Russia Analytical Report, May 26–June 1, 2026

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. The Russia-Ukraine conflict “is ripe for conclusion,” according to CFR’s Thomas Graham. In an interview with NYT, Graham argues that “the mood has changed in Moscow. The battlefield is different: The Ukrainians have frozen the front line. The economic problems in Russia are building, and some political discontent is bubbling up. Conversations inside the Kremlin are on ‘How do we present this as a victory?’” Graham told NYT. He also noted that “you have to have a negotiating process,” and that is still missing. “I think they would like to see the process institutionalized,” Graham added, “so it’s more than a couple of envoys talking to Putin.” For RM’s account of how Russian and Ukrainian influentials are pondering whether they can sell the end of the conflict as a victory to their compatriots, follow this link. For RM’s assessment of changes in territorial control, visit this link.*
  2. Despite contrasting battlefields, the Ukraine and Iran wars share core similarities: powerful militaries—the U.S. and Russia—have failed to decisively defeat weaker adversaries, revealing “unmet expectations” and “hubris,” according to NYT’s Lara Jakes. This NYT journalist argues that both Ukraine and Iran rely on asymmetrical tactics, including drone attacks, proxy strikes, assassinations and maritime threats, to offset conventional disadvantages. The Iran and Ukraine conflicts highlight the rise of cheap, AI-enabled drones and sensor networks, which will “democratize” precision warfare for smaller states, Carnegie Endowment’s Michael Kofman has told NYT. One way to assess whether and “what lessons your historical comparisons may hold for the present case,” is to apply the May Method.
  3. Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times contends that Russian history suggests Vladimir Putin should fear not only military failure, but also regime instability, recalling how Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 “contributed to popular unrest and moves toward a constitutional monarchy,” as well as how the “removal of Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the Soviet Union in 1964 was closely related to his perceived failure in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Russia’s defeat in a conflict didn’t always lead to the removal of the Russian commander or leader in that conflict. For instance:
    1. In 1812, commander‑in‑chief of the Russian forces Mikhail Kutuzov ordered the retreat of Russian troops after the Battle of Borodino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow, but neither he nor Emperor Alexander I stepped down (and Russia, along with its allies, then went on to win the war against Napoleon, even though Kutuzov fell ill and died in 1813).
    2. Alexander I’s successor, Nicholas I, reigned throughout many setbacks in the Crimean War, which began in 1853, including the evacuation from Danubian principalities in 1854, which Austria then occupied, and the successful landing of the anti-Russian alliance’s troops in Crimea that same year. He died in 1855, leaving it to his successor Alexander II to wrap up the conflict that Russia lost.
    3. In 1904–1905, Emperor Nicholas II presided over Russia’s defeat in the Russo‑Japanese War, which the author cites. It is true that the war (and the 1905 revolution) forced Nicholas II to attempt to transform the monarchy and pursue other reforms, but he continued to reign until forced to abdicate in the 1917 revolution (Russia’s losses in WWI did play a role in causing the two-stage revolution).
    4. In 1941, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin remained in power and did not resign despite the Red Army’s catastrophic losses during the first months of the German invasion.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

  • No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

  • No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“The Wars in Ukraine and Iran Are More Alike Than You May Think,” Lara Jakes, The New York Times, 05.27.26.

  • Lara Jakes writes that although Ukraine’s trench warfare and the U.S.–Israeli air‑sea campaign against Iran look different, “similarities between the two conflicts soon became evident,” above all that “in both, the country with the more powerful military has been unable to vanquish its adversary.” Nicole Grajewski told her that “for both Russia and for the United States, there’s a lot of unmet expectations about their military operations,” which she attributes to “the hubris on both sides.”
  • Jakes argues that “asymmetrical tactics have helped both Ukraine and Iran hold off stronger forces,” noting that Iran struck the U.S. “by attacking its allies” with one‑way drones and threats to the Strait of Hormuz, while Ukraine has “assassinated Russian military officials in Moscow,” hit oil facilities and used sea drones to neutralize Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Michael Kofman said the wars show “the advent of mass precision on the battlefield” and that cheap, AI‑enabled drone and sensor networks “will democratize access to mass precision… for middle and small powers.”
  • The article details “similar attack strategies,” including Iran’s Shahed drones first supplied to Russia for use against Ukraine and now launched at Gulf states, and Russian anti‑jamming gear found in an Iranian drone that targeted a British base. Diplomatically, Jakes notes that Tehran’s war has “strained some alliances” and “delayed the Russia‑Ukraine peace process,” even as it helped forge unexpected ties between Kyiv and Gulf monarchies, with Ukraine seeking to “turn this crisis into an opportunity” by trading drone technology for backing and air defenses.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

  • No significant developments.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Ukraine’s latest challenge is how to deal with hope,” The Economist, 05.26.26.

  • The Economist writes that “the front line is stabilizing, Europe is delivering cash and the country is carving out a role as a defense power,” yet “survival alone is not victory.” By conventional metrics “Ukraine should already have lost,” facing an adversary with “4.5 times its population, 28 times its land mass and an economy 12 times bigger,” but commanders now believe “their drone-led forces have found a formula to thwart Vladimir Putin’s ground offensive.” Ukraine is “killing or seriously wounding an average of 35,000 Russian soldiers a month,” aiming for 50,000, while long‑range drones, “95%” domestically designed, are “wreaking havoc” on supply lines and hitting “oil facilities [and] arms factories… more than a thousand kilometers inside Russia,” the article notes.
  • At home, however, “a war fought mostly on Ukrainian soil has hollowed out the rear.” Air defenses are “dangerously thin,” blackouts have cut GDP growth by “an estimated 2.5 percentage points,” and an unpublished survey finds society fracturing into “patriots (46%), the skeptical moderates (36%) and the demotivated (18%),” with demotivation driven less by trauma than by “elite corruption and distrust of institutions,” the author reports. Conscription abuses and scandals “implicated members of the president’s circle,” and insiders complain that Zelensky “doesn’t tolerate strong people” and has built “a cult of loyalty around himself.”
  • Looking ahead, government sources say Zelensky has ordered preparations for “another two to three years of war,” and a senior intelligence source insists, “as crappy as things look, we’ll make it work,” adding, “I have this strange sense… that, I don’t know, God loves Ukraine.” The piece concludes that Ukraine will probably emerge as “a damaged but functioning democracy and a new middle power: poorer, traumatized, but confident in its identity,” provided it can “fight corruption and build democracy” alongside beating Russia.

“How Ukraine Put Russia on the Back Foot in Year 5 of the War,” Benjamin Hart interviewing Michael Kofman, New York Magazine Intelligencer, 05.25.26.

  • Michael Kofman says that the image of the war as “a bit like World War I with trenches plus drones is simply inaccurate.” The side that has the advantage “in both qualitative and quantitative employment of drones,” he argues, “can dictate the initiative and has the ability to displace the drone units and supporting artillery of the other side,” so that “control really shifts not by infantry assaulting… but by one side being able to effectively suppress and displace” the other’s drones and guns.
  • Asked if Russia can make much progress, Kofman replies, “It’s very unlikely,” noting that “so far this year, the Russian military is performing quite a bit worse than last year,” with “the rate of gain… barely half of what it was around this time in 2025.” He says Russian tactics “are simply not capable of generating any kind of operationally significant breakthroughs,” and estimates that Russian losses are “more than” the 350,000 often cited: “my own estimate is over 400,000,” while the “force‑generation engine… is visibly struggling to produce the same numbers it did in 2024 and 2025.”
  • By contrast, Kofman says that “the manpower situation in the Ukrainian military has improved slightly… the force along the front line is no longer shrinking,” and that prepared defenses plus “the growing Ukrainian drone force… present the Russian military with fairly substantial and difficult‑to‑overcome” engagement zones. Ukraine is now “invest[ing] heavily in what folks call ‘middle strike’,” expanding “its footprint steadily over the Russian military’s rear,” and he concludes that “Ukraine is objectively in a better position,” with its situation “not fragile,” which is why “there’s no eagerness to make a deal or sign a cease‑fire under onerous or unreasonable terms,” while “time is increasingly not on Russia’s side in this war.”

“As Ukraine’s fortunes improve, it’s ‘zugzwang’ time for Putin,” George F. Will, Washington Post, 05.29.26. 

  • George F. Will recalls that “15 months ago, in an Oval Office tantrum that will live in infamy, President Donald Trump ordered Ukraine to surrender… ‘You don’t have the cards,’” but says “some tulip. Overrated bulldozer,” as Ukraine forced Putin to scale down Victory Day: “there were fewer men and machines because Moscow now lives with the threat of Ukrainian drones,” and Zelensky “splendid[ly] taunt[ed]” Russia by announcing Ukraine would “permit” the parade by not striking Moscow.
  • Will notes that “so far this year, Russia has captured about 0.04 percent of Ukraine, and in April… experienced a net loss of territory,” while The Economist estimates the war’s human cost at “about 3 percent of Russia’s pre-war population of fighting-age men killed or wounded.” He describes how poorly trained Russian “infiltration groups” must cross a 20‑mile‑deep “kill zone,” and says drones have made 2026 “reminiscent of 1916,” with Russia able to lose “hundreds of its scarcest resource — fighting-age men — in weeks spent seizing patches of land the size of the National Mall.”
  • Fear of “assassination‑by‑drone,” Will writes, has Putin “spending much time in underground bunkers,” as a Ukrainian strike hit “3½ miles from the Kremlin” and “70 percent of Russia’s population is within the 1,200‑mile range of Ukraine’s drones.” Citing an Economist piece, he says Russia is in “negative equilibrium… holding itself together while steadily destroying its own future capacity,” and quotes a former official that the war has reached “zugzwang… when every move worsens the position.”

“Ukraine Turns the Tide: Why a Cease-Fire Is Now a Real Possibility,” Jack Watling, Foreign Affairs, 06.01.26.

  • Jack Watling writes that “the war in Ukraine has reached a turning point,” noting that although spring 2026 looks similar on the surface, “Russian combat performance is waning” and “there is a growing optimism that Ukraine can fight Russia to a cease-fire.” For much of 2024–25, he says, Russia could “recruit more soldiers than it was losing,” while Ukraine’s lines “were getting thinner and thinner every month,” which led Moscow to believe it could “eventually occupy the entirety of the Donbas” and therefore adopt “an intransigent stance in negotiations.” Now, however, “Russia is no longer on an inexorable path to achieving even its minimal military objective,” and “what has long seemed so implausible has become more likely”: convincing Moscow that “a cease-fire is its best option.”
  • Watling argues that “the Ukrainian military has turned the corner in its manpower challenge,” reporting that in early 2026 “there has been a net positive inflow of new personnel into the combat units,” and that corps‑level reforms, longer basic training and better integration of “infantry, uncrewed systems, artillery, and armor” have allowed Ukraine to “maintain a favorable casualty exchange ratio, losing fewer soldiers than the Russians, even when they were on the offensive.” Ukrainian UAV units are now “better able to engage in what the Ukrainian army calls ‘middle strike,’ attacking Russian logistics targets as far as 60 miles from the frontline,” so that “the growing density of Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike systems… limits the combat power that Russia can mass at any point.”
  • At the same time, Watling cautions that “the Russian military still has over 600,000 troops attacking Ukraine and it faces no shortfall of ammunition,” and that Ukrainian units are “more optimistic, but… remain tired,” with “some brigades… consistently underperforming.” He warns that the Kremlin might “escalate and begin a more concerted process of military mobilization,” but notes this is “fraught with political and economic risk at home,” as the central bank already warns of a major labor shortage. He concludes that “Ukraine’s partners must keep applying sufficient pressure on Russia” by continuing to arm Kyiv and sanction Moscow, and that it is “increasingly important that Europe, given Washington’s progressive disengagement, thinks hard about how it can win the fragile peace” if a cease-fire is reached, since a cease-fire is “necessary… but it does not guarantee” Ukraine’s security.

“Ukraine is turning the tables,” Christopher Miller and Max Seddon, Financial Times, 05.28.26.

  • The authors report that Zelenskyy declares that “this month saw changes in the dynamics in our favor,” adding that Ukraine’s long-range hits on Russia are “especially significant.” In addition, Defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov says that some “35,000 Russians had been ‘killed or severely wounded’ in both April and March,” while Kyiv estimates Russia enlists 29,500 soldiers a month, meaning “for five straight months its foe has lost more personnel than it can mobilize,” according to this FT article. Robert Brovdi states that “the Ukrainian army is exhausting the Russians.” 
  • Backed by “some €90bn in EU loans,” the defense ministry reports reconnaissance‑drone output up 441 percent on all of 2025 and mid‑strike drones up 312 percent, according to FT.
  • Black Bird Group data show Russia’s gains were “a mere 94 sq km, one of the lowest totals of the past two years; in February it lost ground,” according to FT.
  • Leading European military analyst Franz‑Stefan Gady judges that “Ukraine is arguably in a better military position in May 2026 than it was in May 2025.” Zelenskyy’s claim citied in FT that Ukraine has turned the tables on Russia with increased reachability of Russian targets for Ukrainian drones appears to be on shaky ground. FT’s own graph shows Ukraine conducted about 2,000 air/drone strikes in a recent month, while Russia conducted almost twice as many of these air/drone strikes that same month.

“With a stalemate in Ukraine and discontent at home, Putin seems ready to escalate his war,” AP/PBS, 05.29.26.

  • The article argues that “facing a battlefield stalemate in Ukraine and growing war fatigue among Russians, President Vladimir Putin appears ready to try to change the narrative,” noting that Moscow has warned of “consistent and systematic” missile strikes on Kyiv and urged foreign embassies to evacuate. Massive nuclear‑force drills and “belligerent statements… warning Kyiv’s European allies about possible retaliation” underscore that Putin “looks likely to sharply escalate” aerial attacks to “shore up his sagging domestic approval ratings” and convince Russians “that Moscow is winning the war, now in its fifth year,” the author writes.
  • On the battlefield, Russia’s advances “have ground to a near halt,” while Ukraine “has launched successful counterstrikes and reclaimed some ground.” The Institute for the Study of War says “the character of the war is shifting in favor of Ukrainian forces,” as Russia’s “rates of advances are stagnating” and Ukraine employs “novel tactics and operational concepts.” At the same time, Kyiv has “significantly expanded its long-range strikes on Russian energy facilities and arms factories,” with a major drone attack on Moscow’s suburbs showing that “even the densely protected capital isn’t fully immune,” shattering Kremlin efforts to keep the war distant.
  • The piece highlights that the Iran war has “put U.S. mediation efforts in Ukraine on hold and drained American missile arsenals,” delaying Patriot deliveries that “Ukraine desperately needs to fend off Russian attacks.” Russian officials are threatening NATO members, publishing a list of European drone‑related facilities and warning the Baltics that “their NATO membership won’t protect them,” prompting allies to denounce Moscow’s claims but leading Russia’s envoy to the OSCE to say “we are actually very, very close to direct military confrontation.”

“Ukraine turns real-life kills into video game thrills for drone pilots,” David L. Stern, The Washington Post, 05.31.26.

  • David Stern reports that Ukraine’s “Army of Drones Bonus system, or ePoints,” is a government-run competition in which frontline drone units “earn points for each Russian soldier they incapacitate or kill and each weapon, vehicle or piece of military equipment they destroy,” with points redeemed “for more drones, with which to target more Russian forces.” “The program’s philosophy is simple,” Andrii Hrytseniuk of the Brave1 agency says: “The more you destroy, the more you receive.”
  • In April, Ukrainian drones “incapacitated or killed more than 35,200 Russian troops,” Stern writes, the fifth straight month in which “Moscow lost more troops than it can mobilize,” according to Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. Zelensky has set an “optimal level” of Russian losses at “about 50,000 per month,” saying this would “ensure a level of destruction [that would] exceed the number of reinforcements they can send,” and that this “can be achieved. First and foremost, through drones, unquestionably, of all types.”
  • Analysts say the kill‑zone between the lines has widened to “18 to 24 miles,” with Michael Kofman noting that at the tactical level drone capabilities are at “relative parity” and that “most of the fight is not between infantry… It is about the drone units of one side… being able to displace the drone units of the other side.” He cautions that “just killing Russian infantry… won’t be enough to win the war,” arguing Ukraine must “restore superiority in drone employment… and most importantly expand strikes to control operational depth.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Military aid to Ukraine:

  • No significant developments.

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

“What are the reasons behind Trump’s Iran policy? I’m answering your questions,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 06.01.26.

  • Q: How can I best support the troops in Ukraine until we have a change in the administration?
    • David Ignatius: There are some wonderful charities doing courageous work in Ukraine. I have toured hospitals where Ukrainian amputees are learning to walk, thanks to the Howard G. Buffett Foundation. A friend's daughter works for an NGO that provides counseling to families who have lost fathers, mothers or children to this war. The Ukrainian embassy here in D.C. would be a good starting point to ask about NGOs that are active in Ukraine. In terms of U.S. support for Ukrainian troops, I guess the most important thing is to support R and D candidates in the midterms who share your view that the U.S. should help Ukraine defend itself against this illegal invasion.
  • Q: How vulnerable might Kaliningrad be if NATO wanted to get nasty? (I wish!) It seems to me that Europe has leverage if it wants to use it.
    • David Ignatius: Well, striking Kaliningrad would certainly be a way to flip the script on Vlad. One path would be to emulate Putin and start with a little "hybrid" pressure there. But… to be clear, this war needs de-escalation, not escalation. So I would hold off on encouraging World War III.
  • Q: How will Putin take advantage of Trump's showy withdrawal of troops from Europe and his historic debacle in the Gulf? Does he move to create a corridor to Kalingrad? Take the next steps for real incursions into the Baltics?
    • David Ignatius: Unfortunately, you can already see Putin trying to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" presented by Trump's squabbles with Europe and NATO. Accident or not, last Friday's Russian drone attack on a city in Romania—a NATO member—shows that Putin is flirting with the "red lines." I fear that Putin might take an action, in Kaliningrad, say, to open a line of support to that Russian enclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania—that would test NATO's Article 5 commitment. U.S. officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio say the right things about how the U.S. still stands behind its Article 5 commitment to defend NATO nations, but do Europeans (or Russians!) believe them?
  • Q: There have been several recent incidents of Ukrainian drones being shot down in the Baltic states crossing into their airspace. Ukraine says that the cause is Russia “reprogramming” their drones’ navigation while in flight, causing them to deviate into EU airspace. Is that technically possible.
    • David Ignatius: I have no idea whether this has happened. I'm dubious, frankly. But it is certainly technically possible to insert code or malware into systems at a distance, using lasers and high-powered microwaves.
  • Q: Putin cobbled together an oligarch class that has effectively run Russia for Putin for decades (give or take). Any intel on which of these might either break with Putin or seek to replace him? It may be too early, and too much wishful thinking, to realistically contemplate a Putin replacement but, Russian history being what it is, his "successor" is likely to be from this oligarch class, or from its sub-class: The Siloviki (like the president of Rosneft, Sechin, for example). Or we could be more cynical, and ask which of Xi's henchmen might become a kind of "governor" of Russia. (Kidding!)
    • David Ignatius: Russians are getting fed up with Putin's war. You can see that in public comments—and even public opinion polls from the Levada Center and other sources. And Putin himself looks physically exhausted, like a deflated tire, someone said recently. I don't see any organized challenge, but there's certainly a lot of fraying around the edges. What would come after Putin? Very possibly something worse. You would likely see regional warlords, even more corruption, and a defeated, dispirited army (that includes many former convicts, the worst of the worst). China would have greater leverage (I have described Xi as a future de-facto president of Eurasia) but I doubt the Chinese would want to get involved in cleaning up the mess of post-war Russia. That's why Xi, if he's as smart as everyone says, should be easing Putin toward a settlement in Ukraine now, before things get worse.
  • Q: What is the current state of play in the Ukraine? Are the summer months likely to improve either side’s momentum?
    • David Ignatius: Stalemate is the current situation. Ukraine hopes for advances this summer; Putin threatens savage "strategic" bombing of Kyiv and other cities. We shall see…

“Trump Hits the Stalemate Phase of His International Interventions, and It Stings,” David E. Sanger, The New York Times, 05.31.26.

  • David Sanger writes that in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran, “President Trump’s early declarations of easy wins have given way to harsh reality,” noting that he “famously boasted he would end” the Ukraine war “in 24 hours after taking office” but “16 months after he was sworn in, he rarely mentions the war anymore.” Trump told the Times in January, “I’ve had cases where I had Putin all done and Zelensky wouldn’t make the deal, which shocked me… I think now they both want to make a deal, but we’ll find out,” yet Sanger notes that “repeatedly it has fallen through.”
  • Today, Sanger reports, “the Ukrainians feel more empowered,” as “their long-range drones and homemade missiles are reaching deep into Russian territory,” and Britain’s Anne Keast‑Butler said “nearly half a million Russian soldiers had been killed in a conflict that Mr. Putin thought would be over in weeks.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio now sounds as if “he had given up on moving either side to a peace accord anytime soon,” saying, “the U.S. stands ready… to help facilitate the end of this war… hopefully the opportunity will present itself.”
  • Thomas Graham argues that “this conflict is ripe for conclusion,” saying “the mood has changed in Moscow” and that “the Ukrainians have frozen the front line,” but warns that “you have to have a negotiating process, and that is still missing,” since the administration has relied too much on “episodic phone calls or visits of special envoys… without the day-to-day engagement of traditional diplomacy to keep talks moving.”

“Selling Peace to Ukrainians, Russians,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 05.29.26.

  • “[R]obust support for peace talks and, more importantly, the absence of signs of triumph in the war that is already longer than the Soviets’ war against Nazi Germany in 1941–1945, can, perhaps, help explain why we have recently begun to hear suggestions from inside the Kremlin walls, as well as outside them, on how to convince common Russians to accept a perhaps not-so-distant end to the war as a victory, even if that end would not feature a clear Russian military triumph.”
  • “One such ‘sales pitch’ was reportedly made by members of Vladimir Putin’s administration, (of which, by the way, Medinsky is a member) in February 2026. It took the form of a presentation shown to deputy head of the presidential administration Sergei Kiriyenko, and said, ‘One must know when to stop. Overreach means defeat; continuing the SVO [special military operation] would amount to a Pyrrhic victory,’ according to staff of exiled Russian opposition investigative outlet Dossier Center, who saw the document.”
  • “The presentation ponders how to ‘sell’ the end of the war to the public once (and if) Russian forces capture the rest of Donbas, according to Dossier … Soon after the revelation of that presentation by Dossier, Kremlin-connected Russian commentator Aleksey Chadaev and pro-Kremlin ex-Ukrainian MP Oleg Tsarev weighed in with posts that appeared to play down the need for a military triumph over Ukraine, offering their own versions of what could constitute a victory.”
  • “Interestingly, the Russian side has not been alone in pondering whether and how the end of hostilities can be sold to the public. In conversation with students of the Serhiy Nyzhny Kyiv School of Government posted on YouTube in early May, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces and current ambassador to the U.K., offered his views on this subject.”
  • “Zaluzhnyi—who has led some of the recent Ukrainian polls on potential candidates for the next president of Ukraine—further explored what could be publicly framed as a victory even as a military triumph remains unattainable in his May 22 commentary for Ukraine’s NV.ua outlet. The general wrote: ‘such a war for survival on one side, and the imposition of achieving the goal of this war of destruction at the cost of enormous losses on the other, poses a threat to the existence of both Ukraine and Russia... This is a war of attrition, where survival means victory.’”
  • “That peace would have to be sold to respective publics follows from recent opinion polls that show while a majority of Ukrainians and Russians support talks on peace, they disagree on the conditions for it, with Donbas being the biggest apple of discord. … The chances that their visions of this end can be reconciled in ways both men [Zelenskyy and Putin] can sell to their compatriots as a victory are slim, but not non-existent. Perhaps these chances could be increased if, given that the U.S. mediation of the conflict has stalled, EU mediators join the negotiating process under the leadership of someone who, unlike the current American mediators, is well versed in dealing with heads of state.”

“Vladimir Putin’s remarks at press Q&A in Kazakhstan,” Kremlin.ru, 06.21.26.

  • Asked about the state of talks on Ukraine, Putin said negotiations are merely “put on pause”: “contacts… remain, but negotiations as such do not exist,” while insisting that “we are ready for this, we have never refused negotiations… we did not stop them, we are ready for their resumption.” On Western claims they are preparing for war with Russia, he called it “rubbish,” saying it is “a lie, a gross, brazen lie” and that “Russia has never had any aggressive intentions towards European countries.”
  • Responding to Lithuania’s foreign minister saying NATO could “level” Russian air‑defense bases in Kaliningrad, Putin replied that “the Russian Federation has all the means to level to the ground everyone who tries to do this.” Asked about reports of Ukrainian operators in Latvia, he warned that “all places from which there is a direct threat, I want to stress, a direct military threat to Russia, are legitimate targets.”

“Systematic strikes on Kyiv must force Ukraine to end the war on our terms,” Dmitri Trenin interview, Russian International Affairs Council/Monocle, 05.29.26. Clues from Russian Views. (RIAC is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Dmitri Trenin says the foreign ministry’s statement means “a transition to ‘systematic’ strikes against the enemy,” which “apparently signifies the determination and readiness to intensify military actions on our side,” including “strikes on targets that previously, for various reasons, were not hit,” and “increased frequency of strikes and greater effectiveness of the weapons used.” But “the main thing,” he argues, is “the setting of the strategic goal: compelling the enemy to end the war on Russian terms. Systematic strikes of the necessary intensity should help achieve this goal,” and “in conditions when advance ‘on the ground’ is extremely difficult, the conditional ‘air’ strategy becomes the main one, and the ground strategy auxiliary.”
  • On reactions to such strikes, he predicts Europe’s will be “externally indifferent, but 100 percent pro‑Ukrainian,” adding that if people die “this can be used to strengthen anti‑Russian hysteria — cynical but rational.” China’s response will be “detached,” he believes, while the United States will “publicly oppose the strikes, but is unlikely to become particularly indignant,” and “if Russia can force Kyiv to peace on its terms, the United States will declare that this peace is the result of Trump’s efforts.”

“Cast-Iron Prose of Reality,” Vasily Kashin, Russia in Global Affairs, 06.21.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Vasily Kashin writes that “attempts by the Russian leadership to end the conflict on the basis of the Anchorage agreements between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump are a serious negotiating effort aimed at a real result, which can be considered the best of the possible.” He insists that “it is in our interests to achieve this result sooner,” while adding that “there can be no question of making concessions on the fundamental aspects of these agreements,” and argues that such a settlement “quite counts as a major victory of Russian arms.”
  • According to Kashin, the goal of “liquidating the anti-Russian regime in Ukraine at the current stage is in principle unattainable without full military occupation of the entire country (including the western part) for a long period,” which “is technically impossible for Russia.” Therefore, he contends, this objective “is not achievable within the framework of the special military operation and should not be mentioned.” In contrast, “The securing of territories for Russia under the terms of the Anchorage agreements—combined with a prohibition on Ukraine joining military blocs or hosting foreign troops on its territory, as well as certain restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces—would, in this scenario, constitute a favorable outcome for us and a complete military victory.”
  • On escalation, Kashin writes that a nuclear option or non-nuclear strikes on Europe “should be considered only as a variant of ending the war, and not of achieving expanded (compared to Anchorage) political goals,” arguing that “the likely result of a Ukrainian nuclear crisis is a freeze of hostilities along the front line – that is, a result that can be obtained already now without nuclear risk.”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“Europe Is Starting to Think Putin Will Expand the War Beyond Ukraine,” Yaroslav Trofimov, The Wall Street Journal, 05.26.26.

  • Trofimov reports that “Russia is stuck on the Ukrainian battlefield and lashing out with massive strikes on Kyiv,” while in Europe “the growing fear… is that President Vladimir Putin will try next to reshuffle the cards by expanding the conflict to Europe.” Sweden’s defense minister Pål Jonson says “we see a greater inclination from the Russian side to take greater operational risks… moving up also to kinetic elements,” and warns “we need to be focused on strengthening our ability to deter and defend against the Russians.”
  • Western estimates cited by the author say Russian forces are losing “nearly 35,000 soldiers a month, more than the Kremlin can recruit,” making the current war “untenable without resorting to forced mobilization.” EU foreign‑policy chief Kaja Kallas argues that “if you just mobilize for this war, then you would send a signal that you are not really winning,” so “there comes the point where they need to escalate… vertically, by increasing the intensity of violence… [or] horizontally, by expanding the geography of the conflict,” as Oleksandr Danylyuk puts it.
  • Trofimov notes that Russia has already conducted “snap nuclear exercises” with warheads in Belarus and threatens “systemic” bombardment of Kyiv, while its rhetoric paints the EU as “the implacable enemy that must be punished or destroyed.” EU commissioner Michael McGrath says “ultimately, their aim is to destroy the European Union,” and German lawmaker Norbert Röttgen cautions that, despite the huge risks of attacking NATO, “we also have to calculate that Putin behaves irrationally and in an escalatory way.”

“The Coming Crisis of NATO Deterrence: Nuclear Guarantees Cannot Replace U.S. Forces in Europe,” Celeste A. Wallander, Foreign Affairs, 05.28.26.

  • Celeste A. Wallander argues that President Trump is “making a dangerous bet in Europe,” noting that Washington has canceled a long‑range precision‑strike battalion to Germany, withdrawn “some 5,000 troops,” and curtailed rotational combat teams to Poland and Romania while promising that “the nuclear umbrella” will suffice. This, she writes, “is strategically dangerous, eroding the foundations of the deterrence that has protected the transatlantic alliance for decades.”
  • In her view, Russia “could be tempted to seize territory in the Baltics or Poland… and dare NATO to escalate, knowing that its doctrine permits limited nuclear strikes against even conventional forces that threaten newly held territory.” Unless Washington remains “central to thwarting Russia’s war plans from the opening hours of any attack,” she argues, “Moscow will see the weaknesses in NATO’s escalation ladder” and U.S. leaders may one day face a stark choice: “concede Russian gains or leap to the nuclear rung,” a “historic strategic dilemma of its own making.”

“What’s Up With Trump and NATO?,” The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, 05.29.26.

  • The editors say a Russian drone strike in Romania shows “the Kremlin is probing to test NATO’s response,” which makes it “all the more puzzling that President Trump is sending confusing signals about America’s commitment to the defense of Europe.” Pentagon officials are “floating a one-third to one-half reduction of available military assets in a war, including strategic bombers and ships,” a move they argue “amounts to a rewrite of American strategy in Europe, without leveling with the public about the risks and costs to U.S. security.”
  • They ask, “If the U.S. is cutting down on conventional forces ready to surge in a crisis, is Mr. Trump prepared to lean more heavily on the U.S. nuclear deterrent?” and question “why pare back strategic bombers, a unique American capability,” warning that “Europeans… increasingly think the U.S. isn’t an honest broker.”
  • The board insists that “the composition of American military forces in Europe shouldn’t be based on score settling,” but on “threats to peace and freedom… growing as Mr. Putin tests NATO’s will,” and concludes that if Trump has “a different risk assessment, Congress, our allies and the U.S. public deserve to hear it.”

“Peace in Times of War,” Dmitri Trenin, Russian International Affairs Council, 05.27.26. Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

  • Dmitriy Trenin argues that “the ‘war or peace’ dilemma is false under current circumstances,” saying that if war is understood only as armed conflict “it will likely come to an end within the foreseeable future,” but that “even then… there will be no genuine lasting peace.” Instead, “the confrontation with the West will continue across multiple spheres and in many different forms” and “will be a prolonged one,” requiring “long-term goal-setting and a carefully planned strategy for achieving those goals,” he writes.
  • He says Russia’s “principal objective should be to build the Russian ‘civilizational state’ that we have proclaimed but have yet to define,” a project aimed at “shaping a society grounded in civic solidarity and on foundational core values… faith, freedom, family, and justice.” Such a project “cannot be left to the elites alone,” since “the elites themselves are in need of renewal,” and only when this idea “truly becomes national in character” can it transform Russia so that the special military operation becomes “a prologue to a profound transformation of both the state and the people,” Trenin contends.
  • Trenin warns that “our adversary—the West’s ‘globalist elites’… is not pursuing compromise, but the total defeat of Russia,” aiming “not ‘regime change,’ but the destruction of our country as a major independent power in the world.” After three generations raised under “strategic stability based on mutual nuclear deterrence,” he concludes that “the very paradigm of security has become obsolete”: Russia now faces “war in peacetime or peace in wartime—this is the new, unsettling reality,” and “there is no going back for Russia, for going back only means to fall.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“How to Understand the China-Russia Axis,” Jing Ge, The National Interest, 05.27.26.

  • Jing Ge argues that Putin’s May visit to Beijing “signals something more durable and potentially harder to counter: a China-Russia axis that is becoming institutional, operational, and normative.” She writes that although Beijing and Moscow “do not” agree on everything, they are building “enough institutional depth, operational habits, economic insulation, technological interfaces, and shared political language to coordinate even when their interests are not identical,” creating “a long-term strategic framework” that may function less as a formal alliance and more as “an operating system for coordination against US power across multiple domains.”
  • Institutionally, she notes that 2026 marks the 30th anniversary of their “Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the 21st Century” and the 25th of the Treaty of Good‑Neighborliness, and that the new joint statement describes the relationship as at “the highest level in its history” with “internal momentum largely insulated from external pressures.” Operationally, she says they are moving beyond symbolism to “joint exercises… joint maritime and aerial patrols,” all‑domain security cooperation (from counterterrorism to anti–money laundering), and economic ties that focus on “resisting sanctions, reducing exposure to Western‑controlled systems, and protecting supply-chain security,” with energy remaining “the central pillar.”
  • Technologically and normatively, Ge writes that Beijing and Moscow are “building the foundations of a non‑Western technology and governance ecosystem,” cooperating on “digital economy, AI… satellite navigation,” and space projects linking BeiDou and GLONASS, while promoting AI rules that emphasize “sovereignty, state‑led cooperation, and political control.” She says they are fusing grievances over Taiwan, Ukraine, sanctions, and international justice into “one broader narrative about Western coercion,” aiming “to redefine the meaning of sovereignty in ways that insulate authoritarian regimes from external pressure,” and concludes that Washington must “limit China‑Russia coordination capacity” in key sectors, offer alternatives in Eurasian logistics and tech standards, and treat Taiwan, Ukraine, space, AI, and nuclear stability as “connected parts of the same strategic environment.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Counterterrorism:

“Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2026,” Alexander Palmer et al., CSIS, 05.26.26.

  • The authors conclude that “the United States faces an increasingly complex and unpredictable terrorism landscape,” with “no clear paramount threat” but instead “a variety of formal groups, loose networks, and lone actors” that can harm U.S. interests. They warn that as Washington “reduces its investment in counterterrorism as other priorities come to the fore,” the threat “is increasingly unpredictable,” and “could deteriorate significantly” if African jihadist groups turn outward or “a high-profile partisan assassination occurs in the United States, prompting a cycle of retaliation.”
  • At home, they find terrorism “far less prevalent than in other regions,” but note that incidents and fatalities in 2025 rose to “40 attacks and 31 deaths.” The report says “anti-government extremism is the most common motivation,” driven by more left‑wing attacks on immigration authorities, while “partisan extremism… will likely remain a feature of U.S. politics,” and jihadist attacks, though rare, are “disproportionately lethal,” as shown by the Bourbon Street bombing that killed 14 people.
  • Globally, the assessment highlights that “terrorism in Africa poses the greatest uncertainty,” with al Shabaab and JNIM “threatening the survival of governments” and Islamic State affiliates gaining capacity, including “rapid advances in armed drone use.” It stresses that “degradation is not defeat” because groups “repeatedly brought to the brink of defeat have resurged,” and warns that cuts and politicization in the FBI, CIA, and prevention programs are “increasing the risk of missed warnings and undetected plots,” raising “the probability of surprise and a reduced capacity to prevent it.”

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“In the disinformation war, the U.S. unilaterally disarmed,” Jim Geraghty, Washington Post, 05.27.26.

  • Jim Geraghty notes that “the Russian government’s draft budget for 2026 allocated $1.77 billion for propaganda efforts,” while a U.S. report finds that China “spends billions of dollars annually on foreign information manipulation efforts,” and a think tank “put the figure at $10 billion,” the author writes. Even Iran, he adds, “spent an estimated $600 million on propaganda” in one year, including “pro-Iranian—and often virulently antisemitic—music videos” whose creator told the BBC that “the Iranian government is a ‘customer’ of his,” Geraghty reports.
  • By contrast, Geraghty argues, “the answer is: not much” when asking what Washington is doing in response. He writes that “upon taking office, the Trump administration closed the Global Engagement Center,” with Marco Rubio claiming it had “spent millions of dollars to actively silence and censor the voices of Americans,” and that “the United States isn’t in the business of monitoring and rebutting foreign propaganda and disinformation anymore,” while “Voice of America has been gutted and is operating on a skeleton staff,” the author contends.
  • In Europe, a Polish cybersecurity official tells him, “It is more than just ‘fake news’… It is a systematic effort to change how people perceive things and understand the world. Russia has been pushing further along the intensity axis. Polarization always works best; divide and conquer.” Yet when they report content, “often the response is nothing,” especially from Telegram, whose infrastructure is tied to firms with “highly sensitive clients tied to [Russian] security services,” including “the FSB intelligence agency,” Geraghty writes, concluding that while adversaries spend billions on information war, “apparently, to the Trump administration, it isn’t worth the cost.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“So far it looks like the market is in a fragile, nervous, but real balance,” Sergei Vakulenko, EchoFM/Facebook post, 05.28.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

  • Sergei Vakulenko writes that “there is no dispute, Ukraine is now powerfully and purposefully hitting Russian oil refining,” but “judging by what is happening on the markets, there is a sense of impending shortage in the air, yet there is no noticeable deficit of any fuels.” “So far it looks like the market is in a fragile, nervous, but [real] balance,” he argues, noting that the prewar gasoline surplus was “10–15% per year” and “now, apparently, there is no surplus.”
  • He suggests that part of the reduction in throughput “was caused by the government asking oil companies to carry out refinery maintenance early… in the hope that in the first summer months they would produce and stockpile more fuel for the August peak,” but that recent Ukrainian attacks “hit storage at refineries, so part of what was stockpiled… burned, and tank‑farm capacity also decreased,” meaning that “there will clearly be problems with producing and stockpiling in advance.”
  • On current consumption, Vakulenko says that “all the symptoms are that there are no excesses of gasoline on the market and sales are going ‘off the wheels’, but there is also no deficit,” stressing that “there are no reports similar to those last summer,” which “you can’t hide by censorship.” Claims that Russian gasoline output is now “30–40% of normal,” he concludes, are “clearly and shamelessly lying… either the fruit of a fevered imagination… or deliberate lies.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

  • No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Putin could pay a personal price for failure in Ukraine,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 06.01.26.

  • “Russia has now been fighting in Ukraine for longer than the Soviet Union fought Germany in the second world war. It has still failed to conquer the whole of the Donbas and, in April, the Russians actually lost territory,” Rachman writes.
  • According to Rachman, “This dire situation is now producing visible signs of dissent within the Russian elite, including some openly questioning the war.”
  • Rachman writes, “Russian history suggests Putin should be worried—not just about the progress of the war but about his own position. Russian military setbacks have often led to radical changes of political direction in Moscow. 
    • Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 contributed to popular unrest and moves towards a constitutional monarchy. Failure in the first world war formed the backdrop to the Russian Revolution. 
    • The removal of Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the Soviet Union in 1964 was closely related to his perceived failure in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
    • The endless Afghanistan war was an important part of the malaise that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
  • “A split within the Russian elite still seems the most likely way of getting rid of Putin,” Rachman writes. But “The obstacles to his removal remain formidable,” he admits. Defeat in a conflict didn’t always lead to removal of the Russian commander or leader in that conflict. For instance,”
  • In 1812, commander‑in‑chief of the Russian forces Mikhail Kutuzov ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops after the Battle of Borodino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow, but neither he nor Emperor Alexander I stepped down (and Russia, along with its allies, then went to win the war against Napoleon even though Kutuzov fell ill and died in April 1813).
  • Emperor Nicholas I remained on the throne despite setbacks in the Crimean War, which began in 1853. He died in 1855, leaving it to his successor to wrap up the conflict that Russia lost.
  • In 1905–1907, Emperor Nicholas II presided over Russia’s defeat in the Russo‑Japanese War, which the author cites,  but he did not resign after that defeat. Rather he continued to reign until forced to abdicate in the 1917 revolution (Russia’s losses in WWI did play a role in causing the 2-stage revolution).
  • Soviet leader Joseph Stalin remained in power and did not resign despite the Red Army’s disastrous performance in the Winter War of 1939 against Finland, and catastrophic losses during the first five months of the Third Reich’s invasion of 1941.

“Putin is cornered and lashing out,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 05.29.26.

  • The editors argue that “as the fifth year of the Ukraine war grinds on, the besieged nation is slowly gaining the upper hand,” making Putin “more unpredictable and dangerous.” They note that a suspected Russian drone hitting an apartment block in Galati, Romania, was “the 28th time Russian drones have breached Romanian airspace,” and quote Dmitry Medvedev warning that “this will continue to happen” and that E.U. citizens “will not be able to sleep peacefully.”
  • But this “boasting is a sign of weakness,” they contend, citing British estimates that “nearly half a million Russian soldiers had been killed,” that Russian forces “suffered a net loss of territory in April for the first time since 2024,” and that Ukrainian strikes are “reaching ever deeper into Russia, striking targets in Moscow this month.” They highlight Putin’s new law authorizing deployments to “protect” Russians abroad and satellites maneuvering near Western assets as “bluster meant to intimidate.”
  • The board criticizes Washington’s timing, noting that a Pentagon envoy told NATO allies the United States plans to “sharply cut the forces it commits to the alliance in a crisis” and to prioritize those who “move fastest to fill the gaps.” “The moment a cornered Putin is hurling drones into NATO territory and menacing Western satellites is an awful time to negotiate burden sharing,” they write, warning that “whatever Washington intends, the Kremlin will read a shrinking American commitment as the alliance flinching,” which “will invite even more reckless behavior from Putin.”

“Russia Finance Officials Tell Putin War Spending Is Unaffordable,” Bloomberg News, 06.01.26.

  • Bloomberg reports that senior officials in Russia’s Finance Ministry and central bank have warned Putin that current war spending is “on an unaffordable path,” advising that projected defense outlays risk the deficit “widening dangerously.” They have “proposed new cuts to defense spending,” arguing that “it will be difficult to mend the country’s stretched public finances without finding further efficiencies,” while the Defense Ministry is resisting and “demanding additional funding,” citing a shortfall “as high as three trillion rubles” this year.
  • The article says the 2026 budget was drafted on the assumption that war would end after last August’s Anchorage summit, but “earlier hopes for a deal to end the war haven’t materialized.” Russia is now “teetering on recession,” with the Economy Ministry cutting its 2026 growth forecast to 0.4 percent, official data showing the economy “contracted in the first quarter for the first time in three years,” and the budget gap for January–April hitting 5.9 trillion rubles—“about 50% above the full-year plan.”
  • Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Kommersant that “a certain restraint” is needed, warning that “reserves are not endless” and that “weakness in finances cannot be tolerated in the context of such large-scale transformations in the world,” and insisting “we need to improve the efficiency of budget expenditures.” A senior lawmaker, Valery Gartung, evoked 1992 hyperinflation: “What are we going to do about it? Print money or what? … We understand that’s not the solution.”

See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

  •  No significant developments.
  • See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

  • No significant developments.

     

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

  • No significant developments.

Ukraine:

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject: 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“A former U.S. ally is slipping into Iran’s orbit,” Editorial Board, Washington Post, 05.26.26.

  • The author warns that “the United States’ once-stalwart ally in the region, Georgia, is increasingly turning anti-American,” noting that the Georgian Dream government “has for years openly played footsie with Russia at the expense of its Western ties” and “has also been cultivating ties with Iran.” Citing a Hudson Institute report, the piece says Tbilisi has allowed Tehran to build “a network of religious schools, youth organizations, charitable fronts and media outlets” targeting Shiite minorities, while Al-Mustafa International University—“designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2020 as a recruitment pipeline for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”—runs “three campuses in Georgia.”
  • The article highlights that the Ahl al‑Bayt World Assembly has declared Georgia its strategic “base” for Caucasus operations, and that Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze “traveled to Tehran twice in 2024 and was photographed alongside the late Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.” It links this “flirtation” to concrete plots: a Georgian national recruited by the Quds Force “to assassinate a Jewish leader in Baku,” another sentenced in the United States for an IRGC assassination plot against Masih Alinejad, and a Georgian of Azerbaijani origin arrested in Crete “on suspicion of espionage.”
  • As Washington pursues a Caucasus peace corridor, the author asks “why would the Trump administration boost the increasingly authoritarian Georgian government without first seeing meaningful changes,” arguing that Tbilisi must “releas[e] political prisoners, restor[e] civil liberties and end[] its crackdown on pro‑Western civil society,” and “dismantl[e] dangerous pro‑Iranian networks.” “Without that,” the piece concludes, “there’s no reason for Washington to treat Georgia as an ally in waiting. Right now it looks more like a country aligned with America’s adversaries.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: A Ukrainian drone pilot, who uses the call-sign Tarik in line with Ukrainian military regulations, flies a FPV drone during a military exercises in Gotland, Sweden, Sunday, May 10, 2026. ADDITION: adds info that Tarik is the call-sign name (AP Photo/Emma Burrows)

Sections

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  1. 3 Ideas to Explore
  2. I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
    1. Nuclear security and safety:
    2. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
    3. Iran and its nuclear program:
    4. Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
    5. Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
    6. Military aid to Ukraine:
    7. Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
    8. Ukraine-related negotiations: 
    9. Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
    10. China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
    11. Missile defense:
    12. Nuclear arms:
    13. Counterterrorism:
    14. Conflict in Syria:
    15. Cyber security/AI: 
    16. Energy exports from CIS:
    17. Climate change:
    18. U.S.-Russian economic ties:
    19. U.S.-Russian relations in general:
  3. II. Russia’s domestic policies 
    1. Domestic politics, economy and energy:
    2. Defense and aerospace:
    3. Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:
  4. III. Russia’s relations with other countries
    1. Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
    2. Ukraine:
    3. Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

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