This Week’s Highlights

• Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the World Economic Forum in Davos that “movement towards negotiations on peace” in Ukraine need to begin in “the next two months.” In these talks, Ukraine’s neutrality should still be “an ultimate objective,” TASS quoted Kissinger as saying May 23. The WEF quoted him as saying that the world is “facing a situation now where Russia could alienate itself completely from Europe and seek a permanent alliance elsewhere.” 
• CFR’s Charles Kupchan argues that “it’s time for the Atlantic democracies to turn their focus to bringing the war to an end. “The West needs to begin looking beyond the war to salvage a relationship with Russia that keeps the door open to a modicum of collaboration,” according to Kupchan.
• China’s ex-ambassador to Ukraine Gao Yusheng has offered his take on Russia’s war against Ukraine, concluding that “[t]he failure of the Russian blitzkrieg and the failure to achieve a quick victory signaled the beginning of the Russian defeat.” “Russia’s political, economic, military and diplomatic power will be significantly weakened and isolated,” according to the former diplomat. 
• RAND’s Dara Massicot examines the Russian war machine’s culture of indifference to its personnel, arguing that it “fundamentally compromises the Russian military’s efficacy.” Meanwhile, Tel Aviv University’s Lucian Staiano-Daniels drills down how “offering nothing to its soldiers but contempt, the Russian army has created an atrocity factory.” 
• Harold Chambers, a political and security analyst, has examined the conduct of Chechen units, known as “kadyrovtsy” for their loyalty to Ramzan Kadyrov, in the war against Ukraine, concluding that they are “unsuccessful when acting as a conventional military force rather than as a counterinsurgency force.”
• The Washington Post’s editorial board accuses Vladimir Putin of starving millions by blockading shipments of grain from Ukraine via the Black Sea. “Mr. Putin’s war is on the verge of becoming Mr. Putin’s global famine,” the WaPo board writes.
• FT reporters have explored whether the Kremlin can be made to pay for Ukraine, concluding that while international law recognizes that the assets of convicted war criminals can be seized in reparations to their victim, the assets, which have been seized from Russia in the course of war, remain the property of Moscow under U.S. law.

NB: The next Russia Analytical Report will appear on Monday, June 6 due to the U.S. Memorial Day holiday.

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Putin is starving millions of people around the world,” Editorial Board, WP, 05.22.22. The Washington Post’s editorial board writes:

• “Ukraine is the breadbasket for much of the Middle East and North Africa. Right now, Mr. Putin is preventing Ukrainian grain from leaving the port of Odessa and along other key Black Sea routes. The result is dire: Global food prices are at an all-time high, and 276 million people are now food insecure — more than double the numbers from 2019.”
• “It turns out not only is Mr. Putin blockading shipments on the Black Sea, he has even had Russian ships steal Ukrainian grain and try to sell it, according to CNN. Many nations refused to buy the pilfered goods, but it appears the grain ended up in Syria.”
• “With 20 million metric tons of grain and corn just sitting in storage at Ukrainian ports right now, there’s only so much the rest of the world can do. Mr. Putin’s war is on the verge of becoming Mr. Putin’s global famine.”

“A Crime in Search of a Court: How to Hold Russia Accountable,” Oona A. Hathaway, FA, 05.19.22. The author, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, writes:

• “International institutions and an unprecedented coalition of states have taken early steps toward holding Russia accountable for war crimes [in Ukraine]. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has launched an investigation, and it is already sending officials to Ukraine to gather evidence. But when it comes to prosecuting those most responsible for the most notorious crime—waging an aggressive war—there are no international venues for doing so.”
• “While the United States has had a turbulent relationship with the ICC, championing a new, narrowly focused court would allow the United States to reclaim the role it played at the close of World War II, when it emerged as a leading advocate of international justice. More, recently, Washington has supported a number of international courts—most notably the courts for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia—and it has even supported Security Council referrals of the situations in Libya and Syria to the ICC (although the latter was vetoed by Russia).”
• “It is unlikely that Putin, who is clearly the man most responsible for the war, will ever be placed in the dock, even if such a court is established. But the creation of a court is not simply about holding one person—or a few—personally accountable. Russia has challenged the fundamental principles for which the Allies fought in World War II and the very core of the modern international legal order they established in its aftermath. If those principles are to survive Russia’s assault, the global community, working through the institution created after the war to keep the peace, must act—together with Ukraine—to reinforce and reaffirm those principles. If it does so, there is a chance that the international legal order will emerge from this crisis stronger than ever.”

Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“The Russian Military’s People Problem: It’s Hard for Moscow to Win While Mistreating Its Soldiers,” Dara Massicot, FA, 05.18.22. The author, a senior policy researcher at RAND, writes:

• “In Ukraine, the Russian military struggles to retrieve the bodies of its dead, obscures casualties, and is indifferent to its worried military families. It may spend billions of dollars on new equipment, but it does not properly treat soldiers’ injuries, and it generally does not appear to care tremendously whether troops are traumatized.”
• “This culture of indifference to its personnel fundamentally compromises the Russian military’s efficacy, no matter how extensively it has been modernized. … [T]he Russian high command behaves as if its troops are an afterthought, making tactical decisions as if it can simply throw people at poorly designed objectives until it succeeds. This is a self-defeating attitude that both lowers troops’ morale and degrades combat effectiveness. The results are plain to see.
• “The Russian military stands to lose much more than the thousands of pieces of equipment that have been destroyed. The Russian military's experiment in having professional enlisted personnel is almost 20 years old. Its success relies on the prestige of military service and social trust that the Ministry of Defense worked to achieve through a series of new policies, benefits and improved service conditions.”
• “Feeding the country’s young men into what U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently called a ‘wood chipper’ undermines that contract, and it does not bode well for future recruiting and retention.”
• “The country still has conscripts, but if the invasion’s popularity sags as the war drags on, Russian families may return to the old ways of keeping their sons away from the draft, such as through bribes or by hiding them domestically or abroad. The military may then have no choice but to change its personnel culture, but it will be too late to achieve its larger aims in Ukraine. It will also be too late to save the thousands of troops being carelessly sacrificed for Russia’s attempt at conquest.”

“The Russian Army Is an Atrocity Factory,” Lucian Staiano-Daniels, FP, 05.18.22. The author, a scholar of 17th century military history, writes:

• “Habitual looting, thefts, requisitions and clashes with civilians create an example of what psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton called an ‘atrocity-producing situation.’ An ‘atrocity-producing situation’ is one so structured that an average person, like an 18-year-old Russian conscript—or you or I—can ‘regularly commit atrocities.’ Lifton lists factors, such as a feeling of vulnerability, a breakdown in the distinction between combatants and civilians, tacit or explicit encouragement by superiors to produce results, and anger and grief at dead friends. One factor he stresses is the assumed presence of ‘invisible’ or hidden assailants and the ‘desperate need to identify some ‘enemy.’”
• “Some of these factors were present for all armies in the 16th and 17th centuries... All of these factors were present for the U.S. Army in Vietnam and Iraq, and they are present for the Russian army in Ukraine. The difference is that in the Russian army, the eventual atrocities are at best ignored and often officially praised.”
• “Offering nothing to its soldiers but contempt, the Russian army has created an atrocity factory.”

“When Strongmen Invade, They Bring Their Pathologies With Them,” Akar Bharadvaj and Kevin Woods, War on the Rocks, 05.18.22. The authors, a staff member and the deputy director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, write:

• “Problems in four areas — promotion patterns, training regimen, command arrangements, and information management — have ... plagued Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. … Much like Iraq in 1981, Russia now seems to be scaling back its definition of ‘victory’ to better align with military realities, but it has not shrunk from its strategic objectives.”
• “These four factors seem deeply embedded into Russia’s military behaviors. Iraq learned painful lessons from its initial failures, the most important of which was the need to adapt. That required time. To buy time and maintain his regime until this learning process could take effect, Saddam escalated: He disrupted global energy (‘the Tanker War’), he attacked civilian populations (the ‘War of the Cities’), and he used chemical weapons on both military and civilian targets. Here the parallels between the two conflicts prompt a set of questions: Is the Russian military capable of learning and adapting after its initial failure? If yes, and given the parallels between the early phases of these two ineffectual campaigns, how might Russia buy time?”

“Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part 2, Neveen Shaaban Abdalla, Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian Gustafson, Dan Lomas, and Steven Wagner, War on the Rocks, 05.19.22. The authors of the report write:

• “Ukraine’s ability to integrate intelligence, including open source intelligence, into its military operations signals the success of its reforms and Western aid in recent years. We have few details about how this is working, far fewer than the data available about Russia’s various dysfunctions. This too is evidence of competence. It is safe to assume that, unlike the invading force, the Ukrainian army has the capacity to secure their communications, and to plan for both the most likely and most dangerous course of action. Commanders appear to be well-nourished by intelligence.”
• “Although we are forced to speculate, this perhaps is best evidenced by Ukraine’s defense of Hostomel and subsequent counter-attacks. The destruction of Russia’s airborne mission there eliminated the possibility for Russia to achieve a quick victory and its political goals of rapid regime change. Ukraine’s selective use of air power and counterfire, and its widespread integration of tactical-level and open source intelligence and reconnaissance, have been key to its ability to hold off an invading force despite being outgunned. Ukraine’s defense is certain to go down in intelligence history as one of the clearest studies of success in contrast to Russia’s failures. In years to come, Western intelligence officials will need to visit and learn from their Ukrainian counterparts.”

“Two months on in the Ukraine war: what role for the kadyrovtsy?,” Harold Chambers, Foundation for Strategic Research, 05.17.22. The author, a political and security analyst, writes:

• “In the first month of the invasion of Ukraine, Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed his personal army, the ‘kadyrovtsy,’ to achieve psychological, informational and conventional objectives. This force, led by a majority of the security services’ most senior commanders, predominantly participated in the assault on Kyiv but withdrew when it stalled out in mid-March. At the same time, a new deployment went to take Mariupol under the guidance of Duma representative Adam Delimkhanov. Other factions of the kadyrovtsy were located near Kharkiv, Kherson, Rubezhnoe and Zaporizhzhia.”
• “Some of the lessons on the kadyrovtsy’s effectiveness, both among their ranks and in their public portrayal, from the first month have been further exemplified during the second month.”
  • “First, the kadyrovtsy are still, unfortunately, being taken at face value. The movement to paint them as ‘Tik Tok warriors’ accepts their propaganda as it is. … As the non-viral clips of Kadyrov’s army in Mariupol show, and as this paper previously addressed, they are not just goofing around, but conducting zachistki at a high frequency. Are the kadyrovtsy an elite military force? No, but they never were. Their expertise has always been terrorizing civilian populations.”
  • “The second … is that the internal cracks seem more evident. The tensions between Kadyrov and his top commanders are indicative of the kadyrovtsy’s poor performance, as well as the state of the invasion in general.”
  • “Kadyrov’s manpower resources appear to be strained. The Chechen leader … is now being more conservative with deploying reinforcements.”
  • “Tensions are emerging with other troops. The kadyrovtsy are alienating their compatriots because of their size and ineffectiveness. Despite their significant numbers, they are unsuccessful when acting as a conventional military force rather than as a counterinsurgency force; plus, they continue to station themselves away from the fighting.”

Punitive measures related to Ukraine and their impact globally:

“The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Global Trade and Investment,” World Bank, 2022. The authors of this report write:

• “The long term effects of the war in Ukraine on globalization will depend on how government policies and firms’ trade and investment decisions adjust in a world of higher geopolitical risks. ... The war has direct effects on the firms operating in Russia and Ukraine and on firms relying on suppliers from those markets. But the shock caused by the war goes well beyond these two countries, as geopolitical risks have increased globally.”
  • “Russia stands out as a supplier of primary and intermediate goods and services for other countries’ exports at an early stage of production. Transport equipment, machinery, electronics, and agribusiness are especially reliant on imports of Russian metals, chemicals, fertilizers and other commodities. Supply chain production hubs in China, Germany and the United States are among Russia’s largest trade partners … The largest effects of trade disruptions would be felt by members of the Eurasian Economic Union … and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.”
  • “The data also show substantial changes in geopolitical risks in several economies that are more integrated than Russia and Ukraine in world trade and global value chains including China, Finland, Sweden, Taiwan China, among others.”
• “The war in Ukraine exposes the risks associated with the interconnected nature of global trade. The reliance on foreign input producers can lead to the disruption of production when source countries experience a negative shock.”
• “The war in Ukraine may reshape GVCs [global value chains], particularly for firms that rely heavily on countries where geopolitical risks have surged, but this does not imply the end of globalization. … First, cost differentials between countries are not affected by geopolitical risk. This makes reshoring to high-cost countries unlikely. … Second, relocating production is expensive, due to the sunk cost of building new infrastructure and the search cost of establishing new relationships in a different country.”
• “Rather than aiming at reshoring or nearshoring, government policies should focus on defusing tensions and strengthening global value chains against future disruptions.”

“Can Russia be made to pay for Ukraine?,” Sam Fleming, Joseph Cotterill, James Politi and Robin Wigglesworth, FT, 05.17.22. The authors of this article write:

• “The idea of using the $300 billion of frozen Russian foreign exchange reserves to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction is gaining traction in Washington, Brussels and London. ... But scholars and lawyers are warning the decision to confiscate the funds, while tempting, would be fraught with risk, legally questionable and could generate unintended consequences. Even Janet Yellen, U.S. Treasury secretary, said grabbing Moscow’s reserves was not something to consider ‘lightly.’”
• “An outright seizure of Moscow’s wealth would be viewed as crossing a political Rubicon. ‘It would essentially be an action that does away with the international political economy system we have set up over [recent] decades,’ said Simon Hinrichsen, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics.”
• “In a blog post published by the Bruegel think-tank on Monday, Nicolas Véron and Joshua Kirschenbaum argued that while the idea of seizing the assets was ‘seductive,’ it was also ‘unnecessary and unwise.’ ‘Credibly standing for a rules-based order is worth more than the billions that would be gained from appropriating Russia’s money,’ they said. ‘Countries place their reserves in other countries trusting they will not be expropriated in situations short of being at war with each other.’ It would also remove ‘a powerful bargaining chip’ for Kyiv in discussions with Moscow on a possible resolution of the conflict, the two authors noted.”
• “International law recognizes that the assets of convicted war criminals can be seized in reparations to their victims. ... With Ukraine, the scale of the asset freezes already targeting Russia is a clear advantage. But the assets remain the property of Moscow under U.S. law. Lee Buchheit, a veteran lawyer of international finance, said the U.S. president was likely to need an act of Congress to change that. ... Véron and Kirschenbaum argue that, even if Congress passes new legislation, it could be found to be unconstitutional in future court cases.”

“The Right Way to Sanction Russian Energy: How to Slash Moscow’s Revenues Without Crippling the Global Economy,” Edward Fishman and Chris Miller, FA, 05.17.22. The authors, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an assistant professor at the Fletcher School, write:

• “For energy sanctions to work, however, they must be carefully designed to hurt Russia more than they hurt Western states. Their primary goal should not be to cut the volume of oil and gas leaving Russia, which would further drive up world energy prices and endanger domestic support, but to reduce the dollars and euros flowing into Russia. Moving forward, the EU should therefore focus collective efforts on a more ambitious approach: partnering with the United States and other allies to impose a global regime, backed by the threat of secondary sanctions, to cap the price of Russian oil and slash the Kremlin’s revenue.”
• “The key to limiting the price of Russian oil is for these allied countries to band together and dictate terms. Think of it like a reverse OPEC ... So long as the price is slightly above the marginal cost of production, Russia has every reason to keep shipping.” 
• “The United States and its allies would be better served by focusing on the goal of slashing Russian revenues while keeping enough Russian oil flowing to avoid a massive price spike. Imposing a reverse OPEC price cap on Russia, backed by Western sanctions, would benefit consumers the world over while focusing pressure on the petrodollars flowing into Putin’s coffers.”

“Divisions emerge among Western allies over how to cut Russian oil profits,” Jeff Stein, Quentin Ariès and Emily Rauhal, WP, 05.19.22. The news outlet reports:

• “Ukraine, the United States and Canada are among those that have supported proposals to quickly impose a price cap or tariff on Russian energy exports to Europe. But many European officials are quietly voicing skepticism of the approach. German officials, for instance, have questions about the effectiveness of the price cap proposal.”
• “Western officials have also discussed imposing a tariff on Russian oil sales, which would be animated by a similar intention as the price cap. The tariff would require a portion of Russia’s oil sales to go to European government coffers.”
• “There is no guarantee that Russia would agree to continue selling oil under a new price cap, which could push Europe into recession with unforeseen consequences for the global economy.”
• “‘Just as Europe is struggling to get to unanimity on an embargo, it would also struggle to agree to a tariff or a price cap,’ said Bob McNally, president of Rapidan Energy Group, an energy consulting firm. McNally said Europe is also traditionally wary of the ‘secondary’ sanctions on other nations that would probably be necessary to ensure the price cap is effective. McNally also pointed to the added risk ‘that EU countries heavily dependent on Russian oil would be forced to pay the tariff instead of Moscow.’”

“The World Needs an Economic NATO,” Bruce Stokes, FP, 05.17.22. The author, a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes:

• “British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, in her London Mansion House speech on April 27, proposed that the G-7 ‘act as an economic NATO, collectively defending our prosperity. If the economy of a partner is being targeted by an aggressive regime, we should act to support them. All for one and one for all.’ Truss’s goal of modeling an economic security pact after NATO is a good one. It just needs fleshing out.”
• “The first step would be to decide on membership. Truss’s proposal for the G-7 to constitute an ‘economic NATO’ would be a good starting point.”
• “The second step—admittedly, a diplomatic challenge—would be to spell out what actions would spark a collective economic response. Even if an aggressor’s action does not involve a member of any future such pact, the attempt to change any border by force—as Russia has done to Ukraine since 2014—should certainly be an actionable event calling for an immediate response.”
• “The value of an Economic Article 5 would be to signal to a would-be violator in no uncertain terms that the bloc’s major economic powers would punish it.”

“How the West Is Strangling Putin’s Economy,” Paul Krugman, NYT, 05.22.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Is Vladimir Putin winning the economic war?  No, he’s losing it.”
• “That surging surplus is a sign of weakness, not strength—it largely reflects a plunge in Russia’s imports, which even state-backed analysts say is hobbling its economy. Russia is, in effect, making a lot of money selling oil and gas, but finding it hard to use that money to buy the things it needs, reportedly including crucial components used in the production of tanks and other military equipment.”
• “The effect of sanctions on Russia offers a graphic, if grisly, demonstration of a point economists often try to make, but rarely manage to get across: Imports, not exports, are the point of international trade.”

Ukraine-related negotiations:

“Professor Jeffrey Sachs: ‘I Don’t Believe in Isolating Russia’”, Russian International Affairs Council/Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 05.16.22. In this interview, the Columbia University professor of economics says:

• “This war would not have occurred if all parties had negotiated properly and prudently. Even in 2021, the U.S. and Russia could have agreed on key issues such as the non-enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and the importance of fulfilling the Minsk Agreements by all parties. The U.S. was very stubborn in refusing to negotiate the question of NATO enlargement, but I think that Russia should have persevered with peaceful diplomacy and built support around the world for a sensible security arrangement based on Ukraine’s neutrality and the respect for the Minsk agreements.”
• “I believe that a peace agreement should be negotiated immediately, based on Ukraine’s neutrality (no NATO enlargement), Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine, implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the removal of economic sanctions on Russia. By rapidly reaching this kind of agreement, countless lives will be saved and the world will be made vastly safer.”
• “I don’t believe in isolating Russia. I think that is neither desirable nor feasible. I believe in rapidly and successfully concluding peace negotiations and ending sanctions on Russia. Most of the world does not want to be divided into geopolitical camps. Most of the world simply wants peace, security and the chance for economic development and environmental sustainability. I don’t believe in dividing the world into camps. I believe that all of the world faces similar challenges of sustainable development, and should therefore work together to meet those challenges.”

“The Russia-Ukraine war at three months,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, 05.23.22. The author, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:

• “While Kyiv in March offered a proposal that suggested a readiness to compromise on Crimea, illegally seized and annexed by Russia in March 2014, Ukrainian officials now insist on full restoration of Ukraine’s borders as of 1991. The West should support that position and reject the Kremlin’s attempt to redraw international borders by force of arms.”
• “Whether Kyiv would sustain that position if the war drags on is unknown. Barring a total collapse of the Russian military (not to be excluded, but unlikely), it is difficult to see how Ukraine can muster the necessary leverage to regain Crimea.” 

• “In the end, the desired outcome to this war would see the Ukrainians forcing a Russian withdrawal or, at a minimum, getting Moscow to agree to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv. Ensuring that Russia’s aggression fails and that Ukraine achieves one of these outcomes should be primary goals for the West.” 

“Zelensky’s Agonizing Choice to Save Ukraine,” Gerald F. Hyman, NI, 05.22.22. The author, a senior adviser at CSIS, writes:

• “Ultimately, to end the slaughter, the two sides will need to reach some kind of agreement, if only a tacit modus vivendi. Almost certainly that settlement will mean some de facto if not de jure control of Ukrainian territory by Russia or its proxies. Ukrainians cannot possibly forget. It will be a red blistering rash on the sides of the relationship and live in the active memory of Ukrainians for generations to come. But if it is inevitable, why not reach that arrangement sooner rather than later and avoid more devastation, carnage and death?”

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Summary of remarks by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 05.23.22, as reported: 

• "‘We are faced with the reality that modern technologies are putting countries in situations that they've never been in before,’ said Kissinger. [‘]Nuclear powers and new military technologies, without established criteria for limitations, could spell catastrophe for humankind.’" (World Economic Forum, 05.23.22) 
• “Kissinger emphasized how the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine could reshape the world as we know it: … ‘Ukraine should've been a bridge between Europe and Russia, but now, as the relationships are reshaped, we may enter a space where the dividing line is redrawn and Russia is entirely isolated. We are facing a situation now where Russia could alienate itself completely from Europe and seek a permanent alliance elsewhere. This may lead to Cold War-like diplomatic distances, which will set us back decades. We should strive for long-term peace.’" (World Economic Forum, 05.23.22) 
• “‘The ideal outcome would be if Ukraine could become situated as a neutral kind of state, as a bridge between Russia and Europe,’ Kissinger told the Davos forum by video link. … [He] said that Ukraine’s neutral status the way it was seen then [in 2014] was no longer achievable, but Ukraine’s neutrality must still be regarded as ‘an ultimate objective in the current situation.’" (TASS, 05.23.22)  
• "‘Movement towards negotiations on peace need to begin [in] the next two months or so. The outcome [of the crisis] should be outlined by them before it creates upheaval and tensions that will be even harder to overcome, particularly in the relationships of Russia towards Europe and of Ukraine towards Europe,’ he told the forum… He added that, ‘ideally, the dividing line should return to the status quo.’" (TASS, 05.23.22) 
• “Kissinger … said that Washington and Beijing must seek to avoid putting Taiwan at the center of their tense diplomatic relationship, adding that the need for the world’s two largest economies to avoid direct confrontation is in the interest of global peace.” (CNBC, 05.23.22) 
• "‘The U.S.,’ he says, ‘must realize that China's strategic and technical competence has evolved. Diplomatic negotiations must be sensitive, informed and unilaterally strive for peace.’" (World Economic Forum, 05.23.22) 

“Ukraine’s Way Out,” Charles A. Kupchan, The Atlantic, 05.18.22. The author, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, writes:

• “The war in Ukraine is entering a more dangerous phase. ... With both sides doubling down, NATO must engage in a forthright dialogue with the Ukrainian government about its goals and how best to bring the bloodshed to a close sooner rather than later.”
• “Russia has already been dealt a decisive strategic defeat. Ukrainian forces have rebuffed the advance on Kyiv and retain control of most of the country; the West has hit Russia with severe economic sanctions; and NATO has reinforced its eastern flank, while Finland and Sweden now seek to join the alliance. For NATO and Ukraine alike, strategic prudence argues in favor of pocketing these successes rather than pressing the fight and running the tantamount risks.”
• “Several considerations call for restraint.”
  • “First, the longer the war continues, the greater the death, destruction, and dislocation it will reap. … Second is the risk of escalation. … Third, even though the West has demonstrated impressive unity in supporting Ukraine and standing up to Russian aggression, the West’s solidarity may wane over time. Inflation is spiking on both sides of the Atlantic, fueled in part by the knock-on … Finally, the West needs to begin looking beyond the war to salvage a relationship with Russia that keeps the door open to a modicum of collaboration.”
• “Putin’s back is up against the wall. Pushing him further is both unnecessary and unnecessarily risky. And China can hardly be interpreting the blowback against Russia—in particular, Russia’s detachment from the global economy—as anything but a stark warning against Beijing’s own expansionism.”
• “Putin’s errant invasion of Ukraine has produced no winners, but one clear loser: Russia. Even as the West continues to provide Ukraine the means to defend itself, it’s time for the Atlantic democracies to turn their focus to bringing the war to an end.”

“Sabine Fischer on power and control in Vladimir Putin’s Russia,” The Economist, 05.16.22. The political scientist writes:

• “As long as Vladimir Putin is in power, the Russian regime will remain hostile towards Ukraine. Moscow will continue to antagonize the West and to pursue the idea of a Europe divided into zones of influence. To change this would require a redefinition of Russia’s “national interests”, along with a reorganization of political priorities to put the wellbeing of Russia’s economy and society ahead of the narrowly defined security interests of its ruling elite. In other words, only domestic political change could profoundly alter Russia’s foreign policy.”
• “Western countries must do everything in their power to constrain Russia’s ability to wage war on Ukraine and pursue its aggressive foreign policy. Sanctions and the supply of weapons to Ukraine are essential elements of their approach. While this policy is not aimed at regime change, a weakening of the Russian state and the Russian economy increases the possibility of such change.”

“How to Prepare for the Next Ukraine. Washington Must Ramp Up Support for Vulnerable Partners—Before It’s Too Late,” Michèle A. Flournoy, FA, 05.23.22. The author, co-founder and chair of the Board of Directors of the Center for a New American Security, writes:

• “If the United States and its allies and partners want to meaningfully strengthen their capacity to deter and defeat future attacks by Russia, China, and other authoritarian states, there is much they can learn from the war in Ukraine. Above all, the early trajectory of this crisis makes clear that Washington cannot and should not wait until conflict looms to start strengthening its own ability to prevent aggression and the ability of at-risk partners to defend themselves. Security assistance should be accelerated and focused on providing asymmetric capabilities that are not provocative on their own but instead turn vulnerable partners into “porcupines” that are difficult and costly to attack.”
• “These lessons can most obviously be applied in the case of Taiwan, where Chinese leadership may contemplate future military action to conquer the island. Efforts to strengthen the U.S. deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific should go hand in hand with helping Taipei strengthen a multilayered defense, from its maritime and air approaches to its cybersecurity and the security of its major cities. Washington should ramp up its provision of key defensive capabilities, including antiship missiles, sea mines, and air and missile defenses. It should also offer more training in insurgency and popular resistance, so that in the event of a Chinese attack, Taiwan could buy time for the international community to muster an effective response.”
• “In Ukraine, Western countries were quickly able to mobilize and fill gaps with military aid after the Russian invasion began; they should not count on such favorable conditions in other conflicts. As the rest of this war plays out, the United States and its partners should be thinking carefully about how to deter and, if necessary, prevail in the next one. They can be sure that their adversaries will be learning their own lessons as well.”

“Russia is losing. That might make Putin more dangerous, Editorial Board, WP, 05.17.22. The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Now is not the time ...to go for a negotiated cease-fire between Ukraine and Russia, as France, Germany and Italy have proposed in recent days. ... [T]he risks of relaxing the pressure on Mr. Putin before he is thoroughly beaten, and maybe not even then, are too high.”
• “Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, ... told lawmakers that U.S. agencies ‘do not see a viable negotiating path forward, at least in the short term.’ The main reason for this is that Mr. Putin remains bent on conquest, regardless of near-term military losses.”
• “Mr. Putin ‘is probably counting on U.S. and [European Union] resolve to weaken as food shortages, inflation and energy prices get worse,’ Ms. Haines said. NATO leaders must give Mr. Putin no reason to believe that such a strategy will work.”

“What Are Sweden and Finland Thinking?,” Stephen M. Walt, FP, 05.18.22. The author, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, writes:

• “War is sometimes necessary, and every now and then a war will pay off handsomely for the country that started it. But launching a war invariably alarms other states, and it usually brings them together to contain the danger. Putin may have believed Europe was too divided and dependent on Russian oil and gas to oppose his action, so he gambled that he could accomplish his aims quickly and eventually get back to business as usual. What he got instead was classic realist balancing behavior, driven by a revised assessment of Russian intentions. Overwrought denunciations of supposed Ukrainian Nazis and the brutal behavior of Russia’s soldiers just made the Swedish and Finnish decision easier.”
• “Is this all that is going on in Stockholm and Helsinki? Probably not. NATO’s ability to rapidly supply Ukraine with advanced armaments—an undeniably impressive display of logistical prowess—may have made membership look more valuable. Russia’s failure to escalate in the face of mounting Western support for Ukraine—at least so far—may have also allayed Swedish and Finnish concerns about possible Russian countermeasures. Seeing Russia as simultaneously weaker and more belligerent may have made abandoning strict neutrality look like a safer option.”
• “Whatever the reason, there is a broader lesson that more world leaders ought to take to heart: States are sensitive to power, but they’re even more sensitive to the ways that power is used. If you have a big stick, speaking softly is smart. So is using one’s power wisely—and not very often.”

“The Case Against Finland Joining NATO,” Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan, NI, 05.22.22. The authors, policy director at Defense Priorities and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, write:

• “The United States needs to get back to basics in Europe, which means letting capable states balance Russian power. It did not bleed and die in two European wars in the twentieth century for the peripheral stakes NATO demands it defend today. It went to war and spent big in the Cold War to prevent one country from dominating the industrial heartland of Europe, a development that could have threatened U.S. national security. Whatever else we think about Russian aggression against Ukraine, or potentially against Finland, it does not threaten our security.”
• “Finland would be fine without NATO, and U.S. relations with Helsinki need not suffer much by denying it U.S. defenses. If Europeans want to defend it, they should say so, and draw up plans for doing so. Today, NATO serves mostly as a vehicle for transfer payments from U.S. taxpayers to European ones. Stepping back from Europe would save the United States at least $80 billion each year. Now is the time for U.S. retrenchment from Europe, not expansion there.”

“The new balance of power: U.S. and allies up, Russia down,” David Ignatius, WP, 05.18.22. The author, a columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Take a look at what Russians like to call the ‘correlation of forces’ and you can see that there has been a significant change in the global balance of power: Simply put, the United States and its European allies are up, and Russia is down.”
• “Putin’s defeat could become a very messy affair, through a desperate Russian attempt to use nuclear weapons, or simply through the spread of chaos and fragmentation across Eurasia as Russian power dissolves.”
• “In a rebalancing world, the United States can advance its interests in every direction. Let’s start with Europe: NATO’s center of gravity will shift eastward, as European nations such as Germany add military muscle and become more independent of Russian energy. NATO’s leverage will also extend north, to the new strategic prize of the Arctic, as Sweden and Finland join the alliance. A more European Ukraine may pull Russia and its remaining satellites toward the West, too. The right first step is a rapid move to draw Ukraine—as much as remains unoccupied by Russian forces—into the European Union.”
• “Putin’s mistakes may be costly, too, for China, Russia’s main ally. … [T]he world is different from what it was before Feb. 24, and for now, it’s going America’s way.”

“The European Union needs its own army,” Vincent-Immanuel Herr and Martin Speer, WP 05.18.22., The authors, fellows at the Charlemagne Prize Academy in Germany, write:

• “Establishing an EU armed forces would not only provide important protection from aggression of the sort on display in Ukraine; it would also be a logical next step in European integration.”
  • “First … establishing an EU armed forces would provide a degree of security independence from the United States.”
  • “The second argument concerns efficiency. ... While the U.S. Armed Forces uses just one main battle tank, the EU fields—depending how you count—11 to 17 different models. Pointing to facts like these, then-European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested, ‘We are spending half of the American budget when it comes to defense, so we should be efficient at 50 percent of the U.S. We are only 15 percent as efficient.’”
  • “The third argument concerns responsiveness. When the Afghan government collapsed last summer, NATO states scrambled to get their citizens and Afghan allies out of the country. Only the quick and determined deployment of some 6,000 U.S. troops prevented an already catastrophic situation from becoming even worse.”
  • “The last argument concerns the development of a European identity. The EU prides itself on its diversity of languages, cultures and histories. This heterogeneity does come at a price, though. Most EU citizens define themselves by their country of birth first; few consider themselves Europeans primarily.”
• “Russia's invasion of Ukraine … has laid bare the shortcomings of EU foreign and security policy. The EU response to this crisis must match its gravity. While the first chapter of European integration centered on securing peace and prosperity internally, the next chapter should build up the capability to defend against external threats. An EU armed forces could transform the union from a dependent soft power into a sovereign superpower of global relevance.”

“How war in Ukraine convinced Germany to rebuild its army,” Guy Chazan, FT, 05.23.22. The author, Berlin bureau chief, writes:

• “Three days after Russia invaded Ukraine, the German government said it would spend €100 billion on modernizing its army, the Bundeswehr.”
• “The €100 billion fund promised by German chancellor Olaf Scholz marks the biggest increase in the country’s military expenditure since the end of the cold war. It was accompanied by a commitment to spend more than 2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product on the military. The goal, Scholz told MPs, was ‘a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us.’”
• “It was a bold move. Pacifist sentiment is strong in Germany, where many remain wary of their country’s army, mindful of the Wehrmacht’s role in Nazi atrocities. At a May Day event in Düsseldorf, protesters called Scholz a ‘warmonger’ for sending heavy weapons to Ukraine. But the reaction within the army was one of unconcealed delight.”

“Lies weaken Russia in its trial of strength with the west,” Gideon Rachman, FT, 05.23.22. The author, chief foreign affairs columnist for the news outlet, writes:

• “Putin’s anger is unfeigned. As the political commentator Ivan Krastev observes: ‘The hypocrisy of the west has become an obsession for him.’ But hypocrisy and lies are not quite the same thing. The distinction may seem semantic, even frivolous—but it matters.”
• “The Russian government specializes in outright lies, insisting variously that it has not invaded Ukraine, did not poison opposition leader Alexei Navalny, had nothing to do with the shooting down of flight MH17 and its army has not committed war crimes. … The U.S. and its allies, by contrast, specialize in hypocrisy. … The west is an ‘empire of hypocrisy.’ It is Russia that is the real ‘empire of lies.’ And when it comes to a trial of strength between systems, hypocrisy works better than outright lies.”
• “The danger of basing a policy on lies has been amply demonstrated in Ukraine. Right until the last moment, the Kremlin was denying that an invasion was planned. Even senior Russian officials apparently only learned the truth a few hours before the tanks got rolling. Even now, a full-scale war has to be called a ‘special military operation.’ But Putin and Russia are now paying a heavy price for the lies that the Kremlin told the world and itself.”
• “The Ukrainian government is not led by drug-crazed neo-Nazis. The people of eastern Ukraine were not desperate to be ‘liberated’ by the Russian army. Putin’s dreams of a swift victory crumbled when they encountered reality.”
• “Freedom of speech is so entrenched in America that even a re-elected Trump would not be able to insist—as Putin does—that every citizen of his country must endorse his lie or face imprisonment. But for the politics of the big lie to once again be blasted out from the White House would degrade America and endanger the world.”

“This Is No Time to Go Wobbly on Russia,” Garry Kasparov, WSJ, 05.16.22. The author, chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative and Russian chess grandmaster, writes:

• “I've long said that Mr. Putin is a Russian problem and must be removed by Russians. But the West needs to stop helping him. Every phone call that legitimizes his authority, every cubic meter of gas and every barrel of oil imported from Russia is a lifeline to a dictatorship that is shaking for the first time.”
• “Mr. Putin's corrupt and incompetent military is good only at brutality and massacring civilians, but has had eight years to entrench in the occupied east that Ukraine's forces are now approaching. We will see how committed Ukraine's allies really are as the war moves into a new phase in which defense is not enough. Will they help Ukraine win, to destroy Mr. Putin's war machine, and to restore all Ukrainian territory? Will they keep sanctions in place to increase domestic pressure on Mr. Putin and to let his mafia know that there is no way back to the civilized world for them and their families while Mr. Putin is in power?”
• “The free world that won the Cold War is remembering how to fight and rediscovering the values that give meaning to the fight. That's bad news for Mr. Putin and the other dictators watching closely, from Beijing to Tehran to Caracas. Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and their nation, and for the free world. Let it not be as a proxy, but as a partner.”

“Andrey Kortunov offers three scenarios for the end of the war in Ukraine,” The Economist, 05.20.22. The Russian political scientist writes:

• “The conflict concerns a clash between very different ways of organizing social and political life within two countries which together once constituted a large portion of Soviet territory. It is also an intellectual and spiritual confrontation between two mindsets.”
• “The most important thing, however, is that this fundamental incompatibility of the two models of social organization has led not only to a horrendous fratricidal military confrontation in the very center of Europe, but that it will also dictate how each side acts in the conflict. … There are three scenarios for how the war ends, and each would have enormous geopolitical consequences.”
  • “If the Kremlin were to lose decisively … we would probably see a re-emergence of the unipolar moment—the remaining opposition to this arrangement by Beijing notwithstanding. Although Ukraine might be unfinished business for Mr. Putin, Russia’s status is itself unfinished business for many in the West. Triumph for Ukraine might lead to a tamed and domesticated Russia. A quiet Russia would allow the West to cope more easily with China, which would be the only major obstacle to liberal hegemony and the long-awaited ‘end of history.’”
  • “If the conflict results with an imperfect but mutually acceptable settlement, the final outcome of the collision between the Russian and the Ukrainian models will be postponed.”
  • “If there is no agreement on Ukraine and the conflict endures through cycles of shaky ceasefires followed by new rounds of escalation, expect decay in global and regional bodies.”
• “Assessing the probability of any of the three scenarios is extremely difficult … I consider the reformation scenario, in which an agreement is made to end the war, to be the best option for all. The others either will introduce change too quickly or block badly-needed change; in both cases political risks will multiply. If the conflict triggers a gradual, orderly and non-violent transition in which the global order becomes more stable, it would mean that humankind has not let Ukraine’s sacrifices go to waste.”

“NATO’s Cheek by Russia’s Jowl,” Andrey Kortunov , Russian International Affairs Council 05.17.22. The author, a Russian political scientist, writes:

• “The ninth enlargement of NATO is perhaps the most vivid illustration of the ongoing consolidation of the Collective West. A change in the political and military-strategic status of the two formerly neutral countries in Europe not only completely flips the geopolitical situation in Europe’s north upside down, but also brings NATO and the European Union even closer together, pushing the prospect of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ to an uncertain future.”
• “The events of Feb. 24 gave this consolidation a new—and powerful—impetus. The West was preparing for a similar scenario for a long time: Therefore, the reaction of its leaders, business and influence makers to Moscow’s actions in 2022 was more rapid, coordinated and effective than it was in a similar situation in 2014.”
• “Moscow should not expect a new transatlantic rift to come in the near future. The reality is that Russia will have to prepare for a protracted confrontation with a newly consolidated Collective West, and attempts to play on situational contradictions between the U.S. and Europe are likely to fail. Fortunately, the modern world is much larger than the Collective West, even if it is newly aware of its common historical destiny.”

“Politics and Circumstances,” Dmitry Trenin, Russia in Global Affairs, 05.20.22. The author, former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes:

• “The challenge that Russia is facing is unparalleled in our history. The point is not only that in the West we have not only no allies, but even potential partners. … The United States and its allies, instead of the relatively conservative strategies of containment of the Soviet Union … have set much more decisive goals, which in fact mean the exclusion of Russia from world politics as an independent factor and the complete destruction of the Russian economy.”
• “The success of this strategy would allow the West, led by the United States, to finally resolve the ‘Russian question’ and create favorable opportunities for victory in the confrontation with China.”  
• “It must be understood that the strategic defeat that the West, led by the United States, is preparing for Russia, will not lead to peace and the subsequent restoration of relations. With a high probability, the theater of the ‘hybrid war’ will simply move from Ukraine further east, into the borders of Russia itself, the existence of which in its current form will be in question. … This strategy of the adversary must be actively counteracted … The immediate and most important task of this strategy is to achieve strategic success in Ukraine.”
• “As part of solving the problems of restructuring foreign economic relations and creating a new model of the world order, the most important areas are cooperation with world powers, China and India, as well as Brazil; with leading regional players - Turkey, ASEAN countries, Gulf states, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and others.”
• “It is necessary to move from retaliatory steps to initiative actions that strengthen the position of the Russian Federation in the total economic war actually declared by the West and cause significant damage to the adversary. Now the question is being decided whether we are able to save the country and develop it further. To do this, Russia's strategy must overcome the circumstances surrounding and constraining it.”

“World at a Crossroads,” Andrey Bystritskiy, Valdai Discussion Club, 05.16.22. The author, chairman of the board of the Valdai Discussion Club, writes:

• “The current conflict demonstrates that international regulation is disproportionately weak compared to mutual dependence in the world. Primarily because the regulating capabilities, for example, in the sphere of economics and finance, are concentrated in the hands of a handful of countries, their governments. Which enables them to cause tremendous damage to opponents. If this is true, we have two ways out.”
  • “The first one is to overcome differences diplomatically, to build just and inclusive regulation in all spheres, including defense.”
  • “The second is that one part of the world or even one country comes to control this regulation.”
• “The closest historical analogy of today’s situation is the Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century Europe. A lot of participants, alliances of various degrees of stability, weak ability to make decisive moves for the sake of peace. It took years and huge casualties to achieve what could have been negotiated without a war.”
• “Strange as it may seem, but the world today needs a system of efficient international organizations. Reckless use of sanctions, especially by the United States and the Western European countries, has led to global asymmetry and weakening of the UN role even though this organization is supposed to prevent world conflicts or at least help resolve them with the least dramatic aftermath possible.”
• “The recent developments have shown that we need a certain set of neutral platforms. For example, in the communication, media sphere. Alas, almost all social networks (Facebook, Twitter) have turned into a kind of information weapon. Financial and payment platforms also turned out to be not neutral. Like many others. As a result, people who are not guilty of what is happening suffer. In fact, only the Red Cross has remained neutral, trying to help all parties.”

“Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” Galip Dalay, SWP, May 2022. The author, an expert with SWP, writes:

• “Given the salience of anti-Westernism and discontent with the West in the triangle of Turkey-Russia-West relations, there is a need to distinguish between anti-Westernism as sentiment, narrative and policy response. Discontent with the West has often led to similar sentiments and narratives in Ankara and Moscow, but not necessarily to similar policy responses. Lumping both countries’ discontent together under the same umbrella of anti-Westernism without due attention to differences in their sources and manifestations is unlikely to culminate in better understanding of both countries’ approaches to the current international system.”
• “Moreover, contemporary anti-Westernism in Turkey is largely anti-American in nature – for instance, an anti-NATO position is a surrogate for anti-U.S. sentiment. But while anti-NATO and anti-US sentiments are prominently heard, polls find support for Turkey’s place in NATO, and rising aspirations for EU membership. Therefore, anti-Western sentiments and narratives do not necessarily culminate in anti-Western policy responses. That is more a matter of cost-benefit analysis.”

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“The Former PRC Ambassador to Ukraine Gao Yusheng: The Dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian War and the Implications for the International Order,” David Cowhig's Translation Blog, 05.10.22. In this speech, the former Chinese ambassador to Ukraine says:  

• “Russia’s position in the Russia-Ukraine war has became increasingly passive and unfavorable. Its coming defeat is already clear. ... The main reasons why Russia is now heading towards defeat are:
  • “Russia has been declining ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union ... the so-called revival or revitalization of Russia under Putin’s leadership is false; it simply does not exist. … The failure of the Russian blitzkrieg and the failure to achieve a quick victory signaled the beginning of the Russian defeat. … Russian military and economic advantages over Ukraine have been offset by the resilience of Ukraine and the huge, sustained and effective aid provided to Ukraine.”
  • “Modern wars are necessarily hybrid wars, covering military, economic, political, diplomatic, public opinion, propaganda, intelligence, and information. Russia is not only in a passive position on the battlefield, but has lost in other areas. … Russia can no longer decide when and how the war will end.”
  • “The next phase of the war is likely to be more violent and intense The possibility of expansion and escalation cannot be ruled out. This is because: the objectives of the two sides are diametrically opposed.”
• “The Russo-Ukrainian War put an end to the Yalta system and the remnants of the Cold War, and the world began to move toward a new pattern and order of international relations. … Russia’s political, economic, military and diplomatic power will be significantly weakened and isolated. … Ukraine would be removed from Russia’s orbit and sphere of influence … Other former Soviet states may experience new and different degrees of de-Russianization. … Japan and Germany, while completely free from the constraints of the defeated countries of World War II and accelerating their armament development.”
• “The U.S. and other countries will push hard for substantive reform of the U.N. and other important international organizations. If they are blocked, they may also start a new one. Both may exclude some countries, such as Russia, by drawing ideological lines of so-called independence.”

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“We Must Prepare for Putin’s Worst Weapons,” Mitt Romney, NYT, 05.21.22. The author, a U.S. senator, writes:

• “Russia’s foreign minister and its ambassador to the United States have both signaled that Russia’s debacle in Ukraine could lead to a nuclear strike. … We should imagine the unimaginable, specifically how we would respond militarily and economically to such a seismic shift in the global geopolitical terrain.”
• “The right answer is to continue to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defend itself and to win. Its military successes may force Mr. Putin to exit Ukraine or to agree to a cease-fire acceptable to the Ukrainian people. Perhaps his control of Russian media would enable him to spin a loss into a face-saving narrative at home. These are the outcomes he would be smart to take. But if a cornered and delusional Mr. Putin were to instead use a nuclear weapon—whether via a tactical strike or by weaponizing one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants—we would have several options.”
• “Russia’s use of a nuclear weapon would unarguably be a redefining, reorienting geopolitical event. … Today, the West represents over half of the global GDP. Separating any nation from our combined economies could devastate it. The impact on Western economies could be significant, but the impact on the economies of Russia and its fellow travelers would be much worse. It could ultimately be economic Armageddon, but that is far preferable to nuclear Armageddon.”
• “Together with our key NATO allies, we should develop and evaluate a broad range of options. I presume the president and the administration are already engaged in such a process. The potential responses to an act so heinous and geopolitically disorienting as a nuclear strike must be optimally designed and have the support of our NATO allies. Mr. Putin and his enablers should have no doubt that our answer to such depravity would be devastating.”

“Arms Control Implications of the War in Ukraine: Proliferation,” Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, 05.23.22. The author, co-founder of the Stimson Center, writes:

• “One consequence of Putin’s folly in Ukraine is that the denuclearization of North Korea appears more remote than ever. ... Iran’s nuclear ambition tops most lists of challenges to the NPT regime, including my own. Iran’s nuclear program has already prompted hedging strategies by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other states. The more Iran seeks to advance its nuclear capabilities, the more pronounced these hedging strategies will become.”
• “There is no clear, long term, achievable solution to the Iranian nuclear program — not by diplomacy and not by military strikes — until Iran is governed differently. Until then, successful management of nuclear danger will have to suffice.”
• “If Iran has no reasonable hope for sanctions relief and meager prospects for a resuscitated nuclear deal, what then? And how will Putin’s aggressive war against Ukraine affect Tehran’s choices?”
• “Iran’s deciders could choose to go for the Bomb or remain within reach of possession. Either way, they’ll have the company of competitors in the Islamic world. Analytically speaking, it’s better when your competitors don’t possess nuclear weapons. Consequently, Iran could have more national security by staying below the bomb making threshold than by crossing it. But analytics aren’t always decisive. Just look at Putin.”

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant developments.

Cyber security:

“What the digital front lines in Ukraine say about the future of war,” Gillian Tett, FT, 05.18.22. The author, chair of the editorial board and editor-at-large, U.S., for the news outlet, writes:

• “In the post-independence years, the spread of digital technology tapped into this Ukrainian networking culture and is now making its society (and military) more resilient in the fight against Russia than many outsiders expected. As a result, one way to frame the Ukraine-Russia conflict is to see it as a test between using a networked approach to solving problems, versus the type of ­top-down, authoritarian system that dominated Russia in the past. So far, networks are winning.”
• “In the early 21st century a digital industry emerged in Ukraine, fostered in part by the fact that the country has a large pool of scientists and engineers. ... One consequence was that Ukraine had one of the highest rates of crypto adoption, per capita, in the world. Another was that three years ago, Mykhailo Fedorov, the newly appointed digital minister, assembled a crew of young techies, including Bornyakov, to create a self-styled ‘digital government’ with an app called Diia (The State and I), following in the footsteps of Estonia. This proved very successful, unlike many of Zelensky’s other economic policies, which had mixed results.”
• “It has also helped that Elon Musk has donated 15,000 Starlink routers to keep the internet running.”
• “Has this produced a complete digital government? Sadly not. Can it survive future Russian cyber attacks? No one knows. But if nothing else, the tale underscores a crucial point about war: it can reveal the benefits of innovation in unexpected ways. That might yet help Ukraine reap some economic benefits in a postwar world — and give future historians a reason to celebrate the power of networks over top-down autocracy.”

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

• No significant developments.

Defense and aerospace:

“For Opposition to Putin’s War, Look to the Fringes of His Empire,” Alexey Kovalev, FP, 05.20.22. The author, an investigative editor at Meduza, writes:

• “Russia’s own army is in many ways an imperial one: Members of ethnic minorities subjugated by the expanding Russian Empire centuries ago appear to be disproportionately fighting and dying in the Kremlin’s army—while ethnic Russians, especially those from better-off regions such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, overwhelmingly manage to avoid duty at the front, mainly by dodging the draft for young men in the first place.”
• “It’s the dirty secret of the Russian military: Russia’s peripheral subjects—Buryats, Dagestanis, Tuvans—are Putin’s cannon fodder.”
• “For me—an ethnic Russian, politically liberal, an emigrant since March—Putin’s war and my fellow Russians’ sadistic behavior in Ukraine have made me question my own assumptions. I, too, have been part of the problem: I should have recognized the inexcusable racism and xenophobia in every Russian punchline stereotyping Ukrainians, Georgians and Chukchis from the Far East as somehow inferior. My acquiescence is a cousin to Putin’s warped view of a world where only ethnic Russians deserve statehood and whose culture must prevail above all others, by force if needed.”

See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

 

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Five reasons that Russia’s nuclear exports will continue, despite sanctions and the Ukraine invasion. But for how long?” Marina Lorenzini and Francesca Giovannini, BAS, 05.17.22. The authors, the project coordinator and the executive director of the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, write:

• “Disdain for Russia’s actions in Ukraine and current sanctions related to the invasion will ultimately exact costs from the Russian nuclear industry, but Russia’s dominance in the nuclear energy market will likely endure in the short term for five main reasons.”
  1. “U.S. and EU reluctance to apply sanctions specifically to the Russian nuclear energy sector.”
  2. “U.S. and EU reliance on Russian fuel.”
  3. “Most destination countries continue to import nuclear products from Russia.”
  4. “Russia offers extensive and generous financing structures.”
  5. “No other supplier is prepared to quickly operate a Russian facility.”
• “If Russia cannot continue to fulfill generous loans as sanctions shrink Russian reserves, Rosatom’s immense strategic commercial advantage over competitors—France’s Framatome and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, among others—could be diminished. In this event, other companies may be able to make a stronger case for their products and gain market share in the global nuclear energy industry.”

“Vladimir Putin,” Alexei Navalny, Time, 05.23.22. The author, a jailed Russian opposition politician, writes:

• “Perhaps Vladimir Putin’s true mission is to teach lessons. To everyone—from world leaders and pundits to ordinary people. He has been especially good at this in 2022. He reminded us once again that a path that begins with ‘just a little election rigging’ always ends with a dictatorship. And dictatorship always leads to war. It’s a lesson we shouldn’t have forgotten.”
• “Putin has reminded us all of the ‘duck test’: if something looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. The very same logic should be applied in this case: if someone destroys the independent media, organizes political assassinations, and sticks to his imperial delusions, then he is a madman capable of causing a bloodbath in the center of Europe in the 21st century.”  
• “Right now, Putin is also teaching a lesson on how to nullify economic gains made by one’s country over the course of 20 years. However, the answer to the main question he poses—how to stop an evil madman with an army, nuclear weapons and membership in the U.N. Security Council—is yet to be answered. And we are the ones who must find that answer.” 

Ukraine:

“Why Europe Hedges Its Support for Ukraine,” Ralph Gert Schoellhammer, WSJ, 05.23.22. The author, an assistant professor of political science and economics at Webster Vienna Private University, writes:

• “High-ranking EU representatives are regularly visiting Kyiv and promising President Volodymyr Zelensky immense military, economic and diplomatic aid. These promises will be hard to keep once they collide with the cold realities of European politics and the national interests of EU member states.”
• “With negotiations over an EU end-of-year embargo on Russian oil stalling, it isn't clear when to expect an end of major oil flows from Russia to Europe. And even if a plan were to come together, the current EU proposal is full of exemptions, allowing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to continue importing Russian crude until 2024.”
• “It has become obvious in recent months that many European states care more about ending the war than about who wins. Germany in particular seems to be interested in keeping the option to return to the pre-Ukraine war status quo. Berlin doesn't stand alone in this. Following his successful re-election, French President Emmanuel Macron has hedged his bets, saying that a future peace in Eastern Europe must not include an unnecessary humiliation of Russia and could include territorial concessions to Moscow.”
• “It would be too optimistic to expect imminent Ukrainian EU membership.”
• “The EU is built around Germany and France, and both states have jealously guarded their position as the ultimate decision makers in Europe. Policy makers in both countries are aware that an EU with Ukraine could lead to a competing Warsaw-Kyiv axis, something neither France nor Germany wants. Ukraine is politically and culturally closer to Poland than Germany, meaning that German power in the EU could be diminished significantly and replaced by growing Eastern European influence.”

“Ukraine’s Road to EU Membership,” Pierre Morcos, CSIS, 05.18.22. The author, a visiting fellow at CSIS, writes:

• “As Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will not occur overnight, EU countries should think of the ways to deepen Ukraine’s European integration in the meantime. In addition to its immediate assistance to Kyiv (military aid, humanitarian support, macro-financial assistance), the European Union has already taken important steps to further integrate Ukraine.”
• “In order to manage expectations, as this process will certainly be long, greater political association of Ukraine could be envisioned. President Macron recently proposed the creation of a ‘political community,’ which would include EU and non-EU countries sharing the same values, and the desire to foster their cooperation on security, energy, transport, investment, or education. Such a ‘community’ would not be a substitute to EU membership (or a halfway house policy) but a way to shape the relations between the European Union and Ukraine in parallel of the accession process.”
• “Ukraine’s road to the European Union will require both audacity and patience. EU countries will need to take bold decisions to send a strong political signal to Kyiv while keeping the long view in mind, as the accession process will demand challenging reforms on both sides.”

“Volodymyr Zelensky,” Joe Biden, Time, 05.23.22. The U.S. president writes:

• “When Vladimir Putin launched his brutal war against Ukraine and Ukrainians needed their leader, Volodymyr Zelensky’s words echoed around the world: ‘The President is here.’”  
• “In President Zelensky, the people of Ukraine have a leader worthy of their bravery and resilience, as citizens across the country—shopkeepers and soldiers, tailors and truck drivers—fight for their homes and their freedom. Each time we speak, I hear in President Zelensky’s voice the relentless determination of a man who believes profoundly in his duty to his people, and lives up daily to the solemn responsibility of leading his nation through this dark and difficult hour.”  
• “The nations of the free world, inspired by the example of President Zelensky, are more united, more determined, and more purposeful than at any point in recent memory. With the support of the U.S. and our allies and partners, he has left his mark on history and proved to the world that Ukraine will long endure and its people will ultimately realize the democratic future they have long desired.” 

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“The Limits of Authoritarian Learning,” Azamat Junisbai, PONARS, May 2022. The author, a professor of sociology at Pitzer College, writes:

• “The Uzbek scenario wherein Karimov’s passing severely upset the status quo in Tashkent may have inspired those in Nazarbayev’s inner circle to design an elaborate political transition that would safeguard their massive power and wealth for decades to come. However, only three years after Nazarbayev’s surprise resignation in March of 2019, this meticulously crafted plan failed, laying bare the limits of ‘authoritarian learning.’”
• “Back in 2019, Tokayev was reported to have been viewed … as a neutral technocrat largely devoid of ambition for power. Yet, just three years later, he has proven himself to be a skillful politician who prevailed against an attempted coup and consolidated his power, while Nazarbayev and members of his extended family have experienced an unfathomable reversal of their fortunes.” 
• “Tokayev’s victory against the coup d’état afforded Kazakhstan a historic opportunity for meaningful political reforms and modernization. Only time will tell whether this unique opportunity will be used or squandered. Many ordinary Kazakhstanis fear that one extended patronage network will merely be replaced by another while the ‘rules of the game’ will remain fundamentally the same.”
• “There are credible reports about the killings of nonviolent protesters and even simple passersby on Jan. 6 and beyond. Similarly, there are many reports of arbitrary detention and torture of those suspected of participation in the unrest. … Unable to rely completely on Kazakhstan’s own law enforcement agencies or the army, Tokayev was forced to call upon CSTO military forces led by Russia. Arguably, the rapid deployment of CSTO forces to Kazakhstan played a key role in defeating the coup d’état. What price will Kazakhstan need to pay for Putin’s help? “
• “In any event, Kazakhstan now has a rare opportunity, however small, for genuine political reforms. Only time will tell whether cautious optimism about the future is warranted.”

“Is Moldova Next? Brigadoon in a Tough Neighborhood,” Ronald H. Linden, NI, 05.22.22. The author, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, writes:

• “Moldova is small, poor, and vulnerable to economic pressure from Russia. The country covers most of its energy needs with gas from Russia’s Gazprom. This is provided virtually free to Transnistria, where the country’s main electricity generator is located, but at a steadily increasing price to Moldova itself. Some efforts have been made to seek other suppliers, but the war next door has limited those possibilities. Remittances, which provide more than 16 percent of the country’s GDP, have fallen since the war began. The World Bank predicts virtually no growth this year.”
• “The thirty-year existence of independent, democratic Moldova carries a significance that is more symbolic than concrete. Given its past, its heterogeneous makeup, weak economic legacy, and location in a turbulent neighborhood, its very endurance is something miraculous. What it will look like in the future is, to a large extent, dependent on forces that surround it. Like that mythical village, contemporary Moldova is an example of what courage and imagination can create, if only the world will just leave it alone to do so.”