Russia Analytical Report, March 9–16, 2026

3 Ideas to Explore

  1. The Economist outlines three “no good” options for the U.S. and its allies regarding Iran’s nuclear program: a massive special‑forces seizure that is “feasible, though demanding and risky”; recurring strikes that would be “costly” and politically untenable; or “a deal with the regime to end its nuclear threat.” Despite being “an odious compromise,” the Economist concludes a permanent agreement ending enrichment and placing Iran under monitoring “is still the best option.” One part of this last but not least third option could, in theory, be for all of Iran’s HEU to be moved to Russia. In fact, that’s what Putin proposed to Trump in a call last week, but the U.S. leader rejected it, according to Axios.* 
  2. One of multiple reasons why Russia is in no hurry to save Iran, its closest partner in the Middle East, is that the longer the Iran conflict lasts, the greater the chance that the regional infrastructure will be seriously damaged, from which Russia can benefit. This follows from an article written by Alexander Gabuev, Nicole Grajewski and Sergey Vakulenko for Foreign Affairs. If the conflict causes “significant and lasting damage to the Gulf’s energy infrastructure,” then Russian oil and gas could become “indispensable,” pressuring China to build overland pipelines from Russia and forcing Western policymakers to choose between “mounting economic cost” and softer Russia sanctions, according to the trio. For more commentaries on how Russia is or could be benefiting from the war, see: “How the hot war in Iran diminished the cold war with Russia,” Emily Peck, Axios, 03.16.26; “Suspended U.S. Sanctions Add a Political Win to Russia’s Economic Gains,” Ivan Nechepurenko and Paul Sonne, New York Times, 03.13.26; “Vladimir Putin enjoys a huge windfall from the Iran war,” The Economist, 03.13.26; “How Trump suspending sanctions on Russian oil helps Putin’s war effort,” Catherine Belton, Washington Post, 03.14.26; and “Is Russia the Winner of the Iran War?,” Peter Rutland, The National Interest, 03.16.26.
  3. The Wall Street Journal’s Alistair MacDonald and his co-authors contrast the Gulf countries’ and U.S. forces’ use of “multimillion‑dollar Patriot missiles and jet fighters” on Iranian drones costing tens of thousands with Ukraine’s reliance on bullets and other low‑cost methods. Per that contrast, the U.S. strategy against Iranian Shahed drones is shifting from expensive missiles to Ukrainian‑style cheap interceptors. One American official said the U.S. military had watched Ukraine “learn these lessons in blood for four years,” but did not take them seriously “until Iranian drones started killing American troops,” according to Michael Schwirtz of NYT. Now, phones are “ringing off the hook” for Ukraine’s defense firms as the Mideast is burning through expensive interceptors, according to the Economist staff and NYT’s Andrew E. Kramer and his co-authors. For useful charts on the interception of Iranian drones in the Gulf (as well as on the growth of Russian drone usage), follow this link. 

 

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s address to participants in the Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 03.16.26. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Sergey Lavrov frames the current non-proliferation debate explicitly around the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran, condemning the “armed aggression by Israel and the United States” since February 28. He argues that attacking Iran in the midst of indirect Tehran–Washington nuclear talks “has dealt a severe blow to the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the credibility of diplomacy,” and warns that more countries now conclude “only possessing nuclear weapons can reliably guarantee protection,” a trend he presents as a direct proliferation risk.
  • Lavrov situates these developments in a broader arms-control breakdown between Russia and the United States, stressing that the New START treaty “expired on February 5, 2026” and that, although President Vladimir Putin proposed both sides “continue voluntarily to observe its central quantitative limits,” this initiative “received no response from the United States,” according to the minister. He also notes that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty still has “no prospects” of entry into force.
  • Looking ahead, Lavrov links these nuclear disputes to what he portrays as a wider Western-driven erosion of non-proliferation norms, from the “implementation of the US Golden Dome global missile defense project,” which he says foresees space-based interceptors and “poses a significant threat to strategic stability,” to the “excessive politicization” of the OPCW and the lack of a verification regime under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, according to his statement. 

“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks at a meeting with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi,” Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Russian Foreign Ministry, 03.13.26. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Sergey Lavrov opened his meeting with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi by stressing that Russia is “delighted to welcome you to Moscow” and noting that Grossi “traditionally” takes part in the biannual Moscow Nonproliferation Conference. Lavrov said he knew Grossi had held “substantive talks” with Rosatom chief Alexey Likhachev and that he wanted to “talk about the details of some aspects you have mentioned.”
  • Lavrov reminded Grossi that “Russia was one of the countries that stood at the origin of the IAEA, and we still believe that your organization merits broad support.” He argued that in the modern world—“especially over the past few years”—the IAEA, “like any other multilateral organization dealing with non-proliferation issues,” has been “put to the test due to the Western colleagues’ attempts to regain domination in all spheres of global politics.” In this situation, he said, it is “extremely important” to uphold statutory principles such as an “objective and depoliticized approach” and ensure all NPT members have access to the “benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.”

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

“How North Korea Supplied Shells to Russia,” Egor Feoktistov, iStories, 03.16.26. Machine-translated. Clues from Russian Views.

  • Egor Feoktistov reports that the Russian cargo ship Angara, joined later by Lady R, Maya‑1 and Maria, became the backbone of a covert operation that moved “more than nine million” North Korean artillery shells and rockets to Russia over two and a half years, in violation of U.N. sanctions. Working with Britain’s Open Source Centre, iStories used ship-movement records and satellite imagery to estimate that at least 29,488 containers—“from 8 to 11 million” rounds—were carried on at least 112 voyages from the North Korean port of Rajin to Russian military ports such as Dunay and Vostochny, with paperwork falsely listing destinations like Busan and Qingdao.
  • The article shows how Russian border guards and port agents helped sustain the fiction while crews posted photos and videos from North Korean waters and the Dunay naval base on social media. It details one Angara voyage with 50.69 tons of rockets escorted by a Special Communications (Spetssvyaz) courier, Alexander Borovik, and traces the role of sanctioned shipowners MG‑Flot and Sovfracht and their front company “Autoparomnyy gruzovoy terminal.” By early 2025, Ukrainian and Western intelligence assessed that North Korean ammunition made up “from 75% to 100%” of Russia’s daily shelling, though deliveries have recently declined, likely because of Russian production gains and North Korean stockpile limits.

Iran and its nuclear program:

“Why has Trump left Iran’s nuclear stockpile untouched?,” Abigail Hauslohner and Lauren Fedor, Financial Times, 03.14.26.

  • To explain why the stockpile remains untouched, experts stress feasibility and planning. John Tierney, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, warns Iran still has “some 900 pounds of enriched uranium that is still around” and that reaching what is buried at Isfahan and other sites would require “a sizeable number of ground troops” and raises the question: “How do you get 900 pounds [of uranium] safely out of Iran?” A former senior U.S. intelligence official said they “didn’t get the sense . . . that Iran was on the cusp of some breakthrough,” while Senator Ron Wyden, a Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said, “I’ve gone to all the briefings... And I leave scratching my head [because] it doesn’t seem like people thought much about that.”

“Scoop: Trump rejected Putin offer to move Iran’s uranium to Russia,” Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo, Axios, 03.13.26.

  • In a phone call this week, “Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed moving Iran's enriched uranium to Russia as part of a deal to end the war,” but “Trump turned him down,” Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo report, citing sources. A U.S. official told Axios, “This is not the first time it was offered. It hasn't been accepted. The U.S. position is we need to see the uranium secured,” noting that “Russia raised similar proposals during U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations last May” and again “in the weeks before the current war began.” 
  • The authors stress that securing “Iran's 450 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium — convertible to weapons grade within weeks, and enough for more than 10 nuclear bombs — is one of the U.S. and Israel's key war objectives,” and that in theory Putin’s offer “could help facilitate the removal of Iran's nuclear stockpile without U.S. or Israeli boots on the ground.” Yet Trump told Fox News Radio, “We are not focused on that, but at some point we might be,” while acknowledging, “I think [Putin] might be helping them a little bit, yeah,” and adding, “he probably thinks we're helping Ukraine, right? … It's like, hey, they do it and we do it, in all fairness.”

“There are no good options for Iran’s nuclear program,” The Economist, 03.12.26.

  • The article outlines three bad options: a massive special‑forces seizure that is “feasible, though demanding and risky”; recurring strikes that would be “costly” and politically untenable; or “a deal with the regime to end its nuclear threat.” Despite being “an odious compromise,” the article concludes a permanent agreement ending enrichment and placing Iran under monitoring “is still the best option” and a damning indictment that “eight years and two wars later” Trump “has no better options.”

Interview: “Donald Trump warns NATO faces ‘very bad future’ if allies fail to help US in Iran,” Edward Luce, Financial Times, 03.15.26.

  • FT reports that “Donald Trump has warned that NATO faces a “very bad” future if US allies fail to assist in opening up the Strait of Hormuz, sending a blunt message to European nations to join his war effort in Iran.”
  • “The US president told the FT in an interview on Sunday that he could also delay his summit with China’s President Xi Jinping later this month as he presses Beijing to help unblock the crucial waterway,” according to FT.
  • “It’s only appropriate that people who are the beneficiaries of the strait will help to make sure that nothing bad happens there,” Trump said, arguing that Europe and China are heavily dependent on oil from the Gulf, unlike the US. “If there’s no response or if it’s a negative response I think it will be very bad for the future of NATO,” Trump told FT in an 8-minute interview.
  • “We have a thing called NATO,” said Trump, who has often criticized the alliance. “We’ve been very sweet. We didn’t have to help them with Ukraine. Ukraine is thousands of miles away from us . . . But we helped them. Now we’ll see if they help us. Because I’ve long said that we’ll be there for them but they won’t be there for us. And I’m not sure that they’d be there,” Trump told FT. 
  • “Asked whether Russia was helping Iran with satellite data to target US and Israeli anti-missile shields, Trump said: “I don’t know one way or the other. But you could also make the case that we helped Ukraine to an extent. It’s hard to say: ‘you’re targeting us, but we’ve been helping Ukraine,’” FT reported.

“Putin’s ‘Hidden Hand’ Guides Iran’s Strikes in Widening War”, Natalia Drozdiak, Alberto Nardelli and Ellen Milligan, Bloomberg, 03.12.26.

  • The authors report that “Moscow is currently providing Iran with various forms of intelligence, including satellite imagery and drone targeting tactics, in an effort to help Iran hit back at US forces in the region,” a relationship rooted in Russia’s earlier “reliance on deadly Iranian Shahed attack drones in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.” U.K. Defense Secretary John Healey told a London briefing that “no one will be surprised to believe that Putin’s hidden hand is behind some of the Iranian tactics and potentially some of their capabilities as well,” adding that “patterns of Iranian attack have the hallmarks of the way Russia is attacking Ukraine.”
  • They note that in exchange for Shaheds, “Russia has been sharing sensitive military know-how for years,” and Andrea Kendall-Taylor says “the lessons learned have been happening throughout the course of the war in Ukraine, but the implications now are here,” as Moscow can even share its experience “countering US-made weaponry, including Patriot missiles and ATACMS.” While US envoy Steve Witkoff quotes Putin as denying any sharing—“the Russians said that they have not been sharing — that’s what they said, so we can take them at their word”—the piece also recalls that Putin has expressed “unwavering support for Tehran,” congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei, and vowed to “remain a reliable partner of the Islamic Republic.”

“Why Russia Is Watching Iran Burn: The Kremlin Is in No Hurry to Save Its Closest Partner in the Middle East,” Alexander Gabuev, Nicole Grajewski and Sergey Vakulenko, Foreign Affairs, 03.16.26.

  • Gabuev, Grajewski and Vakulenko write that after the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran in February, Russia “mostly stood idly by,” limiting itself to statements about a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” and calls for de‑escalation, but “didn’t do much of substance to aid a key partner in the Middle East.” They argue this fits a “familiar pattern” in which Moscow issues “strongly worded statements and does little else,” as in Nagorno‑Karabakh, Syria and Venezuela, because Russia’s military is tied down in Ukraine and it must balance ties with Gulf partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia while courting the Trump administration over Ukraine.
  • Yet “the current war in Iran has unintended consequences that benefit Russia.” With Hormuz disrupted, “the price of energy will likely continue to rise,” helping Moscow “earn additional revenue and address a ballooning budget deficit,” while a 30‑day U.S. license for Russian crude and reduced Gulf LNG exports “help Russia sell its own liquefied natural gas.” If the conflict causes “significant and lasting damage to the Gulf’s energy infrastructure,” they say, Russian oil and gas could become “indispensable,” pressuring China to build overland pipelines and forcing Western policymakers to choose between “mounting economic cost” and softer sanctions.

“How the hot war in Iran diminished the cold war with Russia,” Emily Peck, Axios, 03.16.26.

  • Emily Peck writes that “the war in Iran has sent oil prices skyrocketing, scrambling an economic conflict with Russia that's been raging for more than a decade,” making it “harder to maintain tight sanctions on Russia — effectively a ‘cold war’ — while also grappling with the economic impact from the ‘hot war’ with Iran.” The Treasury Department’s one‑month waiver on U.S. sanctions for Russian oil already on tankers is meant “to free up supply while the Iranians have 20% of the world's oil blockaded in the Strait of Hormuz,” but Brent still rose to $103, and Richard Nephew of Columbia’s Center on Global Energy Policy notes the volumes involved are only “about eight to 10 days' worth” of normal Hormuz flows.
  • Foreign‑policy veterans warn the move weakens the long‑running sanctions regime funding pressure on Moscow. Eddie Fishman, a former State Department Russia/Europe sanctions lead, says this is “the first major relaxation of sanctions on Russia we've seen, and risks dismantling the regime that we built starting in 2014,” adding that lifting them “reduces the stigma around buying Russian oil.” Brookings fellow and ex‑State economist Kari Heerman argues Washington has effectively chosen “low gas prices and war in Iran” over “pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine,” illustrating how the hot war in Iran is diminishing the cold‑war‑style economic front against Russia.

“Ending Iran War Quickly Carries Big Risks for the U.S. and Allies,” Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 03.11.26.

  • Trofimov warns that if Trump proclaims victory and pulls back, “leaving in place Iran’s theocratic regime—angry, defiant and in possession of its nuclear stockpile and what remains of its arsenal of missiles and drones—would essentially grant Tehran control over the world’s energy markets,” since “around 20% of the world’s oil supplies transited the strait daily before the war started.” Former U.S. official Andrew Tabler asks, “what is to stop its missiles and drones from threatening tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, and the energy infrastructure of America’s Gulf allies at the time of their choosing?” and argues that Iran’s “ability to impact energy prices would be enormous.”
  • He adds that “this war hugely damages U.S. standing in the world, which means that China has much more scope to establish its own standing in the Middle East and the Global South generally,” quoting Steve Tsang’s observation that “everyone is observing that Iran has, at best, a middling military capability—and the Americans can’t take them out.” Eric Brewer cautions that stopping short would leave Iran “in a position where it can produce nuclear weapons, and you also leave Iran potentially with more motive to produce nuclear weapons,” while Brian Katulis says the crisis is exposing “the limits of what air and naval power alone can do,” since priorities like reopening Hormuz and securing enriched uranium “will likely require some ground troops if no diplomatic options are pursued.”

“There will be no regime change in Iran,” Thomas Graham’s interview to Daniil Sechkin, Izvestia, March 2026.

  • Thomas Graham argues that the Trump administration’s main objective in the current conflict is “to limit Iran’s capabilities, primarily in the nuclear sphere, and reduce its military power,” rather than to overthrow the regime. He notes that Trump’s demand for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” is vague and that the president “often talks about the goals and the course of the conflict in different ways,” treating unpredictability as a strength.
  • ” As far as I know, none of the administration representatives has explained how regime change could happen in practice. Therefore, I would say that the main thing now is to limit Iran's nuclear program and reduce its military potential,” Graham said.
  • “Washington is not currently looking for a diplomatic way out of this situation. The administration is determined to continue using force for several more weeks. After that, the White House is supposed to look at how the situation has changed, and then they will decide what to do next,” Graham said.
  • “So far, the United States and its allies have the ability to continue supplying the necessary weapons to Ukraine. I do not think that in the near future, what is happening in the Middle East will significantly weaken the combat capability of the Ukrainian armed forces,” according to Graham.

Podcast: “‘This is Bibi’s War’ - Harvard’s Graham Allison on the Influences and Endgame of the Iran War,” All-In Podcast, 03.09.26.

  • “First point, most important point, is that there's more questions than answers [about the war in Iran] though there's a huge level of uncertainty currently about what's happening and about what's likely to happen,” Allison said. “Part of this is Clausewitz's famous fog of war, but there's a fog of war that's actually increased because we’ve got two big fog machines adding to the confusion, namely Trump and the administration on the one hand, and Bibi on the other, and then we’ve got all the chattering class around this.”
  • “So, I would say why did Trump decide to go to war now? There's six different reasons he and the administration have given and each one they back around. What's the objective? There's five different objectives backing around. And when is this war going to end? You know, a day, a week, a month, who knows? So, it's very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain things are,” Allison said. “But I think the place to start is there's a huge amount of uncertainty.”
  • “Building a new regime, regime change, is something that we know historically doesn't work very well, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Allison said. “The next point slightly more controversial, but I think this is Bibi's war. … He's tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump one, to Biden, and how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, whom I thought had his number, I'm surprised.”
  • “I don't think the arguments that were made, that Trump has actually repeated, that Iran was about to attack us—I see no evidence for that,” Allison said. “That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon—I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the U.S.—I see no evidence for that. There's many, many bad things about the Iranian regime, but not most of the claims that that were made. So, I look at this, and I hope it turns out well, but I remember that in wars very frequently, it's easy to get in and it's quite difficult to get out.”
  • “If you ask about ,what is this [Iran war] meaning for Ukraine? All the Patriots that were to hope to prevent missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine are now in the Middle East. … Unfortunately it unfolds in so many different directions,” Allison said.

Transcript: “America Doesn’t Understand Iran And It Shows,” Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer, The Long Game, 03.12.26.

  • In his discussion with former IDF Iran analyst Danny Citrinowicz, Jake Sullivan underscores how the Iran war benefits Moscow, noting that Russia “absolutely loves the high oil prices that are basically bailing out their economy right now” and warning that if Middle East supplies remain constrained, “even some of our friends in Europe might start looking back to Moscow for help,” as he put it. Citrinowicz adds that Russia, China, and North Korea will “help behind the scene to the Iranians,” providing intelligence and support because “they don’t want to lose the Islamic Republic,” which he calls “a great advantage” for them, even as they also “want to have peace and calm returning back to the Middle East or the Gulf because everything related to the [straits] for them” is vital.
  • Sullivan and Finer repeatedly highlight that a prolonged, strategically mismanaged Iran war risks undercutting Western focus and resources needed to contain Russia and sustain Ukraine. Sullivan describes the United States as being in a “strategic cul-de-sac,” summarizing Citrinowicz’s assessment that “the regime will emerge from this war…more implacable” and “more likely to actually seek a nuclear weapon than they were before the war kicked off,” while still retaining the capability to do so. That outcome, Sullivan argues, means the administration will face rising pressure to keep forces and attention tied down in the Middle East, even as Russia is “already absolutely loving” the oil-price windfall and looking to turn energy leverage and Western distraction into advantages on the Ukraine front.
  • Looking ahead, Citrinowicz explicitly links Iran’s survival and radicalization to a tighter anti-U.S. bloc that includes Moscow and directly affects Ukraine. If the current regime prevails, he predicts, “we’ll see much more close ties between North Korea, China and Russia and everything related to Iran,” stressing that Iran will “rearm…working with China and Russia.” Sullivan reinforces that this convergence—Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran’s confrontation with the U.S. and Israel, and Chinese and North Korean backing—creates a unified strategic problem set: a world in which an emboldened, sanction‑resistant Russia fights on in Ukraine while drawing economic, military, and political support from partners strengthened rather than weakened by Washington’s handling of the Iran conflict.

“The New Khamenei: How America and Israel Solved Iran’s Succession Problem,” Akbar Ganji, Foreign Affairs, 03.12.26.

  • Ganji argues that the joint U.S.–Israeli assassination of Ali Khamenei and strikes on the Assembly of Experts turned Iran’s long‑running succession question into “an opaque emergency process,” making Mojtaba Khamenei “the only viable option for regime survival” in the face of Trump’s public vow that his succession would be “unacceptable” and Israel’s threats to kill any new supreme leader. He notes that, by traditional standards of velayat‑e faqih, Mojtaba is “a midlevel cleric” with “no scholarly work” and no marja confirming his juristic authority, and that even the elder Khamenei once denounced hereditary rule as passing down “a copper ablution pot,” but says humiliation by Washington and Jerusalem pushed the regime to “discard” those principles and elevate a dynastic successor as a symbol of defiance.
  • Ganji writes that Mojtaba’s rise reflects the triumph of hard‑liners in the IRGC, Basij, and Saeed Jalili’s camp, who used their security role after the strikes to “proceed unimpeded,” while reformists and moderates, lacking similar access and constrained by wartime repression, could only issue statements calling for a more broadly acceptable leader. He concludes that Mojtaba is likely to “follow in his father’s footsteps” by further empowering the IRGC, tightening control over media and the internet, and continuing “Tehran’s aggressive foreign policy,” and warns that even further decapitation strikes would probably only “strengthen the regime’s base of religious support” and could yield an outright IRGC military dictatorship, leaving ordinary Iranians trapped “under a repressive regime on the one hand and bombardment on the other.”

“Phones ‘Ringing Off the Hook’ for Ukraine Defense Firms as Mideast Seeks Help,” Andrew E. Kramer, Maria Varenikova and Brendan Hoffman, New York Times, 03.13.26.

  • The authors write that Ukraine, long a recipient of Western security aid, is now offering “a pivotal technology to intercept the exploding drones menacing the region’s oil facilities and shipping,” having sent interceptor drones and teams to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Zelensky says “eleven countries in all” have requested Ukrainian assistance against Shaheds, and Uforce CEO Oleg Rogynskyy says, “This phone has been ringing off the hook,” as demand for Ukrainian drones and drone boats “is skyrocketing” with the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran.
  • The NYT journalists report that some firms can now produce tens of thousands of interceptors monthly—Skyfall says it can make “50,000” P1‑Sun drones and General Cherry “10,000” Bullet interceptors—so that “by last year, Ukrainian companies’ capacity to produce such drones exceeded the government’s budget to buy them.” Anatolii Khrapchynskyi of Fly Group UA underlines the economic edge against Russia’s and Iran’s cheap Shaheds: “War is about technology but also mathematics,” he says, noting that Ukrainian interceptors cost “several thousand dollars each, compared with millions of dollars for the Patriot missiles” currently being fired over the Gulf.

“Gulf states are burning through interceptors,” The Economist, 03.13.26.

  • The Economist notes it was “striking” when Ukraine’s defense ministry said that “in the first three days of the war with Iran, Gulf countries had fired 800 American-made Patriot interceptor missiles at incoming Iranian missiles and drones,” “more… than the 600 Ukraine had fired in four years of war against Russia.” Based on Fabian Hoffmann’s estimates and reported shoot-downs, the article calculates that “some 1,900 interceptors have been used,” and that if commanders are “being extra careful” the tally is “almost 3,000,” suggesting some stocks “may be running low.”
  • The magazine cites work indicating “Saudi Arabia may have bought 1,800 Patriots, Qatar 1,000 and the United Arab Emirates 900,” and says Patriots “cost $3m-6m each,” implying “a combined outgoing on interceptors of at least $5.1bn.” It concludes that usage in the Gulf’s first three days is “comparable” to Ukraine’s entire four years.

“To Fight Iran’s Drones, U.S. Taps Ukraine’s Hard-Earned Knowledge,” Michael Schwirtz, New York Times, 03.13.26.

  • Michael Schwirtz recounts how Eric Schmidt, the former C.E.O. of Google, turned up at the Ukrainian front in 2023 asking drone operators for advice, then abandoned plans to build a battle drone and instead created Merops, an anti‑drone system that, officials say, has used “small, cheap interceptor drones to take out thousands of long-range Russian attack drones, saving untold numbers of lives.” U.S. officials told the Times the Pentagon is now “racing to deliver thousands of Merops interceptors to the Middle East” because existing air defenses like Patriot batteries—designed for fast ballistic missiles—are too costly and overstretched after the United States has already fired “some 800 Patriot missiles since the Iran war began two weeks ago,” more than Ukraine has used in its entire war.
  • One American official said the U.S. military had watched Ukraine “learn these lessons in blood for four years,” but did not take them seriously “until Iranian drones started killing American troops.” Volodymyr Zelensky argues Ukraine is “the world’s biggest laboratory for the technologies that will shape the future of warfare,” saying partners now “realize that Ukraine can be helpful, that our expertise is of value,” and that “we really can help to defend people.”

“The Middle East Needs to Learn How Ukraine Stops Cheap Drones,” Alistair MacDonald, Stephen Kalin and Ievgeniia Sivorka, Wall Street Journal, 03.15.26.

  • WSJ reports that the U.S. and Gulf states have been firing “multimillion-dollar Patriot missiles and jet fighters” at Iranian Shahed drones costing “tens of thousands of dollars,” whereas Ukraine prefers “a hail of bullets and other cheaper methods.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Kyiv has dispatched “three teams of dozens of experts to the Middle East to help assess and demonstrate how to defend against drones,” hoping this is a first step toward “long-term deals for drones and counterdrone technology.”
  • The article reports Qatar and others have high missile‑intercept rates but limited “affordable” ways to shoot down low‑flying UAVs; Qatar even sold Gepard anti‑aircraft guns to Germany that now protect Ukraine with “a burst of bullets that cost in the low thousand dollars,” according to Rheinmetall. Former Pentagon budget official Elaine McCusker estimates the U.S. likely fired about $5.7 billion of interceptors in the war’s first four days, prompting ex–acting defense secretary Chris Miller to ask, “Who’s going to run out first?” and to argue Washington has been fixated on “state-of-the-art technology.” Ukrainian spokesman Col. Yuriy Ihnat calls his country’s painful experience “highly instructive” for the rest of the world.

“Defeating Iranian drones means listening to Ukraine,” Luke Zahner and Robert Benson, Stars and Stripes, 03.12.26.

  • Luke Zahner and Robert Benson argue that “Iranian-designed drones are reshaping modern warfare — and some of the most important lessons about how to defeat them are coming from Ukraine.” They write that small, cheap Shaheds “present a challenge traditional air-defense networks were never designed to confront,” and that “for more than four years, Ukraine has defended its cities, energy infrastructure, and military forces against waves of Iranian-designed Shahed drones deployed by Russia.” According to Ukrainian commanders, they note, Ukraine is now using “highly specialized first-person-view (FPV) interceptor drones designed to destroy Shahed drones in midair,” with “interception rates approaching 70%.”
  • “Far from lacking leverage, Ukraine is rapidly becoming a hinge point for defensive warfighting,” the authors contend, pointing out that Volodymyr Zelenskyy “confirmed that the U.S. has asked Kyiv for assistance” against Shaheds in the Middle East — an “unusual reversal” that shows the relationship “is not simply a flow of assistance in one direction.” They describe Ukraine as “one of the world’s most active laboratories for modern warfare,” where “prototypes can move from design to combat deployment in weeks rather than years,” and argue that by combining “Ukraine’s battlefield-driven innovation” with America’s “unrivaled defense industrial base,” the U.S.–Ukraine partnership “may prove to be one of America’s most valuable strategic advantages.”

See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“How Russia’s Scorched-Earth Attacks Put Ukraine’s Power Grid Near Collapse,” Constant Méheut, New York Times, 03.12.26.

  • Méheut reports that from December to February “Ukraine endured 15 large-scale attacks on its energy facilities involving swarms of drones and missiles, more than three times the average number of attacks over the past three winters of war,” and that this winter the country faced a power shortfall of “5 to 6 gigawatts… roughly a third” of peak demand. DTEK data show that in January “Kyiv residents spent half of every day without power on average,” and that on Jan. 31 “virtually all of Kyiv went dark for a few hours” as strikes cut power to 100 percent of customers; the accompanying chart, “Customers without power in Kyiv,” shows the daily peak share of customers without electricity rising from roughly 25–40 percent in late 2025 to peaks above 75 percent, with a full blackout at the end of January.
  • He notes that one key site, CHPP‑4, which “supplies heat to about 1,100 multistory buildings and dozens of schools and hospitals,” was hit by “five missiles” in early February, leaving “half a million residents” without heat as temperatures fell to “5 degrees Fahrenheit.” Energy researcher Vladyslav Mikhnych concludes that “worst-case planning is not optional for Ukraine; it is a necessity,” warning that any belief Russia would respect “certain limits” or “red lines” “should be gone after what Ukrainians went through this winter.” For a useful NYT chart on customers without power in Kyiv, follow this link.

“Ukrainians Retreat to Villages After Russian Bombing Turns Off Power in Cities,” Oksana Grytsenko, Wall Street Journal, 03.09.26.

  • Grytsenko reports that Russian strikes on infrastructure left “hundreds of thousands of Kyiv residents without power or heating for long stretches this winter, as temperatures dropped to minus 4 degrees Fahrenheit,” prompting Mayor Vitali Klitschko to urge people “to leave the city if they had somewhere to go” and saying “about 600,000 had already done so.” One Kyiv resident, Radoslava Kabachiy, describes two weeks without heat and five days without power before she and her husband “packed up essentials, including their cat Frida,” and moved 30 miles south to a village house, explaining, “In a village, you always find refuge, food and something that helps you to hold up emotionally.”

“Lessons from Ukraine for Defending Gulf Airspace from Shaheds,” Dimko Zhluktenko, War on the Rocks, 03.10.26.

  • Zhluktenko argues that Russia’s coordinated waves of “cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, Shahed drones, and decoys”—sometimes “over 800 Shahed-type drones in one night”—are designed to “probe and exhaust air-defense systems,” deplete interceptors, and force defenders into “bad trades (expensive shots against cheap targets).” Because Ukraine “cannot afford to fight Shaheds primarily with top-tier interceptor missiles,” which are scarce and reserved for higher‑end threats, he says Kyiv has built a “layered, redundant, sustainable” small‑air‑defense ecosystem of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, radars, digital situational awareness, and conventional air defenses.
  • He reports that interceptor drones now form a key operational layer: crews launch FPV or fixed‑wing drones costing “between $800 and $3,000,” guided by radar-fed digital tools, and in February “flew roughly 6,300 missions” that destroyed “more than 1,500 Russian drones,” with “more than 70 percent of Shahed-type drones in the Kyiv area” reportedly downed by interceptors. Warning that Shahed/Geran systems are rapidly evolving with Western components and decoys, he concludes that if U.S. counter‑drone plans in the Gulf rely mainly on Patriots and manned aircraft, they will face the same “munition scarcity, crew fatigue, and tactical chaos” as Ukraine, and that adopting Ukrainian‑style interceptor layers, sensors, doctrine, and training is essential as “Ukraine’s drone-centric warfare has changed all the next theaters of warfare.”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“First Ukraine, Now Iran: A New Era of Drone Warfare Takes Hold,” Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn, Council on Foreign Relations, 03.13.26. For useful charts on Russian drone usage growth and interception of Iranian drones in the Gulf, follow this link.

  • Horowitz and Kahn argue that the Ukraine war ushered in an age of “precise mass,” in which states can field “low-cost precision weapons and sensors at scale,” and note that Russia, Iran, and Ukraine have all shown it is possible to produce “tens of thousands to millions of drones per year since 2022.” They point out that Iran’s Shahed‑136, which inspired Russia’s Geran‑2 and the U.S. LUCAS, costs only “between $20,000 and $50,000 per unit” and that Russia is now “aiming to produce up to one thousand Geran‑2… every day,” whereas U.S. industry hopes merely to reach about “five hundred Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles” a year in the future.
  • They stress that defenders are on “the wrong side of the cost curve” against weapons like Shaheds and Gerans: a Patriot interceptor at roughly “$4 million dollars per missile” may be used to shoot down a $35,000 drone, and even a cheaper Coyote costs “$125,000 per shot.” Ironically, they note, U.S. air defenses “to protect against Iran’s strikes are eliminating stockpiles that Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russia,” with Zelensky saying that more Patriots were used in the Middle East “in three days than Ukraine has used since Russia invaded in 2022,” underscoring how Russia’s cheap precise-mass systems are straining Western arsenals.Top of Form

For WSJ’s chart on Ukraine’s rate of interception of attack drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, follow this link. 

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Ukraine peace talks fizzle out as Trump’s focus shifts to Iran,” Ben Hall, Max Seddon, Henry Foy and Amy Mackinnon, Financial Times, 03.14.26.

  • The FT reports that “the US-led peace process in Ukraine is fizzling out because Donald Trump is losing interest in the talks and his war against Iran is easing pressure on Russia,” with one senior European official warning that negotiations are now “really in the danger zone.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov admitted that “a pause has indeed appeared in the talks. The Americans have other priorities, and that’s understandable,” while an EU diplomat said “the Middle East has severely reoriented political attention” away from Ukraine — “for us, and for Ukraine, it’s a disaster.” Volodymyr Zelensky argued that Washington’s move to relax oil sanctions on Moscow “certainly does not help peace.”
  • According to the FT, Trump “was disinclined to discuss in detail” Ukraine with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and “remains convinced that Russia is strong and Ukraine is weak,” as U.S. officials told Europeans “there would be no further sanctions on Russia’s oil industry.” Andrew Weiss said “the administration has consistently avoided putting pressure on Moscow and has focused instead on offering incentives,” while Oleksandr Merezhko insisted that “the obstacles are still the same, Putin has no interest in achieving a result, he’s only interested in negotiations because it allows him to avoid sanctions from Trump.”

“Russians say Iran attack shows U.S. can’t be trusted in Ukraine talks,” Mary Ilyushina, Natalia Abbakumova and David L. Stern, Washington Post, 03.11.26.

  • Russian commentators ask whether “negotiations with the United States always end with missiles hitting the capital,” with Moskovsky Komsomolets warning that Trump is “devouring” Russian allies while “lulling us to sleep with fairy tales about unprecedented prospects for Russian-American cooperation” and urging, “Perhaps it is time to wake up?” Fyodor Lukyanov says the U.S.–Israeli campaign in Iran “marks a transition to a different type of international relations” where “at any moment, you can move from being a person sitting across the table to becoming a victim,” asking, “How can negotiations even be conducted in such a situation?”
  • A Russian academic close to diplomats says the Iran strike creates “an unpleasant background for further U.S.-Russian talks,” complaining that it “undermines trust and to some degree discredits the U.S. as a mediator” when Washington “allows itself such actions in relation to a Russian partner.” Vladimir Pastukhov argues the pattern from “Belgrade in 1999 to Tehran in 2026” convinces Moscow that “those who strike last are trampled first,” so from the Kremlin’s view it is now harder “to convince Putin that he was wrong about anything,” as he tells allies, “We would have been in their place.”

“Levada Poll Shows Rising Support for Peace Talks, But Devil In Details,” RM Staff, Russia Matters, 03.12.26.

  • “A recent survey by the Levada Center indicates that while a large majority of Russians express support for the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine and for its strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, support for peace negotiations has reached its highest level to date.”
  • “The survey, which Levada conducted on Feb. 18-25 and released on March 3, shows 72.2% of respondents support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, down from 75.8% in January 2026. Opposition to these actions stands at 16.7%, slightly higher than 15.8% in Jan. 2026. Compared with most of 2023–2025 (typically 74–78% support), the latest figures suggest modestly declining support, although backing for the war remains above 70%, indicating continued majority approval.”
  • “Another question in Levada’s latest poll on Ukraine addressed Russian military’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Respondents were asked whether they consider such strikes justified or unacceptable. In February 2026, a majority of respondents—about 57%—said such strikes are justified, while around 20% said they are unacceptable.”
  • “Last but not least, Levada pollsters asked respondents whether military actions should continue or whether peace negotiations should begin. In February 2026, a record high of 67.2% said peace negotiations should begin, while 24.3% said military actions should continue, with the remainder unable to answer. At the same time, the 24.3% in support of military action recorded in February 2026 is the lowest level observed, while 67.2% supporting negotiations is the highest level recorded since the question was first asked.”
  • See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“How Putin Views Trump’s War in Iran,” Joshua Yaffa, The New Yorker, 03.11.26.

  • Yaffa writes that for years Putin championed a world where “power and interests, not norms or international law, drove state behavior,” but now finds that “this was supposed to be the Putin model,” and, as analyst Hanna Notte puts it, “now that it’s Trump who is carrying it out, it only exposes the limits of Russian power.” A Moscow foreign‑policy source says Iran has been “a valuable asset” in Russia’s project to build alternative alliances, yet after the rapid loss of Assad, Maduro, and Khamenei as clients “it was as if Putin’s project to undermine the world order was being blown apart by an even greater disruption,” leaving Russia “longing for the bygone world of rules, norms, and institutions.”
  • Despite that, the Kremlin sees Ukraine as the only real priority: “the outcome of that war will represent the ultimate verdict on Russian power,” Notte says, and the Moscow source explains that “if there remains any chance at all that Trump can help with Ukraine, that’s enough of an argument not to create problems for yourself in other areas.” Economically, Alexandra Prokopenko estimates that if current oil prices hold, “Russia stands to net an additional three and a half billion dollars in revenue a month—as much as a third of the estimated total monthly cost of the war in Ukraine,” but warns that “the Russian economy is stagnating not because there isn’t money but, rather, because it has become wrapped in knots due to the war in Ukraine,” so the Iran windfall means that Putin “got lucky” and can “put that off a while longer,” but only temporarily.

“Russia’s European Enclave Is Its Soft Underbelly,” Paul Hockenos, Foreign Policy, 03.10.26.

  • Hockenos writes that Kaliningrad, once “an armed-to-the-teeth battle post and principal naval base for Russia’s Baltic fleet,” is now “an isolated and besieged island surrounded by angry enemies,” cut off from easy access to EU markets and travel and reachable from Russia only by sea, air routes that avoid EU airspace, and “a sealed train across 150 miles of Lithuanian territory.” He notes that with Finland and Sweden in NATO, “eight NATO nations now have Baltic Sea coastlines” while Russia has only Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, and that NATO’s conventional superiority in the region “is unquestioned as never before.”
  • Exiled journalist Sergey Faldin says that “now all of that is over,” recalling that before the war “a resident of Kaliningrad could easily travel to Poland (Gdansk) and buy IKEA products or Polish or EU products,” whereas today crossing the border reveals “less products on the shelves, the Russian propaganda, etc.,” underscoring “just how different life looks like in Kaliningrad compared to a few hundred kilometers to the west.” Former Transparency International Kaliningrad head Ilia Shumanov adds that although quality of life has “degenerated in diverse ways” and many feel “betrayed,” civil society has been hollowed out as activists flee, so “there is little fear of a from-below insurgence.”
  • On the military and energy fronts, Hockenos cites analyst Maciej Bukowski’s warning that Kaliningrad is now “on its own” electrically after being disconnected from the post‑Soviet grid, and that Lithuania’s decision to keep gas transit reflects that “cutting off the route for Russian gas would be an escalation and very risky,” but also “a card that Lithuania can keep in its hand.” He closes with University of Bath professor Stephen Hall’s observation that tensions are so high “that a single ‘itchy trigger finger’ in the region could spark a full-fledged war,” and that in such a case Russia’s supposed advantage—its Baltic enclave—“could quickly transform into its opposite.”

Statement by SACEUR Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 03.12.26.

  • Gen. Alexus Grynkewich warns that the United States faces “one of the most dangerous strategic environments in our Nation’s history,” in which “China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others are increasing their collaboration and cooperation as their interests align against the United States and our Allies,” according to his testimony. He describes Russia as “an enduring regional challenger,” and says the Russia‑Ukraine war illustrates Moscow’s willingness to use force “at significant human and financial cost” to expand its control and influence, the general wrote. Grynkewich emphasizes that “Russia’s partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea have emboldened Moscow’s war effort against Ukraine,” noting that “Iran has produced and shared missiles and drones—and the underlying technology—with the Russian military,” while North Korea has committed troops, munitions, and materiel, the commander stated.
  • On Ukraine specifically, Grynkewich explains that the President’s objectives are “to stop the bloodshed, achieve a ceasefire, and settle the conflict,” and that USEUCOM is supporting a U.S.‑brokered peace process “with military planning for peace monitoring to inform diplomatic negotiations,” according to the author. At the same time, he notes that USEUCOM “coordinates and executes U.S. security assistance to Ukraine alongside NATO Allies,” including President Trump’s directive to transfer additional interceptors for previously donated air‑defense systems such as PATRIOT and NASAMS, the statement says. Grynkewich highlights that European Allies and partners have committed “more than €300 billion in financial, humanitarian, and military assistance to Ukraine since February 2022,” and argues that sustaining this support while managing the broader challenge posed by Russia and its partners, including Iran, is central to USEUCOM’s mission and to reestablishing strategic stability in Europe.
  • In his statement Grynkewich flags that “Russia continues to hold the largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world” and maintains “increasingly lethal air and maritime capabilities.” That nuclear arsenal is part of why he calls Russia an “enduring regional challenger” capable of threatening the U.S. homeland as well as Allies in Europe. The broader goal, he says, is to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass” and mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European Allies.

“‘World War III is already underway’: Zelenskyy advisor Mykhailo Podolyak on what the new Middle East war means for Ukraine,” Meduza, 03.10.26. Clues from Ukrainian Views.

  • Podolyak argues that “World War III is already underway,” describing “hot zones, like the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as numerous hybrid theaters,” and says Trump’s “political eccentricity” has “accelerated many irreversible processes,” forcing Europe “to become a real geopolitical actor.” He envisions a “logical conclusion” to the Iran war as a “reconfiguration of the government” in Tehran—“abandoning the ideological doctrine of strict Islamization, opening Iran to the global energy market, a total reduction of its military complex, and ending the financing of Hezbollah”—and maintains that “the ayatollah regime… has reached its end,” just as he believes the systems of “Kim Jong Un and Putin” are “not competitive” and ultimately unsustainable.

“The Irresistible Urge to Invoke World War III,” Jo Inge Bekkevold, Foreign Policy, 03.12.26.

  • Bekkevold stresses that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is “a serious conflict with devastating consequences” but remains “a regional war,” arguing that “military operations only take place in Ukraine and Russia” and that “there is no direct military confrontation between the United States and China.” He concludes that, for that reason, “the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war will not have any systemic effects,” and says that in this regard it “resembles the Korean War,” which also failed to transform the global balance of power despite U.S.–Chinese combat.
  • On the current Middle East conflict, he likewise calls it “a regional war—notwithstanding U.S. involvement” and notes that it “is not linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine, despite reports that Russia is feeding Iran with intelligence about U.S. military targets and Russia’s use of Iranian Shahed drones to attack Ukraine.” Looking ahead, he warns that in a U.S.–China crisis over Taiwan, “Russia may use a war in Asia as an opportunity to test European and U.S. resolve in Europe,” illustrating how Moscow could exploit regional wars even if they fall far short of a true World War III.

“War Triggers Growing Rift in Trans-Atlantic Alliance Over Russia,” Bojan Pancevski and Max Colchester, Wall Street Journal, 03.13.26.

  • The Wall Street Journal reports that the Iran war is “triggering an increasingly bitter dispute in the trans-Atlantic alliance” as Europeans argue it is “inadvertently strengthening Russia, which Europe sees as a greater threat than Iran.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the Trump administration’s decision to temporarily lift some sanctions on Russian oil, saying, “We consider the loosening of sanctions, for whatever reason, to be wrong,” and asking “the motives behind this decision.” He said that in a pre‑announcement G‑7 call “all except Trump agreed it would be wrong to lift sanctions designed to slash Russia’s revenues and force it to negotiate an end to its invasion of Ukraine.”
  • Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent insisted the waiver on oil already at sea “will not provide significant financial benefit to the Russian government,” but European officials note analysts now estimate Moscow earns about $150 million a day from oil sales. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned the U.S. decision “could give Russia about $10 billion” and “certainly does not help peace.” Analyst Ivan Krastev argues Europeans “should wake up and start believing” that “the trans-Atlantic relationship no longer matters,” while Eurasia Group’s Mujtaba Rahman says the EU “did not offer a forceful response” and “had no say” in prewar diplomacy.

“The War That Cracked the Postwar Order Illusion,” Anastasia Edel, Foreign Policy, 03.12.26.

  • Edel argues that it is Russia’s war in Ukraine that “cracked the postwar order illusion,” revealing that the decades‑old Western system of U.S. leadership, NATO unity, and collective deterrence was more assumption than enforced reality. She writes that Russia has “morphed into an openly militaristic, anti-Western country,” with a society that once said “anything but war” now “reconciled…to the role of aggressor,” and that “Western hopes that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine would catalyze resistance to [Vladimir] Putin’s regime proved misplaced,” as “Putin’s grip on power has not been challenged” and the public has “acquiesced.”
  • She stresses that sanctions “have hurt Russia, but not enough to incapacitate the war machine,” since “China provides financial and economic support, energy revenues still flow, and domestic factories produce enough ammunition to sustain a prolonged conflict.” In Edel’s view, “the more that the United States signals its readiness to compromise, the more that Putin is encouraged to believe that time and pressure work in his favor,” because his “stated goal—the elimination of Ukraine’s sovereignty—has not changed,” and if Western leaders want him to negotiate seriously they must “dramatically raise the cost for Russia to continue fighting” by squeezing oil revenues and giving Ukraine the capabilities to change the battlefield balance.

“America’s imperial trap in Iran,” Fareed Zakaria, Washington Post, 03.13.26.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Trump’s choices are only pushing China and Russia closer together,” Alexander Gabuev, Financial Times, 03.12.26.

  • Gabuev recalls Trump bragging that “the one thing you never want to happen is you never want Russia and China uniting. I’m going to have to un-unite them,” but says that “fourteen months into his second presidency, Trump’s actions are having precisely the opposite effect,” as America’s war in the Middle East “looks set to bring Beijing and Moscow’s asymmetrical interdependence to a whole new level.” He notes that in 2025 Russia supplied “17.9 per cent of Beijing’s oil imports and 27.8 per cent of natural gas,” and that with Venezuelan and Gulf barrels now disrupted or controllable by Washington, “Russia looks like Beijing’s quickest and most obvious hedge,” so much so that “the new five-year economic development plan adopted by Beijing this week includes a new gas pipeline from Russia” that “could be completed in under five years” [if Xi approves the plan.]
  • On Moscow’s side, Gabuev writes that “the Kremlin has no choice but to redirect its energy flows eastward,” facing “mounting risks to its westward-oriented energy export infrastructure” from Ukrainian strikes and EU moves against its shadow fleet, while “Beijing can be sure that Russia will continue to sell below market prices.” He concludes that “Trump’s chaotic policy choices are pushing Russia into an unprecedented degree of vassalage to China,” with “energy trade in renminbi coupled with western sanctions and China’s industrial dominance” leaving the Kremlin “with few options but to crawl even further into Beijing’s pocket,” a “vicious” cycle for Russia but “virtuous for China.”

“Chinese-Style World Leadership: Why Beijing Isn’t Rushing to Rescue Iran”, Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov, Carnegie Politika, 03.05.26.

  • Gabuev and Umarov observe that after U.S.–Israeli strikes “put the Iranian regime on the brink of survival,” Tehran’s supposed CRINK partners—China and Russia—have done little beyond statements: “neither Moscow nor Beijing came to the brotherly regime’s real aid.” Russia’s passivity, they say, can be explained because “almost all modern S‑400 air-defense systems, aircraft, and missiles that would be useful to the Iranians are tied up in the war with Ukraine,” and because the Kremlin “continues negotiations with the Trump administration,” so “openly opposing him in the Middle East could be risky for Moscow’s own priorities.”
  • For China, they argue, “diversification has become the main principle of foreign policy,” and although Iran supplied “13 percent of China’s total oil imports” in 2025 and Hormuz carries a third of its oil and a quarter of its gas, Beijing also has far larger, easier ties with Gulf monarchies and Israel. China “has never given anyone formal security guarantees” and prefers “to invest in partners’ economies, buy their resources, and train their police,” but “will not take responsibility for their security,” seeing that as unnecessary for great‑power status in the twenty‑first century. Ultimately, they write, even if Iran’s regime falls, any new leadership “will have to reckon with China, which monopolistically supplies technologies there and is the main buyer of Iranian oil,” whereas for Beijing “it is much easier to find other suppliers—like Russia—than it is for Tehran to find other buyers,” so there is “no need to get involved in a regional war with an unpredictable outcome.”

“China and Russia are capturing the global space sector,” Jana Robinson, Financial Times, 03.11.26.

  • Robinson writes that China and Russia “share a common playbook: swoop into aspiring space nations with ‘package deals’ that are difficult to refuse, under the guise of benign commercial transactions,” bundling “satellites, launch and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services, ground stations, operating personnel and subsidized credits.” She says her institute calls this hidden agenda “space sector capture,” and reports that an analysis of “644 entities and 807 deals in 125 countries between 1990 and 2026 found that China has overtaken Russia as the global leader in this strategic brand of space commerce,” with “some 28 countries now” having their “space sovereignty compromised.”
  • She cites Venezuela as a “cautionary case of full-spectrum space sector capture,” noting that since 2004 “China has concluded seven space deals with Caracas and Russia three,” including Russian construction of “a ground and measurement station, enabling PNT services tied to Moscow’s global navigation satellite system,” and two Chinese-built ground stations “at the same military base.” Robinson warns that Beijing and Moscow are “intent on collecting the ‘votes’ of these compromised nations in multilateral space forums” and urges Western governments to “compete with these authoritarian space enterprises,” arguing that it would be “a grave oversight not to shift some attention to this adversary-driven ‘ground game.’”

“The Brics Bloc Is a House of Cards,” Sadanand Dhume, Wall Street Journal, 03.11.26.

  • Dhume argues that the Iran war shows fears of a coherent anti‑Western BRICS front are “overblown,” writing that the bloc has proved “utterly ineffectual, unable to come up with a unified response to an international crisis.” He notes that while “four” of the five core members criticized U.S.‑Israeli strikes, “India, which holds the Brics presidency this year, has refused to condemn the U.S. and Israel,” and says the group’s “anti‑Western core—consisting of China, Russia and Iran—is tempered by countries with no interest in a confrontational stand against the U.S. and its allies.”
  • Calling BRICS unity “laughable,” he points out that “since the war’s outbreak, Iran has pummeled the U.A.E., a fellow Brics member, with missiles and drones.” India’s behavior, Dhume writes, shows that “countries tend to place their national interest above vague notions of non‑Western solidarity,” with Narendra Modi condemning attacks on the UAE, calling its ruler his “brother,” and not even phoning Tehran, while India’s trade with Gulf states was “more than $180 billion” in 2024 versus just “$1.6 billion” with Iran.

“Targeting the Russian Rear Zone in a Hypothetical Baltic War,” Leah Pedro, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 03.11.26.

  • Pedro argues that if Russia ever attacked the Baltic states, “the Baltic States themselves would not permit war to remain confined to their lands alone,” and that FOFA‑style strikes on Russia’s rear—“the band of territory which is directly pertinent to the sustainment of the close battle”—would be “much more sensible operational actions” than simply expanding ground combat. She maps a 50‑kilometer‑deep Russian (and Belarusian) rear zone, highlighting key bridges and rail hubs from the Narva axis near St. Petersburg to Pskov and Velikiye Luki, and notes that the Pskov–Rēzekne rail line runs “barely even 50 meters” from Latvia’s border, creating “innumerable opportunities for sabotage… by Latvian and other NATO special forces” that would force Moscow “to commit substantial resources to fully secure it.”
  • She writes that similar vulnerabilities exist along axes out of Belarus and from Kaliningrad, whose entire territory “is within the range of air and missile strikes from both Lithuania and Poland” and is “crisscrossed with various rivers, resulting in perhaps dozens of bridges whose destruction could truly impede the operation of Russian armed forces.” Although such attacks would not by themselves “solve the military problems of defending against potential Russian aggression,” Pedro concludes that degrading rear‑area infrastructure would “weaken Russian military pressure on the front,” buy time for NATO reinforcements, and is likely part of what Baltic generals mean when they talk about “bringing the war to Russia.”

Missile defense:

  • No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“How Should We Now View Trump and U.S. Policy as a Whole?,” Dmitry Trenin, Profil, 03.14.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. 

Counterterrorism:

  • No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

  • No significant developments.

Cyber security/AI: 

“Deception and Detection: Why Artificial Intelligence Empowers Cyber Defense over Offense,” Lennart Maschmeyer, International Security, Winter 2025/2026.

  • Lennart Maschmeyer notes that despite predictions of an AI revolution in cyber warfare, “there has been no transformative change in the speed, scale, or impact of cyberattacks.” Russia-based hacking groups, among others, have primarily used LLMs for automating “low-level social engineering tasks” and “basic coding” rather than developing and executing revolutionary techniques. Ultimately, Maschmeyer argues AI improves both cyber offense and defense but “defense has more to gain” since “core defensive tasks,” like rapid detection, play to AI’s strengths.
  • Maschmeyer notes “there are already indications that Russia is increasingly relying on sabotage rather than cyber operations to weaken and destabilize the Western alliance from within.” He suggests that the defensive advantages of AI increase the costs and risks of detection and make cyber instruments a “less attractive” instrument of power to state actors. 
  • Ukraine illustrates the potential of “long-term cyber aggression” to train defenders, improve resilience, and “rais[e] the bar for offensive actors.” Further, “the superior learning potential of AI” across large datasets provides additional opportunities to train models against adversary techniques. This suggests to Maschmeyer that long-term offensive cyber campaigns that “pursue cumulative effects” are “likely to decrease” in value over time. 

“Cascade of A.I. Fakes About War With Iran Causes Chaos Online,” Stuart A. Thompson and Alexander Cardia, New York Times, 03.14.26.

  • The New York Times reports that “a torrent of fake videos and images generated by artificial intelligence have overrun social networks during the first weeks of the war in Iran,” adding “a chaotic and confusing layer to the conflict online.” The Times “identified over 110 unique A.I.-generated images and videos” about the war in two weeks, viewed “millions of times” on X, TikTok and Facebook, noting that similar content spread in “the war between Ukraine and Russia” but “we’re probably seeing far more A.I.-related content now than we ever have before,” according to Marc Owen Jones of Northwestern University in Qatar.
  • See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Energy exports from CIS:

“Suspended U.S. Sanctions Add a Political Win to Russia’s Economic Gains,” Ivan Nechepurenko and Paul Sonne, New York Times, 03.13.26.

  • Nechepurenko and Sonne report that Trump’s decision to “temporarily lift some restrictions on Russian oil” has given the Kremlin a “geopolitical victory” on top of a budget windfall from prices that have “soared over $100 a barrel.” Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev boasted that the U.S. is “effectively acknowledging the obvious: without Russian oil, the global energy market cannot remain stable,” and said on social media that “EU bureaucrats will soon be forced to recognize this reality, acknowledge their strategic blunders, and atone.”
  • They note that about “137 million barrels of Russian crude” were already on the water, and that Urals crude’s discount to Brent has “almost disappearing,” so that, as Robin Brooks puts it, Russian oil has gone “from global pariah to now being extremely sought after.” Sergey Vakulenko estimates that “Russia’s budget is set to gain more than $1.6 billion per month from each $10 increase” in its crude price, and Argus data show Urals up about “$30 per barrel since before the war with Iran,” meaning “more than $150 million extra every day” for a budget that already spends “more than a third” on the war in Ukraine.Top of Form

“Vladimir Putin enjoys a huge windfall from the Iran war,” The Economist, 03.13.26.

  • “The ship’s U-turn is a metaphor for the dramatic reversal in the fortunes of Russia’s energy industry since the start of the Iran war,” The Economist writes, as “the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz has trapped around 15% of the world’s oil in the Gulf” and lifted Brent from “a five-year low of $59 a barrel” to “around $100.” Robin Brooks reckons Russia could reap another “2022-style windfall,” while exiled Russian energy expert Sergey Vakulenko estimates that every $10 Brent increase boosts exports by $2.8 billion, $1.6 billion of which “goes to the Kremlin.”
  • Yet the weekly warns the windfall may be a mere “sugar high.” Thane Gustafson argues it “does little to solve its deeper problems,” with sanctions, “a rapacious taxman,” minimal spare capacity and war-degraded infrastructure meaning higher prices “will not prevent Russia’s oil output from declining by 3% a year.”

“How Trump suspending sanctions on Russian oil helps Putin’s war effort,” Catherine Belton, Washington Post, 03.14.26.

  • Russia is “reveling” in the Trump administration’s 30 day license allowing traders to buy Russian crude already on tankers, a move Kirill Dmitriev hailed as proof that “the global energy market cannot remain stable without Russian oil” and that “a further softening of restrictions on Russian energy producers looks more and more inevitable.” Economist Janis Kluge warned “all of this has been upended,” while Borys Dodonov said “Russia will have enough money to balance its budget and even start to accumulate some money in its national wealth fund,” calling Vladimir Putin “the biggest winner.”
  • Volodymyr Zelensky cautioned the waiver “could give Russia about $10 billion” and “certainly does not help peace,” while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said “easing sanctions now, for whatever reason, would be wrong.” Kluge fears it could “lead to more damage to the sanctions regime in the future.”

“Is Russia the Winner of the Iran War?” Peter Rutland, The National Interest, 03.16.26.

  • Peter Rutland argues that in the short term Russia gains significantly from the Iran war: Brent has jumped from $60 to over $103, Russian Urals from under $40 to $89, and the discount to India and China has shrunk from $25 to $4–5 per barrel, while a U.S. 30‑day waiver on Indian purchases and disruptions to Gulf aluminum and fertilizer exports further boost Russian revenues. He estimates the price spike could deliver an extra $3–4 billion a month—$30–40 billion if elevated prices last six months—just as Moscow was facing a large budget deficit and planning cuts. At the same time, U.S. missiles and interceptors diverted to the Gulf leave fewer available for Ukraine, even as only U.S.-made systems can reliably stop Russian ballistic missiles.
  • Yet Rutland stresses that Russia’s inability or unwillingness to shield a “strategic partner” from devastating U.S.–Israeli strikes badly undercuts its prestige. Despite a 2025 partnership treaty, BRICS membership for Iran, and reports of nuclear cooperation, “Russia did not lift a finger” when Iran’s program was hit, and Russian commentators now marvel at U.S. “ruthless efficiency” while fretting that “Cuba is next” and “Trump is devouring our allies one by one.” Official rhetoric stays mild and avoids criticizing Trump by name—Putin is betting on him to impose a Ukraine deal—but if reports that Russia supplied targeting intelligence to Iran are confirmed, Rutland warns it could alienate Gulf states and damage Trump’s trust in Putin. Overall, he concludes, Russia enjoys a tactical windfall but faces long‑term strategic uncertainty that hinges on how long the war and the Hormuz shutdown last.

“How the War in Iran Is Affecting Russian Energy,” Maxim Blant, Russia.Post, 02.11.26.

  • Maxim Blant argues that “the current conflagration in the Middle East has brought short-term benefits to Russia in the form of soaring oil and gas prices,” so that “at this stage, Russia currently appears to be the main beneficiary of the war in the Persian Gulf,” even as Urals “has not gone above $67” and spot prices leave oil income “below that assumed in Russia’s federal budget.” He notes that India, “critically dependent on supplies from the Persian Gulf,” has sought “a green light to purchase Russian crude,” giving Moscow “the opportunity to unload these tankers” and “somewhat improve their fragile finances,” while an Iranian strike on Qatar has pushed European gas prices to “a level last seen in 2022,” allowing Gazprom “to reap rewards in the meantime.”
  • Yet Blant warns that “the end of the war in the Gulf does not bode well for the Kremlin.” He contends that “Putin’s unequivocal support for the current Iranian regime” will spur “an even more vigorous hunt for Russian ‘shadow fleet’ tankers,” that “the hitherto chummy relations between Russia and the Arab countries within OPEC+ will also disappear,” and that if Tehran’s regime falls, “Russia’s interests… will be the last thing on anyone’s mind,” likely intensifying Putin’s “paranoia.”

Video: “Is Russia the real winner from the war in Iran?”, Zanny Minton Beddoes and Shashank Joshi, The Economist, 03.13.26.

  • Shashank Joshi tells Beddoes that “there’s lots of good news for Russia,” starting with the fact that “air defense interceptors that might have been sold for Ukraine… are being chewed up at this extraordinary rate by the Gulf states and by the United States,” so “more Russian missiles will get through and that’s good news for Russia.” He adds that U.S. waivers for Indian purchases show “holes develop in the sanctions architecture,” and that, more broadly, the Iran shock “has stuck a safety net under Russia,” giving an economy that was “highly vulnerable to an external shock” some “space to breathe.”
  • The panel argues that this respite alters Moscow’s incentives: Joshi notes that “Russia’s economy is suffering some serious pressures,” with “increasing fiscal pressure of mobilizing more men by paying them bigger and bigger salaries,” and that the war in Iran “pushes [a deal] further away” because Putin “wasn’t jumping for a deal” to begin with. He cautions that Russia’s problem at the front is “not a lack of money, it’s a lack of a way to convert manpower and weapons into advances,” so the Iran windfall “just buys a bit more time and changes the incentive structure,” making Russia “seemingly one of the few winners out of this.”

“‘We Would Be Entering a Completely Different World.’ What happens if oil hits $200 a barrel?” Rogé Karma, Atlantic, 03.13.26. 

  • “The Iran war has already created the ‘largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market,’ according to the International Energy Agency,” Rogé Karma wrote, with Iran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and oil already up from about $65 to around $90–$100 a barrel. Ebrahim Zolfaqari “has declared that the world should ‘get ready for oil to be $200 a barrel,’” the author noted; in that scenario, “sustained higher oil prices could plunge the world into a recession, raise borrowing costs, alter the outcome of ongoing wars, and shift the balance of global-power competition in favor of Russia and China,” Karma explained. “We would be entering a completely different world,” Meghan O’Sullivan, the director of the Geopolitics of Energy Project at Harvard Kennedy School, told the author.

“Putin’s actions in Iran demand a U.S. response,” Jeanne Shaheen, Washington Post, 03.10.26.

Climate change:

  • No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

“From Minnesota to the Red Carpets: How Far Has Polarization in the US Gone?,” Pavel Koshkin, Valdai Club, 03.16.26. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.

  • Pavel Koshkin, a Russian‑government–affiliated analyst writing for the Valdai Club, argues that “the main source of disagreement is President Donald Trump’s controversial policy on immigration, as well as the ambiguous methods used by the current administration to suppress protest sentiment.” He writes that the ICE killing of “the poet Renée Nicole Goode and Alex Jeffrey Pretty, a nurse at a veterans’ hospital” in Minnesota “triggered a wave of public outrage on all fronts — from spontaneous street demonstrations in major US cities to debates in the halls of the Capitol and speeches from the red carpets at film and music award ceremonies … as well as during sporting events.” Citing NBC News, he notes that disapproval of Trump’s immigration approach rose from “34 percent in April of last year to 49 percent in February 2026,” while AP–NORC data show support for mass deportation raids falling “from about 50 percent to 38 percent.”
  • According to the author, some academics and former lawmakers, including “retired congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, a former Trump supporter, and … University of Pennsylvania professor Claire Finkelstein,” now speak of “the risks of a new civil war,” with rumors that a revived Black Panthers “self‑defense party was allegedly prepared to take up arms.” He recounts how Trump, “apparently fearing serious reputational damage,” cut federal agents in Minnesota and ultimately removed DHS Secretary Kristi Noem as a “ritual sacrifice,” but insists “the polarization did not go anywhere,” pointing to repeated DHS‑funding shutdowns, Crowd Counting Consortium data showing demonstrations up “133 percent” between Trump’s first and second terms, and Pew findings that “only 17 percent of Americans trusted the federal government.” Koshkin concludes that “a cultural war is gaining momentum in the United States” and that while the system of checks and balances still works and makes a Civil War–style scenario “unlikely,” polarization “seriously affects the functioning of government” and will shape the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential race.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

  • No significant developments.

 

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“The Vicious Cycle of Military Post-Keynesianism: Why rapid income growth has not stimulated domestic production," Re:Russia, 03.11.26.

  • The authors note that in 2025 Russians’ real disposable incomes rose 7.4% year-on-year, while real wages grew 4.4%, yet retail turnover increased only 2.6% (down from roughly 8% in each of the previous two years), with non‑food sales up just 3.1% and food sales 2.2%. They stress that the Central Bank’s key rate, raised to 21% at end‑2024, shrank the consumer‑credit portfolio by 4.6% in 2025 and pulled money into deposits paying “over 21% per annum” at the peak, so that the share of income going to consumption fell from 74.5% to 70% while the savings share jumped from 9.7% to 14.1%, pushing household bank balances from 57.5 to 67 trillion rubles.
  • This “means that the rapid growth of household incomes in 2025 did not translate into stronger consumption and, accordingly, did not stimulate expansion in consumer‑oriented industries,” they argue, while banks instead lent to firms “likely connected to budgetary financing.” They conclude that “the structural imbalances of Russia’s military economy, associated with inflated budget spending, have blocked the mechanism through which rising domestic demand could stimulate the consumer sector,” creating “a self‑reinforcing cycle of military post‑Keynesianism,” just as wage and income growth is losing momentum and “domestic demand can no longer be relied upon as a driver of economic growth in 2026.”

“Why the Return of ‘Special Military Operation’ Veterans Hasn’t Yet Led to a Crime Wave,” Kirill Titaev, iStories, 03.11.26.

  • Titaev argues that predictions of a major surge in violence from returning Russia–Ukraine war veterans haven’t materialized because “the total number of returnees is still small,” citing official data of 167,000 and calculating that even if “every fifth of them commits a crime within a year,” overall recorded violent crime would rise only “7–8%,” barely visible to ordinary citizens or statistics. He notes that most volunteers come from “marginalized strata” — “young men from villages, convicts, poor townspeople, usually with addictions” — milieus where baseline violence is already high, so “the aggressiveness of the returnees will not significantly exceed the existing level.”
  • On the police side, he observes that, unlike Chechnya, “regular units of law enforcement agencies are not being sent to the combat zone,” and recruitment of veterans is “very difficult” because of their social background, prior convictions, and higher health requirements, so the expected “greater tolerance for violence” inside the police hasn’t appeared. Instead, he says the war has “undermined the personnel reserves of the police,” which used to hire “20–30 percent of all demobilized conscripts,” forcing a “sharp lowering of requirements” for new recruits.
  • Titaev warns that veterans are emerging more as victims than perpetrators, with “diverse forms of fraud and extortion” targeting combat pay and death benefits, including “direct seizure” of cash, registering payments to fake spouses and children, and classic scams selling “fictitious or defective goods” at inflated prices. He notes that many fighters, suddenly receiving around “20,000 euros” after living on roughly “300 euros” a month, “have no idea about prices for premium goods” or how to use banks, insurance, and credit markets, making them “good targets for scammers” who often go unreported, and concludes that so far the war has primarily provided a “powerful stimulus for the development of the fraud market,” with a larger crime problem likely only “after the end of hostilities and significant demobilization.”
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Defense and aerospace:

Security, law-enforcement, justice and emergencies:

  • No significant developments.

     

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“Viktor Orbán Carries Putin’s Water,” Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, 03.13.26.

  • The editorial notes that after U.S. aid to Ukraine “fell by 99% in 2025,” the EU agreed to a nearly $105 billion loan package, but Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is now blocking it, creating a “dangerous fiscal crunch” that plays directly into Moscow’s hands. Orbán’s pretext is a disruption to the Druzhba pipeline that carries Russian oil through Ukraine to Hungary and Slovakia: Kyiv says it was damaged by a Russian strike, while Orbán accuses Ukraine of an “oil blockade” and is using a “loan blockade” to force Ukraine to reopen a Russian revenue stream that helps finance Vladimir Putin’s war.
  • The board argues that “the Druzhba disruption isn’t the whole story,” pointing out that Orbán faces his “toughest challenge” since 2010, with Fidesz trailing the opposition Tisza party 39% to 48% in a Feb. 28 poll, and has “a long history of ginning up nationalist sentiment” by invoking foreign threats. By undermining EU financial support for Kyiv over a Russian pipeline and domestic politics, the piece contends, Orbán is “carrying Putin’s water” at a moment when Hungary had already been allowed to opt out of backing the loan, but now is obstructing funding that could help Ukraine resist Kremlin aggression.

“Lost in translation: How Russia’s new elite hit squad was compromised by an idiotic lapse in tradecraft,” Christo Grozev, Roman Dobrokhotov, Michael Weiss, Fidelius Schmid and Nikolai Antoniadis, The Insider, 03.13.26.

  • The authors describe Center 795 as “Russia's newest and most secretive assassination directorate,” a “top-secret and fully autonomous entity designed to carry out the most critical operations, ranging from military missions in Ukraine to political assassinations and abductions abroad.” Created in December 2022 as Military Unit 75127 and reporting “directly to Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov,” it was meant to avoid the “liability” of GRU Unit 29155 after that unit’s operatives were so exposed that “their biometric data sat in every customs computer outside Russia.”
  • They explain that the unit was “embedded inside the Kalashnikov Concern” at Patriot Park, giving Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov “his own private army,” financed by billionaire Andrei Bokarev, whose revenues from Kalashnikov and Transmashholding are channeled into “special state projects.” Commanded by ex‑Alfa officer Denis Fisenko, Center 795 fields “approximately 500 officers divided into three directorates: Intelligence, Assault, and Combat Support,” with its Combat Support arm boasting “T‑90A main battle tanks and Smerch multiple‑launch rocket systems,” reflecting ambitions far beyond small sabotage.
  • Operationally, they note, the Intelligence Directorate’s 12th Department “runs human agents abroad” and is “staffed almost entirely by veterans of Unit 29155,” while Department 19 (Sniper) and dedicated SIGINT and UAV units allow the Center “to find, track, and liquidate targets of interest” worldwide. One GRU source is scathing about the design, saying, “You cannot stuff all the specialties of the GRU and the FSB into a single structure of five hundred people… without scale, you cannot maintain genuine specialization, you cannot handle truly complex tasks.”
  • The investigation recounts how star operative Denis Alimov—a decorated Alfa veteran close to Ramzan Kadyrov—offered “a bounty of $1.5 million” per Chechen exile “dead or deported,” but coordinated with his Serbo‑Croatian–speaking hitman via Google Translate. “Armed with a court order, the FBI was reading the clear-text translations of a murder-for-hire plot in real time,” the authors write, calling it “even better than a wiretap,” and conclude that “the entire unit has been compromised thanks to one operative’s sloppy tradecraft,” exposing a structure meant to be “the Kremlin’s most untraceable instrument of coercion.”

“Why African Leaders Are Beginning to Speak Out Against Russia”, Thomas Kent, The National Interest, 03.11.26.

  • Kent writes that Russia’s manpower shortage has led it to “entice over 1,400 people from across the African continent to fight in Ukraine,” citing INPACT’s finding that 1,417 Africans have served in Russian units and 316 have died, with the highest tolls among “citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha has urged African governments to warn citizens that Russia treats them “as second-rate, expendable human material,” while Ghana’s foreign minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa says “nearly 300 Ghanaians” were lured by job offers that became front‑line deployments, 55 of whom have died, adding: “They have no security background… They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”
  • He notes that a Kenyan intelligence report said 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited, with 89 at the front, one dead, 39 hospitalized, and 28 missing, prompting Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi to call the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and seek an agreement with Moscow barring such recruitment. Kent concludes that after years of silence, the “deaths and deceptions of their citizens” have pushed African governments from Ghana and Kenya to South Africa and Nigeria to speak out against Russia’s practices, even as some local actors—such as Kenya’s Russian Orthodox Church and recruiters under investigation in South Africa—have abetted Moscow’s efforts.
  • See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:

Ukraine:

“Rotations, Arrests, and the Specter of Elections: How Ukraine’s Government Works After Yermak,” Konstantin Skorkin, Carnegie Politika, 03.09.26.

  • Skorkin writes that Ukraine entered its fifth year of war “in a state of domestic political crisis,” with the resignation of powerful presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak “temporarily defusing the situation but not resolving accumulated problems.” New office head Kyrylo Budanov is “mainly busy with peace negotiations” and willing to coordinate with the Foreign Ministry and parliament, while the return of Servant of the People faction head David Arakhamia shows that the Rada is “gradually regaining its subjectivity,” even as talks with Russia, he says, have shifted “from the realm of historical disputes to a pragmatic plane” where “military men are talking to military men.”
  • He details turbulence in the security bloc: tech‑savvy defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov has admitted that “two million draft dodgers are wanted” and says mobilization must become more transparent, but the army’s conservative high command is skeptical and “Fedorov, in turn, is rumored to be lobbying for a change of commander‑in‑chief.” Anti‑corruption arrests, such as that of ex–energy minister Herman Halushchenko—linked both to Zelensky’s circle and to defector Andriy Derkach—combine accusations of “corruption and treason” and fuel elite anxiety, while polling shows support for delaying elections until a peace treaty has fallen from 78 to 59 percent, and Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s sharp criticism of Zelensky “quite fits the role of a future presidential candidate” even though, Skorkin notes, the central question remains “the choice between continuing the war and the painful compromises Moscow is trying to impose.”

“Notes from Kyiv: How Ukraine Is Preparing for Elections,” Balazs Jarabik, Carnegie Politika, 02.27.26.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“How the Iran War Puts Central Asia Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Eldar Mamedov, The National Interest, 03.13.26.

  • The drones that struck Azerbaijan “shattered the illusion that Central Asia could sit out the Iran War,” Eldar Mamedov writes. He notes that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan condemned the attack while pursuing a joint investigation with Tehran and maintaining a foreign policy that Central Asia’s largest states have long defined as “multivector and pragmatic,” backing a Turkic sibling without burning bridges to Iran. According to Mamedov, closing U.S. bases now looks like “foresight,” as those decisions removed Central Asia as a direct target even while Iran hits American allies in the Gulf. 
  • He warns that if the U.S.-Israeli campaign weakens or collapses Iran, ISIS‑K could gain “territorial footholds and strategic depth” just as scenarios for Iran’s “territorial fragmentation” circulate in Western and Israeli circles, a precedent deeply unwelcome for multiethnic Central Asian states. The convergence of a weakened Iran, resurgent jihadism, instability from Afghanistan, and ethnic separatism means that, in Mamedov’s words, the long‑term consequences for Central Asia will be measured not in disrupted trade routes but in “lost lives,” and the war launched “in the name of security” looks “less like a solution than a threat to their stability.”

“How Azerbaijan Views the Iran War,” Natalie Arbatman, The National Interest, 03.09.26.

  • After two Iranian drones struck Nakhichevan, Ilham Aliyev demanded an apology, threatened an “iron fist,” and ordered “retaliatory measures,” Natalie Arbatman reports. She highlights that the White House now calls Azerbaijan a “partner,” reflecting a broader U.S. strategy to draw a line from Central Asia through the Caucasus to Europe in which Azerbaijan—“the only country that borders both Russia and Iran”—sits at the center. Arbatman emphasizes Donald Trump’s Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a corridor that would send energy, critical minerals, and goods westward while bypassing Russia and Iran, and notes that oil already flows from Kazakhstan through Baku and the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan pipeline to global markets, “including Israel.” 
  • The author      argues that a trans‑Caspian link from Turkmenistan into the Southern Gas Corridor could “significantly reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy,” which helps explain why Iran tried to hit the BTC pipeline and why Nakhichevan has become an “aerial equivalent of the Strait of Hormuz.” In Arbatman’s telling, Iran’s large, deeply integrated Azerbaijani minority and Baku’s “cultural ties, geographic proximity, or political influence” inside Iran mean no neighbor is better positioned to help stabilize Iran’s north and reconnect a postwar Iran to trade, and she concludes that the real meaning of Washington’s “partner” language is a call for sustained engagement and investment, because in this region “rhetoric…is tested quickly.”

“Kazakhstan has begun handing over antiwar activists to Russia. Why has the country become dangerous for Kremlin critics?” Temur Umarov, Meduza (via Carnegie Politika), 03.13.26.

  • Umarov notes that after Russia’s 2022 invasion, “hundreds of thousands of Russians left for Kazakhstan,” with FSB border data showing 568,000 crossings in Q2 2022 and “already 1.25 million” in Q3, as it became “one of the few available destinations” for draft dodgers and deserters. For several years Astana “did not extradite Russians persecuted for political reasons,” but 2026 marked a sharp turn: IT specialist Aleksandr Kachkurkin was detained for a jaywalking and hookah pretext, “swiftly expelled for ‘disrespect for the laws and sovereignty,’” and then arrested on landing in Russia “on treason charges for money transfers to Ukraine,” while Kazakhstan has also agreed to hand over former Navalny volunteer Yuliya Yemelyanova and Chechen activist Mansur Movlaev.
  • He argues that with Trump back in the White House, “the previous incentives and pressure” from the West to shelter opposition activists have faded, while “protection of activists from other authoritarian countries no longer brings Astana dividends in the West, but annoys its neighbors.” Kazakhstan’s earlier balancing—granting safe exit to some Uzbek Karakalpak activists and refusing to recognize Russia’s annexations while giving antiwar Russians refuge—helped build a reputation as “the most open and Western‑leaning state in the region,” but today, Umarov writes, it is “literally in a month” becoming “a dangerous country for antiwar Russians,” as cutting deals with Moscow and other authoritarian neighbors is “much easier” than expecting reciprocity from Europe.

“Georgia’s Fall From U.S. Favor Heralds South Caucasus Realignment,” Bashir Kitachaev, Carnegie Politika, 03.09.26.

  • Kitachaev notes that when U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance toured the South Caucasus in February “this time Vance only visited Armenia and Azerbaijan,” and that Washington “has not even asked Tbilisi to join Trump’s new Board of Peace,” while inviting Yerevan and Baku. He writes that the planned TRIPP corridor through southern Armenia “is intended to become a new transport artery connecting Asia and Europe,” so that “the realization of such a project would downgrade Georgia’s importance,” and cites Ilham Aliyev saying that once TRIPP operates “it will be able to handle the majority of the region’s cargo throughput.”
  • Georgia’s ruling party tried to woo Trump by stressing shared culture‑war positions: Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze wrote that “we have identical assessments of the war in Ukraine, gender and LGBT propaganda, and many other issues,” but “never received a reply” and now finds Georgia “one of the few countries the Trump administration appears happy to criticize for censorship, jailing its political opponents, and electoral fraud.” Kitachaev argues that after Tbilisi let a Chinese‑led consortium build the Anaklia deep‑water port, Washington “no longer sees Georgia as a reliable partner,” and concludes that under Trump it “seems sufficient… that Georgia does not become a full-fledged Russian ally,” while big, deal‑driven projects with Armenia and Azerbaijan matter far more.

 

Endnotes

  1. The Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference was held on March 12-14, 2026, organized by Russia's Center for Energy and Security. More than 300 delegates from 80 countries participated in the conference, according to a VK post by participants from the Urals Federal University. Participants included Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Ryabkov, Director of the IAEA Rafael Grossi, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Ishikawa Nakamitsu, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBT) Richard Floyd, representatives of foreign diplomatic missions, the expert and scientific community and students and faculty from Russian and international universities, according to the Urals Federal University participants. Additionally, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recorded a video address for the conference, in which he  spoke about current challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the current threats posed by chemical and biological weapons.
  2. Around 124 million barrels of Russian oil are currently at sea worldwide, equivalent to roughly five to six days of the supplies that would normally transit the Strait of Hormuz, industry executives told The Wall Street Journal. The figure underscores the scale of seaborne Russian crude now covered by a new U.S. Treasury waiver, which allows countries to purchase sanctioned Russian oil already in transit through April 11 in an effort to ease supply constraints and contain price pressures on benchmarks such as Brent. (Wall Street Journal, 03.13.26)

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

AI was used in production of this digest.

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo: Almost undamaged Russian drone "Geran-2" ("Shahed-136"), landed by air defense in Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine. Explosive experts are going to remove and neutralize the warhead, and send the rest for research. Photo by National Police of Ukraine.

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