3 Things to Know

1. Western officials have claimed this week that Russia is shipping Iran upgraded Shahed-type drones whose designs Moscow refined in Ukraine—adding decoy airframes, jet engines, advanced anti-jammers, AI platforms, cameras, radio links and even Starlink-capable kits, while Russian-pioneered fiber-optic FPV drones are now being used by to strike U.S. assets, according to AP and WSJ. Russian authorities have denied reports of military and intelligence aid to Iran in the course of the war, with Vladimir Putin calling for a cessation of hostilities and offering Russia as a mediator this week, according to FT. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz has remained open for Russian shipping, MT reported, citing Putin’s foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov. Bloomberg reports that Iran’s “stranglehold” on this strait  is delivering a “broad commodity windfall to Russia, lifting Urals crude to an average $93.40 a barrel by late March—versus prewar budget talks of $45–50—and potentially adding about $40 billion to Russia’s annual oil export revenues if prices stay elevated.” 
2. RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (March 3–31, 2026) indicates that Russian forces lost 12 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (area equivalent to about half of Manhattan Island) during that period, according to the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. During the prior four-week period (Feb. 3–March 3, 2026), Russia had gained 46 square miles, according to RM’s analysis of ISW data. During the past week (March 24–31, 2026), Russia gained 17 square miles—the gains likely due to Russia’s reported spring offensive gaining momentum, according to the April 1 issue of the card. In that period Russian forces advanced in or near a total of 14 settlements and occupied two settlements, while Ukrainian forces conducted counteractions near two settlements, according to Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState.
3. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s proposal for an Orthodox Easter ceasefire. Peskov also said Zelenskyy should have “yesterday” withdrawn Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk oblast—where they still control about 19.5% of the oblast’s territory, according to ISW data analyzed by RM. Peskov made the comment a day after ​Zelenskyy claimed that Russia had told the United States it ⁠would harden its terms for a peace settlement ​if Ukrainian forces did not withdraw from Donbas (made up of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, with the latter claimed by Russian authorities to have been fully captured (again)) within ​two months, according to Reuters. 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• See section on Iran.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko says Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia “remains on the agenda,” framing ties as a “strategic partnership and alliance.” He warns South Korea that any direct or indirect role in NATO’s PURL scheme to supply “lethal weapons” to Ukraine would trigger Russian “retaliatory measures,” and accuses Japan of “remilitarization” via 2%‑of‑GDP defense spending and large foreign arms buys. He adds that peace‑treaty talks with Tokyo remain frozen and that visa‑free group travel with India is still under negotiation. (Russian MFA, 03.28.26)
• North Korea's state news agency and Russian counterpart TASS have agreed to counter jointly what they call "disinformation" delivered by their "many enemies," the outlets reported March 31, in a further deepening of ties. (MT/AFP, 03.31.26)

Iran and its nuclear program:

Friday, March 27, 2026

• U.S. and European officials say Russia is shipping Iran upgraded Shahed‑type drones whose designs Moscow refined in Ukraine—adding decoy airframes, jet engines, advanced anti‑jammers, AI platforms, cameras, radio links and even Starlink‑capable kits. (AP/Washington Post, 03.27.26)
• Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a call in which Moscow reiterated its readiness to help de‑escalate regional tensions, while Araghchi vowed Iran would keep defending itself, including by blocking ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s president publicly thanked Vladimir Putin and the Russian people for their support in the war. (Financial Times, 03.28.26)
• Iran‑backed militias in Iraq are now using fiber‑optic‑guided FPV drones—pioneered by Russia in Kursk in 2024—to hit U.S. assets, including a Black Hawk helicopter and an air‑defense radar near Baghdad. (Wall Street Journal, 03.27.26)
• U.S. intelligence estimates show American and Israeli strikes have definitively destroyed about one-third of Iran’s missile arsenal, with another roughly third likely damaged, destroyed, or buried in tunnels, leaving a significant remainder intact. A similar share of Iran’s drones is believed destroyed. Officials warn Iran is still firing missiles and may be conserving stocks, contradicting U.S. President Donald Trump’s claim that Tehran has “very few rockets left.” (Reuters, 03.27.26) For an expert analysis of the Iran conflict, see Graham Allison’s key takeaways from “‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on Iran,” the retired general’s conversation with David French, which was published on March 23 in The New York Times and which Professor Allison summarized on April 3 on his X account.*

Saturday, March 28, 2026

• Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova condemned U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran’s Khondab heavy‑water plant, Ardakan yellowcake facility and the Bushehr NPP area as “blatant violations of international law” that risk “large‑scale radioactive contamination.” She urged the IAEA to speak out more forcefully, accused the attackers of effectively negating the NPT and nuclear‑safety conventions, and warned they are “crossing the line” toward a potential global disaster. (Russian MFA, 03.28.26)
• U.S. officials say the Pentagon is preparing options for weeks of limited ground operations in Iran if Trump orders an escalation, including seizing Kharg Island and raiding coastal sites near the Strait of Hormuz to destroy missile and drone launchers. (Washington Post, 03.28.26)
• Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed it destroyed a warehouse in Dubai holding Ukrainian anti-drone systems and said 21 Ukrainians were present there. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhiy Tykhyi called the statement “a lie,” comparing Tehran’s disinformation tactics to Russia’s. (Meduza, 03.28.26)
• Some of the Russian drones for Iran may be Starlink‑capable or jet‑propelled models that Russia can no longer use effectively in Ukraine after losing Starlink access there. Moscow may also be sending AI‑guided or reconnaissance variants. U.S. analysts warn that such high‑end Russian technology could strain U.S. and allied air defenses in the Middle East and further tie the Ukraine and Iran wars together, with Russia trading advanced drones for Iranian support and distraction of Western attention from Ukraine. (Washington Post/AP, 03.28.26)
• G7 foreign ministers meeting in France signaled readiness to join a post‑ceasefire multinational mission to patrol the Strait of Hormuz, after initially distancing themselves from Trump’s Iran war. Officials say Iran’s blockade and bid to charge transit fees have jolted allies, both by roiling energy markets and by boosting Russia’s wartime economy and deepening Moscow–Tehran military cooperation, especially intelligence sharing on targets in Ukraine and the Middle East. (Wall Street Journal, 03.28.26)
• In unannounced visits to the UAE and Qatar, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pushed a broader strategy: swap Ukraine’s “combat‑tested” drone‑defense expertise for Gulf deliveries of high‑end air‑defense missiles that Kyiv needs against Russia. He said Ukraine is already helping five Arab states counter Iranian drones and is exploring a role in Strait of Hormuz security, even as Russia profits from Iran‑driven oil price spikes and launched 273 drones at Ukraine overnight, killing at least five and striking Odesa, Kryvyi Rih and Poltava. (Washington Post/AP, 03.28.26) 

Sunday, March 29, 2026

• At the one‑month mark of the Iran war, U.S. Central Command says it has hit more than 11,000 targets and damaged or destroyed over 150 Iranian vessels, from IRGC facilities and missile sites to weapons factories, using assets including B‑1s, F‑35s, carriers, submarines and HIMARS. Thirteen U.S. troops have been killed and 303 wounded. The scale of the campaign both constrains U.S. stockpiles needed in Ukraine and indirectly benefits Russia, which is earning more from high oil prices while Tehran absorbs the strikes. (Wall Street Journal, 03.29.26) 
• House Intelligence Committee Democrat Jim Himes said he “would sure not argue with” Zelenskyy’s claim that Russian satellites are helping Iran target U.S. bases, noting he has seen classified intelligence and highlighting how Russia, Iran and China are all profiting from oil flows. He warned that Iran is funding drone buys from Russia with oil sales to China, while Russia uses oil revenues—boosted by Trump’s sanctions waivers—to attack Ukraine and assist Iranian strikes on U.S. forces. (Wall Street Journal, 03.29.26)

Monday, March 30, 2026

• A Wall Street Journal survey of the arms race against cheap Iranian and Russian drones highlights a core imbalance: the U.S. and Gulf states are often shooting down $5,000 Shaheds with Patriot interceptors costing millions, forcing a push for “micro‑missiles” and other low‑cost interceptors in the tens of thousands of dollars or less. (Wall Street Journal, 03.30.26) 
• German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that the economic fallout from the Iran war could hit Europe as hard as the Covid‑19 pandemic or the start of Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. (Financial Times, 03.30.26) 

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• Trump claimed he has already eliminated Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon, but U.S. and international officials say Tehran still retains roughly 970 pounds of highly enriched uranium—enough for 10–12 bombs if further processed. The administration has quietly dropped denuclearization from its public war aims, raising questions over whether any stockpile seizure or removal will occur before Trump’s promised drawdown in about two weeks. (New York Times, 03.31.26)
• Trump has told aides he is prepared to end the U.S. campaign against Iran even if the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, judging that a full-scale operation to reopen the chokepoint would overshoot his preferred 4–6 week timeline. He believes core goals—crippling Iran’s navy and missile stocks—can be met without restoring free passage, and says future efforts to reopen the strait should be led by European and Gulf allies. In a Truth Social post, he urged countries like the U.K. to “go to the Strait, and just TAKE IT,” insisting “the hard part is done” and telling them to “go get your own oil.” (Wall Street Journal, 03.31.26)
• Iran is now firing fewer ballistic missiles per day (roughly 20–30, versus hundreds on day one of the war) but is hitting more high‑value targets, including U.S. bases, Gulf energy infrastructure and Israeli sites. (RFE/RL, 03.31.26)
• Zelenskyy told Axios on March 30 that a long war in Iran would be very good for Russia and very bad for Ukraine. Zelenskyy also said Ukraine had shared intelligence with Middle Eastern leaders about Russian help to Iran, including potential targeting assistance for attacks on U.S. and allied military bases in the region. “I am sure Russia wants long war. They have benefits: The U.S. is focusing on the Middle East and may decrease military help to Ukraine. Sanctions are partially lifted. I see only benefits for Russia from the war with Iran continuing," Zelenskyy told Axios over Zoom. Asked if he was concerned a prolonged war in Iran would hamper Ukraine's weapons supply, Zelenskyy said: "I am not just concerned, I am sure we will have such challenges.” (Axios, 03.31.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• Russia’s ambassador to Tehran, Alexey Dedov, said Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has remained inside the country but is deliberately avoiding public appearances since taking office on March 8, fueling speculation about his health and whereabouts. Dedov told RTVI he has not yet met Khamenei, adding that Iranian officials insist the leader is in Iran but staying out of sight “for understandable reasons.” (WSJ, 04.01.26)
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and UAE leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed discussed their “serious concern” over the worsening military and political situation in the Middle East, the Kremlin said. In calls with both the Emirati ruler and Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Putin backed an immediate ceasefire and diplomatic efforts to end the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran, while stressing that any settlement should “respect the legal interests of all states in the region.” (Financial Times, 04.01.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom said late April 1 that it will carry out a final evacuation of its employees from Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power in the coming days, while a group of “volunteers” will remain at the facility to ensure that it remains operational. (MT/AFP, 04.02.26)
• Putin said Russia wants the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran to end “as soon as possible” and offered Moscow as a mediator between Washington, Israel and Tehran, declaring Russia “ready to do everything” to restore a “normalized” situation and calling the conflict a matter of broad international concern. (Financial Times, 04.02.26)
• Ex-CIA Director William Burns cautioned that despite windfalls from the Iran war, Russia’s economy is “not in great shape” and its military has “vulnerabilities,” largely exposed by Ukrainian “courage and tenacity,” so it is a mistake to accept Putin’s narrative that Ukraine will inevitably lose. (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26)
• The Trump administration is scrambling to counter foreign disinformation about the Iran war after having dismantled many of its own anti‑influence defenses. A State Department cable signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio orders all embassies and consulates to push back against propaganda from Russia, China, Iran and others, coordinate more closely with Pentagon information operations, and use tools like X’s Community. (New York Times, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• U.S. officials say an Air Force F‑15E was shot down over Iran—America’s first jet lost to Iranian fire in five weeks of war—with one crew member rescued from Iranian territory and search‑and‑rescue operations ongoing for the second. Around the same time, an A‑10 attack plane crashed near the Strait of Hormuz, with its pilot recovered. The incidents heighten risks of escalation as Trump threatens to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Ages” and both sides pound military and civilian infrastructure across the region. (New York Times live briefing, 04.03.26) As of 3:30 p.m. U.S. East Coast time, it remained unclear how this two-seat warplane and Warthog were downed in two separate incidents on April 3. Iran purchased four S-300 air defense batteries from Russia as well as MANPADs. Some of the S-300s were reportedly destroyed in the course of the 12-Day war of June 2025, if not earlier. Some of Iran’s S-300s may have survived, however, (as could have scores of MANPADs). Writing in Arms Control Wonk on Feb. 20, 2026, Sam Lair wrote that “some of those S-300 launchers have reemerged” at air defense sites around Tehran.
• As U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran continue, Trump urged Tehran to “make a deal before it is too late” after boasting of having bombed the country “back to the stone ages,” while new attacks reportedly destroyed Iran’s tallest bridge, killed IRGC brigadier Mohammad Ali Fathalizadeh, and hit missile sites and airports. Iran’s leaders vowed “broader and more destructive” retaliation and tightened repression at home, even as the Hormuz blockade and surging oil prices deepen global anxiety. (RFE/RL, 04.03.26) 
• Iran is fortifying key oil facilities and recruiting large numbers of volunteers, including minors, as it prepares for the possibility of a U.S. ground invasion, the Wall Street Journal reports. Military analysts estimate Tehran can field roughly 1 million active and reserve troops; officials threaten expanded attacks on Gulf targets if U.S. forces cross the border, even as Trump deploys thousands of Marines and airborne troops to the region. (Wall Street Journal, 04.03.26)
• The U.N. Security Council is due to vote April 4 on a Bahrain‑sponsored resolution to restore commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, after China, Russia, and France forced the removal of language authorizing “all necessary means” and limited the text to “defensive measures.” Iran has effectively halted most traffic and is pushing a permit scheme with Oman; EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas insists only toll‑free passage under international law is acceptable. (RFE/RL, 04.03.26) 
  • Russia signaled it may veto a Bahrain-led UN Security Council resolution backing “defensive measures” to secure traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, with Lavrov warning it would either derail fragile talks or be used to “retroactively legitimize aggression against Iran” by Gulf states and their partners. (Bloomberg, 04.03.26)
• Kremlin foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov said the Strait of Hormuz “remains open” for Russian shipping despite Iran’s effective closure of the waterway to most traffic in response to U.S.–Israeli strikes. Iran says the strait is shut only to “enemies” and has allowed “friendly” nations including Russia, China and India to transit, while the U.N. Security Council is due to vote on a Bahrain‑drafted resolution mandating a defensive mission to protect shipping. (Moscow Times/AFP, 04.03.26)
• Former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has outlined a “comprehensive peace” proposal under which Iran would cap enrichment below 3.67%, pledge never to seek nuclear weapons, place all facilities under permanent international monitoring, reopen the Strait of Hormuz with Oman, and invite U.S. firms into its oil sector in exchange for full U.S. sanctions relief, compensation for war damage, and a U.S.–Iran non‑aggression pact. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Zarif says prolonging the war will only deepen destruction and warns that if the U.S. “packs up and leaves” without a deal, Iran will lose the chance to turn its “resistance” into economic gains. (Financial Times, 04.03.26) 
• The Iran war’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz—removing about 10 million barrels of crude a day—has triggered the largest oil shock in history and a sharp rally in U.S. energy stocks, with the S&P 500 energy sector up as much as 40% this year. Exxon, Chevron and Phillips 66 just logged record quarters and Exxon’s forward P/E briefly topped Nvidia’s, as investors bet on tighter long‑term supply, slowing U.S. shale growth and a new era of “higher highs and higher lows” for oil prices. (Wall Street Journal, 04.03.26)

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

Monday, March 30, 2026

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• In “How Russia Weaponized the Cold Ukrainian Winter,” C.J. Chivers reminds us in NYT how missile and drone barrages shattered Kyiv’s energy grid, severing power and heat to hundreds of thousands. Ukrainian energy expert Oleksandr Kharchenko calls it a premeditated assault on the city’s “life‑support system,” warning that even in a best‑case scenario, only 30–40% of electrical capacity can be restored before next winter and that full recovery may take five years, according to Chivers. (New York Times, 03.30.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• European foreign ministers visited Ukraine to mark the fourth anniversary of the Bucha massacres, vowing accountability for Russian atrocities as Ukraine steps up long‑range drone strikes on Russian Baltic oil terminals. The EU has recently sanctioned Russian soldiers and begun backing a special tribunal on aggression. (Washington Post, 03.31.26, Financial Times, 03.31.26) 

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Roman Abramovich is preparing to set up a foundation to oversee the frozen proceeds from the £2.5 billion sale of Chelsea FC, in a move that would defy the British government’s insistence the money be used solely to help victims of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The planned vehicle would fund global humanitarian causes, reviving a long‑stalled dispute over control of the club’s sale funds. (New York Times, 04.01.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• During a massive Russian missile‑drone barrage, Zelenskyy spoke by phone with Pope Leo XIV, briefed him on negotiations and U.S. mediation efforts, and thanked the Vatican for aiding the return of abducted Ukrainian children and wider humanitarian support. Zelenskyy invited the Pope to visit Ukraine and noted the call came as Moscow offers “Easter escalation” instead of a ceasefire. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.03.26)
• U.S. charities say the Iran conflict is severely disrupting private humanitarian aid to Ukraine as shipping routes are diverted from the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, causing weeks‑long delays and freight hikes of 10–25%. Groups like Hope For Ukraine report containers with generators, medical supplies, and mobility scooters for amputees arriving nearly a month late, forcing them to choose between paying higher transport costs or cutting life‑saving deliveries to frontline communities. (RFE/RL, 04.03.26) 
• Serbia will provide €2 million via the U.N. Development Program to buy and deliver high‑voltage transformers for Ukraine’s power grid, helping restore transmission capacity and stabilize electricity supply amid repeated Russian strikes. Serbian officials framed the move as solidarity to keep hospitals, schools, and homes powered; it follows fresh support pledges from Ireland and Norway. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.03.26)
• For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

• RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (March 3–31, 2026) indicates that Russian forces lost 12 square miles of Ukraine’s territory (area equivalent to about half of Manhattan Island) during that period, according to the latest issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. During the prior four-week period (Feb. 3–March 3, 2026), Russia had gained 46 square miles. According to ISW data, during the past week (March 24–31, 2026) Russia gained 17 square miles—the gains likely due to Russia’s reported spring offensive gaining momentum. In that period of March 24–31, Russian forces advanced in or near a total of 14 settlements and occupied two settlements while Ukrainian forces conducted counteractions near two settlements, according to Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState. (RM, 04.02.26)
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Kyiv’s defense plan for the capital was fully prepared before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, with key officials briefed on roles and chains of command the day prior. He called the first hours—when Russia threw in mass airstrikes, airborne assaults, and ground forces—the “decisive moment,” arguing that pre‑war planning and rapid coordination helped prevent Kyiv’s fall. (RBC.ua, 04.03.26)
• A new IISS study argues Ukraine has become a “combat incubator” for UAV warfare: Kyiv went from under 100 drones in February 2022 to a target of 4.5 million in 2025, with FPV and one‑way attack drones now causing up to 80% of front‑line casualties—surpassing artillery. Thousands of small UAVs generate unprecedented ISR data, enabling a “tactical reconnaissance‑strike complex,” while Russian production of Geran‑class drones has reportedly reached about 170 per day, allowing massive strike and decoy swarms. (IISS, March 2026)

Friday, March 27, 2026

• On March 27, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Vasyukivka and Fedorivka Druha. (RM, 04.03.26)

Saturday, March 28, 2026

• On March 28, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Yablunivka, Pokrovsk and Chervonyi Lyman. (RM, 04.03.26)
• ISW reports that Russia launched 273 Shahed, Gerbera and Italmas drones overnight on March 27–28, mostly at Odesa Oblast. About 252 were downed, but 21 hit 18 locations; over 60 targeted Odesa City, where a maternity hospital was struck, killing two and injuring 12, with 22 women in labor and 19 newborns inside. Additional strikes hit residential, industrial and energy sites in Poltava and Kryvyi Rih, underscoring Russia’s deliberate adaptation of drones to maximize civilian damage. (ISW, 03.28.26)
• Russian air attacks across Ukraine early March 28 killed at least four people and damaged critical infrastructure including a port and a maternity hospital, authorities said, as Russia pressed on with its war with Ukraine. In the southern port city of Odesa, two people were killed and at least 13 wounded, Sergiy Lysak, head of the city's military administration, said. (MT/AFP, 03.28.26)
• Ukraine has expanded its deep‑strike campaign against Russia’s defense industry and fuel network using new domestically produced FP‑5 “Flamingo” cruise missiles and FP‑1 long‑range drones, targeting sites hundreds of kilometers inside Russian territory. ISW reports that an FP‑5 strike hit the Promsintez explosives plant in Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast—which produces over 30,000 tons of military explosives annually—while FP‑1 drones set fires at the 15‑million‑ton‑per‑year Yaroslavl oil refinery, a key source of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel for Russian logistics Ukraine’s General Staff said “a hit was recorded on the territory of the [Yaroslavl] plant, followed by a fire,” at the Rosneft/Gazprom Neft‑owned refinery, which can process about 300,000 barrels per day, while regional governors in Russia acknowledged air‑raid alerts and the downing of “over 30” drones but denied serious damage. (ISW, 03.28.26, Bloomberg, 03.28.26)

Sunday, March 29, 2026

• On March 29, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced in Pazeno, Rusyn Yar and Varvarivka. Ukrainian Defense Forces conducted a sweep near Orestopol and Oleksiyivka.  (RM, 04.03.26) 
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged some of their largest drone and missile barrages to date over March 28–29, underscoring an escalating contest of long‑range strikes. Russia’s Defense Ministry said Ukraine launched more than 345 drones overnight at targets across the country, part of a broader deep‑strike campaign on refineries, explosives plants and logistics hubs At the same time, ISW reports Russia fired one Kinzhal hypersonic missile and 442 attack drones—around 300 of them Shaheds—against Ukraine; Kyiv says its air defenses downed roughly 380, but remaining drones still hit seven locations, killing a child and wounding at least 10 civilians at a recreation area while damaging energy and civilian infrastructure in multiple oblasts. Russian forces also dropped five KAB‑250 glide bombs on Kramatorsk, killing three and injuring 13. (RFE/RL, 03.29.26, ISW, 03.29.26)
• WP columnist Max Boot describes how the drone war has flipped the battlefield economics. Russia fired nearly 1,000 Shaheds in one 24‑hour period on March 23–24, yet Ukraine shot down about 95%—often using its own cheap interceptor drones instead of million‑dollar missiles. Zelenskyy now estimates 30,000–35,000 Russian casualties a month, 90% from drones, as Ukraine aims to build 7 million UAVs in 2026 and uses long‑range strikes to cut Russian oil exports by roughly 40%. One elite “Achilles” brigade near Kharkiv alone claims 38,000 targets hit in 2025 and is aiming for 80,000 this year. (Washington Post, 03.30.26)
• A Ukrainian drone attack killed one person and wounded several others in the southern port city of Taganrog, local authorities said March 29 night. (MT/AFP, 03.30.26)

Monday, March 30, 2026

• On March 30, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces occupied Svyato-Pokrovske and Vasyukivka and advanced near Riznykivka and Bondarne. (RM, 04.03.26)
• Kyiv has apologized to Finland after several Ukrainian drones crashed on Finnish territory. (Meduza, 03.30.26)

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• On March 31, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pishchane and Novopavlivka. (RM, 04.03.26)
• Ukrainian forces in Winter and Spring 2026 have made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and have liberated the most territory in Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives. (ISW, 03.31.26)
• Ukrainian forces have targeted Russia’s Baltic energy infrastructure since March 22, repeatedly striking the Ust‑Luga and Primorsk oil terminals and related facilities. Multiple reports say Novatek’s gas‑processing and Ust‑Luga Oil fuel facilities have been hit, and Kirishi refinery’s crude, bitumen, hydrotreating and gas units have suffered serious damage; Zelenskyy claims about 60% of Ust‑Luga’s export capacity is offline. Ust‑Luga exports have been suspended for a week, Druzhba pipeline flows to Hungary and Slovakia are already halted, storage is filling, and Transneft is unable to take scheduled volumes, forcing some fields to prepare to throttle back (Reuters, 04.02.26; ISW, 03.27.26 and 03.29.26; RFE/RL, 03.29.26; The Moscow Times, 03.29.26 and 03.31.26; Istories, 03.31.26; Bloomberg, 03.31.26 and 04.02.26; bne IntelliNews, 04.01.26)

• A Russian An‑26 military transport aircraft crashed in Russian‑occupied Crimea on March 31, killing all seven crew and 22 passengers on board, including servicemembers from the Northern Fleet, Murmansk governor Andrey Chibis said. The Defense Ministry said contact was lost around 18:00 Moscow time during a routine flight and blamed a presumed technical fault, insisting there was “no damaging impact” on the plane; investigators opened a criminal case over flight‑rule violations. (Meduza, 04.01.26)

  • BBC Russia reports that Lt. Gen. Alexander Otroschenko, commander of the Northern Fleet’s composite aviation corps, was likely among the 29 people killed. (Meduza, 04.02.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• On April 1, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Pishchane. (RM, 04.03.26)
• Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed its forces have “completed the liberation” of the self‑proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic, saying the Western Group of Forces has fully seized the territory. Meduza’s analysis of open sources notes, however, that Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps “Azov” still holds a small strip of land between the destroyed villages of Nadiya and Novoyehorivka, where Russian troops have not advanced for months, echoing earlier premature LNR “100% liberated” claims. (Meduza, 04.01.26)
• Russian forces are gradually being pushed out of Kupyansk by Ukrainian troops, according to two people in Moscow with knowledge of the situation. (Bloomberg, 04.01.26)
• Finland’s Border Guard found a crashed drone with a warhead on the ice of Lake Pyhäjärvi near Parikkala, close to the Russian border—the third UAV to fall in Finland in a week. Public broadcaster Yle reports authorities believe it came from Ukrainian territory. (Meduza, 04.01.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• On April 2, Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT group reported in its interactive map that the Russian armed forces advanced near Ryasne. Ukrainian Defense Forces cleared areas near Rodynske and Nove Shakhove. (RM, 04.03.26)
• Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities killed at least two people and wounded several others on April 2, including strikes on Synelnykove in Dnipropetrovsk region, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa region and Kherson, even as both sides work on an Easter prisoner exchange. Russia launched 172 strike drones overnight, of which Ukraine says 147 were shot down, while Kyiv continues to press for a temporary Easter ceasefire that Moscow so far rejects. (Washington Post, 04.03.26)
• Gazprom said April 2 that Ukraine had again attacked a compressor station linked to the TurkStream gas pipeline, which runs under the Black Sea and carries natural gas to Europe through Turkey. Gazprom credited the Russian Defense Ministry and “mobile operational groups” for managing to repel the attack. Russia’s Defense Ministry said its air defense systems intercepted 147 Ukrainian drones over 10 Russian regions, including Krasnodar, between April 1 night and April 2 morning. There was no immediate response from Ukraine. Drones targeted oil refineries in Russia’s Bashkortostan republic on April 2 morning, causing fire in an industrial area of the regional capital Ufa, according to authorities. (MT/AFP, 04.02.26, Bloomberg, 04.02.26)
• Ex-CIA Director William Burns argued Putin believes time and battlefield attrition are on Russia’s side in its war against Ukraine and that Washington will eventually “drive to agreement,” so he’s trying to “drive a hard enough bargain” in talks by projecting inevitability about a Russian victory. (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• France 24, citing analysis of Institute for the Study of War data, assesses that Russia made no confirmed territorial gains in Ukraine in March 2026 for the first time in more than two years, while Ukrainian forces retook about 9 square kilometers (France 24, 04.03.26) See above, at the top of this section, for RM’s analysis of recent ISW data on changes in territorial control.
• Zelenskyy said U.K. intelligence assesses the battlefield situation as Ukraine’s best in 10 months, with Ukrainian forces netting about 20 square kilometers of liberated territory when gains and losses are compared. (RBC.ua, 04.03.26)
• Russian drone and missile strikes across Ukraine overnight into April 3 killed at least five people and wounded 36. Russia launched one of its largest combined missile‑and‑drone strikes of the war overnight, firing 37 missiles and 542 attack drones of various types at Ukrainian critical infrastructure. (Korrespondent.net, 04.03.26, Washington Post, 04.03.26)
  • Ukraine’s air defenses and electronic warfare units say they shot down or suppressed 541 out of 579 Russian targets launched overnight on April 3, including 26 cruise missiles and 515 drones of various types. (RBC.ua, 04.03.26)
• Ukraine’s military says March 2026 marked one of its largest “deep strike” campaigns of the war, with attacks on five strategic Russian defense‑industrial plants and 10 oil facilities, including the Kremniy El microelectronics producer, the Aviastar Il‑76/Il‑78 plant, an A‑50 servicing base, the Alchevsk steel mill, and the Granit S‑400 service center in Sevastopol. Separately, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed its drones struck the Bashneft Novoyl refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan, about 1,400 km from Ukrainian territory, causing a fire at what Kyiv calls a key fuel supplier to the Russian army, while additional strikes hit a training ground and ammo depot. (RBC.ua, 04.03.26, Ukrainska Pravda, 04.03.26) 
• Ukrainian Air Assault Forces commander Maj. Gen. Oleh Apostol said no former convicts or foreign volunteers currently serve in Ukraine’s Air Assault (DShV) units: ex‑prisoners had fought in the Kursk incursion but have since left, and foreigners “were not ready” for the most intense combat. He said new contract soldiers now include both 18–24‑year‑olds and volunteers aged 60+, who are being trained to maximize battlefield effectiveness. (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.03.26)
• The Economist describes a Russian front‑line “economy of blood money” in which Russian contract soldiers must pay their own officers to avoid suicidal assaults in Ukraine. One deserter says he received a 2.5 million‑ruble enlistment bonus and 200,000 rubles a month, but spent about 6 million of 8 million rubles total on gear and bribes, including 1 million up front and 100,000–150,000 rubles monthly to be kept in a rear job. Others report officers seizing bank cards from troops sent into attacks and extorting 100,000 rubles for post‑wound leave, 1 million for discharge or 2 million in “regiment needs” payments; refusers risk torture or being “zeroed out,” with independent outlet Verstka identifying at least 100 commanders involved in such killings. (The Economist, 04.03.26) 
• Russia’s deputy digital development minister Andrey Zarenin, who oversees radio electronics at the ministry, has volunteered to fight in the war against Ukraine, Kommersant reports. (Meduza, 04.03.26)

Military aid to Ukraine: 

Saturday, March 28, 2026

• Zelenskyy says Ukraine has finalized 10‑year air‑defense and counter‑drone agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and expects a similar deal with the UAE, positioning Kyiv as a supplier of battle‑tested interception technology against Iranian drones. A newly announced 10‑year pact with Qatar covers joint production, air defense, counter‑drone systems, AI, cybersecurity and training, following a Saudi deal and ahead of one with Abu Dhabi. ISW notes Ukraine is leveraging frontline experience against Russian and Iranian‑origin drones to become a sought‑after security partner for U.S. allies, even as Zelenskyy warns the Iran war and eased Russian oil sanctions are boosting Moscow’s revenues and enabling Russian help to Iran. (New York Times, 03.28.26, ISW, 03.28.26)

Sunday, March 29, 2026

• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha says the U.S. has given Kyiv assurances that weapons provided under NATO’s PURL scheme will not be diverted to the Middle East, despite earlier public comments from Secretary of State Marco Rubio that such a shift “could” happen. Sybiha also says another (unnamed) country has joined PURL funding. Meduza notes this guarantee comes as Ukraine warns that U.S. and its allies used over 800 Patriot missiles in just the first five days of the Iran war, while Ukraine received only about 600 in four years. (Meduza, 03.29.26)

Monday, March 30, 2026

• In an interview with Axios, Zelenskyy says he is “sure Russia wants [a] long war,” arguing Moscow benefits as U.S. attention shifts to Iran, sanctions on Russian oil are partly eased, and Western aid to Kyiv risks being reduced. He warns Ukraine will “absolutely” face weapons‑supply challenges if the Iran war drags on, and fears that once it ends the Trump administration will again pressure Kyiv to surrender territory to Russia, a step he says would gravely endanger Ukraine’s security. (Axios, 03.30.26) 
• Ukraine’s defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov says “private air defense” units are now operating successfully, with a Kharkiv‑region company’s in‑house air‑defense group already downing several Russian drones. (Meduza, 03.30.26)
• The European Commission approved a €1.5 billion package to modernize Europe’s defense industry and co-fund Ukrainian‑EU production, including €260 million to rebuild Ukraine’s defense tech sector and €35.3 million for the BraveTech EU innovation program. (ISW, 03.30.26) 

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Trump was reported to have privately threatened to halt U.S. arms supplies for Ukraine via NATO’s Purl procurement mechanism unless key European allies joined a “coalition of the willing” to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. While Secretary of State Marco Rubio says no Ukraine shipments have yet been diverted, he has also insisted that “if we need something for America… we’re going to keep it for America first,” signaling that Patriot PAC‑3 interceptors and other key munitions for Kyiv could be reprioritized if U.S. needs rise. (Financial Times, 04.01.26, Financial Times, 04.01.26)
• Ukraine and Romania plan joint drone production funded with €200 million from the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry announced. Facilities will be established in Romania, and ISW argues such co‑production lets allies absorb Ukraine’s rapid offense‑defense tech innovations into their own defense‑industrial bases. (ISW, 04.02.26) 

Friday, April 3, 2026

• A Russian Su-30 fighter jet crashed during a training flight in annexed Crimea on April 3. (Moscow Times/AFP, 04.03.26)

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

Monday, March 30, 2026

• The U.K.’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation fined Apple Distribution International £390,000 for breaching Russia sanctions by sending £635,618.75 in 2022 to Okko, a Russian streaming service owned at the time by recently sanctioned JSC New Opportunities. Apple’s Irish subsidiary, which processes App Store payments in Europe, voluntarily disclosed the transactions and received a reduced penalty under a new settlement scheme; OFSI said the payments likely represented App Store revenues passed through to a sanctioned Russian-owned company. (Financial Times, 03.30.26) 
  • Apple has halted all payment processing for App Store and other Apple services in Russia as of April 1, ending the last working method of funding Apple IDs via mobile carrier billing. (Meduza, 04.03.26)
• Russia’s Foreign Ministry said March 30 that it would expel a British diplomat after he was accused of being an undercover spy and engaging in economic espionage. The FSB security service alleged earlier that the second secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, Albertus Gerhardus Janse van Rensburg, had “knowingly provided false information” when obtaining permission to enter Russia. (MT/AFP, 03.30.26)
• Russia’s FSB expelled a British embassy second secretary it accused of being an undeclared spy and warned Russians not to meet U.K. diplomats without Foreign Ministry approval, citing possible “criminal responsibility.” (Financial Times, 03.30.26)

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office has designated Tufts University and its Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as “undesirable” organizations. (Moscow Times/Agence France Press, 03.31.26)
• Hungary’s government allegedly intervened at Moscow’s request to help remove Gulbakhor Ismailova, sister of sanctioned oligarch Alisher Usmanov, from the EU sanctions list, according to a joint media investigation. (Bloomberg, 03.31.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• The U.S. Treasury has quietly lifted sanctions on three Russian vessels, including the cargo ship Sv Nikolay, previously exposed by Reuters, PBS and Kyiv Independent as smuggling Ukrainian grain and Donbas metallurgical coke from occupied territories under falsified routes. (Istories, 04.01.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• The U.S. Treasury has lifted sanctions on former Russian finance minister and ex‑Otkritie bank chief Mikhail Zadornov, who was placed under U.S. measures in April 2022 but left the bank at the start of 2023. Zadornov had sued in a U.S. federal court, arguing he no longer holds posts in Russia’s financial sector, is not tied to the authorities, and does not influence Kremlin policy. (Meduza, 04.03.26)

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

Friday, March 27, 2026

• At a closed-door G7 foreign ministers’ meeting on March 27, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas pressed U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on “when” Washington would finally get tougher on Russia, noting he’d warned a year earlier that U.S. patience was limited. Rubio, visibly irritated, shot back that the U.S. was “doing the best we can to end the war” and told her, “If you think you can do it better, go ahead. We will step aside,” before both held a brief sideline talk to cool tensions. (Axios, 03.28.26)

Saturday, March 28, 2026

• Rubio publicly rejected Zelenskyy’s claim that Washington is conditioning postwar U.S. security guarantees on Ukraine ceding the remaining Ukrainian‑held part of Donbas to Russia. Rubio said the U.S. only relayed Moscow’s demands and that “it’s their choice,” stressing guarantees can start only after fighting ends. The dispute highlights how central Russia’s aim to seize all of Donbas remains in any U.S.-mediated talks. (Washington Post / AP, 03.28.26)

Monday, March 30, 2026

• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has received “signals” from some partners to dial back its drone and missile attacks on Russian oil and energy infrastructure, amid fears the Iran war and Hormuz closure are driving a global energy crunch. He told the Wall Street Journal Kyiv is ready for a reciprocal cease-fire on energy targets—“if Russia is ready not to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, we will not respond against theirs”—even as the SBU boasts of four successful strikes on Baltic oil terminals in the past week. (Wall Street Journal, 03.30.26)

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• The Kremlin rejected Zelenskyy’s proposal for an Orthodox Easter ceasefire as “vague” and insufficient for “lasting peace,” with spokesman Dmitry Peskov claiming Russia sees no clear plan from Kyiv and warning that any delay in Ukrainian concessions will mean peace “at a much higher price,” while ignoring Zelenskyy’s call for a mutual halt on energy strikes. Zelenskyy said upcoming U.S.–Ukraine talks will center on territory, reiterating that Kyiv’s “compromise” is to freeze the war along current lines, while Russia demands a full Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk and tells Washington it will “seize Donbas” within two months if Kyiv refuses, which he argues proves “the issue is not Donbas” but broader pressure for forced concessions. (Moscow Times/AFP, 03.31.26, UNIAN, 03.31.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Zelenskyy “must already today” decide to withdraw Ukrainian forces from the entire Donetsk region, arguing that a pullout beyond the “administrative borders of the Donetsk People’s Republic” could stop the “hot phase” of the war. He dismissed talk of Russia’s reported two‑month deadline as secondary, after Zelenskyy said Moscow was demanding Ukraine leave Donbas within that timeframe or face harsher terms later. (Meduza, 04.01.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Zelenskyy, in calls with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Sen. Lindsey Graham, NATO chief Mark Rutte and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, again proposed a temporary “Easter holidays” ceasefire and an energy truce. (ISW, 04.02.26)
• Ex-CIA Director William Burns warned that conceding to a Russia‑dictated settlement now would not only be “unfair” to Ukrainians but would set a damaging precedent for European security and the Indo‑Pacific, where Xi Jinping is “watching this all very carefully” to gauge Western resolve against aggression. Looking ahead,  Burns expects Putin to push hard to “hollow out” any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in a final deal; he argues the West must counter by locking in robust, long‑term military support that deters a future Russian attack even if Kyiv has to accept painful territorial compromises. (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26)
• A March Levada Center poll found 64% of Russians now say Moscow should move toward peace talks with Ukraine compared to 67% in February, while 24% favor continuing military action, which is the same as the month before. Among supporters of negotiations, 43% cite “many casualties and heavy losses” and 22% say the war is “unnecessary” and “tiring.” Yet overall backing for the military operation remains high: 72% say they support Russia’s armed forces in Ukraine, with 17% opposed. (Levada Center/RM , 04.02.26) 

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Zelenskyy is seeking stronger U.S. security guarantees as part of any peace deal, saying Washington should spell out its response to a renewed Russian attack and help fund an 800,000-strong postwar army plus advanced air defenses such as THAAD. He called a recent discussion with Trump envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff “partner-like,” adding Ukraine will now insert detailed U.S. guarantee demands into draft texts. (Bloomberg, 04.03.26)
• Zelenskyy said Ukraine has passed to the United States a request for Russia to observe an Easter ceasefire, including an “energy truce,” and is awaiting word on whether Washington can relay the message to Moscow. (Korrespondent.net, 04.03.26)

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

• Testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said Russia’s ground forces are still “mostly focused on Ukraine,” but warned that redeploying 500,000 battle‑hardened troops once the war ends would pose a major potential threat to NATO. He linked Russia’s mass use of Shahed‑type drones in Ukraine directly to Iranian technology transfers and said Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang now cooperate across drones, missiles and even North Korean troops and workers in Russia’s industrial base—evidence that U.S. adversaries are learning from and reinforcing each other as Washington still struggles to integrate its own commercial tech sector into defense at Ukraine‑like speed. (SASC transcript, 03.15.26, Bloomberg, 03.24.26)

Sunday, March 29, 2026

• The Telegraph reports that Trump is considering a “pay‑to‑play” overhaul of NATO under which allies that fail to hit a new 5%‑of‑GDP defense‑spending target could be stripped of voting rights on decisions about enlargement, joint missions and even triggering Article 5. (Telegraph, 03.29.26) 

• Jens Stoltenberg’s memoir confirms that in late 2021, as NATO secretary-general, he privately proposed to Lavrov that the NATO–Russia Council discuss Moscow’s demand for a “buffer zone” and the withdrawal of allied forces to pre‑1997 positions—despite knowing Poland and the Baltic states opposed the idea. The article argues this would have left newer eastern members more exposed while sparing Norway, which joined NATO before 1997, and amounted to flirting with a partial return to Russia’s old sphere of influence under the label of confidence‑building. Estonian diplomats told the author Stoltenberg raised the issue “behind the backs” of frontline allies, undermining trust and effectively redistributing risk eastward. (Baltic Sentinel, 03.29.26) 

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Al Jazeera that NATO allies’ refusal to provide bases for strikes on Iran—citing Spain in particular—was “very disappointing” and warned Washington will “reassess” its relationship with the alliance after the war, questioning the value of a deal where America defends Europe but is denied bases “when we need them” and saying it will be “hard to stay engaged” unless this changes. Meanwhile, several European governments are hardening opposition to President Donald Trump’s Iran war: Spain has closed its airspace and blocked U.S. base access, Italy has refused combat landings from Sicily, and France has barred some overflights, even as Romania and Germany still permit limited logistics amid public anger over energy prices. (Meduza, 03.31.26, Bloomberg, 03.31.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal that Trump has privately raised the possibility of withdrawing from NATO or downgrading U.S. commitments if allies do not help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, despite a 2023 law barring a unilateral exit without Congress. The threat comes as many European governments refuse to join his Iran war, even while providing key bases and logistics. Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have publicly lambasted NATO members and warned the U.S. “will remember,” which European leaders say undermines NATO’s deterrent value even as they pledge future Hormuz escort missions. (Wall Street Journal, 04.01.26, Wall Street Journal, 04.02.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Retired U.S. Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg called NATO “cowardly” over its stance on the Iran war and urged creating a new defense alliance of truly “willing” states—potentially including Ukraine—while even raising the option of U.S. withdrawal from NATO under Article 13. He floated a bloc built around the U.S., Japan, Australia, Poland, a “renewed” Germany and Ukraine, a view echoed by Mike Pompeo and Victoria Coates, who say current NATO has failed Europe’s biggest war since 1945. (RBC.ua, 04.03.26)
• Gold has overtaken U.S. Treasuries as the largest single component of Russia’s global central-bank reserves for the first time since the mid‑1990s, now accounting for about 24% versus 21% for U.S. government debt, bne IntelliNews reports, citing Bloomberg data. Gold’s share has nearly tripled in a decade amid aggressive central‑bank buying and surging prices, while major emerging markets, led by China and BRICS, steadily cut Treasury holdings after Washington froze Russia’s reserves and escalated tariff and sanctions use. (bne IntelliNews, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• European officials and analysts are openly contemplating a NATO without the United States as Trump repeatedly threatens to quit the alliance over Europe’s refusal to join his Iran war. One study, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies last May, gave a rough cost estimate over 25 years of $1 trillion. Bruegel, a research institution in Brussels, did a similar study a year ago with the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and estimated that Europe could need 300,000 more troops and an annual increase in military spending of at least $290 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression. (New York Times, 04.03.26)

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

• In an interview with France Télévisions, Lavrov said any future talks on strategic stability and nuclear arms control must include France and the UK, arguing it would be a “blind alley” to restore U.S.–Russia dialogue while excluding Europe’s nuclear powers. He cited President Emmanuel Macron’s stated plans to expand France’s nuclear arsenal and offer a nuclear “umbrella” to European states as reason they must be part of any such negotiations. (Russian Foreign Ministry, 03.26.26)

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

• Hacked personal emails and photos from FBI Director Kash Patel were posted online by a group styling itself as the pro‑Iran “Handala Team,” but the leak site is hosted on a Russian server and its domain was registered via an entity claiming to be in Tonga. (New York Times, 03.28.26) 

Energy exports from CIS:

Sunday, March 29, 2026

• The Biden administration is allowing a Russian state‑owned tanker carrying about 730,000 barrels of crude to dock at Matanzas, effectively letting Moscow break Trump’s de facto oil blockade of Cuba. The shipment will buy Havana a few weeks of diesel and other fuels, easing blackouts and economic collapse, and underscores how Cuba can still rely on Russia as a lifeline even as Trump talks of “taking Cuba” next and hints at possible military action after the Iran war. (New York Times, 03.29.26)

Monday, March 30, 2026

• Trump said he has “no problem” with a sanctioned Russian tanker delivering about 730,000 barrels of oil to Cuba, effectively allowing it to break his own de facto oil blockade that has caused nationwide blackouts and fuel shortages on the island. He framed the delivery as humanitarian relief that “doesn’t help” Putin, even as experts say the shipment will provide roughly 9–10 days of diesel equivalent and temporarily stabilize Cuba’s collapsing energy system. (Washington Post, 03.30.26)
• Russia’s Transport Ministry confirmed the tanker Anatoly Kolodkin arrived in Matanzas with what it called “humanitarian” oil, while Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow had discussed the shipment with Washington in advance and “considers it its duty” to aid Cuba. The vessel and its owner Sovcomflot are under U.S., EU and U.K. sanctions, underscoring how the Iran war and energy crunch are creating loopholes that benefit Russian state actors. (Washington Post, 03.30.26)

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• Weekly crude flows from Russia slumped by 1.75 million barrels a day to 2.32 million last week, but the impact on four-week average shipments was more muted, with shipments in the 28 days to March 29 falling by 280,000 barrels a day to average 3.31 million, the lowest in two months. (Bloomberg, 03.31.26)
• Russian tanker Anatoly Kolodkin has docked at Cuba’s Matanzas port, temporarily breaking President Donald Trump’s de facto blockade on fuel supplies to the island. Trump said he would allow this and possibly other “humanitarian” shipments on a case‑by‑case basis, even as he insists “Cuba’s finished” and predicts regime collapse. The cargo, Cuba’s first major delivery since early January, offers only weeks of relief amid nationwide blackouts, hospital cutbacks and a collapsing tourism sector, and could take up to 45 days to refine and distribute. (Bloomberg, 03.30.26; Financial Times, 03.31.26; Wall Street Journal, 03.31.26; Washington Post, 03.31.26)
• South Korea’s LG Chem has bought 27,000 tons of Russian naphtha for the first time since 2022 after U.S. sanctions waivers and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz tightened supplies, signaling a broader regional shift back toward Russian feedstock as Asian refiners scramble to replace increasingly costly Middle Eastern imports. (MT/AFP, 03.31.26)
• Georgia’s only oil refinery, at the Kulevi terminal on the Black Sea, plans to phase out Russian crude in favor of supplies from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other alternative sources. (MT/AFP, 03.31.26) 
• Zelenskyy expressed concern about the U.S. move to issue sanctions waivers related to Russian oil sales in response to the energy crisis. "If now they get more money from energy, it doesn't help us." Zelenskyy said. (Axios, 03.31.26) 

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• Bloomberg reports that Iran’s war and its “stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz” are delivering a broad commodity windfall to Russia, lifting Urals crude to an average $93.40 a barrel by late March—versus prewar budget talks of $45–50—and potentially adding about $40 billion to annual oil export revenues if prices stay elevated. Aluminum prices are up 12% and urea nearly 75% since the conflict began, while Western buyers are again inquiring about Rusal’s aluminum and Russian fertilizer amid Gulf supply disruptions. Analysts say wheat and gas exports also stand to benefit, though Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries, terminals and fertilizer plants are limiting Russia’s ability to fully exploit the boom. (Bloomberg News, 04.01.26) 
• Asian countries hit hard by the Iran war’s energy shock are turning to Russian oil under a 30‑day U.S. sanctions waiver, restarting or boosting imports to replace Middle Eastern supplies cut off by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. India’s purchases jumped from about 1mn barrels a day of Russian crude in February to 1.9mn by late March, while China and India together already took roughly 85% of Russian exports. The Philippines’ Petron bought 2.5mn barrels, and South Korea imported 27,000 tons of Russian naphtha, as Brent crude surged 63% in March to above $118 a barrel from around $70 pre‑war. (Financial Times, 03.31.26)
• The U.S. administration will allow Kazakhstan to continue transiting Russian pipeline crude to China until next March, according to the Central Asian nation’s energy ministry. Following consultations with the U.S. Treasury, a waiver was extended until March 19, 2027, the ministry’s spokeswoman Asel Serikpayeva said April 1 in an email. The previous license issued by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, was in force through this April, according to Interfax. Interfax was the first to report about the extension of the waiver. (Bloomberg, 04.01.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Russian oil output cuts are now “unavoidable,” industry sources told Reuters, after Ukrainian drone strikes on ports, pipelines and refineries knocked out about 1 million barrels per day of export capacity—around 20% of Russia’s total, down from a late‑March peak near 40%. Exports from Ust‑Luga have been suspended for a week, Druzhba pipeline flows to Hungary and Slovakia are halted, storage is filling up and Transneft cannot take scheduled volumes, forcing some fields to prepare to throttle back just as Hormuz‑related disruptions further tighten global markets. Russia pumped about 9.18mn b/d in February and gets roughly a quarter of its budget from oil and gas, so damaged Baltic ports, refinery outages and limited storage now risk leaving high‑priced barrels in the ground. (Reuters, 04.02.26)
• Dated Brent, the key benchmark for physical crude cargoes, has jumped to $141.37 a barrel, its highest level since 2008, as the month-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggers what the IEA calls the biggest supply disruption in oil-market history. Bloomberg notes a widening gap between “real-world” prices and ICE Brent futures, which are still near $107, reflecting acute tightness in prompt North Sea supply. (Bloomberg, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Russia’s oil tax revenues in March fell 48% year-on-year to 494.9 billion rubles, as levies were based on February Urals prices averaging below $45 a barrel, far under the $59 assumed in the 2026 budget. Bloomberg notes Moscow’s take is set to rebound sharply from April as Urals, buoyed by the Iran war and a U.S. sanctions waiver for “at sea” cargoes, has surged above $120 a barrel to India. (Bloomberg, 04.03.26)
• Russia will send a second oil tanker to crisis‑hit Cuba after the Anatoly Kolodkin “broke through the blockade” and delivered hundreds of tons of crude to Matanzas, Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev said. He framed the shipments, made despite U.S. and EU sanctions on the vessel, as humanitarian aid to an island suffering blackouts after Trump’s embargo cut off Venezuelan supplies. (MT/AFP, 04.03.26)
• Libyan authorities say a damaged Russian LNG tanker, the Arctic Metagaz, is now “out of control” and adrift in the Mediterranean after bad weather foiled attempts to tow it away from their coast. The ship, carrying about 700 tons of fuel and a large load of natural gas, was abandoned after explosions on March 3 while en route from Russia to Egypt; Russia has blamed Ukraine. Libya and Italy’s Eni had planned to move the vessel to reduce pollution risk to Libyan shores. (MT/AFP, 04.03.26) 
  • French outlet RFI reports, via Meduza, that more than 200 Ukrainian officers and specialists are allegedly stationed at three bases in western Libya under an October 2025 agreement with Tripoli, and that a Ukrainian Magura V5 sea drone launched from near the Mellitah gas complex was behind the March attack on the Russian LNG tanker Arctic Metagaz in the Mediterranean. Kyiv has not commented. (Meduza, 04.03.26)

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

Monday, March 30, 2026

• A New York Times investigation finds that “the Base,” an online neo‑Nazi organization once disrupted by U.S. prosecutions, has resurged in Europe and is now led from Russia by American citizen Rinaldo Nazzaro, who lives there beyond Western reach. European terrorism cases in the U.K., Spain, Italy and the Netherlands all trace to the group, whose accelerationist ideology and calls for sabotage now explicitly target Ukrainian politicians and infrastructure, aligning closely with the Kremlin’s aims to destabilize Western states and Ukraine. (New York Times, 03.30.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Ex-CIA Director William Burns said the agency “took advantage of a once‑in‑a‑lifetime opportunity to recruit Russians” after the 2022 invasion, appealing to those who see “corruption at the core of the rot” in Putin’s system and achieving “significant results” in human intelligence collection. (Foreign Affairs, 04.02.26)

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

• Bloomberg reports that the Federal Security Service (FSB), “the main successor to the Soviet-era KGB,” is gaining “wide-ranging access to corporate databases, telecommunications networks, financial communications and even information on international contacts by scientists” under new laws. A measure taking effect April 1 “grants the FSB the authority to obtain copies of any organization’s databases without a court order,” and banks have been ordered to install surveillance systems “by 2027” that can monitor messages in banking apps. (Bloomberg News, 03.31.26)
• Russia is moving to sharply restrict virtual private networks, signaling a new phase in the Kremlin’s drive to crush online anonymity and access to blocked content. Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said the state’s task is to “reduce the use of VPNs,” floating measures such as surcharges on high volumes of international traffic and pressuring major platforms like Yandex and Wildberries to limit VPN users’ access, while calling direct criminal penalties a “blunt solution.” At a closed March 28 meeting, he proposed metering mobile connections over 15 GB of foreign traffic per month by May 1 and warned services that refuse to restrict VPN users could lose “whitelist” status—even as VPN apps now dominate Russian download charts amid Telegram and media blocks. (Moscow Times/AFP, 03.31.26, Meduza, 03.31.26)
  • With some 4.7 million sites blocked and Western platforms throttled, VPNs have become “a way of life” for tens of millions of Russians seeking access to social media, games, and independent news. (MT/AFP, 04.03.26) 
• Putin again urged regional authorities to “pull people out of barracks” and unsafe housing during a meeting with the Arkhangelsk governor, repeating a demand he has made nine times since 2007 even as 1.28 million Russians still live in officially condemned buildings and over 300,000 have waited more than five years to be resettled. (Istories, 03.31.26) 
• A Moscow court has sentenced exiled investigative journalist and security services expert Andrei Soldatov to four years in prison in absentia for allegedly violating Russia’s “foreign agent” law and taking part in an “undesirable” organization, adding to earlier administrative penalties and a still-pending “fake news” case over his reporting on the military. (MT/AFP, 03.31.26)
• The Kremlin’s propaganda machine has struggled to reconcile Putin’s description of the invasion as a limited “special military operation” in Donbas with mounting evidence of a full‑scale, bloody war across Ukraine. Media regulator Roskomnadzor ordered outlets not to use words like “war” or “invasion” and to rely only on official sources, while state TV showed calm scenes and repeated denials of strikes on cities even as Ukrainians posted battlefield videos online. (Financial Times, 03.31.26) 

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• Russia’s manufacturing sector fell deeper into contraction in March as demand and output weakened, S&P Global’s latest PMI survey shows. The seasonally adjusted Manufacturing PMI slipped to 48.3 from 49.5 in February—its lowest in 2026—signaling a “modest” but accelerating downturn. New orders and export demand declined, purchasing activity saw its sharpest fall in four years, and employment dropped for a fourth month. Input costs rose at the second‑fastest pace in over a year, while firms struggled to pass price increases on to customers. Business optimism fell to its weakest in almost four years. (bne IntelliNews, 04.01.26) 
• Russian supermarket chain VkusVill closed 286 stores last year, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Izvestia reported April 1, citing a market analytics firm. (MT/AFP, 04.01.26)
• Russia is rolling out “Max,” a Kremlin‑backed super‑app built by VK that mimics China’s WeChat, bundling messaging, payments, e‑government services and e‑ID functions while Telegram and WhatsApp are throttled. Max is pre‑installed on all new phones and required for tasks from university Wi‑Fi access to age checks in stores. Critics warn the unencrypted platform is a “Trojan horse” for pervasive surveillance and internet control inside Russia and beyond. (Wall Street Journal, 04.01.26) 

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Russia’s Interior Ministry has placed Meduza correspondent Andrei Pertsev on its federal wanted list on unspecified criminal charges, Mediazona reports. In February, Moscow prosecutors opened a case accusing him of participating in an “undesirable organization” for continuing to work for Meduza from abroad and publishing material on Russian political, economic and social affairs. (Meduza via Mediazona, 04.03.26)

Defense and aerospace:

• Russia’s Space Forces launched a Soyuz‑2.1a rocket with a Fregat upper stage from Plesetsk on April 3, placing a Meridian‑M (14F112 No. 21) military communications satellite into orbit, the first launch of this series since March 2022. The Meridian‑M constellation provides secure communications for the Defense Ministry, including in Arctic and high‑latitude regions. (Russianforces.org, 04.03.26)
• Russia’s Higher Education and Science Ministry has reportedly told rectors of major universities that at least 2% of their students must sign military contracts, sources told the independent newsletter Faridaily. With about 2.2 million male university students in 2025, the quota could yield some 44,000 contract soldiers, rising to 76,000 if applied to technical colleges. Universities have already been recruiting students—especially for drone units—using bonuses and exam pressure, as the Defense Ministry aims to staff nearly 78,800 drone-force positions by end‑2026. (Meduza, 04.01.26)
• Russian milbloggers also slam the Defense Ministry’s new Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment drive as a failure, saying contracts look like standard army deals and recruits fear being redeployed into infantry assault units. They accuse generals of resisting innovation and warn that voluntary recruitment no longer covers casualties—echoing ISW’s assessment that the Kremlin is laying ground for limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups to sustain high losses in Ukraine rather than expand the overall force. (ISW, 03.29.26) 
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• Violent crime committed by active-duty Russian servicemen has surged since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, with garrison courts handling 729 murder cases between 2022 and 2025, compared to 67 in the previous four years, alongside steep rises in grievous bodily harm, rape, sexual assault and robbery. Most victims are civilians rather than fellow soldiers, and many cases involve alcohol, prior criminal records or recruits from prison, including sexual violence and killings of minors in occupied Ukrainian territories. Rights advocates say the true scale is higher because “the entire combat zone is a lawless place” where crimes are rarely recorded, while authorities appear more focused on keeping “people… at the front rather than to prison.” (MT/AFP, 03.31.26) 
• PBS reports widespread extreme brutality and extortion inside the Russian military, with videos and thousands of complaints showing soldiers locked in cages, electrocuted, sexually assaulted, and forced to pay bribes—sometimes up to 80% of their salary—to avoid suicidal assaults or to get medical discharges, rear postings, or even basic treatment. Researchers found “price lists” governing survival: roughly $2,000 to be assigned as a drone operator away from the front, $6,000 for a rear‑area job, and about $12,000 for a forged medical discharge. Leaked messages to a Russian government website include nearly 12,000 complaints in six months accusing officers of torture, extortion, and violence against their own men. (PBS NewsHour, 04.02.26)
• Russia’s FSB has now killed at least 81 people “during detention” since the start of the full‑scale war, according to Istories’ tally, most recently a man in the Moscow region accused of preparing a terrorist attack at a defense plant and acting on instructions from Ukrainian intelligence, amid a pattern of deadly operations justified by unverified terrorism or sabotage claims. (Istories, 03.31.26)
• A Moscow court sentenced Maj. Gen. Konstantin Kuvshinov, former head of the Defense Ministry’s 9th treatment and diagnostic center near the main MoD building, to 7½ years in a strict‑regime colony for large‑scale fraud, bribery and document forgery. (Mediazona, 03.30.26)
• Dagestan’s Supreme Court sentenced exiled former State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev in absentia to 19 years in prison for allegedly organizing the antisemitic riot at Makhachkala airport on October 29, 2023, when a mob stormed a flight from Tel Aviv “searching” for Israeli refugees and injured 23 police officers. Islamist preacher Israil Akhmednabiyev (Abu Umar Sasitlinsky) and alleged “Utro Dagestana” channel admin Abakar Abakarov received 16 and 15 years respectively. All three remain on international wanted lists. (Meduza, 04.03.26)
• A Moscow regional court sentenced gang leader Konstantin Piskaryov, known as “Kostya Bolshoy,” to life in prison for at least 21 murders and four attempted murders committed since the 1990s, capping a seven‑year trial. His largely ex‑military gang “protected” markets, a yacht club, and other businesses, while Piskaryov also invested in firms including a restaurant near FSB headquarters. Other members received terms from about 9 to 24 years; several who cooperated earlier got 8–9 years. One suspect remains on an international wanted list. (Meduza, 04.02.26)
• Former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov has told investigators he is ready to sign a pretrial cooperation deal in his second criminal case, Kommersant reports. Accused of taking 1.3 billion rubles in bribes, laundering criminal proceeds, and illegal weapons possession, Ivanov denies guilt and claims his actions amount only to abuse of office. In exchange for reclassifying his charges, he offers to reveal undisclosed crimes and “illegal assets” of senior officials worth “billions of rubles.” (Meduza, 03.28.26) Once it became clear that even Sergei Shoigu’s former right-hand man at MoD, Ruslan Tsalikov, is being charged, Ivanov must have concluded that the old rules and protections no longer apply at the top of the Defense Ministry. That greatly increases the incentive to cooperate, and suggests investigators are trying to build cases by moving up the chain with insider testimony.
• The FSB says it foiled a plot to assassinate a senior Russian law-enforcement official in Moscow using a bomb hidden in an electric scooter’s storage compartment, allegedly planned by Ukraine’s Security Service. Agents claim they found 1.5 kilograms of plastic explosive packed with bolts and nuts and wired to a WiFi relay and 4G modem, and say the same method was used in the December 2024 killing of Gen. Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s nuclear, chemical and biological defense forces. (Meduza, 04.03.26)
• Russian authorities have arrested Alexei Marushchenko, founder of the little‑known PMC “Yastreb,” in Kursk region on charges of defrauding nearly 100 would‑be contract soldiers. Investigators say recruits paid him and associates on promises of relatively “easier” service in a private military company rather than regular army units, but were in fact simply signing Defence Ministry contracts. The case—handled by the FSB and Investigative Committee—also includes counts of fraud, weapons theft, extortion and murder, amid prior reports tying Marushchenko to sham PMCs and brutal abuse of fighters. (Meduza, 04.02.26)
• Prosecutors have requested a 15‑year maximum‑security sentence and a 500‑million‑ruble fine for former Kursk governor Alexei Smirnov, who has pleaded guilty to taking over 20 million rubles in bribes tied to contracts for border fortifications with Ukraine. Smirnov, who led the region in 2024, says the term is disproportionate given his plea deal and claims his late predecessor Roman Starovoit actually received “tens of millions” from the same schemes. (Meduza, 04.02.26)
• Heavy rains have caused major flooding across Russia’s North Caucasus, with Dagestan and Chechnya hit hardest. In Dagestan, rivers burst their banks on March 27, cutting power to some 132 settlements (about 70,000 people), flooding roads, rail lines, orchards and vineyards, and submerging parts of Makhachkala under up to 1.5 meters of water. Chechnya declared a republic‑wide state of emergency after landslides destroyed nearly 70 homes, damaged 17 bridges and severed road links, prompting mass evacuations. (Meduza, 03.31.26)

• An explosion at a petrochemical plant in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan killed at least two people and injured dozens more, local authorities said, as emergency services battled the blaze and searched for survivors. The blast occurred at a facility in the town of Nizhnekamsk, a major hub of Russia’s oil and petrochemical industry, with videos on social media showing large plumes of smoke rising over the area. Officials opened a criminal investigation into possible safety violations. (MT/AFP, 03.31.26)

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• A leaked recording published by an investigative consortium shows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asking Hungarian FM Péter Szijjártó in August 2024 to “remind” him he was working to remove Kremlin-connected oligarch Alisher Usmanov’s sister, Gulbakhor Ismailova, from the EU sanctions list. Szijjártó replies that Budapest and Bratislava are preparing a joint proposal to lift sanctions on her, which the EU later did in March 2025, reportedly in exchange for Hungary backing extension of other Russia sanctions. The tapes also depict Szijjártó sharing confidential EU deliberations with Lavrov and mocking Baltic calls to cut Russian energy revenues, fueling accusations he acts as Moscow’s “mole” inside EU and NATO meetings. (Meduza, 03.31.26)
  • Leaders in the Czech Republic and Poland reacted with dismay on Tuesday to a report claiming that the Hungarian government intervened on behalf of Moscow to seek relief from the European Union sanctions. (Bloomberg, 03.31.26)
• Alexandra Prokopenko argues that Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz is quietly reshaping global fertilizer markets in ways that structurally advantage Russia. With Gulf exporters handling 46% of seaborne urea and 30% of ammonia now largely frozen, prices for nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers are surging. Russia and Belarus, by contrast, control about 23% of ammonia exports, 14% of urea and 40% of potash via routes that bypass Hormuz. New long‑term buyers in Africa are already locking in Russian supply, creating dependencies Moscow can later convert into political leverage, potentially letting the Kremlin portray itself by 2027 as the indispensable supplier that “saved the world from starvation.” (Carnegie Politika, 03.24.26)
• Madagascar’s five-month-old military government received another shipment of Russian arms and equipment on Wednesday as the two countries deepen ties. (Bloomberg, 04.02.26)
• Czech police arrested a foreign national who turned himself in and admitted planning last week’s Molotov cocktail attack on the Russian House cultural center in Prague since last summer. Six firebombs were reportedly thrown, breaking a window and blackening walls but failing to set the building ablaze. Russian officials condemned the incident as “barbaric,” while the Czech Foreign Ministry also denounced the attack. (Washington Post, 03.31.26)
• A joint investigation by The Insider found that components for synthesizing epibatidine—the ultra‑toxic poison used to kill Alexei Navalny—were imported into Russia by ABCR Chemi Rus, 90% owned by Germany’s Chemie GmbH. Billing and call records show ABCR staff frequently contacted scientists at the Signal research center, which allegedly produced epibatidine and other poisons for Russian security services, as well as chemists at institutes linked to Novichok development. German lawyers told The Insider such supplies could constitute complicity if knowingly continued. (Istories, 04.01.26)
• A Paris court has opened proceedings against Russian businessman Dmitry Klyuev, alleged architect of the tax‑fraud scheme uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky. French prosecutors accuse Klyuev of laundering money stolen from the Russian budget via Hermitage Capital’s 5.4 billion‑ruble tax refund scam, tracing over €2 million spent in France on luxury goods and holidays, including €127,000 for Senator Dmitry Saveliev’s ski trip. Klyuev is wanted internationally but believed to live in Russia under official protection. (iStories, 03.30.26)
• A Moscow court sentenced German carnival float designer Jacques Tilly in absentia to 8½ years in prison for “spreading false information” about the Russian military and “insulting religious feelings” over satirical parade displays depicting Vladimir Putin bathing in Ukrainian blood and devouring Ukraine. Tilly called the case a propaganda show trial and an attack on freedom of expression. (Washington Post, 04.03.26)
• Kenya warned it will prosecute citizens who enlist in foreign conflicts, after repatriating 47 people recruited to fight for Russia in its war on Ukraine. (Bloomberg, 04.01.26)
• Andrey Baklitskiy notes that Dmitry Trenin—former director of Carnegie Moscow and now affiliated with the Higher School of Economics and IMEMO—has been elected the next president of the Russian International Affairs Council, replacing former foreign minister Igor Ivanov. (Andrey Baklitskiy on X, 03.31.26)

Ukraine:

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities have uncovered a large-scale scheme involving the misappropriation of grain at the state-owned State Food and Grain Corporation of Ukraine, investigators said. The scheme involved former senior management of the corporation, also known as DPGCU, along with representatives of a foreign company, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, or NABU, reported. Corporation executives signed four foreign trade contracts in 2021 for the supply of feed corn to a non-resident company, investigators said. Original bills of lading were transferred to the buyer despite contractual terms requiring full prepayment before ownership transfer, allowing the company to unload the cargo and dispose of unpaid grain, investigators said. “As a result, the state corporation lost nearly 106,000 tons of grain worth UAH 776 million ($17.7 million).” (New Voice of Ukraine, 04.02.26)
• Retired Army Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, a key witness in Trump’s first impeachment and former NSC Ukraine analyst, is mounting a long‑shot Democratic bid for the U.S. Senate in deep‑red Florida, seeking to flip Marco Rubio’s old seat now held by Trump‑backed Republican Ashley Moody. (Wall Street Journal, 04.02.26)

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Ukrainian prosecutors have sent to court the case of a former battalion logistics commander accused of fabricating “combat” deployments for four soldiers who never left their base in Dnipropetrovsk region, allowing them to receive up to 100,000 hryvnias per month each in extra pay. Investigators say the scheme, run from Kramatorsk between October 2023 and December 2024, cost the state more than 4.6 million hryvnias; the lieutenant colonel has been dismissed and is in pretrial detention. (Korrespondent.net, 04.03.26)
• An acting regional chief of Ukraine’s State Service on Food Safety and Consumer Protection in Volyn, caught taking a $2,000 bribe for issuing an operating permit, has agreed in a plea deal to transfer 1.5 million hryvnias to support the Armed Forces. The State Bureau of Investigation says strong evidence led the official to admit guilt and accept the obligation as part of a court‑filed agreement. (Korrespondent.net, 04.03.26)

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

Monday, March 30, 2026

• Exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called on the European Union to maintain sanctions against her country’s authoritarian regime as she warned against following an easing of U.S. policy toward Minsk. (Bloomberg, 03.30.26)

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

• Putin warned Armenia it cannot simultaneously be part of both the EU and the Russia‑led Eurasian Economic Union, telling Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow that “it’s impossible to be in a customs union with the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union” because of clashing rules. As Yerevan pivots toward Brussels after the Karabakh defeat and suspends its role in the CSTO, Putin stressed Armenia’s cheap Russian gas and signaled concern over June elections, saying he hopes pro‑Russia forces can compete freely. (AP via Washington Post, 04.01.26)

Thursday, April 2, 2026

• Moldova’s parliament has approved laws denouncing key agreements with the Commonwealth of Independent States, setting the country on a formal path to quit the Russian‑led bloc. Sixty of 101 deputies backed the move, opposed by Communist and Socialist MPs who warned of “catastrophic” economic consequences. After the president signs, the Foreign Ministry will notify the CIS Executive Committee; Moldova will exit 12 months later. Georgia left the CIS in 2008 and Ukraine in 2018. (Meduza, 04.02.26)
• Latvia’s military intelligence service publicly named six Russian GRU officers and one Belarusian GRU officer it says are conducting espionage against the country: Alexey Pyzhikov, Alexey Lesnikov, Nikolai Chetverikov, Alexander Yushin, Alexander Gladkov, Grigory Ivanov, and Belarusian officer Sergey Baranov. In its 2025 report, the service describes Belarusian military intelligence as effectively a “branch” of Russia’s GRU and warns that, in a war with the West, Moscow could use agents recruited in Latvia for sabotage and attacks on civilians, as in Ukraine. (Meduza, 04.02.26) 

Friday, April 3, 2026

• Belarus has canceled the passports of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Byalyatski and other political prisoners recently released and expelled under U.S.‑brokered deals, a move rights groups call a new form of transnational repression. Stripping ex‑detainees of valid documents makes it harder to travel, regularize status abroad, or ever return, effectively formalizing exile for more than 170 prisoners deported in swaps since late 2025. Minsk has not commented publicly. (RFE/RL, 04.03.26)

IV. Quotable and notable

• Meghan O’Sullivan, director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and former deputy national security adviser, said new intelligence on Iran’s remaining missile‑launch capability suggests the war is likely to last “two to three weeks, perhaps, but maybe even longer,” because Tehran only needs enough capacity to create uncertainty. Even a diminished arsenal will both keep the Strait of Hormuz “hostage” by deterring tanker traffic and fuel Gulf states’ resistance to ending the war, since they fear an “angrier regime” still able to strike their energy infrastructure—making it “very hard to bring this conflict to a close in the timeframe that the President has suggested.” (Anderson Cooper 360°, 04.02.26)
• Member of Harvard University Board of Overseers Fiona Hill argued that if modern forms of warfare such as cyber, hybrid and other grey zone operations are taken into account, a world war has been under way for some time and has been brought closer to a boil by the Iran war. “I think it meets that threshold for a system-changing war,” Hill said. (The Guardian, 04.02.26)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am East Coast time on the day it was distributed.

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Russian-flagged oil tanker Anatoly Kolodkin arrives in Matanzas, Cuba, Tuesday, March 31, 2026. (AP Photo/Ramon Espinosa)