This Week’s Highlights:

• Expansion commits NATO to defending vulnerable states and makes another jab at Russia, write Matthew Cancian and Mark Cancian, a non-resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute and a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program. They write that what Russians see is that NATO and Ukraine currently occupy approximately the spring 1942 frontline between the Soviet Union and the Wehrmacht.
• The Arctic defies simplistic views of geopolitical friends and foes, writes RAND’s Stephanie Pezard. Recent U.S. strategic documents portray Russia as a competitor and an unambiguous rival; however, she writes, in the Arctic, Russia is a neighbor with whom matters need to be discussed.
• Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov is worried that the U.S. will deploy a “Trojan horse” strategy of fostering a fifth column within Russia, writes Bloomberg’s Leonid Bershidsky. But what the generals and the Kremlin are actually scared of is ordinary Russians; they are afraid their own people will knife them in the back if the U.S. tries regime change, Bershidsky argues.
• Viewed through the lens of Russian strategic culture, writes professor Valeriy Solovey, Ukraine and Belarus are artificial and inferior states, their independent existence only justified if they are strategically subordinate to Moscow. There is not the slightest sign that Moscow is ready to conduct a strategic reassessment of its foreign policy situation, Solovey argues. The Russian leadership, he writes, intends to stick with its policy of strategic patience and wait for a new window of opportunity that will allow it to achieve its goals.
• Thirty years ago this month, Gen. Boris crossed the Friendship bridge from Afghanistan into Uzbekistan, heralding the end of a Soviet military intervention, writes Russia Matters founding director Simon Saradzhyan. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan offers plenty of lessons to explore, Saradzhyan writes, some of which can, perhaps, be applied by the U.S. and its allies as Washington leans toward ending its own military campaign in this war-plagued Central Asian country.
• Ukrainians are justifiably disenchanted with the politicians who have run their country since 2014’s Maidan revolution, argues Tony Barber of the Financial Times. “The acrid pre-Maidan odors of corruption in high places, lack of transparency and oligarchical influence over government and business continue to hang in the air,” he writes.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security:

• No significant commentary.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant commentary.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary.

New Cold War/saber rattling:

“Russian Generals’ Biggest Fear? Ordinary Russians. It’s not the U.S., even if Moscow’s chief military strategist thinks the Pentagon’s goal is regime change,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 03.04.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “Russian Chief of [the] General Staff Valery Gerasimov is now fretting that the U.S. will deploy a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy of fostering a fifth column within Russia and its allies. That the general should be looking so publicly over his shoulder at his own people should trouble citizens.”
• “[In a speech] [h]e said: … Their [the U.S. and its allies’] goal is to liquidate the statehood of undesirable countries, to undermine their sovereignty and replace their legally elected governments. That’s what happened in Iraq, in Libya and in Ukraine. Currently such action is observable in Venezuela. The Pentagon has started developing a completely new strategy of military action, which has already been called ‘Trojan Horse.’ It’s based on the active use of the ‘fifth column protest potential’ to destabilize the situation along with precision strikes on the most important targets.”
• “‘Trojan Horse’ isn’t one [a term] used by his [Gerasimov’s] counterparts in Washington. This … likely refers to a recent appearance by Gen. David Goldfein, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff … The left-wing German online magazine Telepolis wrote that Goldfein’s ideas were ‘reminiscent of the Trojan Horse.’ … The ‘Trojan Horse’ reference … likely referred to the hidden threat of stealth aircraft and whatever ‘dilemmas’ Goldfein mentioned vaguely.”
• “What the generals and the Kremlin are really scared of, though, is ordinary Russians. They are afraid their own people will knife them in the back if the U.S. tries regime change. That fear is the Russian regime’s Achilles’ heel … The “Gerasimov doctrine,” if one even exists, … [is] about constantly covering one's own back. That should scare Russians more than Americans: It won’t take much to set off reprisals when a random quote from a U.S. general can put their Moscow counterparts on high alert.”

“Mourning the INF Treaty. The United States Is Not Better for Withdrawing,” Tom Nichols, Foreign Affairs, 03.04.19: The author, a professor of national security affairs, writes:

• “Today, the biggest threat to NATO is … that Russian President Vladimir Putin will make a grab for Baltic or Polish territory, perhaps as an attempt to distract his increasingly restive population. … Western nuclear threats will mean little to Putin in such a circumstance.”
• “China—which is not a signatory to the INF Treaty—has deployed intermediate-range systems on its territory and may well use them in a future conflict. Freed from the shackles of treaty compliance, Washington can now respond by shoring up its regional presence with similar weapons systems. Yet doing so inevitably raises the same strategic questions as in Europe.”
• “What would a more comprehensive U.S. strategy look like? First and foremost, it should disentangle American interests in Asia and Europe. The United States is time limited in its decisions about Europe, where the … New START treaty is set to expire in early 2021. Responding to China’s rise, meanwhile, will take … more investment in conventional forces and especially a recommitment to U.S. naval power in the Pacific.”
• “In Europe, the United States should engage Russia on several issues that both sides care about, such the New START treaty, sanctions and Ukraine. The United States should go into these talks with clear plans for exacting a price for Russian intransigence. For such talks to be successful, the United States needs to treat NATO members like allies rather than clients or serfs and to work with them to reinforce the alliance’s eastern borders. … The United States needs a better plan than to keep leaning not only on the crutch of nuclear weapons but on weapons systems it got rid of more than 30 years ago.”

“America Needs a Space Force,” Mike Pence, The Washington Post, 03.04.19: The U.S. vice president writes:

• “To meet the emerging threats in space … the president has called for the creation of the U.S. Space Force. … The domain of space, once desolate and uncontested, is now crowded and confrontational. As the Defense Intelligence Agency detailed in a recent report, China and Russia are aggressively developing and deploying capabilities—including anti-satellite weapons, airborne lasers, menacing ‘on-orbit’ capabilities and evasive hypersonic missiles—that have transformed space into a war-fighting domain.”
• “While our adversaries have weaponized space, too often we have bureaucratized it. … To ensure the success of our war-fighters in this new domain, Congress must modify Title 10 of the U.S. Code to establish a new branch of our armed forces that is responsible for organizing, training and equipping space forces … The Space Force is the next and the natural evolution of U.S. supremacy in space.”

“A Year After the Skripal Poisoning, How Much Has Really Changed? The fallout from the Skripal affair has influenced Moscow's tactics but not its strategy,” Mark Galeotti, The Moscow Times, 03.04.19: The author, a senior associate fellow of RUSI, writes:

• “Moscow contends that it had nothing to do with it [the Skripal poisoning]; London is equally adamant that the Russian state was behind an attempted assassination. … Putin's Kremlin is on a campaign to assert Russia's great power status, and politics is all about perception. The Kremlin is enjoying the reputation of being a swashbuckling maverick, ruthless, dangerous and decisive.”
• “The very multinationalism of the response to Skripal was its own message, as countries with little reason to placate Britain instead used this as an opportunity to express their own frustrations with Russian meddling, trolling, spying and, yes, sometimes murdering. … The Kremlin's media machine, so quick to claim London was acting out a conspiratorial Russophobic charade, had considerably more trouble handwaving away this axis of the exasperated.”
• “Skripal survived and the agents used were (predictably) unmasked, but the Kremlin's reach and resolution were demonstrated. Nonetheless, the political price the Russian government then was forced to pay was clearly far higher than it had anticipated. As a result, it seems that the Russians have again pivoted away from such direct measures, at least in Western Europe and North America. The aggressiveness has simply been displaced, though, into more peripheral regions and … into cultivating deniable proxies for future acts of violence, from extremist militias to gangsters."
• “Russia has shifted away from election meddling and murderous ‘wet work’ in the West, instead putting its energies into less immediately confrontational and more deniable, but no less disruptive, activities. The battle goes on.”

NATO-Russia relations:

“It Is Long Past Time to Stop Expanding NATO,” Matthew Cancian and Mark Cancian, War on the Rocks, 03.01.19: The authors, a non-resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute and a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program, write:

• “NATO should have learned from its 2004 inclusion of the Baltic states, … countries whose defense now constitutes a major, expensive and perhaps unachievable military requirement. Instead, the expansion of membership has continued.”
• “But expansion weakens the alliance rather than strengthening it. It commits NATO to defending vulnerable, and often politically fragile, states while adding little to NATO military capabilities. It weakens U.S. domestic commitment by provoking resentment from NATO-skeptics. Finally, it constitutes yet one more jab at Russia, increasing its sense of encirclement and paranoia.”
• “The Russians have some objective facts on their side. Military analysts are often told to ‘turn the map around’ and imagine how the world looks to an opponent. What the Russians see is this: NATO and Ukraine now occupy approximately the spring 1942 frontline between the Soviet Union and the Wehrmacht, except for Belarus. … While Western audiences dismiss as propaganda Putin’s denunciations of fascism in neighboring countries, many Russians share Putin’s alarm about Western intentions.”
• “Cessation of expansion does not mean that other countries must be left out in the cold. The ‘partnership for peace’ still exists … Ultimately, though, NATO is not the United Nations where universal membership is a goal. It is a military alliance that requires some degree of internal cohesion for effectiveness and commits its members … to use force on behalf of the others. Continuous expansion makes the alliance vulnerable to eventual collapse as military demands increase, internal cohesion fractures, Russia finds more weaknesses to exploit and U.S. commitment declines.”

“How Trump Killed the Atlantic Alliance. And How the Next President Can Restore It,” Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Foreign Affairs, 02.26.19: The authors, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, write:

• “The Atlantic alliance as we know it is dead. The end of the Cold War, the United States’ growing weariness of global burdens, and a preoccupation with domestic affairs on both sides of the ocean had already weakened transatlantic bonds when the presidency of Donald Trump inflicted the deathblow.”
• “Having watched Trump in action, only 27 percent of people in the United Kingdom, ten percent in Germany, nine percent in France and seven percent in Spain have confidence in the U.S. president to do the right thing when it comes to global affairs. Majorities in France and Germany trust China and Russia more than they do the United States and favorable views of the United States are down by double digits across the continent.”
• “A future U.S. administration, even one that is more sympathetic to the idea of alliances, will be unable to restore the old alliance. If a new alliance is to emerge from the ashes of the past, it must be one based on a more realistic bargain between Europe and the United States, and one that better addresses the needs of both partners.”
• “A new transatlantic alliance will require both a U.S. president who recognizes its value and Europeans who are able to overcome their own internal divisions and commit to an equal partnership. The next alliance … must also be a global partnership to which each side contributes in order to protect their mutual security and economic interests.”

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary.

Nuclear arms control:

• No significant commentary.

Counter-terrorism:

• No significant commentary.

Conflict in Syria:

• No significant commentary.

Cyber security:

• No significant commentary.

Elections interference:

“Understanding and Combating Russian and Chinese Influence Operations,” Carolyn Kenney, Max Bergmann and James Lamond, Center for American Progress, 02.28.19: The authors, a senior policy analyst, a senior fellow and a senior policy adviser at the Center for American Progress, write:

• “While foreign influence operations are not new, the convergence of three larger global trends has made them a more important and acute challenge. The first trend is the re-emergence of geopolitical great power competition, which is why the United States … should focus primarily on the country’s greatest geopolitical adversaries—Russia and China. The second trend is the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism around the world. … [T]he third trend is the digital revolution.”
• “China sees itself as the United States’ peer competitor and wants to tilt the playing field further in its favor … Russia … is not a peer competitor … Russia seeks to level the playing field by disrupting and subverting the international order.”
• “Both China and Russia are motivated by the authoritarian aim of regime survival … Both countries also see covert, coercive or corrupt influence operations as a normal feature of engaging with foreign countries … [B]oth … exploit similar vulnerabilities in democratic societies, such as loopholes in existing legislation that enable gray areas between legitimate and illegitimate forms of influence.”
• “To best respond … the United States should … mak[e] clear … that the United States will respond assertively to malign interference in U.S. domestic affairs. … [It should also] [i]mprove information sharing and better coordinate information security practices with democratic allies. … Reinvest in U.S. public diplomacy operations. …Work with social media companies to combat threats … Reform, update and vigorously enforce laws that force greater transparency of actions taken by foreign governments and their agents … Close loopholes and more forcefully enforce existing money laundering regulations.”

“Investigations of Trump Are Far From Over,” David Ignatius, The Washington Post, 02.28.19: The author, a veteran foreign correspondent-turned-columnist, writes:

• “The investigations of President Trump's activities won't end when special counsel Robert S. Mueller III presents his report to the Justice Department. … The prospect for continuing, and perhaps escalating, legal confrontation was clear from the jaw-dropping congressional testimony … by Michael Cohen, Trump's former fixer.”
• “Even without Cohen's headline- grabbing allegations, it became clear this month that House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam B. Schiff … and other congressional investigators were crossing Trump's declared ‘red line’ and beginning to investigate his personal and family finances.”
• “The legal and political battlefields will be shaped by Mueller's report, and how much of it is made public by Attorney General William P. Barr. Lawyers who have followed the Mueller investigation closely say they doubt the special counsel will present evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia beyond what he has already revealed in a string of indictments.”
• “If the fracas surrounding Cohen's testimony this week proved anything, it's that there is nothing remotely like bipartisan consensus about how to deal with the allegations about Trump. Instead, this is a political war, and it's probably heading into a more combative phase, just at the moment some expected it would be ending.”

Energy exports from CIS:

“Why Europe Won't Go for American Natural Gas,” Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 02.25.19: The author, a professor of national security affairs, writes:

• “Imagine that I am a Bulgarian, Hungarian or Austrian politician who is being offered a definitive Russian commitment to sell and market natural gas. Or imagine that I am a German or French leader who believes that, in the long term, Iran’s energy reserves are crucial for the continent’s economic development.”
• “Any official U.S. offer of an energy alternative depends … either on Trump’s re-election in 2020 or the unshakeable promise from any of Trump’s … competitors to honor Trump’s commitments. In these circumstances, it is not difficult to see why Europeans may hedge their bets. Why bet the proverbial farm on a U.S. LNG supply across the Atlantic if there remains significant doubt as to whether a Democratic successor to Trump … would continue with such plans?”
• “The Russians are also aided by the reputation that Putin has for ‘doing what he says’ whether with regard to a Syria intervention or the construction of the Kerch Straits bridge … With actual pipe being laid across the Black Sea to create a new energy transit route between Russia and European Turkey, southern and central European states will have easy and immediate access to supplies of Russian natural gas. In contrast, U.S. plans to increase exports remain on the drawing board.”

“Negative Energy: Berlin’s Trumpian Turn on Nord Stream 2,” Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 02.27.19: The author, a senior policy fellow at ECFR, writes:

• “Germany has no capacity or domestic mandate to deal with the geopolitical fallout of its choices on Nord Stream 2. It cannot prevent Russia from absorbing Belarus, nor from escalating the war in Ukraine. In environmental and climate politics, German leaders often emphasize that one should not commit to policies whose ramifications one cannot control. But, in a mirror image of Trump’s approach to climate policy, Merkel simply bows to ideological stubbornness and the lobbying efforts of domestic industry and special interest groups.”

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

“How Not to Compete in the Arctic: The Blurry Lines Between Friend and Foe,” Stephanie Pezard, War on The Rocks,  02.27.19: The author, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, writes:

• “The Arctic defies simplistic views of geopolitical friends and foes. … Russia’s mix of competition and cooperation with Norway displays some similarities to its relations with the United States in the Arctic. Recent U.S. strategic documents portray Russia as a competitor of the United States and an unambiguous rival … Yet in the Arctic, Russia is also a neighbor with whom trivial matters need to be discussed and deconflicted before they become nontrivial.”
• “Take the Bering Strait: Last May, the International Maritime Organization adopted a joint U.S.-Russia proposal creating shipping lanes to offer more space for ships to maneuver safely and delineating dangerous areas to be avoided. … In 2014, the [organization] … adopted the Polar Code on the basis of a recommendation from the Arctic Council, of which both the United States and Russia are members. … [A]chievements [like these] may have been easy to overlook amid growing tensions with Russia, but they represent progress for those who live in, or transit through, the region.”
• “Of course, the United States should not ignore less constructive Russian actions. Moscow is building and upgrading military infrastructure in its Arctic region. … Russia is deploying capabilities that can defend a region it deems highly strategic, but could also, in theory, be employed for other purposes—for instance, locking Norway (a NATO member) behind an anti-access/area denial ‘bubble.’”
• “The United States should not assume that what it does to keep China in check in the South China Sea will also work against Russia in the Arctic. Not only are they different competitors calling for different approaches, [but] the Arctic is also a region where simple lines of division between competitors and friends may not hold.”

II. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:

“The True Story of How Russia's Foreign Policy Process Evolved. Moscow's foreign-policy behavior hinges on the practice of strategic patience,” Valeriy Solovey, The National Interest, 02.28.19: The author, a professor of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, writes:

• “The contemporary Russian mentality … [views] Ukraine and Belarus … [as] artificial and inferior states, whose independent existence is only officially justified if they are strategically subordinate to Moscow. … [Their drift] toward the West is perceived as an encroachment on Russia’s national identity and a dangerous challenge to the country’s security.”
• “The idea of strategic patience is probably the most important and prominent ingredient in Russian strategic culture. The Russian elite is confident that the Russian people are ready to endure deprivation and suffering indefinitely in the face of an external threat. … The thinking is that patience will lead to a window of opportunity … [that will allow Russia to] achieve its goals. … Russia is the only country in the world … run by former and current intelligence officers. … [Thus] foreign policy is viewed in a paranoid light … [and] the methods employed by the intelligence services … [became instrument of] Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.”
• “Considering that the U.S. did not defend its own ambassador [Michael McFaul in 2013-2014] … Russian leaders concluded that President Barack Obama’s administration was the weakest since World War II in terms of foreign policy. … [And they] were confident that the Obama administration would not dare oppose Russia [annexing Crimea].”
• “Foreign policy is President Putin’s main sphere of interest in which his personality is most vividly and visibly expressed. … Putin is convinced that he is the man who raised Russia from its knees, restored its power and that he is led by the Lord himself. … The second aspect of Putin’s personality that influences his foreign policy is the subculture in which he evolved … among a group of so-called ‘goodfellas,’ whose fundamental principles are extremely close to those of Soviet KGB officers.”

“Lessons for Leaders: What Afghanistan Taught Russian and Soviet Strategists,” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 02.28.19: The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:

• “The Soviet leadership made a number of mistakes [in the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Afghanistan] … Some of these mistakes were particularly costly, such as the failure to take full stock either of the hierarchy of vital national interests at stake in Afghanistan or of the costs and benefits of intervention. … Whatever the mission, the Soviet military operations would have probably dealt greater setbacks to the armed Afghan opposition at lower costs to the Soviet troops if the various Soviet government agencies had fostered effective coordination of their activities from the very beginning.”  
• “It was a matter of time before the Soviets realized that their only option was to leave. That was the right decision, which was made in spite of pressure from the DRA ruling elite. However, while leaving was the right move … the diplomatic and political aspects of that maneuver were not without flaw.”
• “The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not what bankrupted the Soviet Union or led to its collapse, contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump’s January 2019 take … Rather, as Yegor Gaidar convincingly demonstrated, a combination of structural economic and other factors played the lead role in the demise of the Soviet empire. However, that intervention … did contribute to the demise by imposing formidable human, financial, economic, political and reputational costs on the Soviet Union, despite the fact that Soviet leaders did eventually realize some of the mistakes … and sought to correct them.”
• “Not all erroneous decisions can be reversed and some of them can have disastrous consequences. … [L]eaders around the world would do well to learn from those [Russia’s] mistakes [in Afghanistan], rather than make their own.”

China:

“China, India and the Rise of the ‘Civilization State’. This illiberal idea is also appealing to some on the American right,” Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, 03.04.19: The author, chief foreign affairs commentator for the news outlet, writes:

• “A civilization state is a country that claims to represent not just a historic territory or a particular language or ethnic-group, but a distinctive civilization. It is an idea that is gaining ground in states as diverse as China, India, Russia, Turkey and, even, the U.S.”
• “One reason that the idea … is likely to gain wider currency is the rise of China. In speeches to foreign audiences, President Xi Jinping likes to stress the unique history and civilization of China. … Civilizational views of the state are also gaining ground in Russia. Some of the ideologues around Vladimir Putin now embrace the idea that Russia represents a distinct Eurasian civilization, which should never have sought to integrate with the West.”
• “In a global system molded by the West, it is unsurprising that some intellectuals in countries such as China, India or Russia should want to stress the distinctiveness of their own civilizations. What is more surprising is that rightwing thinkers in the U.S. are also … emphasizing the unique and allegedly endangered nature of Western civilization. … [T]he global power of Western ideas … made the nation-state the international norm for political organization. The rise of Asian powers such as China and India may create new models.”

“Russia’s Search for a Greater Eurasia: Origins, Promises and Prospects,” Seçkin Köstem, Wilson Center, 02.26.19: The author, an assistant professor of international relations, writes:

• “Vladimir Putin announced the Russian government’s desire for a greater Eurasian partnership at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2016. … For Russia’s ruling elite, Greater Eurasia is more significant than a project of increased connectivity, trade and investment. … Greater Eurasia is a ‘geopolitical imaginary’ that enables Russian policy makers to articulate an international identity for Russia.”
• “Russia may be the architect of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, but China will decide its fate. … For Beijing, closer cooperation with Moscow works as insurance for strategic stability in Eurasia. … China needs Russia to access the European markets, as unimpeded trade and infrastructure connectivity are two goals that Xi Jinping wants to have in Eurasia. Three of the four economic corridors that are part of the Silk Road Economic Belt go through the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union].”
• “It is unclear how much longer Russia will tolerate China’s rising capabilities and influence in its own perceived sphere of influence.”

Ukraine:

“Candidates Are the Biggest Flaw in Ukraine’s Presidential Polls. None of this trio inspires confidence that they would lose habits of overt and veiled government by oligarchy,” Tony Barber, Financial Times, 02.28.19: The author, Europe editor for the news outlet, writes:

• “Ukraine will hold its presidential election on March 31 as a half-reformed, territorially truncated state, fighting a financially draining war against a mightier neighbor … The problem in Ukraine is not that political competition at the highest level is a sort of magician’s illusion, as in Russia.”
• “What raises concern is rather the character of the three leading candidates. … Poroshenko, abandoning the reformist language that swept him to power after the Maidan revolution, now proclaims the conservative patriotic slogan ‘army, language, faith.’ … Yet the suspicion lingers that he deploys pro-Western rhetoric and the excuse of wartime conditions to distract attention from his failure to implement deeper reforms.”
• “Similar doubts surround … [Yulia] Tymoshenko. … In early February, she lashed out at the U.S.-born health minister … as someone supposedly ‘sent by foreigners . . . to experiment on Ukrainians.’ … As for … [Volodymyr] Zelensky, he is known for a light-hearted TV series … Less amusing are his nebulous connections to Igor Kolomoisky, a leading oligarch. These ties, and his apparently superficial knowledge of basic issues that face Ukraine, raise questions about who would be running the show if the comedian were elected president.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Moldova’s Vote Is a Cautionary Tale for Putin’s Foes. Corruption and mismanagement are undermining pro-European political forces and empowering Russia-leaning ones,” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 02.26.19: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes:

• “In the Moldovan elections, the relatively pro-Russian Socialist Party, formerly led by pro-Putin President Igor Dodon, won a plurality of the vote …The pro-European Union ACUM bloc came in second … The ruling Democratic Party … came in third … but it’ll get the second biggest number of seats in Parliament thanks to a new electoral system.”
• “The result indicates that Moldovans are confused about three possible paths for their country: Toward closer integration with Russia, toward following the EU-supported development model or toward continued state capture by an all-powerful oligarch who pretty much owns the country.”
• “There is a fourth choice, however: leaving. The turnout of the vote, at 49 percent, was low by European standards—but then, the number of citizens living outside the country is estimated at between 500,000 and 1 million. … Moldovans are leaving for the same reasons as citizens of neighboring Ukraine: Both Europe and Russia offer better job opportunities, and neither requires visas.
• “Corruption and mismanagement undermined Moldova’s pro-European Union political forces and cheered President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who would like something similar to happen in Ukraine. … [Russia] may not have a strong favorite in the presidential race there, but whoever wins will combine pro-European rhetoric with oligarchic state capture.”
• “Neither Moldova nor Ukraine is doomed to have the Kremlin wait out their pro-European aspirations. To prevent that, both should be serious about institution-building and about following European rules rather than merely paying them lip service.”

“People of the World, Stop Looking at Moldova! Politicians in this corner of the Balkans insist their country is a stage for geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia—the better to profit from the attention,” Maxim Edwards, Foreign Policy, 03.03.19: The author, an editor and journalist covering central and eastern Europe, writes:

• “‘Whether it’s about taking the country closer to Europe or Russia, the arguments that Moldovan elites sell in Brussels or Washington cannot be further from the truth,’ said Vlad Kulminski, an analyst at the Institute for Strategic Initiatives, a Chisinau-based think tank. ‘They are interested in maintaining Moldova as a gray zone between Russia and the West. It’s about running a local fiefdom under the pretext of fighting a geopolitical battle, unaccountable to either Brussels or Moscow.’”
• “It’s a pretext that pro-Europe and pro-Russia forces in the country seem to cooperate in maintaining. So when [Moldovan President Igor] Dodon clashes with the parliament and constitutional court after another pro-Kremlin speech, he can’t make good on his rhetoric because his role is largely ceremonial. But Moldova’s PDM leaders can invoke that rhetoric to Western backers as an example of what the country would face if they lost power.”

III. Russia’s domestic policies

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Russia’s Investment Image Suffers Yet Another Blow. Michael Calvey is the latest in a line of businesspeople to be targeted,” Editorial Board, Financial Times, 03.04.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “While many of his counterparts have left as Russia’s relations with the West have soured, Michael Calvey, founder of Baring Vostok, stayed. Today he is behind bars, facing trial on dubious fraud charges linked to a business dispute. Russia is yet again shooting itself in the foot when it comes to wooing investment.”
• “Russia’s ruling circle appears as indifferent towards foreign investment as it does towards domestic entrepreneurs. Big state companies, it believes, are the real economic drivers, not small private businesses. And for all the setbacks, foreign investors always come back; if not, China can help. … When the Kremlin claims to be committed to restoring Russia’s status as a great power, such a cavalier attitude to economic development is baffling.”

“Russia's Shocking Assault on Religion,” Editorial Board, The Washington Post, 03.03.19: The news outlet’s editorial board writes:

• “Russia's pursuit of believers in the Jehovah's Witnesses is reviving dark practices of the past. The worst of the Soviet Union's interrogation methods appear to have been revived recently in the Siberian city of Surgut. Although today's Russia was founded on principles of freedom of thought and worship, under a constitution that guarantees them, the security services behave as if Joseph Stalin were still around.”

Defense and aerospace:

• No significant commentary.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary.