The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Oct. 8, 2025

Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

Oct. 7 update:  In the past week, Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 2025, Russia has gained 34 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, up from the previous week’s gain of 13 square miles, which constitutes an increase of 162%. In the past four weeks (Sept. 9–Oct. 7, 2025), Russian forces gained 166 square miles of Ukrainian territory, a slight increase from the 160 square miles these forces gained during the previous four-week period (Aug. 12–Sept. 9, 2025). Since Jan. 1, 2025, average Russian monthly gains have been 168 square miles. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin and his senior officials, have taken turns this week to threaten a range of consequences if Donald Trump approves the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv, including a Russian attack on a military base in Poland in a "qualitatively new stage of escalation” and an increased risk of WWIII.

Territorial Control (figures as of Oct. 7, 2025)

 

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and change in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

  • Since Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +28,484 square miles. 12% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the size of the U.S. state of Iowa).
  • Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
    • Russia: +45,109 square miles. 19% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio.)1
  • In the period of Sept. 9–Oct. 7, 2025: Russian forces gained 166 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase from the 160 square miles it gained from the previous four-week period of Aug. 12–Sept. 9, 2025.2 Since Jan. 1, 2025, the average monthly rate of Russian gains has been 168 square miles.
  • In past week (Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 2025): Russia gained 34 square miles of Ukrainian territory (about one and a half Manhattan islands)—a 162% increase over the previous week’s (Sept. 23–30, 2025) gain of 13 square miles.
  • In Russia, Ukraine’s foothold across Kursk and Belgorod regions stayed the same this week as last (Sept. 23–30, 2025): 4 square miles.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–September 2025.(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

  • Russia: More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli.3 50,000 missing.
  • Ukraine: 400,000 killed or injured, according to a January 2025 estimate by Zelenskyy.4 35,000 missing.

Civilian fatalities

Military vehicles and equipment6

  • Russia: 22,909 lost.
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 13,293.  
    • Aircraft: 332.7
    • Naval vessels: 22.8
  • Ukraine: 9,974 lost.
    • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,057.
    • Aircraft: 188.9
    • Naval vessels: 35.10

Citizens displaced

  • Russia:
    • Internally displaced: 5,000 as of August 2025.
    • 800,000 left Russia for economic or political reasons, 0.6% of Russian population.
  • Ukraine: 9.5 million displaced Ukrainians, 22% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44 million, including:
    • Internally displaced: 3.8 million as of September 2025.
    • International refugees: 5.7 million, as of September 2025.

Economic impact11

  • Russia’s economic growth: 5.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 0.9% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit in 2024: 1.7%  of GDP.
    • Russian ruble: 0.01205 U.S. dollars. 2% since the invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 14.8%.
  • Ukraine’s economic growth (negative): -22.6% GDP since 2022 (through 2024)
    • 2% GDP growth forecast for 2025.
    • Budget deficit in 2024: 20.4% of GDP, excluding grants.
    • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02417 U.S. dollars. -28% since the invasion.
    • 3-year bond yield: 25.1%.

Infrastructure

  • Russia:  
    • A journalistic investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector have caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
    • As of early October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these attacks, according to Russian energy market data. (RM, 10.03.25)
  • Ukraine:  
    • Ukraine's extensive transmission infrastructure has suffered severe damage in the war, with capacity falling from 56 GW to an estimated 9 GW by the end of 2024.
    • Some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 25 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied as of 2024.12
      • For one visualization of vulnerability of Ukraine’s power grid to Russian aggression, see this FT product, updated June 17, 2025.
    • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
    • Ukraine relied for 2/3rds of its electricity generation on three functioning Soviet-era NPPs, which it still controls, as of 2024.
    • Russia has damaged around 40% of Ukraine’s gas production facilities as of early 2025.
    • Ukraine's energy infrastructure is operating at only about one-third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.

Popular support

  • Russia: 62% support peace negotiations.13
  • Ukraine: 74% support negotiated peace (along the current front line and backed by Western security guarantees)

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

  • Ammunition supply
  • Foreign military aid
  • Force generation
  • Military leadership
  • Training
  • Morale
  • Control of strategic locations
  • Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

 

Footnotes:

  1. According to Ukraine's DeepState OSINT group's map, as of Oct. 7, 2025, Russian forces occupied a total of 115,026 square kilometers of Ukrainian land (44,412 square miles, almost equal to the total area of the U.S. state of Ohio), which constituted 19% of Ukrainian territory.
  2. RM will only include weekly percentage change if the percentage change is greater than +/- 10%.
  3. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
    1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
    2. 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
    3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
    4. More than 700,000, according to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
    5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
    6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
    7. 100,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war this year, NATO Secretary General Matt Rutte said in July 2025.
    8. 219,000 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukraine war, according to Meduza and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
    9. More than 50,000 inquiries have been submitted by Russians seeking missing soldiers through Ukraine’s "I Want to Find" project, according to Ukrainian media.
  4. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
    1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
    2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
    3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
    4. 400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
  5. This estimate was given by Russia’s Investigative Committee in March 2025. A July 2025 estimate by Russia’s Foreign Ministry put the total number of “peaceful residents” who were allegedly killed by “actions of the Ukrainian authorities and their armed formations” from early 2022 to June 2025 at “almost” 7,500.
  6. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List Of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html. According to a June 2025 study by CSIS, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery, and 1,865 tanks since January 2024.
  7. Oryx is not updating its estimates of aircraft losses as of June 24, 2025. In May 2025, Ukraine claimed to have shot down two Russian Su-30s by missiles launched from drone boats. On June 1, 2025 Ukraine destroyed an estimated total of 11 to 12 Russian strategic bombers. On June 7, 2025 Ukraine said  that its forces shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet over the Kursk region, according to MT. On June 27, 2025, Ukraine claimed to have struck four Su-34 aircraft in Russia’s Volgograd region.
  8. Oryx is not updating losses of warships as of January 1, 2025. According to a May 2025 estimate by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, since the war’s start, Russia has lost at least 10,000 ground combat vehicles, including more than 3,000 tanks, as well as nearly 250 aircraft and helicopters and more than 10 naval vessels.
  9. Oryx is not updating its estimates of aircraft losses as of June 24, 2025. Ukraine was reported to have lost 3 F-16s as of May 2025. On June 28, 2025 Ukraine admitted to losing a pilot and his F-16 jet. Then on Sept. 11, 2025, Ukrainian Su-27 pilot Maj. Oleksandr Borovyk was reported to have been killed on while carrying out a combat mission.
  10. Oryx is not updating losses of Ukrainian warships as of Jan. 1, 2025. Thus, this number excludes the Ukrainian Navy's reconnaissance ship, Simferopol, which was sunken by a Russian naval drone strike in the Danube River estuary on Aug. 28, 2025.
  11. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov ; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. This count does not include the loss of the Ukrainian reconnaissance warship near the mouth of the Danube river where it was attacked by a Russian naval drone on Aug. 28, 2025.
  12. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.
  13. As many as 80% would support Putin's decision to end the conflict without any conditions this week, according to Levada's latest poll. However, if that decision was accompanied by returning the annexed territories, only 33% would support it (an increase of 5 percentage points since February), according to the Levada Center's September poll.

* This card was produced by RM staff and research assistant Maryana Schnitser.

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