This Week's Highlights:

• Although polls suggest that Russians go along with the Kremlin’s official narratives—that Russia did not interfere in the U.S. election, attempt to poison the Skripals or, earlier, send troops into Ukraine—focus groups show a different story. Participants acknowledged interference but did not see it as a problem; the problem was that Russia didn’t always get away with it, writes Denis Volkov of the Levada Center.
• A silver lining in the U.S.-Russian relationship is the new communication channel between John Bolton and his Russian counterpart, writes Paul Saunders of the Center for the National Interest, arguing that the U.S. midterms may lead to deeper and more frequent U.S.-Russia interactions.
• As the U.S. retreats from the world stage, other countries are stepping forward, notably Russia, writes columnist David Ignatius. Putin may hold a weak hand, Ignatius argues, but he’s in the game, playing diplomat in more than one Middle Eastern conflict.
• This year’s election in Zimbabwe appears to be the first post-Soviet instance of Russian political consultants playing an active role in an African election, write Africa experts Andrey Maslov and Vadim Zaytsev. Russian can’t convert the election results into direct political or economic power, so Zimbabwe willingly accepts Moscow’s support.
• Vladimir Ruvinsky, a columnist at Vedomosti, writes that in a recent Levada poll, 28 percent of respondents agreed that beating and intimidation were sometimes acceptable, while seven percent said prisoners have no right to expect normal treatment, responses that reflect a growing acceptance of violence within Russian society.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:

• No significant commentary.

NATO-Russia relations:

• No significant commentary.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

“There’s a Right Way to End Syria’s War. The New Special Envoy Must Not Allow Russia to Protect Assad,” Janine di Giovanni, Foreign Affairs, 11.14.18: The author, a senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs, writes:

• “Earlier this month, Geir Pedersen, Norway’s ambassador to China and a former permanent representative to the United Nations, was appointed special envoy on the Syria conflict.”
• “What might work in Pedersen’s favor is timing: all the actors … are exhausted, suggesting that the time for negotiation might be ripe.”
• “… [I]f Pedersen managed to get Arafat and Rabin to shake hands, perhaps he can find a way to convince the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, that Assad is done.”
• “Pedersen has a track record of working with the most difficult negotiators on the planet. But he needs to insist that when this war ends, it ends on the right terms: Syria’s future must not include Assad, and any settlement must provide a mechanism for transitional justice, such that the perpetrators of horrific crimes against humanity can be sought out and tried. Otherwise … the hatred and the suffering will surely return. And another Assad will appear.”

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

• No significant commentary.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“The World Is Moving on From Trump. And Others Are Stepping Forward.” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 11.13.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes:

•  “French President Emmanuel Macron … told a French radio station that Europe needs a ‘true European army’ at a time when the United States is a less reliable ally. ‘We have to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia and even the United States of America,’ Macron said. … Trump blasted Macron’s comments as ‘very insulting’ … But joining Macron on Tuesday was German Chancellor Angela Merkel.”
• “The world is moving on, in other ways, from Trump’s ‘America First’ idea of U.S. power. Macron announced Monday the ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.’ … It was backed by more than 50 countries, 90 nonprofits and 130 private companies … Absent from the list was the United States—along with Russia, China, Iran and Israel.”
• “As Trump’s United States retreats from global diplomatic engagements, other opportunistic countries are stepping forward. The most obvious example is Russia. … Russia talks with everyone: Israel and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the Taliban and the Afghan government. Putin may be a bully boy, but he’s wearing a diplomat’s pinstriped pants … Once upon a time, America owned this role of global broker, but not anymore.”
• “The greatest beneficiary of Trump’s retreat is China, which openly proclaims its desire to challenge U.S. global primacy.”
• “Most of the world hopes we’ll [the U.S.] find our balance again, but in the meantime, they must consider making other arrangements.”

“After US Midterms, Dialogue With Russia May Become Easier, Not Harder,” Paul J. Saunders, Russia Matters, 11.14.18: The author, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, writes:

• “While conventional wisdom has suggested that America's 2018 midterm elections are likely to further harden U.S. policy toward Russia … there is good reason to think that this assessment is both overly simplistic and overly pessimistic.”
• “For those seeking silver linings in the storm clouds over Washington and Moscow, the most promising may well be the new communication channel between National Security Advisor John Bolton and his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.”
• “Moreover, Bolton's hardline reputation in the United States helps to insulate Trump at home from further political attacks over the administration's engagement with Russia. … [W]hile Russian officials don't welcome Bolton's conservative positions or Trump's slow evolution into a more traditional Republican president on many foreign policy matters, many in Russia's foreign policy elite prefer dealing with a hardline Republican administration over some of the alternatives, like an Obama or Clinton administration.”
• “[T]he midterm elections may clear the way for deeper and more frequent U.S.-Russia interactions that have been impossible since charges of Russian interference in the 2016 election first emerged.”

“Partisan Conflict Over Grand Strategy in Eastern Europe, 2014-2017,” Andrew J. Stravers, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11.13.18: The author, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin, writes: 

• “How should foreign policy analysts understand the American response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014?”
• “Despite widespread bipartisan recognition that Eastern European states … were experiencing their most severe crisis since at least the end of the Cold War, the United States responded with little military support to the region.”
• “The tepid reaction to the Russian invasion was due to the partisan divide over the means of addressing the issue. This divide foreclosed the two main options for the President: a redeployment of forces from the United States or a larger military and budget. This disagreement over the means … counter intuitively prevented a response for which both parties expressed support.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Is Putin Getting Serious on Libya?” Maxim A. Suchkov, Al Monitor, 11.15.18: The author, editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia/Mideast coverage, writes:

• “Over the last few weeks … Libya has dominated Russia’s Middle Eastern agenda. On Nov. 12, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev led the Russian delegation to Italy for a two-day conference in Palermo in an Italian bid to bridge the parties in conflict, reunite Libya’s institutions and craft a path to elections.”
• “The double-engagement policy in Libya by the Russian diplomats and by the Russian military with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj and Hifter, respectively, has bewildered some and amazed others: Are the Foreign and Defense ministries showcasing a classic interagency rivalry … or is Russia diversifying its toolbox, channels of contacts and hedging the potential risks of placing all its eggs in one basket? Or has the Kremlin made its decision in favor of Hifter, as many in the West presume, with the outreach to Sarraj's people just a facade of multilateralism … ? In fact, all three theories have some plausibility and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.”
• “It certainly is no coincidence that Putin dispatched Medvedev on a Libya mission. The bombing of Libya in 2011 by France, the U.K. and the United States, as well as the killing of longtime Libyan leader Col. Moammar Gadhafi, occurred with the backdrop of Russia's abstention on a key Security Council vote during Medvedev’s presidency.”
• “The message Putin is sending to Medvedev with this designation is clear: ‘You [helped] break it, now you [help] fix it’—or pay for it with [your own] political capital, if you fail.’”

“A Century After the Armistice, the World Is Still Coping With the End of Empires,” Jeffrey Mankoff, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 11.13.18: The author, deputy director and senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS, writes:

• “A century after the Armistice that ended World War I on the Western Front, much of the world remains haunted by the legacies of that conflict.”
• “The old imperial cores—states like Russia and Turkey—still wrestle with the loss of status and territory that accompanied the end of empire. With the post-Cold War order giving way, instability along the old periphery remains, even as the centers of the old empires increasingly look to the past for inspiration, seeking to recreate something like an imperial order in the regions they once ruled.”
• “Russia was replaced by the Soviet Union, which eventually managed to restore a lesser version of the Russian Empire, but at horrific cost. … The combination of economic dysfunction and nationalist mobilization in the non-Russian periphery eventually brought about the demise of not only the Soviet Union but of Russia’s empire.”
• “With European integration off the table, Russia and Turkey are pursuing a different strategy, one with strong notes of imperial nostalgia. … Russia and Turkey are both seeking to construct something like an imperial order around their borders.”
• “Russia and Turkey also struggle with questions of identity stemming from the loss of empire. Although their governments prefer to emphasize a civic-territorial version of national identity, influential voices in both countries call for ethnic homogenization, usually with strong religious undertones.”
• “Imperial nostalgia … will be one of the primary factors shaping European and Eurasian geopolitics for years to come.”

“What’s Behind Russia’s Newfound Interest in Zimbabwe,” Andrey Maslov and Vadim Zaytsev, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.14.18: The authors, experts on Africa, write:

• “In the year since the soft military coup in Zimbabwe … the country’s new, more predictable leadership has elicited keen interest from China and Russia.”
• “Russians played a significant role in the July 2018 presidential election that saw the ruling party’s Emmerson Mnangagwa … officially elected. This … could be the start of more systemic Russian participation in political processes across the African continent.”
• “This year’s election in Zimbabwe was seemingly the first time in post-Soviet history that Russian political consultants have played an active role in an election campaign in an African nation.”
• “But the main player in Mnangagwa’s dirty campaign, according to the opposition, was … China.”
• “In response to the pressure of sanctions, Russia is beginning to show interest in even the most distant spots on the map: any countries where a government skeptical of the West can be supported with minimal resources. And in these countries, Russia is greeted with eager anticipation.”
• “The Zimbabweans understand that the Russians will not be able to convert the results of their assistance into direct political or economic power, and even the simple monetization of influence is not yet being discussed. Therefore, they willingly accept any form of support from Moscow.”
• “Russia … still lacks the experience, information and human resources to compete in Africa with the former colonial powers or China. It can, however, comfortably play a role … of a restraining and independent power.”

China:

“China and Russia's Awkward Romance. The US Is Pushing China and Russia Into a Tighter Alliance,” Jonathan Hillman, The Washington Post, 11.15.18: The author, director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes:

• “[T]he cumulative effect of U.S. sanctions against Russia and tariffs against China could hasten the very threat Washington seeks to avoid: an anti-Western authoritarian partnership between the world's largest nuclear power and second-largest economy.”
• “China still towers above Russia in economic and demographic terms. With a long history of invasions, Russia's paranoia about foreign powers approaching its borders will not vanish overnight.”
• “China's grand ambitions run through Russia and its neighbors, but its investments and infrastructure projects have not yet triggered alarms in Moscow. Russia is the gatekeeper for China's overland push westward, but Xi now holds the keys in the form of investment and respect that Putin … craves. Washington should highlight the risks of China's Belt and Road in Russia's backyard. Three of the eight countries with the highest debt risk from Chinese lending are Russia's close neighbors: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia.”  
• “To take the air out of Xi and Putin's globalization tale, Trump's trade policy must be updated. … [T]he United States urgently needs to get back into the game of offering regional alternatives rather than bilateral ultimatums.”
• “Finally, a bit of old-fashioned diplomacy would go a long way. For now, the United States does not need to choose between Russia and China … It would be wiser to work selectively with both sides. … With restraint and patience, the United States could reestablish itself as a natural wedge between Russia and China. At the very least, it must avoid becoming a bridge that unites them.”

“Russia and China Have Made the Mediterranean a Priority, Will the United States Rise to the Challenge?” Tony Chavez, The National Interest, 11.14.18: The author, a navy federal executive fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, writes:

• “Access to the Mediterranean Sea means access to the world, and Russia and China are seeking to gain veto power … over other nations’ economic, diplomatic and security decisions.”
• “The threats, then, are twofold. First, Russia and China have begun to sew instability in the eastern Mediterranean that concerns U.S. allies and partners, as well as U.S. economic interests. Second, Moscow and Beijing seem to be betting that the Mediterranean is an ideal choke point to challenge U.S. policy far and wide.”
• “The United States will need to use all its resources … in the Mediterranean region as Russia and China make the sea and Europe a priority. Washington can begin by maintaining a constant carrier strike group presence in the region, by increasing military-to-military interoperability exercises and training and by developing key leadership engagements with partners and potential friendly nations in the region.”

“Payback Time for Chinese Espionage,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 11.15.18: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes:

• “While the bombastic U.S.-China ‘trade war’ has been getting the headlines, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been waging a quieter battle to combat Chinese theft of trade secrets from American companies.”
• “To combat Chinese spying and hacking, U.S. intelligence agencies are increasingly sharing with the Justice Department revelatory information about Chinese operations. That has led to a string of recent indictments and, in one case, the arrest abroad of an alleged Chinese spy and his extradition to the United States to face trial.”
• “The Justice Department has pursued a similar open assault on Russian cyberespionage, with three recent indictments naming a score of Russian operatives and disclosing their hacking techniques, malware tools and planned targets.”
• “China, like Russia, is displaying an increasingly freewheeling and entrepreneurial approach to espionage.”
• “As a rising power, China is also a rising threat in the intelligence sphere. The U.S. counterattack, in part, seems to be a public revelation of just how and why Beijing is stealing America's secrets—overt payback for covert espionage.”

Ukraine:

“Are Ukraine’s Anti-corruption Reforms Working?” John Lough and Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Chatham House, 11.19.18: The authors, an associate fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House and a senior economist with CASE Ukraine, write:

• “Corruption is a symptom of the poor system of governance in the country, not the cause of it. A decisive breakthrough will require opening the political system to more actors, creating greater competition and developing credible institutions to support the rule of law.”
• “Progress is lacking in priority areas such as customs, deregulation, privatization, demonopolization and the reform of public administration. Defense spending is particularly opaque. Corruption schemes remain untouched in some parts of the energy sector. An overhaul of the civil service is also essential.”
• “Reforms of the law enforcement agencies are proceeding slowly, if at all. It is too early to say whether judicial reform will lead to improvements in the functioning of the courts.”
• “Punitive measures on their own can only have a limited effect on reducing corruption. They must be part of a sustained and comprehensive strategy to reduce the space for corrupt practices and open the political and economic system to greater competition.”
• “Citizens condemn high-level corruption but regard petty corruption as a justifiable evil. This perception needs to change, and citizens must accept their responsibilities for limiting the scope of corruption.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

• No significant commentary.

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Debt and Discontent: The Collapse of the Putin Consensus?” Chris Jarmas, Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 2018: The author, a threat finance analyst, writes:

• “For the vast majority of Russians, the … regime … they encounter is neither the Kremlin nor the Duma. It is considerably more local.”
• “Although the Kremlin projects a centralized vision of the Russian Federation, in which Moscow’s writ is executed evenly throughout the country, this image is not the reality of center-periphery politics in Russia.”
• “Rather than managing the situation on a technocratic basis, the Kremlin has prioritized politically or strategically sensitive regions, while allowing fiscal problems to mount in others. … The Kremlin has also opted at each turn to delay painful repayments of subnational debts.”
• “Center-periphery politics in Russia are not dead, but hidden. If the ‘Putin consensus’ begins to break down in Vladimir Putin’s fourth term, its cracks … will appear first in the informal relationships that define Moscow’s interactions with its periphery.”

“Do Russians Really Believe Moscow Didn’t Interfere Abroad?”, Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center/The Moscow Times, 11.16.18: The author, a sociologist and an expert at the Levada Center, writes:

• “Experts have long debated whether Russian propaganda … is effective. … Can state-controlled media actually force most Russians to accept the Kremlin’s version of events?”
• “At first glance, public opinion polls suggest that Russians indeed go along with the government’s official narrative. … [O]nly 3 percent of those polled by the Levada Center in October blamed the Russian security services for the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia ... It is quite telling, however, that less than a quarter of respondents blamed the British for the attack on the Skripals. Instead, most chose not to answer the question directly, saying: ‘It could have been anyone.’”
• “In fact, avoiding answers is how Russians typically react to any stories of Moscow’s possible interference in other states’ affairs. And it reflects the complicated relationship Russians have with their country’s political narratives and its standoff with the West.”
• My colleagues and I have moderated dozens of focus group discussions over the past several years … Many respondents who hide their opinion or publicly deny Russia’s interference in other countries’ affairs, in fact, allow for these possibilities.”
• “People didn’t see Russian interference as a problem in and of itself. Rather, the problem was that the country did not always manage to get away with it.”
• “As soon as the discussion turns to foreign pressure on Russia, even Russians who would otherwise be skeptical of the Russian leadership or oppose their country’s active involvement abroad side with the Russian authorities.”
• “Most Russians consciously reproduce the official version of state propaganda—even if they don’t truly believe it—because they do not perceive themselves as outside observers. Rather, they feel that they are participants in the information confrontation between Russia and the West.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

“A Tangled Web: Organized Crime and Oligarchy in Putin’s Russia,” Louise Shelley’s 11.15.18 review of Mark Galeotti’s 2018 book “The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia”: The reviewer, a professor at George Mason University, writes of Galeotti’s book:

• “The vory, the professional elite of Russian organized crime, have roots that go far back into the days of the tsars. While many historians trace the origins of organized crime to the emergence of the mafia in Sicily in the mid-19th century, … Galeotti suggests that professional criminals were an important component of Russian society as much as a century before that.”
• “Joseph Stalin worked closely with professional criminals, both as a bank robber and a pirate, in the Caucasus region in … the final years of the Russian Empire.”
• “Russia’s professional criminals largely survived the Soviet revolution. Subsequently, however, many were rounded up and placed in labor camps.”
• “During the Soviet era, true vory refused to cooperate with the state, ensuring that their children did not attend school or serve in the military. But as Galeotti explains, the political calculus of the criminal world changed in the final days of the Soviet Union, setting organized criminals on a trajectory that would lead them to assume political influence and wealth at the end of the Soviet period and in the tumultuous transitional period that followed. … The links between Russian state power and organized crime persist today, impacting global economics and politics.”
• “‘The Vory’ accurately explains that post-Soviet organized crime … was much more a product of the privatization of former state property. Furthermore, these criminals were key sellers of security and protection services.”
• “[A]s the Russian state began to reassert its authority under Putin, members of organized crime became less important than the oligarchs whom they had helped ascend to wealth and power. Today, Putin controls the oligarchs, and together they control and exploit the criminal world to their mutual advantage.”

“Why Violence Is Becoming the Norm in Russia,” Vladimir Ruvinsky, The Moscow Times, 11.19.18: The author, a columnist at the Vedomosti business daily, writes:

• “A Levada Center survey conducted in October on the use of torture and mistreatment in detention centers … suggests that Russians are highly tolerant of violence and cruelty.”
• “Although a majority, or 57 percent, of respondents of the recent … survey believe that intimidation and force should never be used against prisoners, [Levada’s] Gudkov argued that they represent a powerless majority. Another 28 percent held that beating and intimidation were acceptable ‘in some cases,’ while seven percent said they believed that prisoners have no right to expect normal treatment in general.”
• “These responses reflect a growing acceptance of violence within Russian society. The same trend is evident from surveys about the reinstatement of the death penalty, the use of force against minorities, corporal punishment for children and violence within the family.”
• “This is partly the result of the state’s promotion of so-called ‘traditional values’ and the patriarchal and rigidly disciplined nature of family life. It also reflects a culture of violence as a means of establishing order in society and the world—an approach that Russian leadership considers effective.”

“Is Interpol Being Manipulated By Authoritarian Regimes?” Michael Peel, Financial Times, 11.18.18: The author, a reporter for the news outlet, writes:

• “Bill Browder was in a hotel room in Madrid … when three large men arrived at his door. … ‘Mr. Browder, you are under arrest’ … ‘I said: ‘what am I under arrest for?’ And they said: ‘Interpol—Russia.’ … Browder sees his experience as part of a growing pattern of the exploitation of Interpol by authoritarian and corrupt states to target political enemies and business rivals.”
• “The organization is still reeling from the disappearance last month of Meng Hongwei, its then president, in his native China.”
• “Rights campaigners had previously raised concerns about the Interpol role of Mr. Meng … now some are worried that one of the two candidates so far to replace him is Alexander Prokopchuk, a Russian who is current Interpol vice-president.”
• “Russia has insisted it uses Interpol in good faith. … Moscow has also claimed Western countries have abused Interpol in matters such as the U.K.’s pursuit of two Russians accused of attempting to murder … Sergei Skripal.”
• “But the step change that has triggered concern about Interpol is the explosion in the volumes of requests being put through its systems.”
• “‘The world needs an Interpol,’ Browder says. ‘But the world doesn’t need an Interpol that is being abused.’”