Find past issues in the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card archive. 

Feb. 10, 2026, update: RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Jan. 13–Feb. 10, 2026) indicates that Russian forces gained 182 square miles (area roughly equivalent to 2 Nantucket Islands) of Ukraine’s territory during that period, an increase over the 79 square miles Russia gained over the previous four-week period (Dec. 16, 2025–Jan. 13, 2026). Russian forces, which have been reported this week to be close to capturing three key Ukrainian towns,¹ are preparing an offensive likely starting as early as late April, and focused on the Slovyansk–Kramatorsk and/or Orikhiv–Zaporizhzhia City axes, according to ISW. Meanwhile, Financial Times reports that under U.S. pressure, Volodymyr Zelenskyy plans to announce on Feb. 24 his plan for wartime presidential elections and a referendum on a peace deal. The U.S. wants that deal finalized by June so that Donald Trump can focus on the U.S. midterm elections, according to Axios.

Territorial Control (figures as of Feb. 10, 2026)²

Russian Advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia as of Feb. 10, 2026

Report Card*

Change in Russia’s control of Ukrainian territory and change in Ukraine’s control of Russian territory

(Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.)

• Since Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +29,210 square miles. 13% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to half the U.S. state of Illinois).
• Total area of all Ukrainian territory Russia presently controls, including Crimea and parts of Donbas, Russia had seized prior to the full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022:
  • Russia: +45,835 square miles. About 20% of Ukraine. (Area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Pennsylvania.)³
• In the period of Jan. 13–Feb. 10, 2026: Russian forces gained 182 square miles of Ukrainian territory (area roughly equivalent to 8 Manhattan islands). In 2025, the average monthly rate of Russian gains was 171 square miles. From Jan. 1–27, 2026, Russia gained 106 square miles. For comparison, Russia’s gains from Dec. 2–30, 2025 were 117 square miles.
• In the past week (Feb. 3–10, 2026): Russia gained 73 square miles of Ukrainian territory (a little less than the area of Martha’s Vineyard Island).
• In Russia, Ukraine’s foothold across the Kursk and Belgorod regions was 4 square miles over the past week (Feb. 3–10, 2026).
• According to RM’s measurements, using ISW data, Russia in 2025 captured 2,171 square miles—about 0.93% of Ukraine’s total territory.

Russian net territorial control in Ukraine by month: February 2022–January 2026  (Based on data from the Institute for the Study of War.) 

Military casualties (see footnotes for detailed source estimates)

• 1,200,000 Russian military casualties (killed, wounded and missing) and as many as 325,000 killed between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.⁴
• 500,000–600,000 Ukrainian military casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025, according to CSIS’s January 2026 estimate.⁵

Civilian fatalities⁶

• Russia: 7,254 killed (7,175 in 2022–2025, 79 in 2026)
• Ukraine: 15,954 killed.

Military vehicles and equipment⁷

• Russia: 24,044 lost. 
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 13,864.
  • Aircraft: 361.⁸
  • Naval vessels: 29.
• Ukraine: 11,290lost.
  • Tanks and armored vehicles: 5,571.
  • Aircraft: 194.
  • Naval vessels: 42.

Russian aerial attacks and Ukrainian interceptions⁹

In January 2026

• Russia fired:
  • 4,838 drones
  • 14 ballistic missiles
  • 61 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted:
  • 4,120 drones
  • 1 ballistic missile
  • 38 cruise missiles

Since September 2022

• Russia fired
  • 77,027 drones
  • 904 ballistic missiles
  • 4,485 cruise missiles
• Ukraine intercepted:
  • 54,479 drones
  • 194 ballistic missiles
  • 3,186 cruise missiles

Citizens displaced

• Russia:
  • Internally displaced: 5,000 as of August 2025.
  • 1,000,000 (0.7% of Russia’s 2022 population) left Russia for economic or political reasons in the first year of the full-scale war. Between 15% and 45% of those who had left have returned since then, so, between 550,000 and 850,000 people have not returned to Russia.
• Ukraine: 10,600,000 displaced Ukrainians, 24% of Ukraine’s pre-invasion population of 44,000,000, including:
  • Internally displaced: 3,700,000. 
  • International refugees: 6,900,000.

Economic impact¹⁰

• Russia’s cumulative economic growth in 2022–2025: 8%.
  • 0.9% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
  • Budget deficit in 2025: 2.6% of GDP.
  • Russian ruble: 0.01299  U.S. dollars. 10% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 15.3 %.
• Ukraine’s cumulative economic growth (negative) in 2022-2025: -21.2%
  • 2% GDP growth estimate for 2025.
  • Budget deficit estimate for 2025: 18.5% of GDP.
  • Ukrainian hryvnia: 0.02321 U.S. dollars. -31% since the invasion.
  • 3-year bond yield: 21.9%.

Infrastructure

• Russia estimates: 
  • An investigation by RFE/RL estimated in March 2025 that Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage.
  • As of October 2025, Ukrainian drone strikes were reported to have forced nearly 40% of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with at least 70% of shutdowns directly linked to these strikes, according to the Russian energy market data. According to Reuters’ November 2025, estimate, however, Russia's oil processing has actually fallen just 3% this year despite Ukraine's drone attacks.
  • In January 2026, Russia’s western border regions, such as the Belgorod Oblast, saw weeks‑long outages caused by Ukrainian strikes, with heating at only 50% capacity and thousands without power as of Feb. 4. 
  • Around 100,000 customers in the Russian city of Belgorod were without running water early Feb 9 after power surges caused by Ukrainian airstrikes on the local power grid forced two pumping stations to go into emergency shutdown, MT reported on Feb. 9.
• Ukraine estimates: 
  • Ukraine had lost 80% of its thermal capacity due to Russian attacks as of September 2024.
  • Some 90% of Ukraine’s thermal power generation was destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Some 50% of all of Ukraine’s hydropower installations were damaged and 40% destroyed as of May 2025.
  • Ukraine's energy infrastructure was operating at only about one third of its pre-invasion generation capacity as of Fall 2025.
  • In October 2025, Russia was reported to have destroyed 60% of Ukraine’s gas production ahead of winter of 2025–2026. 
  • Ukraine's overall electricity consumption has fallen by around 30% since the launch of the Russian invasion, according to an October 2025 estimate.
  • ISW estimated in December 2025 that Russia’s strike campaign was close to splitting Ukraine’s power grid east–west, with eastern regions “at the brink” of blackout and Kyiv also at risk while Washington Post reported that Kyiv residents were facing up to 16 hours a day without power.
  • As a result of the Russian attacks, Ukraine’s available generating capacity has fallen from 33.7 GW at the start of the full‑scale invasion to about 14 GW as of January 2026, according to The Economist. The resulting outages have produced blackouts of several days in parts of Ukraine, The Economist wrote in January 2026.¹¹
  • Russian attacks on Ukraine’s rail network “have caused $5.8 billion in damages since the start of the invasion,” according to a December 2025 report by WSJ.
  • Ukrainian energy provider DTEK’s CEO said in late January 2026 Ukraine has lost about 70% of its generation capacity and many civilians get only 3–4 hours of electricity daily, driving roughly 600,000 people to leave Kyiv, according to a Jan. 29, 2026, report by Istories. DTEK then said Russia’s Feb. 3 assault “dealt the most powerful blow to the energy sector since the beginning of the year,” WP reported.
  • From early October 2025 through mid‑January 2026, Ukraine’s intelligence service logged 256 drone and missile strikes on energy facilities: 11 on hydroelectric plants, 94 on thermal plants and 151 on substations. Ukraine’s energy minister Denys Shmyhal said on Jan. 16 that “there is not a single power plant in Ukraine that the enemy has not attacked” and that “thousands of megawatts of generation have been knocked out,” according to The New Yorker.

Popular support

• Russia: 61% support peace negotiations.
• Ukraine: 26% “believe in the success of the [peace] negotiations [with Russia].”

Other criteria which may be even more important (about which we continue to search for reliable indicators):

• Ammunition supply
• Foreign military aid
• Force generation
• Military leadership
• Training
• Morale
• Control of strategic locations
• Information war: with U.S./Europe; with world.

Endnotes

1. Constant Méheut of New York Times reported on Feb. 10 that “at a glacial pace” “Russia is nearing capture of key Ukrainian towns”: Huliaipole (in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast) Pokrovsk (in the Donetsk Oblast) and Myrnohrad (also in the Donetsk Oblast).
2. Production note. RM’s map graphics incorporate publicly shared map features from ISW, ESRI, AParrish1 (European countries) and collab2021_Fleming (Black Sea).
3. RM’s methodology sums three ISW map layers to arrive at its totals each week rather than two (specifically, RM adds “Claimed Russian control over Ukrainian territory” to “Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory” and “Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine”). 
4. Here are more estimates of Russian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 600,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate.
   2. Almost 1,000,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   3. More than 750,000 killed or injured, according to a March 2025 estimate by DNI/U.S. intelligence community.
   4. More than 790,000 killed or injured, according to an April 2025 estimate by then-SACEUR Cavoli.  84,568 missing, according to an April 2025 estimate by the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
   5. 950,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including 250,000 killed and 700,000 injured.
   6. More than 1,000,000, including 250,000 killed, according to the U.K. Defense Ministry’s June 2025 estimate.
   7. 219,000 Russian soldiers killed in the Ukraine war, according to Meduza and Mediazona’s August 2025 estimate.
   8. Some 1,000,000 casualties, including 240,000 KIAs, according to then-British spy chief Richard Moore’s September 2025 estimate.
   9. Some 1,168,000 killed and wounded, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s December 2025 estimate.
   10. 1,100,000 casualties, according to ex-CIA director William Burns’ January 2026 interview in FT.
   11. 1,000,000Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, according to a February 2026 estimate by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.
5. Here are more estimates of Ukrainian servicemen killed and injured [in chronological order]:
   1. 400,000 killed or injured, according to Trump’s December 2024 estimate. 35,000 missing.
   2. 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 370,000 injured, according to Zelenskyy’s December 2024 estimate.
   3. 700,000 killed, according to Trump’s January 2025 estimate.
   4. 100,000 killed, according to Zelensky’s April 2025 estimate.
   5.  400,000 killed or injured, according to CSIS’s June 2025 estimate, including somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 killed and 300,000-340,000 injured.
   6. 73,000–140,000 killed, according to The Economist’s July 2025 estimate.
   7. 140,000 killed, according to BBC’s December 2025 estimate.
   8. 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s February 2026 estimate.
6. RM cannot verify casualty figures.
7. Oryx, “Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx (blog), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “The Military Balance 2022,” IISS, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022; Oryx, “List Of Aircraft Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html; Oryx, “List of Naval Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.  
8. Oryx has not updated tallies of either Russian or Ukrainian lost aircraft and naval vessels since Jan. 7, 2026.
9. Jensen, Benjamin and Yasir Atalan, “Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine?f%5B0%5D=content_type%3Aarticle&f%5B1%5D=content_type%3Areport. Note that due to limitations associated with refreshing of attack and intercept data, this section of the scorecard is updated once a month.
10. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Russian estimates. “Russia and Ukraine 3-Year Bond Yield,” Investing.com, https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/russia-3-year-bond-yield; World Bank Group, “Europe and Central Asia Economic Update,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/94bdc078-9c64-4833-992a-fda7b3d1a640/content; World Bank, “Russian Federation MPO,” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d5f32ef28464d01f195827b7e020a3e8-0500022021/related/mpo-rus.pdf; Trading Economics, “Russia 3-Year Bond Yield,”  https://tradingeconomics.com/ruge3y:gov; World Bank, “The World Bank in Ukraine,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#3; https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/rub-usd-2024-11-01. This count does not include the loss of the Ukrainian reconnaissance warship near the mouth of the Danube river where it was attacked by a Russian naval drone on Aug. 28, 2025.
11. Earlier, a different estimate of Ukraine’s generating capacity and damage to it was provided by RM and CSIS: as of 2024, some 64%, or 36 out of Ukraine’s 56 GW electricity generating capacity destroyed or occupied. Combining the occupied, destroyed and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 48% (27 gigawatts) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW, according to an alternative estimate in a July 2025 report by CSIS.

* This card was produced by RM staff and Belfer Center Avoiding Great Power War Project’s researcher Quinn Urich.