude oil exports by using a fleet of so-called “shadow tankers.” About four out of every five barrels of seaborne crude that Russia sells are now carried on shadow tankers, while Russian gas “is sneaking back into Europe in liquefied form,” according to this FP writer. “Despite years of unprecedented sanctions on one of the world’s biggest energy providers, Russia’s cash machine is still working enough to continue underwriting the war,” according to Johnson.
- The victory of reformer Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran’s presidential elections reinforce the Iranian public’s quest for a “new Iranian foreign policy—above all, normalizing relations with the West and moving away from Russia,” according to Nikita Smagin of the Russian International Affairs Council’s commentary for CEIP. “Since it is Iranian voters who are seeking change, rather than the ruling elite, Pezeshkian will not cause any immediate problems for Moscow,” according to Smagin. In the longer-term, however, the new president may prove to be a threat for Moscow. “After all, he was swept to power by a demand for change that is unmistakably tinged with anti-Russian feeling,” according to Smagin.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- “While the recently signed agreement between Russia and North Korea has sparked concern in the West, the reality is that cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang on sensitive technologies is not new – it is merely coming out into the open.”
- “It is obvious that Russia's cooperation with other authoritarian regimes is not a consequence of the deterioration of its relations with the West, but a natural phenomenon that Russia used to hide better, and the West chose not to notice. What is new in this cooperation is the strengthening of Russia's dependence on it. Russia's critical dependence on the supply of weapons, and in the foreseeable future probably troops from these countries, will in turn make Moscow much more willing to share sensitive technologies with them. At the same time, the greatest threat to international security is Russia's interest in opening new theatres of military operations with the participation of other authoritarian regimes, which would both disperse the resources of the Western coalition and consolidate the “new axis of evil.” The opening of such new theatres could be the result of provocations by the Russian intelligence services, in which the transfer of technologies necessary for developing WMD is only one of the possible triggers.”
Iran and its nuclear program:
“Is Iran’s Pro-Reform President a Threat to Russia-Iran Ties?” Nikita Smagin, CEIP, 07.19.24.
- “The unexpected victory of reformer Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran’s presidential elections this month showed that the country’s conservatives are increasingly unable to resist the growing demand for change. Among other things, the change being sought includes a new Iranian foreign policy—above all, normalizing relations with the West and moving away from Russia.”
- “Since it is Iranian voters who are seeking change, rather than the ruling elite, Pezeshkian will not cause any immediate problems for Moscow. But anti-Russian feeling in Iranian society is not likely to disappear anytime soon, and Pezeshkian’s victory should serve as a warning sign for the Kremlin. Cooperation with Tehran could become much harder in the future.”
- “Pezeshkian has little room for maneuver when it comes to rethinking Iran’s relationship with Russia. However strong the demand for a normalization of ties with the West, Tehran is more likely to deepen its relations with Moscow and Beijing in the coming years.”
- “Long-term, however, things look different. Iran’s pro-reform electorate, as well as the country’s pro-reform media, see Moscow as the heir to the Russian and Soviet empires, and believe it is only interested in acquiring Iran’s assets and resources. There is a popular opinion in opposition circles that without Moscow’s support, the Iranian regime would have collapsed long ago.”
- “In the final analysis, Pezeshkian’s win is extremely unlikely to mean that Russia and Iran will not increase their cooperation in the near future: the two sides need each other too much. At the same time, however, Iranian society is increasingly projecting its unhappiness with the domestic situation onto foreign policy. Critics of the authorities present Russia—fairly or otherwise—as one of those responsible for their country’s plight.”
- “Pezeshkian’s victory is further proof of this trend. That means the new president is a potential threat for Moscow. After all, he was swept to power by a demand for change that is unmistakably tinged with anti-Russian feeling.”
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
“Could America fight its enemies without breaking the law?”, Economist, 07.18.24.
- “Gloom will accompany the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions next month. … The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has warned of “increasing elasticity” in how countries apply the laws of war, which the conventions underpin.”
- “Take Russia. In Ukraine and Syria the country has disdained the laws of war and frequently hit civilian targets without compunction: on July 8th a children’s hospital in Ukraine’s capital was bombed. … The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor has … issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president.”
- “Some Western officials increasingly believe China or Russia might ignore the laws of war. A major conflict between America and China could lead to the demise of the laws.”
- “Now some generals are calling for a return to a more basic, permissive understanding of the laws of war in the face of growing tension between America and its rivals. … [Lt. Gen. Charles Pede] warned that American forces were suffering from a counter-terrorism “hangover,” accustomed to “highly constrained, policy-driven rules of engagement.” Such restrictions, if applied to a war with Russia or China, he warned, “would be disastrous.” … A fight against China or Russia “will not provide commanders the luxury of time, nor…near certainty regarding collateral effects,” write Lt. Gen. Stuart Risch, currently the U.S. Army’s top lawyer, and his colleague Col. Ryan Dowdy.”
- “[D]eath and destruction on a vast scale may become much more common [in urban warfare]. That became vividly apparent in a recent wargame conducted by the Stimson Center … which sought to “stress-test” NATO’s policy on civilian-harm mitigation in a scenario where the alliance faced a “near-peer competitor”—read, Russia—“during a high-intensity, urban conflict.” More than 66,000 civilian casualties occurred in some rounds. The report concluded that NATO’s aspirations for reduced civilian deaths “have never been achievable and are even less so” in that sort of intense urban war.”
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
Remarks by Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli on Day 3 of the 2024 Aspen Security Forum, 07.18.24.
- “Although Ukrainian forces are being slowly pushed back in some places along the front, the country's overall military strategy is a good one. “The Ukrainians right now for these past few months have been focused on defending what they have in the east, denying Russia the free use of Crimea and southern Ukraine to attack the rest of Ukraine, preserving their access to the Black Sea and generating force,” the U.S. general said. “I think that they’ve got a great strategy. It is just a matter of prosecuting it. The key part is the force generation,” Cavoli added in a speech at the U.S. security and foreign policy conference.” (Politico, 07.19.24)
- “Ukraine has challenges in how it uses its manpower. There’s a pool of people, who need to work in factories, fields and in military fighting. It is the job of the Ukrainian government to figure out what that balance is. They’ve recently extended the age of conscription, they’re bringing people in at a pretty good clip right now,” Cavoli said at the annual Aspen Security Forum July 18.” (Politico, 07.19.24)
- “The outcome on the ground [in Ukraine] is terribly, terribly important ... But we can't be under any illusions ... At the end of a conflict in Ukraine, however it concludes, we are going to have a very, very big Russia problem. ... We are going to have a situation where Russia is reconstituting its force, is located on the borders of NATO, is led by largely the same people as it is right now, is convinced that we're the adversary, and is very, very angry." (Defense.gov, 07.18.24)
- “Russia launched its second invasion of its Ukrainian neighbor, and that force-generating process was instantly outdated. NATO had to focus — once again — on collective territorial defense. "We need standing forces, and at standing levels of readiness, geographically focused on specific areas," Cavoli said at the annual Aspen Security Forum July 18. "So, we wrote … operational plans to do this." These plans are for northwest Europe, the center of Europe and in southeast Europe, and they are "classical plans that describe how to defend a certain piece of geography, with what forces and what methods," the general said. "This has led to a huge raft of advances that we're working on in NATO right now." (Defense.gov, 07.18.24)
- “As Ukraine prepares to ramp up military conscription to defend against Russia’s invasion — after a key deadline to register with recruitment offices passed this week — some men are dodging the draft preemptively by paying thousands of dollars for help to illegally leave the country. Smugglers who assist with border crossings often charge more than $5,000, according to Ukrainian officials and men who have paid for the service. … Those caught often face exactly what they were hoping to avoid: military service.”
- “With units on the front badly depleted, Ukraine’s parliament adopted the mobilization law requiring all draft-age men to renew their personal data online or at military offices by July 16. The law also lowered Ukraine’s minimum conscription age to 25.”
- “Now that the deadline has passed, many expect a spate of draft slips to be distributed. Ukrainian officials haven’t specified how many men they intend to conscript, but the former commander in chief Gen. Valery Zaluzhny previously suggested up to 500,000 were needed to replenish ranks. Zaluzhny’s successor, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, has said significantly less men will be drafted but has not offered any details.”
- “Even before the deadline, officials said the number of newly mobilized soldiers has increased — more than doubling in May and June compared to the previous two months.”
- “Ukraine’s borders with Moldova and Romania have been the most popular for people to attempt illegal crossings, said Andriy Demchenko, a spokesman for Ukraine’s border guard service. More than 30,000 Ukrainian men have illegally crossed into both countries since the start of Russia’s invasion, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported recently, citing data from the Moldovan and Romanian border police.”
“Ukraine Goes All-In on Ground Robots,” Jack Detsch, FP, 07.17.24.
- “Ukraine’s military will be deploying robots to fight against Russia within the next year, part of a strategy to deal with a shortage of readily available human combat troops, the country’s defense industry czar said. Ukraine’s strategic industries minister, Oleksandr Kamyshin, was in Washington last week to help the country’s state defense company open an office in the United States and to work on a number of joint ventures, including a deal with Northrop Grumman to produce medium-caliber ammunition in Ukraine.”
- “This year will be the year of land systems as well, unmanned land systems,” Kamyshin said at the opening of the defense office. “We’ll see more of them on the front line. That’s one of the game-changers we expect in the nearest 12 months.” The point, Kamyshin said, is to get more troops off the front lines. “That’s the main philosophy,” he said.”
- “There are about 250 defense start-ups building unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs, across Ukraine, The Associated Press reported this week—many of them in secret to hide from Russian bombs. Ukraine’s government-funded Brave1 platform has already tested more than 50 ground systems, and Kyiv is expected to buy hundreds of them in the coming months. Ukraine has also certified at least 67 models of domestically built unmanned aerial vehicles, the vast majority of which the country’s defense ministry has contracted to buy. Kamyshin said Ukraine will produce millions of first-person-view drones, tens of thousands of midrange strike drones, and thousands of long-range strike drones this year.”
- “Experts believe the tactical payoff for fielding UGVs at scale could be enormous. “If you are advancing through a breach, and you have concealed enemy firing posts, there is a high probability they would knock out your tanks,” Jack Watling, the senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank, said in an interview in March. “If the UGVs go first but the tanks are behind them, the enemy may be detected by the UGVs—they may be killed by the UGVs if they don’t destroy them. But if they destroy them, they will reveal their position and be destroyed by the tanks.”
- “Russia's military has sustained more casualties in 18 months of war in Ukraine than in an entire decade in Afghanistan or during two campaigns in Chechnya. The impact of these casualties and the combat trauma for those who survive will have acute and lasting effects on the Russian military's ability to recruit and retain service personnel for many years.”
- “Severe casualties and a brutal command style are threatening to undo nearly 20 years of effort to create a more professional force.”
- “Russia took extraordinary measures to stabilize manpower levels, such as lowering recruiting standards; expanding financial and social benefits; and using mercenaries, convicts, and mobilization to fill its ranks. Russia will likely need to continue some of these policies to recruit and retain personnel after the war ends.”
- “Recruiting after the war concludes could be less affected as memories fade and if Russian authorities can maintain competitive material benefits. Much will depend on how the conflict ends and whether that resolution is viewed as successful.”
- “The impact on future retention is largely unknown because no military personnel can voluntarily leave military service until the government declares an end to the war. Many pillars of pre-war retention, such as discipline, good order, and perceptions of prestige, have been undermined.”
- “The Russian government is shaping domestic impressions of the war and of military performance. The government is using intangible factors to increase feelings of patriotism and duty and is progressively framing the war in Ukraine as an existential conflict against the West.”
- “The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.”
- “The key issue is not manpower. ...according to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armored vehicles. ... When the then defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, boasted in December 2023 that 1,530 tanks had been delivered in the course of the year, he omitted to say that nearly 85% of them, according to an assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think-tank, were not new tanks but old ones (mainly T-72s, also T-62s and even some T-55s dating from just after the second world war) that had been taken out of storage and given a wash and brush-up.”
- “Although the IISS estimated that in February of this year Russia may have had about 3,200 tanks in storage to draw on, Michael Gjerstad says up to 70% of them “have not moved an inch since the beginning of the war.”
- “Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive, says Mr. Gjerstad. It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Expect Mr. Putin’s interest in agreeing a temporary ceasefire to increase.”
For more analysis on this subject and military aid to Ukraine, see:
Military aid to Ukraine:
“Biden Gives Putin a Sanctuary,” George Barros, WSJ, 07.18.24.
- “I'm the guy that shut Putin down," President Biden told ABC's George Stephanopoulos in a recent interview. True, Mr. Biden has supported Ukraine. But he has only gradually eased restrictions against firing U.S.-supplied weapons into Russian territory, and he hasn't gone far enough. His half-measures severely compromise Ukraine's defense and provide Russia a haven to wage its war. The Russian military exploited that safe space to mount its renewed cross-border offensive in Kharkiv.”
- “It is absurd that Washington continues to grant Russia a sanctuary while Moscow wages unrelenting strikes across all of Ukraine and seeks to interdict Western aid. Ukraine is within its rights under international law to strike military targets in Russia. Any serious strategy to defeat Russia's intensified offensives must remove all advantages freely granted to Moscow. Several North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, including the U.K. and France, support eliminating Russia's sanctuary. It's past time for Washington to allow Ukraine to strike back without restrictions.”
For more analysis on this subject, see:
- “Deep Strikes into Russia: A Partner’s Decision for Ukraine’s Strategic Success,” Serhii Kuzan, War on the Rocks, 07.16.24.
- “Let Ukraine fly its jets from 'sanctuary bases' on NATO territory,” Jerry Hendrix, WP, 07.17.24.
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
“Russia Is Using Lawsuits to Fight the West’s Sanctions,” Maximilian Hess, FP, 07.16.24.
- “The imposition of the largest sanctions program since the Second World War in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine remains a key tool for limiting the Kremlin’s war machine. But it has inadvertently also had substantial secondary and tertiary effects, from the rewiring of European energy networks to myriad lawsuits over what insurers should have to pay for the Kremlin’s seizure of over 400 Western aircraft.”
- “Consider the June G-7 summit, where member states united on a plan for using the returns earned by Russia’s $300 billion in frozen sovereign assets to aid Ukraine, of which $200 billion are held as cash and securities at the Belgian financial company Euroclear. Leaders of the G7 have agreed to effectively monetize the future income flow on the frozen assets, and turn it into an immediate $50 billion in loans to Ukraine.”
- “It is also this treaty that Russia would ultimately use to try and have its domestic court rulings against Euroclear and other Western institutions enforced. We can be sure that there is more to come: Russia has already promised “endless legal challenges” if its assets or the income on these assets are seized.”
- “Potential vulnerability to legal action by Russia and its proxies, and a lack of credible or coherent response by the West appears to have led Euroclear to take a number of actions that are clearly not in the Western interest and are often inconsistent with its past practices. The clearing house has, for example, refused to label a number of securities as being in default in cases where the underlying entity has chosen to default rather than being forced to into default by sanctions.”
- “How should Western policymakers respond to these challenges? Firstly, by looking at the existing playbook for economic war, and treating as many claims as standard defaults and bankruptcies as possible. Secondly, by recognizing that the “international rules-based order” is in fact largely a set of established norms, particularly when it comes to creditor disputes, and that Russia has spent at least the last decade seeking to undermine these—beginning with its attempt to muck up Ukraine’s restructuring in 2014, something that continues to wind its way through the English courts.”
- “This reveals a fundamental flaw in the arguments made by proponents of the so-called “rules-based international order.” Russia can appeal to its structures too—and, slowly but surely, make sanctions even less effective than they already are. Meanwhile in the West, the powers that be continue to dither, and ignore the blueprints for economic confrontation from the past.”
Ukraine-related negotiations:
“Rethinking Trump and Ukraine,” Holman W. Jenkins Jr., WSJ, 07.17.24.
- “As little as he has said [on Ukraine], Mr. Trump has actually spoken more clearly than the Biden administration. His words, actions and history point to an outcome little different from the one Mr. Biden has been passively anticipating at least since Gen. Mark Milley let the cat out of the bag in November 2022. That outcome is a negotiated cease-fire, with or without settlement of the underlying issues.”
- “Mr. Putin's message to fellow Russians has been, Shut up, the war isn't your problem. His incentives, in my estimation, change radically if, with no end in sight, Russia finds itself fighting as much on its own territory as Ukraine's. That's where we've gotten in the wake of his failed Kharkiv push…Mr. Putin's hope of significant territorial gain is kaput, says the latest U.S. intelligence assessment.”
- “A deal might be possible and yet the signal wouldn't emerge from the parties because they judge the U.S. incapable of delivering. At times like this you might wish there were more Trump in the Biden administration -- a firm idea (however imperfect) of what it wants, the ability to sniff out a deal, the fortitude and confidence to pursue it. The Ukrainian war was only ever going to end one way, and it serves all to make the day sooner rather than later.”
- “The top priority for Ukraine and its allies should be achieving terms that minimize risks to Ukraine’s sovereignty by creating a durable, sustainable peace: long-term military aid and multilateral security guarantees, Ukrainian military neutrality, and a rebuilding effort alongside economic integration with the West.”
- “First, long-term military aid offers the best protection for Ukrainian sovereignty.”
- “Second, Ukraine should reinstate its former neutrality.”
- “Third, Ukraine must be rebuilt.”
- “While Ukraine need not relinquish its claims to territory that is rightfully theirs, insisting that all territory be returned before any negotiations, as Zelensky has, will likely detract from opportunities to cement its sovereignty. Given the choice to prioritize territorial concessions or multilateral security guarantees in peace negotiations, Ukraine would be best served by making itself as strong and steady as possible.”
- “As Ukraine and its Western allies formulate a strategy to end the war, leaders should remember what matters most in Ukraine: sovereignty. The key will be designing a peace that is not only resilient against future Russian aggression but also sustainable for the Ukrainian people. We hope that leaders in both the United States and Ukraine, armed with the knowledge of how past wars ended, can succeed in ensuring Ukraine remains sovereign and prosperous for decades to come.”
“Whose Terms Will Set a Peace Deal in Ukraine?” Eugene Chausovsky, FP, 07.18.24.
- “Two visions to end the war in Ukraine have been floated recently, and the difference in both the setting and substance of these proposals couldn’t be more stark.”
- “On the one hand was a peace summit held in a scenic resort in Switzerland, where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky promoted his 10-point peace plan to leaders and dignitaries from more than 90 countries (with Russia not among them).”
- “On the other hand was a cease-fire offer made by Russian President Vladimir Putin during an official gathering of Russian ambassadors at the Kremlin, on the conditions that Ukraine drop its ambitions to join NATO and withdraw from the four territories that Russia unilaterally annexed following its full-scale invasion of the country in 2022.”
- “Russia currently has the advantage militarily, Ukraine and the West have the advantage economically, and the political and diplomatic sphere is much more mixed. The struggles now will set the terms for negotiating peace—whenever that comes.”
- “The Levada Center has released the results of its monthly polling of Russians on Russia’s war in Ukraine and its broader stand-off with NATO. Some results, such as a record level of support for peace talks, may seem to be encouraging to doves, but the devil is in the details. More worrisome, the share of Russians who believe that an armed conflict between Russia and NATO could erupt has increased, as did the share of Russians who believe the use of nuclear weapons by their country in the context of “the current conflict in Ukraine” would be justified. In fact, every third Russian now shares this alarming belief, according to the poll’s findings.”
- “Levada polls also show that the two most common feelings elicited in Russians by its military actions in Ukraine are anxiety (including fear and horror) and pride, with the latter declining somewhat since the launch of the SVO and the former growing slightly in that period.”
- “Interestingly, as in Russia, in Ukraine, the share of those who favor peace talks is now greater than the share of those who believe the time for such talks has not come. Some 44% of respondents to a poll conducted by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center in June 2024 believe the time has come for official peace talks with Russia, while another 35% think it has not.”
- “Thus, it may seem that the support for peace talks among Russians and Ukrainians, as measured by the Moscow-based Levada and Kyiv-based Razumkov pollsters, respectively, indicates the existence of what negotiators would describe as a “zone of potential agreement” (ZOPA) between Moscow and Kyiv. However, this perception is illusory.”
- “[W]hen asked in October 2023 to elaborate on what the peace deal should entail to win their support, 31% of Russian Field’s respondents in Russia named conditions that the majority of Ukrainians continue to find unacceptable, such as annexations of parts of Ukraine (beyond Crimea), or the full capitulation of Ukraine. A more recent poll by Russian Field revealed that such demands continue to feature in Russian respondents’ answers.”
- “That conditions such as the annexation of parts of Ukraine by Russia remain unacceptable for most Ukrainians follows from the results of the Razumkov Center’s … June 2024 poll, [in which] more than 82% of respondents rejected Russia’s demands that Ukraine withdraw troops from the parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions Kyiv controls and that Ukraine recognize these regions as parts of Russia.”
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
- “When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, they [Europeans] found in him [Biden] a shepherd of sorts, who worked with them to unite behind Kyiv and shaped the response to Russia’s aggression. ... For those European leaders who consider Russia to be an aggressor that aims to swallow Ukraine and poses a real challenge to their continent’s security — and that is most of them — Mr. Biden was the person to listen to and emulate.”
- “In the wake of Mr. Biden’s announcement that he would not seek re-election this year, European leaders may be feeling some relief: A different Democratic ticket could perhaps improve the chances of defeating the Republican ticket of former President Donald J. Trump and JD Vance, and avert a total reshaping of Europe’s security posture and the U.S. role in it.”
- “But they are also aware that Mr. Biden was one of the last of his kind, an American politician who had been a fixture of what in foreign policy circles is called Atlanticism or trans-Atlanticism.”
- “Mr. Trump has said he wants to see a swift end to the war in Ukraine, something that would be likely to involve losing territory to an empowered and emboldened Russia.”
- “This would leave Europe facing a difficult dilemma. It could fall in line with a Trump deal and go back on its promises to support Ukraine in its fight with Russia. Or it could carry on without the United States, picking up the tab to support Ukraine alone. It is far from clear that the Europeans have the will and the resources to do so.”
- “Ukrainians are watching anxiously...Oleksandr Kraiev, head of the North America program at Ukrainian Prism, a Kyiv-based research group, said the twists and turns in the U.S. presidential campaign suggested that the country had entered a “prolonged period of political struggle” that could oblige any future president, even a Democrat, to focus on domestic issues and sideline foreign policy, including Ukraine.”
"China and Russia Are Breaking the World Into Pieces," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 07.21.24.
- “From Ukraine to Gaza to the South China Sea, the world is littered with crises.”
- “First, blocs are back. Not so long ago, geopolitical dividing lines were fading. Now, rival coalitions are squaring off across the globe... In Ukraine, a cohort of Eurasian autocracies — North Korea, Iran and China — is aiding Russia’s effort to shatter the norm of non-aggression. They confront a group of advanced democracies — from North America, Europe and the Indo-Pacific — who support Kyiv to sustain a larger system that has served them well.”
- “Second, the battle of ideas is on again. Russia and China didn’t get the memo about the irresistible triumph of democracy. They are rewiring international norms and organizations to make autocracies more secure.”
- “Third, the fight for techno-primacy is raging.”
- “Fourth, cutthroat competition is killing global problem-solving. Transnational challenges are getting more severe, but geopolitical tensions have impeded US-China cooperation on issues from Covid to climate change.”
- “Fifth, amid cold wars, tech wars, and trade wars, the shadow of real war has become inescapable... However the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will emerge from it with an experienced military, a mobilized economy and an epic grudge against the West.”
- “For political leaders and business leaders, navigating this age of fragmentation will require keeping some core principles in mind.”
- “First, there is no return to “normal.” Today’s crises in Ukraine, the Middle East and other hotspots aren’t freak occurrences. They are symptoms of deep, ongoing shifts that are changing the basic rhythms of global affairs.”
- “Second, you can’t have it all. ... As the leaders who attended this month’s NATO summit can attest, the cost of national security, and of safeguarding democratic values, is rising.”
- “Third, take worst-case scenarios seriously. Responsible American officials need to consider not just the possibility of a US-Russia clash or a US-China conflict — as cataclysmic as either would be — but also a global war, in which conflicts in multiple theaters erupt at once.”
- “Fourth, as geopolitics and geoeconomics become inseparable, the West needs to invest in new knowledge.”
For more analysis on this subject, see:
- “The Case for Inclusive Alliances. America Must Rediscover the Ideological Flexibility That Helped It Win the Cold War,” Jeremy Friedman, FA, 07.17.24.
- “Putin’s Naval Flotilla in a Larger Strategic Context,” Garrett Campbell, FPRI, 07.18.24.
- “How the West Misunderstood Moscow in Ukraine,” Julia Kazdobina, Jakob Hedenskog, and Andreas Umland, FP, 07.18.24.
- “Stop Wasting Captured Spies. Russian and Chinese agents should be prosecuted, not expelled,” Elisabeth Braw, 07.16.24.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “China is the anchor of Vladimir Putin’s Asia strategy. Since China stepped in to support Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in the Donbas in 2014, Moscow has become increasingly reliant on Beijing. This dependence has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.”
- “Putin has, in the past two years, created an “axis of resistance” of countries that facilitate his aggression—China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. … Given Putin’s recent trips to North Korea and Vietnam, it is becoming increasingly evident that the war in Ukraine and Russia’s threat to European security have acquired an important Asian dimension.”
- “Perhaps it is time for NATO to revisit its Asian ties. European and Asian security cannot be decoupled. … The alliance’s Washington Summit Declaration notes, for the first time, that China has become a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war.”
- “If NATO wants to ensure that Russia does not win this war, it will have to confront and deal with the new Asian realities. This will involve closer military, economic, and political cooperation with the West’s Asian allies on a number of levels, and it should also be part of a broader Western effort to counter Russia’s moves. The G7 and the E.U. should be part of this effort. The NATO+4 format (with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) could be upgraded and strengthened to meet the new challenges.”
- “American advocates who argue that the U.S. should focus on the Indo-Pacific threats it faces, and let the Europeans take care of the threats they face—primarily Russia and its war in Ukraine—are missing the point. The threats from and to Asia and the threats to and from Europe cannot be decoupled. They are part of a new nexus of authoritarian and revisionist states seeking to upend the current world order.”
“China and Russia Are Quietly Building a NATO Rival,” James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 07.18.24.
- “This month, there was an important gathering of major geopolitical actors in the capital of a founding member of their alliance, which is also a powerful energy-producing nation. No, I’m not talking about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington. The other major security alliance that held significant meetings is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which met in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, an energy giant and founding member of the SCO.”
- “How worried should the democratic alliance be? Two things really stand out in the SCO’s geopolitical ambitions.”
- “The first is the degree to which it becomes a stable platform for China and Russia to legitimize and spread their autocratic systems.”
- “The second main concern for the West is the degree to which Moscow and Beijing can use the SCO to pull important nations away from the US-led order.”
- “NATO should be paying closer attention to the growing influence, economic and military capability, and ambition of the Shanghai group. It needs to undertake plenty of quiet diplomacy, high-level visits, joint military exercises and sharing of defense technology with the now-friendly countries China and Russia are targeting for membership. The SCO isn’t a legitimate rival to the transatlantic bloc yet, but if U.S. and its allies aren’t careful, it could become one soon.”1
“No nation is an island: How China's development impacts the world,” Andrey Kortunov, CGTN (China), 07.20.24. Clues from Russian Views.
- “It would not be an overstatement to say that the communique of the third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was closely followed by the whole world. ... the session clearly underscored continuity in the political, economic, and social course set at the 20th National Congress of the CPC held in 2022.”
- “A steady economic development and social peace are essential for achieving Chinese modernization.”
- “Decisions made in Beijing directly or indirectly affect all of us. When foreigners analyze the proceedings of the session, they do it not because of an idle curiosity, but because of obvious self-interest. Look at the modern international trade system. China’s total imports and exports of goods are near a breathtaking level of $6 trillion, making China the top trading partner for more than 120 nations. China accounts for more than half of all new electric cars sold worldwide today and takes up over 80% of global photovoltaic module equipment production. It is inconceivable to imagine global markets of computers and electronics, chemicals, machinery, motor vehicles, rare earth elements, electrical equipment and many other products without keeping China's role in mind. Besides, China is a major producer and consumer of essential commodities and food stock.”
- “Of course, this interconnectedness and interdependence is mutual. The world depends on China, and China depends on the world as well. This interdependence is not regarded as a potential problem or a future liability, but rather as an achievement and an opportunity to explore further.”
- “For achieving its ambitious economic and social development goals, China needs a friendly and stable international environment. ... Further maturation of the Chinese social and economic system should enable Beijing to make an even greater contribution to building a truly multipolar world and advancing universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.”
Missile defense:
- No significant developments.
Nuclear arms:
- “What we are seeing is a growing willingness of state and non-state actors to engage in large-scale conventional and unconventional warfare, even against the interests of nuclear powers. It turns out that, without the capability to deter or win conventional wars or unconventional attacks against vital interests, a state’s nuclear arsenal is, effectively, a one-dimensional success story sitting atop a glue factory of military insufficiency.”
- “Russia’s war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022 is an example of conventional deterrence failure that, as the fighting grows in terms of economic costs and societal destruction, invites an eventual expansion to nuclear war. NATO’s considerable support for Ukraine has kept the latter in the fight, together with the tenacity of Ukrainian resistance, the ingenuity of its intelligence services and tactical commanders in force employment, and the inability of Russia to close the deal with its own conventional forces and military assets greatly outnumbering those of Ukraine.”
- “This stalemate has led to Russian frustration that expresses itself in periodic threats of nuclear first use by Putin, other members of the Russian government, and noted Russian academics. Just as NATO failed in conventional deterrence before the outbreak of war in February 2022, Russia has failed to compel extensive Ukrainian resistance, including strikes into Russian territory with drones and long-range missiles supplied by the United States and NATO allies. Sooner or later, the military stalemate in Ukraine will have to give way to negotiations and a peace agreement—however distasteful such a deal might be to hardliners on all sides.”
- “The U.S. and its allies in Europe and Asia must now expect more assertive political and military behavior from Russia and China than hitherto, and the two powers have already increased their cooperation through joint military exercises. This cooperation does not mean that their partnership will extend to combined military operations in the near future, and cooperation is far short of the military interoperability needed for shared responsibility in battle.”
- “In addition, the U.S. has allied support in Europe and Asia that is more than symbolic and capable of providing technology, training, and forces to support deterrence and defense in theater. Nevertheless, deterrence and defense requirements for this most demanding case will require policymakers with strategic vision, commanders with imagination and daring, and durable linkages among allied partners across the conflict domains of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Unfortunately, conventional deterrence and defense failure in this scenario can open the door to nuclear escalation with unforeseeable consequences.”
“Putin’s Russia Will Continue to Pursue Nuclear Escalation,” Maxim Starchak, CEIP, 07.16.24. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Unpredictable years of confrontation lie ahead.”
- “First, we’re likely to see the development of new weapons, both real and modeled. Nuclear drones, hypersonic missiles, and lasers will be a constant feature of official speeches and military exercises.”
- “Second, nuclear weapons will be moved closer to the enemy.”
- “Third, strategic missile carriers and nuclear submarines will appear more often in border areas.”
- “Fourth, there will be a buildup of conventional weapons and troops in Europe as soon as funds and manpower are available (probably once the active phase of the war in Ukraine is over).”
- “Fifth, there will be an increase in the number and scale of military exercises.”
- “Sixth, there will be more military incidents.”
- “Seventh, we will return to a nuclear arms race.”
- “Finally, and most worryingly, nuclear arsenals could—at some point—be put on high alert.”
- “Some of this is already under way. Russia has moved nuclear weapons to Belarus, and the U.S. is scouting for sites for a similar deployment. Moscow appears ready to lift the moratorium on the deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe after Washington put ground-based Typhon missile systems in the Philippines. And experts in both Russia and the U.S. are trying to justify the buildup of strategic offensive weapons. Moscow hopes its demands will be met after a changing of the guard in the West. Washington has similar hopes for Russia. It hasn’t forgotten how Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in 1985 led to nuclear arms control agreements and a stable Europe. These expectations mean that the current worrying trends could continue for years—at least for as long as Putin remains in office.”
- “The Federation of American Scientists applauds the U.S. for declassifying the number of nuclear warheads in its military stockpile and the number of retired and dismantled warheads. The decision is consistent with America’s stated commitment to nuclear transparency, and FAS calls on all other nuclear states to follow this important precedent. The information published on the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) web site today shows that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile as of September 2023 included 3,748 nuclear warheads, only 40 warheads off FAS’ estimate of 3,708 warheads. The information also shows that the U.S. last year dismantled only 69 retired nuclear warheads, the lowest number since 1994.”
- “With today’s announcement, the Biden Administration has restored the nuclear stockpile transparency that was created by the Obama administration, halted by the Trump administration, revived by Biden administration in its first year, but then halted again for the past three years.”
- “While applauding the U.S. disclosure, FAS also urged other nuclear-armed states to disclose their stockpile numbers and warheads dismantled. Excessive nuclear secrecy creates mistrust, fuels worst-case planning, and enables hardliners and misinformers to exaggerate nuclear threats.”
Counterterrorism:
- No significant developments.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant developments.
Cyber security/AI:
“Humans should teach AI how to avoid nuclear war—while they still can,” Cameron Vega, BAS, 07.22.24.
- “The use of AI-assisted nuclear decision-making has the potential to reveal and exacerbate the biases and beliefs of policymakers and strategists, including the oft-disputed idea that nuclear war can be won. AI-powered analysis incorporated into nuclear planning or decision-making processes would operate on assumptions about the capabilities of nuclear weapons as well as their estimated costs and benefits, in the same way that targeters and planners have done for generations. Some of these assumptions could include missile performance, accurate delivery, radiation effects, adversary response, and whether nuclear arms control or disarmament is viable.”
- “Not only are there risks of inherent bias in AI systems, but this technology can be purposely designed with bias. Nuclear planners have historically underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons in their calculations, so an AI system fed that data to make recommendations could also systemically underestimate the costs of nuclear employment and the number of weapons needed for targeting purposes. There is also a non-zero chance that nuclear planners poison the data so that an AI program recommends certain weapons systems or strategies.”
- “Despite this heavy skepticism, advanced AI/machine learning models could still potentially provide a means of sober calculation in crisis scenarios, where human decision-making is often clouded, rushed, or falls victim to fallacies. However, this requires that the system has been fed accurate data, shaped with frameworks that support good faith analysis, and is used with an awareness of its limitations. Rigorous training on nuclear strategy for the “humans in the loop” as well as on methods for interpreting AI-generated outputs—that is, considering all its limitations and embedded biases—could also help mitigate some of these risks. Finally, it is essential that governments practice and promote transparency concerning the integration of AI technology into their military systems and strategic processes, as well as the structures in place to prevent deception, cyberattacks, disinformation, and bias.”
- “Human nature is nearly impossible to predict, and escalation is difficult to control. Moreover, there is arguably little evidence to support claims that any nuclear employment could control or de-escalate a conflict. Highlighting and addressing potential bias in AI-enabled systems is critical for uncovering assumptions that may deceive users into believing that a nuclear war can be won and for maintaining the well-established ethical principle that a nuclear war should never be fought.”
“Governing Military AI Amid a Geopolitical Minefield,” by Raluca Csernatoni, CEIP, 07.17.24.
- “The geopolitical landscape is rife with tensions, as states and corporate giants vie for dominance in AI. There is therefore a sense of urgency among international organizations, scientists, and researchers, prompted by the potential of runaway AI developments, including disruptive applications in the military domain. If indeed AI poses an extinction-level existential threat to the future of humankind akin to the atomic bomb, as many in the field claim, the absence of a universally accepted global governance framework for military AI is a crucial concern. While this future Oppenheimer moment is worrying, the present risk of mission creep is more troubling because AI systems initially designed for specific civilian tasks can be repurposed to serve military objectives.”
- “Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has already showcased how AI is shaping military strategies and national security. Dubbed by Time’s Vera Bergengruen an “AI war lab,” the conflict has seen civilian tech firms experiment with AI tools and play critical roles in military operations. Private companies like Palantir and ClearviewAI have become pivotal actors on the battlefield by providing data analytics for drone strikes and surveillance. Such ventures raise concerns about the increasing militarization of AI as well as the ethical and legal responsibilities of the private tech sector during conflict.”
- “The EU’s engagement in the global governance of military AI is not merely a regulatory challenge but also a foreign policy, moral, and strategic imperative. Although security and defense are not EU competencies, the union cannot ignore the profound implications of the development and proliferation of military AI. To mitigate the global spread of these technologies, EU leaders need to build strategies for responsible military AI, including stronger multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral partnerships to align governance regimes.”
- “The EU also needs to ground multistakeholder coalition building and norms promotion in a shared vision of responsible military AI. One way ahead is for the EU to establish a framework for dual-use and military AI applications, drawing on the AI Act’s tiered approach to risk assessment. An EU-wide strategy would guide European military organizations and defense industries to approach these technologies responsibly. Overall, spearheading a comprehensive global governance framework for military AI is a monumental but essential task to defend the future, and it requires sustained multistakeholder advocacy and international cooperation.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- “Almost two and half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s war machine still runs on energy revenues—despite unprecedented Western sanctions that took a bite out of, but hardly battered, the Kremlin’s cash cow.”
- “Russian energy export revenues before the war were about 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion) a day, and the whole gamut of sanctions had brought that down to about 660 million euros ($720 million) by this June—but those levels have stayed remarkably steady for the past 18 months. Russia recorded a rare current accounts surplus just last month, a sign of that export health. The sanctions battle, like the war itself, seems to have stalemated.”
- “Some aspects of Russia’s energy exports have fallen off a cliff, such as its exports of natural gas via pipelines, which have all but disappeared from the lucrative European market. But the country’s exports of oil and refined oil products, which make up the biggest chunk of its sales, have stayed essentially the same after an initial hit in the first months after the introduction of Western sanctions, and state earnings even crept a little higher thanks to a rise in global oil prices.”
- “The main Western effort to curb Russian energy earnings was a balancing act meant to keep the global market supplied while limiting the Kremlin’s take by capping Russian oil sales at $60 a barrel. ... but... Russia has found a reliable way to sidestep that formal limit on its crude oil exports by using a fleet of so-called shadow tankers that don’t have to follow Western restrictions on insurance, safety, and the like. About 4 out of every 5 barrels of seaborne crude that Russia sells are now carried on shadow tankers.”
- “It’s not just oil. Russian natural gas exports are not dead yet, either, despite lots of pain for state-owned energy company Gazprom and plenty of crowing in Europe about largely weaning itself off of what used to be its biggest energy supplier. ... What’s amazing about the sharp decline in exports of Russian natural gas to what was formerly the nation’s biggest market is that Russian natural gas is not sanctioned in Europe at all, yet it has suffered the most of all of Moscow’s energy streams.”
- “But this year, Russian gas is sneaking back into Europe in liquefied form, supercooled and shipped on tankers rather than compressed and routed through pipelines. EU imports of Russian liquefied natural gas, or LNG, are up 24% over past year, especially to big Western European countries such as France, Spain, and Belgium; the bloc buys half of all Russian LNG exports.”
- “The bad news is that despite years of unprecedented sanctions on one of the world’s biggest energy providers, Russia’s cash machine is still working enough to continue underwriting the war. The relatively limited success in the battle against the country’s energy sector is mirrored by similar failings in cracking down on Russian trade in all sorts of other things, from Western machinery routed through Central Asia to the high-tech Chinese-made components needed for the war.”
Climate change:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant developments.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- “She would likely stay tough on Russia and China, and has rebuked Israel’s handling of aid into Gaza.”
- “Like Biden, Harris has been a strong backer of Ukraine in its defense against Russia and is expected to mostly continue his policies. In June, Harris represented the U.S. at the Summit for Peace in Ukraine, where she had her sixth meeting with Zelenskyy. She has voiced strong support for transatlantic cooperation on supporting Kyiv. Harris said in an interview with NBC News this year that Ukraine can continue to count on support from Washington as the war drags on. “Ukraine needs our support,” Harris said. “And we must give it.” At this year’s Munich Security Conference, Harris also reiterated the Biden administration’s pledge of supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes.”
- “She has also been a fierce critic of Vladimir Putin, blaming him for Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s death this year. And she has criticized Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian civilians as “crimes against humanity” and pledged to hold authorities in Moscow accountable. “To all those who have perpetrated these crimes, and to their superiors who are complicit in those crimes, you will be held to account,” Harris said in 2023 at Munich. More recently, Harris has criticized Trump on the campaign trail for his previous comments claiming that he would pull the U.S. out of NATO. “Donald Trump has embraced Putin,” Harris said at a July 11 campaign event in North Carolina. “It’s not just happening today. It’s been happening, as he, Trump, threatened to abandon NATO and encouraged Putin to invade our Allies.”
- “Joe Biden’s decision to drop out of the U.S. presidential race and support his VP Kamala Harris has Russian officials and scholars of U.S.-Russian relations divided on whether a Democrat can defeat the GOP’s Donald Trump in November. Boris Mezhuev, a Moscow-based political scientist, told pro-Kremlin conservative analytical portal Vzglyad in reference to Harris: “I think her prospects can be described as positive. The gap in ratings with Donald Trump is only a few percent.” According to Russian foreign policy veteran Sen. Alexey Pushkov, however, “in the battle for the presidency, Trump defeated Biden ahead of schedule.” Pushkov’s colleague, and deputy chairman of the Russian Senate Konstantin Kosachev, also believes Trump is more likely to win. Interestingly, Vladimir Pastukhov, a self-exiled opposition-minded Russian political scientist, concurs, predicting that Harris’s chances to defeat Trump are dim, while U.S.-based opposition-minded Russian scholar Konstantin Sonin is less pessimistic, putting her chances of Harris winning at 50/50.”
- “Regardless of who wins the election, the Kremlin is already claiming that Russians (42% of whom would vote for Trump) should not hold their breath on the question of how or whether U.S.-Russia relations will shift after the elections. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Russia expects “nothing good” with regard to the U.S. presidential election, predicting that Washington will continue to aid Kyiv “one way or another.” However, despite this aid, Russia will achieve its war goals, Putin’s deputy at the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev declared when commenting on Biden’s decision not to run for re-election. That decision should not sadden Russians, according to Fyodor Lukyanov, who heads Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. That said, Biden “was not the worst option as a counterpart in a tough confrontation” between Washington and Moscow, according to Lukyanov. Regardless of who becomes the next U.S. president, this leading Russian foreign policy expert predicted, “the degree of volatility [in U.S.-Russia relations] will increase.”
- “Putin’s strategy for defeating Ukraine can be summed up in one revealing moment in his February interview with the former television host Tucker Carlson. Addressing the possibility of heightened U.S. involvement in Ukraine, the Russian leader asked Americans: “Don’t you have anything better to do?”
- “All told, the arc of American foreign policy could be moving closer to Mr. Putin’s expectations of it: an inward-looking worldview that cares far less about Ukraine than Russians do, making it only a matter of time until Washington abandons Kyiv like its critics say Afghanistan was abandoned in 2021.”
- “In Moscow, analysts are poring over American polls and news reports… Dmitri Trenin, the former head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, said his conclusion from the polling is that “all foreign problems” are low on the priority list for American voters. “Putin’s strategic calculus is built on this: at some point, Americans will get tired,” said Mr. Trenin… and described Russia’s war aims as “completely appropriate.” … [W]hen YouGov surveyed Americans in June on 28 policies proposed by Mr. Biden, the least popular one — with 30% backing — was “pledging 10 years of U.S. military support for Ukraine in its war against Russia.”
- “[Putin] has shaped his foreign policy for years around the idea that America is led by a virulently anti-Russian elite pursuing world hegemony rather than the best interests of the American public — and that Russia can outlast that elite. The stakes in that bet have never been as high as they are now.”
- “Analysts believe that Putin expects that eventually, the American-led West will stop arming Ukraine and push its leaders into an armistice on Russia’s terms. … But it appears too soon for Putin to celebrate. His calculations about American policies have repeatedly been proved wrong.”
- “They’re talking about Russia in America far less than they do in Russia about America,” said Ekaterina Moore, a Russian American commentator based in Washington. “And in Russia, they would of course really like Russia to be more interesting to America.”
- “Long before the assassination attempt2 on him last weekend, Donald Trump had transformed the Republican party into a cult of personality.”
- “Yet the tyrant might be less important than the oligarchs behind him. Whereas Trump can slip through the gaps of the legal system, his backers waltz through the cellophane barrier between money and politics. The right metric for predicting Trump’s vice-presidential pick was simple: what do these supporters want?”
- “The most important is Putin, whose propagandists adore Trump and celebrate Vance. David Sacks, a Silicon Valley investor, included Russian propaganda tropes in his speech at the convention. Like Elon Musk, whose changes to X, his social media platform, have helped the Russian cause, Sacks supported Vance. In the background is Peter Thiel, without whom Vance would not have become a wealthy politician.”
- “These oligarchs’ own platform is anarchy. If there is a general rather than personal explanation for their support of a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine, with its implicit territorial reward for Russian aggression, it is likely in the desire to bring down order: to create international chaos. The war in Ukraine, an atrocity in itself, is also a test case for the aspiring global anarchists. Their man Vance refused to meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference.”
- “Ukraine is defending basic principles of international law, which is that one country may not invade another and seize its territory. Ukraine also defends the international order in a broader, geopolitical sense, demonstrating that major offensive operations are difficult. Ukrainians are thereby deterring China, making a world war less likely.”
- “By defying a nuclear power, Ukraine is also making nuclear proliferation and thus nuclear war much less likely. Were it allowed to lose, countries in Europe and Asia would likely build nuclear weapons. In short, forcing Ukraine into surrender, which seems to be the Republican platform, will lead to all hell breaking loose around the world.”
- “When Republicans cede the republic, this could create an opportunity for Democrats. Almost nothing in the Republican platform is popular. Almost no one desires regime change. Democrats who stand behind the republic — while offering an exciting ticket and a coherent future — would seem to have every chance of winning in November.”
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “Despite the small proportion of Russians who have left relative to the total Russian population (only 0.5%), the mass emigration of Russians has become the largest in the last 20 years. Previously, the largest 'wave' was considered the period from 1992 to 2004, when, according to demographers' estimates, 1.6 million people left the country.”
- “There is already a labor shortage in Russia, and it will only continue to grow. Russia entered the invasion of Ukraine already with a declining number of workers. And now a demographic pit is looming in Russia, stated Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko at a business breakfast of “Sber” at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June.”
- “In many ways, emigration, especially in the spring of 2022, as well as the ongoing one, which is not reinforced by mobilization, is characterized by a brain drain. These are people with a very high level of human capital, many are young professionals.”
- “When counting the number of Russians who have left, there are at least several limitations. Firstly, not all countries popular among new emigrants provided data. For example, the authorities of Thailand, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Greece did not respond to The Bell’s requests, and the migration and statistical authorities of Cyprus stated in their responses that they do not keep records of Russians who have moved to the island.”
“Russians Expect Nothing From Putin’s War,” Kristaps Andrejsons, FP, 07.15.24.
- “One thing that most experts agree on is that Russia has a severe political apathy problem. That’s true—but it’s also far more pervasive than even Russianists often realize. This problem is not new; it’s a continuation of Soviet-era cultural norms that have been carefully amplified and curated by Putin’s state propaganda.”
- “Recent polls by the Moscow-based Levada Center show that support for war among the general population remains high, fluctuating around the 75 percent mark. At the same time, 71 percent of respondents would also approve of immediate peace talks. Although part of this can be attributed to the “preference falsification” that researchers find is common in authoritarian states, the apathy that Putin has cultivated goes far deeper than that.”
- “In part, this cynicism is bred by the gap between propaganda and reality. Russian state media takes nationalism to extremes, but ordinary Russians know that this is nonsense, often using the phrase “war between the TV and the refrigerator” to talk about the discrepancies between broadcast propaganda and the reality of empty shelves or failing appliances.”
- “Putin has described Ukrainians as belonging to the Russian civilization—misled by the West, yes, but brothers nonetheless. My impression from talking to Russians is that at this point, they’ll support whatever Putin declares needs supporting, whatever scheme he has going on, as long as this confusing nightmare ends faster. Then everyone, ideally, could go back to business as usual, pretending that this war never even happened.”
- “Russians won’t be overthrowing their regime anytime soon. But if the war becomes a more personal problem, attitudes could shift fast. This is important, because people reevaluate their risks on a daily basis—when the regime is strong, they would rather lay low and stay on the safer side. But as soon as cracks start to appear, the very same people can suddenly turn fiercely.”
For more analysis on this subject, see:
- “What will happen when Russia runs out of Soviet-era reserves for waging war in Ukraine? Economist Igor Litpsits explains,” Republic.ru, 07.15.24. In Russian
- “Russian censors itch to trap zombie mice,” Tony Barber, FT, 07.18.24.
- “How Alexei Navalny got trapped by Russian history,” Sergei Lebedev, WP, 07.22.34.
Defense and aerospace:
“How Russia Became the Street Bully of Space,” John Shaw, WSJ, 07.15.24.
- “Russia’s new nuclear space weapon has energized White House and congressional warnings about Moscow’s irresponsibility on the global stage. Russia’s move isn’t surprising, given its frustration over the war with Ukraine and its failure to contain or fracture the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is yet another chapter in Moscow’s long decline in space leadership.”
- “The swiftest descent of Russian space leadership has happened over the past four years. In 2020 during the pandemic, a State Department colleague and I led a delegation to Vienna to discuss space security with the Russians. It was the first such meeting since 2014. We hoped the world’s two senior spacefaring nations could discuss how to limit space debris and space weapons and how to keep space open to all. Instead we sensed that the Russia delegation was merely groping for leverage against the U.S., its allies, and China. We reached no agreements, and plans to continue discussions evaporated after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.”
- “Now, the U.S. has learned that Russia is developing a new and potentially devastating antisatellite weapon. The capability appears to use a nuclear explosive to generate a powerful energy wave called a space electromagnetic pulse. If true, this capability could damage or destroy thousands of satellites. This represents the deepest nadir for Russia. As U.S. diplomats to the United Nations recently made clear, developing such a capability violates the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The Soviet Union joined the treaty and Russia remains a signatory.”
- “In November 2021, as deputy commander of U.S. Space Command, I was in our operations center watching Russia conduct an antisatellite test using a ground-launched kinetic interceptor. I expected the Russians to do an “offset test,” meaning they would deliberately miss their orbiting target by a precise amount, to validate their capability but generate no space debris. I was wrong. I grew dismayed as U.S. and allied sensors around and above the planet began reporting a large debris cloud. This wasn’t the act of a responsible nation.”
- “Vladimir Putin has called the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century.” Others can debate that. But it is clear that the fall of Russia as a senior spacefaring nation is the greatest astro-political catastrophe of the 21st century so far.”
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant developments.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
“Russia-Africa Cooperation: Outlook and Objectives,” Andrey Maslov, Vsevolod Sviridov, Amuhaya C. Ayuma , Valentin Bianki , Anna Bondarenko, Olesya Kalashnik, Nikita Panin, Andrei Shelkovnikov, Valdai Club, 07.19.24. Clues from Russian Views.
- “The first priority within the 2026 horizon would be to facilitate Russian investment in Africa by creating a favourable environment. Russia’s annual trade surplus with Africa exceeds $20 billion, which means that Russia could use at least 10 percent of this amount to launch new investment projects, including to further expand its exports.”
- “Second, technology transfers and knowledge sharing must be high on the agenda, since these processes go hand in hand with efforts to expand trade and investment cooperation and are instrumental in terms of exporting technological sovereignty.”
- “Third, the fact that both Africa and Russia are destined to play a bigger role in global politics and economics is obvious.”
- “Russia’s efforts to reinforce its positions in Africa creates new opportunities for the continent. The same holds the other way around. In fact, instead of competing against one another, Russia and Africa need each other to be strong, stable and independent. Having a shared vision for the future in which economic freedoms and trade globalization do not limit or infringe upon the diversity of values and political and civilizational systems is even more important. This forms the very foundation of our cooperation in the 21st century.”
Ukraine:
- No significant developments.
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Why China Is So Interested in Kazakhstan,” Daisuke Wakabayashi and Chang W. Lee, NYT, 07.18.24.
- “The world’s transition to renewable energy, including electric cars, requires huge amounts of nickel, copper, lithium and other so-called critical minerals. Kazakhstan has many of them, and China, the biggest producer of electric vehicles and batteries, is right next door and eager to buy.”
- “If somebody is doing geological exploration, I don’t care what flag they carry,” said Kanat Sharlapayev, Kazakhstan’s minister of industry and construction and a former Citigroup executive in Kazakhstan and the Middle East.”
- “In recent years, Kazakhstan has signed pacts with the European Union and Britain to cooperate on critical minerals. The United States held initial discussions with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries this year.”
- “It’s not just critical minerals that China wants from Kazakhstan. Beijing has invested billions of dollars, much of it as part of its Belt and Road foreign policy initiative, into upgrading Kazakhstan’s railways and other infrastructure to establish easier trade routes to Europe, an essential trading partner of China.”
- “China’s economic influence is now apparent across the country. In Almaty, Kazakhstan’s wealthiest city, new car dealerships for Chinese electric vehicle brands are popping up. On the Chinese-Kazakh border, the two countries built the Khorgos Gateway, the world’s biggest port used exclusively for handling cargo containers carried by trains. On Kazakhstan’s western border along the Caspian Sea, China invested in a container hub in the port city of Aktau.”
- “We are a natural, organic partner to China,” said Nurlan Zhakupov, the chief executive of Samruk-Kazyna JSC, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund. “We are very safe economically and politically.”
Footnotes
- For a recent sceptic view of the SCO’s capabilities see this commentary.
- For analysis of what history tells us about the assassination attempt, see “Assassination and the American Presidency: What History Tells Us,” Graham Allison, NI, 07.19.24.
The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.
Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.
White House photo available in the public domain.
Russia Analytical Report
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