4 Ideas to Explore

1. On the battlefields of Ukraine, the future of war is quickly becoming its present, but America is not ready to engage in warfare transformed by new technologies, according to Mark Milley and Eric Schmidt. “Future wars will no longer be about who can mass the most people or field the best jets, ships, and tanks. Instead, they will be dominated by increasingly autonomous weapons systems and powerful algorithms,” the former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former CEO of Google argue in FA. “Robots and AI are here to stay. If the United States fails to lead this revolution, malevolent actors equipped with new technologies will become more willing to attempt attacks on the United States. When they do, they might succeed,” the duo writes. “China and Russia are swiftly gaining ground” in the sphere of AI, the authors warn, and “in the worst-case scenario, AI warfare could even endanger humanity.”
2. “The United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War,” with China and Russia “fusing military, diplomatic and industrial strength to expand power worldwide and coerce its neighbors,” according to a newly-released report by the Commission on America’s National Defense Strategy.^[1] The report acknowledges that “the United States cannot compete with China, Russia and their partners alone.” Thus, the United States must “continue to invest in strengthening its allies and integrating its military efforts with theirs.” The report also recommends that “the Joint Force be sized and structured to simultaneously defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence, prevent mass casualty terrorist attacks, maintain global posture and respond to small-scale, short-duration crises; lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China ... and fight and win if needed; lead NATO planning and force structure to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression; and sustain capabilities, along with U.S. partners in the Middle East, to defend against Iranian malign activities.”
3. The largest post-Cold War prisoner swap between Russia and the West on Aug. 1 does not herald a détente, according to Tatiana Stanovaya of R.Politik. “There are far more important factors—which have nothing to do with the exchange—that determine the dynamics of the war in Ukraine. The outcome of the U.S. election, domestic political changes in Ukraine, the situation on the battlefield and the military resources available to both sides carry far more weight when it comes to possible peace talks,” Stanovaya writes in a commentary for CEIP. In his take on the ramifications of the prisoner exchange, NI’s Jacob Heilbrunn also sees no thaw. “The clash with Russia will continue. It may even intensify in coming years as positions harden in Moscow and Western capitals,” he writes.
4. The core of Kamala Harris’ foreign policy “would not likely swerve from Biden's robust support for Ukraine, which remains at war with Russia, and his hard line on China,” the aides to the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee tell WP. She should also be expected to be less rigid in her approaches to foreign policy than Joe Biden, whose longtime personal relationships with leaders such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin shaped his views on many international issues, according to WP.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant developments.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

• No significant developments.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“America Isn’t Ready for the Wars of the Future. And They’re Already Here,” Mark A. Milley and Eric Schmidt, FA, 08.05.24.

• On the battlefields of Ukraine, the future of war is quickly becoming its present. Thousands of drones fill the skies. These drones and their operators are using artificial intelligence systems to avoid obstacles and identify potential targets. AI models are also helping Ukraine predict where to strike ... Both states are racing to develop even more advanced technologies that can counter relentless attacks and overcome their adversary’s defenses.
• The war in Ukraine is hardly the only conflict in which new technology is transforming the nature of warfare. In Myanmar and Sudan, insurgents and the government are both using unmanned vehicles and algorithms as they fight. In 2020, an autonomous Turkish-made drone fielded by Libyan government-backed troops struck retreating combatants—perhaps the first drone attack conducted without human input. In the same year, Azerbaijan’s military used Turkish- and Israeli-made drones, along with loitering munitions (explosives designed to hover over a target), to seize the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. And in Gaza, Israel has fielded thousands of drones connected to AI algorithms, helping Israeli troops navigate the territory’s urban canyons.
• Future wars will ... be dominated by increasingly autonomous weapons systems and powerful algorithms.
• Unfortunately, this is a future for which the United States remains unprepared. Its troops are not fully ready to fight in an environment in which they rarely enjoy the element of surprise. Its jets, ships, and tanks are not equipped to defend against an onslaught of drones. The military has not yet embraced artificial intelligence. The Pentagon does not have nearly enough initiatives aimed at rectifying these failures— and its current efforts are moving too slowly. Meanwhile, the Russian military has fielded many AI-powered drones in Ukraine. And in April, China announced its largest military restructuring in almost a decade, with a new emphasis on building up technology-driven forces.
• If it wants to remain the preeminent global power, the United States will have to quickly shift course. The country needs to reform the structure of its armed forces. The U.S. military needs to reform its tactics and leadership development. It needs new ways to procure equipment. It needs to buy new types of gear. And it needs to better train soldiers to operate drones and use AI.
• Robots and AI are here to stay. If the United States fails to lead this revolution, malevolent actors equipped with new technologies will become more willing to attempt attacks on the United States. When they do, they might succeed. 
• The next major conflict will likely see the wholesale integration of AI into every aspect of military planning and execution. AI systems could, for instance, simulate different tactical and operational approaches thousands of times, drastically shortening the period between preparation and execution.
  • Ukraine has already sought to hand over as many dangerous frontline tasks as it can to robots to preserve scarce manpower.
• So far, automation has focused on naval power and airpower in the form of sea and air drones. But it will turn to land warfare soon. In the future, the first phase of any war will likely be led by ground robots capable of everything from reconnaissance to direct attacks. Russia has already deployed unmanned ground vehicles that can launch antitank missiles, grenades, and drones. Ukraine has used robots for casualty evacuation and explosive disposal. The next generation of machines will be led by AI systems that use the robots’ sensors to map the battlefield and predict points of attack. 
  • If Russia’s war on Ukraine expands to other parts of Europe, a first wave of land-based robots and aerial drones could enable both NATO and Russia to oversee a wider frontline than humans alone can attack or defend.
• The use of unmanned weapons is essential for another reason: they are cheap. 
• When it comes to AI, the United States still has the highest quality systems and spends the most on them. Yet China and Russia are swiftly gaining ground. Washington has the resources to keep outspending them, but even if it maintains this lead, it could struggle to overcome the bureaucratic and industrial obstacles to deploying its inventions on the battlefield. As a result, the U.S. military risks fighting a war in which its first-rate training and superior conventional weaponry will be rendered less than effective. 
• The next generation of small, cheap drones are unlikely to be designed by traditional defense firms. 
• The United States will need to do more than simply reform the way it purchases weapons. It must also change the military’s organizational structures and training systems
• In the worst-case scenario, AI warfare could even endanger humanity. 

Yuri Kotenok’s Assessment of Fighting in Ukraine, Telegram, 07.29.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

• According to Russian war blogger, voeynkorKotenkok, the pace of Russian advances had slowed down in the east while Russian forces are standing still in the south. “We are slowly crawling west from Donetsk,” Kotenok wrote on July 29 in his Telegram account. “At this rate we will clear the Donetsk region in ...2 years!,” Kotenok wrote. 
• “In the Kharkov [direction] we are fighting off with heavy losses ...[and we] are crawling in the Svatovo-Kupyansk [direction]. [Russian troops in the] Zaporizhia and Dnepr [directions] are standing still,” he wrote. 
• Kotenok attributed the slowdown of Russian offensive partially to lack of soldiers. “There are no people. The level of casualties is high,” he wrote. “For those who don't understand - there is physically no one to go on offensive with.”
•  In addition to lack of manpower Kotenok also attributed the setbacks to the “level [of commanding skills]  of a number of tactical level commanders being below the baseboard.” 
• He also attributed Russian forces’ inability to make significant advances to Ukraine’s “domination in the sphere of unmanned aerial vehicles,” which allows the Ukrainian forces to timely detect the Russian military’s attempts to attack. (RM, 07.29.24)

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine Recruits Prisoners to Fight Russia,” Liz Cookman, FP, 07.31.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“How much of a difference will Ukraine’s new F-16s make? Too few to beat Russia’s air force, but a strong symbolic start,” The Economist, 08.04.24.

• The first ten (of an eventual 79 F-16s) arrived in Ukraine on the last day of July, a year after the reluctant Biden administration finally gave its more eager European allies the green light to send them. By the end of 2024, Ukraine should be flying 20 of the American-made fighter jets. The rest, promised by the so-called F-16 coalition led by Denmark and the Netherlands, will arrive in batches during 2025.
• The F-16s could lessen the impunity with which Russian Su-34s have been pummeling Ukraine’s front lines. The Russians have been launching more than a hundred crude but effective glide-bombs every day without having to leave Russian airspace. 
• The F-16s can use cheaper heat-seeking AIM-9X missiles to take down the cruise missiles that have been crippling Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Their 20mm six-barrel Gatling gun should be effective against Russia’s slow-moving Geran drones, copies of the Iranian Shahed. F-16s could also fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles against the remainder of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.
• But with numbers building up slowly, it may take some time before the F-16s can have much impact. A recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), another think-tank, argues that Ukraine needs many more aircraft than have so far been promised. .... The report argues that it [Ukraine] needs 12 squadrons or more with 18 planes per squadron to achieve local air superiority and support a ground offensive.
• Too few and too late though they may be, the F-16s’ importance should not be underestimated.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine Might Breathe a Sigh of Relief — Whether Trump or Harris Wins,” Matthew Kaminski, Politico, 08.04.24.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“As War Gets Bleaker, More Ukrainians Appear Open to a Peace Deal,” Oksana Parafeniuk and Kim Barker, WP, 07.31.24.^[2]

• In mid-July, a survey by the Ukrainian independent media outlet ZN.UA found that about 44 percent of Ukrainian civilians favored starting official talks with Russia. On July 23, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology released a poll showing that nearly a third of Ukrainians would agree to cede some territory to Russia to end the war. That’s more than three times as many as the year before.
• In Ukraine, the third year of the war is grueling: The Russians are inching forward every day, and Ukraine has been unable to mount a successful counteroffensive since 2022. The country has been beset by frequent power outages and a growing death toll.
• In June, President Vladimir Putin said he would order a cease-fire and enter negotiations with Ukraine only if Kyiv withdrew from the regions that Moscow has claimed — but does not yet completely control — and dropped aspirations to join NATO. 
• Russia was not invited to Switzerland in June for the first international peace summit........ Russia has so far been noncommittal about participating in a second peace summit. But the Kremlin has also signaled in recent weeks that it could enter negotiations even if Kyiv doesn’t fulfill Mr. Putin’s June demands. Regardless, many Western officials and analysts question whether Mr. Putin is ready to negotiate anything other than a peace deal on his terms.
• A key adviser to Mr. Zelensky [Podolyak] last week said making a deal now with Mr. Putin was akin to signing “a deal with the devil.” And while the Kyiv Institute poll showed a threefold increase in people willing to give up land for peace, it also found that 55 percent of Ukrainians oppose any territorial concessions whatsoever.
• The sociology institute’s survey did not identify how large concessions should be, whether territory should be officially conceded or whether it should be controlled temporarily by Russia in a less formal way. “It’s just in general, what’s your emotions?” said Anton Grushetskyi, the institute’s executive director. “And surely, more and more people are ready. And the key reason is the failed expectations from the last year, because lots of people had more hopes.”
• “I’d rather believe in the chastity of a prostitute,” said Oleksandr Tsebrii, a soldier of the 58th motorized brigade, in a Facebook video posted on July 15, shortly after Mr. Zelensky publicly suggested Russia could come to the next peace summit. He added: “The only formula for our security and the existence of Ukraine is our resistance.” Last week, he was killed in heavy fighting in the eastern region of Donetsk.

“Russia-West Prisoner Swap Does Not Herald a Détente,” Tatiana Stanovaya, CEIP, 08.02.24.

• Russia and the West have carried out the biggest prisoner swap since the Cold War, with sixteen prisoners handed from Russia to the West, and eight moving to Russia from the West. 
• Many have suggested the fact that the two sides were able to come to an agreement is a hopeful sign for peace negotiations in Ukraine. But there’s little justification for such a position.
• Even if the exchange can be considered a success, it was a success against all the odds. 
• In the end, Moscow paid a high price for [FSB hitman] Krasikov, and Putin risks domestic criticism that Russia “overpaid” by releasing high-profile opposition politicians. Russia can also expect some more reputational damage: the exchange was a stark reminder to the world of Russian repression, lawlessness, and its brutal treatment of opposition figures. This is unlikely to make anyone more inclined to come to an accommodation with Moscow.
• For the West, the deal had a double significance: first, to free its nationals from incarceration in Russian prisons, and second, to underline that Russia is dangerous and cruel. There will no longer be the same need for the intelligence services of Russia and the United States to maintain such close contact.
• Finally, there are far more important factors—which have nothing to do with the exchange—that determine the dynamics of the war in Ukraine. The outcome of the U.S. election, domestic political changes in Ukraine, the situation on the battlefield, and the military resources available to both sides carry far more weight when it comes to possible peace talks. The recent exchange was just the end of a particular phase of confrontation. The contours of the next phase are still being formed. 

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

Report by the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, co-chaired by Jane Harman and Eric Edelman, RAND, 07.29.24.

• The United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not better. … China and Russia are major powers that seek to undermine U.S. influence.^[3] … Russia possesses considerable strategic, space, and cyber capabilities and under Vladimir Putin seeks a return to its global leadership role of the Cold War.
• China and Russia’s “no-limits” partnership, formed in February 2022 just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has only deepened and broadened to include a military and economic partnership with Iran and North Korea, each of which presents its own significant threat to U.S. interests. This new alignment of nations opposed to U.S. interests creates a real risk, if not likelihood, that conflict anywhere could become a multitheater or global war.
• China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia) is fusing military, diplomatic, and industrial strength to expand power worldwide and coerce its neighbors. The United States needs a similarly integrated approach to match, deter, and overcome theirs, which we describe as all elements of national power.
• The United States cannot compete with China, Russia, and their partners alone—and certainly cannot win a war that way. Given the growing alignment of authoritarian states, the United States must continue to invest in strengthening its allies and integrating its military (and economic, diplomatic, and industrial) efforts with theirs. 
• The United States must engage globally with a presence—military, diplomatic, and economic—to maintain stability and preserve influence worldwide, including across the Global South, where China and Russia are extending their reach. 
• We recommend that the Joint Force be sized and structured to simultaneously defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence, prevent mass casualty terrorist attacks, maintain global posture, and respond to small-scale, short-duration crises; lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China from territorial aggression in the Western Pacific—and fight and win if needed; lead NATO planning and force structure to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression; and sustain capabilities, along with U.S. partners in the Middle East, to defend against Iranian malign activities.

“Behind Russia's absence at the Olympics, a deepening fury,” Lee Hockstader, WP, 08.01.24.

• The Kremlin has not disguised its rage at having been all but excluded from the 2024 Summer Games - just 15 Russians are competing as designated neutral athletes, and Russian teams, the Russian anthem and the Russian flag have been banned, including during the parade of nations at last week's Opening Ceremonies.
• When top U.S. and European generals assess Russia's postwar intentions, they see a country consumed by fury and bent on revenge. In three to five years - the time Moscow will need to reconstitute its battered forces - strategists believe the Kremlin will gear up to intensify a payback campaign that has already begun with sabotage attacks in Europe and might also target the United States.
  • "At the end of a conflict in Ukraine - however it concludes - we are going to have a very big Russia problem," U.S. Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, the supreme allied commander in Europe, told the Aspen Security Forum last month. "We are going to have a situation where Russia is reconstituting its force, is located on the borders of NATO, is led by largely the same people as it is right now, is convinced that we're the adversary, and is very, very angry."
  • Similarly, the new British armed forces chief, Gen. Sir Roland Walker, warns that Russia is unlikely to settle for a cold peace with Washington and its European allies. "The lesson from history is the Russians don't forget, and they will come back ... wanting retribution for the support that was given to Ukraine," he told a conference in London last week.
• "The tragedy is that what started two and half years ago as Putin's war - really one person's war - in Year 3 is much more Russia's war than just Putin's war," Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, told me. "Too many people have died, too much animosity has been created between Russians and Ukrainians and Russia and the West."
• It's critical that U.S. and European leaders take stock of what Russia has become: an increasingly galvanized society led by elites who see the Western powers as Moscow's sworn enemy; the war in Ukraine as the outcome of Washington's provocations; and Putin as an irreplaceable leader on a righteous mission to avenge the Soviet Union's ignominious collapse. That toxic stew is a recipe for generational struggle.

“Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO,” Steven Pifer, Brookings, August 2024.

• The United States has long defined a stable and secure Europe as a vital national interest. European members of NATO of course share that interest. A number of allies have concluded that Ukraine’s membership is critical for a stable and secure Europe, calculating that Europe will be unstable and less secure if Russia prevails over Ukraine, if the war drags out endlessly, or if a tense, unsteady, and fragile peace is struck between the two.
• While much has been accomplished in the NATO and Western effort to support Ukraine and move it closer to the alliance since the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukrainians remain frustrated. They see their fight against Russia not only as a war to defend Ukraine but as a defense of Europe. Ukrainians are also frustrated that some Western arms come with strings attached, i.e., they cannot be used to strike targets in Russia. Getting those limits lifted was high on Zelensky’s wish list in Washington, but he did not succeed, at least not as regards US-provided weapons.
• The bilateral security agreements commit important assistance to Kyiv in terms of financing, training, arms, and ammunition. However, no bilateral agreement commits a country to send its military forces to Ukraine’s defense. Ukraine remains outside any alliance structure, and a Ukraine alone could prove a temptation for Moscow to return to conflict in the future. Uncertainty hangs over the “when” of Ukraine’s membership (even leaving aside the question of a possible return by Donald Trump to the White House in 2025). While it is not wholly excluded that Kyiv might receive an invitation even as the current war with Russia continues, that appears extremely unlikely.
• While continuing to make its case for membership, Ukraine should work diligently with the NATO-Ukraine Council to implement reforms needed to bring the country into full conformity with NATO standards and norms. Kyiv should aim to be in a position so that, when a window of opportunity to join opens, it is fully ready to enter. When that will be, however, remains unclear. 

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Who Caused the Ukraine War? John J. Mearsheimer, Substack, 08.05.24.  
• “Moscow’s Spies Were Stealing US Tech — Until the FBI Started a Sabotage Campaign,” Zach Dorfman, Politico, 08.04.24.  

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

“Marxism and the Xi-Putin Link,” Leon Aron, WSJ, 08.05.24.

• Mr. Xi [Jinping of China] won’t seek to end the Ukraine war with “one phone call,” as Finnish President Alexander Stubb has suggested. That’s because Mr. Xi’s motive for supporting Mr. Putin’s war is bound up with passionate ideological conviction. Namely, Mr. Xi is a fervent Marxist.
• Beyond obvious geopolitical gains, a Russian victory would offer a powerful vindication of the Marxist theory of history. A demoralized and degraded West would be Exhibit A of the decay of “bourgeois democracies,” validating what the Central Committee has called the party’s place on the “right side of history and the side of human progress.”
• Mr. Xi’s inspirations—Lenin, Stalin, Mao—all forged or expanded communist regimes during or following wars. Stalin’s 1939 pact with Hitler also offers an uncanny parallel to Mr. Xi’s support for Mr. Putin: a communist state aiding a fascist state in its war on the capitalist West.
• Driven by what the People’s Daily has called a “powerful sense of mission,” the faithful Marxist in Beijing, who holds a doctorate in Marxist theory, will stand by Russia in pursuit of a victory that his dogma foretells.

“Biden's Indo-Pacific diplomacy has made America's future more secure,” Antony Blinken, Lloyd Austin and Jake Sullivan, WP, 08.05.24.

• No place on Earth is more critical to Americans' livelihoods and futures than the Indo-Pacific. The region — which stretches from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean — generates nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product. Its commerce supports more than 3 million American jobs. Much of the world's advanced manufacturing, which helps power the U.S. economy, happens in its factories. And the area's serious security challenges, including North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling and China's dangerous and provocative actions at sea, have effects far beyond the region.
• President Biden instructed us to transform our approach to the region.
  • First, we upgraded the old "hub and spoke" model of diplomacy with an integrated, interconnected network of partnerships.
  • Second, we worked closely with our allies and partners to confront shared challenges together.....President Biden has ... built bridges among our allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Japan and other Asian partners have stepped forward with strong support for Ukraine in the face of Russia's aggression. Meanwhile, our European partners are standing together to hold China accountable for supporting Vladimir Putin's war machine and undermining the international rules-based order.
• All this is producing historic security dividends. We're locking arms with our allies and partners against North Korea's destabilizing weapons programs. We're pushing back together against China's dangerous brinkmanship in the region's waterways. Our security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific are more effective and more unified — which makes us and our neighbors safer and stronger.

“Chinese Assessment of PM Modi’s Russia Visit,” Antara Ghosal Singh, Observer Research Foundation, 08.02.24.

• Indian PM Narendra Modi's recent visit to Russia garnered much attention worldwide. While international media has largely focused on the reactions from the West, what is missing from the current discourse is how the visit was perceived in Beijing, supposedly Russia's closest partner in today's geopolitics.
• In Chinese discourse, the visit was mostly analyzed in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s absence from the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] SCO Summit in Astana, which was held on 3–4 July, just days before the said visit. Chinese observers were rather aggravated that while the leaders of all the eight countries attended the SCO summit, PM Modi was the only one who did not attend.
• What further upset the Chinese side was that while PM Modi could not attend the SCO Summit, he could very well to go Italy to attend the G7 Summit, of which it is not even a member. And right after giving the SCO summit a miss, PM Modi headed straight for a private meeting with President Putin. The inference drawn by Beijing is that India is deliberately snubbing China, and China-headed multilateral forums, but is ready to appease Russia.
• The development needs to be put into perspective… Terms like “diplomatic flexibility, diversification and balancing” seem to be making a comeback. As a possible consequence, on one hand, we see Putin's visit to North Korea and signing a mutual defense agreement, his agreement with Vietnam to jointly develop marine resources in the South China Sea causing much heartburn in Beijing. The inference drawn by Chinese observers is that Russia is actively seeking to get the attention of the US and the West back to the Asia-Pacific region, at China’s doorstep, so as to reduce the pressure on itself, even as it knows very well that its action will mean greater pressure and provocation for China.
• It is in this backdrop, that PM Modi’s Russia visit sounded an alarm bell among Chinese strategic circles, where the primary concern was that India might seek to use its traditional ties with Russia to check and balance China.

Missile defense:

• No significant developments.

Nuclear arms:

“U.S. Options for Post–New START Arms Control with Russia,” Samuel Charap and Christian Curriden, RAND, 07.30.24.

• From ... two variables—whether Russia returns to full compliance with the treaty before it expires and whether Russia maintains its pledge to comply with the NST central limits on a voluntary basis—we can derive three possible scenarios for the period until NST’s expiry: (1) a return to full Russian compliance before NST expiry; (2) continued Russian non-implementation of NST until its expiry but no clear violation of the central limits; and (3) continued Russian non-implementation of NST until its expiry accompanied by a buildup of its strategic arsenal beyond the central limits. 
• The best-case scenario of Russia’s return to NST implementation and compliance with the ceilings would be most conducive to future arms control. However, that seems a rather unlikely scenario as of this writing. Yet, even in the worst case of a Russian buildup beyond NST’s central limits, considering certain unilateral measures would still be sensible, such as commitments not to develop and deploy destabilizing capabilities. And in the scenario of a continuation of the status quo of Russia’s noncompliance with NST but de facto adherence to its central limits, bilateral agreements or political commitments would be possible, assuming creative diplomacy and political will on both sides. In any case, as we have demonstrated in this paper, the United States has arms control options that could further core national security interest

“Why America Stands to Lose If It Resumes Nuclear Testing. China and Russia Would Finally Be Able to Catch Up,”  Jeffrey Lewis, FA, 07.30.24.

• People close to former President Donald Trump, including those who could serve in a second administration of his, are once again floating the unhelpful idea of the United States resuming nuclear weapons testing. 
• The United States combined supercomputing and the wealth of data from the tests it had conducted into something it called “science-based stockpile stewardship,” a massive investment in science, surveillance, facilities, and computing that has allowed the country to maintain its nuclear arsenal without testing.
• If a second Trump administration resumed nuclear testing, Russia and China would surely follow suit—and because they have more to learn from each test, they would erode the United States’ advantage. Moreover, new or emerging nuclear weapons states—say, Iran or Saudi Arabia—would feel no constraints against carrying out explosion tests. The result would be that the United States’ nuclear-armed foes would be even more capable.

“Statement by Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Mikhail Kondratenkov,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 07.31.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• One should have in mind that our strategic nuclear forces have already become target of Ukrainian attacks, and we are confident that Kiev, which absolutely lacks legal personality, could not make this decision on its own. NATO obviously had a hand in this. An aggressive, bloodthirsty, illegitimate nuclear military bloc, NATO has put the world on the brink of a global nuclear war with the only purpose of checking Russia's reaction to its aggressive behavior. Such steps on the part of NATO should receive proper assessment and response of all countries interested in ensuring their security.
• Going back to the matters of transparency and accountability, we believe that all countries should contribute to this process. At the same time, there is a number of States that are considered non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, yet they are in fact NATO members, they take part in nuclear sharing, and nuclear weapons have been placed in the territories of some of them and can at any moment be placed in the territories of others. It is these States who should exercise maximum transparency and report in as great detail as possible their nuclear infrastructure, its use and their plans for the future.

“A Duo of Strategic Counteraction,” Dmitry Stefanovich, RIAC/Profil, 08.01.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• The deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia is imminent, as well as the encouragement of the emergence of such weapons in the arsenals of the U.S. allies and partners, about which unambiguous statements were also made on the margins of the NATO summit. 
•  Washington seems to have convinced itself that the 1980s “NATO dual solution,” i.e., the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe in parallel with negotiations on their reduction with the USSR, was a remarkable success story, and is now trying a similar scheme with respect to the PRC.
• n such an environment, we cannot rule out deepening Russian-Chinese cooperation in this very sphere, up to and including the transfer of the previously existing practice of joint computer exercises on missile defense to the practical plane. Perhaps soon we will also see joint missile defense exercises with China.
• Joint actions by Russia and China on international platforms are important. It is necessary to continue working at the IAEA, including on novel issues such as AUKUS nuclear submarines (and the prospects for nuclear submarines in other non-nuclear-weapon states that are members of the NPT). Preventing a space arms race is important: the Russian-Chinese draft Treaty on Prevention the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space remains the only well-developed instrument in this area.  
• Today it is difficult to talk about disarmament, nuclear and non-nuclear since most countries of the world are increasing their military expenditures. Meanwhile, in accordance with the Article VI of the NPT, nuclear disarmament is linked to “general disarmament under international control.” But this does not mean that we should not look for options to reverse this trend and revitalize arms control. Moreover, what is particularly important in a tense military and political situation, arms control simultaneously serves as an effective tool for strengthening national security, primarily in the military sphere.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany,” Jonas Schneider and Torben Arnold, SWP, July 2024.
• "It’s Time to Build the Nuclear Arsenal of the Twenty-First Century," Robert Peters, NI, 08.04.24.

Counterterrorism:

“The Islamic State Keeps Finding Opportunities,” Jeremy Hodge, War on the Rocks, 07.30.24.

• In March 2024, the Islamic State killed more people in parts of Syria controlled by the Assad regime than at any point since July 2018. The attacks are part of an ongoing trend since October 2023 that has seen Islamic State activity in this area grow to levels unseen since the group lost control of its territorial caliphate. This growth is largely attributable to the recent withdrawal of thousands of Russian and Iranian troops from parts of Syria controlled by the Assad regime, which has given the Islamic State more space to operate than at any point since 2017. 
• U.S. forces in Syria should ... brace for a period of growing instability in the medium to long term, particularly in the event that a conflict breaks out between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon.
  • First, U.S. forces in Syria should ramp up anti-Islamic State raids and operations after a period of lull. 
  • The United States should also attach increased urgency to resuming training courses for Syrian Democrat Forces’ prison guards, which have been put on indefinite hold in 2024. 
• Though the current political climate in the United States likely will not permit it, in the medium to long term Washington should increase its troop presence in northeast Syria to expand its patrols along key highways where the Islamic State moves weapons and fighters between different regions.  

Conflict in Syria:

“In Syria, Iran Is Gaining Ground After Russia’s Withdrawal,” Arman Mahmoudian, FP, 08.01.24.

• Although the Russian withdrawal [from Syria] might initially appear to be a boon for the West, it ultimately introduces new challenges and uncertainties in the Middle East. What may initially seem like a strategic opportunity due to the reduced influence of a major rival, the reality is that the power vacuum left by Russia has been quickly filled by Iranian and Hezbollah forces. This shift could drag the U.S. and its allies into a conflict with Iran’s Axis of Resistance, as their advancement in Syria might provoke a strong response from Israel, potentially triggering a chain of events.
• In the absence of any easy options to remove Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, the best alternative for the U.S. government could be to maintain its military presence in Syria and resume supportive relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While maintaining military presence is solely in the hands of Washington, the future of SDF largely depends on Turkey. If Ankara decides to normalize relations with Syria, the SDF, designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, could become even more vulnerable. In this context, the U.S. might need to consider establishing clear boundaries with Turkey or expanding its military footprint in the north.
• Evidently, as long as there are military threats to Bashar al-Assad’s government on the ground in Syria, members of the Axis of Resistance will be cautious in pursuing an ambitious agenda against Israel that could trigger a two-fold conflict in the region: with Israel in the south and the United States in the east and north.

“Rewind and Reconnoiter: The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir Al-Zour with Kimberly Martin,” Kimberly Marten, War on the Rocks, 08.01.24.

• [On the subject of Wagner Group mercenaries since Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny of June 2023:] The Wagner Group still exists. As of spring 2024, its members were officially recognized — with their insignia displayed — in Russian military parades, and the group was once again being allowed to recruit. The situation is still evolving, but it appears that for now, control over the Wagner Group has been both strengthened and split between several Russian military and security agencies.
• Wagner Group fighters who wish to continue to work with the Russian state are now officially under contract to the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), the organization responsible for domestic security that President Vladimir Putin created in 2016 out of Interior Ministry and specialized police forces. Three Wagner Group assault detachments joined a newly created Rosgvardia volunteer battalion to fight in Ukraine in late 2023, according to the U.K. Defense Intelligence Agency, with a new base camp in Rostov collocated with Russia’s 150th Motorized Rifle Division.
• To complicate matters, fighters associated with the longtime warlord leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, are officially a local branch of Russia’s Rosgvardia, and they established their own volunteer battalion to fight in Ukraine, called the Akhmat special forces group, in 2022. Over the past year, the Akhmat group has recruited hundreds of Wagner Group fighters to join its ranks in combat. In April 2024, Kadyrov publicly announced that 3,000 Wagner fighters would be added to the Akhmat group.
• [On the three major factors have affected Russia’s involvement with its Syrian ally since 2018:] First, while Syria remains unstable and much of the civilian population remains displaced and impoverished, the most violent phase of the civil war there has ended. The central government of Bashar Assad controls only about 70 percent of Syrian territory, but most analysts now refer to the situation as a stalemate or frozen conflict between Assad and the opposition forces.
• Second, Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022, and its growing need for both more weaponry and more troops to fight its ongoing attrition war against Ukraine, has left Moscow with fewer resources to dedicate to the Syrian problem. Russia could not have fought two major wars simultaneously in Syria and Ukraine.
• Third, the horrific Hamas terrorist attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, led the Kremlin to make a curious choice: It abandoned what had been a relatively cooperative relationship with Israel in Syria, and instead chose the side of Hamas, inviting the terrorist group’s leaders to a friendly meeting in Moscow less than three weeks after the attack. This almost certainly resulted from Russia’s growing dependence on Iran for drones and missiles to use in the war against Ukraine.

Cyber security/AI: 

• No significant developments.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant developments.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“Foreign policy flair a key test for Harris,” Michael Birnbaum, Missy Ryan, WP, 07.31.24.

• If she claims the Democratic presidential nomination and then the White House, Harris, a longtime prosecutor, would apply her decades spent battling in courtrooms to confronting the world's most pressing crises and standing firm against U.S. adversaries should they seek to test her, say people who have worked with her. Observers said the leaders of Russia and China would be most likely to try.
• Aides say the core of her foreign policy would not likely swerve from Biden's robust support for Ukraine, which remains at war with Russia, and his hard line on China as it seeks to displace the United States as the world's leading superpower. On Gaza - the most divisive global issue among Democrats - Harris has carved out a distinct rhetorical lane, voicing sharp criticism of Palestinian suffering even while continuing to back strong military support for Israel.
• But she is likely to approach global problems differently from Biden, who has longtime personal relationships with leaders such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin through decades of service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and two terms as vice president. That experience shaped [Biden’s] rigid views on many issues, officials say.
• Republicans view Harris's foreign policy record as a vulnerability. "Kamala Harris has zero foreign policy experience aside from supporting Joe Biden's weak agenda that has emboldened our adversaries, led to war in Ukraine, and enabled Iranian-backed terrorists to attack Israel," said a spokeswoman for the Trump campaign, Karoline Leavitt, calling [Harris] "dangerously liberal" and asserting there is "zero doubt that America will be a more dangerous place if she was our Commander in Chief."
• Harris, if elected, would enter office with a smaller cadre of foreign policy aides than Biden, who had a team that had worked with him for years in the Senate and during his vice presidency. As vice president, Harris has had unusually high staff turnover. And her efforts to promote U.S. policy have not always been successful.
  • At a security conference in Munich in February, where many European leaders were looking at U.S. opinion polls and growing concerned about Washington's future commitment to Ukraine and NATO, Harris sought to quell fears.... Many European policymakers who watched her speech questioned whether her assurances met the moment. Some were searching for practical advice about how to deal with political instability in Washington and said that they found her approach more condescending than helpful. Officials who met with her privately in Munich said she was more engaging behind closed doors.
• On Ukraine, Harris hasn't driven policy, but aides say she has led at critical moments with key European allies. In February 2022, five days before Russia's full-scale invasion, Harris was charged with walking Volodymyr Zelensky through Western intelligence indicating an attack was days away, pushing the Ukrainian president, who had been publicly dismissive of the threat, to prepare for war.
• One senior European policymaker who attended a Ukrainian-organized peace conference last month in Switzerland observed that Harris delivered "strong remarks" and appeared at ease with other leaders. But this person warned that "niceties" are less important than decision-making qualities, and said that "Russia and China will definitely test a new president they do not know."

“What might a Harris foreign policy look like?,” Anne-Marie Slaughter, FT, 08.04.24.

• Efforts to find space between Harris and President Joe Biden, most notably on Israel/Gaza, yield differences of tone rather than substance.
• Harris’s life experience and her top foreign policy staff offer a better guide. First, she is plenty tough. She was a prosecutor, bringing cases against criminals with the aim of sending them to jail. That steeliness has emerged both in her questioning at Senate hearings and in repeated appearances at the Munich Security Conference. In 2023 she used her speech to accuse Russia, in graphic detail, of crimes against humanity; this year she detailed the ways in which “Putin’s war has already been an utter failure for Russia.”
• Harris is a strong internationalist, emphasizing that US “global leadership is to the direct benefit of the American people.” 
• Her mantra is less likely to be “foreign policy for the middle class” than a version of “peace through strength,” where strength flows from many sources, including fair and equal treatment for all Americans. Call it a new mix of might and right.

“Trump splits with GOP lawmakers on national security, raising alarm,” Alexander Bolton, The Hill, 08.01.24.

• National security-minded Republican lawmakers are alarmed by what they see as a growing split between themselves and former President Trump on key issues, including the war in Ukraine, preserving the NATO alliance and protecting Taiwan from Chinese aggression.
• Defense-minded GOP senators viewed Trump’s invitation to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to visit him at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida after the NATO summit in Washington as a worrisome development, given Orbán’s close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin and his efforts to undermine NATO’s support for the defense of Ukraine.
• GOP senators who support U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine were dismayed when Trump selected Sen. JD Vance (R-Ohio), who led the opposition to the Ukrainian assistance package, as his running mate.
• “I support the ticket. I also support Ukraine, and I’m going to be arguing, no matter who gets elected president” for deterring Russian aggression, [Sen. Mitch] McConnell said. “It’s not just Ukraine, we’ve got worldwide organized authoritarian regimes talking to each other — China, North Korea, Russia, Iran and Iran’s proxies.” “This is a serious challenge,” he warned. “This is the single largest problem facing the democratic world, no matter who wins the election. And that’s what I’m going to be working on the next couple years.”
• “I think Trump goes in and tries to negotiate a deal [to end the war in Ukraine] where they cede certain territory to Putin knowing that Putin can’t walk away a loser. Putin’s only graceful exit from this is Zelensky and company ceding some territory, the Russian-speaking parks of Ukraine,” the senator said, predicting that Trump will lean on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“Ukraine wary as West, Moscow show they can deal,” David L. Stern and Isabelle Khurshudyan, WP, 08.02.24.

• Ukrainian officials had no direct part in Thursday's monumental prisoner exchange between Russia and the West. But as news of the swap spread, some wondered what the deal negotiated with Ukraine's invading tormentor could mean for their country. Top officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, did not comment on the trade. But the size, complexity and importance of the swap did not go unnoticed— a difficult and secret diplomatic process that involved officials in nine countries.
• On Friday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov quickly squashed any speculation that the prisoner deal could lead to negotiations over ending the war in Ukraine. But there has long been anxiety in Kyiv that supporters, especially the United States, might begin secret talks with Moscow. Ukrainian officials insisted on Friday that they would hold President Biden to his oft-repeated promise: "Nothing about Ukraine, without Ukraine."
• Mykhailo Podolyak, a Zelensky adviser, said in an interview with The Washington Post that Ukraine is now "too independent" to be sidestepped during any potential negotiations and to have cease-fire terms imposed by others. "You won't be able to agree upon something with Russia that concerns Ukraine without Ukraine," Podolyak said. "The price of the war is too high, Ukraine's informational influence is too high and a wrongful termination of the war will bring tragedy to not only Ukraine."
• But Ukrainians are aware that their country is surviving on donated weapons and money, borrowed and gifted, from abroad. If either of those lifelines get cut off, Ukraine is in deep trouble. For that reason, word of the prisoner deal… left some Ukrainians wary. "There are concerns that this does not become a trend," Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko said, adding that whatever is agreed upon "should be a joint position with Ukraine."
• A Ukrainian official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive politics, said that successful prisoner exchanges did not imply talks to end the war. But the official stressed that Ukraine remains open to talks that are fair and adhere to international law. "We have some talks with Russians, too, when it is about prisoners of war exchange, and thousands of people are free now," the official said. "But it does nothing to push us to negotiations."

“Was the Prisoner Swap with Russia a Bad Idea?,” Jacob Heilbrunn, NI, August 2024.

• As uneasy as the deal may make some in the West, the cold dictates of realpolitik demanded that a moral stand had to be taken. Washington could not simply abandon innocent citizens who had been seized as pawns on a larger global chessboard. For Biden, as much as for Putin, the prisoner exchange is a personal victory but not one that will alter the nature of relations between the two sides.
• The clash with Russia will continue. It may even intensify in coming years as positions harden in Moscow and Western capitals. This deal, as Melinda Haring cogently noted in USA Today, represented “nothing more than a temporary moment of convenience when Putin and Biden’s narrow political interests overlapped. There will be no thaw or reset in the final days of Biden’s term.” Quite the contrary.

“Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?,” Douglas London, FP, 07.30.24.

• [S]hould the United States and its allies seek to depose Putin by enabling a coup in his absence, or assassinating him during such travels [Putin’s trips abroad]? The answer lies in assessing the risk versus gain.
• Despite Putin’s obsession with intrigue, denial and deception, and smoke and mirrors, he’s fairly predictable … U.S. governments have arguably favored the status quo of a predictable adversary. Regime change has not worked out well for U.S. interests.
• In Russia, like most autocracies, power rests with those who control the nation’s instruments of power … That power is currently concentrated within a small circle of septuagenarians, almost all of whom have long ties to Putin, the Cold War-era KGB, and St. Petersburg.
• If Putin were assassinated abroad, regardless of the evidence, the old guard would likely accuse the United States and use it as a lightning rod to consolidate power and rally the public. And sharing Putin’s paranoia over the West’s existential threat, the risk is credible that they would retaliate militarily, directly, and with uncertain restraint. Believing themselves insecure, they would likewise crack down at home in an indiscriminately ruthless manner that might unleash long-contained revolutionary vigor among the population, which would throw a large, nuclear-armed power into chaos.
• There are also significant bureaucratic hurdles to lethal operations. For the moment, at least, the U.S. practice of covert action is dictated by the rule of law.

For more analysis on this subject, see 

• "Inside the Secret Negotiations to Free Evan Gershkovich," Joe Parkinston, et al, WSJ, 08.01.24.
• "How Biden Persuaded Scholz to Release a Top Kremlin Assassin," Arne Delfs, Akayla Gardner, and Marilen Martin, Bloomberg, 08.01.24.
• "With Historic Prisoner Swap, Biden Has Mastered the Art of the Deal," Jessica Karl, Bloomberg, 08.01.24.
• “Navalny Couldn’t Be Freed Until Gershkovich Was Kidnapped. Gershkovich Couldn’t Be Freed Until Navalny Was Dead,” Masha Gessen, NYT, 08.02.24.
• “Historic Prisoner Swap Is a Boon for Biden’s Legacy,” Ravi Agrawal, FP, 08.01.24.
• “Long Johns, Forensics and a Bound Russian Killer: Inside the Big Prisoner Swap,” Anton Troianovski, Mark Mazzetti, NYT, 08.03.24.
• “They were in prison in the West. Now they're celebrities in Russia,” Mary Ilyushina, Claire Parker, Adam Taylor, Robyn Dixon, WP, 03.08.24.
• “Value to Putin of a 'Hero' Assassin Made Clear,” Ivan Nechepurenko, NYT, 08.03.24.
• “Russia’s Prisoner Trade Says All You Need Know About Putin,” Marc Champion, Bloomberg, 08.02.24.^[4]
• “Evan Gershkovich comes home after a prisoner exchange worth making,” BG editorial board, BG, 08.05.24.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“What’s Driving Russia’s Biggest Property Redistribution in Thirty Years?,” Alexandra Prokopenko, CEIP, 07.31.24.^[5] Clues from Russian Views. 

• Property rights in Russia have become yet another victim of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Since the full-scale invasion, we have seen assets owned by foreigners nationalized via presidential decree; prosecutors and courts overturn decades-old privatizations to benefit members of President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle; property owned by residents of occupied Ukraine who oppose Russian rule handed to decorated Russian military veterans; and companies, land, and real estate taken off those designated as “extremist.”
• Battles over some of these assets have led to dramas worthy of Shakespeare himself, characterized by the institutional dysfunctionality and informal practices that increasingly typify late Putinism. None of this is a problem for Putin himself, but it risks becoming a nightmare for his successor.
• While there have been conversations about reversing the post-Soviet privatization ever since Putin came to power, no formal decision to do this has ever been taken. Nevertheless, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a significant amount of property has been informally redistributed, from small businesses and private apartments to enormous metals factories and power generation assets. This generally happens in one of several ways:
  • First, assets can be seized from former officials who now live abroad (this is how ex-senator Leonid Lebedev lost control of thermal power company TGK-2, and how the pasta manufacturer Makfa was taken from ex-governor Mikhail Yurevich). 
  • Second, individuals can be accused of supporting Ukraine (like Ukrainian tycoons Rinat Akhmetov and Yevhen Cherniak). 
  • Third, the legality of privatization agreements from the 1990s can be challenged: an approach that sets a dangerous precedent. 
  • Finally, the authorities can designate a businessperson or their company as “extremist,” which means their property can be seized (this is what happened to vodka magnate Yuri Shefler and journalist Alexander Nevzorov).
• Property redistribution in Russia has now reached such a scale that it is not only spooking the business community, but even some of Putin’s close allies. German Gref, the head of state-owned banking giant Sberbank, recently complained that the prosecutor general was “undermining the stability of economic activity and the inviolability of property rights.”
• By dishing out property rights and acting as a guarantor on commercial deals, Putin is bolstering his position and helping to preserve the current system. In essence, he is making Russian business a hostage to Putinism. Sooner or later, however, Putin will depart the political scene, and leave behind an institutional vacuum. This will result in confusion over property rights, lawsuits from former owners, and a whole host of attendant economic problem

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including  relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The West’s Loss of the Sahel: Not (only) Russia’s Doing,” Dan Whitman, FPRI, 07.30.24.

• After a bit more than two years, Russia’s disinformation campaigns in Africa’s Sahel region look like the quickest propaganda success ever staged. The three countries in the Sahel where military powers recently seized power—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and set up a rival defense pact, the Alliance of Sahel States. 
• But Russia alone couldn’t have done all this. There is little doubt that their motives are cynical, and seek to destabilize a vulnerable region, then capture any natural resources that may be rattling around, such as uranium and gold … The French had their turn with these extractions, as well as the Americans, Britons, and Belgians elsewhere on the Continent. Now Russia has moved in to fill a void. That said, the West’s Russia fixation is distracting and overlooks a wider context.
• Resentment of France is historic and deep, love or trust for Russia vanishingly small. African demonstrators in Ouagadougou, Bamako, and Niamey brandishing the Russian flag are motivated more by resentment for the former colonizer and less from love or faith in Russia.
• Russia’s sudden influence in the Sahel is likely to fade in time, as did the domination of other world powers in the region … US fixation on Russia in the Sahel is a distraction, not a policy.
• The United States could take away lessons, both positive and negative, from the French experience in the region.
• Africans have run out of patience with proxy rivalries and seek partnerships, not patronage.

“Russia’s Doxing Campaign: An Expanding Trend in Extraterritorial Repression,” Mariya Omelicheva, Russia.Post, 08.05.24.

• The Russian government has been at the forefront of deploying digital tools to target its critics residing outside Russia, with these practices becoming more common following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s digital repression has taken many forms— intimidation on social media, harassment and threats through hacked email accounts and mobile devices, and digital attacks by online bots and trolls. This analysis brings the spotlight on doxing attacks carried out by Underside— the Kremlin-backed hacking, leaking and doxing agent, which, gathering sensitive and personal data, commits malicious acts aimed at exposing Putin critics who wish to remain anonymous.
• Underside’s immediate goal is to instill fear and silence those who dare to speak against the war and Putin’s regime. This operation is effective: many journalists and academics targeted by Underside have closed their social media accounts or purged them of sensitive content. Some have chosen to cut down on their public appearances and eschewed participation in Russia-themed events out of concern for data breaches and online surveillance by Russian authorities.
• The effects of doxing reverberate beyond the immediate targets. Based on widely circulated Underside’s exposés, Russian officials have called for criminal investigations into a broad range of activities and organizations inside and outside of Russia. A Duma commission charged with investigating foreign interference in Russia’s internal affairs cited Underside’s reports in its review of “undesirable” and “extremist” activities of civil society organizations and individuals associated with the West. 
• For Western donors, the doxing operation is a critical reminder of their responsibility to protect sensitive and PII data as part of proper stewardship of public and private funds. It also raises challenging questions about the pros and cons of social media visibility around the recipients of their funding.

Ukraine:

"Ukraine’s Allies Are Worried About the Power of Zelenskiy’s Top Aide," Daryna Krasnolutska, Bloomberg, 08.01.24.

• Anyone who’s dealt with the Ukrainian president is likely to recognize Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff who is constantly at his side... Some officials have compared his role to a chief executive officer, with Zelenskiy acting as chairman.
• As Russia’s assault stretches deep into its third year, some of Ukraine’s international backers are growing concerned about just how much decision making is concentrated in the hands of 52-year-old Yermak, a one-time film producer, who has become the sole gatekeeper to the president with a direct say in everything from foreign policy to military planning.
• Yermak’s rise has been accompanied by the fall of many others near the top — a parliamentary speaker, a central bank governor and his predecessor as chief of staff among them — often at the hands of the top aide, according to the people familiar with the issue who spoke on condition of anonymity.
• The personnel moves attributed to Yermak have raised concern that any further tightening among Zelenskiy and his inner circle could sap energy for badly needed reforms.
• Allies have been watching closely. The replacement of Ukraine’s popular top general, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, in February raised hackles in NATO capitals over a shakeup just as Kyiv confronted a fresh Russian offensive.  In May, Yermak was instrumental in the removal of Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov, an official who once had a direct line to Zelenskiy and was close to the Biden administration, according to people familiar with the ouster. 
• A further shakeup is in the offing. The Ukrainian leader confirmed last month that he’s considering a cabinet overhaul, though he declined to comment on widespread speculation that he may swap out Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal.
• Yermak’s mandate is broader than that of any of his predecessors. He’s been central in every key wartime decision: replacing Zelenskiy’s top general, sourcing weapons supplies, negotiating security guarantees, overseeing prisoner swaps and — at the Swiss summit — winning over the Global South to Kyiv’s cause.

“Factory or front line? Ukrainian businesses fight to retain workers,” Polina Ivanova, FT, 08.04.24.

• Though Interpipe [steel maker] has been designated a strategic enterprise, meaning half its workforce can be exempt from military service, around 1,000 men remain at risk of being mobilized. 
• The answer proposed by Ukraine’s biggest businesses and submitted as a bill to parliament would allow companies to pay a military fee of 20,000 hryvnia ($487) per worker per month to shield them from conscription. A second bill proposes to exempt all Ukrainian men that earn a salary above 36,500 hryvnia.
  • But the planned legislation has sparked intense debate over what should come first—factory or front line, the economy or the war—and has split society on how to shape a fair conscription system.
• Companies had already lost on average 10–20 per cent of their workforces to conscription or emigration since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A renewed Russian offensive this year, which has resulted in more deaths and destruction, as well as power cuts, could drive even more people to leave.

For more analysis on this subject, see:

• “Ukraine's Campaign to Win Over the World,” Nataliya Gumenyuk, FP, 08.03.24.
• "War Shatters Dating Scene for Women in Ukraine," Constant Méheut, Daria Mitiuk and Oksana Parafeniuk, NYT, 08.03.24.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Humiliated by Azerbaijan, Armenia tacks towards the West,” The Economist, 08.01.24.

• On July 22nd the EU announced that one of its military-assistance programs will send aid to Armenia for the first time. The same day it opened visa-liberalization talks. Meanwhile, American troops were conducting a small exercise with Armenian forces. It was all part of the pivot to the West begun last year by Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister.
• Armenians are disillusioned with their erstwhile patron, Russia. Distracted by its war in Ukraine, it failed in 2023 to stop Azerbaijan from conquering Nagorno-Karabakh, formerly an autonomous ethnically Armenian enclave. Both America and European powers are eager to weaken Russia in its traditional backyard … But it is a difficult maneuver, and Mr Pashinyan is buffeted by winds from multiple directions.
• The Russian response to Armenia’s westward turn has ranged from concern trolling (Maria Zakharova, a foreign-ministry spokeswoman, expressed “concern for Armenia’s future”) to veiled threats. Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, said Armenia was free to pursue relations with other partners but not “the way the Kyiv regime did it, that is, in an ‘either-or’ fashion” … If the Kremlin wants trouble for Armenia, Azerbaijan will be happy to help.
• The extent of the pivot to the West remains unclear. It will probably depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and on whether Russia’s relations with the West remain bitter.

“Inside the Petrostate Hosting This Year’s Global Climate Negotiations,” Max Bearak, NYT, 08.02.24.

• [On how siting this year’s annual climate change summit, COP29, is likely to affect its host, Azerbaijan, and climate change outcomes worldwide:] In Azerbaijan, the causes and effects of climate change are on vivid display and the painful trade-offs needed to fight it are acutely felt.
• [Azerbaijan is] an unlikely place for such talk: It is out of the way, under authoritarian rule and, crucially, hyper-dependent on fossil fuels. Azerbaijan is hosting the annual climate summit, called COP29, only by dint of a quirky United Nations selection process that left it as the last option on the table.
• Compared to oil and coal, [Mukhtar Babayev, Azerbaijan’s point man for talks] said, “Gas is a less-harm-to-nature energy resource.” He also noted, “If the European countries are against gas, then why do they request more from Azerbaijan? Why does Commissioner Simson come to Baku three, four times in a year?” he said, referring to Kadri Simson, the European Union energy commissioner.
• The environmental damage wrought by fossil fuel extraction will be in plain view from the stadium in the capital, Baku, where the talks will be held. Across a lake reeking of sulfur, creaking rigs excrete pools of stagnant oil. Day and night, a refinery next door burns off methane, one of the most potent greenhouse gases.
• [Last year’s summit in Dubai, also a petrostate,] … alluded to the role of gas as a “transitional fuel” even as climate scientists warned that the world can’t afford to invest in new gas production if it is serious about limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. That target, researchers say, is necessary to avoid a cascade of catastrophic changes to Earth’s natural systems.

“Upgrading EU-Central Asia Cooperation: How to Leverage Common Interests Amid Geopolitical Turmoil,” Stefan Meister and Judith Heckenthaler, DGAP Policy Brief, 08.02.24.

• Russia’s war against Ukraine has sparked the interest of EU and CA countries to boost economic cooperation and connectivity. The EU wants to diversify its energy and raw materials partnerships and CA countries want to diversify markets and political relations.
• Despite the interest in more cooperation, structural differences in governance and rule of law limit the deepening of the relations. In some areas it is still more attractive for CA states to cooperate with Russia and China.
• To put relations with CA countries on a new plane, especially in finding a better balance with its economic interests and normative approach, the EU must build up leverage in areas of common interest and foster high-level ownership and coordination with its member states.

“Why Are Central Asian Migrant Workers Spurning Russia?,” Galiya Ibragimova, Carnegie Politika, 08.01.24.

• Despite an acute labor shortage, the Russian authorities are trying to curtail the numbers of workers arriving from Central Asia. The crackdown intensified after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in March, which was reportedly carried out by Tajik nationals. But the appeal of Russia’s job market was already diminished prior to these restrictions.
• Historically, Russia has been the main destination for Central Asian migrant workers. Even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and the recruitment of foreign migrants into the armed forces—Central Asians continued to go to Russia. The Crocus City Hall attack was a watershed moment. In its aftermath, labor migrants faced constant document checks, workplace raids, firings, flight delays, and hours-long lines at the border with Kazakhstan. If they were detained by law enforcement officials, they could be subjected to torture, or given a choice between conscription and deportation.
• There has been no change in approach, however, and that has caused an outflow of migrant workers from Russia. Since April, the number of job seekers from Tajikistan in St. Petersburg has fallen 60 percent, while the number of job seekers from Uzbekistan dropped 40 percent. St. Petersburg is second only to Moscow in terms of its appeal to migrants.
• More than a dozen Russian regions have tightened labor restrictions. As a consequence, the Krasnodar region, a leading producer of wheat, corn, sunflowers, and rice in Russia, is experiencing a shortage of agricultural workers. In the Ural Mountains, the same is true for factories, including those producing military equipment. In Yakutia in Russia’s far north, migrants have been banned from driving taxis and other transportation jobs. In Dagestan, there are not enough workers to dispose of the region’s waste.
• The Kremlin has … used threats to punish migrants as a way to squeeze concessions from Central Asian governments on issues from language policy to economic integration. Central Asian leaders may care little about the welfare of their compatriots in Russia, but they do worry about the consequences that a fall in remittances would have for their economies.
• Remittances account for up to 40 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP, and more than 20 percent of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s. With more and more Central Asians leaving Russia as a result of the pandemic, the invasion, and now the crackdown on migrants, less money is being sent home. In 2023, remittances to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan fell by 42 percent, 12 percent, and 8 percent, respectively.

Footnotes

1. Congress created the Commission on the National Defense Strategy in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act as an independent body charged with assessing the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Its members are non-governmental experts in national security. The Commission released its final report on July 29, 2024. RAND contributed analytic and administrative support.
2. For a more detailed description of Ukrainian and Russian public opinion on a potential peace deal, see RM’s “Majority of Russians Favor Talks to End Ukraine War, But 1/3 Support Use of Nukes.”
3. “The NDS refers to Russia as an ‘acute’ threat. We [the Commission on the National Defense Strategy] believe this term inappropriately suggests a limited duration and prefer to label Russia a ‘chronic threat.’”
4. For one list of American citizens remaining in Russian custody, please visit this link to a USA Today news story. The full list of prisoners exchanged on Aug. 1 can be found in this Reuters news story.
5. For Andrei Yakovlev’s take on the same issue in RM see, “Is Russia Shifting Toward Mobilization Economy or Forming New, Loyal Business Elite?”

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

Slider photo by U.S. Airman 1st Class William Rio Rosado shared in the public domain.