5 Ideas to Explore

1. In their article, Christopher Miller and his Financial Times co-authors highlight a crucial diplomatic moment as Donald Trump prepares to host Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Oct. 17 to discuss arming Ukraine with U.S-made Tomahawk missiles. Trump is reportedly considering this move in an effort to pressure Vladimir Putin toward ending the Russia-Ukraine war, which Axios has described as the U.S. president’s “next target” now that he has achieved a breakthrough in the Middle East. According to Axios, Tomahawks could prove to be “game-changing” with “Trump's quest to end the Russia-Ukraine war” serving as “the backdrop” for the Oct. 17 meeting. According to Stacie Pettyjohn of the Center for a New American Security, however, Washington could only spare some 20 to 50 Tomahawks for Ukraine, “which will not decisively shift the dynamics of the war.” Regardless of the quantity, however, Deputy Chairman of Putin’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev has already warned that Russia cannot distinguish between nuclear and conventional Tomahawks in flight, according to ISW, while Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned that the supplies of these cruise missiles to Ukraine “will escalate the situation to a nuclear war,” according to Kommersant. While debating whether to supply Tomahawks, which have a range of 1,500 miles, the U.S. government has already been sharing intelligence with Kyiv for months on routes, timing and target vulnerabilities, which has enabled Ukraine to launch effective long-range drone strikes inside Russia, according to FT.
2. Recent analyses by Maria Varenikova, Brendan Hoffman, Keith Johnson and Andrew Kramer converge on the pivotal role of strikes on energy infrastructure in the Russia-Ukraine war. Varenikova and Hoffman detail Ukraine’s escalating drone strikes on Russian oil refineries, which Zelenskyy describes as the “most effective sanctions.” Johnson echoes this, highlighting how Ukrainian drones penetrate deep into Russia, disrupting refining capacity and creating economic pain. Kramer further examines Ukraine’s strategic calculus, arguing that only by inflicting tangible hardship inside Russia can Kyiv hope to push Moscow toward negotiations. At the same time, Russia has intensified missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s civilian energy installations, according to Peter Dickinson. These strikes, Dickinson writes, have disabled “60% of the country’s gas production.”¹
3. Dara Massicot argues that Western observers have underestimated how much Russia has adapted and learned from its failures in Ukraine. Since 2022, Moscow has developed a complex system for integrating battlefield lessons across its military, defense industry and educational institutions, the Carnegie Endowment expert writes in Foreign Affairs. Notably, Russia has improved its drone capabilities, giving junior commanders more autonomy and updating logistics and doctrine. As a result, Ukraine now faces more frequent and destructive drone attacks, with greater harm to civilians and infrastructure, according to Massicot. Massicot argues that the West must pay closer attention and learn from these Russian adaptations, as they will shape the future of warfare.
4. Andrew Kramer, in his New York Times article, examines the significant opacity and persistent challenges underlying Ukraine’s wartime weapons procurement. While Ukraine has rapidly expanded its domestic defense industry to produce artillery shells, armored vehicles and drones, Kramer notes that much of this spending remains hidden from public scrutiny—a situation that alarms analysts and anti-corruption activists who see little progress in overcoming the country’s legacy issues in military contracting. Internal audits uncovered numerous contracts plagued by late deliveries, incomplete shipments and substantial prepayments for goods never received, according to Kramer. Disturbingly, many deals for critical armaments were not awarded to the lowest bidders, resulting in at least $129 million in excess spending—a discrepancy viewed by experts like Tamerlan Vahabov and Olena Tregub as symptomatic of either poor management or ongoing corrupt practices, according to Kramer.
5. Reflecting on possible endgames for the Russia-Ukraine war at a recent Russia Matters event, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Kevin Ryan told Harvard Professor Graham Allison that “Ukraine cannot destroy Russia’s war capacity, while Russia appears unable to militarily defeat Ukraine”—in what makes a clear-cut military victory impossible for either side. American and NATO caution, born of fear of escalation with a nuclear power, has partially shaped the conflict’s tempo, according to Ryan. He agreed with Allison and other participants who asserted that such caution—shared by senior U.S. officials in the Biden administration such as William Burns and Jake Sullivan, who had intimate access to the thinking of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle before and during the war—was necessary to avoid catastrophic nuclear risk. In his comments, Ryan also stressed that peace demands “credible military force coupled with pragmatic diplomacy.” 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

See these links for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Nuclear Energy Now – Ukraine Nuclear Energy Sites Face Renewed Attacks" Emily Day, The National Interest, 10.10.25.
• "How Russia Tried to Con Americans into Paying for Plutonium Disposal, and Why It Failed," Vladimir Slivyak, The Moscow Times, 10.08.25.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

See these links for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "The Ukraine War Is Making North Korea Stronger Than Ever," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 10.10.25.
• "North Korea’s Military Is More Advanced Than You Think," Karishma Vaswami, Bloomberg, 10.09.25.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Russia is torturing its Ukrainian captives" The Economist, 09.10.25 

• According to The Economist, the U.N.’s human rights mission in Kyiv describes Russia’s abuse of Ukrainian prisoners as “systematic and widespread,” with both civilian and military detainees subjected to severe mistreatment.
• A recent U.N. report found that 92% of 216 released civilian detainees interviewed recounted abuse, including “beatings, electric shocks, stress positions, ritual humiliation and rape.” Abuse of soldiers is reported to be even more prevalent.
• Volodymyr Mykolayenko, ex-mayor of Kherson and former prisoner, describes “welcome beatings” on each transfer, starvation, appalling sanitary conditions, and dental torture; he states, “The biggest lesson I have learned is that you can’t negotiate with evil. And Russia is evil.”
• Members of Ukraine’s Azov Corps, specifically targeted, have faced extreme brutality. Yan Danylko, a recently released Azov officer, lost a third of his weight and recounts torture techniques such as “the motorcycle” and “the starfish.”
• Russia has designated Azov as a terrorist organization, with at least 130 Azov fighters now sentenced to 10 years or more, and dozens more under investigation.
• Prisoners’ conditions temporarily improve when Russian officials stage “Potemkin” visits, but abuses resume immediately after.
• The article concludes that, as Russia is “immune to shaming” and internal monitors are ineffective, Ukraine’s only recourse is limited prisoner exchanges, as large-scale swaps are unlikely while Ukraine remains on the defensive.

"Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are a European problem," Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council, 10.10.25

• Dickinson warns that “Russia has already intensified missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s civilian energy installations,” with October attacks leaving “large parts of Kyiv and neighboring regions without electricity and water” and hitting gas production in eastern Ukraine.
• He notes the scale is now “unprecedented,” as “targets are pounded by dozens of drones in one go,” overwhelming air defenses. On October 9, Russia launched “approximately 450 drones and 30 missiles at energy infrastructure.”
• These strikes, Dickinson writes, have disabled “60 percent of the country’s gas production,” with Ukrainian officials calling the attacks on Kyiv’s power grid “some of the most devastating since the start of the full-scale invasion.”
• Despite Ukraine’s “remarkable resilience”—restoring power quickly after attacks—he warns the coming winter “is shaping up to be the harshest of the war for Ukraine’s civilian population.” The knock-on effects threaten to become “a wider European issue unless more support is offered to Kyiv.”
• February 2025 strikes on Ukrainian gas assets led to “severe imbalances, with a knock-on impact on most central and eastern European countries.” Ukraine has imported “close to five billion cubic meters of gas from European markets” to fill the gap, raising regional prices.
• “Europe has options,” Dickinson argues, but only if “quick political decisions” are made. He describes how expensive tariffs and restrictions in Slovakia and Romania—despite “idle transmission capacity”—make it harder for Ukraine to import needed energy.
• He cautions that keeping infrastructure blocked “poses risks to the entire region,” as congestion and high prices may hit Romania, Slovakia, and even U.S. LNG exporters wishing to reach European clients.
• Dickinson calls for Brussels and Washington to “convince countries such as Slovakia and Romania to cooperate” ahead of winter. In an ideal scenario, “Western allies would consider radical measures such as establishing a no-fly zone,” but given NATO reluctance, “the next best option is to persuade Ukraine’s neighbors to put narrow national interests aside and take concrete steps to support Kyiv.”

For military strikes on civilian targets see the next section.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

"How Russia Recovered: What the Kremlin Is Learning From the War in Ukraine," Dara Massicot, Foreign Affairs, 10.08.25 

• According to Massicot, many Western strategists “have missed...the extent to which Moscow has learned from its failures and adapted its strategy and approach to war, in Ukraine and beyond.”
• She writes that Russia has “constructed a complex ecosystem of learning” since 2022, integrating lessons from the battlefield into “the defense manufacturing base, universities, and soldiers up and down the chain of command.”
• Moscow has developed new tactics and improved weapons, especially in drone warfare, turning “an area of weakness into an area of strength,” and begun giving junior commanders more autonomy while reorganizing logistics and doctrine.
• Massicot notes, “Ukraine is likely to face even greater destruction in the months ahead. It will have to contend with faster and more numerous Russian drone attacks… and more harm to cities, civilians, and critical infrastructure.”
• She describes how the Russian military institutionalizes battlefield experience, using analytic teams, revised training, and over 450 updates to combat manuals since 2022.
• Russia’s defense sector now partners with startups, creating elite drone units and adapting tactics to counter Ukrainian strengths.
• Despite these improvements, Massicot highlights ongoing problems: “Russia’s training programs remain uneven,” and implementation of reforms is inconsistent, undermined by persistent “problems with discipline and professionalism.”
• Moscow is preparing for future war by investing more in UAVs, robots, and artificial intelligence, but resource and structural constraints remain.
• Massicot concludes that the West must “start learning from the war in Ukraine, not turning away,” as Russia’s relentless adaptation will continue to shape the future of warfare.

"To Inflict Pain on Russians, Ukraine’s Drones Zero In on Oil Refineries," Maria Varenikova and Brendan Hoffman, The New York Times, 10.13.25

• The article describes how Ukrainian long-range drones with 24-foot wingspans and 110-pound warheads are targeting Russian oil refineries, with the aim of inflicting economic pain on Russia and ordinary Russians in ways that Western sanctions have not.
• According to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, “The most effective sanctions, the ones that work the fastest, are the fires at Russia’s oil refineries.”
• By September, Ukrainian strikes had damaged or destroyed refinery equipment handling 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day—about 20% of Russia’s refining capacity (per Wood Mackenzie).
• Gasoline prices in Russia have risen about 40% since the start of 2025 amid escalating fuel shortages and restrictions, with some stations in Crimea ceasing gasoline sales and others rationing to five gallons per customer.
• Ukraine’s drone regiment began with 40 people and 10 vehicles but now numbers as many as 2,000. In August alone, the 14th regiment struck 17 Russian refinery sites.
• Russian efforts to counter the attacks are limited: “Russia does little to protect refineries with air defenses, and they are full of flammable liquids, amplifying the effect,” noted economist Vladislav Inozemtsev.
• While Western sanctions focused on crude oil and gas, drone strikes on refineries directly impact Russian citizens’ daily lives, creating lines at the pump and shortages, though not deeply cutting Kremlin revenues.
• Repair of refineries is slow due to the inability to import European and US parts.
• Homegrown Ukrainian drone production and innovation have increased dramatically but are limited by funding, with Ukrainian officials saying that more Western funding could “change the course of the war very quickly.”

"Ukraine Is Hitting Russia Where It Hurts: Its Oil Refineries," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 10.09.25. 

• According to Johnson, Ukraine’s “two-year offensive against Russian oil facilities has intensified, eating away at Moscow’s energy revenues” through drone and possible cruise missile strikes deep inside Russia.
• He reports that mass-produced small drones allow Kyiv to reach oil targets “as far as 2,000 kilometers inside Russia,” and recent attacks have led to “gas lines” in Russian cities—a role reversal after Russian strikes caused years of blackouts in Ukraine.
• Johnson notes that although some claims about the scale of refinery damage are exaggerated, Ukraine’s attacks “limit Russia’s ability to turn crude oil into higher-value refined products,” squeezing profits and forcing Russians to export more crude at lower profit margins.
• Citing expert Sergey Vakulenko, he writes that Kyiv’s aims are “to make it painful for the population” and “to make it painful for Russia’s economy,” but not to cripple the Russian military, which still sources fuel from varied suppliers.
• He highlights that Russian experts estimate refinery sector loans have surged to $14 billion in the past year, partly due to emergency imports of Chinese equipment, signaling hidden strain.
• Craig Kennedy of Harvard notes that refinery strikes “are unlikely to change that calculus” alone, but as part of a “broader, multifront assault” could feed into Kremlin decision-making.
• Johnson concludes that Ukraine’s strikes are “not the death blow,” but have turned from a “small inconvenience to a major nuisance” for Russia’s energy sector, with the question remaining whether Ukraine can sustain pressure or Russia can adapt its defenses.

"Why Ukraine Is Betting on Strikes Deep Inside Russia," Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 10.13.25.

• According to Kramer, Ukrainian officials believe “the Kremlin will only negotiate if missiles and drones bring the pain of war home to Russians,” prompting a major campaign of long-range strikes on oil refineries, factories, ports, and railways deep inside Russia.
• Ukraine’s arsenal now includes domestically produced cruise missiles (like the Flamingo, with a claimed range of 1,800 miles) and drones (such as the Beaver and Furious, with ranges of up to 600 miles), many adapted from Soviet-era tech or developed by wartime start-ups.
• President Zelenskyy has called the campaign “long-range sanctions” or “drone sanctions,” arguing that “it’s only fair that Russia bears the war’s full cost” after rejecting both Ukrainian and U.S. cease-fire proposals.
• The article notes that Ukrainian strikes have already damaged Russia’s oil industry, causing fuel shortages and long gas lines in multiple regions—visible, dramatic impacts meant to ratchet pressure on the Russian economy and public morale.
• While Russia launches more drones and missiles nightly at Ukraine, Kyiv’s strategy is to hit economic and infrastructure targets, aiming to force Moscow to negotiate via a trade: “Kyiv halts attacks if Moscow does the same.”
• Though Kyiv says it avoids strikes on civilians, some officials speak of targeting symbolic sites in Moscow itself to shift Kremlin thinking.
• Trump’s administration has signaled support for the strikes. Trump wrote that “it is very hard, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking an invader’s country,” and has hinted at using the offer of Tomahawk missiles as a bargaining chip with Putin.

"The Russia–Ukraine war has entered a new phase," Nigel Gould-Davies, IISS, 10.07.25.

• Gould-Davies argues, “Russia’s actions are the logical result of four wider developments that are reshaping its calculus. The first three are policy choices of America, Europe and China. The fourth is Russia’s own deteriorating domestic condition. Russia’s response has ushered in a new and more dangerous phase of its war in Ukraine.”
• He notes, “U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 initially raised Kremlin hopes… Despite intensive diplomatic efforts, culminating in the Alaska summit… Russia has failed to achieve this. Although America made unilateral concessions—abandoning demands for an immediate ceasefire and dropping threats of new sanctions—it has not decisively broken with Ukraine or Europe. Trump… continues to provide weapons—now sold, not given—to Ukraine.”
• Gould-Davies observes, “Europe is stepping up. At the June 2025 NATO summit, member states agreed to spend 5% of GDP on defense by 2035… The EU is also intensifying pressure on Russia’s economy… Most significantly, the EU is now working on an ambitious plan to provide a €140 billion reparation loan to Ukraine using frozen Russian Central Bank assets… [which] will keep Ukraine afloat and enable it to fight for the next two to three years, while alleviating the burden of support on European taxpayers.”
• He writes, “China has tilted more decisively towards Russia… Beijing finally agreed to build the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline… When completed, it will more than double Russia’s pipeline gas exports to China.”
• Gould-Davies details Russia’s domestic crisis: “War and sanctions are cutting ever deeper into its economy, distorting the financial system and eroding productive capacity. Russia’s real interest rates are now the highest in the world. The labor market faces record shortages. The civilian economy is stagnant… Ukraine’s potent attacks on oil refineries are now causing significant disruption to Russian civilian life.”
• He writes, “The complacency that swept elites two years ago… is gone. Instead, there is growing anxiety, alarm and even plans for ‘escape routes from the country if everything falls apart’… The mood even among ‘Z-bloggers’… has also darkened in the face of military setbacks.”
• Gould-Davies concludes: “Time may no longer be on Russia’s side. The balance of material and technological potential vastly favors its adversaries. Russia can now prevail only if it… undermines their resolve. This compels it to accelerate its theory of victory... before the window for winning closes forever.”
• He warns, “Russia’s behavior will inevitably grow more risky and aggressive unless it faces unacceptable costs. The question is whether Europe will demonstrate, not only in word but deed, that it is ready to impose these. Failure to do so will merely postpone, not avert, confrontation. To fear escalation is to invite it.”

"From Stings to Deterrence: The drone army allows Ukraine not to avoid defeat, but remains incomplete without the missile component," Re: Russia, 10.02.25.

• According to the analysis, “the Russia-Ukraine war has almost completely transformed into a war of drones and drone technologies,” with both sides prioritizing drone strikes as a ‘second front’ beyond the stalled front lines.
• “In the first half of 2025…the sharp increase in the scale of Russian combined attacks using missiles, combat ‘Shaheds’ and decoy drones” has been the most significant development, while Ukraine escalated drone attacks on Russia’s industrial infrastructure, sparking visible fuel shortages.
• The report notes that Ukraine could produce up to 4 million drones in 2025, plus about 1 million from foreign aid, but “this is only half of what experts believe is needed to shift the balance of power in Ukraine’s favor.”
• However, “the power of Ukraine’s strikes remains limited as long as they rely exclusively on drones and are not combined operations like Russia’s. …The key question for Ukraine remains the development of a missile program.”
• For true deterrence, the article argues, “Ukraine will only reach a new level by developing a strategy of combined strikes similar to those Russia carries out regularly,” including the domestic production of long-range missiles.
• New Ukrainian drones like the FP-1 have enabled deep strikes, but the report highlights the debut of Ukraine’s heavy cruise missile, the FP 5 Flamingo, with a 3,000 km range and 1,150 kg payload. “If serial production can be established, possession of missiles with such characteristics would by itself alter the balance of power in the war and provide a powerful deterrent to Russian aggression.”
• Fire Point claims production could surpass 2,500 Flamingos annually next year, but challenges include bottlenecks, vulnerability to attack, and corruption investigations.
• The analysis concludes: “If all these problems are resolved and Ukraine’s missile program gains momentum…Ukraine could expand its capabilities and take a decisive step towards becoming a genuine military power—one whose defeat could only be achieved at the cost of substantial and almost unacceptable losses for the aggressor.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine Targets Russian Wallets Via Oil Attacks," Maria Varenikova and Brendan Hoffman, The New York Times, 10.14.25.
• "Russian Fiber Optic Drones Are Reaching Farther Into Ukraine," William Lawson, The National Interest, 10.12.25.

Military aid to Ukraine: 

“1 big thing: Trump's next target,” Mike Allen, Axios, 10.14.25. Commenting on the developments to Russia Matters, Harvard Professor Graham Allison noted that “for Trump’s post- Middle East agenda, Russia is at the top.”*

• “President Trump — during his triumphal address in Jerusalem yesterday to the Knesset, Israel's parliament — said he may call back his envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, for an Iran deal. "But first we have to get Russia done," Trump added. "We gotta get that one done. If you don't mind, Steve, let's focus on Russia first. All right? We'll get it, though."
• “Trump's quest to end the Russia-Ukraine war will be the backdrop on Friday when he meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House... The two will discuss what weapons should be supplied to Ukraine, specifically if the U.S. should provide game-changing, long-range Tomahawk missiles to the war-torn country.”
• “Zelensky confirmed in a Monday post on X that he will discuss ‘a series of steps that I intend to propose’ with Trump. The Ukrainian president said that, as Trump proposed, he would meet with energy companies because there are pressing needs linked to various formats of attacks, not even the attacks that Russia has already carried out. The main focus of the visit, Zelensky said, will be air defense and Ukraine's long-range capabilities.”
• “Trump said he ‘might have to speak to Russia’ about the Tomahawks. ‘Do they want to have Tomahawks going in their direction? I don't think so. I told that to President Zelensky, because Tomahawks are a new step of aggression,’ Trump said. ‘I might say: 'Look, if this war is not gonna get settled, I may send them Tomahawks.' Russia doesn't need that. I think it is appropriate to bring that up.’”

“Donald Trump to meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington on Friday,” Christopher Miller, Amy Mackinnon and Steff Chávez, Financial Times, 10.13.25.

• “US President Donald Trump will welcome his Ukrainian counterpart to Washington on Friday for talks about how they can force Russia’s Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table, including through the possibility of supplying American-made Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv,” the FT journalists write. “The meeting will be Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s third with the US president at the White House since Trump returned to office in January.”
• “Trump has said that he is considering selling an unspecified number of long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine but that he needs to hear more about how Kyiv plans to use them, two people briefed on the president’s calls told the Financial Times.”
• “A Ukrainian official said Kyiv believed Trump was closer than ever to supplying the missiles but cautioned that the US president was clear that he had not yet come to a decision... People familiar with Trump’s discussions with Zelenskyy said that his about-face stems from growing frustration with Putin.”
• “On Sunday, Trump told reporters the US might send Ukraine Tomahawk missiles if Putin did not come to a settlement.”
• “Mark Cancian, a former Pentagon official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank, estimated in a recent war game that the US had 4,150 Tomahawks in total... Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security think-tank, said Washington could spare some 20 to 50 Tomahawks for Ukraine, “which will not decisively shift the dynamics of the war.”

“US intel guided Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy sites,” Christopher Miller, Amy Mackinnon and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 10.12.25.

• For months “American intelligence shared with Kyiv has enabled strikes on important Russian energy assets including oil refineries far beyond the frontline, according to multiple Ukrainian and US officials familiar with the campaign.”
• “The shift came after a phone call between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in July, when the FT reported the US president asked whether Ukraine could strike Moscow if Washington provided long-range weapons.”
• “The US intelligence helps Kyiv shape route planning, altitude, timing and mission decisions, enabling Ukraine’s long-range, one-way attack drones to evade Russian air defenses, said the officials familiar with the matter.
• Three people familiar with the operation said Washington was closely involved in all stages of planning. A US official said Ukraine selected the targets for long-range strikes and Washington then provided intelligence on the sites’ vulnerabilities. But others involved and briefed on the operations said the US had also set out target priorities for the Ukrainians. One of them described Kyiv’s drone force as the “instrument” for Washington to undermine Russia’s economy and push Putin towards a settlement.”
• “Ukraine’s recent success with deep strikes was mostly because of technological upgrades to drones and increased domestic production, which has allowed Kyiv to launch more at once. “Our drones, drone-missiles and some missiles are getting better: more uses, greater production,” he [Zelenskyy] said.
• “The tempo of Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil and gas facilities and pipelines that underpin Moscow’s war effort escalated dramatically in August and September. The damage forced Moscow to curtail diesel exports and increased its reliance on imported fuel.”

"Russia Doesn’t Fear American Tomahawk Missiles in Ukraine. Here’s Why," Brandon J. Weichert, The National Interest, 10.08.25.

• Weichert argues that Trump’s public statements about arming Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles are largely empty threats—and that “Putin understands this reality.” He writes, “It is doubtful that Trump is truly interested in expanding the already expansive (and expensive) Ukraine War beyond what it has already been expanded to.”
• He notes Trump’s recent reversal—“from belittling Ukraine’s military position in the ongoing war with Russia… to claiming instead that Ukraine could reclaim all its lost territory”—but interprets this as mostly “rhetorical flourishes” meant to gain negotiation leverage, not a sincere commitment to escalation.
• On military feasibility, Weichert explains, “Ukraine simply lacks the launch systems needed for these weapons. Tomahawks are primarily launched from warships and submarines belonging to the US Navy. They are also fired from US Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers—none of which Ukraine possesses, or could even easily integrate.” Adapting Tomahawks for ground use would require “extensive modifications, training, and direct US personnel involvement,” risking escalation with Russia.
• He further argues that “the missiles rely on US-controlled targeting data and GPS—meaning Ukraine couldn’t use them without Pentagon approval,” so any transfer would be seen as direct US involvement and a major provocation by Moscow.
• Weichert emphasizes US stockpile limitations: “The United States has a very finite stockpile of Tomahawks, which have been prioritized for potential conflicts in the Middle East and Venezuela… There is simply no realistic way the Americans could ever make enough Tomahawk cruise missiles to both support their own national strategic needs as well as the never-ending demand from Ukraine.”
• Russia, he notes, has declared the deployment of Tomahawks to Ukraine a red line, warning it would “equate it to direct US involvement—potentially leading to significant upward movement on the ‘escalation ladder,’ moving the world one rung closer to nuclear Armageddon.” Still, Weichert observes that “Russia has drawn other ‘red lines’ before, and did little when they were crossed.”
• The real takeaway, he contends, is that Trump’s “pattern of bold statements for leverage without any significant follow-through” means Moscow need not fear: “Trump has no real desire for war—and Putin understands this reality.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Ukraine’s Formula for Peace: Fewer Talks, More Weapons," Constant Méheut, The New York Times, 10.14.25
• "How Russia Is Beating Ukraine’s Patriot Missile Batteries," Brandon J. Weichert, The National Interest, 10.07.25.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“To stop Putin’s war, punish refineries processing Russian oil. Western sanctions will not be effective until the loophole for facilities in India, Turkey and China is closed,” Bill Browder, Financial Times, 10.13.25.

• Browder argues that Putin’s war machine is still fueled by oil and gas revenues, with oil sales alone surging by over 25 percent to $108 billion in 2024, as China, India, and Turkey have together purchased around $380 billion in Russian crude since 2023.
• He writes, “Current western sanctions, while impactful, have not been surgical enough. Russia’s war effort remains financially resilient… because they have left Russia’s most vital revenue stream largely intact: oil and gas exports.”
• Browder notes the G7 price cap has failed due to “non-compliance and weak enforcement,” with Russia using a “shadow fleet” and shell companies to sell as much as 75 percent of its crude outside the G7’s system.
• The EU’s continued reliance on Russian liquefied natural gas—over $122 billion in imports since February 2022—represents another critical lifeline for Putin.
• He contends the most effective move is “threatening the refineries that process the lion’s share of Russian crude, largely concentrated in just eight facilities across China, India and Turkey.” He urges the West to set a clear ultimatum: “any refinery processing Russian oil… must choose”—either cut energy ties with Russia or “face comprehensive bans from western shipping, finance and insurance.”
• He concludes, “Crude oil, refined products and LNG remain the arteries of Putin’s regime. Cutting them is not just the clearest way to end Russia’s war; it may be the only one.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How to cut Russia’s oil revenue by $80 bln a year," Hugo Dixon, Reuters, 10.13.25.

For sanctions on the energy sector, please see section “Energy exports from CIS” below.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“When Will This War End? Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan Reports From Kyiv,” Chris Conway, Russia Matters, 10.10.25.

• “Ryan painted a portrait of a country at war yet profoundly alive. In Kyiv, he noted, life continues amid danger … although only until the 10:00pm nightly curfew, when drone and missile strikes begin. These are often led by Iranian-designed drones, referred to as ‘mopeds’ in reference to their whining engines.”
• “This ‘bifurcated world’ of daily normalcy and nightly warfare has made Ukrainians remarkably self-reliant, according to Ryan. Around 60% of munitions and nearly all drones Ukrainians use in the war are now domestically produced … However, both Ukrainian and Russian drones are heavily reliant on Chinese-made parts, Ryan said, noting that replacing a Chinese camera with a Western-made one on a Ukrainian drone triples the cost.”
• “[W]hen asked if Ukraine had already seen the worst of the war, Ryan offered the grim prediction that Ukrainians will ‘suffer more’ before the war is over. This is a shift in Ryan’s thinking through living and working in Kyiv, as at the war’s beginning in February 2022, Ryan had originally predicted it would be over that May.”
• “Ryan acknowledged that despite Russia’s unexpectedly poor military performance in the war’s early days, Russia has surprised him in its ability to learn from those mistakes and adapt. Ryan argued that Ukraine would be unlikely to dislodge Russian forces from Donetsk, Luhansk and occupied Zaporizhzhia. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s leadership and public remain unwilling to accept an offer demanding the surrender of territory Russia claims but does not control, nor one that restricts Ukraine’s military.”
• “American and NATO caution, born of fear of escalation with a nuclear power, has partially shaped the conflict’s tempo, according to Ryan. He agreed with [Harvard Professor] Graham Allison and other participants who asserted that such caution—shared by senior U.S. officials in the Biden administration such as former CIA Director William Burns and former National Security Adviser Jake Sulliavn, who had intimate access to the thinking of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle before and during the war—was necessary to avoid catastrophic nuclear risk.”
• “The event underscored three intertwined realities.”
  • “First, the value of a sovereign and independent Ukraine, a nation whose tenacity and fortitude has surprised both allies and adversaries.”
  • “Second, fundamental political and military asymmetries would complicate any ‘simple’ or ‘clean’ end to the fighting; Ukraine cannot destroy Russia’s war capacity, while Russia appears unable to militarily defeat Ukraine.”
  • “Third, serious proposals to end the war will require renewed Western engagement with Moscow.”
• “In Ryan’s view, the only path to peace lies in coupling credible military force with pragmatic diplomacy, preserving Ukrainian sovereignty while addressing Russia’s long-term security concerns.”

"A Snapback Solution for Ukraine: How to Craft Security Guarantees That Kyiv—and Moscow—Will Find Credible," Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, Foreign Affairs, 10.07.25.

• According to Charap and Shapiro, “Ukraine understandably does not trust Moscow to abide by any cease-fire…Before Kyiv signs one, it wants assurances from its key partners that if Russia attacks again, Ukraine will not be left to fend for itself.”
• They propose, “should Moscow attack Ukraine again, the country’s allies would reimpose sanctions on Russia, provide new financial support to Kyiv, and offer Ukraine military assistance that goes beyond what they would offer in peacetime.”
• Charap and Shapiro stress, “Sanctions alone, of course, cannot stop Russia’s tanks. For that, Ukraine will need more weaponry.”
• On financial support, the authors suggest, “The G-7 states should ...set up a standing Ukraine stabilization fund that can surge aid to Kyiv.”
• Charap and Shapiro emphasize that security guarantees must not be discretionary.
• To ensure rapid military support, Charap and Shapiro recommend, “the United States and Europe should sign standing contracts with their defense industries to produce the long-range missiles, advanced aircraft, artillery systems, and other weapons necessary to support Kyiv. Ukraine’s partners should also pre-position munitions in designated stockpiles in bordering states’ territory. “
• Charap and Shapiro conclude, “A security guarantee based on snapback of sanctions, financing, and weapons may not have the grandeur of NATO’s Article 5 or the bravado of deploying European forces to Ukraine. But for Kyiv, those are illusions, not real options.”

"Yes, Trump Can End the Russia–Ukraine War," Andrew Day, The American Conservative, 10.14.25

• Day argues that “Trump remains Ukraine’s best hope for peace… Only the U.S. has the power and political will to engineer a solution to the conflict, and among American politicians, Trump is better than the alternatives.”
• Trump’s approach now should be threefold: “1) sustain military support for Ukraine to keep alive the possibility of a negotiated settlement, 2) push Kiev to make significant concessions, and 3) offer Moscow a genuine chance for constructive, respectful relations with the West after the war.”
• Day notes that “signaling to Russia that the U.S. won’t allow an imminent Ukrainian collapse is necessary to bring Putin to the negotiating table.” He warns, however, that Trump “should be wary of facilitating long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russia that invite escalatory retaliation and jeopardize any chance of improved U.S. relations with Moscow.”
• If peace talks begin, “Ukraine—which is losing the war—should be ready to make painful concessions to secure a deal. To that end, Trump should play the role of the bad guy… pushing Zelensky to adopt a concessive negotiating stance that otherwise would be politically too risky for the Ukrainian leader.”
• “The biggest concession doesn’t necessarily require Ukraine’s acquiescence. “If the U.S. and other alliance members…formally repudiated previous promises that Ukraine will one day join NATO, that could be a costly enough signal to assuage Moscow’s concerns.”
• He stresses that “Putin’s grip on power is sufficiently secure that he has much political leeway in negotiating a deal.” Meanwhile, “with Ukraine suffering an acute manpower shortage… Zelensky may be willing to give up valuable territory that he’d lose anyway if the war continued.”
• The final aspect is “the most controversial but unavoidable: Trump needs to somehow convince Putin that… Russia can expect improved relations with the West.”
• Day concludes, “Putin… still appears to be a relative moderate within the Russian national security establishment,” and “sees in Trump a fleeting opportunity to put relations with America on better footing. Now, Trump needs to convince Russia that reintegration with the American-led West is possible and desirable, even if that first requires ending the Ukraine war.”

"Trump Sets Sights on Peace in Ukraine --- Mideast deal seen as giving momentum, with Zelensky set to visit White House," Robbie Gramer and Ian Lovett, The Wall Street Journal, 10.13.25.

• Gramer and Lovett report that after brokering a ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza, “Europeans are hoping Trump can repeat the success with another knotty foreign-policy problem”—the Russia-Ukraine war.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is set to visit the White House following Trump’s diplomatic Middle East win. Trump “referenced the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine, underscoring how, as he touted his achievements on one major conflict, he has still set his sights on resolving another.”
• Zelenskyy told the Journal: “Putin can be forced into peace — just like any other terrorist. Even Hamas is now preparing to release hostages. If that is possible, then Putin can also be forced to restore peace.”
• Senior European officials and analysts say Trump’s leverage from Gaza now provides a “momentum” to pressure Putin, but that pressure, especially financial sanctions, must be ramped up: “increasing financial penalties on Moscow is crucial because its economy is on the brink of crisis and moving to a full-scale wartime economy.”
• Trump has imposed steep tariffs on India, a major Russian trading partner, but “hasn’t yet targeted Moscow’s so-called shadow fleet of illicit oil tankers,” nor implemented major new secondary sanctions.
• Ukraine is lobbying Trump to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles, with their 1,500-mile range. “Trump said he was open to the idea… but hasn’t committed.”
• Franz-Stefan Gady, a defense analyst, cautions that Russia’s nuclear arsenal “will always be a factor in any pressure campaign,” and “the United States has not really shown any desire to trigger any escalatory dynamics.” He fears the likelier outcome is Trump forcing a truce and “strong-arming Zelenskyy into signing it.”
• The article also notes the unprecedented role of China as “Moscow’s major economic and political lifeline,” with former U.S. envoy Kurt Volker noting, “If we come to a point where China feels that it’s in its interest for Russia to end the war… that would be significant. Unfortunately, we are not there.”

"Ukraine Is Starving Russia of Oil," Michael Bohnert, The Wall Street Journal, 10.10.25. 

• According to Bohnert, Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil infrastructure are, in President Zelensky’s words, “the most effective sanctions,” with Washington now planning to share more intelligence with Kyiv about Russian energy targets.
• Bohnert notes that disrupting Russian oil and gas is vital: “Putin relies heavily on corruption and patronage, with oil and gas serving as key revenue streams. Disrupting the flow could force Mr. Putin to choose between sustaining the war and maintaining the payouts to oligarchs and citizens that secure his political backing.”
• He argues, “Oil shortages alone can grind the Russian bear to a halt militarily,” since Russia’s vast geography and its war effort are dependent on petroleum products.
• Bohnert draws parallels with World War II, remarking that “attacks on oil infrastructure were decisive in both Europe and the Pacific,” and that “attacks on oil and logistics alone were sufficient to end World War II.”
• He connects this to Ukraine’s campaign: “Striking Russian oil and logistics networks with drones and saboteurs” mimics historic strategies, and is producing tangible effects in Russia’s economy and society.
• According to Bohnert, “Between 25% and 38% of Russian oil-refining capacity is offline...Russia doesn’t have a 25% to 38% buffer to insulate it from the steep reduction in refining capacity.”
• He reports increasing fuel and supply shortages in Russia, with growing complaints about cutbacks to transportation and impact on daily life, as well as on the military’s supplies.
• Bohnert concludes, “Putin could be forced to choose: war-materials production or the commerce demands of Russia’s oligarchs. Without reliable resupplies, the Russian military will become less mobile and create opportunities for incremental Ukrainian victories. The Russian bear is slowly being starved.”

"I'm the Foreign Minister of Poland. This Is How to Negotiate With Putin," Radosław Sikorski, The New York Times, 10.09.25. 

• According to Sikorski, “Each U.S. administration discovers Russia anew. … The more that's offered to Moscow, the more it demands.”
• He reports that Russia orchestrated deliberate drone and fighter jet provocations in NATO airspace, including over Poland and Estonia: “These drones did not veer off course… my government is certain that it was a provocation orchestrated by the Russian regime.”
• Sikorski warns, “The Kremlin is not interested in peace but in escalation. If you are surprised by that, you have not been paying attention.”
• He recounts President Trump’s efforts to negotiate with Russia, including creating a special envoy for peace and directly appealing to Putin, but notes, “Russia is not looking for an offramp.”
• Sikorski observes that Russian military spending has soared, and that Russia is escalating not only in Ukraine but “another rung up the ladder” with NATO airspace violations.
• He contends that “Putin’s long-term goals have not changed: rebuild the Russian empire, undermine trans-Atlantic security guarantees, divide the West, and…weaken the United States.”
• Recalling history, Sikorski writes, “It is possible to negotiate with Russia. Just do it in two stages: Make a show of force first, and only then have dialogue.” He credits President Reagan’s Cold War pressure for bringing the Soviet Union to the table.
• He argues, “The only way to bring [Putin] to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on Feb. 24, 2022.”
• Sikorski calls for steadfast military and economic support for Ukraine, using frozen Russian assets for aid, and ending purchases of Russian oil by European allies: “The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe's last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.”

“Putin Is Escalating His War. If You Are Surprised, You Have Not Been Paying Attention," Radosław Sikorski, The New York Times, 10.09.25. 

• According to Sikorski, “the more that’s offered to Moscow, the more it demands,” noting that Russian provocations—such as drone and fighter jet incursions into NATO airspace—are deliberate escalations, not accidents.
• “These and other incidents are yet more proof that the Kremlin is not interested in peace but in escalation. If you are surprised by that, you have not been paying attention,” Sikorski writes.
• He recounts that President Trump pursued various diplomatic channels, but states, “Russia is not looking for an offramp.”
• Sikorski details Russia’s surge in military spending, troop build-up, and relentless strikes on Ukraine as evidence of “another rung up the ladder of escalation.”
• He argues that Putin’s goals remain unchanged: “rebuild the Russian empire, undermine trans-Atlantic security guarantees, divide the West, and—last, but certainly not least—weaken the United States.”
• Sikorski insists that “it is possible to negotiate with Russia. Just do it in two stages: Make a show of force first, and only then have dialogue,” citing Reagan’s Cold War approach as a model.
• “The only way to bring [Putin] to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on Feb. 24, 2022,” Sikorski asserts.
• He urges unwavering military and financial support for Ukraine, use of frozen Russian assets, and ending purchases of Russian oil, stating, “The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe’s last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

•  "Dispatch from Ukraine: The path to a durable peace is emerging," Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council, 10.10.25

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"By Sending Drones Into NATO States, Russia Is Repeating the Mistakes of 2022," Alexander Baunov, Carnegie Politika, 10.10.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Baunov argues that while the Ukraine “war is at a virtual standstill,”² Russia has “crossed a new line” by sending drones and aircraft into NATO airspace in Poland, Romania, Germany, Norway, and Denmark, as well as conducting cyberattacks: “In a matter of weeks, by combining various methods and attack targets, Russia has created a new reality in Europe.”
• He writes, “Putin drew three conclusions from the Anchorage summit with Trump: Trump won’t hand him victory at Ukraine’s expense, is willing to develop relations with Russia even as the war goes on, but won’t fully restore them until the fighting ends, and views Ukraine as low priority, intervening only as a last resort.”
• Baunov contends that “Russia has applied itself single-mindedly” to knocking Europe out of the game, because “in Russia’s calculations, Trump does not like Europe either, … and views NATO as a freeloader and the EU as a competitor.”
• He explains Moscow’s new goal: “Instead of defeating Ukraine and, through it, the collective West, it is seeking to inflict a kind of hybrid military-propaganda defeat on the collective West itself—Europe and NATO—and in that roundabout way, on Ukraine.”
• Baunov describes how crossing this “Rubicon” is purposely ambiguous: “Russia crossed it in such a way as to preserve the ability to make excuses and, as usual, dissolve the facts in denials, ridicule, and alternative theories.”
• The aim, Baunov writes, is not just to “scare the Europeans away from helping Ukraine,” but to “prove that Europeans will not just pay with money: Russia is capable of ruining the established European order and turning the public’s anger against their politicians.”
• Baunov remarks on NATO’s response: “Hybrid attacks seem to cross the red line of military aggression against NATO member states, but they do so cautiously, hesitantly, and inconclusively. Therefore, they are incapable of producing a conclusive, convincing result.”
• He concludes with a warning: “There’s no guarantee that Russia won’t repeat the mistake it made in 2022. Back then, the Kremlin was counting on Ukraine … to be weak and futile. Now it is counting on NATO to be weak, divided, and indecisive … Moscow is literally quoting its own propaganda, just as it did on the eve of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”

"U.S. Tries to Catch Up On a New Battlefield Dominated by Drones," Greg Jaffe and Meridith Kohut, The New York Times, 10.13.25.

• According to Jaffe and Kohut, the U.S. Army is urgently trying to adapt to drone-dominated warfare, holding exercises that introduce hundreds of drones and loitering munitions to regular brigades—some “receiving about 150 drones” for a training battle in Germany.
• Drones provided near-total situational awareness: during one exercise, “a volley of about 144 simulated artillery rounds quickly followed” the drones’ discovery of enemy vehicles, tripling the kill rate over traditional units.
• Army chief Gen. Randy George has cut legacy weapons, including the M-10 Booker light tank (after a $1 billion investment) and limited the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle buy to 18,000 (down from a planned 50,000), declaring older platforms too easy to destroy by cheap drones.
• New funds are going to low-profile, fast vehicles and “transformation in contact” brigades, which are issued the latest drones, electronic warfare systems, and told to experiment, often bypassing traditional acquisition cycles.
• About 90% of brigade fire missions now start with a drone finding the enemy and confirming the kill. Some drone-spotting missions involve teams managing “a torrent of information,” leading to exhaustion, with one sergeant describing going “four days with almost no sleep.”
• In training, Army units experiment with camouflage, decoy artillery pieces, inflatable fakes, and even A.I. imagery recognition to deceive and outmaneuver networked drone swarms, following Ukrainian battlefield innovations.
• New “Strike” companies—80-soldier units packed with drones, loitering munitions, and mortars—became the brigade’s “most efficient killers.”
• U.S. soldiers admit the psychological impact of being constantly surveilled and hunted by small drones is only starting to be understood: “We certainly haven’t encountered the psychological impact of having a machine looking at you all the time that’s devoted to killing you.”
• American drone training is challenged by heat, weather, and competition with adversarial scouts, while U.S. Army success is increasingly measured by how well it can maneuver and survive in the drone-intensive battlespace now seen in Ukraine.

"What if a Russian victory in Ukraine were only the beginning?" George F. Will, The Washington Post, 10.08.25.

• According to Will, Russia’s recent campaign of “drones, sabotage, and airspace violations” over Europe is “war,” not merely “hybrid” or “gray zone” conflict, and is partly a probe of “the West's continuing commitment to noncommittal dithering.”
• Will highlights “119 pages of wartime reading: ‘If Russia Wins: A Scenario’ by Carlo Masala,” which imagines Russia invading Estonia in 2028 following a forced Ukrainian capitulation to Russia and Western pressure for Ukrainian neutrality and territory concessions.
• Masala’s scenario, as described by Will, envisions Russian forces surging into Narva, Estonia, with support from armed local Russian-speakers, and covert forces seizing Estonian islands—an attack on NATO territory.
• The narrative suggests that much of the West, dazzled by a “new Gorbachev” in the Kremlin, would hesitate to defend the Baltics, with some NATO members “going wobbly” or arguing for “historical context,” and the U.S. president blocking effective alliance action.
• Will writes, “Russia’s nuclear arsenal deters a conventional response to a limited regional escalation — the taking of a small Estonian town.”
• He asks, “What if Russia’s winning in Ukraine were only the beginning? The beginning of the enfeeblement of the United States?”
• Will closes by noting Putin’s pattern of exploiting and anticipating “Western dithering,” including Trump’s unwillingness to punish renewed Russian attacks, concluding that “A connoisseur of Western dithering, Putin probably anticipated the response his current flurry of contemptuous aggressions has elicited. Trump has said: ‘I don’t love it.’”

"Russia's feral adventurism against the West is too bellicose to ignore," Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 10.09.25. 

• According to the Editorial Board, while the focus remains on Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine, “Putin is also fighting a calibrated conflict against NATO countries far beyond Ukraine’s borders.”
• The board cites MI6 chief Richard Moore, who said Russian intelligence agencies had gone “a little feral,” and adds, “things have only gotten worse since.”
• Citing Globsec, the editorial notes “110 Russian-linked incidents—most involving vandalism, sabotage and arson and explosive attacks—in Europe since 2022,” of which “89 of the 110 were successfully carried out.”
• Listed actions include sabotage attempts on cargo flights, and assassination attempts against a major German arms manufacturer.
• The Board warns, “Russia has also been trying to disrupt confidence in elections throughout the West… These efforts extend beyond post-Soviet states to other established democracies, including Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.”
• It argues Russian “influence operations and kinetic attacks form a broader backdrop” for “recent escalations across Europe—from drone incursions to cyberattacks… what specialists call ‘gray zone’ tactics—attacks designed to allow plausible deniability for the perpetrating country.”
• The editorial observes that a “passive deterrence strategy has failed,” and that “showing weakness to a bully can be even more provocative.”
• The Board concludes: “Perhaps it’s time to make Russia pay a steeper price for its feral adventurism by giving the Kremlin a taste of its own medicine.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Air Superiority in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Iran and Ukraine," Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward, CSIS, 10.10.25.
• "Army Special Forces Are Preparing for the Next War with Russia," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 10.08.25.
• "Can Shotguns, Spy Planes and Lasers Protect Europe From the Next Drone Incursion?" Sune Engel Rasmussen, Thomas Grove, and Karolina Jeznach, The Wall Street Journal, 10.13.25.
• "How Europe Can Defend Itself with Less America," Max Bergmann and Otto Svendsen, CSIS, 10.08.25.
• "Putin Is Not Winning," Andrew Ryvkin, The Atlantic, 10.14.25.
• "Putin Is Taking His Hybrid Warfare to the Sea," James Stavridis, Bloomberg, 10.08.25.
• "Anchors Away: Finland’s failure to convict Russian crew clears the way for more cable-cutting attacks," Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, 10.10.25.
• "Icebreaker diplomacy, part II: A new ‘Great Game’ is brewing in the Arctic," Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, 10.13.25.
• "Danish Intelligence Asserts Russian Hybrid War Against NATO," William Lawson, The National Interest, 10.07.25.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Behind Russia's battlefield drone surge in Ukraine? Chinese factories," Pei-Lin Wu, Christian Shepherd and Rudy Lu, The Washington Post, 10.13.25.

• “China has materially helped Russia gain a key battlefield advantage in its grinding war against Ukraine, dramatically increasing exports over the summer of key components needed to make the fiber-optic drones that have enabled Moscow to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses on the front lines,” according to the article. The article’s opening graphs ignores that Ukraine uses Chinese-made parts to assemble its drones, according to Quinn Urich’s RM post, entitled “Chinese Drone Tech Fuels Both Sides of Russia-Ukraine War.” “With only 5% of Ukrainian defense firms reporting they do not use Chinese components in their systems, the vast majority of drones that fill the sky are likely either made in China or contain a number of key components made in China. A more accurate way to describe these so-called ‘domestically produced’ Ukrainian drones, therefore, would be ‘made in China, assembled in Ukraine,’” Urich writes.
• According to the article, Chinese exports of fiber-optic cables to Russia hit record highs of 119,000 miles in May, 130,000 miles in June, and then spiked to 328,000 miles in August 2025. In comparison, China sold only 72 miles of cables to Ukraine in August.
• China’s exports of lithium-ion batteries to Russia surged to $54 million in June and $47 million in August 2025, while comparable battery exports to Ukraine amounted to only $11–12 million a month during the same period.
• The close partnerships between Russian and Chinese manufacturers are enabling Russia to assemble advanced fiber-optic drones which “are difficult to defend against” and have helped change the front lines, according to analysts.
• By summer 2025, Russia increased use of these drones to retake territory in the western Kursk region, using the drones—which can be operated through cables over 12 miles long—to attack Ukrainian logistics and jamming lines.
• Official data shows Russian drone firms have imported hundreds of millions in Chinese components: For example, Rustakt LLC imported $577 million in parts from China (including motors, batteries, panels) between July 2023 and December 2024.
• At least 140 drone manufacturers and another 60 parts suppliers or operators have been registered in Russia since 2023, supporting rapid scale-up.
• While giants like DJI halted direct sales, smaller Chinese suppliers and joint venture factories in China have supported Russian firms, allowing St. Petersburg-based Stribog and others to feature “Chinese staff and machinery,” including newly developed lightweight cables for long-range drones.
• Analysts and officials say the Chinese export surge and technology transfer now give Russia a “significant advantage over Ukraine” on the battlefield, raising growing concern among European and U.S. defense planners.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "China Is Joining Russia’s Shadow War on Europe," Hal Brands, Bloomberg, 10.07.25.
• "Main Trends in the Development of China’s Missile-Nuclear Forces," Alexey Stepanov, Russian International Affairs Council, 10.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. In Russian. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

"‘The Nuclear Age’ Review: The World and the Bomb," John Bolton, The Wall Street Journal, 10.12.25.

• Bolton reviews Serhii Plokhy’s "The Nuclear Age," which traces the political, military, and ethical dilemmas faced by world leaders since the dawn of the atomic era and challenges the inevitability of nuclear history’s outcomes.
• Plokhy, a Harvard historian, shows that early nuclear research was international and aimed at peaceful applications, before the rise of nationalism and war drove scientists toward military ends.
• According to the review, America was uniquely positioned to build the atomic bomb, being “the only country prepared and affluent enough to take the scientific, financial and, ultimately, military risk to prevail.”
• Bolton recounts that postwar efforts to “internationalize” nuclear weapons failed; leaders like Churchill and de Gaulle dismissed U.N. schemes as futile, and the U.S. instead pursued the hydrogen bomb for leverage over the Soviets.
• He writes that arms control agreements often faltered over mistrust and verification issues, citing the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty as a rare exception, but noting the challenge—then and now—of effective verification, with Cold War adversaries wary of revealing their weaknesses.
• The rise of China as a nuclear power creates a “tripolar” world, complicating prior U.S.-Soviet arms control mechanics and making three-way agreements even more difficult.
• Bolton notes the NPT (1968) restrained proliferation for a time, especially via extended U.S. deterrence, but the spread of nuclear technology continued—with India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and North Korea all acquiring bomb programs.
• He remarks that despite the threat, the West has hesitated to use force against rising nuclear states, with rare exceptions—like the U.S. and Israel’s strike on Iran earlier in 2025, which brought “real successes but stopped too soon.”
• Bolton concludes that nuclear weapons remain existentially central, and Plokhy’s book is a reminder “why each ‘next new thing’ should not distract us from the continuing existential need to deal with the power of the sun’s nearest relatives here on earth.”

"Europe and the end of New START," Oliver Meier, European Leadership Network, 10.08.25.

• Meier explains that on Sept. 22, 2025, “Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to offer the United States a voluntary, time-limited extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) key obligations. Putin said that ‘Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026.’”
• He notes, “The White House called the initiative ‘pretty good’. On the 5th of October, Donald Trump said that Putin’s offer ‘sounds like a good idea’ to him. Yet, the United States has yet to formally respond to the Kremlin’s proposal.”
• Meier argues that, despite European skepticism of Moscow’s motivations, “even the faintest opportunity to strengthen global arms control should be seized upon,” urging “Europeans should therefore urge Washington to reciprocate the Russian offer, whilst at the same time injecting their own ideas on the next steps to control nuclear weapons.”
• The commentary warns that Russia’s proposal to maintain New START limits “is only feasible if the United States acts in a similar spirit and refrains from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence,” highlighting in particular Russian preoccupation with Trump’s “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative.
• Meier contends that “a commitment by Russia and the US to maintain New START upper limits would create urgently needed space for talks on a new nuclear arms control accord,” and that even without full verification, “as long as US intelligence is able to maintain this level of confidence in Russian overall compliance, Europeans should not let the lack of transparency become a stumbling block for their endorsement of unilateral or bilateral pledges to maintain treaty limits.”
• He cautions against using the lack of transparency as a barrier, and also against the notion that a nuclear arms race would necessarily be to the West’s advantage, reminding that “trying to ‘win’ a nuclear arms race against an economically and politically fragile state would be a dangerous proposition, which Europeans should try to avoid in the first place.”
• Meier calls for a stronger European voice: “European NATO members should therefore state clearly that they would support a pledge by the US to adhere to New START limits beyond the treaty’s expiration date… Europeans, collectively or individually, should encourage both sides to commit to maintaining upper limits until a successor treaty is in place.”
• He further suggests Europeans press for “better transparency and accountability by nuclear-weapon states, a pledge… not to increase nuclear weapon numbers in Europe until a New START successor is in place, and a dialogue between NATO and Russia on better crisis communication channels,” signaling readiness for future multilateral arms control involving European nuclear powers as well.

"Vladimir Putin answered media questions," Kremlin.ru, 10.10.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• Putin said: “I have spoken about this before, and it is no secret: the novelty of our nuclear deterrent systems surpasses that of any other nuclear state, and we are advancing this very actively. What I mentioned in previous years is all being developed. We are refining these systems, and I believe we will soon be able to announce new weapons that were previously unveiled. They are materializing and undergoing successful tests.”
• Putin asserted: “Regarding the intercontinental components at sea and in the air, I reiterate: the novelty and modernity of our systems, as military experts say, are at a very high level, which we maintain. We are prepared to negotiate if this proves acceptable and beneficial for the American side. If not – then so be it. It would be regrettable, as nothing would then remain in terms of strategic offensive arms control.”
• On the possibility of nuclear tests, Putin stated: “I never said the United States is preparing for such tests. I said that some countries are preparing. This is well known to specialists, because there is always a temptation to test the effectiveness of the combat fuel that has been stored in missiles for many, many years. ... As far as we know, some countries are considering this and even making preparations. So I said that if they do it, we will do the same.”
• Putin added: “Is that good or bad? From the standpoint of ensuring security, it is good; from the overall perspective of deterrence and efforts aimed at – if not reducing, then at least containing – the arms race, it is probably not bad either. But our proposal to extend the New START Treaty for at least one year is in the same context. Let everyone think about it.”
• On the outcome of the Anchorage talks with the U.S., Putin said: “We simply stated that, in general, there is an understanding – both on the part of the United States and the Russian Federation – of where we should move and what we should strive for in order to end this conflict, and by peaceful means at that. These are not simple matters.” He continued: “We agreed with Donald that I, too, would need to consider the matter in Moscow and discuss it with our colleagues, as well as consult our allies. He told me the same. These are complex issues requiring further elaboration. But we remain grounded in the discussions that took place in Anchorage. We are not changing our position on this and believe that some additional work is needed on both sides. However, overall, we remain within the framework of the Alaska agreements.”
• Regarding Ukrainian use of Tomahawk missiles and threats against Russia, Putin said: “Our response is the strengthening of the Russian Federation’s air defense systems.”
• On the Tomahawk question and arms deliveries to Ukraine, Putin commented: “Linking the Nobel Peace Prize to arms supplies is absurd. It simply speaks volumes about the current Kiev regime’s level.”
• On meeting with Russian military commanders for his birthday, Putin explained: “Russia’s fate is largely, is always exclusively in the hands of the Russian people. And right now, our military are in the foreground, on the frontline – in the literal and figurative sense of the word. They are resolving the tasks fateful for our country – both the men at the front, on the line of engagement, and their commanders, of course.”

"Not bad if after the defeat of the Kyiv regime, Russia and China come closer to the remnants," interview with Sergei Karaganov, Ukraina.ru, 10.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. (This individual is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• Karaganov said that the Russian-Chinese partnership remains strong and is not endangered by differences between the two countries: “If China or Russia decide to escalate tensions between each other, both will lose in their aggregate power. But fortunately, there are no such preconditions at the moment.” He emphasized that although Russia and China have different systems, potentials, and this at times causes suspicion or friction, as long as both elites act in their national interests, “we are doomed to close cooperation—regardless of our differences.”
• Karaganov stated that much in the future depends on the current top leadership in both Moscow and Beijing: “In today’s multifaceted and multilayered world, much depends on the leaders.” He observed that the strengthening of Xi Jinping’s power in China far exceeds Mao’s era, but also makes China much more dependent on the outside world, including Russia. He suggested, “I do not see in China nor in Russia any leaders interested in escalating tensions. I hope we will avoid competition, and for now, the two leaders we have are conducting policies in precise accordance with the interests of their countries. I also hope that the next [leaders of Russia and China] will act the same way."
• Regarding China’s relations with Ukraine and the impact on Russia, Karaganov said: “China is maneuvering, it does not want to escalate relations with the West completely. … The Chinese hope, in the not too distant future, when the situation is somehow resolved, that Ukraine can become a reliable supplier of food.” He also recalled that previous agreements between China and Ukraine were violated by Kyiv’s former leadership, but now, “If China and Ukraine eventually have good relations—nothing terrible.” Karaganov concluded that he hopes that, following the defeat of the current Ukrainian regime, Moscow will have “good relations with what is left of Ukraine.”
• On U.S. sanctions and Chinese-American tensions, Karaganov remarked: “They [the Chinese] are seriously concerned about the challenges from their American partners. In our conversations, we constantly return to this issue. It’s almost the most important subject of our joint discussions and attempts to coordinate our policy.” He played down Beijing’s strong public posture against U.S. sanctions, describing it as “merely a tactical move.”
• On the subject of a new nuclear deterrence doctrine and multilateral frameworks, Karaganov said: “We are in constant communication with our Chinese friends on this issue—ever more closely, currently in a bilateral format. Although, of course, it is a delicate matter. I think that in about half a year to a year, our discussions will reach a multilateral level. Talks are ongoing about a Russia–China–India–Pakistan format, and in the future, other countries may possibly join. But for now, this is an open question, and, I repeat, for now, we are working only in a bilateral format.” He continued: “This is a delicate area, but in the end, building a stable multipolar nuclear deterrence regime, involving several major powers, is essential for stability in the emerging world order.”
• “I think that in about half a year to a year our discussions will reach a multilateral level. Talks are ongoing about a Russia–China–India–Pakistan format, and in the future, other countries may possibly join. But for now, this is an open question, and, I repeat, for now, we are working only in a bilateral format.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Should the US Walk Away from the NPT?" Henry Sokolski, The National Interest, 10.06.25.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

See this link for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "How and Why Ukraine’s Military Is Going Digital," Kateryna Bondar, CSIS, 10.06.25.

Energy:

"Ukraine's energy sector is a key battleground in the war with Russia," Maciej Zaniewicz and Danylo Moiseienko, Brookings Institution, 10.07.25.

• Maciej Zaniewicz and Danylo Moiseienko argue that Ukraine’s energy sector “has proved to be a key element in this struggle,” as Moscow aims “to prove that the only alternative to integration with Russia in the region is war and destruction.”
• The sector is the legacy of the Soviet era, overbuilt for resilience, and historically fostered “continued dependence on Russian energy sources.” This made it a focal point for Russian political leverage and, since 2014, a target for physical attacks and economic pressure.
• Reforms since 2014 have “created the first comprehensive legal framework for competitive gas and electricity markets aligned with the European Union’s rules,” yet many inefficiencies and dependencies remained before the full-scale invasion.
• During the war, Russia has launched “nearly 2,000 missiles and drones at Ukrainian energy infrastructure,” causing $20.5 billion in damage and reducing available generation capacity to a third of prewar levels. Blackouts and targeted strikes have disrupted “heat, water, transport, health care, telecommunications, and schooling."
• Resilience has been supported by oversized Soviet design, rapid repairs, massive EU and Japanese aid, and “deployment of more decentralized power sources, including mostly gas-fired generation and renewables.” This enabled Ukraine to avoid catastrophic blackouts in the harsh 2024–25 winter.
• Ironically, while Ukraine’s network previously relied on synchrony and support from Russia, “synchronization with the EU grid in March 2022” and expanded cross-border electricity trade became lifelines during Russian assaults.
• The article highlights that Ukraine’s future energy security now depends on sustained reforms and market integration with the EU—including as a storage hub and supplier of renewables, biomethane, and critical raw materials for European industry.
• The war’s cost for the sector is immense: “The World Bank’s RDNA4 damage assessment puts the total cost of Ukraine’s energy-sector recovery needs (as of December 2024) at $67.78 billion and its damages at $20.51 billion.”
• Brookings concludes, “supporting the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy sector is not only a humanitarian issue but also a struggle to maintain a Western-based order of rule of law, trade, and technological cooperation, rather than an Eastern-based order of military power. The stakes in this war go far beyond Ukraine’s own security and independence.”

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

"Russia And The US: Dangerous Games," Tatiana Stanovaya, R.Politik Bulletin, 10.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• According to Stanovaya, by mid-October the framework for a possible “Alaska deal” between Russia and the US had “faded away,” with both sides realizing that a Putin-Zelensky meeting was unrealistic and deep disagreements on security guarantees and potential territorial exchanges blocking progress.
• US Vice President JD Vance stated that “Russia had refused to engage in any format, whether bilateral or trilateral,” while Russian officials in Moscow admitted they didn’t understand what Washington expected, and the Kremlin made clear there was no serious intention for a Zelensky meeting.
• No new contact or proposals were forthcoming from Washington, putting bilateral relations on hold and apparently taking Trump’s planned trip to Moscow off the agenda.
• Stanovaya writes that Russia views Kyiv as rejecting any new negotiations in Istanbul, while Moscow hardens its stance, now demanding any dialogue be based on “the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine.”
• She notes that Trump’s rhetoric has grown more critical, with increased efforts to pressure Europe and Turkey to stop purchasing Russian oil and gas, and attempts to get the EU to sanction China and India as Russian oil buyers.
• Remarkably, Trump “unexpectedly changed course,” stating that Ukraine could in fact regain its territory, signaling a shift from his earlier stance that Russia was winning.
• Stanovaya identifies September as a turning point, with Russia losing momentum on the battlefield and suffering intensified Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries, while economic pressures mounted.
• She concludes that a new Western consensus has emerged: “Putin appeared weak, Russia was faltering, and that greater pressure would likely force Moscow to make concessions.”

"Inside the West’s Race to Defend the Arctic," Sune Engel Rasmussen, The Wall Street Journal, 10.11.25. 

• According to Rasmussen, “The West is racing to catch up with Russian and Chinese expansion in the Arctic, one of the world’s most contested places, in a new era of geopolitical conflict.”

• Russia holds a significant military lead in the Arctic, having “for decades expanded its bases,” and its Kola Peninsula hosts the Northern Fleet, advanced weaponry, and part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The article warns, “the most direct way for Moscow to attack the U.S. with missiles is over the Arctic.”

• Western efforts to defend the region are hampered by extreme weather, logistical obstacles, and a lack of infrastructure; “building a significant military presence in the Arctic will have to be done almost from scratch.”

• Rasmussen highlights how even small delays—such as cargo crews unable to dock—can set Allied construction projects back a year due to the narrow shipping window.

• Troy Bouffard of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, says, “This is one of the only areas where we are not able to go toe-to-toe with our adversaries…We are in the beginning of one of the hardest challenges ever, comparable only to exploring space.”

• The U.S. and Canada are upgrading radar and early warning systems, and President Trump has ordered work on a new missile shield, but the West’s Arctic military investments lag far behind Russia’s.

• China, declaring itself a “near-Arctic nation,” has also deployed research ships and collaborated with Russia in air patrols near North America.

• The article concludes that “developing your own warfighting capabilities…becomes a form of deterrence,” but the harsh Arctic environment, vast distances, and logistical challenges mean “the West is only awakening to the challenge” of defending the high north.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Putin’s Polycrisis," Sergei Guriev, Project Syndicate, 10.07.25.

• Guriev argues that Russia’s economy is stagnating: “GDP declined by 0.6% in Q1 2025 and grew only 0.4% in Q2. Most optimistic forecasts expect Russia’s growth to be around 1% in 2025, down from 4.3% in 2024 and 4.1% in 2023.”
• He notes persistent inflation and falling consumer activity: “Car sales, for example, are forecast to fall by 24% this year,” while the Russian Central Bank’s policy rate sits at 17%.
• Guriev highlights that Russia’s budget deficit “hit 1.9% of annual GDP in the first eight months of 2025 and is projected to grow to 2.6% by year’s end,” with liquid sovereign wealth fund assets down to $50 billion, or 1.9% of GDP.
• He warns Putin’s new budget includes “substantial tax hikes,” which "will depress the economy further and could trigger a public backlash."
• On demographics, Guriev writes, “Around one million troops have been killed or wounded in the war, and roughly the same number of people have fled the country, many avoiding conscription.” Russia “has stopped publishing demographic data.”
• He notes Western sanctions are strangling Russian modernization: “Russia’s access to crucial technologies is limited, undermining investment and modernization.”
• Despite these pressures, Guriev cautions that “Putin seems undeterred. That is because the situation is not yet catastrophic. … As long as Putin continues to seize more Ukrainian land, he has no incentive to negotiate, regardless of what the US government offers him.”
• In his view, “Putin can still recruit about 30,000 soldiers per month by paying men from Russia's poorest regions ten or 20 times their average wage,” and maintain repression to suppress dissent.
• To change Putin’s calculus, Guriev insists the West must “strengthen sanctions against the Kremlin, provide advanced weapons to Ukraine, and incentivize Russian brain drain” to “accelerate the demise of Putin’s war machine, freeze the frontline, and save Ukrainian lives.”

"Why Some Nations Succeed: The Competitive Marketplace of Ideas," Joel Mokyr, The Vtimes, 2022. Machine-translated from Russian.

• Mokyr argues that the secret behind Europe’s historical prosperity lies not in geography, resources, or exploitation—but in “a competitive market of ideas.” In contrast to China, the Islamic world, or premodern societies, Europe fostered an environment where dissent and innovation could flourish.
• He illustrates how societies like Florence, Cologne, Paris, and Danzig at times tried to suppress innovation, but ultimately Europe’s intellectual pluralism broke through. Elsewhere (notably in imperial China or the medieval Islamic world), orthodoxy was enforced and those with new ideas were marginalized—or worse.
• Mokyr says, “Economic growth depends on more than institutions and capital—it’s shaped by what people believe is possible.” Critical are: belief in progress, accumulation of scientific knowledge, and willingness to apply discoveries to real life—foundations that were solidified in Europe from the early modern period.
• He notes that knowledge is “cumulative and durable.” After cataclysmic events—such as the World Wars—Germany and Japan could rapidly recover because the “knowledge” base survived. Only systematic destruction of knowledge (not just factories) can halt growth for long.
• The historian draws a sharp distinction between open and closed systems: Europe’s fragmented, competitive landscape allowed dissenters to migrate or be heard, while rigid bureaucratic states like China required conformity. “Where the market for ideas is monopolized, innovation stagnates.”
• Russia’s ambivalence is highlighted: “torn between joining Europe’s open marketplace of ideas and retreating into cultural isolation.” When it leans West (as with its composers and artists), Russia achieves at a world-class level; when it turns inward, it stalls.
• Mokyr asserts that totalitarian regimes—like Stalin’s USSR or Nazi Germany—deliberately restrict the intellectual marketplace, promoting ideas only when sanctioned by power-holders. While some sectors (like aerospace) advanced, lack of genuine competition led to scientific disasters and stagnation elsewhere.
• On China today, Mokyr is cautious: the current government’s turn toward closedness could threaten its long-term innovative strength, as creative minds may leave or be discouraged.
• Finally, Mokyr critiques “extractive” regimes: as in the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (Why Nations Fail), self-serving elites suppress pluralism, block innovation, and thus doom their nations to failure. For Mokyr, true success comes where “people can test new ideas without fearing punishment”—and where free intellectual competition is the ultimate engine of prosperity.

"Russia’s Next Opposition Will Not Be Liberal," Alexey Kovalev, Foreign Policy, 10.09.25.

• According to Kovalev, the deaths of two Russian drone pilots sent on a “nullification mission” for exposing their commander’s corruption has become a symbol within the Russian military of systemic “impunity, incompetence, and lethal betrayal,” now called puzikovschina.
• The term signifies a “systemic collapse of trust between the military’s leaders and its rank and file,” with officers running regiments as “private fiefdoms” and sending dissenters on deadly missions, he writes.
• Many soldiers are forced into indefinite service, assigned to the front regardless of skills or health, and “there is now almost universal contempt for military generals, many of whom have become infamous for nepotism, gross incompetence, and indifference toward appalling loss of life.”
• Kovalev estimates Russian military losses at “350,000 killed—or close to a million if one includes those who cannot return to service because of severed limbs or other permanent injuries,” and describes mass disillusionment, fatalism, and a “groundswell of opposition far broader than anything Russian President Vladimir Putin faced in peacetime.”
• He observes that dissent now comes “not just from the cowered, passive remnants of Russia’s liberal circles but from millions of soldiers, their families, and even patriotic pro-war bloggers.”
• Public protest movements led by soldiers’ wives and widows persist despite repression, as even “hyperpatriotic state journalists and war correspondents” warn that mobilization will fail without justice for corrupt commanders.
• The Kremlin’s repression cannot contain “anger that has spread to millions of soldiers, as well as their families and friends, whose personal experiences contradict the official narrative,” he argues.
• Economic hardship, wartime inflation, and relentless casualties have eroded public trust; “the social contract that once united Russia around the promise of a quick victory is in tatters.”
• Kovalev concludes that, while the old liberal opposition has been crushed, the new opposition emerging out of military trauma, economic pain, and betrayal “will be tested—not against a reform movement among a small urban elite but against simmering, unpredictable disillusionment among the regime’s own supporters and across wide swaths of the population.”

"Putin is crushing the last voices of dissent," Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 10.14.25.

• Kara-Murza writes, “Hardly a day goes by without another political arrest in Russia. Under President Vladimir Putin, the scale of repression against those who disagree with the Kremlin has surpassed anything seen in our country since the death of Joseph Stalin.”
• He notes, “some 60 politically motivated criminal cases are opened against Russian citizens every month. The number of known political prisoners in Russia (more than 1,700) already exceeds the respective figure for the whole of the Soviet Union — that is, 15 present-day countries together — in the mid-1980s.”
• Kara-Murza calls attention to the arrest of Maxim Kruglov, a leader in Yabloko, Russia’s last remaining openly anti-war political party: “He was charged with ‘disseminating knowingly false information’ about the Russian army, which, in the Orwellian speak of Putin’s Russia, means telling the truth about the Kremlin's war in Ukraine.”
• The article details a growing crackdown on dissent: “Kruglov’s arrest brought the total number of Yabloko members who are under criminal prosecution to nine people, while another 11 had served administrative detention and 36 had been charged by police with ‘discrediting’ the Russian army.”
• Kara-Murza explains Yabloko’s unique status: “Yabloko stands as one of the last vestiges of our brief experiment with democracy. Its presence on the ballot provides the last legal and relatively safe option for Russian citizens to express opposition to the war in Ukraine.”
• He argues that the Kremlin’s repression is motivated by fear: “Putin’s anxiety is understandable. The Kremlin knows that public opposition to the Ukraine war is much greater than what its propaganda would admit. Last year, the… anti-war presidential bid by former lawmaker Boris Nadezhdin elicited an extraordinary public response… the carefully crafted propaganda myth of universal support for Putin’s war was shattered.”
• Kara-Murza concludes, “people like Maxim — Russians who refuse to become silent accomplices to the Kremlin's crimes — are saving our country's honor amid this current darkness. And it will be they who will lead Russia back to normality and back to civilization once the drawn-out nightmare of Vladimir Putin’s rule is finally over.”

"Russia’s System Is Beginning to Eat Its Own," Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Politika, 10.14.25. Clues from Russian Views.

• Stanovaya observes that Russia is experiencing “an unprecedented wave of political arrests,” including “the routing of the political clan of the once-powerful former defense minister Sergei Shoigu,” the suicide of a federal minister “who was facing jail,” and the detention of numerous regional officials and judges.
• Asset confiscations have become “a massive program” accompanying the arrests, sending “a chill through those with high-level contacts who once believed they were protected.”
• She argues, “the system is being reforged amid the fires of war,” with no sign of the crackdown easing; “On the contrary: …the regime requires resources to continue prosecuting the war, and token displays of justice.”
• Stanovaya notes that individual ambition among security officials (“their success is judged according to the number of arrests and the volume of assets seized”) matters, but so does the erosion of institutional constraints. “Even the most authoritarian states…have semiformal mechanisms to limit repression.” In Russia, those guardrails are now gone.
• Previously, “the major constraint on the security agencies was the memory of Soviet-era repression among the elite, and a belief that giving the security forces too much power could make the system dangerously imbalanced.” Now, she writes, “the absence of political guardrails has become the norm.”
• In the past, targeted officials could count on help from “their bosses, political patrons, or business partners.” Today, “traditional forms of political protection are no longer reliable, and being close to an influential figure is no longer a guarantee” of safety.
• She points to “mass nationalization of private assets,” noting that assets linked to “those living abroad, or those critical of the regime or the war in Ukraine” are especially targeted. But even “relatively senior regional officials have found themselves targeted via asset confiscations.”

"War for Other People’s Interests: Russia Is Losing Sovereignty Due to the War in Ukraine," Andrei Okun, Republic, 10.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Okun writes: “The tragedy of modern Russia is that the government convinces people this war is necessary for them. But the true interests of the country are far removed from burning people and resources in the trenches of someone else’s land. Having found itself in a narrow geopolitical corridor, the Kremlin no longer decides when or how to get out.”
• Okun observes: “The illusion of the war’s necessity has led the country into a dead end.… Not just a positional deadlock at the front—which the Russian army has been stuck in for four years—but fundamentally, the inability to get out of this dead end at all. The true depth of the impasse is not a frozen front, but the inability to turn back.”
• Citing Putin’s claims of territorial gains, Okun notes: “Of course, President Vladimir Putin is free to claim the enemy is retreating in all directions… But his only real role in the era of the so-called ‘special military operation’ is to be an irrepressible optimist.”
• According to Okun, “Russia is waging war in a situation where the interests of all parties are being considered—except Russia’s. It is the only one, aside from Ukraine, that bears the full costs of the full-scale invasion. In the end, the country finds itself in a narrow corridor it cannot exit.”
• Okun argues that “the war is fought for the benefit of others.” He points out that while Trump launches peace initiatives, the U.S. profits from massive arms sales: “Between 2020 and 2024, five U.S. military-industrial corporations made $771 billion in Pentagon contracts. Money always turns into political influence.”
• The author highlights: “American, South Korean, and Japanese defense contractors have all seen explosive profit growth. India benefits from cheap Russian energy. Turkey cements its mediator status, balancing on the diplomatic tightrope between both sides.”
• Okun quotes Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as saying that China’s main fear is that once the Ukraine conflict ends, the U.S. will refocus pressure on Beijing, especially over Taiwan. “So, Beijing acts cautiously and watches to make sure Putin does not lose the war. China isn’t interested in chaos but in ‘manageable instability’ that distracts the U.S. and Europe.”
• Okun notes: “China receives Russian military experience, buys floating armor, and gets satellite intelligence… Russia is even reportedly training Chinese paratroopers for a possible Taiwan operation.”
• Meanwhile, Okun reports, “China provides Russia with satellite images used to strike Ukrainian targets—including foreign investors’ assets—while Trump approved intelligence-sharing with Ukraine to strike Russian critical infrastructure.”
• He concludes: “Thus, the geopolitical situation is one where two world powers, in their contest for global influence, use Russia and Ukraine to land economic blows. So whose interests is the Russian army defending as the war enters its fourth year? How ‘sovereign’ is the sovereignty being earned in this ‘special military operation’?”
• “In February 2022, Putin started the war—but now he has lost the ability to decide when it ends. This is what real ‘sovereignty’ looks like in a war fought for the interests of others.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Which sectors of Russian industry will be affected?" Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 10.14.25.
• "Tax crackdown on Russia’s small businesses," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 10.10.25.
• "Havana Syndrome: Could Russia’s roads go full Cuban?" Denis Kasyanchuk, The Bell, 10.14.25.
• "Slaughtering a sacred cow: How the IT-sector lost its tax breaks," Alexander Kolyandr and Alexandra Prokopenko, The Bell, 10.08.25.
• "Sashka's Patent, or How the Government Decided to Kill Small Business," Tatyana Rybakova, The Moscow Times, 10.07.25.
• "Putin's Autumn: No Peace, No Easements," Sergey Shelin, The Moscow Times, 10.10.25.
• "How Putin’s allies benefit from internet shutdowns," The Bell, 10.07.25.
• "'Time of Heroes': Why Putin is handing out posts to war veterans," Mikhail Komin, The Moscow Times, 10.13.25.
• "Radical Ideas Have Become an Important Condition of Loyalty," Ilya Venyavkin, interview with Republic, 10.09.25. 

Defense and aerospace:

See these links for some notable commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Putin Conscripts 135,000 Russians as Ukraine War Rages," Stavros Atlamazoglou, The National Interest, 10.09.25.
• "What Happened to All of Russia’s Tanks?" Peter Suciu, The National Interest, 10.09.25.
• See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

• No significant developments.

   

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

"Problems Can Be Solved by Civilized Means," Dmitry Drize, Kommersant FM, 10.07.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• Drize reports that a ceasefire agreement on Gaza was signed at Sharm el-Sheikh by Donald Trump and three mediator countries—Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar—calling it Trump’s “first serious success” as president.
• Trump began the day with a high-profile visit to Israel—where he received “a star reception, gratitude, and ovations in the Knesset”—and declared the start of a “new era” for the Middle East.
• “Another war on the planet has ended,” said Drize, quoting Trump’s rhetoric, and now “the U.S. president promises to focus closely on Ukraine”—as well as the Iranian nuclear issue.
• The Sharm el-Sheikh summit gathered many world leaders, though notably not Israel (Prime Minister Netanyahu declined, citing holidays) and not Russia (no invitation was sent). Turkish President Erdoğan reportedly considered boycotting, but ultimately attended as a guarantor of the agreement.
• The resulting agreement on Gaza was endorsed by the U.S., Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey “in the presence of at least 20 leaders including key European and Middle Eastern nations” (as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia’s presidents). The event underlines “the diminishing role of the UN,” Drize observes, as “the U.S. would like to chair the world’s peace council,” with Trump at its head.
• Drize notes deep skepticism about the durability of the Gaza deal: “It’s only paper, and the likelihood of it falling apart is extremely high.” Nonetheless, he sees hope in the “demonstration that representatives of different regions, cultures, and religions agree to solve problems exclusively by civilized means—building peace without violence.”
• He emphasizes that the expansion of the Abraham Accords should be the bedrock for further progress, though “if you sit and do nothing, things will only get worse”—and force still remains in the toolkit: “peace through coercion is still on the agenda.”
• Drize concludes that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has already urged Trump to use a similar approach for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and “Trump has promised to focus closely on it”—so the world is now waiting.

“Remarks and answers to questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a meeting with Arab media representatives,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 10.13.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• “President D. Trump put forward his plan, which we have repeatedly assessed as the best currently on the table, although, of course, the Palestinian problem is not exhausted by this document.”
• “It is vital to halt the bloodshed as soon as possible, and resolve the most acute humanitarian problems of the population.”
• “Thousands of Gazans are now returning home. I cannot imagine how they will live, but still, it is better to rebuild your own house than live constantly under shelling, facing daily threats to your children and loved ones.”
• “We sincerely wish success to today’s summit in Sharm El Sheikh… although we are already hearing statements from both Hamas and Tel Aviv that not everything is over and there may be recurrences of the crisis.”
• “It is important for those who initiated this forum—above all President D. Trump, with the support of President of Egypt, the leadership of Qatar, Turkey—not to allow such developments, and to focus on the need for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Israeli troops into Gaza, humanitarian aid, and the restoration of this beautiful land, which has probably suffered more than any other territory in recent decades.”
• “Long-term settlement is only possible by implementing the UN decisions on the creation of a Palestinian state… The Trump plan mentions Gaza, but refers to statehood in rather general terms. We must make this more concrete, including defining what happens on the West Bank, because UN decisions envision a single, territorially unified Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.”
• “We remain committed to these [UN] decisions, as do the overwhelming majority of the international community.”
• On why Russia is absent at the summit: “Invitations were sent by the Egyptian leadership, which, as was announced, coordinated their efforts primarily with the United States. By the way, Iraq was not invited either, though it currently chairs the Arab League… Russia is ready to participate in any format… But imposing ourselves is not our tradition.”
• Recalling previous peace efforts: “The ‘Quartet’ was destroyed by the Biden administration, although it produced serious agreements, including the Roadmap adopted by the UN Security Council in 2003… All steps necessary for the creation of a Palestinian state were laid out. And what happened after is well known.”
• “These hopes for peace in this region have failed too many times.”
• “The root of the problem is the lack of progress toward a Palestinian state. In fact, the situation is regressing.”
• “I told my Israeli colleagues… the main risk for the region, including Israel’s security, is the lingering non-implementation of the UN decisions on the creation of a Palestinian state for nearly 80 years now. My Israeli interlocutors called this ‘exaggerated’, claiming it would only encourage terrorists. But it is precisely the unresolved issue of a Palestinian state that is the most significant factor fueling extremism in the Arab world.”
• On October 7, 2023: “There was a heinous terrorist attack (which we immediately condemned), but then Israel began its operation under the slogan of destroying everyone, and members of the cabinet responded to calls to spare civilians in Gaza by saying ‘there are no civilians in Gaza, only extremists—from the age of three.’ I remember this very well.”
• “We brought ceasefire resolutions to the UN Security Council five times. The US (under Biden) vetoed these resolutions. But ‘collective punishment’ of Palestinians continued.”
• “If you look at the map of the West Bank, outside of illegal settlements there is almost nothing left. I’ve even heard someone propose creating two or three municipalities for Palestinians. That’s not a state. I don’t think the Arab world—or the Palestinians themselves—would accept such an outcome to this decades-long tragedy.”
• “There’s no escaping the question of Palestinian statehood. It must be resolved. How is another issue—but mutual concessions are unavoidable.”
• On the West: “The West dragged its feet… If there had been real pressure for the creation of a Palestinian state, the Quartet’s roadmap would have been implemented and the issue resolved. I read today a political analyst arguing that the West doesn’t want a Palestinian state; it wants another mandate. I don’t want to believe that, but some actions support this theory.”
• Concluding on the summit: “The initiators have already proposed a compromise. We must not tempt fate now, but clearly implement everything that has been proposed so far—stop the bloodshed, solve the humanitarian crisis, and start Gaza’s reconstruction. But in parallel, without delay, we must begin working out the next step: the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

"Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with RT’s Bridges to the East project," Russian Foreign Ministry, 10.09.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• According to Lavrov, the Gaza conflict is “a disaster” with 65,000 reported deaths in two years, “most of them civilians,” and a humanitarian crisis that has seen “children dying of starvation and exhaustion.”
• Lavrov notes that earlier ideas for solving the conflict, such as relocating Gazans to Egypt or other countries, were firmly rejected by Arab neighbors and would result in “a humanitarian disaster for the Palestinians and a serious blow to the UN, which proclaimed the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside the State of Israel in 1947.”
• He underscores that “the state must be created”—insisting that UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Palestinian statehood “have never been rescinded.”
• Lavrov observes that while Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly said Palestinian statehood is “out of the question”, the current Trump peace plan, which Lavrov regards as “the best solution we have on the table,” only mentions statehood in vague terms for Gaza but not the West Bank.
• He cautions that “the plan must be acceptable to the Palestinians,” and reminds that “Hamas is part of the Palestinian people and part of the problem,” but denounces both the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent ‘collective punishment’ as a “gross violation of international humanitarian law.”
• According to Lavrov, ignoring legitimate, UN-approved Palestinian aspirations “is the main factor fueling extremism in the Middle East,” warning that generations will grow up knowing only frustration.
• He calls the Trump plan “quite realistic provided the Palestinians find it acceptable,” expressing hope for the indirect talks in Egypt and stressing that “it is absolutely essential to cease the hostilities” and ensure any guarantees against renewed strikes are robust—citing previous breakdowns when Israel resumed operations after partial ceasefires.
• Lavrov states that Russia stands ready to act as a guarantor or assist in mediating, reiterating Russia’s willingness “to help establish a Palestinian State, but we must start with something. Statehood will come later. This goal should remain part of the agenda.”
• He criticizes Western countries for failing to advance Palestinian statehood and highlights Saudi Arabia’s continuing insistence on “first, the establishment of a Palestinian State and then normalisation of relations with Israel.”
• Lavrov concludes, “To reiterate, stopping the bloodshed is our number one priority. In this regard, President Trump’s plan gives hope.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Blaming Russia Won’t Stop the Populist Right," Maciej Kisilowski, Project Syndicate, 10.07.25.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Secret Weapons Spending Faces Questions After Internal Review," Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, 10.06.25. 

• According to Kramer, while “Ukraine has built a defense industry stamping out thousands of artillery shells, armored vehicles and drones…much of the spending is shrouded in wartime secrecy. That worries analysts and activists who say that Ukraine has made little progress in reining in a long history of corruption in military procurement.”
• The author reveals that internal government audits “show dozens of … contracts signed over a period of a little over a year, as well as cases of late or incomplete deliveries and prepayments for weaponry that never arrived.”
• Kramer notes the audits documented that “dozens of contracts for artillery shells, drones and other weaponry were not awarded to the lowest bidder,” with the difference between lowest bids and actual awards totaling “at least 5.4 billion hryvnia, or $129 million.”
• Tamerlan Vahabov, a former adviser to the procurement agency, observes, “They overpay for unknown reasons and without justification … there is a lack of political will to do it the right way.”
• Olena Tregub, executive director of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, points out, “That justification can be true, or it can be corruption,” when discussing the agency’s explanations for selecting higher bids.
• In response, the agency’s director Arsen Zhumadilov stated that lower bids “may not meet the required standards of quality, delivery timelines, payment terms or other essential criteria” and claimed to be “overhauling its contracting practices to ensure fairness.”
• Kramer notes that until at least last year, “a large majority of purchases were brokered through arms dealers, most of whom received a markup of 3 percent on sales… The procurement agency involved such middlemen in 83 percent of its contracts, rather than buying directly from suppliers.”
• The article explains that Ukraine’s system “is a wartime experiment in buying arms not from several large, established defense contractors but a chaotic swirl of more than 2,000 weapons suppliers, most of them defense technology start-ups, and others tiny basement workshops.”
• Kramer writes that “the defense procurement agency is experimenting with new models for procurement,” such as “an online marketplace allowing army commanders to buy drone weapons directly from suppliers, with one or two clicks, cutting out the military bureaucracy,” which Zhumadilov called “a game changer in military supply.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

"Is Georgia the next Ukraine?" Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 10.14.25.

• Kinzer warns, “The story of Ukraine… could repeat itself in another former Soviet republic: Georgia.” Post-election unrest in October saw opposition parties boycott municipal elections, violent protests erupt in Tbilisi, and protest leaders charged with seeking to overthrow the government.
• He writes that Georgian Dream, the ruling party, won after the opposition refused to participate—mirroring “the path that led to war in Ukraine,” where internal division left a vacuum for Russian intervention.
• Western organizations—including the Open Society Foundations and the National Endowment for Democracy—have spent millions supporting Georgia’s opposition, while the ruling party is “also rely[ing] on deep-pocketed donors” and government-linked business executives.
• Kinzer observes the core tension: “The government wants to maintain good relations with Moscow. Protesters want the opposite: a turn toward Western Europe and the United States.” The government’s halt to EU entry talks, arrests of opposition leaders, and a proposed “foreign agents law” recall the prelude to conflict in Ukraine.
• He notes that NATO’s past declarations that “these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO” have contributed to Moscow’s sense of threat, making Georgia a perpetual flashpoint—even as Russia, since 2008, occupies enclaves in Georgian territory.
• Georgia’s society is divided: cosmopolitan urbanites “want to make their country fully European, regardless of what Russia thinks,” while rural Georgians worry that antagonizing Russia could have serious economic impacts.
• Unlike Ukraine, Georgia is smaller (under four million people), more economically dependent on Russia, and shaped by the Orthodox Church and its unique culture.
• Kinzer concludes: “A Ukraine-style tragedy is hardly inevitable, but Georgia remains Europe’s most flammable tinder box.”

"Why Is Central Asia Buying Trump’s Attention?" Temur Umarov, Carnegie Politika, 10.09.25. 

• Umarov writes that Central Asia has found the Trump administration “the easiest one so far” to engage: “Business interests can be used to attract Washington’s attention, and there is no longer any need for demonstrative distancing from Russia or commitment to democratic reforms.”
• He notes a shift in regional strategy: “Previously, Central Asian leaders would boast to Washington about their domestic political reforms. Now they have switched to simply supporting any initiatives by the new U.S. president—especially those that play into their own hands.”
• Umarov highlights the new mercantile approach: “The most effective approach to the current U.S. administration… is talk of money. Trump makes no secret of his mercantilist approach to foreign policy, he even boasts of it.”
• Describing recent agreements, Umarov writes: “Tashkent was able to effectively buy this five-minute meeting with Trump thanks to an agreement… under which Uzbekistan will purchase twenty-two Boeing aircraft for $8 billion,” while Kazakhstan’s “$4.2 billion” locomotive deal was apparently “insufficiently ambitious” for even a short meeting.
• He says “the main purpose of such figures is to attract attention,” and emphasizes: “Central Asian countries sign multibillion-dollar agreements at almost every meeting with partner countries: $15 billion with China here, $20 billion with Russia there. The United States is no exception; on the contrary, it is a particularly desirable partner.”
• Umarov argues that, despite new business connections, “the main goal is to strengthen their multi-vector foreign policy,” noting, “Without U.S. involvement, the multi-vector policy becomes meaningless: after all, only Washington can serve as a sufficient counterweight to both Moscow and Beijing.”
• He observes that increased U.S. attention “is strengthening Central Asia’s negotiating position with regard to China and Russia,” while making clear that the region does not seek to replace those powers, but improve its leverage.
• Umarov concludes: “Even if no such historic visit [by Trump] ultimately takes place, the region has at least made a good enough impression on Trump for him to refrain from raising tariffs on its countries. And Russia and China have seen that Central Asia isn’t locked in a geopolitical impasse where they alone monopolize influence.”

"Georgia’s Ruling Party Uses Opposition’s Election Boycott to Seal Its Control of Institutions," Bashir Kitachaev, Carnegie Politika, 10.13.25.

• Kitachaev writes that the October 4 municipal elections resulted in “another resounding victory for the ruling party, Georgian Dream. Its candidates took first place in all sixty-four municipalities across the country,” including the capital, Tbilisi.
• He notes official turnout was 41 percent—ten points lower than in 2021—with “neither ongoing street protests nor Western criticism able to shake Georgian Dream’s dominance.”
• Kitachaev observes that “the contradictory actions of the opposition, which went into the elections without a unified strategy, only deepened public apathy… paving the way for a further tightening of the screws by the regime.”
• After the parliamentary elections and opposition boycott, some coalitions ran in the municipal elections while others chose more street action, but “neither approach yielded any particular results. The participation of some opposition parties in the elections failed to prevent candidates from Georgian Dream from sweeping the board…”
• He adds that post-election protests “attracted considerable media coverage, but fell short of the promised ‘peaceful revolution.’ Far fewer people took to the streets” than in last year’s protests.
• Kitachaev argues Georgian Dream’s resilience comes from gradually consolidating power without provoking a mass backlash, writing: “Georgian Dream arrests protesters and opposition figures, restricts funding for independent media and NGOs, and is constantly inventing new tools for putting pressure on dissenters. But it does all of that without taking drastic steps that could escalate the protests enough to bring moderate voters out onto the streets.”
• Key to the current calm, he contends, is Georgia’s “sustained economic boom. Georgia’s GDP grew a robust 7.9 percent year-on-year from January to August… and by mid-2025, the average nominal salary was 10.3 percent higher than the previous year.”
• Despite tough talk on values and national sovereignty, “limited dialogue and economic ties with the West are still in place; visa requirements to travel to the EU… have not been reimposed,” and “there is no talk of large-scale sanctions against the Georgian economy.”
• Kitachaev concludes: “Now there will be practically no opposition to keep the government in check—at either a national or local level—until the next parliamentary elections. There’s no doubt that Georgian Dream will take advantage of this to tighten the screws even further and to weaken its opponents.”

"Meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State," Vladimir Putin, Kremlin.ru, 10.10.25. Clues from Russian Views. 

• Putin said: “For over three decades the Commonwealth of Independent States has firmly established itself as an influential regional and integration association. But most importantly, we have managed to do more than just maintain a platform for dialogue; we have developed a common market and a shared humanitarian space.”
• Putin stated: “Russia’s trade with CIS countries grew by 7 percent in 2024 alone, reaching $112 billion. Furthermore, the structure of this trade is consistently improving – a point of high importance. The emphasis is shifting towards a growing segment of high value-added products.”
• He emphasized the growing financial independence of CIS members: “Our countries are creating a stable financial infrastructure that is independent of outside influences. Today, practically all mutual settlements are carried out in national currencies. In the first six months of 2025, their share in commercial transactions between CIS member states amounted to 96 percent.”
• Putin commented on economic integration: “If certain additional instruments and mechanisms, which someone would like to introduce, serve to promote our cooperation… Why not? We should aspire to this, because it is hard to disagree with the idea that economic collaboration lies at the base of solutions to all other problems.”
• On Eurasian production and logistics, Putin said: “New Eurasian production and transport chains are now taking shape, while transcontinental North–South and East–West logistics corridors are being upgraded, discussed, and actively developed.”
• Regarding innovation and leadership, Putin noted: “Import substitution efforts are actively progressing within the CIS. However, as we now recognize in Russia – and I believe this applies to all of us – the goal is not merely to replace something, but to take the lead in certain fields.”
• On cooperation in security, Putin said: “An important area of cooperation among the Commonwealth states is the joint fight against terrorism, extremism and corruption. We are making every effort to strengthen collaboration across a broad range of fields, and therefore fully support the documents being adopted today.”
• On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Putin said: “We support efforts to forge closer contacts between the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as per the draft decision to grant the SCO observer status within the CIS. In fact, it makes every sense to use the potential these two organizations have in terms of their cooperation for promoting safe and steady development for our countries and the entire Eurasian region.”
• On CIS-plus, Putin stated: “We support the principled decision we will be taking today to establish the CIS-plus as a new operating framework. This will make us more agile and proactive when attracting other countries and international structures to work with our organization.”
• Regarding talks with the US on Ukraine, Putin said: “I have already discussed this with some of our colleagues here and informed them about the outcomes of the meeting on the Ukraine settlement with the Americans in Alaska’s Anchorage. We will have a chance to meet in an even more private setting. When it happens, I will inform you about these outcomes in greater detail. Overall, we believe that they were quite positive. Of course, all our future efforts to achieve a settlement in Ukraine rely on the fundamental takeaways from the Alaska meeting.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

• "Why Azerbaijan Is the Next Front of US-China Competition," Kamran Bokhari, The National Interest, 10.08.25.
• “Meet Belarus's power couple that is taking on a dictator,” Francesca Ebel, The Washington Post, 10.14.25.

Footnotes:

1. By September, Ukrainian strikes had damaged or destroyed refinery equipment handling 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day—about 20% of Russia’s refining capacity, according to The New York Times. Between 25% and 38% of Russian oil-refining capacity is offline, according to WSJ. At the same time, Ukraine’s energy sector has become a central battleground, with Russian attacks causing $20.5 billion in damage and reducing infrastructure to a third of pre-invasion capacity, according to Brookings.
2. The claim of standstill is contestable. In the period of Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 2025, Russia gained 34 square miles of Ukraine’s territory, up from the previous week’s gain of 13 square miles, which constitutes an increase of 162%. In the past four weeks (Sept. 9–Oct. 7, 2025), Russian forces gained 166 square miles of Ukrainian territory, a slight increase from the 160 square miles they gained during the previous four-week period (Aug. 12–Sept. 9, 2025), according to the latest issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. The past week also saw Vladimir Putin claim that Russian forces had captured almost 1,930 square miles (5,000 square kilometers) of land in Ukraine in 2025. According to data from DeepState, which is associated with Ukraine’s MoD, however, from Jan. 1, 2025, to Oct. 5, 2025, Russia gained approximately 1,217 square miles (3,152 square kilometers) of Ukrainian land.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by U.S. Department of Defense.