Russia Analytical Report, June 30-July 7, 2025
6 Ideas to Explore
- “As the war grinds on ..., it's worth questioning the conventional wisdom that neither side can win on the battlefield. Which is to say, Ukraine can lose,” Lee Hockstader writes in his July 4 column in The Washington Post. Hockstader argues that “the chances of that outcome have risen considerably in recent days” due, in part, to the Trump administration’s decision to suspend delivery of certain arms to Ukraine, including interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems. “One has to wonder how many more such blows [like halting U.S. arms supplies] Ukraine—badly outmanned, struggling with personnel shortages and lacking Russia’s strategic depth—can withstand,” he warns.
- “Russia now controls more than two-thirds of Donetsk. But to seize the rest of the region, it must take urban centers still under Ukraine’s control and vital to its army logistics,” Constant Méheut, Olha Konovalova and David Guttenfelder write in The New York Times. Russian strikes around this region’s city of Kostiantynivka, which is a primary target for Russian forces, have already become so constant that “Ukrainian troops avoid leaving their underground shelters altogether,” the three authors report. Still, the battle for this city could “take months to play out,” they predict.
- “If you want to defend the U.S., you have to make sure that three things are secure. You need a secure Arctic … You need a secure Atlantic … And you need a secure Europe, because Russia’s here, and Russia is reconstituting itself at an incredible pace—not to attack Norway, but to attack ultimately the U.S.,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte claimed in an interview with The New York Times. It is difficult to see how Russia would initiate an attack on the U.S., given that both possess enormous nuclear arsenals.
- China does not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the United States would then shift its whole focus to China, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, according to South China Morning Post.
- Ukraine’s political infighting has escalated, with Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov charged with corruption, a cabinet reshuffle imminent and a failed (for now) attempt to oust military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist. Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s powerful chief of staff, is seen as driving these moves, though Zelenskyy retains final authority, according to this U.K. media outlet. According to the Economist, an opaque co-dependency has emerged between Zelenskyy and Yermak as Ukraine navigates war and internal power struggles. Referring to these circumstances, one Ukrainian official told the Economist: “The Russians are slow-roasting us over a low flame while we are playing at idiotism with very serious consequences.”
- Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 27 gigawatts (GW) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW to the combination of Russia’s occupation and strikes, Romina Bandura and Alexander Romanishyn write in a report for CSIS. The two authors argue that a strategy of survival through energy decentralization should be adopted to mitigate these losses, warning that the “next two years are critical for Ukraine’s energy security.”
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security and safety:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Iran and its nuclear program:
"Iran After the Battle," Nicole Grajewski, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 07.01.25
- "Tehran now stands before a fateful choice: to persist in the same confrontational policies that have deepened its isolation and exposed its weaknesses, or to adapt to a new reality in which its deterrent has been pierced, its strategic depth has been compromised, and its survival is no longer guaranteed by old formulas."
- "The lesson drawn is not to revise the strategy but to reinforce it: expand missile capabilities, enhance command-and-control resilience, and tighten internal security to prepare for the next confrontation."
- "The question is no longer simply whether Iran’s deterrent held; it is whether the entire foundation of that deterrent is still tenable."
- “[N]either the Russians nor the Iranians fully trusted each other. Despite repeated requests from the regime in Tehran, Russia has thus far refused to transfer SU-35 aircraft and S-400 air defense systems. Furthermore, as some analysts have noted, Iran was never willing to supply troops to the Ukraine war effort the way North Korea did.”
- “The very fact that Donald Trump has been able to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, however short or long-lived it may turn out to be, demonstrates how marginalized Russia now is in the Middle East. It also lays bare that Russia’s now three-and-a-half-year-old war in Ukraine has sidelined Moscow, despite its pretenses to being a global player. “
- “The Israeli-U.S. military campaign—including heavy U.S. bombardment of underground portions of the Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment plants and the Isfahan uranium conversion facility June 21—inflicted heavy damage but did not eliminate the program.”
- “Iran’s nuclear knowledge, its stockpile of 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60-percent uranium-235, its centrifuge manufacturing capacity, its third underground enrichment site, and its determination to keep the nuclear program going remain.”
- “The Israeli-U.S. strikes have severely reduced Iran’s incentives to allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams.”
- “In the long run, the illegal attack on Iran by two nuclear-armed states—the United States and Israel, which has refused to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has some 100 nuclear weapons—increases the chances that Iran may make the wrong decision, withdraw from the NPT and pursue a clandestine weaponization campaign.”
“The Dangerous American Fantasy of Regime Change in Iran,” Stephen Kinzer, The Boston Globe, 07.01.25.
• “Iranians know perhaps better than any other people on earth that no matter how bad a regime is, the next one could be worse.”
• “Syria, Iraq, and Libya were all stable countries under dictatorship... After American power led to the fall... democracy did not emerge.”
• “Political change that comes after bombing or invasion is usually for the worse. If it comes from within... it will be more authentic, profound, and long-lasting.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "War With Iran Exposes the Emptiness of the ‘Axis of Autocracy,'" Daniel R. Depetris, Politico, 07.01.25.
- "The US Bombing Iran Was a Win for ... Putin," Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 07.02.25. For RM’s 06.27.25 take on what Putin’s Russia gained from the outcome of missile strike exchanges by Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other, follow this link.
Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:
- “Since launching its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s energy system, along with other infrastructure. In November 2024 alone, Russia fired 350 missiles and over 2,500 drones at the Ukrainian power grid. As a result of these attacks, the total damage to the energy infrastructure—heating, power, and oil and gas—at the end of 2024 was estimated at $20.5 billion, while the cost to rebuild according to EU standards amounts to $67.8 billion. Combining the occupied, destroyed, and damaged power capacities, Ukraine has lost a total of approximately 27 gigawatts (GW) of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 GW.”
- “Amid this crisis, energy decentralization as a strategy for survival has moved to the forefront of expert discussions. Small, distributed power units, ranging from 5 to 100 megawatts (MW) each, are regarded as the only way to prevent a nationwide blackout and ensure a stable electricity supply to people and businesses. In addition, these small units are not an easy target for Russian missiles.”
- “The next two years are critical for Ukraine’s energy security. As Russian attacks persist, Ukraine is racing to winterize its grid and add new generation capacity. At the same time, there is significant work ahead for the Ukrainian government—both at the national and subnational levels—in terms of regulations, reforms, and incentives to address Ukraine’s energy challenges. The international donor community and foreign investors are watching developments in the country very closely, as they will be key players in achieving Ukraine’s vision. For the United States, supporting Ukraine’s energy modernization aligns with its strategic interests in the country and the broader region: It creates markets for U.S. firms, strengthens Ukraine’s resiliency, and diminishes Russia’s ability to cripple the Ukrainian economy.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:
- “Russia now controls more than two-thirds of Donetsk. But to seize the rest of the region, it must take urban centers still under Ukraine’s control and vital to its army logistics. That makes Kostiantynivka a prime target. The city is the southern gateway to a chain of cities that form Ukraine’s last major defensive belt in Donetsk. Should it fall, nearly all cities farther north would come within range of Russian drones. It would bring Moscow closer to its long-sought goal of seizing all of Donetsk.”
- “Russian forces have carved out a 10-mile-deep pocket around the Ukrainian troops defending Kostiantynivka, partly surrounding them from the east, south and west. Practically every movement in that pocket is targeted by Russian drones around the clock, according to a half-dozen Ukrainian soldiers and officers fighting in the area. Troops are often stranded for weeks without rotation or the possibility of evacuating the wounded.”
- “Ukraine is now bracing for Russia’s final push on Kostiantynivka although the battle could still take months to play out.”
- “When asked about the turning point in Russia’s new drone campaign, Oleksandr and other Ukrainian soldiers all pointed to the same name: Rubicon, an elite Russian drone unit.”
- “Russian strikes around Kostiantynivka are so constant that Ukrainian troops avoid leaving their underground shelters altogether.”
- “A near encirclement could force Ukraine to rely even more heavily on tactics developed to supply troops under dire conditions, including drone airdrops and deploying robot-like vehicles.”
- “Three-and-a-half years of all-out war against Russia have transformed the country into a factory of weaponry that’s redefining the battlefield.”
- “Kyiv now gets about 40% of its weapons from its own sources — a model for how NATO allies could ramp up production.”
- “‘Weapons production is ‘Ukraine’s oil,’ said Oleksandr Kamyshin. ‘My country is becoming the arsenal of the free world.’”
- “Some 70% of Russian equipment destroyed by Ukrainian forces was hit by drones, transforming the kill zone.”
- “Russia counters with mass production of Shahed drones and fiber-optic guidance to evade jamming.”
- “‘The Ukrainian mil-tech scene is extremely hot right now,’ said venture investor Roman Sulzhyk—betting on lasers, spoofing-resistant GPS and cheap drone interceptors.”
- Michael Carpenter argues that Russia is much weaker economically than many analysts realize, and hard-hitting sanctions and export controls can still cripple its war economy.
- Carpenter argues that Ukraine is fighting smartly and could turn the tide on the battlefield with more high-end drones, air defense systems, long-range missiles, and munitions.
- According to Carpenter, instead of prolonging the war by giving Ukraine too much military assistance, Kyiv’s foreign allies have prolonged it by giving too little, and often with significant delays.
- Carpenter writes that the dose makes the poison — and the insufficient dosing of punitive economic measures produced an underwhelming campaign with limited strategic effect.
- According to Carpenter, victory for Ukraine — minimally defined as preserving its sovereignty and continuing to chart a course toward NATO and EU membership — is still squarely within reach.
• Carpenter argues that the linchpin for this new strategy is the West’s mobilization of the approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets held in their jurisdictions — mostly in the EU — to support Ukraine’s current fight. - Carpenter writes that Western governments must prioritize co-production agreements, intellectual property sharing and defense manufacturing partnerships.
- According to Carpenter, to buttress Ukraine’s military capabilities, the West must also target the economic foundations of Russia’s war effort.
- Carpenter claims that from a strategic vantage point, Russia has already lost this war.
- Carpenter writes that victory may not come quickly, cheaply, or easily, but it is still possible and will likely cost fewer lives and resources than a perpetuation of the status quo.
- “Air superiority lies at the heart of modern military victory.”
- “Mastery of air superiority can determine the outcome of wars, even before they are fully underway.”
- “Israel’s campaign against Iran, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine… offer some common lessons for Europeans.”
- “In the initial stages of Israel’s air war against Iran, it gained air superiority… within 48 hours.”
- “Russia still cannot dominate Ukrainian airspace… its jets are hemmed in by Ukrainian air defenses.”
- “What matters more is planning, intelligence, innovation—and the capacity to integrate all tools of national power.”
- “NATO… needs to learn from Israel’s success and Russia’s failure.”
- “Ukraine has been able to hold its airspace in part due to a continual resupply of air defense systems.”
- “Israel approached gaining air superiority as a joint, integrated national campaign.”
- “NATO has a window to prepare for air superiority—and that time is now.”
- “Ukraine has proved its own ferocious resilience in the course of fighting a war of survival. But as the war grinds on into its 41st month, it's worth questioning the conventional wisdom that neither side can win on the battlefield. Which is to say, Ukraine can lose.”
- “A Ukrainian defeat could take various forms. It would not necessarily mean Ukraine’s forces would crumble along the 750-mile front line, resulting in a catastrophic loss of territory and subsequent carnage, as Russian troops swept through Ukrainian towns and villages... defeat might also mean that Kyiv is forced to sue for an unjust peace — one that subjugates it to Putin’s will.”
- “That halt [of U.S. arms deliveries] came more abruptly than anyone in Kyiv expected. The blow to Ukrainian morale is undeniable. And now one has to wonder how many more such blows Ukraine — badly outmanned, struggling with personnel shortages and lacking Russia’s strategic depth — can withstand.”
- “The chances of that outcome have risen considerably in recent days. Even as vicious Russian aerial assaults have crescendoed in the past month, sowing terror in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, the Trump administration has said it would withhold scarce Patriot air defense missiles and an array of other critical weapons already en route to Ukraine. The move, if prolonged, could turn the cracks in Ukrainian defenses into gashes, leaving Kyiv and other cities increasingly defenseless against Russian ballistic missiles.”
- “To use a phrase often attributed to Joseph Stalin, quantity has a quality of its own. And Russia's massive quantitative edge over Ukraine, not least a nearly 4-1 advantage in population, exerts a gravitational force that over time cannot but erode Kyiv's reserves of resolve and courage.”
- “[N]ow one has to wonder how many more such blows Ukraine — badly outmanned, struggling with personnel shortages and lacking Russia's strategic depth — can withstand.”
"The Majority of Russians Do Not Want to Fight, But a Minority Will Suffice for the Kremlin," Sergei Shelin, Russia.Post, 07.07.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Putin’s military is not facing a shortage of contract soldiers. Recruits are enlisting faster than soldiers are being killed.”
- “The response of ‘armed defense’ garnered only 23%, finishing at the bottom of the list.”
- “Even more telling is that young Russians expressed the least desire to ‘take part in the armed defense of the country.’”
- “Thus, the regime’s ability to continue the war with Ukraine without a draft depends entirely on whether it can ensure a steady flow of kontraktniki mercenaries.”
- “With so many kontraktniki, big losses are no cause for concern.”
- “Currently, if Putin is to be believed, about 700,000 Russians are fighting against Ukraine.”
- “The regime has already swallowed one and a half million men, and if it needs another million or one and a half million, it will probably manage to get them.”
- “Putin has only a minority of the country at his disposal. The majority do not want to become mercenaries.”
- “This majority is allowed to be almost completely unafraid of mobilization and to watch the war from their couches; in return, it does not interfere with Putin’s prosecution of the war.”
“People’s Front Forum ‘Everything for Victory!’,” Vladimir Putin’s remarks, Kremlin.ru, 06.07.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
- “The Russian Popular Front has become a mass public movement thanks to the support of the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens and their ambition to defend the inherited life principles and values together, to fight and work hard for a common outcome, for national success, for peace, and for the safety of our children.”
- “‘Everything for Victory!’ is a well-known historical slogan that every one of us understands. This slogan first emerged in the early days of the Great Patriotic War, becoming a symbol of our era – of the struggle for freedom and justice, for the security of our borders, and for the right of the Russian people to independently determine their own path of development. We will achieve that – there is no doubt. Because together, we are a colossal and unbreakable force in its justice and internal unity.”
- “As previously mentioned, a total of 54.5 billion rubles has been raised through ‘popular’ contributions to support the special military operation.”
- “[T]he Popular Front alone has delivered 110,000 drones of various modifications to the troops, including strike systems on fiber optics, resistant to interference. According to our experts, these drones have already destroyed enemy equipment worth over 2 billion dollars... Let Western taxpayers see these figures and ask themselves how their governments are spending their money.”
- “On the information front, we now have 60,000 battle-hardened cyber warriors – skilled programmers and IT specialists standing at the digital forefront.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Military aid to Ukraine:
"Why Trump is freezing Ukraine weapons shipments," Jason Willick, The Washington Post, 07.06.25.
- “A few weeks ago, President Donald Trump devastated the anti-interventionists in his political base by not only condoning Israel's assault on Iran but also ultimately joining with the U.S. Air Force. Traditional Republican advocates of muscular foreign policy exulted. But last week, Trump disappointed hawks by freezing shipments of key weapons to a different American ally, Ukraine, as it resists Russia's invasion.”
- “On their face, the two policies seem inconsistent. In fact, they are two sides of the same coin. The central challenge in American foreign policy today is that Washington's defense commitments around the world exceed its military power. This is known as the ‘Lippmann gap,’ for journalist Walter Lippmann, who popularized the concept in 1943.”
- “If Trump wants to please both the hawks and the doves in his divided coalition, taking a hard line on Iran and a softer line on Russia has obvious political advantages from his point of view. Even if he changes course, the Lippmann gap will remain. ‘There's unlimited demand for American power,’ as historian Stephen Kotkin put it, ‘but American power can't fulfill all its current commitments.’”
“America’s ominous new halt on weapons to Ukraine,” The Economist, 07.02.25.
- “In recent weeks Ukraine has endured some of the most intense drone and missile bombardments since the start of Russia’s full-on invasion three years ago. There could scarcely be a worse time for America to halt the delivery of precious air-defense equipment. Yet Ukrainian officials say that on the night of June 30th-July 1st the Pentagon turned back cargo planes delivering supplies of air-defense interceptors and other arms to European bases, from where they would be taken overland to Ukraine.”
- “The Pentagon presents the interruption as a limited and temporary action. But Ukrainian officials suspect a more concerted effort by the Trump administration to squeeze political concessions out of Ukraine, as it did in early March when it briefly stopped arms deliveries and intelligence co-operation after an infamous televised bust-up between Donald Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.”
- “Ukraine’s front lines seem unlikely to collapse in the coming months, though Russia is making incremental gains. Nevertheless, Ukraine faces a grim reckoning: the fewer weapons it receives, the more people and territory it will lose.”
- “Trump meant it when he said that Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism that has vowed ‘death to Israel,’ would not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.”
- “If only the president had the same moral clarity about stopping the barbaric war being waged in Ukraine by Iran’s despotic ally, Russia.”
- “Trump appears to be engaged in exactly the kind of irresolute policy that many (wrongly) suspected he was pursuing with Iran.”
- “More than a month later, Trump isn't doing anything differently even as Russia shows no sign of ending its aggression.”
- “Russia’s summer offensive appears stalled… but Ukrainian cities are suffering more damage from Russian drone and missile strikes amid fears that Ukrainian air defenses are being depleted.”
- “Trump has repeatedly insisted that, if he had been president in 2022, Putin would never have invaded Ukraine. But since Trump returned to office this year, Putin's attacks have surged — and Trump hasn't done anything about it.”
- “At the Group of Seven summit in Canada recently, Trump complained about Russia’s expulsion from the group. He apparently continues to speak regularly and cordially with Putin.”
- “Since returning to office, he has not imposed any additional sanctions on Russia, thereby allowing existing sanctions to become less effective.”
- “Providing Ukraine with badly needed air defense ammunition and other munitions while pressuring European countries to release to Ukraine the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets.”
- “Ukraine already produces about 40 percent of the weapons it uses on the front lines. With that influx of Russian funds, Ukraine could dramatically expand defense production.”
- “Of even greater immediate impact would be additional deliveries of Patriot air defense interceptors.”
- “Having failed to end the Ukraine war in 24 hours — as he repeatedly promised on the campaign trail — Trump now seems ready to wash his hands of the conflict.”
- “Such comments suggest Trump is guilty of moral myopia about the war in Ukraine — quite a contrast to the moral clarity he displayed about the Iranian nuclear program.”
- “Ukraine and Russia are not toddlers squabbling on the playground… There is no moral equivalence between the sides.”
- “That makes aid to Ukraine — leading to a peace settlement that safeguards its sovereignty — a moral and strategic imperative for the United States.”
- Ukraine has achieved rapid, large-scale drone production, now manufacturing millions of autonomous systems annually, including both short- and long-range models, according to Finer and Shimer. U.S. support was key to this success, with over $1.5 billion directed to Ukraine’s drone industry, including direct financing of manufacturers and supplying critical components, according to Finer and Shimer.
- Ukrainian drone innovation is outperforming U.S. systems, producing cheaper, more adaptable, battlefield-tested drones that are often superior to American-made alternatives, according to Finer and Shimer.
- AI integration into drone technology by both Ukraine and Russia is accelerating, with Kyiv, not Silicon Valley, leading in deploying AI-enabled defense systems, according to Finer and Shimer.
- U.S. military and defense industry are lagging, still relying on expensive, slower-produced legacy systems, and not adopting lessons from Ukraine fast enough, according to Finer and Shimer. U.S. should pursue coproduction and licensing agreements with Ukraine, enabling domestic production of affordable, battlefield-proven drones and counterdrone systems, according to Finer and Shimer.
- Failing to support Ukraine weakens U.S. innovation and security, cutting off access to vital technological expertise, battlefield data, and tested defense capabilities, according to Finer and Shimer.
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:
"Trump Is Playing a Cynical Game With Ukraine," Jake Sullivan, The New York Times, 07.02.25.
- “For months, President Trump has played a cynical game. In front of the press, he threatens to impose new sanctions on the Russian economy. In private, he never follows through. He publicly suggests he might increase support for Ukraine; in fact, only last week, Mr. Trump said he would “see if we can make” additional air defense missiles available for the Ukrainian military. But behind the scenes he is halting supplies that were already committed to Ukraine.”
- “All of this suggests that Mr. Trump is not willing to pressure Russia to end this war. Instead, he is folding and abandoning Ukraine.”
- Trump “has to adjust course through three important steps.”
- “First, Ukraine will continue to need arms that only we produce, such as air defense and HIMARS rockets. The administration should release all outstanding drawdown and U.S.A.I. deliveries for Ukraine, which Ukraine needs to defend itself.”
- “Second, the United States should request that the European Union seize the approximately $300 billion in immobilized Russian sovereign assets that are held in Europe.”
- “Third, Mr. Trump should follow through on his threats to intensify sanctions against the Russian energy sector, which would build on the sanctions announced last year and further pressure Mr. Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations.”
- “The real choice is between a true peace reached by supporting Ukraine in effective negotiations and a false peace reached by implicitly surrendering to Mr. Putin.”
"Trump Is ‘Disappointed’ With Putin," Editorial Board, The Wall Street Journal, 07.07.25
- “President Trump keeps beseeching Vladimir Putin to end his vicious assault on Ukraine, but the Russian keeps stringing the American along. Could Mr. Trump finally be losing enough patience to try a different strategy?”
- “Mr. Trump has ready options. One is to restore the weapons deliveries already promised to Ukraine and begin to work with Congress on sending more. Another is to declare his support for the Lindsey Graham-Richard Blumenthal bill that would impose sanctions on countries that buy Russian oil and don't aid Ukraine. It has 84 co-sponsors, and the Senate could send a message by voting this week.”
- “Mr. Putin thinks he can make President Trump look plaintive and weak, and then get away with it as Russia swallows Ukraine. If the Russian is right, much of the U.S. deterrence benefit of the Iran strike will vanish.”
- “Europeans [should] use Russia’s $300bn (€255bn) of frozen sovereign assets, of which about €210bn is held in the European Union. .... [A] ‘reparation loan’ ... is a way to use Russia’s money against itself by lending it to Ukraine. Moscow only gets its money back if it pays reparations. The loan is effectively a downpayment on the Kremlin’s obligation to pay war damages.”
- “A coalition of willing European and other countries should make the loan. The EU and Britain should be core members of the coalition. The other G7 members—America, Canada, and Japan—could also be invited to join. If Donald Trump does not wish to take part, the coalition should move ahead without him. America’s involvement is not critical as it has frozen only around $5bn of Russian sovereign assets.”
“The coalition countries could then take the following steps:
1. They would instruct the current custodians of the assets, such as Belgian clearing house Euroclear, to move the money into new depositaries.
2. The new depositaries would invest those funds in reparation loans to Ukraine. The loans would be structured as “limited recourse” obligations, meaning that Kyiv would only have to pay them back if Russia pays reparations. Ukraine would assign its entitlement to receive reparations as collateral for the loan.
3. The coalition countries would pass enabling legislation to authorize these two steps. They would also provide an indemnity to the current custodians to cover their legal risks.”
"Securing Ukraine: Next Steps," Charles A. Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations , 07.01.25.
- “President Donald Trump is right to launch a diplomatic effort to end the war in Ukraine. Ukraine has virtually no prospect of defeating Russian forces and restoring its territorial integrity. Yet Trump has made no progress, and Russian forces continue to conquer additional Ukrainian territory. If Trump is to deliver on his promise to end the war in Ukraine, he will need to offer the Kremlin inducements: the prospect of improved relations with the United States and reassurance that Ukraine will not join NATO if and when Russia ceases its aggression. But Trump will also need to impose greater costs on Russia for continuing its war of aggression. The United States and its European allies will have to tighten economic sanctions and ensure that they continue to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs to defend itself.”
- “Today’s economic warfare is rooted in three decades of failed attempts to draw Russia closer to the west, Thane Gustafson, a professor at Georgetown University, argues in ‘Perfect Storm.’ Instead of drawing the cold war adversaries together, efforts to integrate Russia into the capitalist system gave each side powerful weapons against the other. When Putin’s tanks rolled into Ukraine in 2022, Kyiv’s allies responded by expelling Moscow from global markets and supply chains. Russia cut Europe off from cheap gas supplies and crowed that the continent would soon freeze.”
- “As western companies leapt to get their hands on Russia’s riches, those who had already made it in biznes headed the other way. Inflows into the country totaled over $630bn from 1992 to 2020 but were dwarfed by an estimated $800bn of Russian money held outside the country. This created a vulnerability that western sanctions have sought to exploit, limiting Russia’s ability to sell commodities abroad and import irreplaceable goods for its war machine with the proceeds. But predictions of economic disaster, made in Washington and Moscow alike at the war’s outset, have not come to pass. Gustafson finds the sanctions have been too incremental, often laxly enforced, and rarely with a clear goal in mind.”
- “Putin’s war, however, has laid new foundations that will be difficult for any successor to shake off. Power and wealth are in the hands of a venal elite in the security services. Sanctions have fueled resentment even among an elite that once looked to the west. No western companies have made an effort to return to Russia. And those who have profited in their absence are in no rush to welcome them back. Or, as Putin put it last month when he backed efforts to block McDonald’s from returning: ‘Only cowards pay their debts.’”
- “A new cryptocurrency token designed to allow cross-border payments in spite of western sanctions on Russia, launched by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Șor and Russian defense sector bank Promsvyazbank, has moved some $9.3bn on a dedicated crypto exchange in just four months since it was launched, the FT has found.”
- “Billed as the first stablecoin pegged to the Russian ruble, the A7A5 token was officially launched in Kyrgyzstan in February and aims to facilitate large-scale financial flows into and out of Russia, which have been severely complicated by western restrictions.”
- “An FT analysis of wallets linked to Grinex, a crypto exchange also founded very recently in Kyrgyzstan and trading only in A7A5, rubles, and a dollar-pegged stablecoin, shows a total of $9.3bn worth of A7A5 being moved to and from wallets linked to that exchange.”
- “The stablecoin says it is backed by ruble deposits in Moscow’s Promsvyazbank, a defense sector bank subject to US, UK and EU sanctions over Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The coin’s rapid growth is clear: it now has 12bn tokens in circulation, equivalent to $156mn, and is used intensively by a relatively small group of users, whose daily transfers routinely amount to several times that volume. ”
- “But the A7A5 token also appears to be linked to Moscow’s attempts to use cryptocurrencies to bankroll political influence campaigns abroad, according to a new report by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR), a London-based non-profit research group.”
- “In its new report, CIR found multiple domains used in political influence operations in Moldova shared an IP address with A7 and A7A5 sites.”
- “Moldovan businessman Ilan Șor is the majority owner of A7, the company behind the token, now subject to British sanctions. ... Last year, Șor was involved in discussions with Keremet Bank in Kyrgyzstan, according to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, as parts of plans ‘to create a sanctions evasion hub for Russia to pay for imports and receive payment for exports.’”
“How much money does Ukraine need?” Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, 07.03.25.
- “The least expensive policy by far is to give the country enough now to win the war.”
- “The IMF’s report is, in the circumstances, good news. It’s all relative!”
- “About $40bn a year in ‘financing needs’, then, which this coalition has managed to provide until now and should be able to keep providing.”
- “Even that is only enough to allow Kyiv to keep fighting, not win the war.”
- “Ash speculates it would take $150bn a year, rather than $100bn, to put Ukraine in a sufficiently dominant position to defeat the Russian invaders.”
- “There are understandable, if bad, reasons why the IMF number is what it is.”
- “There is something strikingly resilient about the country’s economic activity.”
- “Ukraine is worth betting money on.”
- “Ukraine struggles to attract capital; it is largely forced to borrow from the EU.”
- “So how much does Ukraine need? Ash is right to say it needs enough to win the war, and his guess of $150bn a year is as good as any.”
- “Are we actually idiots? So we can increase funding to Ukraine by $50 billion a year for two years to defeat Russia, or we can spend an extra $750 billion a year for the next however many years.”
- “A victorious Ukraine would be a booming Ukraine.”
- “The west’s failure to transfer Russia’s blocked foreign exchange reserves — about $300bn — to Ukraine as a down payment on the compensation Moscow clearly owes.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Ukraine-related negotiations:
"Russian-American Coaster," Andrei Kortunov, Izvestia, 07.30.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
- “Washington expects the same fateful ‘deal’ from Moscow in the form of an agreement to end the armed confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. It is unlikely that Trump has a clear idea of what exactly a long-term political settlement of the conflict should look like, much less how exactly a new security system in Europe should be built.”
- “But the American leader needs to achieve at least a temporary cessation of hostilities at all costs in order to declare to the whole world his victory and ability to achieve success where his predecessor, Democrat Joe Biden, completely failed. Therefore, the complex, painstaking and, by definition, slow work of restoring full-fledged Russian-American cooperation will not replace the historic ‘deal’ on Ukraine in the eyes of Donald Trump. "
Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:
“Trump Seeks to Remake the World,” Walter Russell Mead, The Wall Street Journal, 07.01.25.
- “Five months into the most consequential foreign-policy presidency since Richard Nixon left the White House, Donald Trump's approach to the world is taking on a definitive shape.”
- “First and foremost, restraint isn't part of Mr. Trump's political method.”
- “He seeks to accumulate as much executive power as possible at home; he wants the same thing internationally.”
- “What Alice Longworth said of her father, Theodore Roosevelt, is true of Mr. Trump… He wants to be the corpse at every funeral, the bride at every wedding, and the baby at every christening.”
- “The 47th president loathes crusades for democracy, despises multinational institutions, and treats international courts with the contempt he believes they deserve.”
- “His presidency is about the concentration of power for maximalist goals.”
- “Mr. Trump's Europe policy shows every quality except restraint.”
- “America's president is Europe's daddy now -- and he has gotten the Old World to jump through more hoops than any of his predecessors in the past 50 years.”
- “The world is a stage, and Mr. Trump intends to stand in its limelight.”
- “One thing is clear. Donald Trump is no shrinking violet, and as long as he sits in the Oval Office, the U.S. is unlikely to retreat from the world.”
- “If you want to defend the U.S., you have to make sure that three things are secure. You need a secure Arctic … You need a secure Atlantic … And you need a secure Europe, because Russia’s here, and Russia is reconstituting itself at an incredible pace — not to attack Norway, but to attack ultimately the U.S. If the Arctic, if the Atlantic Ocean, if Europe is not secure, the U.S. has a big problem.”
- “They [Russians] are now producing three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO is doing in a year. This is unsustainable, but the Russians are working together with the North Koreans, with the Chinese and Iranians, the mullahs, in fighting this unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. So here, the Indo-Pacific and your Atlantic are getting more and more interconnected. … So, yes, this is an enormous amount of spending. But if we don’t, we’ll have to learn Russian.”
- “We have to make sure that the deterrence is there, and the fact that Lavrov makes that comment [about NATO’s new spending target] … it is clearly evidence that the deterrence is working. And that is crucial, because Russia is on a war footing in every sense. The size of the military, what they’re investing in, in their tanks, in air defense systems, in their artillery, in ammunition — it is amazing.”
- “[W]e have all the plans in place that if Estonia will be attacked — and the Russians know this — our reaction will be devastating. … And this is exactly why we need to spend more. But it’s not that the Estonians are left to themselves. It would be the full force of NATO, including the full backup of the United States, which will come to the rescue. Putin knows this. This is why he will not attack Estonia today. But he might in five or seven years if we would not make all these extra investments.”
- “With the risk that I’m again praising President Trump: He is the one who broke the deadlock with Putin [on peace negotiations]. … Then, of course, this is a step-by-step process. … [I]n the meantime you have to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to stay in the fight.”
- “The American administration completely takes the view and shares it with the Europeans that this war in Ukraine is crucial for the defense of NATO territory going forward and that we have to make sure that Ukraine is in the strongest possible position to stop the Russians from taking more territory, and that when it comes to a cease-fire or, even better, a peace deal, that Ukraine with some help will be able to prevent Putin from ever attacking Ukraine again in the future.”
“The NATO Summit,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 13 (165) 2025, 07.07.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- “For Russia, the outcomes of the recent NATO summit in The Hague represent both a strategic warning and a geopolitical opportunity. On the one hand, the new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP formalized has sent an unmistakable message that Europe is preparing for a long-term confrontation with Russia. Russia may currently dismiss Europe’s rearmament plans as exaggerated and dependent on US patronage, but even a partial realization of the stated aims—especially in areas like missile defense, drone production and infrastructure protection—would complicate Moscow’s military assessments and its preferred approach of using coercive leverage to extract strategic gains.”
- “At the same time, the contrast between rhetorical commitments and de facto unity—most visible in Spain’s dissent, Trump’s transactional approach and the diluted language on Ukraine—reinforces a core Russian strategic narrative: Western cohesion is brittle and instrumental, and Europe remains unwilling to bear the cost of true strategic autonomy. Ambiguous signals from Washington regarding future deployments to Europe, disruptions in military aid to Ukraine and Trump’s ambivalence towards NATO all play into Moscow’s hands. In response, Russia is likely to intensify efforts to operate at lower levels—national and local—by actively promoting the narrative that hostility towards Russia will prove costly for Europeans, whereas partnership with Moscow is beneficial. Crucially, there is a growing sense of urgency in Moscow: in the medium term, if Russia fails to consolidate its advantages through territorial gains in Ukraine and sustained military development, it perceives a risk that Europe itself could emerge as a serious possible threat.”
- “Is silence strategic when your adversary barely hides?”
- “President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would now systematically attribute hostile acts in response to the growing Russian threat.”
- “These announcements mark the end of France’s long-standing policy of avoiding public attribution to state actors — especially in cyber attacks.”
- “Attribution is ultimately a very high-level political decision.”
- “Naming and shaming is also seen as a way to help set and enforce international norms and promote stability.”
- “Public attribution and disclosure are not risk-free.”
- “France’s first public attribution of cyber operations to Russia and disclosure of thirteen hostile acts linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin seem to represent a major policy shift.”
- “France has also used intelligence-led attribution outside of cyberspace.”
- “Still, France’s approach remains cautious.”
- “France’s decision to systematically attribute hostile acts by Russia marks a shift but not a rupture.”
“Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Negotiations in Vienna on Military Security and Arms Control, Y.D. Zhdanova, at the Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 07.02.25. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.
- “We proceed from the premise that agreements on a Ukrainian settlement must be comprehensive and long-term, address the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis, and be based on the new territorial realities, which reflect the will of the people living on this land.”
- “The military failure of the Ukrainian-Western conglomerate on the battlefield is obvious. Today our army is advancing in all directions, along the entire line of contact.”
- “It is perfectly clear to us that, having failed in their objectives in Ukraine, our opponents have switched to fueling panic and pre-war hysteria, now predicting an imminent Russian attack on the Baltics or Germany in the next three, five, or seven years.”
- “Moreover, NATO’s own math does not add up in its myth of an imminent Russian attack: if Russia is supposed to attack by 2030, why do the transatlantic allies plan to be fully prepared only by 2035? The atmosphere at the summit was so heated, it was as if Russian troops were about to burst into the meeting hall.”
- “The curators of the Kyiv regime should realize that the battlefield situation for Zelensky will continue to deteriorate.”
- “The increase in NATO military spending could end in catastrophe, the burden of which will fall on the people of Europe.”
"Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Nemzet," Russian Foreign Ministry, 07.07.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Russia has always been and remains open to a political and diplomatic settlement in Ukraine. However, it must bring durable peace, not a mere ceasefire. ... Sustainable solution cannot be achieved without eliminating the underlying causes of the conflict.”
- “It is crucial to remove threats to Russia’s security caused by NATO expansion and dragging Ukraine into this military bloc.”
- “It is no less important to ensure human rights in the territories that remain under control of the Kyiv regime.”
- “There must be international legal recognition of the new territorial realities arising from the inclusion of Crimea, Sevastopol, and Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, as well as the Zaporozhzhia and Kherson regions into Russia.”
- “These provisions must be included in a legally binding agreement for peaceful settlement. Ukraine should return to the origins of its statehood and adhere to the spirit and letter of the instruments that formed its legal basis. As a reminder, the provision on Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned, and nuclear-free status is enshrined in the 1990 Declaration of its state sovereignty. In August 1991, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, reaffirming the inviolability of the provisions of this Declaration. Reference to the Act of Declaration of Independence is included in the preamble of the applicable Constitution of Ukraine.”
- “The North Atlantic Alliance has long ceased to be a defensive alliance, even though NATO leaders continue to claim so. ... We find this state of affairs unacceptable. That is why, in late 2021, we asked the United States and NATO to provide Russia with security guarantees without altering Ukraine’s non-aligned status.”
- “Once an integration project, the European Union has in no time morphed into a military-political bloc, essentially an offshoot of NATO. This is a dangerous dynamic that can have far-reaching consequences for all Europeans.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "It’s time for a United States of Europe," Theo Zenou, The Boston Globe, 07.06.25.
- "What Is Trump’s 'New Realism' in Foreign Policy?," Lyle J. Goldstein, The National Interest, 07.04.25.
- "Trump Is Breaking American Intelligence: Politicizing the System Makes Dangerous Failures More Likely," David V. Gioe and Michael V. Hayden, Foreign Affairs, 07.02.25.
China-Russia: Allied or aligned?
- “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s top diplomat on Wednesday that Beijing did not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it feared the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing, according to several people familiar with the exchange. The comment, to the EU’s Kaja Kallas, would confirm what many in Brussels believe to be Beijing’s position but jar with China’s public utterances. The foreign ministry regularly says China is “not a party” to the war. Some EU officials involved were surprised by the frankness of Wang’s remarks.”
- “However, Wang is said to have rejected the accusation that China was materially supporting Russia’s war effort, financially or militarily, insisting that if it was doing so, the conflict would have ended long ago.”
“China, Russia and the ‘Dragon-Bear’ embrace,” Peter Frankopan, Financial Times, 07.05.25.
- “So close have the two countries become that the axis is often referred to as the ‘Dragon-Bear’ — implying a convergence between two fearsome predators.”
- “Xi has told his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin that ‘now there are changes that haven’t happened in 100 years’ and that ‘when we are together, we drive these changes.’”
- “Russia, like China, in other words, seeks to offer an alternative to the western way of doing things — something that helps forge an obvious marriage of convenience.”
- “Whether Russia is a reliable partner to China, however, is not clear. A significant part of Russia’s territorial expansion came in the second half of the 19th century at China’s expense. ... That dominance has now shifted, with China not only the source of much-needed revenue for Russia’s war-stressed economy, but also of advanced and dual-use technology.”
- “Some leading Chinese scholars are also willing to look beyond the constant expressions of solidarity between Putin and Xi — whose personal relationship seems genuinely warm — to express more critical views of Russia. Feng Yujun of Peking University provides one good example. Russia’s aim, he has noted, is ‘to restore the Russian Empire and rebuild a geopolitical space in Eurasia dominated by Russia from east to west’ ... Moreover, Russia’s culture and aims diverge dramatically from those of Beijing — not least in ‘its inherent sense of insecurity, deep-seated hostility towards the outside world, insatiable desire for territorial expansion, geopolitical impulse to seek spheres of influence, and the messianic ideology rooted in Orthodox Christianity.’”
- “Feng is not the only person to form critical views of China’s apparently steadfast partner. When firebrand Russian nationalist commentator Alexander Dugin criticized these views, adding that many Chinese people underestimated Russia’s ‘tenacity and perseverance,’ he was roundly attacked on social media sites, with many endorsing comments such as ‘Russia must lose.’”
- “The suspicion goes both ways. Last month, a leaked document revealed that Chinese efforts to recruit officials, businesspeople and experts close to the heart of power in Moscow had risen sharply since the invasion of Ukraine. Russian intelligence officers were ordered to anticipate the threats posed by China and told to ‘prevent the transfer of important strategic information to the Chinese’ — particularly about weapons systems. China, moreover, was labelled not as an ally or a partner, but as ‘the enemy.’”
- “There is no doubt that the war in Ukraine has been useful to China.”
- “Trade has soared, with Beijing securing valuable resources at knockdown prices in face of sanctions, albeit imperfectly imposed. In the year of the February 24 2022 full-scale invasion, trade between Russia and China rose 30 per cent to $190bn a year. By the end of 2024, it had risen by another 30 per cent to about $245bn.”
- “Many lessons have been learnt from the battlefield, including the performance of military hardware, the value and operational opportunities of drone warfare, and the weakness of command, all of which will benefit the Chinese military in years to come.”
- “For now, what unites Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China is not a shared worldview, nor similar local, regional or global objectives. Marriages of convenience last for as long as it suits both sides. In this case, there is a powerful incentive in framing the problems of the past and the challenges of the future in similar language, and with similar themes. And little is more powerful in such cases than the legacy of history.”
- “Xi aims to achieve what Mao Zedong used to call a ‘strategic stalemate’—an enduring equilibrium where American pressure becomes manageable and China buys time to catch up to the U.S.”
- “One key pillar of the lessons Xi has drawn from the Soviet collapse is economic: The Soviets put all their economic bets on heavy industry, focused on energy and weaponry. Beijing by contrast is trying to produce everything, fortifying the Chinese economy against trade and technological restrictions from the U.S. while still leveraging world markets' appetites for its goods.”
- “Another pillar is geopolitical, where the goal is to avoid Soviet-style isolation. This involves weakening U.S. alliances while promoting what Beijing calls ‘multialignment,’ where countries engage with multiple global powers rather than choosing a single side.”
- “Also key to the strategy is to continue China's military buildup but without a costly arms race with the U.S. The country's official defense budget has grown at a stable rate of about 7.2% over the past three years. While that exceeds China's overall economic growth, it is below 1.5% of its gross domestic product.”
- “Xi often talks about the Soviet fall as a lesson for China. ‘Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union fall to pieces?’ Xi said in a closed-door speech to senior party officials in January 2013, shortly after he took the reins of the party. ‘An important reason is that in the ideological domain, competition is fierce.’”
- "‘Xi's goal is to achieve technological pre-eminence and play an even more influential role in this long-term competition,’ said Robert Hormats, Kissinger's senior economic adviser in the 1970s.”
“Russia and China in the Era of Trade Wars and Sanctions,” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club/RIAC, 07.04.25. Clues from Russian Views. (These organizations are affiliated with the Russian authorities.)
- “The US-China trade war has so far had little effect on Russian-Chinese relations. The increase in US tariffs has had virtually no effect on Russia. Russia is already facing a significant number of restrictive measures, and the volume of trade with the United States has been reduced to near zero since the start of Moscow’s Special Military Operation in 2022. However, Russia may feel the effects of the trade war. For example, the United States may require China to purchase American energy resources as a measure to correct the trade balance. Obviously, such a measure is unlikely to solve the imbalance. However, it has the potential to affect the volume of Russian oil supplies to China in one way or another. In addition, the trade war as a whole may affect oil prices downwards, which is also disadvantageous for Russia. On the other hand, Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources for China, which will not politicize them. Even in the context of new aggravations of the trade war, China is unlikely to refuse Russian supplies.”
- “Another factor is US sanctions against Russia. After the start of Russian-American negotiations on Ukraine in 2025, Washington avoided using new sanctions, although all previously adopted restrictive measures and their legal mechanisms are in force. However, Donald Trump failed to carry out a diplomatic blitzkrieg and achieve a quick settlement. The negotiations have dragged on and may continue for a long time. If they fail, the United States is ready to escalate sanctions again.”
- “New legal mechanisms in the field of sanctions, which are being worked on in the United States, may also affect Russian-Chinese relations. We are talking about the bill introduced by US Senator Lindsey Graham and several other senators and members of Congress.”
- “Another factor is EU sanctions policy. Unlike the US, the EU continues to escalate sanctions against Russia despite the negotiations on Ukraine.”
- “‘Many young people want to go to China to study,’ said Alyona Iyevskaya, a 19-year-old first-year student at Moscow City University. … ‘There are so many prospects in China,’ Iyevskaya added. ‘It is so cool, and it is developing so fast.’”
- “‘The last three years let the Russians see the East in a totally new light, not as an exotic alternative to Europe but as a mainstream direction for business, tourism and studies,’ said Kirill V. Babaev, head of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences.”
- “‘The Russian people are following this trend with so much interest, as if they had just discovered another planet,’ Babaev added.”
- “‘The process of recruiting has been quite hard,’ said Valentin Gogol, founder of English Nanny, which supplies nannies for the Russian elite. Gogol said he had been scrambling to meet ever-growing demand for Chinese speakers. Salaries now run to $5,000 per month, he said, generally high by Russian standards, and still, 'The process of recruiting has been quite hard.'”
- “‘People now see it as an additional second language to complement English,’ said Gogol.”
- “‘BMW is still more prestigious,’ said Sergei Stillavin, a Russian radio host and car blogger. … ‘I hope you are joking,’ [a girl in a video] says [when given a Chinese car]. ‘I won’t drive a Chinese one, this is not a Porsche, or a Mercedes.’”
- “‘China is our only friend now,’ said Aleksandr Grek, a Russian magazine editor and China enthusiast.”
- “‘Deep down nothing has changed,’ said Yulia Kuznetsova, a Chinese language and culture specialist. ‘Even the Arab world is much closer to us… We can only be close with Europe because we are united by a culture that is similar or even the same.’”
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Nuclear arms:
- “While some nuclear weapons states are more forthcoming about their nuclear policy and targeting strategies than others, factual official information of how countries would potentially use their nuclear weapons is limited and often misunderstood or misrepresented in the public debate. Citizens of nuclear-armed countries are largely uninformed about who and what their governments target with nuclear weapons; additionally, individuals in nuclear-armed states and other states that would be directly affected in a nuclear conflict are left without a comprehensive understanding of how their government is planning for the potential use of nuclear weapons and how they individually might be affected by nuclear targeting plans.”
- “In recent years, nascent polling efforts have attempted to interrogate the extent to which civilians living in regions that would be targeted with nuclear weapons are aware of this reality. Polling by the Federation of American Scientists and ReThink Media in 2020 revealed that 76 percent of respondents living in states hosting U.S. ICBMs were “concerned” when presented with a map illustrating a realistic fallout projection from a comprehensive counterforce attack on the United States. This percentage increased to 81 percent when the same question was asked to respondents across the country Polls commissioned in 2019 and 2021 by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons revealed that strong majorities in the four European host countries for U.S. nuclear weapons—Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany—want U.S. nuclear weapons removed from their soil; however, it is unclear whether these results can specifically be attributed to concerns about being nuclear targets.”
- “Secrecy and ambiguity about nuclear policy can lead to worst-case assumptions and miscalculations, resulting in dangerous nuclear dynamics and arms racing, increased investment in nuclear arsenals, and heightened risk of nuclear use. It is therefore important for the public—as a critical stakeholder in nuclear policy—to have access to knowledge about targeting strategies as discussed in this report, so that they can participate in an informed debate about the role of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their potential use.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Counterterrorism:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
Cyber security/AI:
- "Quantity could gain a significant edge vis-à-vis quality. As mass becomes cheaper and more capable, the relative cost-effectiveness of investing in quality versus quantity could change. Advances in autonomy and robotics might make it feasible to field large numbers of platforms at a scale that was previously financially impractical without dramatically sacrificing performance. Exquisite platforms and weapons will still have a role in future fights, but the relative advantages of mass in military operations will likely increase."
- "More sophisticated hiding could help offset advances in finding, but this requires new approaches and investments in deception. Hiding could become much more effective than it is today if militaries use AI to create ‘fog-of-war machines’ that orchestrate sophisticated deception campaigns with large numbers of advanced decoys. However, this potential advantage depends on the kind of information the hider is trying to conceal and the finder’s ability to leverage advanced networks of AI-enabled sensors. The result will likely be an especially contested measure-countermeasure race between hiders and finders in which the relative advantage could vary across contexts. AI and robotic decoys are likely to be particularly useful for hiding great powers’ nuclear forces, which reduces the risk that AI will upend strategic stability between peer competitors."
- "Mission command—a hybrid of centralized and decentralized modes—will remain dominant. The main limiting factor in improving C2 is not better intelligence or faster decision making but instead the resilience of communications links between forces."
- "Cyber defenses will benefit from AI in ways that could make battle networks more resilient against attacks in the long term. Critically, AI could help address challenges with scale and speed that currently limit the effectiveness of cyber defenses and give the offense an edge. However, the cyber offense will also benefit from AI, and attackers will retain the ability to penetrate networks at certain times and places."
- "Militaries that fail to embrace mass and deception may be at a serious disadvantage. Relying on small force structures of exquisite capabilities is quickly becoming a liability rather than an asset. Advances in sensing networks and long-range strike mean that militaries must place deception at the center of how they operate. Making this shift will require new approaches to U.S. defense production and sustainment, including protecting the logistics tail required to sustain a much larger force structure over long distances."
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Energy exports from CIS:
- “The global oil market appears to have entered a new ‘bear’ era.”
- “Oil prices are under pressure from fundamental factors. Supply growth is outpacing demand, while OPEC+, against this backdrop, is ‘relaxing’ voluntary production cuts, thereby further increasing the market surplus.”
- “One of the ongoing pressures on Russian oil income is the discount of Russian crude relative to Brent, which has recently stabilized at around $12 per barrel.”
- “The idea of lowering the cap to $45 is supported by most of Ukraine's Western allies, but is being blocked by Donald Trump.”
- “Meanwhile, market conditions are such that a theoretical scenario involving a complete replacement of Russian oil supplies to India with those from other countries is now entirely plausible.”
- “Such a scenario would severely limit the potential of the Russian economy and the capacity of its federal budget, but it would not lead to collapse.”
- “Russia’s oil revenues may suffer even more if Ukraine’s allies continue to maintain sanctions pressure.”
- “In any case, a surplus-driven oil market will not only constrain Russia’s economic potential and fiscal income, but will also render the country significantly more vulnerable to economic and political pressure than in the past.”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Papers, Please: How Europe Is Cracking Down on Russia’s Shadow Fleet," Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, 07.03.25
- “Russian LNG: The Plans Are Falling Apart,” Mikhail Krutikhin, The Moscow Times, 07.07.25. (In Russian.)
- “Harvard’s Meghan O’Sullivan on what the Israel-Iran conflict means for the U.S.,” Meghan O’Sullivan, CNBC, 06.16.25.
Climate change:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
- “The suicide of federal minister of transportation Roman #Starovoit, ex-governor of Kursk region, invaded last summer by Ukrainian military) even if it remains an isolated incident, is still a watershed event for the ruling elite.”
- “When Putin has repeatedly said that “this is not 1937 now,” (year of mass terror in the USSR) he meant, among other things, that the Russian regime adheres to the convention established under Khrushchev: not to kill each other. Resignation or prison were possible — death was not. Death was reserved for traitors — primarily those who switched sides after swearing an oath: intelligence officers and military men. Even prominent opposition figures were added to this list only later — apparently after Putin let himself be persuaded that they too were not just enemies but traitors, working for foreign intelligence services while pretending to be Russian politicians.”
- “Now death has spread to a category that used to have “immunity” — high-ranking officials who fell out of favor. In fact, there are three versions of this death. Suicide out of conscience (his embezzlement brought terrible suffering to the people of his region); suicide out of fear: the frightening backdrop of Stalinist prison terms, the recent sentencing of deputy defense minister Ivanov, the arrest of Alexey Smirnov — once Starovoit’s deputy created a grim context. And finally, the version that he was liquidated as punishment.”
- “[To officials], the third version won’t seem far-fetched at all. In a just-published excerpt from Alexandra Prokopenko’s book on officials after the start of the war, she describes how the idea of punishment by death — of being eliminated for saying too much or the wrong person — spread through their circles within the very first weeks of the war. No matter how much the investigation insists it was suicide, they will believe their own fears. After all, everyone can imagine that stealing from military budgets is something Putin has equated with treason. So from today, for senior officials, it is no longer ‘not 1937.’”
- “Russia’s transition from a hybrid to a mobilization model is the main outcome of the war economy’s evolution over the past two years.”
- “The hybrid model combined market mechanisms with informal arrangements among elites, ensuring relative economic stability and limited political pluralism within strict boundaries.”
- “With the escalation of the war, the Kremlin has turned to large-scale mobilization, pushing businesses and regional elites to contribute resources and manpower.”
- “Big business is compelled to demonstrate loyalty by financing social projects, supplying the army, and refraining from political activity.”
- “Private owners have become de facto managers of state assets rather than independent proprietors.”
- “The ‘mobilization economy’ exacerbates structural weaknesses: labor shortages, declining productivity, and technological dependence on imports.”
- “Despite massive defense spending, the government faces the dilemma of sustaining production while avoiding social discontent.”
- “The Kremlin’s demands on regional elites have intensified, forcing them to balance recruitment quotas with preventing local unrest.”
- “Efforts to expand mobilization reveal the fragility of the new social contract between state and society.”
- “In the long term, Russia’s mobilization path risks deepening corruption, elite fragmentation and economic inefficiency.”
- “Russian officials are now openly warning of the risks of a recession, and companies from tractor producers to furniture makers are reducing output.”
- “In the first quarter, Russian GDP grew by 1.4% compared with a year earlier, official data shows, down from 4.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024. Russia's manufacturing sector contracted at its sharpest rate in more than three years in June, according to S&P Global's purchasing managers' index. Sales of new cars in Russia dropped nearly 30% in June year-over-year, according to the Association of European Businesses.”
- “Some analysts say the banking system is also increasingly unstable.”
- “The economic woes increase pressure on the Kremlin by shortening the financial runway it has to fund its fight in Ukraine. ... The government has been running a budget deficit throughout the war and projects it will continue for at least two more years. That provides an opening for the West if it manages to agree on powerful new sanctions on Moscow.”
- “Oil prices—which have been generally lower this year despite the turmoil in the Middle East—present another risk for Russia, which relies on energy sales for around a third of its budget revenues. The price of Russian crude has been consistently below the level assumed in this year's budget.”
- "‘Falling oil prices and tightening of the sanctions regime would be more keenly felt in the current situation,’ said Alexandra Prokopenko, a former Russian central bank official who is now a fellow at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. ‘The risks are high.’”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "In Putin’s Moscow, a summer of death and distraction," The Economist, 06.30.25.
- "Sanctions, Inflation, Recession: Challenges for Russia's Economy in the Fourth Year of War," Janis Kluge, SWP Podcast, 06.30.25 Podcast. (In German.)
- "Justice is coming for Vladimir Putin," Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 07.01.25.
Defense and aerospace:
- See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.
III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "BRICS: Lessons in Cooperation," Jhanvi Tripathi, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 07.05.25.
- Vladimir Putin’s “Remarks at the main plenary session of the 17th BRICS Summit,” Kremlin.ru, 07.06.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- "The Russia Problem Threatening Germany’s Government," Thomas O. Falk, Foreign Policy, 07.04.25
- Video recordings of the 11th International Forum "Primakov Readings" that took place on June 23-24, 2025.
Ukraine:
"Ukraine’s political infighting gets nasty," The Economist, 07.06.25.
- “On June 23rd, a deputy prime minister, Oleksiy Chernyshov—once tipped as a future prime minister—became the most senior Ukrainian politician ever charged with corruption. On government business in Europe, he initially delayed returning, creating the absurd image of a minister for repatriating Ukrainians planning his own self-exile. At around the same time, the cabinet was warned of an imminent reshuffle, and the probable appointment of a new prime minister, the 39-year-old Yulia Svyrydenko. And a renewed attempt was made to remove Ukraine’s fiercely independent spy chief, Kyrylo Budanov—though it ended in failure, at least for now. Multiple sources identify the shadowy hand of Andriy Yermak, who runs the presidential office but in reality is an unelected chief minister in all but name, as instrumental in all three plays.”
- “General Budanov’s survival shows that President Zelensky retains the final decision, whatever Mr. Yermak’s role may be in his system. Mr. Yermak seems not to wield power on his own, but derive it from a strange co-dependency with the president, something no source can quite put their finger on.”
- “‘The Russians are slow-roasting us over a low flame,’ despairs one senior official, ‘while we are playing at idiotism with very serious consequences.’”
See this link for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:
“Why Is Azerbaijan Ramping Up Tensions With Russia?” Bashir Kitachaev, Carnegie Politika, 07.07.25.
- “In a matter of days, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have unexpectedly become unprecedentedly strained. It all began when several dozen ethnic Azerbaijanis were arrested in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg in connection with a series of murders that took place fifteen years ago. While in detention, the men were also beaten, and two brothers—the main suspects in the case—subsequently died.”
- “Baku’s response has been unusually strong by the standards of post-Soviet regimes, which are generally reluctant to risk falling foul of the Kremlin. The Azerbaijani authorities not only accused Russian security forces of deliberately killing their nationals, they also canceled all cultural events related to Russia, raided the Baku office of Russia’s Sputnik news agency, and detained its employees and several Russian IT specialists who were, judging by subsequent photographs, also beaten and accused of drug dealing and cyberfraud. All of this was accompanied by harsh criticism of Moscow in state media, and Russian nationals in Azerbaijan now face regular document checks, sometimes by force.”
- “Russia is bogged down in its war against Ukraine and isolated in the West by countless sanctions, which has made Azerbaijan an important logistics partner for Moscow. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been actively investing in transport infrastructure on Azerbaijani territory and projects along the Russia-Iran-India route.”
- “At the same time, Russia’s initiative and influence in the South Caucasus has drastically weakened. First, Russian peacekeepers deployed to the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh after the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani war put up no resistance to Azerbaijan’s blockade of the region. Nor, in September 2023, did they intervene in Baku’s successful military operation to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh. And in the spring of 2024, the Russian peacekeeping contingent left the region ahead of schedule.”
- “With few successes elsewhere, victories over external adversaries have been the main source of President Aliyev’s popularity at home ever since his success in the second Karabakh war in 2020. Wealth inequality, low incomes, and the repression of any uncontrolled political and civil activity continue to plague the country.”
- “The current standoff ... will likely die down without any lasting impact on the two countries’ relations, just like the dispute over the downed plane. But the very fact that such maneuvering has become possible in relations with Moscow speaks volumes. In the South Caucasus, Russia is becoming seen less and less as a force to be reckoned with, and it will be far more difficult for the Kremlin to restore its reputation in the region.”
“Russia–Azerbaijan Tensions,” Tatiana Stanovaya, R. Politik Bulletin No. 13 (165) 2025, 07.07.25. Clues from Russian Views.
- “Russia and Azerbaijan have entered a new phase of escalation, reflecting long-term shifts in their bilateral relations and Russia’s evolving role in the Caucasus. The Yekaterinburg incident is not the cause of current tensions but part of a growing list of grievances since the Azerbaijan Airlines crash last year.”
- “These tensions illustrate a broader shift in Russian foreign policy: a recalibration of Moscow’s priorities in the post-Soviet space. Since 2015, and more so after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has focused on global strategic concerns, while regional dynamics have come to seem more marginal and underestimated.”
- “Azerbaijan’s newfound confidence as a regional actor, backstopped by strong ties with Turkey, has also affected the relationship. Azerbaijan's decisive recapture of Karabakh—and more notably, the early withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers in 2024—is widely seen in Baku as the removal of a key vulnerability. The pullout of the Russian forces was seen as a strategic defeat for Moscow.”
- “With Turkey reinforcing its position as Azerbaijan’s primary strategic ally and security guarantor, Baku, with quiet backing from the EU and the US, has been promoting a non-Russian alternative to secure the so-called Zangezur corridor. As such, the current crisis is seen in Moscow as a chance to consolidate Russia’s diminishing regional role.”
- “Russia and Azerbaijan will likely continue postponing any final resolution to their mutual grievances, potentially leading to further such crises. A new escalation will likely occur if Moscow sees any final peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia as an attempt to marginalize Russia, particularly over sensitive transport issues.”
- “Despite the current tensions, structural interdependence remains strong. Energy cooperation, remittances, trade and the sizeable Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia provide a stable basis for engagement. Neither side is aiming to cross the other's red lines, although the gradual deterioration of relations appears set to continue.”
See these links for more commentary/analysis on this subject:
- "Relations between Russia and former close ally Azerbaijan take a nosedive," Mary Ilyushina, The Washington Post, 07.03.25.
- “‘Official Yerevan Believes the Pre-2020 Format of Russia–Armenia Relations Did Not Pay Off,’" Alexander Iskandaryan, Russia.Post, 07.04.25.
- "Is Central Asia the Next Target of Russian Aggression?," Alex Little, The National Interest, 07.04.25.
The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 10:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations.
*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.
Slider photo by Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP.
Russia Analytical Report