It's astounding but not unprecedented how quickly Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen. Just a week after capturing Aleppo, the opposition forces found themselves first at the gates of Damascus, and then in control of the capital. It is difficult to see how Russia can benefit in any way from Assad’s flight to Moscow. In contrast, it is much easier to see how the end of the 53-year Assad dynasty could impose a number of tangible geopolitical, reputational and even domestic security costs on Russia.

One obvious geopolitical cost is, of course, the loss of one of the few official military-political allies Moscow has retained outside the former Soviet Union after its disintegration. There is no denying that the ouster of Assad doesn’t only weaken Russia’s geopolitical positions, but it also weakens Iran, with which Russia has been strengthening ties to not only cooperate in countering the West, but also to receive military aid for its war in Ukraine. Assad’s Syria is not the first military-political ally Russia is in the process of losing since becoming preoccupied with re-invading Ukraine in 2022. The first one (all but de jure) is Nikol Pashinyan’s Armenia, who says Yerevan is on the way out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. In fact, the ouster of Assad by rebel factions, some of which are strongly supported by Turkey, which is seen by some as the biggest winner in these developments, constitutes Ankara’s second recent success in its competition with Moscow for geopolitical influence, with the outcome of Azerbaijan’s second and third wars for Karabakh being the first such success.

The ouster of Assad could also lead to the loss of Russia’s Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval base. The loss of the latter would be particularly impactful given its role in facilitating Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean and its support for shipments from Russia to Africa. Some commentators in Moscow have expressed hope that Russia would be allowed to keep the Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval base, despite reports of Russian personnel there being ordered to pack and burn documentation, while some of their comrades-in-arms remained trapped at their positions outside the bases. The Guardian reported that the Kremlin has launched an effort to try to convince the victors to let Russia keep the two bases, and a Kremlin source told Russian news agencies that a deal has been struck to ensure the safety of the Russian military bases. The victors may guarantee that safety during the transition of power. However, in the longer run, it is rather difficult ( (but not impossible in the realm of transactional realpolitik)to imagine that the victorious coalition of jihadists (e.g. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) and more moderate opposition factions would want their Syria to host the bases of a country that has employed dozens of warplanes to bomb them from the air and thousands of PMC Wagner soldiers and other mercenaries to fight them on the ground.

Moscow’s failure to help Assad cling to power also creates reputational costs for Russia in general and for its ruler Vladimir Putin in particular, even if the Russian authorities may have facilitated the purchase of a number of safe houses for Assad’s clan in Moscow. Other than some half-hearted air attacks on the advancing opposition last week, the Russian forces in Syria are not known to have done anything tangible on the ground to help the Syrian dictator defend his country. In fact, it would be surprising if the Russian military did more, given the scarcity of its military assets on the ground. With PMC Wagner gone from Syria last year and some of the Russian Defense Ministry’s own grouping downsized to free badly needed resources for the war against Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine how Russia, without the help of Iran and its proxies, could have reversed the tide militarily. Nevertheless, Russia’s (and Iran’s) failure to save Assad’s rule cannot help but impact views in countries whose leaderships are engaged in analyzing the costs and benefits of allying with Russia.

Additionally, while Syria has been far down on the list of Russia’s leading trade partners, the Assad regime did not only spend hundreds of millions of dollars on Russian arms, but also purchased Russian goods that were not competitive on global markets, such as Russian-made passenger cars. It is difficult (but not impossible) to see the victorious opposition spending as much on imports from Russia, which exported almost $600 million worth of goods to Syria in 2021. It is also unclear whether the next government (or governments) in Syria will honor all of Russia’s investments into Syria, which total more than $20 billion.

There are also other ways that the ouster of Syria’s Alawite dynasty, which has been allied with Shia Iran, may bode ill for Moscow. For instance, some of the disparate victorious opposition forces include Sunni jihadist groups that have been in the past allied with al-Qaeda (e.g. HTS) and ISIS.¹ Should these factions play decisive roles in Syria’s future foreign policies, one cannot rule out that they will offer tacit support for (and/or turn a blind eye on) Sunni jihadist groups waging campaigns of political violence against Russia, including acts of terrorism against civilians. In fact, the risk of such support emerging was among the reasons why Putin chose to intervene in the Syrian conflict on Assad’s side in 2015.² Paradoxically, perhaps, to some, but preventing jihadist groups from becoming the sole uncontested power in Assad’s Syria is an interest that Putin’s Russia shares with the U.S., although it is something that pro-Kremlin commentators tend to ignore.

For commentary on the reasons for and consequences of Assad’s fall as perceived by Russian officials, experts and media as part of RM’s Clues from Russian Views feature, please see the compilation below. Entries are arranged in alphabetical order.

• Boris Dolgov, leading research fellow at the Moscow-based Center for Arab and Islamic Studies: "What is happening is, in fact, a planned and prepared military operation against the Syrian leadership for regime change. This is absolutely obvious. And the forces behind these events were prepared by external actors: the United States, Turkey and Israel." The opposition's rise to power "could mean a significant change in the Middle East, a change in the balance of power, since if these forces come to power, then Syria, at the very least, will fall apart. Syria will be dismembered, and it can be assumed that there will be some kind of enclave, and those areas where Russian military bases are located - this is also a separate question, how events will develop around them - and other areas.” (TASS, 12.08.24)
• Alexander Baunov, senior fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russia and Eurasia, wrote: “The rapid collapse of the ... regime in Syria is a clear illustration of Vladimir Putin’s extreme, or rather extreme, concentration on Ukraine, which goes beyond the rational political norm. For its sake, he is ready to sacrifice literally everything, including his own previous successes... The greatest military-political achievement of recent years has been lost. Russia has lost its only success story of a forceful entry into the far abroad.” (Meduza, 12.09.24)
• Anastasia Dombitskaya and Sergey Strokan, Kommersant journalists, wrote: “Russia has lost a key ally in the Middle East... Under the blows of anti-government forces, power in Syria has collapsed like a house of cards, ending more than half a century of rule by the Assad family. President Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus after the collapse of the government and the army’s refusal to resist the militants’ advance. In the evening, it became known that he had arrived in Moscow. While victors across the country are taking power into their own hands, world powers are entering a new struggle for control of a strategic region. In the midst of the Ukrainian conflict, Assad’s overthrow threatens to open a new front against Russia, whose efforts had previously managed to maintain the ruling regime and the country’s territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the continued Russian military presence remains both a cause for concern for Moscow and a tool for future bargaining with the armed opposition.” (Kommersant, 12.08.24)
• The Foreign Ministry of Russia said in a statement: “Following his talks with a number of participants in the armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Bashar al-Assad decided to step down as the Syrian President and leave the country, instructing the government to transfer power peacefully. Russia was not a party in those negotiations. However, we call on all the parties involved to renounce the use of violence and resolve all governance issues through political efforts. In this regard, the Russian Federation maintains contact with all Syrian opposition groups. We urge all the parties to respect the opinions of all ethnic and religious groups in Syrian society. ... Additionally, Russia is taking all necessary measures to ensure the safety of our citizens in Syria. Russian military bases in Syria are on high alert. There is no serious threat to their security at the moment.” (Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.08.24)
• Natalia Komarova, Russian senator, said, "Syria is a state that is the custodian of world memory, artistic and moral values. In peace and friendship, there are people who identify themselves with different faiths, including religious ones." Komarova noted that, according to her observations, each of the faiths knows its responsibility for preserving age-old values ​​for the entire planet. "I think that this responsibility, first of all, is the main thing for peace and harmony to come to this country," she added. (TASS, 12.08.24)
• Andrei Kortunov, director general of Russian International Affairs Council: “The unexpected collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria evokes associations with the events of 2021 in Afghanistan. In both cases, the national armed forces actually expressed a vote of no confidence in the country's leadership, after which the government crumbled like a house of cards. While in Afghanistan the Taliban movement managed to consolidate power in Kabul, avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, prevent the predicted multi-million flow of refugees and even take the first steps toward international recognition, the likelihood of such success in Syria looks low.” (Kommersant, 12.09.24)
• Yuri Kotyonok, Russian pro-Kremlin war blogger wrote: “The catastrophe is happening before our eyes, you could say, live. Ancient Damascus has fallen, surrendered without a fight, without resisting the wave of gangs ... Assad has no strength left. Trips to allies have led to nothing: Moscow is shackled by the SVO... Hope was in Iran, the IRGC, Hezbollah - Assad's closest allies. The key ally has surrendered Syria. This is a fact ... The SAR state is rotten, it was presented to the Salafist groups on a silver platter. ... Corruption, greed, incompetence, venality of officials at the local level, in the upper echelons - nails in the coffin of the SAR statehood. There is no one to save Syria.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• Alexander Kotz, Russian pro-Kremlin war blogger, wrote: “In the new Syrian scenario, there is hardly any room for Russian bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. The situation is already being compared to the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. ... Today, our enemies, including internal ones, are for some reason happy – what an image blow this is to Russia.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister said: “Our country has been a very big backer, not only of Syria, but also of Iraq, of Libya, of Lebanon. ... [W]e are very much sorry for the Syrian people who became a subject of another geopolitical experiment. ... And we are sorry not for the image which people see in the face of the Russian Federation, or me personally, but we are very concerned with the fate of the Syrian people. We don't want them to follow the fate of Iraqis, of Libyans and of other nations who were disturbed by the people desiring to keep their domination... the Americans have been leaving Afghanistan even more hastily, I think.” (Russian Foreign Ministry, 12.07.24)
• Grigory Lukyanov, a research fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said: "It is quite likely that certain conflicts should be expected, since no united front of opposition forces has ever existed, and does not exist," the expert said. "As long as the Syrian government existed as a ‘common enemy’ for them, they could act together. This is not the case under current conditions, which could further intensify the confrontation between those actors in the Syrian conflict who have real resources, real people and real ideological concepts for the future of their region and their country as a whole. Therefore, we should not rule out the possibility that the country could slide into the chaos of a new civil war... The new Syria will no longer be called the Syrian Arab Republic. The ideology of Arab nationalism will become a thing of the past. But the question is whether the new authorities will be ready to recognize Kurdish autonomy," he said. (Interfax, 12.08.24, TASS, 12.08.24)
• Ruslan Khakiev, contributor to pro-war Russian Telegram channel War Gonzo wrote:  “Syria will become a recruiting camp for pro-Turkish ‘jihadists’ ... the rapid successes of the militants in the now former Syrian Arab Republic could not but inspire the sleeping terrorist cells waiting for their time on the territory of our country. Moreover, in the near future, an intensification of recruitment of militants from among the residents of the republics of the North Caucasus, and in particular - from among the natives of the states of Central Asia is expected. … And, by the way, about Turkey. It is no secret that everything that is happening in Syria now is paid for and prepared by the Turks." (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• Konstantin Kosachev, Russian senator, said the main priority for Moscow is “to ensure the safety” of Russian citizens in Syria. “If the Syrian people continue to require our support, it will be provided. However, it is unlikely to extend to the conditions of a full-scale civil war. Syrians will have to handle that on their own," Kosachev said. "For us, as Russians, the primary task is to ensure the safety of our compatriots and civilians, including diplomats and their families, as well as, of course, the military personnel who are there for the sake of Syria,” Kosachev said, also referring to personnel at Russian military bases in Syria. (MT, 12.08.24)
• Anton Mardasov, a Moscow-based analyst focusing on the Middle East, said: ''Our involvement over there [in Ukraine] had a cost. The cost was Syria.'' (NYT, 12.08.24)
• Kirill Mikhailov, Russian researcher, emphasizes that the regime's opponents owe their success to a combination of several factors. First, he says, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has learned no lessons from the active phase of the civil war. ... Second, due to the war with Ukraine, Russia has no real resources to participate in military operations in the Middle East. ... For Russia, Syria has become a "sedimentation tank" where generals who failed operations in Ukraine that were important to Putin, such as the capture of Kyiv in three days, are exiled, the researcher says. Third, the Wagner PMC, which defended Assad's regime in previous active phases of the conflict, forcing the attackers to roll back to their original positions, has now practically lost its influence in the region. (Media Zone, 12.03.24)
• Sergei Naryshkin, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service: “The fact is that Syria itself is a country, as if woven from many ‘patches.’ And the fate of the Syrian people and Syria as a state will largely depend on whether the various forces represented in the opposition will be able to find agreement.” (TASS, 12.09.24)
• Vladimir Pastukhov, Russian political scientist in exile: “Of course, if we compare, Syria for Putin is not Afghanistan, but Vietnam, for a very simple reason - no one planned for this and no one was ready for this. It seems that even Turkey, which stuck a dozen knives in the back of the ‘Russian spring’ was not ready... If in Syria everything ends up as it most likely is now - that is, in a complete fiasco - then this will also be a serious reason for Putin to think about Trump's proposals” on peace with Ukraine. (Telegram, 12.09.24)
• Mikhail Piotrovsky, general director of the State Hermitage Museum, said, "Now there is a danger for the monuments of Syria again - not only pagan, but also Christian." (TASS, 12.07.24)
• Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman, said that Russia's position was outlined by the Foreign Ministry. When commenting on the situation in Syria as a whole, Peskov said that what happened there "surprised the entire world" and the Kremlin "is no exception in this case." According to Putin's press secretary, Syria is facing "a very difficult period associated with instability," but the Kremlin will maintain dialogue with all regional countries "on Syrian affairs." (Meduza, 12.09.24, MT, 12.08.24)
• Editors of pro-war Russian Telegram channel “Rybar” wrote: “Russia's military presence in the Middle East region is hanging by a thread.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• Vladimir Solovyov, Russian TV propagandist: “If the people don’t want to fight for their country, no outside forces can help them. If a nation wants freedom, if its people want to fight for themselves, they can be supported. But to take responsibility for a people that doesn’t want that responsibility for itself, that would be a very strange thing to do.” (The Bullwark, 12.09.24)
• Tatiana Stanovaya of R. Politik wrote: “I don't really understand why so much is being said about Putin's defeat. Russia can really be blamed for overlooking the rise of the opposition and the subsequent developments, that the Syrian army would flee and Assad's entourage would enter into negotiations with the rebels and essentially surrender the president (and what choice was there?). You can criticize the fact that Wagner was dismantled. But, firstly, the current events were a surprise not only for Moscow, but also for Iran, Israel and even Turkey, which is heavily involved in all of this, but does not control it. Secondly, what were the options? Bomb 30-40 thousand armed opposition? ... Russia had no particular choice but to watch everything fall apart. ... Now the main question is how Moscow will integrate into the new reality and how much flexibility will be enough in interacting with the new masters of Syria, who are clearly interested in avoiding conflict for now.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• Elena Suponina, a Russian international political scientist, believes Assad's fall was the result of a combination of factors. "One of them is Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election. He does not hide the fact that he wants to reformat the Middle East and seriously weaken Iran's position. A number of regional players (primarily Turkey) decided to show that they have influence on the Syrian opposition and that they must be taken into account. But I can assume that even the Turks did not expect Damascus to fall so quickly," she said. "Part of the opposition, despite everything that has happened, has a fairly warm attitude toward the Russian Federation. I believe that the future of the Russian bases will indeed be decided through negotiations," Suponina believes. (NG, 12.08.24)
• Dmitry Suslov, deputy director at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, said: "Syria will be divided between regional players in the near future. Part of the country will be occupied by Turkey and pro-Turkish formations. Part will fall under HTS control. Part will be taken by Israel. The Kurds will continue building their state.” "Our military presence in Syria is necessary for projecting power into Africa. Syria provided staging bases and logistical services, playing a colossal role in the return to Africa that we've observed in recent years," Suslov noted. (BNE Intellinews, 12.09.24) 
• Leonid Slutsky, head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, the leader of the LDPR, said: "We continue to support the territorial integrity of Syria, an inclusive intra-state dialogue and democratic procedures for the transfer of power by peaceful means. ... Tonight, in fact, the government was overthrown using extremist forces. And this is certainly a new shock for the entire region, given the numerous factors of instability in the Middle East.” According to the head of the Duma committee, the bloodiest scenario has been avoided so far. "Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali promised to hand over power to the opposition without a fight. But no one can guarantee that the confrontation is over," he explained. (TASS, 12.08.24)
• Nikolay Sukhov, leading research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the IMEMO RAS: “Obviously, Russia’s interests since we arrived there have been that we need a stable Syria, we need to confirm our status as a world power at the geopolitical level and enter a region that is currently developing very dynamically. We entered it through Syria ... Recent years have shown that the importance of Syria for Russia’s work in Africa has proven invaluable. ... Our active work with African countries today directly depends logistically on Syria. ... There is also a military aspect: this is NATO’s ‘southern underbelly.’ NATO is constantly looking back at our bases, at the presence of our fleet, which today launches missiles at militants from the eastern Mediterranean. This is a very serious deterrent and geopolitical factor.” (Russia in Global Affairs, 12.08.24)
• Ilya Tumanov, author of the Russian Fighterbomber Telegram channel and air force captain: “It's no secret that I fought in Syria before the signing of that very ceasefire agreement... After 2016, service in Syria turned into a model sanatorium of a strict regime and there was nothing to do there except make money.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)
• A contributor to VCHK-OGPU Telegram channel: “‘The verdict’ on Bashar al-Assad’s regime was de facto issued on Nov. 29 in Moscow following his unsuccessful visit to the Kremlin. ... The news about the presence of the Assad family in Moscow at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in the north of the country actually became proof of the fragility of the regime, which played a significant role in the moral and psychological superiority of the militants over the forces of the Assad government. The admission of such a mistake raises the question of the competence of Russian advisers to the Bashar al-Assad regime.” (Telegram, 12.08.24)

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author or the individuals quoted. Photo is by AP Photo/Hussein Malla.