3 Ideas to Explore

1. The astoundingly rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is likely to impose a number of tangible geopolitical, reputational, and possibly even domestic security costs on Russia, according to RM analysis. One obvious geopolitical cost is the loss of one of the few official military-political allies Moscow has retained outside the former Soviet Union after its disintegration. In addition, Russia’s failure to help Assad cling to power also creates reputational cost for it, insofar as it cannot help but impact the calculations of leaders of countries weighing the costs and benefits of allying with Russia. Finally, the disparate victorious anti-Assad forces include Sunni jihadist groups that have in the past been associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS, and that may therefore offer support for fellow jihadists waging campaigns of political violence against Russia. It should be noted that even some of the Moscow-based pro-government Russian commentators have taken a grim view of the outcome of Russia’s Syria policy. In the diagnosis of Ruslan Pukhov, a member of the Russian MoD’s Public Council, “Russia increasingly focused on maintaining the rotten and ineffective status quo [in Syria], essentially protecting the decaying and delegitimized Assad regime.” In the view of chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia’s withdrawal from Syria would be in line with the general trend of “global powers… leaving the stage because it is not only difficult but also unnecessary to carry such a burden.”

2. In the confluence of reasons that shaped Vladimir Putin’s decision to re-invade Ukraine, one is overlooked: Russia’s demographic decline, according to Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, authors of a recent book on the crisis of liberalism. “Today, Russia defines its national security by the size of its population, not the extent of its landmass,” they argue in FP. “In a way, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was an admission of the failure of his various pro-natalist policies designed to increase the country’s population, particularly the Slavic core of its population,” Krastev and Holes argue. The duo believes that “at the heart of the Kremlin’s calculus seems to be the concern that Russia contains too few people to effectively capitalize on the new opportunities for mineral exploration and extraction in the Arctic region.”

3. “Amid all the uncertainty that Trump 2.0 will bring, the last thing that Putin and Xi are worried about is Washington’s ability to orchestrate a real split between their countries, despite Trump’s promise to do so on the campaign trail,” according to Alexander Gabuev of CEIP. The lack of worry from Putin and Xi is rooted in three propositions. First, whether Donald Trump can negotiate a deal over Ukraine that satisfies Putin remains to be seen. In addition, Russia has become very dependent on China economically. “Finally, Putin and Xi know that this will be Trump’s final term, and that he could easily be followed by a president who would reverse any deal reached under the Republican president,” Gabuev writes in FA.

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

"The Meaning and Significance of North Korean Troops’ Deployment to Russia," Dr. Choi Yong-whan, RUSI, 12.04.24.

• “It is necessary to consider that the ripple effect of North Korea’s appearance on a European battlefield will vary, depending on North Korean troops’ participation method.” 
• “The most direct and explicit method is for North Korean combat troops to participate in the war as an independent operational authority. This is likely to change the nature of the war to an international one, and it is also a method that will require Russia to pay a higher future political and economic price for North Korea’s involvement. The dispatch of troops could become a new channel for North Korea to earn foreign currency and an essential opportunity for the North Korean military to gain combat experience.”
• “Alternatively, the North Korean regime may choose to reduce the burden of escalation by having its troops participate in the war as part of the Russian military or as individuals in a ‘private military company’ such as the Wagner Group. However, if the recent report that Kim Young-bok – the deputy chief of staff of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army – is in charge of the North Korean troops deployed to Russia is accurate, it is likely that the North Korean troops will not be content with participating in the war as individuals.”
• “The challenge facing Seoul and all Western governments is that, in the short term, there are limited means to effectively restrain the North Korean military’s participation in the war or to punish Pyongyang for it. Therefore, governments need to take a longer-term view and rely on experience and diplomatic assets accumulated since the end of the Cold War to produce workable responses.”
• “It remains crucial for South Korea to present a vision for the post-war relationship with Russia. Undoubtedly, it won’t be easy to significantly improve relations with China and Russia in the short term. Yet, it is imperative to establish policy measures that can restrain China–Russia–North Korea relations. Seoul also needs to consider a roundabout approach, leveraging its relations with Central Asian countries that are closely linked to China and Russia.” 
• “Yet none of this obviates the need, in the short term, to continue warning the international community about the risks to global security that the deployment of North Korean troops poses. It is equally important for Seoul to lay out its own ‘red lines’ regarding the cooperation between Russia and North Korea. In particular, Seoul needs to reiterate Russia’s international responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a  NPT ‘P5’ member, and to continue raising global awareness about the transfer of advanced military technology, including nuclear weapons, that the Moscow–Pyongyang relationship entails.”

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

"Chemical Weapons Use in Ukraine Tests Global Norms to Breaking Point," Lennie Phillips and Gareth Williams, RUSI, 12.03.24.

• “At Ukraine’s request, on 18 November 2024, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) made public the report of its visit to Ukraine, highlighting that a grenade and soil samples collected from along the confrontation lines in Dnipropetrovsk had tested positive for 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, a riot control agent (RCA) commonly known as CS gas.” 
• “The OPCW’s report neither decides if CS was used as a CW, nor identifies any potential perpetrators. As such, this leaves others to draw their own conclusions. While many observers lay the blame firmly at the door of Russia, for the broader international community, more evidence is needed before any further action can be considered.”
• “The CWC clearly states that states parties shall review compliance with the convention (Article VIII, paragraph 20), however, the geopolitical backdrop which dwarfs the small stage of the OPCW makes it unlikely that this report on its own will be able to galvanise the widespread support of states parties to seek redress through the CWC.”
• “That said, the CWC puts at Ukraine’s disposal several routes of remedy, the most obvious being to invoke Article IX (Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding), where Ukraine (or another state party) could formally request that Russia respond (within 10 days) with information which is ‘sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised’. Given that the international community is still waiting for a credible response from Russia on the poisoning of Alexei Navalny using this same mechanism, the expectations of states parties could not be much lower.” 
• “Similarly, Ukraine may request an investigation of alleged use of a chemical weapon (IAU).” 
• “Another approach would be to request assistance under Article X … which explicitly states that a state party has the right to request and to receive assistance from the OPCW if it considers that ‘RCAs have been used against it as a method of warfare.’”

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“Inside Ukraine’s Battle for the Skies as Russian Bombardments Hit Records,” Alistair MacDonald and Jane Lytvynenko, WSJ, 12.09.24.

• “Russia fired more than 6,000 explosive drones and missiles against Ukraine over September, October and November, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of daily data from the Ukrainian Air Force Command. That was over three times the number it fired over the previous three months, and more than four times the number fired during the same fall months in 2023.”
• “Russia is using an unprecedented number of Iranian-designed Shahed drones, and it is using more ballistic missiles, which are harder to intercept. One of Moscow’s new tactics is to fly fleets of cheap decoy drones to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses. It is using thermobaric warheads and radar-evading missiles. 'The point is to exhaust the air defense capabilities,' said Maj. Anton Yanovych, a commander of Ukraine’s 164th Radiotechnical Brigade.”
• “Ukraine is scrambling to counter the attacks with increased use of electronic warfare jamming techniques, but the soldiers are struggling. They lack enough modern missile defenses to keep up with the Russian barrages.”
• “The increased bombardments, which have caused civilian casualties and degraded Ukraine’s electricity grids, threaten to further undermine Ukrainian morale as Russia takes more territory in the east. But they also demonstrate Russia’s increased dependence on allies, as it copies Iranian drones and uses North Korean missiles.” 
• “Ukraine’s ability to intercept missiles has improved after deteriorating earlier this year, according to the data. In October, 93% of all drones were intercepted or lost, compared with just over 8% of ballistic and hypersonic missiles.”
• “Russia inundated Ukraine with long-range Shahed drones first supplied by Iran but now also made at a factory in Tatarstan region some 600 miles east of Moscow. Over the past three months, 92% of all long-range aerial munitions fired were drones and their decoys, according to the data. Because they don’t reach a target, Ukraine refers to these decoys, alongside explosive drones downed by electronic warfare, as lost.”
• “Russia can build 1,200 of these drones a month at its Tatarstan factory, according to the Ukrainian official. But Russia’s version of the Shahed uses different electronic components than the Iranian original, the official said.” 

“He Was Shot in the Face. Now Ukraine Wants to Draft Him,” Andrew E. Kramer, NYT, 12.09.24.

• “Early in Russia's war against Ukraine, Mykola Kulichenko endured an ordeal. He was abducted as a civilian, survived a Russian execution attempt by a stroke of luck and then climbed out of his own grave by pushing through the dirt heaped above him. His brothers died beside him, but Mr. Kulichenko had turned his head at the last moment and a bullet passed through his cheek, leaving a hole but not causing life-threatening wounds.”
• “Given the trauma of his ordeal, he doesn't think he should be drafted into the army. ''It was very hard to climb out of my grave,'' he said.....The summons of Mr. Kulichenko, who is 35, underscores the unpredictable and lopsided mobilization system in Ukraine that leans heavily on recruiting older men.”
• “The policies have drawn criticism from the Biden administration, which has said Ukraine should expand its draft to younger men aged 18 to 25, who are now exempt, to defend hundreds of miles of front line. The need for soldiers is now more acute than the need for weapons, American officials have said.”
• “Ukrainian officials say they cannot draft men in their late teens and early 20s without risking demographic shortfalls in the future, and they have pushed back against the American criticism.”
• “Ukraine plans to draft an additional 160,000 men in the ''near future,'' the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksandr Lytvynenko told Parliament late last month. This number would restore units to 85 percent of their full strength, he said. But reaching deeper into the pool of older men risks filling the ranks with less motivated and healthy soldiers.”  

To visualize the recent correlation of the warring forces in Russia’s Kursk region see “Ukraine Clings to Shrinking Sliver of Russia, Expecting Trump to Push for Peace Talks,” Ian Lovett and Nikita Nikolaienko, WSJ, 12.05.24.

To visualize the recent  situation on the frontlines in Ukraine and correlation of the warring forces at these lines, please see “Ukraine’s battle against Russia in maps and charts: latest updates,” Steven Bernard and Christopher Miller, FT, 10.28.24.

Military aid to Ukraine:

“Five Opinion Writers on What Biden Should Do in His Final Days as President,” Binyamin Appelbaum, David Firestone, David French, Michelle Goldberg, Nicholas Kristof and Jillian Weinberger, NYT, 12.08.24.

• “President Biden has about six weeks left in office, and with Republicans set to control both houses of Congress and the presidency next year, his final acts may be more important than ever. So we asked … what should Mr. Biden’s priority be over these next few weeks?”
• “David French: Help Protect Ukraine. I’m David French. I was in Kyiv in 2023, and I was there when the Russian missiles were coming in. I saw the courage of the Ukrainian people. I saw the lines of ambulances of casualties coming in from the front. I saw the damage and the destruction all around Kyiv from Russian aggression.”
• “From the beginning of the war, Western powers froze more than $200 billion in Russian assets. That is a sum of money that could really assist in propping up the Ukrainian economy, propping up Ukrainian arms purchases… And so, the proposal is that President Biden spend at least some of his remaining time in office trying to persuade our Western allies to not just freeze the assets but seize the assets for the use of the Ukrainian war effort, thus dealing an immense financial blow to Russia and providing a financial windfall to Ukraine that Ukraine could use to continue its war.”
• “[A defeat for Ukraine] is a direct threat to the security relationships that have kept the world safe from a great-power war for so long. What may well happen when Donald Trump takes power is he just cuts off Ukraine. If we cut off Ukraine, not only will Ukraine be financially crippled, it could also be militarily crippled in some very important ways.”
• “But the thing that is not as obvious is actually: The Russians are under pressure, too. A lot of people forget this. The Russian military is taking extraordinary losses right now, both in men and equipment. And so both Ukraine and Russia could be theoretically reaching near the limit of their ability to prosecute this war.”
• “Right now, the danger has been that Ukraine would be reaching the critical point before Russia. One final note: I think that seizing the Russian assets for the use of the Ukrainian war effort would be a very tangible way of saying to a people who are exhibiting extraordinary courage under fire, who are laying everything on the line to defend their nation against Russian aggression, it is a tangible way of saying the American people are still with you, and we’re doing everything that our political process allows, that the law allows, that our strategic interests permit, to keep you and support you in this fight.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Ukraine's Security Now Depends on Europe," Elie Tenenbaum and Leo Litra, FA, 11.30.24.
• "Waiting for a Theory of Victory in Ukraine," Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, War on the Rocks, 12.04.24. Podcast.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“The Russian Economy Remains Putin’s Greatest Weakness. Harsher Sanctions Could Push Him to Negotiate With Ukraine,” Theodore Bunzel and Elina Ribakova, FA, 12.09.24.

“We need a more agile EU sanctions regime to counter the Kremlin,” Vladyslav Vlasiuk, FT, 12.05.24.

• “Time is of the essence: the EU needs to maneuver more swiftly. Recently, it adopted a new framework to target individuals and entities behind hybrid attacks by Russia that undermine the EU’s security, independence and integrity. This falls on top of numerous existing frameworks. Nonetheless, it is estimated that up to $3bn in officially prohibited western exports finds its way to Russia every month. The excuse that “we don’t know how critical components keep getting through” cannot stand any longer. We must quickly and continuously identify and list offending entities.”
• “An agile EU sanctions regime will enable a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. It is time to move away from mainly focusing on cumbersome packages and match Russia’s ability to circumvent them. The EU may be slowed down by its consensus-based approach to decision-making on many topics, but sanctions need not be one of them. We must utilize the full capability of the EU’s sanctions framework — to build vital leverage in any future negotiation.”

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

“Trump Should Make Putin Wince Before They Sit Down to Talk,” Mark Montgomery, FP, 12.06.24.

• “If U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is to succeed in brokering a peace deal, he must change Putin’s perspective that he has the upper hand, or Trump’s diplomacy will backfire. To go into talks with a strong hand, Trump will need to bolster U.S. and Ukrainian leverage. And he must do so quickly, without the torturous delays and self-imposed red lines that have characterized President Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine over the last three years. The Trump administration should therefore formulate a maximum pressure campaign to convince Moscow to accept a good and lasting peace deal. By keeping his promise to restore “peace through strength,” Trump can give himself the best possible chance of stopping the bloodshed for good.”
• “The challenge for Ukraine and its Western partners is finding a way to turn the tables so that they’re negotiating from a position of strength. That means stabilizing the front. While the West cannot dictate a solution to Ukraine’s mobilization issue, it can step up military aid. Kyiv needs more equipment and a steady supply of munitions to replace losses, kit out new units, defend its cities and critical infrastructure, and holds its lines. When units are under-resourced, the infantry must shoulder a greater burden, leading to higher casualties.”
• “At the same time, Trump must ensure U.S. assistance—and thus his and Kyiv’s leverage—does not have an expiration date.”
• “Furthermore, Trump should enable Ukraine to take full advantage of Biden’s belated decision to loosen restrictions on Ukrainian strikes in Russia with U.S.-provided missiles.”
• “What’s more, the incoming administration should consider dropping the remaining restrictions on where and what Ukraine is permitted to strike.”
• “To maximize pressure on Putin, Trump should also take the fight to Russia’s economy. Earnings from energy exports, the backbone of Russia’s state budget, should be the primary target.”
• “In addition, the United States should expand its use of secondary sanctions to bar Russia from evading the G-7 oil price cap.”

“Will Trump Channel Nixon in Ukraine? There are indications that the president-elect may intend further escalation,” James W. Carden, American Express, 12.05.24.

• “That [Keith] Kellogg was appointed to such a sensitive position [as Trump’s special envoy o Ukraine] in the first place should worry those who supported Trump on the assumption that he would bring much needed change to the conduct of US foreign policy. Reasonable people might ask: Where are men of experience and imagination, like the retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor, senior fellow at The American Conservative? Unlike Macgregor, Kellogg knows nothing about Russia or its interests, let alone its historic sensitivity to Ukraine’s strategic importance. Macgregor has decades of scholarship invested in Russo-German relations and Moscow’s role in Europe and Asia. But Macgregor is nowhere to be found among the incoming team. Perhaps Howard Luttnick and Linda MacMahon were too busy campaigning for cabinet appointments to do what they should have been doing: selecting the most competent men and women for the most sensitive positions.”
• “Alas, we will have to leave for another time the question of why the president-elect has staffed his national security team with a veritable roster of Fox News personalities and a recent immigrant with suspected ties to foreign intelligence such as Sebastian Gorka. The British-Hungarian Gorka has claimed that Trump will “force” Putin to the negotiating table by threatening a massive increase in military aid to Ukraine. Faux-machismo aside, there is little to indicate that—even if Trump pursues such a plan—there is much left to provide. Indeed, there is little evidence Putin is likely to be swayed by inducements from Washington.”
• “With regard to Ukraine, the playbook of the bipartisan Washington blob still rules. And while it has only been a month since the election, the president-elect has provided few signs that he plans on deviating from the script left by Joe Biden and Jake Sullivan.”

“Why a “Deal” with Putin Makes No Sense,” S. Frederick Starr, The National Interest, 12.04.24.

• “What if Russia loses its war on Ukraine? Some consider the question frivolous because, as President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan has asserted, “Russia cannot be defeated in a military sense.” Such thinking has prompted Tokayev, as well as many in the West, to advocate for a deal with Putin, one that would more than likely result in Kyiv’s loss of land that the United Nations, the United States, and Europe all consider Ukraine’s sovereign territory. [But] Russia is only inching forward in Ukraine with an unsustainable loss of lives and equipment, and it has so far been unable to drive Ukrainian forces from its own territory in Kursk.”
• “There are three main reasons for which the United States and its European allies have rebuffed the Ukrainian government’s call for victory over the aggressors. First, they fear that Putin, in his desperation, might unleash tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere… Second, Ukraine’s partners based their strategy purely on their own often inaccurate assessments of the situation on the fighting front. Conditions there are indeed dire. However, the direness extends to both sides, not just the Ukrainians.” 
• “Russia’s poorly equipped army is running out of fighting gear, while its demoralized conscripted fighting forces are dying in frightful numbers thanks to miserable leadership, against whom they regularly direct withering criticism on their cell phones. The presence of North Koreans on the battlefield, far from reversing the decay, is deepening it as incidents of friendly fire proliferate. Meanwhile, Putin is on the verge of exhausting the huge “rainy day fund” that has hitherto financed his war.”
• “Third, and most importantly, Russia is fast losing the war on its home front. Strict censorship has, until recently, quashed public discussion of the war itself. However, this repression has been unable to stifle public discussion of the impact of the war on Russia’s provinces, cities, and countryside. Prices for basic goods are soaring, and the enormous loss of lives in the fighting is leaving even fewer men to help wives, families, and communities cope with the deepening disaster. Crimes committed by returning veterans are heightening the prevailing disorder. Put bluntly, Putin’s home front is collapsing.”
• “Russian experts are now publicly predicting a demographic cataclysm that may cripple the country for generations to come. This and related issues are now openly discussed in shocked tones by members of Russia’s parliament. So why are Washington officials and America’s friends in Europe straining to achieve a deal with Mr. Putin?”
• “Never mind that any such deal will enable Putin to stay in power in the face of mounting domestic opposition, declare victory, and strengthen his axis with China, North Korea, and Iran. It will also force Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to spend more on rebuilding their defenses against a resurgent Russia. And it will invite mischief elsewhere in the world because the United States and West will have revealed themselves as indecisive and overly eager to compromise.”

“Shades of Grey: The Conditions of Peace and Costs of War as Perceived by Russians,” Re: Russia, 11.29.24.

• “Unlike the views of Ukrainians, the preferences of Russians living under a dictatorship regarding the desired formula for ending the war with Ukraine are not particularly important. However, they reflect the peculiarities of their attitude toward the war and their perception of the current situation. Regarding the preference for peace negotiations, slightly more than half of those willing to participate in surveys consistently support transitioning to peace talks, while just over a third favor continuing military actions.” 
• “If a peace agreement were signed by Putin as early as next week, it would be welcomed by at least 75% of respondents, assuming it was favorable for Russia. 60% would welcome the end of military actions in any form, without being particularly concerned about the conditions. In general, the priority for survey participants is the end of the war, with the most important conditions for peace being Putin's approval and the absence of clear signs of 'weakness' or 'concessions' from Russia.”
• “About half of Russians surveyed (47%) in the autumn of 2024, believe that the war has caused more harm than good (28%), whereas in mid-2023, these two groups were almost equal. This indicates a rise in subjective assessments of the costs of the war. There has also been a slight increase in Russians' feelings of vulnerability due to expanding Ukrainian airstrikes deep within Russian territory.”
• “Recruitment advertisements for military service are almost the only daily reminder of the war that people in Russian cities far from the Ukrainian border encounter. Notably, these ads evoke negative emotions in 40% of respondents, while only 27% have positive feelings… When the figure of Putin is added to the 'peace equation,' the outcome becomes indisputable.” 
• “The proportion of those surveyed who support the scenario in which Putin 'signs a peace agreement and stops the ”'military operation”’ in the Russian Field survey is 79%. At the beginning of 2023, 66% supported this scenario, and by mid-2023, 72%; since then, this proportion has steadily increased, while the share of those opposing an immediate peace agreement signed by Putin has decreased from 24% in the first year of the war to 13% in the latest survey. Even among supporters of continuing military actions, the scenario of ending the war, approved by Putin, is acceptable to the majority (55%).”
• “At the same time, both Russian and global media are more likely to quote survey data that confirm the loyalty of Russians to the war. Against this backdrop, the distribution of answers to the Levada Centre question on whether the ‘military operation’ has caused more harm or more benefit (September 2024) went largely unnoticed. Meanwhile, the first option (‘harm’) was chosen by 47% of those surveyed, while the second (‘benefit’) was chosen by 28%, as already mentioned. Notably, in May 2023, the response distribution was almost equal – 41% (‘harm’) versus 38% (‘benefit’). This indicates a significant increase in the perception of the war's costs over this period.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• “Peace Through Agency: How to End Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Ray Hartley and Dr Greg Mills, RUSI, 12.05.24.

• “Big Questions for Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plans. Trump’s team has ideas, but so do Ukraine and Russia,” Amy Mackinnon, Rishi Iyengar and John Haltiwanger, FP, 12.05.24.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

"The Battle for Ukraine Is a War of Demography," Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, FP, 12.06.24.

• “A speech Putin delivered to schoolchildren in Vladivostok in 2021, half a year before the invasion, offers a telling glimpse at his obsession with demographics. The Russian president told a story about an imaginary Russia that might have been but sadly never came to be. If not for the massive geopolitical shocks of the 20th century, he explained to the students, the population of Russia would have been around 500 million, three or four times larger than it currently is. Russia’s failure to achieve its demographic promise—not the end of communism—was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. After reiterating the need to investigate why the country’s natural and predicted population explosion had failed to materialize, he exhorted: 'In no case should we allow anything like this in the future.'”
• “Traditionally, Russia has defined its security vulnerability in spatial terms. Beginning with the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, the Russian Empire managed to expand at an average rate of 50 square miles per day for hundreds of years. During the last years of the Soviet Union, it covered one-sixth of the habitable globe. But Moscow’s obsession with overland expansion and its thinking about security in terms of strategic depth is now a thing of the past.”
• “Today, Russia defines its national security by the size of its population, not the extent of its landmass. Putin understands that, in the world of tomorrow, Russia will be a territorial giant and population dwarf. Russia’s population will not only be much smaller than the populations of India, China, or the United States but also one-half of Ethiopia’s and one-third of Nigeria’s. For Putin, this population decline translates into an irreversible loss of power. As he stated in 2020, 'Russia’s destiny and its historic prospects depend on how numerous we will be.'”
• “In a way, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was an admission of the failure of his various pro-natalist policies designed to increase the country’s population, particularly the Slavic core of its population. After a series of attempts to increase the country’s fertility rate (including exemption from military service for any man with four children and generous financial incentives for larger families) and to extend the life expectancy of the Russian population, the Russian president seems to have concluded that the only way to achieve a sizable increase in his population is by annexing and subordinating ethnically and culturally related neighbors, by force if necessary. As Eberstadt told the Wall Street Journal: “The most successful population program that the Kremlin has had has been annexing neighboring territories, not increasing the birthrate.” By incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014, Putin added around 2.4 million (mostly) ethnic Russians to his country’s population.”
• “Putin’s alleged fear of democracy in neighboring Ukraine may have been a much less decisive motivation for the invasion than his fear of demography—the precipitous decline of the size of Russia’s population and the percentage of ethnic Slavs within it.”
• “Demographic anxiety is not the only cause of Putin’s war. But it is arguably the most consequential and illuminating because it helps us relate the devastating war in Ukraine to simultaneous, parallel outbreaks of violent identity politics in many other countries subject to the same existential trauma of rapid depopulation. The fear of shrinking numbers, a shortage of young people, mass emigration, and growing cultural insecurity are becoming the defining characteristics of the new geopolitical environment.”
• “At the heart of the Kremlin’s calculus seems to be the concern that Russia contains too few people to effectively capitalize on the new opportunities for mineral exploration and extraction in the Arctic region, which are emerging due to the thawing of the permafrost. In this sense, Putin’s territorial ambitions are no longer driven by a desire to secure vital natural resources for a burgeoning population, but rather by a fear that Russia’s shrinking and aging demographic cannot adequately harness the potential of its own vast geographic expanse. In the population wars of the 21st century, the struggle for supremacy is less about controlling territory than about maintaining the demographic strength to exploit it.”
• “We should understand Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine not only as a futile effort to reverse Russia’s population decline, but also as his way of combating what he sees as a Western conspiracy to make Russia “childless.” As he made clear in his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, Putin is convinced that the United States is hell-bent on Russia’s destruction. It is his firm conviction that liberal policies are weapons that the West is deploying to wipe Russia off the map.”
• “Unlike some of his political allies in the West, Putin has never explicitly quoted the French philosopher René Girard. However, he would likely agree with Girard’s assertion that the world is threatened by apocalyptic “mimetic desire.” In the Kremlin’s view, Russian women are not rejecting motherhood because they distrust the future offered by the Russian state, but rather because they have imitated the decadent choices and behaviors of their Western counterparts. For Putin, it is only by breaking this “mimetic circuit” that Russia can hope to survive and reverse its demographic decline. That explains his battle to reassert Russia’s distinct cultural identity and insulate its citizens from the perceived corrosive effects of Western liberal modernity.”
• “Ukraine is one of the few countries in the world whose demographic prospects are worse than Russia’s. In 1991, when the country gained independence, its population was around 52 million people. However, a combination of low birth rates, early deaths, and massive out-migration has dramatically reduced this figure. By the time Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, there were roughly 41 million people living in Ukraine. The years since the beginning of the war have only exacerbated this demographic crisis, turning it into a catastrophe.  According to the United Nations, over 6 million Ukrainians have left the country since the start of the war. Additionally, the Wall Street Journal reports that the total population in Ukraine-controlled territory is now as low as 25 million. Alongside military deaths and mass emigration, Ukraine’s birth rate has also collapsed to its lowest recorded levels, with three times as many people dying as being born in the first half of 2024, according to state data.”
• “The painful question now facing President Volodymyr Zelensky is: How many people can Ukraine lose in this war before losing its future? The answer to this question will define Kyiv’s definition of victory and defeat in the conflict. Initially, the Ukrainian leadership was focused on retrieving all of its occupied territories. There has now been a notable shift towards accepting a settlement that would guarantee Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the European Union, at the cost of losing a considerable amount of land—a scenario akin to how West Germany was created after World War II. Kyiv is acutely aware that a prolonged war will devastate Ukraine. A long war means not only more people killed and wounded, but also fewer babies born and fewer Ukrainians returning home from abroad. It was because of these demographic fears that, in the first two years of the war, Kyiv decided not to mobilize young men aged 18-24, dramatically reducing the quality of the Ukrainian armed forces but preserving the country’s demographic potential.”
• “The Russia-Ukraine war may portend the shape of violent conflicts to come, both domestic and international. That is because the rest of the world, too, is grappling with frightening demographic pressures and anxieties. Everywhere, it seems, the survival of collective identities hangs in the balance. The population loss experienced by historically dominant groups seems to be preparing the way for an upheaval of end-times aggression, enflamed by a primal fear of national extinction.”
• “The war between Russia and Ukraine is sometimes described as a war of the past, a typical war of attrition. But it is much more radical and terrifying than that. It is the first modern “mourning war.” It is unlikely to be the last.”

“How Trump can end the war in Ukraine for good,” Marc A. Thiessen, WP, 12.03.24.

• “What lessons can we learn from the failure of the Budapest accord?
  • “First, Putin does not want peace; he wants Ukraine. He will violate any international agreement Russia signs to achieve his objective. The only way to stop him is to make his objective impossible to achieve. As we have seen, Putin believes he can wait out a strong U.S. president until a weak one replaces him. If allowed to do so, he simply will use a cessation of hostilities to pause, reconstitute his forces and resume his invasion when the time is right. If Trump wants a peace that outlasts his presidency, that agreement must create conditions that make a resumption of war impossible.”
  • “Second, Western security guarantees are worthless unless they are backed up with Western military might. A lasting peace will require that whatever agreement Trump negotiates creates defensible borders, with a demilitarized zone enforced by an international peacekeeping force (made up of European, not American, troops). Putin must understand that this agreement is final, and that if he ever tries to resume his invasion, he will not be fighting just Ukraine.”
  • “Third, Ukraine must be militarily strong enough to deter Russia. Giving up its nuclear deterrent, and depending on others to protect it, was a mistake. Ukraine will need to create a conventional deterrent so powerful that Russia will never take it on. This means that, even if Trump succeeds in forging peace, the imperative to arm Ukraine will continue. We must find mechanisms to increase the flow of U.S. weapons headed to Kyiv that do not require U.S. taxpayers to bear the cost.”
• “If Trump wants to avoid presiding over a historic failure like Budapest, he needs to avoid the trap of trying to appease Putin with promises of Ukrainian neutrality and disarmament. He does not want to join Neville Chamberlain in the pantheon of leaders who promised peace in our time but delivered the opposite. Trump says he wants to prevent World War III. If that is the case, he should do what he did in his first term and secure peace through strength.”

Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at “Russia Calling! Investment Forum.” Kremlin.ru, 12.04.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “We are naturally guided towards places showing economic growth with the growing number of our partners who are not looking over the shoulder to make sure they are acting in compliance with someone from the outside barking orders out at them.”
• “Last year, Russia’s gross domestic product grew by 3.6 percent, which is a well-known fact, and increased by 4.1 percent in January-October of this year. The growth mainly comes from the manufacturing industries and sectors with high added value. Thus, in a matter of ten months, our manufacturing industry has grown by more than eight percent, 8.1 percent to be precise... Overall, Russia has a record-low unemployment rate of just 2.3 percent. Compared to the majority of the world’s leading and developing economies, this figure is minimal.”
• “As for Germany’s manufacturing industries, as far as I know—please, correct me if I am wrong—the manufacturing industries will decline by 4.6 percent, while in Russia, there will be a 4.4 percent upturn, with manufacturing industries adding over eight percent, 8.1 percent.”
• “We often hear people from the political, military, or economic fields say that these [Western] countries set the task of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, including in the economy and technology, to drastically weaken our country’s manufacturing industry, finance and services, to create an insurmountable shortage of goods on our market, to destabilize the labor market, and to lower the living standards of our citizens. It is obvious that these plans have failed to materialize. Following a challenging period, the Russian economy has not only fully recovered, but is also living through qualitative structural changes, which is vitally important and, perhaps, is the most important outcome of our work in the economy over the past two to three years.”
• “For example, can anyone ban Bitcoin? No one can. Who can ban other electronic means of payment? No one, because these are innovative technologies, and no matter what happens to the dollar, these instruments will keep evolving one way or another, because everyone will strive to cut costs and increase reliability. It is an unavoidable process, and the dollar has absolutely nothing to do with it.  However, if the dollar gets used less and less around the world, and this will be the outcome of their own making, they will, of course, undermine the foundations of their economic power if they do so. This is absolutely clear, and I completely agree with you.” 
• “Our relations with China are not impacted by events that are taking place, for example, in Ukraine. China has long ago become our largest trade and economic partner, even before that. ...I am confident that the progress made, particularly in the development of our relations and trade ties with the People's Republic of China, is self-evident. The trade turnover between Russia and China has reached unprecedented levels, exceeding $240 billion, in dollar equivalent. This is the best evidence indicating that the mechanisms in place – both in China concerning Russian investments and economic operators, and vice versa for Chinese entities and investments in Russia – are functioning effectively.”
• “The climate is changing, and the number of days for unimpeded pilotage [along Northern Sea Route] is growing. We see that many countries, first of all, our Asian partners, such as India, China and many others, are interested in using that route and in working on it. We have a program for the development of ports in that region, with access routes and so on.”

“How Russia Plans to Win in Ukraine,” Dmitry Trenin, Pravda, 12.05.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “NATO knows it has lost its proxy war, but many of its members will still try to prevent a genuine peace. The Ukrainian crisis exposed a troubling reality for Russia: its concept of strategic deterrence proved incapable of preventing enemy aggression. While it has successfully deterred a massive nuclear attack by the United States or large-scale conventional aggression by NATO, it has failed to address a new and insidious form of conflict. Washington and its allies have gambled on inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia through a client state—one they control, arm, and direct.”
• “Realists within NATO understand the war in Ukraine is effectively lost. The Russian army holds the initiative across the front and is advancing steadily in the Donbass. The Ukrainian armed forces are unlikely to turn the tide in the foreseeable future, if ever. Consequently, Western strategists are now eyeing a ceasefire along the battle lines as the only viable option.”
• “Articles in Reuters and other Western outlets suggest that Moscow, too, may consider freezing the conflict. However, such a scenario would need to align with Russian interests. For Moscow, anything less than full victory equates to defeat, and such an outcome is simply not an option.”
• “Russia’s response to the [West’s long-range attack] escalation has not been limited to updating [Russia’s] doctrine. The recent test of the ‘Oreshnik’ intermediate-range hypersonic missile under combat conditions marked a pivotal moment. By striking the Yuzhmash missile factory in Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow signaled to NATO that the vast majority of its European capitals are within range of this new weapon.”
• “The deployment of ‘Oreshnik’ and the updated nuclear doctrine reaffirm Moscow’s commitment to achieving peace on its terms. There will be no return to pre-2022 realities or a new Minsk Agreement. Rather, it is about securing Russia’s long-term security and reshaping the geopolitical order in its favor.”
• “As the conflict continues, much depends on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election. Donald Trump’s potential return to power offers an opportunity for dialogue, though the Kremlin remains skeptical. Regardless of who occupies the White House, Russia will not compromise its objectives.”

“As Russia and China Rewrite Rules of War, NATO Adapts Its Game Plan; Sabotage, cyber and energy security are priorities for alliance's new leader, Mark Rutte,” Daniel Michaels and Alan Cullison, WSJ, 12.08.24.

• "'Russia is really ramping up,' Rutte said in an interview. NATO must 'make sure that deterrence is there and that the Russians don't try anything which is really risky.' He said NATO and its members are responding by expanding exchanges of intelligence, conducting more exercises, boosting cyber defenses and enhancing protection of critical infrastructure. The alliance is now developing a plan for response to hybrid attacks that it aims to adopt at its annual meeting next summer in The Hague.”
• “NATO members have primary responsibility for response to attacks, handling them at the national level, Rutte said, but the alliance can play a critical supporting role by pooling information and sharing best practices.”
• “Rutte, who served as prime minister of the Netherlands for 14 years until July and took over at NATO in October, said Western leaders over the past decade have increased their understanding of adversaries' untraditional hostilities. "I think we lost our naiveté, all of us, and clearly came to the conclusion that collective defense" entails combating hybrid attacks, he said.”
• “Moscow's use of hybrid tactics, which it has honed over the decades since the Cold War, is likely to mushroom further in the coming years, in part because its conventional war in Ukraine has lately been so costly, said Seth Jones, a political scientist and defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.”
• "'I think there's a very strong rationale to be thinking about the growing threat that the Russians pose,' he said, adding that discussion of a coordinated response from NATO has been building for years.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "America Is Cursed by a Foreign Policy of Nostalgia," Nancy Okail and Matthew Duss, FA, 11.30.24.

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

"Can Trump Split China and Russia? Why Beijing and Moscow’s Partnership Will Be Hard to Break,” Alexander Gabuev, FA, 12.06.24.

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Neither Friend Nor Foe: How Russians Perceive China," Denis Volkov, Levada Center, 12.09.24. In Russian.
• "Chinese Views of Strategic Stability: Implications for Nuclear Competition," Fiona S. Cunningham, International Security, Fall 2024.

Missile defense:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Nuclear arms:

“Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s interview with Tucker Carlson,” Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.06.24.

• “I would call it hybrid war as well, but it is obvious that the Ukrainians would not be able to do what they're doing with long-range modern weapons without direct participation of the American servicemen. We don't want to aggravate the situation, but since ATACMS and other long-range weapons are being used against mainland Russia as it were, we are sending signals. We hope that the last one, a couple of weeks ago, the signal with the new weapon system called Oreshnik was taken seriously.” 
• “The United States, and the allies of the United States who also provide this long-range weapons to the Kiev regime, they must understand that we would be ready to use any means not to allow them to succeed in what they call strategic defeat of Russia... So the message which we wanted to send by testing in real action this hypersonic system is that we will be ready to do anything to defend our legitimate interests.”
• “We strongly prefer peaceful solution through negotiations on the basis of respecting legitimate security interest of Russia, and on the basis of respecting the people who live in Ukraine, who still live in Ukraine being Russians, and their basic human rights, language rights, religious rights, have been exterminated by a series of legislation passed by the Ukrainian parliament.” 
• “When President Putin spoke in this Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 14th of June he once again reiterated that we were ready to negotiate on the basis of the principles which were agreed in Istanbul and rejected by Boris Johnson, according to the statement of the head of the Ukrainian delegation. The key principle is non-block status of Ukraine. And we would be ready to be part of the group of countries who would provide collective security guarantees to Ukraine.... No NATO. Absolutely. No military bases, no military exercises on the Ukrainian soil with participation of foreign troops.”
• “[When asked: “What you're saying is American policy makers imagine there could be a nuclear exchange that doesn't directly affect the United States, and you're saying that's not true.”] That's what I said, yes. But professionals in deterrence, nuclear deterrence policy, they know very well that it's a very dangerous game. And to speak about limited exchange of nuclear strikes is an invitation to disaster, which we don't want to have.” 
• “We hate even to think about war with the United States, which will take nuclear character. Our military doctrine says that the most important thing is to avoid a nuclear war. And it was us, by the way, who initiated in January 2022 the message, the joint statement by the leaders of the five permanent members of the Security Council saying that we will do anything to avoid confrontation between us, acknowledging and respecting each other's security interests and concerns. This was our initiative.” 

“’Closer Now than Ever:’ Historian Sergey Radchenko Assesses Tucker Carlson’s Claim that U.S.-Russian Tensions in Ukraine Risk Nuclear War More than the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Sergey Radchenko, Meduza, 12.04.24.

• “Tucker Carlson is back in Moscow and promoting another interview with a senior state official. Ten months ago, the American right-wing pundit traveled to Russia and recorded a two-hour sit-down with Vladimir Putin, during which the president famously lectured him about the ancient historical roots of Moscow’s conflict with Kyiv. This time, Carlson says he spoke to Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov for another serving of “the Russian perspective,” which he argues is neglected in the American mainstream media.” 
• “In his announcement shared on 𝕏, Carlson also claimed that American involvement in Ukraine’s missile strikes inside Russian territory means “we are closer to nuclear war than in any time in history—far closer than we were during the Cuban Missile Crisis.” To assess the accuracy of Carlson’s warning (which undoubtedly resonates with many of his followers), Meduza spoke to Dr. Sergey Radchenko, whose 2024 book “To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power” closely examines the psychology of the Kremlin’s nuclear brinksmanship in Cuba.” 
• “But one thing that has become clear to me in the course of writing about the Cuban Missile Crisis is that it was very unlikely that either Khrushchev or Kennedy would have deliberately authorized a preemptive nuclear strike. In fact, when Castro raised this issue in one of his missives to Khrushchev on October 26, 1962, Khrushchev's reaction was one of horror. He would talk about this for days on end, saying, “How can this guy even propose something crazy like this? Is he mad? Is he out of his mind? Does he not understand what a nuclear war would mean?” So, for Khrushchev, nuclear war was not an option.” 
• “Do we know enough about Putin's intentions and psyche to judge the risks of a deliberate attack? Even if you look at Putin's rhetoric, he's been playing the good cop to [prominent think tank scholar Sergey] Karaganov's bad cop when Karaganov says something like, 'Oh, let’s nuke NATO!' Putin answers, 'Well, you have to be serious with these things, you know. This is all too dangerous.'”
• “Now, I don’t want to downplay what Carlson is saying; it is a dangerous situation. But I would not say the situation is so dangerous that we must make all these concessions to Putin right away. That’s obviously what the Russians are saying: “Surrender quickly! Otherwise, we’ll show you what’s what.” But this is not how it works. If you want to get anywhere in the business of dealing with Russians, you have to play this game the same way that they play and not succumb to unjustified fears.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Nuclear Challenges Facing the Next U.S. President," Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today, December 2024.
• “A Last Chance to Prevent Nuclear Anarchy Can Trump Engage China and Russia Before It’s Too Late?” Lewis A Dunn, FA, 12.04.24.
• “Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Bluff. The Russian ruler wants to scare the West. But he has problems that escalation in Ukraine wouldn’t solve,” Amy Knight, NYT, 12.06.24.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Conflict in Syria:

“Lessons of Syria,” Ruslan Pukhov, Kommersant ,12.08.24. ^ Clues from Russian Views.  

• “Now that the events in Syria have ended in a similar way to the events in Afghanistan in 2021, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about the unsuccessful Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war.”
• “It cannot be said that the Russian authorities did not think about an “exit strategy” from Syria, but from the very beginning this strategy was clearly self-confidently seen by them as reaching some kind of a comprehensive agreement with other external players in the Syrian conflict on the condition of fixing Russian demands at the peak of Russian successes.”
• “Russia, seeking to minimize its costs in Syria, increasingly focused on maintaining the rotten and ineffective status quo there for the sake of the status quo, essentially protecting the decaying and delegitimized Assad regime by the civil war without any prospects and at the same time not having the ability to influence the growing dynamics of other forces and players.”
• “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority for effective military intervention outside the former USSR, and it can act there, in essence, only with the condescending permission of other strong powers and for as long as they allow it.”
• “A long military campaign in itself is already a strategic defeat for its initiator, no matter what private military successes he achieves in it.”

“Obama’s Testament,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs, 12.09.24.^ Clues from Russian Views. (This organization is affiliated with the Russian authorities.)

• “In 2015, when the Russian armed forces carried out a military operation in Syria, the author of these lines suggested that the event draws a line under the era that began immediately after the disappearance of the USSR. The end of the Soviet Union meant a sharp collapse of the international positions of its successor, the Russian Federation. For two and a half decades after 1991, the country, in various ways (they changed as internal transformations took place), made up for lost time in terms of status, prestige and opportunities on the world stage. Syria became the culmination of this process: the first decisive action to change the situation in the center of one of the main world conflicts.”
• “Russia had taken actions abroad before, but only in nearby territories within the former common state. This was the source of Barack Obama's assessment, which many people found unflattering at the time, calling Russia a "regional power" (in contrast to, of course, the global United States). Intervention in the Syrian civil war, where the tentacles of all sorts were already moving, and the ability to reverse its course demonstrated Moscow's ability to influence not only peripheral but also major global processes.”
• “The very definition of Russia as a regional power by Obama does not seem offensive today; on the contrary, it indicates the direction of activity. In the ten years since the US President said this, it has become clear that global powers are leaving the stage because it is not only difficult but also unnecessary to carry such a burden. They themselves are not averse to reviewing their obligations. But regional powers, which have influence in the immediate surrounding area, ensure stability and a basis for development. And this is the main goal of all countries without exception today. And there is no option to leave the game without achieving any acceptable outcome.”

“Everything is just beginning in Syria,” Andrei Kortunov, Kommersant, 12.08.24. ^

• “The unexpected collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria evokes associations with the events of 2021 in Afghanistan. In both cases, the national armed forces actually expressed a vote of no confidence in the country's leadership, after which the government crumbled like a house of cards.”
• “If in Afghanistan the Taliban movement (recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned) managed to consolidate power in Kabul, avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, prevent the predicted multi-million flow of refugees and even take the first steps towards international recognition, then the likelihood of such success in Syria looks low.”
• “The differences between all those who can lay claim to participating in the division of Assad's legacy are too great - between Sunnis and Shiites, Kurds and Turkomans, Alawites and Druze, secular politicians and Islamic fundamentalists, between moderates and radicals. It will be very difficult to maintain the more than motley coalition that opposed Assad after his overthrow. This means that with the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the political game in and around Syria is only just beginning. In this game, Moscow no longer holds the main trump card in the person of a sole Syrian leader.”

“A welcome end to a brutal Middle East dynasty,” Editorial Board, FT, 12.08.24.

• “Syria’s long forgotten war was awakened by a confluence of factors: Assad had only prevailed over a collection of rebel factions because of the support of Russia and Lebanon’s Hizbollah. It was Russia’s air force and Hizbollah’s fighters on the ground that turned the war to his advantage. With Moscow distracted by the invasion of Ukraine and Hizbollah devastated in recent months by the conflict with Israel, the rebels found a propitious moment to strike. So battered was the Syrian army that within days the jihadi HTS, the most well-armed and motivated of the rebel factions, over-ran government-held cities and reached the capital Damascus. There were probably a few deals, a sign of how the Assad system was broken.”
• “Syria now faces two possible paths. The first is the reignition of the civil war, which will take the country the way of Yemen and Libya, long failed and broken. The second is a stabilization, a chance to heal, and to bring home millions of refugees scattered across the world. To seize the opportunity of a more hopeful Syria, those who can influence Jolani — Turkey and perhaps also Qatar — must ensure that he leaves the governing of the country to a civilian administration that reflects Syria’s myriad of religious communities. That should allow Arab and western governments that designate HTS as a terrorist organization to engage with the government. The world let Syria down, time and again, even when Assad used chemical weapons against his people. It, too, now has an opportunity to help the country get back on its feet.”

“The fall of Syria’s dictator. After the rebels’ astonishingly swift advance, Bashar al-Assad has fled,” The Economist, 12.07.24.

• “What happens next is impossible to predict. HTS^[1] will want a big role in governing a post-Assad Syria.”
• “But HTS probably lacks the resources to govern a big, diverse country. The farther it gets from Idlib, the more it will need to work with others. Rebels in the south might want a degree of autonomy; so will the SDF in the north-east. Though HTS has tried to reassure Christians, Alawites and other minorities, it is likely that some of them will flee the country.”
• “As the rebels advanced on Damascus, officials from Iran, Russia and Turkey met on the sidelines of a conference in Qatar to discuss Syria’s future. They did not agree on much. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, called for dialogue between the regime and the opposition; events on the ground may swiftly make that moot. Whoever governs Syria next, Russia’s priority will be to keep its naval base at Tartus, its sole port on the Mediterranean.”
• “Turkey, which has backed the rebels in northern Syria, will have the most influence over how they act. Donald Trump, America’s president-elect, seems content to let others sort out the mess: “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT,” he wrote on social media.”
• “For many Syrians, though, such questions can wait. There is great unease about the future—but greater relief that the end of the Assad regime, which brought so much death and destruction, has finally come.” 

“Assad’s Fall: What Are the Costs for Russia?” Simon Saradzhyan, RM, 12.09.24. 

• “It's astounding but not unprecedented how quickly Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen. Just a week after capturing Aleppo, the opposition forces found themselves first at the gates of Damascus, and then in control of the capital. It is difficult to see how Russia can benefit in any way from Assad’s flight to Moscow. In contrast, it is much easier to see how the end of the 53-year Assad dynasty could impose a number of tangible geopolitical, reputational and even domestic security costs on Russia.”
• “One obvious geopolitical cost is, of course, the loss of one of the few official military-political allies Moscow has retained outside the former Soviet Union … There is no denying that the ouster of Assad doesn’t only weaken Russia’s geopolitical positions, but it also weakens Iran, with which Russia has been strengthening ties to not only cooperate in countering the West, but also to receive military aid for its war in Ukraine.”
• “The ouster of Assad could also lead to the loss of Russia’s Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval base. The loss of the latter would be particularly impactful given its role in facilitating Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean and its support for shipments from Russia to Africa.”
• “Moscow’s failure to help Assad cling to power also creates reputational costs for Russia in general and for its ruler Vladimir Putin in particular, even if the Russian authorities may have facilitated the purchase of a number of safe houses for Assad’s clan in Moscow. Other than some half-hearted air attacks on the advancing opposition last week, the Russian forces in Syria are not known to have done anything tangible on the ground to help the Syrian dictator defend his region. … Russia’s (and Iran’s) failure to save Assad’s rule cannot help but impact views in countries whose leaderships are engaged in analyzing the costs and benefits of allying with Russia.”
• “Some of the disparate victorious opposition forces include Sunni jihadist groups that have been in the past allied with al-Qaeda (e.g. HTS) and ISIS.¹ Should these factions play decisive roles in Syria’s future foreign policies, one cannot rule out that they will offer tacit support for (and/or turn a blind eye on) Sunni jihadist groups waging campaigns of political violence against Russia, including acts of terrorism against civilians.  … Paradoxically, perhaps, to some, but preventing jihadist groups from becoming the sole uncontested power in Assad’s Syria is an interest that Putin’s Russia shares with the U.S., although it is something that pro-Kremlin commentators tend to ignore.”

"Why Syria Matters to the Kremlin," Nicole Grajewski, The Atlantic, 12.03.24.

• “Russia’s commitment to Syria has not actually wavered, and Russia is not really distracted. The advance of Syria’s rebels, led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reflects the degradation not of Russian attention but of the multinational ground forces supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. And Russia is not only not contemplating withdrawing from Syria—it looks poised to double down on its investment there, even if it has to rely on Iranian-backed forces and the cooperation of regional powers to do so.”
• “Syria is important to Moscow because intervening there in 2015 allowed Putin to reverse the narrative of Russian decline that had taken hold since the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
• “The gaps in Moscow’s strategy have now become apparent. When HTS first struck Aleppo, the speed and surprise of the advance left Moscow little time to coordinate with ground forces or organize effective air support at the scale needed to counter such a major offensive. And the collapse of regime defenses revealed that Russia’s long-term strategy to professionalize Assad’s military had failed: At the Kuweires air base, Syrian forces surrendered without resisting. They abandoned valuable assets, including helicopters, aircraft, and advanced air-defense systems.”
• “These setbacks will not drive Russia out of Syria, however. The Kremlin has too much at stake. It has already leveraged its Syrian intervention to rebuild its Middle Eastern influence, positioning itself as an essential mediator among Iran, Turkey, the Gulf states, the United States, and Israel. Moscow has also secured lucrative economic contracts for the reconstruction of Syria.”
• “Given the stakes, Moscow will be forced to adapt rather than withdraw. It will likely seek to strengthen military cooperation with Iran, including by finding a role for Iraqi militias and recruits in Syria. Reports indicate that this is already happening. Iran has also been recruiting on Telegram channels to replenish its Syrian brigades. These reinforcements may help offset Hezbollah’s losses, but they are unlikely to be as effective as the Russian- and Iranian-led campaign that carried out the Aleppo offensive in 2016.Russia will probably also try to negotiate with Turkey, which backs some of the rebel groups.”
• “Moscow has uncharacteristically avoided criticizing Turkey over the rebels’ activities. This restraint suggests that Russia is preparing a diplomatic initiative—perhaps one that allows Russia to maintain its presence in some parts of Syria while accommodating Turkish interests in the northwest.”
• “Russia wouldn’t be seeking such an arrangement if it weren’t militarily weakened. Not only have Iranian proxy forces lost muscle; Syrian opposition forces have gained it. They are much better equipped and coordinated than they were in 2015. If they were to continue to Homs from their current position in Hama, they would effectively sever the Russian bases at Latakia and Tartus from Moscow’s modest deployments elsewhere in Syria.”
• “As consuming as the war in Ukraine has been for Russia, the Kremlin does not see it as superseding its Middle East ambitions. That’s because Syria is not just a military outpost. It is a cornerstone of Russia’s claim to great-power status, a theater where it can demonstrate its diplomatic reach and its counternarrative to Western interventionism. This explains why Russia continues to invest in Syria even as it fights a costly war in Ukraine. Moscow may adjust its tactics, but abandoning Syria would mean surrendering something far more precious than territory: Russia’s hard-won position as an indispensable power broker in the Middle East.”

“Rebel Gains in Syria Put Russia on the Back Foot,” Ruslan Suleymanov, Carnegie Politika, 12.06.24.

• “The speed of recent advances made by armed groups in northern Syria came as a surprise for Damascus. But the inability of Bashar al-Assad’s regime to hold back the rebels is easily explainable by the weakness of its allies: Iran and Hezbollah have been damaged by the conflict with Israel, while Russia is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine. This has created a vacuum in several areas controlled on paper by Damascus, blighted by economic problems and corruption. Now, Islamic militants will fill that vacuum.”
• “The Russian military presence in Syria has shrunk since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine… In recent years, Russia has sought… to focus on political issues in Syria, pushing for a normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus. The first meeting between the Syrian defense minister and his Turkish counterpart in eleven years took place in Moscow in December 2022.”
• “It’s difficult to gauge how deeply Ankara is involved in the recent rebel successes. The main Syrian rebel group—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—has been designated a terrorist entity by Türkiye… For now, Ankara has voiced concern about events in Aleppo, and denied its involvement. But that doesn’t negate the fact that Türkiye is the main political beneficiary of the rebel offensive, which strengthens Erdoğan’s position in relation to Damascus.” 
• “The current escalation will also encourage Türkiye in its ambition to clear all of northern Syria of armed groups, including Kurdish-led forces. The victory of Donald Trump in U.S. presidential elections in November has fueled hopes in Ankara that the United States will decide to withdraw all its troops from Syria—allowing Türkiye to move against the Kurds. Moscow has always opposed such an approach by Ankara, and Russian officials have openly referred to Türkiye as an 'occupying power.'”
• “[I]t appears that the Kremlin believes the latest events in Aleppo to be yet another attempt by Türkiye to exploit Russia’s vulnerability while it is bogged down in Ukraine. There have been a number of sources of friction in the Russian-Turkish relationship since the full-scale invasion, including Ankara’s 2022 ban on Russian planes traveling to Syria using its airspace, Turkish banks refusing to deal with Russian companies because of the threat of U.S. sanctions, and Türkiye’s sale of Bayraktar drones to Kyiv.”
• “This means the situation in Syria will once again become a key issue in talks between Putin and Erdoğan, having been downgraded following the start of the war in Ukraine… Erdoğan has demonstrated repeatedly that he’s happy to use his influence over issues that are painful for Russia to improve relations with the West (for example, Türkiye’s approval of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO). Syria looks set to become a significant addition to this list, strengthening Türkiye’s hand in its relations with both Russia and the West.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

•  “Why did Russia lose Syria? Alexander Baunov answers one of the main questions about the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime,” Meduza, 12.09.24. In Russian.
• “Bogged Down in Ukraine, Russia Pays a Price in Syria,” Anton Troianovski, NYT, 12.08.24.
• "What now for Russia in Syria?" bne IntelliNews, 12.09.24
• “Who will rule Syria now the Assad regime has been toppled?” The Economist, 12.09.24.
• “The fall of President Bashar al-Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia – and a boost for Turkey,” Bronwen Maddo, Chatham House, 12.09.24.
• “Turkey: will Erdoğan emerge as the big winner of the Syria crisis?” Laura Pitel and Ayla Jean Yavckley, FT, 12.09.24.
  “After Fall of Assad Dynasty, Syria’s Risky New Moment,” Steven A. Cook , CFR, 12.08.24.
• “The Day After Assad. How the Syrian Dictator’s Stunning Fall Will Scramble the Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Natasha Hall and Joost Hiltermann, FA, 12.09.24.
• "U.S. Scrambles to Shape Post-Assad Syria but Has to Overcome Years of Disengagement," Michael Gordon, WSJ, 12.09.24.
• "The Fall of Bashar al-Assad and Syria’s Unfinished Business," Alexander Patterson, RUSI, 12.09.24.

Cyber security/AI: 

“How Ukraine uses cheap AI-guided drones to deadly effect against Russia,” The Economist, 12.02.24.

• “A hundred meters above a white Lada saloon, the drone locks onto its target: red lights blink to blue. AI takes over and the drone swoops in for its kill. The Lada is spared at the last moment, with the drone just two meters away. The mission is a test conducted in a field outside Kyiv to fine tune the system. But the technology is already being deployed by dozens of Ukrainian units on the front line. “It’s the best feeling to see your drone enter a tiny opening in an enemy trench,” says Denys, an engineer at The Fourth Law, the Ukrainian firm which makes these autonomous drones. 'I used to be a pacifist, but Russia’s war has stripped me of that privilege.'”
• “Ukraine’s drone war is evolving rapidly. Once a cheap answer to Russia’s artillery dominance, Ukrainian small and inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drones are now a force in their own right. They are used on a huge scale, with Ukraine projected to produce 2m this year. Ukraine now observes 1,000 Russian drones in every 24-hour period, says an insider. That has made some sections of the front lines, for example around Siversk in Luhansk province, practically no-go areas for humans. Drones are now responsible for a majority of battlefield losses, overtaking artillery, according to Ukrainian sources.”
• “Rudimentary object-recognition software has been in use, on both sides, for over a year. But it is getting better. Lorenz Meier of Auterion, a firm based in America, says that between spring and summer his firm’s software, known as Skynode, managed to double the range at which a drone could engage a target, from 500 meters to 1km or so. He says that improvements in the resolution of images captured by drones have since increased that further. The Economistunderstands that AI systems are sometimes locking onto targets at perhaps double that distance, far beyond the range at which basic jammers could take out the drone.”
• “Data from the battlefield suggest that the hit rate for these AI-guided drones is currently above 80%. That is higher than the rate of manually piloted drones. As important, the training burden declines dramatically.” 
• “Ultimately, a human still has to make the final call on any engagement, says Gundbert Scherf, the co-founder and CEO of Helsing. But Western and Ukrainian companies are busy working on deep-strike drones whose AI systems will be able to hunt for a wide range of potential targets far from the human operator.” 

“AI Weapons and the Dangerous Illusion of Human Control,” Sebastian Elbaum and Jonathan Panter, FA, 12.06.24.

Energy exports from CIS:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

Climate change:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

"Russia’s Economic Woes Fuel Search for Scapegoat," Alexandra Prokopenko, Carnegie Politika, 12.03.24.

• “Record interest rates (at least 22% for businesses and 25% for individuals) have led Russian business leaders to launch fierce attacks on the central bank. The country’s biggest industrial lobbyist, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), has even proposed giving the government oversight of some aspects of monetary policy.”
• “Criticism has been raining down ever since the central bank raised interest rates to 21% in October as a result of high inflation. With the Russian economy overheated, further hikes are likely: annual inflation is currently approaching 8.7%; Russia has said it will spend an extra 1.4 trillion rubles ($13.9 billion) before the end of the year; labor shortages are acute; and salaries are growing.”
• “At the same time, there is more and more evidence that the economy is slowing down. Investment has halved, and only sectors linked to the military are seeing growth. The prospect of a recession has spurred a hunt for scapegoats, and business wants to blame the central bank.”
• “If Putin can be persuaded that central bank chairwoman Elvira Nabiullina’s decisions are damaging Russian sovereignty and causing the economy to lag behind that of other countries, then he could withdraw his support. He is distracted by the war, and it’s possible that hawkish members of his inner circle might be able to sway his thinking. Inevitably, any replacement for Nabiullina would likely be more amenable when it comes to interest rates, providing a reprieve for Russian business—but only in the short term.” 
• “The independence of Russia’s central bank is one of the last bulwarks against the economy descending into an unmanageable crisis. As resources shrink and Putin’s determination to continue the war in Ukraine shows no sign of fading, this bulwark is in danger of buckling under the pressure.”

Vladimir Putin’s Remarks at “Russia Calling! Investment Forum,” Kremlin.ru, 12.04.24. Clues from Russian Views

• “We are naturally guided towards places showing economic growth with the growing number of our partners who are not looking over the shoulder to make sure they are acting in compliance with someone from the outside barking orders out at them.”
• “Last year, Russia’s gross domestic product grew by 3.6%, which is a well-known fact, and increased by 4.1% in January–October of this year. The growth mainly comes from the manufacturing industries and sectors with high added value. Thus, in a matter of ten months, our manufacturing industry has grown by more than eight percent, 8.1% to be precise… Overall, Russia has a record-low unemployment rate of just 2.3%. Compared to the majority of the world’s leading and developing economies, this figure is minimal.”
• “As for Germany’s manufacturing industries, as far as I know—please, correct me if I am wrong—the manufacturing industries will decline by 4.6%, while in Russia, there will be a 4.4% upturn, with manufacturing industries adding over eight percent, 8.1%.”
• “We often hear people from the political, military, or economic fields say that these [Western] countries set the task of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, including in the economy and technology, to drastically weaken our country’s manufacturing industry, finance and services, to create an insurmountable shortage of goods on our market, to destabilize the labor market, and to lower the living standards of our citizens. It is obvious that these plans have failed to materialize. Following a challenging period, the Russian economy has not only fully recovered, but is also living through qualitative structural changes, which is vitally important and, perhaps, is the most important outcome of our work in the economy over the past two to three years.” 
• “For example, can anyone ban Bitcoin? No one can. Who can ban other electronic means of payment? No one, because these are innovative technologies, and no matter what happens to the dollar, these instruments will keep evolving one way or another, because everyone will strive to cut costs and increase reliability. It is an unavoidable process, and the dollar has absolutely nothing to do with it. However, if the dollar gets used less and less around the world, and this will be the outcome of their own making, they will, of course, undermine the foundations of their economic power if they do so. This is absolutely clear…” 
• “Our relations with China are not impacted by events that are taking place, for example, in Ukraine. China has long ago become our largest trade and economic partner, even before that… I am confident that the progress made, particularly in the development of our relations and trade ties with the People's Republic of China, is self-evident. The trade turnover between Russia and China has reached unprecedented levels, exceeding $240 billion, in dollar equivalent. This is the best evidence indicating that the mechanisms in place—both in China concerning Russian investments and economic operators, and vice versa for Chinese entities and investments in Russia—are functioning effectively.”
• “The climate is changing, and the number of days for unimpeded pilotage [along Northern Sea Route] is growing. We see that many countries, first of all, our Asian partners, such as India, China and many others, are interested in using that route and in working on it. We have a program for the development of ports in that region, with access routes and so on.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• "Where Is Russia’s ‘Military Keynesianism’ Headed?," Katharina Bluhm, PONARS Eurasia, 11.30.24.
• "Russia Has Given Up on Foreign Investment," Alexandra Prokopenko and Alexandr Kolyandr, The Bell, 12.07.24.
• “Political Reforms for Postwar Russia: What Russian Wartime Migrants Say,” Mikhail Turchenko, PONARS, 12.02.24.
• "Russian Authorities Cracking Down On Gay Clubs," Rustam Alexander, Russia.Post, 12.06.24.

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant commentary or analysis in monitored publications.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

“How Russia-backed influencers meddled in Romania’s vote,” Valentina Pop, Polina Ivanova and Marton Dunai, FT, 12.09.24.

• “The Russian-backed influence campaign that prompted Romania to scrap its presidential election result echoes operations carried out in Moldova and other countries this year, according to Romanian intelligence reports and Moldovan officials. Romania’s constitutional court took the unprecedented decision last week to annul Călin Georgescu’s first-round victory. Declassified documents from the interior ministry, and the domestic and foreign intelligence services said the far-right candidate had “illegally benefited” from a “sophisticated” and “massive” social media campaign backed by Russia.”
• “Similar methods were deployed for Moldova’s election in October, with officials in Chișinău estimating that Moscow could have spent up to $100 million this year on seeking to sway voters against EU membership and in favor of a pro-Russian presidential candidate. They warned that the methods used were likely to be replicated in other democracies. German intelligence has already warned of possible Russian interference in its parliamentary vote in February.”
• “In Romania, Georgescu, a previously little-known ultranationalist who has expressed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and rails against Nato and the EU, secured 23% of the vote in late November despite having polled in the single digits for most of the campaign. The interior ministry said “part of the opening text” used by influencers to promote Georgescu was identical to that used on posts backing pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo in Moldova’s vote.”
• “Moldovan officials told the Financial Times that election interference was no longer as simple as handing out cash in envelopes on election day, with campaigns conducted on social media and payments to influencers made in cryptocurrencies making traditional monitoring methods such as election observers and party financing rules “outdated.” “There is no isolated solution to digitally enabled electoral interference,” said Stanislav Secrieru, adviser on national security to Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “Interference now moves at lightning speed, circumventing laws before they take effect.'”
• “Moscow has ridiculed any suggestion of being behind such influence operations. “The Russian side has not been involved in the electoral processes in Romania. In general, we do not have the habit of meddling in the elections of other countries,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said last month.”
• “Some influencers have admitted to being duped into promoting Georgescu. Alex Stremiteanu, who has more than 50,000 followers on TikTok, admitted in a post that it was “stupid” to take part in a paid campaign that was presented as an effort to get people out to vote. He said the hashtags he was told to use, including “presidential elections 2024,” were attracting “bots” to the comments section where they would post links redirecting viewers to Georgescu’s content. “I’m sorry I was used like a dog in this campaign, without knowing what I was doing,” said Stremiteanu.”

“Operation Destabilize: Russia, Organized Crime and Illicit Finance,” Jamie MacColl and Kathryn Westmore, RUSI, 12.06.24.

• “You would be forgiven for thinking that this week’s news from the National Crime Agency (NCA) of the multi-billion-dollar Russian-speaking money-laundering network that it has broken up is actually the script for a new Netflix drama… At its heart are two linked criminal networks, Smart and TGR. These groups… collect the cash proceeds from street-level drug dealing and exchange it for cryptocurrency, which can then be used by the gangs to purchase drugs and firearms.” 
• “The cryptocurrency itself is sometimes the product of other criminal activities, notably ransomware, enabling cybercriminals to exchange the proceeds of their crimes for cash… Smart and TGR facilitate money laundering on a vast scale… The groups offer services to sanctioned oligarchs, Russian elites, ransomware operators and organized criminal groups, including the notorious Kinahan cartel, allowing them to move money around the world with ease and impunity.” 
• “The funds that were laundered were used to conduct Russian espionage activities in Europe and to further the spread of Russian mis- and disinformation, undermining the safety and security of the UK and its allies. What is notable is that the pure money-laundering element of this case—the physical collection of cash and its exchange into a different form of value—is not really anything new. It is the same principle as Hawala, a traditional method of moving value between countries and outside the formal financial system. But these groups have reinvented Hawala for the 21st century, using US dollar-backed stablecoins, such as Tether (USDT), to facilitate the rapid transfer of value around the world.” 
• “Smart and TGR are sprawling multinational, polycriminal enterprises, defying any attempts to neatly categorize them. While laundering the proceeds of drug dealing and ransomware may have been a starting point, the groups’ activities do not stop there. Five individuals and four entities linked to Smart and TGR have now been sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the US for facilitating ‘significant sanctions circumvention on behalf of Russian elites’ through digital assets.” 
• “The networks and the activities they support also illustrate the blurred lines between criminality and Russian statecraft. Funds laundered through Smart and TGR allegedly supported Russian intelligence operations in Europe, including funding the activities of Russia Today in the UK. In other words, the Russian-speaking criminal diaspora in the UK, and in other countries, has vastly extended the reach of the Russian state.” 
• “Although on this occasion the NCA has been successful, the UK system is not generally well set-up to prioritize, identify and mitigate threats that do not fit neatly into criminal or state categories. While the success of Operation Destabilize should be lauded… given that more than £100 billion is likely laundered through the UK each year, the NCA’s budget of £870 million in 2023–24 (which covers all of the NCA’s activities and the operation of the UK’s Financial Intelligence Unit) seems woefully small, especially with the increased number of complex ways in which criminals are able to launder money… In a world of competing priorities, maintaining momentum—and resources—to tackle industrial-scale financial crime is essential. As Operation Destabilize has clearly shown, failure to do so clearly threatens our national security.”

Ukraine:

“The deepening unpopularity of Zelensky,” Owen Matthews, Spectator, 12.07.24.

• “Recent polls suggest that just 22% of Ukrainians would vote to re-elect Zelensky for a second term (with just 16% marking him as their first choice). According to a poll last month by the Social Monitoring Center in Kyiv, about 60% would prefer Zelensky not even to stand at all. Leading the polls is General Valerii Zaluzhny—whom Zelensky sacked as chief of Ukraine’s general staff in February and effectively exiled as ambassador to London—whose support in presidential elections stands at 42%. Third in the race is Ukraine’s enigmatic and ruthless military intelligence chief, General Kyrylo Budanov, on 18%.” 
• “Formally, Zelensky’s five-year presidential term ended on 20 May this year. In practice, though, there will be no campaigning or voting while the war still rages. In the meantime, Zelensky and his team will continue ruling directly through wartime powers that bypass parliament and, crucially, suspended all non-state broadcast media.”
• “Up to 80% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been destroyed or damaged, as well as swaths of industrial facilities. The economy has collapsed, with GDP down 30%. Public finances have been on life-support since the beginning of the war. Piecemeal international donations—for instance, $6.1 billion in November—are paying for the lion’s share of the salaries of Ukraine’s teachers, doctors, nurses and government officials.”
• “It is the horrifying human toll of the war that remains the chief wellspring of discontent with Zelensky. Ukraine’s civilian and military casualties are a closely held state secret. But civil society groups such as Mediazona, Meduza, the Book of Memory and the UA Losses project have documented the deaths of some 60,435 Ukrainians, including civilians, by name as of 6 Nov. this year. The full total is likely to be much higher. Zelensky’s latest domestic battle is to resist calls—including from the US—to lower the minimum age for conscription from the current 25 to 18. The logic is to save a young generation that is already tiny, to ensure the country’s future survival. To cave in on conscription of 18-year-olds at the 11th hour of the war will only add to Zelensky’s deepening unpopularity.”
• “With opposition forces of every stripe starting to gear up for elections that could, technically, be as soon as 25 May, it is clear that Zelensky will be catching most of the political flak. The final tragedy of his political career will be to sign off on the partition of a country he did so much to preserve and, later, to defend. But in many—in fact most—important ways, Zelensky is a victor. Four fifths of Ukraine will emerge independent of Russian dominion, free to rebuild itself as a prosperous European democracy. But that will be the work of somebody else. If Ukraine is very lucky, it may find another leader of Zelensky’s strength and caliber.”

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Seizing the Moment: Armenia and Azerbaijan at a Crossroads,” Nigar Göksel and Philip Gamaghelyan, War on the Rocks, 12.05.24.

• “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey have a pivotal opportunity to take decisive actions toward peace and stability. By honoring the commitments to open the border between Armenia and Turkey and finalizing the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they can shift the region’s trajectory from entrenched conflict to dynamic cooperation and shared prosperity.”
• “Inaction now risks empowering hardliners and unraveling the fragile gains made thus far, with consequences that could echo for generations to come.”

"COP29 Puts Azerbaijan on the Global Climate Map," Yana Zabanova, Carnegie Politika, 12.09.24.

• “COP29 was effective in putting Azerbaijan on the global climate map. It provided the country with a platform to sign important political and business agreements, while highlighting clean energy cooperation with its neighbors. Achieving a difficult compromise on climate finance, as well as on rules for the international carbon markets, was overall perceived as a success, with Central Asia and the South Caucasus countries standing to benefit from new opportunities.”
• “At the same time, the summit highlighted Azerbaijan’s ongoing attachment to fossil fuels and its poor track record on human rights. That in turn rekindled discussions about whether COP should be reformed to better address climate challenges, including through more stringent selection criteria for host countries.”

“Will the West betray or save anti-Putin protesters in Georgia?” The Economist, 12.03.24.

• “Night after night, a contest between fear and hope is playing out on the streets of Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. Defying club-wielding riot police, protesters have gathered each evening since November 28th to demand that their government resumes its frozen bid to join the European Union and hold fresh, unrigged elections. This being real life rather than a morality tale, it cannot be ruled out that fear will win.”
• “If brutish local police were Georgia’s only threat, pro-European protesters might be on solid ground. Speaking to your columnist from Tbilisi, demonstrators described a city in a febrile, daring mood since the ruling Georgian Dream party, controlled by a tycoon who made billions in Russia, announced that it would suspend the country’s campaign to join the EU until late 2028.”
• “To counter the Russian bogeyman, the West’s best weapon is hope—and credible assurances that Georgia, a country of 3.7 million surrounded by such unstable neighbors as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, has real prospects of joining the EU, and one day possibly NATO. Therein lies a dilemma. Inside the EU, popular support for further enlargement is fragile. America has just elected a NATO-skeptic president. In the specific case of Georgia, EU leaders and many European governments say they must hold its rulers to account for possible abuses during the elections in October, as well as for a slew of recent, anti-democratic laws. Yet imposing harsh sanctions on Georgia risks pushing it into Russia’s arms.”
• “Despair is premature. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revitalized support for enlargement among many EU and NATO leaders, reports a Western official. True, some standards may need loosening if new members are to join either institution soon. Coalitions of EU or NATO members may have to challenge Russian aggression, if consensus is impossible. Still, enlargement is back as a strategic asset, though Tbilisi’s protesters might be shocked if they knew how long their road to the West will be. Fear of Russia imperils Georgian democracy. It might be its best hope, too.”

For more commentary/analysis on this subject, see:

• Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the chairmen of the parliaments of the CSTO member states, Kremlin.ru, 12.09.24. In Russian. At a Dec. 8 meeting with heads of parliaments of CSTO members (Armenia absent), Putin commented on neither war the in Ukraine nor the ouster of his ally in Syria.
• “Trouble in Tbilisi: How the EU should respond to Georgia's drift towards authoritarianism,” ISS, 12.27.24.

Footnotes

^[1] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

*Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute a RM editorial policy.

^Machine-translated.