This week's highlights

• Harvard professor Graham Allison is betting that Vladimir Putin will not order a nuclear strike on Ukraine. “The reason I remain hopeful is that I’m expecting that the combination of Russian success in the battle that is shaping up in the Donbas, on the one hand, and increasing pain caused by the U.S.-led and continually tightening noose around Russia’s economy and society, on the other, will lead to a stalemate where both Russia and Ukraine will settle for a ceasefire,” Professor Allison writes. CFR fellow Gideon Rose also believes that Moscow will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict.
• While Americans believe “there must be a great discontinuity between conventional and nuclear weapons, the Russians don’t consider that so anymore,” warns Siegfried Hecker, one of the most prominent U.S. experts on nuclear security. Moreover, Hecker believes “we must be concerned about Russia committing nuclear or radiological terrorism.”
• The sinking of the Russian Navy’s Moskva cruiser by Ukrainian missiles has made Putin oppose “signing anything” with the Ukrainians, according to three people briefed on conversations with the Russian leader. Instead, he has become “set on seizing as much Ukrainian territory as possible,” the insiders told Financial Times.
• The two main lessons from the Battle for Kyiv are that an invading army should “never rely on host nations’ popular support” and that such an army should “know when to quit,” according to Alex Vershinin, a retiring U.S. lieutenant colonel.
• To “bet on a world without Russia is ultimately futile because the non-western world, which may not favor the Kremlin’s war, is hardly eager to isolate Russia,” according to Ivan Krastev, chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. Cornell University professor Nicholas Mulder reminds that although almost 40 advanced economies have coordinated a “campaign to isolate Russia … much of the international community remains outside that coalition.”
• “Even in the unlikely event of a fundamental regime change, pro-Western forces such as those seen in the 1990s can hardly come to power in Moscow,” according to Alexander Lukin, the head of the Department of International Relations at Russia’s Higher School of Economics.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

"Siegfried Hecker: Putin Has Destroyed the World Nuclear Order. How Should the Democracies Respond?," John Mecklin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 04.21.22. The author, editor in chief of the publication, interviews Siegfried Hecker, emeritus fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, a former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, who says:

• “The United States has worked with Russia in various initiatives to combat global nuclear terrorism, but now we must be concerned about Russia committing nuclear or radiological terrorism.”
• “We in the United States ... thought there must be a great discontinuity between conventional and nuclear weapons. The Russians don’t consider that so anymore. And what we don’t know today, for example: Is there some point where Putin would say—because the way the war was evolving, let’s say in the eastern part of Ukraine—that he believes there is an existential conventional threat to Russia that he needs to use tactical nuclear weapons to counter.”
• “What Putin has done is to blow up the entire global nuclear order. That’s really a major hinge, a turning point in the nuclear world. That’s as big a hinge as when the Soviet Union dissolved, in my opinion.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"There’s a Reason Russian Soldiers Can’t Look Their Victims in the Face," Michael Gerson, WP, 04.22.22. The author, a columnist for the newspaper, writes:

• “It is an obscene irony of the war in Ukraine that Russian leaders use the charge that Ukrainians are ‘Nazis’ to dehumanize them, just as the Nazis used dehumanizing accusations against their own enemies.”
• “This is not merely an exercise in denigration. It has guided Russian conduct during its brutal but pathetically dysfunctional invasion of Ukraine. There are recent reports of mass civilian graves — numbering in the hundreds — in Manhush near Mariupol. Bucha’s streets were left covered with executed and mutilated bodies. More than 100 bodies have been found in Makariv. ‘They laid them on the ground face down,’ one resident said, ‘and shot them in the back of the head.’ This method for the mass killing of civilians was one way the Nazis disabled the normal revulsion that most people would feel for civilian executions.”
• “Russian leaders are conducting a historical spectacle of brutality and lies. But their atrocities arose from refusing to look Ukrainians fully in the face and from denying the reflected image of their own humanity."

“In Ukraine, Russia is Using Rape as a Weapon of War,” Tanya Domi, Haaretz, 04.18.22. The author, an adjunct assistant professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University, and a faculty affiliate of the Harriman Institute, writes:

• “The latest reports by Kyiv journalist Anastasiia Lapatina on the Bucha massacre has revealed a gruesome scenario reminiscent of the targeted rape of women and girls during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘At least 25 women and girls, as young as 14 were raped by Russians in a Bucha basement.”
• “How can we try to ensure the International Criminal Court moves quickly to forcefully uphold international laws pertaining to wartime rape?”
  • “Most immediately, the ICC must move quickly to gather forensic evidence and interview those victims willing to share their testimony.”
  • “The UN Security Council should address these atrocity crimes in session, directly calling on Russia to stop these crimes by withdrawing its soldiers and holding them publicly responsible. Its debate on sexual violence during a UNSC session last week raised visibility about these crimes.”
  • “The UN General Assembly should vote immediately to suspend Russia’s membership from the United Nations for commission of ‘gross and systematic human rights violations.’”
  • “UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sexual Violence During Conflict should deploy a team of investigators to third states where Ukrainian refugees are located to interview women survivors of rape and assist in providing a continuum of care for them.”
  • “Many victims of rape will now have unwanted pregnancies, and many Ukrainian women will fear this consequence. Lithuania is one of the first countries to step forward to donate contraceptives to Ukrainian women.” 

“Loose Language on Atrocities Will Not Help Ukraine: Biden’s Allegation of Genocide Against Russia Is Too Hasty,” Editorial Board, FT, 04.20.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “After US president Joe Biden last week suggested Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine amounted to ‘genocide,’ Volodymyr Zelenskyy lost no time in tweeting approval. ... Some human rights lawyers urge prudence, however, in how politicians describe Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine, warning that war crimes and what constitutes them have precise definitions in international law and should be left to courts and tribunals to rule upon.”
• “Biden’s suggestion that genocide is already under way goes beyond what many European leaders have been ready to say, as they fear such rhetoric could hamper diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire. It also raises questions about whether some conflicts elsewhere in the world ought to merit the same description.”
• “Frankness can be admired among politicians; wartime outrages must be denounced in the strongest terms and war leaders warned of the consequences if they cross boundaries. For democratic leaders, however, using words with care is vital at the best of times. In war, it is all the more so.”

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Lessons From the Battle for Kyiv," Alex Vershinin, RM, 04.21.22. The author, a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel retiring after 20 years of service, writes:

• “The first lesson drawn from the battle for Kyiv is ‘never rely on host nations’ popular support when invading a country.’ The entire Kyiv axis of advance seemed to be built on premises of the elite and the populace supporting the Russian invasion, or at least not resisting.”
• “The second key lesson is to ‘know when to quit,’ a lesson Russian leadership already learned in Afghanistan.”
• “Ukraine won the battle for Kyiv, but the war has just begun. The Russian government’s initial miscalculations about the level of support from the Ukrainian population undermined their plan for a quick, bloodless victory. However, the Russian government has recognized its mistakes, and after accepting a political cost, has now changed course. Most governments make mistakes; few can correct them before they turn into disaster. By changing course early, the Russian government has demonstrated itself to be a dangerous and adaptable enemy. The real challenge for Western governments lays in avoiding the same mistakes and making rapid course adjustments once mistakes become apparent.” 

“The Russo-Ukrainian War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect,” B.J. Armstrong, WOR, 04.21.22. The author, a contributing editor at the website and principal associate of the Forum on Integrated Naval History and Seapower Studies, writes:

• “The stunning sinking of the Moskva may be the turning point: As the Russian warships pull back from the coast to better protect themselves, they open more littoral maneuver space for Ukrainian forces.”
• “The adoption of greater coastal defense measures, combined with a limited guerre de razzia strategy that might even put the facilities as Sevastopol at risk, offers a clear naval strategy that will both limit the advantages the Russians established in the early weeks of the war while at the same time giving Ukrainian naval forces the opportunity to impose costs on Russian forces.”

 “Does the Sinking of the Moskva Matter and Why?” RM Staff, RM, 04.22.22. The authors, Russia Matters staff members, collected opinions from defense and military analysts on the impact of the sinking of the Black Sea Fleet flagship:

• “The sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship this month has been hailed as a poetic victory for Ukrainian forces deeply in need of a morale boost, but commentators diverge on whether the loss has practical implications that could alter the course of the war.”
• “Some, such as Ukraine’s Arkady Babchenko, claim that the sinking of the Moskva leaves warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which are involved in the blockade of Ukraine, without most of their air defense and makes a renewed assault on the city of Odesa problematic.”
• “Others, such as Russia’s Alexander Khramchikhin (perhaps predictably) downplay the military significance of the loss, arguing that it will have no effect on the course of war.”

Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:

“Don’t Expect Sanctions to Win the Ukraine War: In Recent Decades, Western Financial Penalties Have Increasingly Substituted for Military Action. Russia Shows the Limits of That Strategy,” Nicholas Mulder, WSJ, 04.21.22. The author, an assistant professor of history at Cornell University, writes:

• “Sanctions have historically worked better against small states than large ones.... A big economy will virtually always take months, if not longer, to really feel the deprivation that sanctions cause. If the goal is to quickly cripple the war-fighting power of Russia, a resource-rich, hostile nuclear power with a large army, then sanctions are of limited use.”
• “Thirty-seven3 advanced economies have coordinated the campaign to isolate Russia. This group controls about 55% of world GDP. But much of the international community remains outside that coalition. Many Latin American, African and Asian countries are reluctant to join the sanctions in part because they depend on Russian commodities and raw materials.”
• “In the event of real talks, the staged lifting of sanctions could be tied to Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.”
• “The technical ingenuity of the new generation of sanctions cannot answer important questions of politics and strategy. We don't know what victory in this economic war would look like or whether it can yield a geopolitical solution that is stable and durable. Could a nuclear power whose economy and institutions are wrecked by sanctions transition to democracy without external aid? Sanctions alone don't hold the answers. For that, the West will need positive economic measures and farseeing diplomacy.”

"Why Russia’s Economy Is Holding On," Michael Hirsh, FP, 04.22.22. The author, a senior correspondent at the magazine, writes:

• “For Putin, the biggest question going forward will be whether he can adapt his economy to long-term isolation. Other economies that have faced a similar stranglehold, like Iran’s, have done so, and Moscow can keep its banks running a long time on energy-generated subsidies if they become technically insolvent; Russia, unlike Iran, hasn’t faced a near-total strangulation of its energy exports.”

“Who’s to Blame? Sanctions, Economic Hardship, and Putin’s Fear of Color Revolutions,” Stephen Crowley, PONARS, April 2022. The author, a professor of Politics aat Oberlin College, writes:

• “There is little prospect of a mass uprising in Russia anytime soon. Sanctions and resulting hardship will be blamed on the West, as Russia’s state media portrays the country as a besieged fortress. Oil and gas revenues could remain high for an extended period. But, with time—a time that could be measured in years rather than months—the Russian government may feel compelled to undertake painful reforms to improve otherwise intolerable economic conditions. Doing so would prove precarious, as the answer to the question—Kto vinovat?—could then become Putin himself.

“The Putinomics Playbook Won’t Work Forever,” Chris Miller, War on the Rocks, 04.25.22. The author, an assistant professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:

• “Russia’s economy faces three upcoming challenges, any one of which could disrupt the balance of economic policies that have managed to ‘stabilize’ the economy by crushing Russians’ incomes.”
  • “The first challenge is that not all of the sanctions have begun to bite. The West’s financial sanctions had an immediate impact in forcing Russia to impose capital controls, but the technological restrictions will be felt over time.”
  • “Second, Western sanctions could well be intensified.”
  • “The third risk to the Kremlin’s economic strategy is the assumption that suppressing living standards is a stable political equilibrium.

Ukraine-related negotiations:

“Putin Abandons Hopes of Ukraine Deal and Shifts to Land-Grab Strategy,” Max Seddon, Henry Foy, FT, 04.24.22. The authors, correspondents for the newspaper, write:

• “Vladimir Putin has lost interest in diplomatic efforts to end his war with Ukraine and instead appears set on seizing as much Ukrainian territory as possible, according to three people briefed on conversations with the Russian president.”
• “Putin, who was seriously considering a peace deal with Ukraine after Russia suffered battlefield setbacks last month, has told people involved in trying to end the conflict that he sees no prospects for a settlement.”
• “Putin ....was infuriated after Ukraine sank the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, according to two of the people. ‘There was hope for a deal. Putin was going back and forth. He needs to find a way to come out of this a winner,’ one of the people said. After the Moskva sank, ‘Putin was against signing anything. [ . . . ] after the Moskva he doesn’t look like a winner, because it was humiliating,’ the person added.”
• “The Russian president appears to hold a distorted view of the war as set out by his generals and depicted on Russian television, the people briefed on conversations with him said.”
• “Officials in Kyiv are concerned Putin may go further than Russia’s stated goal of capturing the eastern Donbas border region and instead try to seize the whole of the south-east, cutting Ukraine off from the sea, according to people involved in trying to end the war. … Officials are increasingly worried that Moscow could resort to tactical nuclear weapons if it suffers further setbacks, two of the people said.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“What Does the West Want in Ukraine? Defining Success — Before It’s Too Late,” Richard Haass, FA, 04.22.22. 

“Biden’s Foggy War in Ukraine,” Daniel Henninger, WSJ 04.23.22. The author, an opinion columnist at the newspaper, writes:

• “Macron indirectly raised the right question: Where exactly are we going in Ukraine? Mr. Biden’s oh-by-the-way rhetoric again puts U.S. policy in a frustrating zone of unclarity. Is it possible U.S. policy is in fact inching toward helping the Ukrainians drive the Russians out of their country—victory—or is the administration working toward a Cold War containment of Russia, with a carved-up Ukraine effectively on the other side of a new Iron Curtain?”
• “Diplomatic ambiguity has its uses, and it’s possible that with its commitment to send $800 million of advanced military equipment to Ukraine, the United States goal has indeed become to help Ukraine win without publicly rubbing defeat in Mr. Putin’s face."

“About Putin's Invasion of Ukraine and How the New Cold War Actually Started in 2014,” Jonathan Alter’s Interview with Robert Legvold for Old Goats/Substack, 04.22.22. The author, a journalist and analyst, interviews Robert Levgold, a professor emeritus of Political Science at Columbia University, who says:

• “One of the difficulties that we're having is understanding how much of the Putin that we see today is the Putin who has always been there and is simply revealing himself in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, and how much this is a Putin who has evolved since he came to power in 1999. I think it's an issue of evolution. ....  he remained conflicted as late as 2004-2005, a critical turning point. The year 2004 marked the ultimate phase in the color revolutions, including in Ukraine. By that time and as a result of these events, he had begun to convince himself that the United States was committed to regime change.”
• “The question of Ukrainian neutrality would not have emerged without NATO expansion. ... I think Kennan was probably right. Had we not enlarged NATO, there might have been a chance that we would have seen a different Russia had our leaders and theirs worked harder at making Russia’s integration with the West, if not quite into the West, more attractive, more feasible and more urgent.”
• “It drives me crazy when journalists ask — even now — whether we are headed for a new Cold War. That new Cold War began in 2014.”
• “Gorbachev or another leader without Putin’s blood lust would never have done any of this. This war seems to me to confirm that particular leaders—not abstract social forces— change history, though of course it’s the interaction of the two that matters.”
• “Putin might be most dangerous [in terms of tactical nuclear weapons] if he loses this battle, or can claim nothing that looks like a victory.” 

“When Will the Winter End?,” Prokhor Trebin, Russia in Global Affairs, March/April 2022. The author, a political science scholar and defense analyst, writes:

• “The problem of today's Russia is that it is too … strong, large, and rich in population and resources to stay away from the struggle to shape the world order. At the same time, Russia is too weak to compete on equal terms with the West.”
• “Russia’s only option is to seek the status of an independent great power. This implies the existence of a zone of influence within which Russia will be able to provide conditions for its security and development.”
• “The weakening of the United States does not mean the loss of their status as a superpower. On the contrary, Washington has every chance to remain the world hegemon. To do so, the United States needs to isolate and contain China, ensure the integrity and loyalty of NATO, and get as close as possible to India as a potential key military-political and economic partner. Russia would play a secondary role in that scenario.

"To Isolate Russia is Not in the West’s Power or Interest: Treating the Entire Country as a Geopolitical Chernobyl Would Be a Strategic Blunder," Ivan Kravtsev, FT, 04.22.22. The author, chair of the Center for Liberal Strategies and a permanent fellow at IWM Vienna, writes:

• “Treating Russia as a collective Putin will be a strategic blunder. Here is why.”
  • “First, this notion will primarily benefit the Russian leader. It unwittingly gives him the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Russian people.”
  • “Second, an isolation strategy is probably self-defeating because it closes off interest in what is happening in Russia.”
  • “Third, to bet on a world without Russia is ultimately futile because the non-western world, which may not favor the Kremlin’s war, is hardly eager to isolate Russia."

“Ukraine Can Win. The Case Against Compromise,” Alina Polyakova, John Herbst, FA, 04.22.22. 

"We Need Heavy Weapons and Budget Support From the West," Denys Shmyhal, FT, 04.21.22. The author, prime minister of Ukraine, writes:

• “If Russia stops fighting, there will be peace. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine.”
• “We ask our allies to provide heavy weapons for the Ukrainian armed forces, levy new sanctions against the Russian economy and secure funding for the Ukrainian budget.”
  • “We need much more weaponry from our allies.”
  • “Secondary sanctions must be imposed to demonstrate that the west will not tolerate such aggression.”
  • “Oil and commodity embargoes, restrictions against the entire Russian banking sector — these are needed right now.”
  • “Like the taxes western companies pay in Russia, these funds finance the bombs and shells that pound Ukrainian cities.”
  • “We need financial aid from partner countries."

“The Stakes in the Battle for the Donbas,” WSJ Editorial Board, 04.22.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “If the Kremlin crushes Ukraine’s eastern army in the Donbas, it would be able to concentrate its forces for the march south. Once the south is conquered, Mr. Putin might then seek a truce that would leave a quarter or third of Ukraine in his hands. Ukraine would be left as a rump state, more dependent on Western aid."

“Putin Is Pushing Finland and Sweden Into NATO’s Arms,” Anders Fogh Rasmussen,  NYT, 04.25.22. The author, a former secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a former prime minister of Denmark, writes:

• “The change in public opinion is remarkable. Last year, an annual poll showed that only 26% of Finns wanted to join NATO. A more recent survey demonstrates this number has now increased to 68%. The same is true in Sweden.”
• “NATO’s previous posture of deterrence with Russia did not work: It failed to avoid a full-scale war in Europe. If Mr. Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he is not likely to stop there. He will continue to test NATO wherever he sees weak links. Countries that are closely aligned with the Western alliance but not protected by its Article 5 — such as Sweden and Finland — will be at risk."

“Putin’s Aggression Is Pushing Finland and Sweden Into NATO,” FT Editorial Board, 04.24.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “NATO will certainly be bolstered by Finland and Sweden’s inclusion. As well as galvanizing its eastern flank with Finland’s well-regarded armed forces, the Swedish island of Gotland is seen as a strategic bulwark. The alliance must now consider how it can protect its potential new members in the period between any application and accession, which in normal times can take anything between four months and a year for all NATO members to agree."

"Made in the Alliance: How to Shore up the Foundations of Transatlantic Solidarity," William H. McRaven, Peter Orszag, Theodore Bunzel, FA, 04.20.22. 

“Was NATO Enlargement a Mistake? Foreign Affairs Asks the Experts,” FA staff, FA, 04.19.22.

"Biden Should Scrap Talk of the ‘Liberal International Order,'" Edward Luce, FT, 04.21.22. The author, U.S. editor for the newspaper, writes:

• “When Donald Trump became US president, his critics pronounced the death of the liberal international order. The shorthand ‘LIO’ spread like a rash across think-tanks and op-ed pages. Its funeral was both premature and parochial. Like the Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy or Roman, nor an empire, the liberal international order was always more western than global — and often failed to uphold order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers a chance to reconsider this largely western concept.”
• “Putin’s .... case crystallizes two specifically American problems.”
  • “The first is that America is not a member of the International Criminal Court.”
  • “The second is America’s ability to bring a future, deposed Putin to trial. That would mean imposing regime change on Russia, which is both impractical and would be illegal under UN law.”
• “The United States can no longer afford to be selective. Either everyone submits to the rules or they will end up in history’s dustbin.”

“The Big West Is Against Us and It Will Begin to Crumble Sooner or Later,” Evgeniy Shestakov’s interview with Sergey Karaganov for Rossiskaya Gazeta, 04.18.22. The author, a correspondent for the newspaper, interviews Sergey Karaganov, director of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, who says:

• “For Russia, the only guarantee of our security will be the complete demilitarization of the territorial entity that remains [in Ukraine], along with banning this country from possessing heavy weapons, and creating friendly governments on the territory of Ukraine — on the largest possible part of that territory, but by no means on the entire territory of Ukraine.”
• “Apparently, sooner or later, we will have to raise the issue of cutting off the channels for the supply of weapons to Ukraine, which is an absolutely hostile act on the part of the West. This may create a need for escalation of strikes on military targets already outside of Ukraine as well as on transport arteries....The conflict would, therefore, expand . And it will, perhaps, transition to a higher and more terrible level of weapons. This question, unfortunately, is getting more and more acute.”
• “In Asia, a new center of the world will be quietly created, let us call it  ‘Great Eurasia,’ which, I hope, we will join, leaving the Peter the Great page of our history behind. … In order to live to see such a bright future, it is necessary to avoid a thermonuclear catastrophe, to endure the beginning difficulties with dignity, and to prevent a split in society. We will have a tough political regime and a different economy.”

“Russia and the Changes of World Order,” Alexander Lukin, A Restless Embrace of the Past? The Conference on Russia, 2022. The author, a professor and head of the International Relations department at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, wrote the following as part of a collection of conference papers edited by Sandis Šrāders and George Spencer Terry:

• “Russia could have been integrated into the Western system to a large extent either by being admitted to NATO... or by carrying out a flexible policy combining real assistance (a new Marshall Plan) with due respect for Moscow’s interests and concerns. This was a plausible scenario.”
• “From Russia’s point of view, the so-called ‘rules-based international system’ has never existed in reality. It is an utopian construct of Western ideology ... Therefore, Western accusations of Russia and China being revisionist countries undermining the international system are purely mythological as well.”
• “Russia’s foreign policy is natural in the current international situation and will most likely continue in the near future. Even in the unlikely event of a fundamental regime change, pro-Western forces such as those seen in the 1990s can hardly to come to power in Moscow. The existing geopolitical realities and political culture of the Russian population will not allow this to happen.

"World Order: The Limits to Revisionism," Oleg Barabanov, Valdai Club, 04.22.22. The author, program director of the Valdai Club, writes:

• “One of the characteristic features of this ‘pre-February 24’ world order was the dialectical struggle between the Western center of power and the major non-Western powers that sought to challenge it. … From our point of view, the concept of the multipolar world has not worked in the current situation. Only cautious phrases — calling for all that is good and against all that is bad are heard from the non-Western poles (except for Russia itself, of course).”
• “Perhaps most importantly, the case of Russia has made all other non-Western countries with revisionist political ambitions ask themselves the following question: Should they follow the path of Russia in order to achieve their goals? Or should we choose other ways to advance our ambitions? Or is it better to abandon these ways altogether, and instead become that - a ‘normal country’ — in the Western sense of that word?”

“How Pentagon Contractors Are Cashing in on Russia’s Invasion,” William Hartung, Julia Gledhill, TomDispatch/Responsible Statecraft, 04.19.22. The authors, respectively a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an analyst at the Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight, write:

• “For U.S. arms makers the greatest benefits of the war in Ukraine won’t be immediate weapons sales, large as they are, but the changing nature of the ongoing debate over Pentagon spending itself...Indeed, Pentagon officials like Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks promptly cited Ukraine as one of the rationales for the Biden administration’s proposed record national-security budget proposal of $813 billion, calling Russia’s invasion ‘an acute threat to the world order.’”
• “Coming up with a sensible, realistic, and affordable defense policy, always a challenge, will be even more so in the midst of the Ukrainian nightmare. Still, given where our taxpayer dollars go, it remains all too worthwhile.”
  • “Such a new approach should include things like reducing the numbers of the Pentagon’s private contractors, hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom are engaged in thoroughly redundant jobs that could be done more cheaply by civilian government employees or simply eliminated. It’s estimated that cutting spending on contractors by 15% would save around $262 billion over 10 years.”
  • “The Pentagon’s three-decades-long near $2 trillion ‘modernization’ plan to build a new generation of nuclear-armed bombers, missiles, and submarines, along with new warheads, should, for instance, simply be scrapped in keeping with the kind of ‘deterrence-only’ nuclear strategy developed by the nuclear-policy organization Global Zero.”
  • “And the staggering American global military footprint — an invitation to further conflict that includes more than 750 military bases scattered on every continent except Antarctica, and counterterror operations in 85 countries — should, at the very least, be sharply scaled back.

“The Reason Intelligence Agencies Keep Getting It Wrong,” Gershom Gorenberg, WP, 04.20.22. The author, an Israeli historian and journalist, writes:

• “Intelligence agencies have a poor record of crucial predictions lately, at least of those that have become public knowledge.”
  • “In mid-February this year, ‘U.S. officials’ — in the usual anonymous style — expected Russia to take Kyiv in several days and all of Ukraine in about a week. Russia's own strategy assumed no resistance, believing Ukrainians would greet the invaders with flowers as liberators.”
  • “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, figured in U.S. expectations as someone to evacuate from Kyiv. Zelenskyy himself labeled the threat of invasion as mere ‘psychological pressure,’ which fit the Ukrainian intelligence assessment that Russia was bluffing and wouldn't attack.”
• “Why so many mistakes?  History doesn't repeat itself, but it does echo. The echoes of intelligence history teach that the field's core mistake is too much confidence in predicting how people — individuals and whole nations — will act.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"One of China’s Leading Realists: How China Sees the Russia-Ukraine Conflict," Wang Yiwei, Duan Mingnong, NI, 04.22.22. The authors, respectively the director of the Institute of International Affairs and a graduate student at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China, write:

• “The Russia-Ukraine conflict may become a protracted war, which may continue to influence the world for a decade or more. The prospect of a quick resolution is dim.”
  • “After this conflict, Europe’s strength will certainly be diminished, and the continent will face tougher internal divisions.”
  • “China’s role is different from that of Russia: the background of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not applicable to China or its neighbors. Likewise, though there are occasional conflicts minor conflicts in Asia, the region has not partaken in any of the four recent wars that Europe has experienced. Nor has it endured anything similar at home — something that was possible thanks to China’s peaceful rise.”
  • “Because Europe will come out of this conflict weakened, the United States may use this conflict to further reverse globalization and turn its gaze towards the Indo-Pacific.”

“The Ukraine Crisis and Its Aftermath,” Qin Gang, NI, 04.18.22. The author, China’s ambassador to the United States, writes:

• “The Ukraine crisis is agonizing. One more minute the conflict lasts means one more hardship for the 43 million Ukrainian people. To end this unwanted conflict as soon as possible is more important than everything else.”
• “To reverse this situation, there must be not only an end to this war, but also a fundamental answer to lasting peace and stability in Europe, and a balanced, effective, and sustainable philosophy and architecture for its security.”
• “The contrasting shifts over the thirty years on the two ends of the Eurasian continent should shed some light on how security can be ensured for Europe and the world. After the Cold War, when Europe chose to use NATO’s eastward expansion to preserve security, on the other side of the continent, China, Russia, and Central Asian countries initiated the Shanghai Five mechanism, in an unprecedented exploration of a new security philosophy and model.”
• “U.S.-Russia relations are sliding into a new Cold War, which is not in the interest of either China, the United States, or Russia, and is not what China wants to see. After all, a worse Russia-U.S. relationship does not mean a better China-U.S. relationship, and likewise, a worse China-Russia relationship does not mean a better U.S.-Russia relationship, either. More importantly, if the China-U.S. relationship is messed up, that does not augur well for Russia-U.S. relations or the world.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

"Would Putin’s Russia Really Nuke Ukraine?" Grahaam Allison, NI, 04.22.22. The author, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School and principal investigator of Russia Matters, writes:

• “In Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, could he conduct a nuclear strike on a Ukrainian city? Unfortunately, but unquestionably, the answer is: yes.”
• “Will Putin order a nuclear strike on a Ukrainian city? I’m betting not. But the reason I remain hopeful is that I’m expecting that the combination of Russian success in the battle that is shaping up in the Donbas, on the one hand, and increasing pain caused by the U.S.-led and continually tightening noose around Russia’s economy and society, on the other, will lead to a stalemate where both Russia and Ukraine will settle for a ceasefire.”
• “Additionally, with the West flooding weapons into Ukraine, if Ukraine were to ‘win’ the battle for the Donbas, as many Ukrainians now imagine they could, and indeed if they could push Russian forces entirely out of occupied Ukrainian territory, then what? In this case, my bet about whether Putin goes nuclear flips. To state the central analytic point more clinically: if conditions on the battlefield force Putin to choose between losing and escalating the level of destruction, I’ll give it three-to-one odds that he escalates.”
• “If Putin goes nuclear, what will the United States do? Certainly, the menu will include no good choices. This makes all the more urgent the necessity to end the killing now—even if it leaves Putin in control of enough Ukrainian territory for him to believe that he can spin this to his Russian subjects as a victory. On the larger canvas, while avoiding a third world war, and even worse than that, an ultimate nuclear Armageddon, the United States, its European colleagues, and the remarkably courageous Ukrainian people must do everything we can to ensure that Putin suffers a decisive strategic defeat—and that having survived this horror, Ukraine emerges as a successful, vibrant democracy.”

“Why the War in Ukraine Won’t Go Nuclear. Old Rules Still Apply to a New Era of Limited Conflict,” Gideon Rose, FA, 04.25.22. 

“How to Deter Nuclear War in Ukraine,” Robert C. O'Brien, WSJ, 04.19.22. The author, chairman of American Global Strategies LLC, who served as White House national security adviser in 2019-2021, writes:

• “If Ukrainian forces push Russia out of the Donbas and even Crimea, there would be no way for Mr. Putin to hide Russia's humiliating loss from its people. If such an outcome became likely, would he use one of his thousands of ‘tactical’ or ‘battlefiel’ nuclear devices to take out Kharkiv, Odesa or even Kyiv in an attempt to save face and end the war on terms he dictates?”
• “The time is now to deter Russia from ‘escalating to de-escalate.’ The United States must unambiguously communicate to Moscow what lies ahead if it goes down this terrible path. Mr. Putin and his supporters need to understand that if he detonates a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the U.S. response will be swift and significant -- far exceeding the limited export sanctions under consideration around the world in response to Russian atrocities in Bucha. America and its allies shouldn't retaliate in kind, with nuclear weapons.”
• “The same strong and well-messaged deterrence that kept the free world safe from nuclear attack during the long years of the Cold War must be restored to avert a nuclear tragedy in Ukraine. If it isn't, the risk of Russian miscalculation will rise — as will the even greater risk of nuclear escalation beyond Ukraine.”

"Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and NATO’s Crisis of Nuclear Credibility," Tyler Bowen, WOR, 04.20.22. The author, a postdoctoral fellow in the Kissinger Center at Johns Hopkins SAIS, writes:

• “What is important is not making sure that NATO has more tactical nuclear warheads than Russia or that they are able to stop a Russian advance on their own. NATO’s nuclear weapons would primarily have a political effect: threatening a breach of the nuclear threshold. The current arsenal of around 130 tactical nuclear weapons should be sufficient for that task.”
• “Such an asymmetric escalation strategy is not ideal and carries great risks, but it is a product of past decisions to expand NATO without first developing real plans for the defense of new members. NATO expansion came at a time when policymakers assumed that the risk of war in Europe was low and thus did not have to think about the dynamics of great power war or escalation. Putin has disabused Western leaders of their naïveté and in the process shown himself to be aggressive and risk-acceptant in the pursuit of ambitious goals. Threatening early nuclear use in a NATO-Russia conflict may be the best way to protect Europe from Putin’s recklessness.”

“Russia’s Nuclear Threats in the War Against Ukraine,” Liviu Horovitz, Lydia Wachs, SWP, 04.20.22. The authors, international security associates with the organization, write:

• “Moscow’s nuclear threats must be taken seriously, but there is no reason for panic.”
  • “First, when it comes to further aiding Ukraine’s war effort, it is important to realistically assess the likelihood of Russian nuclear weapons use. On the one hand, should NATO intervene directly in the war or actively work for regime change in Moscow, this could indeed generate further risk of nuclear escalation. However, the West is currently far from breaching the relevant thresholds. On the other hand, as the brutality of the war grows, public pressure to take steps that could bring the conflict closer to the nuclear threshold will increase.”
  • “Second, Berlin should convey to the German public that the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely.”
  • “Berlin also needs to seriously consider the long-term effects of Russia’s war of aggression and threatening gestures. Even the attempt to shield the invasion from outside intervention by using nuclear deterrence will have negative consequences, and these consequences will be especially problematic should Russia win the war. The German government therefore has a strategic interest in preventing this outcome.”

“The Role of Terrorism in Great Power Competition,” Daniel Byman, NI, 04.23.22. The author, a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy, writes:

• “Confronting major powers, especially Russia, to say nothing of smaller powers like Iran, also requires counterterrorism.”
• “Russia’s far-ranging activities offer one guide for how great powers might incorporate support for terrorism into their foreign policies. Even after the invasion of Ukraine when Washington was condemning Moscow on a regular basis, the United States did not call Russia a sponsor of terrorism, but many of its actions fit into that category. China, so far at least, seems far more focused on crushing domestic dissent than on supporting terrorists and insurgents abroad, though India claims Beijing supports separatists in northeast India. As competition with the United States heats up, however, Beijing could change, and the Russian model is useful not only for what it says about Moscow’s current approach to terrorist groups, but also how other major powers might use them.”
• “The question today is not about a choice between the terrorism threat and the great power competition challenge. Rather, it is how to use the weapons America has honed and wielded for two decades more effectively, recognizing that the challenge differs and the response must change as well in this new era.”

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” Erica Lonergan, Keren Yarhi-Milo, War on the Rocks, 04.21.22. The authors, respectively an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, write:

• “From its opening moments, the conflict in Ukraine has involved a nuclear dimension. On Feb. 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin ominously warned of ‘consequences you have never seen’ if other countries tried to get involved in Ukraine — an implied nuclear threat. Several days later, Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces would be put on a ‘special combat readiness’ status. More recently, Dmitry Medvedev, a senior Russian official, warned that if Finland and Sweden join NATO, ‘there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic.’”
• “So far, the Biden administration has attempted to dismiss Russia’s announcement as irresponsible saber-rattling. But as Putin continues issuing nuclear threats, policymakers are likely to feel growing pressure to respond. In particular, they may be tempted to find ways to signal to Russia to deter the use of nuclear weapons. One way this might be done is through cyber operations. In fact, some cyber experts are already calling for the United States to consider cyber attacks against Russia for signaling purposes. For example, writing in the Washington Post, Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to conduct a cyber ‘shock-and-awe demonstration,’ such as disrupting the internet throughout Russia, to signal U.S. resolve. But this would be a terrible idea.”
• “Conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.”
• “The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds, just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict, like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Kremlin Insiders Alarmed Over Growing Toll of Putin’s War in Ukraine," Bloomberg, 04.20.22. The article, authored by newspaper staff, reads:

• “Almost eight weeks after Vladimir Putin sent troops into Ukraine, with military losses mounting and Russia facing unprecedented international isolation, a small but growing number of senior Kremlin insiders are quietly questioning his decision to go to war. … The ranks of the critics at the pinnacle of power remain limited, spread across high-level posts in government and state-run business. They believe the invasion was a catastrophic mistake that will set the country back for years, according to ten people with direct knowledge of the situation. All spoke on condition of anonymity, too fearful of retribution to comment publicly.”
• “So far, these people see no chance the Russian president will change course and no prospect of any challenge to him at home. More and more reliant on a narrowing circle of hardline advisers, Putin has dismissed attempts by other officials to warn him of the crippling economic and political cost, they said.”
• “Some said they increasingly share the fear voiced by U.S. intelligence officials that Putin could turn to a limited use of nuclear weapons if faced with failure in a campaign he views as his historic mission. … Senior officials have tried to explain to the president that the economic impact of the sanctions will be devastating, erasing the two decades of growth and higher living standards that Putin had delivered during his rule, according to people familiar with the situation. Putin brushed off the warnings, saying that while Russia would pay a huge cost, the West had left him no alternative but to wage war, the people said. Publicly, Putin says the ‘economic Blitzkrieg’ has failed and the economy will adapt.”
• “In the weeks since the invasion started, Putin’s circle of advisers and contacts has narrowed even further from the limited group of hardliners he’d regularly consulted before, according to two people. The decision to invade was made by Putin and just a handful of hawks including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, General Staff chief Valery Gerasimov, and Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, these people said.”
• “Roman Abramovich had to disabuse Putin of his conviction that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a former comedy actor, would flee the country once the invasion began, according to people familiar with the conversations.”

“The Five Conspiracy Theories That Putin Has Weaponized,” Ilya Yablokov, NYT, 04.25.22. The author, a historian of Russian media, writes:

• “It is impossible to know what is inside Mr. Putin’s head, of course. But to judge from his bellicose and impassioned speeches before the invasion and since then, he may believe the conspiracy theories he repeats. Here are five of the most prevalent theories that the president has endorsed, with increasing fervor, over the past decade. Together, they tell a story of a regime disintegrating into a morass of misinformation, paranoia and mendacity, at a terrible cost to Ukraine and the rest of the world.”
  1. “The West wants to carve up Russia’s territory”
  2. “NATO has turned Ukraine into a military camp”
  3. “The opposition wants to destroy Russia from within — and is backed by the West”
  4. “The global L.G.B.T.Q. movement is a plot against Russia”
  5. “Ukraine is preparing bioweapons to use against Russia”
• “From battles of words on talk shows and online, conspiracy theories have effectively turned into a weapon that kills real people. That’s scary enough. But the most frightening thing is that Mr. Putin, waging war without restraint, seems to believe them.”

“Russians are told they have two choices: Win this war or be destroyed,” Leonid Ragozin, WP, 04.22.22. The author, a Russian journalist, writes:

• “How do Russians justify support of what so far has been a series of crimes against humanity committed against a people who are the transnational-relationship equivalent of next of kin? The Kremlin employs two related narratives here.”
  • “The first paints the enemy as the West, not Ukraine. This framing turns Russia into the smaller, weaker side in the conflict — a victim, not a perpetrator. The war, in this scenario, emerges as the climax of an escalation driven by the West as NATO gradually expanded toward Russian borders in the last three decades.”
  • “Medinsky the negotiator, who is better known in Russia as an architect of the historical narratives promoted by Putin's regime, expresses the second framing best: ‘Russia's very existence is at stake now,’ he said last month. Russia, in this telling, is going through a period like the one that led to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, or the one when the Soviet system was falling apart in the early 1990s.”
• “Some pro-Kremlin commentators, including the editor of a key history journal and a well-known writer, have recently taken to branding members of the Russian opposition ‘internal Ukrainians.’ The implication is that anti-Putin Russians should be treated with the same cruelty as Ukrainians, because they want to destroy Russia.”
• “Russians face few choices that don't lead to self-destruction.” 

“Why Regime Change in Russia Might Not Be a Good Idea,” Timothy Frye, Politico, 04.12.22. The author, a professor of post-Soviet foreign policy at Columbia University, writes:

• “Overthrowing a personalist autocrat is not easy. Because individual elites can rarely remove a dictator on their own, they need a party, business organization, tribe, or military to stand behind them and assure that others will follow their lead. Recognizing this threat, personalist autocrats weaken organizations that enable elites to coalesce against them.”
• “For the moment, there are scant signs of Putin being ousted any time soon... [but]... there are a couple of factors... that should worry Putin.”
  • “Sanctions and corporate withdrawals will continue to degrade Russia’s economy, punish Russia’s wealthy, and threaten the government’s solvency.”
  • “Wars in autocratic regimes that go badly have brought political change.”
• “Personalist autocrats tend to be replaced by other personalist autocrats, not democracies; research by Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz found that only 20% of personalist autocracies are replaced by democracies. Russia’s great power status also may bolster the likelihood that a post-Putin Russia will remain autocratic.”
• “A Russia without Putin that remains a personalist autocracy may disappoint those hoping for a Russia that is less corrupt, repressive and at peace with its neighbors. In the end, real political change in Russia will require more than removing Putin.”

“Russia on the Road to Dictatorship,” Sabine Fischer, SWP, April 2022. The author, research director of the organization's Eastern Europe and Eurasia division, writes:

• “In deciding to invade Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and his circle have taken their country from autocracy to dictatorship, and to the brink of the abyss.”
• “If the invasion of Ukraine leads to political change in Russia, one must be prepared for different scenarios, of which the positive are not the most plausible. Three aspects must be considered:”
  1. “If its pinnacle is destabilized the power vertical faces acute danger of collapse. And if the Russian political system implodes a major destabilization must be expected. Regional secessionism, violence, even civil war would not be excluded. The biggest risk in this context would be Ramzan Kadyrov’s reign of terror in Chechnya.”
  2. “Vladimir Putin’s worldview is shared by an overwhelming majority of the Russian political elites. A political transition negotiated among elite groups would therefore offer scant prospect of substantive political change, especially with respect to foreign policy, Ukraine and the Russian neighborhood.”
  3. “The transition to dictatorship has enormously exacerbated the atomization of Russian society.”
• “None of this is an argument against sanctions.”

“Do Russians Really Support the War?” Tony Barber, FT, 04.22.22. The author, the newspaper’s Europe editor, writes:

• “Measuring public opinion in a climate of political repression is a hazardous business.”
• “Do Russians support Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine? Do they support Putin? Just how accurate are opinion polls in an authoritarian system that silences critics and punishes dissent?”
  • “Let’s start with an Instagram post from the Russian business tycoon Oleg Tinkov. ‘Of course there are morons who draw Z [a symbol of Russia’s armed forces], but 10% of any country are morons. 90% of Russians are AGAINST this war!’ he wrote this week.”
  • “In my view, the most interesting survey is one that was conducted on March 24-30 and published this month by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Center — which is Russia’s most reputable, independent polling group. According to the survey, some 53% of Russians strongly support and 28% somewhat support their country’s military operation in Ukraine. A similarly large majority expresses a favorable view of Putin.”
    • “Two experts on Russian public opinion at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, put their finger on the problem. ‘In the current environment of extreme censorship in Russia, it’s very difficult to know what to make of polls and of public opinion in general,’ wrote Jordan Gans-Morse less than a month after the invasion.”

“The Kremlin’s ‘Holy War’ Against Ukraine,” Editorial Board, FT, 04.19.22. The newspaper’s editorial board writes:

• “The idea of a ‘holy war’ in Europe may seem like a throwback to centuries past. Yet that, in essence, is how, and its head, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, have portrayed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. .... Though not formally a part of it, the Russian Orthodox Church has become a de facto pillar of Putin’s autocratic regime.”
• “Lord Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury … said there is a ‘strong case’ for expelling the Russian church from the World Council of Churches, unless Patriarch Kirill condemns the killing of members of his ‘own flock’. While there might be moral arguments for such a move, it … might only fuel Moscow’s siege mentality — and the narrative that it is engaged in a righteous religious war.”

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine After the War. How the Country Can Tackle Corruption and Revive Its Democracy," Melinda Haring, Jacob Heilbrunn, FA, 04.21.22. 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Rattled by Ukraine War, Moldova Strives to Dodge Russia’s Long Shadow,” Monika Pronczuk, Jeffrey Gettleman, NYT, 04.23.22. The authors, reporters for the newspaper, write:

• “[Moldova’s] Transnistria’s situation mirrors that of Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Russia-backed separatists rebelled after the anti-Russian 2014 rebellion, setting off a chain of events that led to war. Transnistria also complicates Moldova’s aspirations to join the European Union. ’We’d be happy to be part of the E.U.,’ said Serghei Diaconu, the deputy interior minister. But, he added, half-jokingly, Transnistria was ‘a big pain’ that could discourage the E.U. from accepting Moldova.”
• “Joining NATO would be an even taller order. Neutrality is enshrined in Moldova’s constitution, a holdover from the early 1990s, when it tried to stand on its own without antagonizing Russia. Now, Moldova’s leaders are questioning the wisdom of that approach. ‘If you ask me whether neutrality is going to keep us safe, I don’t know,’ said Ms. Sandu, the president. ‘It did not help over the last three decades to convince Russia to take its troops out of the country.’”
• “The geopolitical tightrope the country is forced to walk, in the eyes of many Moldovans, means its future is intertwined with Russia’s.”