3 Ideas to Explore

1. Ukrainian top brass remained mum this week on aims of their cross-border offensive in western Russia even as their commander-in-chief publicly claimed that his forces are now in control of 1,000 sq km (386 sq m) of Russian territory. The top brass’ silence on the issue didn’t stop analysts from offering their takes on the potential aims of the largest cross-border incursion into Russia by a foreign army since World War II. For instance, retired general Mick Ryan of CSIS, wrote that Kyiv may be seeking to draw the Russian forces away from their offensive inside eastern Ukraine as well as to make territorial gains that could be then used as leverage in negotiations with Moscow. A former Russian commander – who had fought in Ukraine -- echoed some of Ryan’s assessments, pointing out in an interview that “this offensive is being carried out in order to make [the Russian command] pull troops from the Donbas.” In his turn Russia’s commander-in-chief Vladimir Putin believes AFU’s incursion aims at “improv[ing] its negotiating positions in the future” and at “stop[ping] the advance of our troops for the complete liberation of the territories” in eastern Ukraine. If AFU’s offensive in western Russia did mean to stop the Russian armed forces from advancing in eastern Ukraine, then that [outcome has] yet to occur, according to both some of Ukrainian commanders on the ground in Donbas and Western analysts.
2. Foreign Affairs has published a renewed call by advocates of restraint in U.S. policy towards European security. “The idea would not be to isolate the United States from Europe but to shift the U.S. role from provider of first resort to balancer of last resort,” according to the article co-authored by Justin Logan of CATO and Joshua Shifrinson of the University of Maryland. The duo calls for a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe accompanied by revaluation of America’s opposition to Germany’s acquiring nuclear weapons and by abandoning of Washington’s demands that Europeans purchase materiel from U.S.. The co-authors also argue that the next SACEUR should all be a European in what would help to facilitate transformation of NATO “into a European-run and -led alliance.”
3. Russia’s economy is soaring, with GDP expected to rise by over 3% in real terms this year, unemployment close to an all-time low, and common public “feeling good about the economy,” according to the Economist.This weekly sees two factors behind the boom: Putin has abandoned austerity while allowing the ruble to strengthen. But just how long can this party last? The Economist predicts that Russia’s financial reserves will be exhausted in five years, constraining Putin’s ability to continue running budget deficits,^[1] while “at some point... people may get angry about the rising cost of living.”

I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda

Nuclear security and safety:

Russian Ambassador to U.S. Anatoly Antonov’s Remarks to Media As Reported by TASS on 08.05.24^[2]

• I believe that terrorism, international terrorism is the main threat to the United States and Russia… Particularly dangerous is the possibility of weapons of mass destruction or their components falling into the hands of terrorists. You don't have to be an expert to [understand this]. For example, take biological weapons. If a small vial of some kind falls into the hands of terrorists, Washington, New York, Chicago, Seattle, everybody will be in big trouble. The same applies to Moscow, Paris, and London.
• What we are saying is that at least the permanent members of the Security Council and other states should cooperate. Because they have a special responsibility for international peace and security. That's what the UN Charter [says].
• There is an academic opinion that great powers can interact and conduct a dialogue only in two cases. First, when one of the nuclear powers or one of the great powers gives in. This is what the Americans are after. They very much like the situation of the 90s, when we had no responsible independent foreign policy... The other situation where interaction is possible is a confrontation with a common enemy.
• Is it possible to assume today that Congress will ratify U.S.-Russian agreements that would take into account Russian priorities? I'll answer you: no.
• [On what may replace New START:] The Americans understand this, so today they are thinking about politically binding agreements for after 2026, or after the expiration of the New START, which would be in effect only for the duration of the president’s term in office.
• We are not ruling out political agreements [on nuclear arms control with U.S.]. We are not. But given the lack of trust between our two countries, of course, legally binding agreements are in our interests.
• [On exchanges of prisoners with the U.S.] We have not closed the book on the matter. Work on releasing Russians from American jails continues. I can say unequivocally that, given the instructions, aspirations and intentions of our president, it is simply not possible to state the opposite.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:

• No significant developments.

Iran and its nuclear program:

• No significant developments.

Humanitarian impact of the Ukraine conflict:

“Fighting for the Light: Protecting Ukraine's Energy System,” Jack Watling and Darya Dolzikova, RUSI, 08.12.24. 

• It is unlikely that Ukraine’s partners will be able to supply sufficient additional air defense capabilities to fully protect the power grid. Other lines of effort must therefore be pursued concurrently.
  • First, Ukraine must accelerate its program of building passive protection around transformer substations.
  • Second, the provision of gas piston engines or gas turbines to Ukrainian municipalities will provide maneuverable local energy production capacity.
  • The third line of effort must be the stockpiling of transformers that are compatible with the Ukrainian energy network.
• The bottom line is that Ukraine faces a harsh winter, but there are the means and there is the time to avoid a worst-case scenario. As large towns in Donbas—like Pokrovsk—come into range of Russian artillery, more Ukrainians are likely to become internally displaced. Ensuring that alternative refuge with the basic utilities remains available is a humanitarian imperative. While not all of Ukraine's partners may have additional air defenses to offer, money, expertise and critical components can all contribute to fighting for the light.

Military and security aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts:

“The Battle of Kursk 2024,” Mick Ryan, Mick Ryan's Substack/Russia Matters, 08.08.24.^[3]

• Despite our ability to only see a small part of what is occurring in Kursk, there are several aspects of this new Ukrainian operation which are apparent.
  • First, this is a multi-brigade operation.
  • Second, the Ukrainians have attacked with a highly mobile, mechanized force.
  • Third, the Ukrainians appear to have deployed a significant amount of air defense capability.
  • Fourth, the Ukrainians have penetrated a good distance into Russia.
  • Fifth, Ukraine has achieved surprise.
• At the most basic tactical level, this operation will be about seizing ground and destroying Russian ground and aerial forces.
• There are a couple of possible operational objectives for this Ukrainian attack.
  • First, Ukraine may be seeking to draw Russian forces away from its attacks on the Niu-York and its advances on Toretsk and Pokrovsk. This might be possible, but given Russia’s advantage in manpower, one would have to assess that this outcome is probably unlikely.
  • Another operational objective, which is more likely to be realized, is to force the Russians to reconsider their force dispositions elsewhere on the front line.
• The strategic objectives of this attack can only be estimated at this early stage.
  • First, the attack might be an attempt to slow or kill Russian momentum in its offensives which have lasted for the duration of 2024.
  • A second strategic objective might be to shift the narrative on the war to one more positive for Ukraine and counter Russian misinformation about [Russia’s] ‘inevitable victory’ in Ukraine.
  • A third strategic objective may be to boost morale in the Ukrainian population.
  • A fourth strategic objective for Ukraine might be to do what the Russians are doing in eastern Ukraine at the moment—grab as much territory as possible in case Ukraine is forced into some kind of negotiated settlement at the end of 2024 or in early 2025.
• While success or failure in this Ukrainian cross-border attack may not win or lose the war, it will have an important bearing on Ukrainian morale and western support. But ultimately, the success or otherwise of the coming offensives will be determined on the ground. Good leadership at all levels, flexible execution, determined close combat, good logistics, surprise and adapting to opportunity will all be crucial to tactical and operational success. And this must be applied with sound strategic reasons.

“Ukraine's Russia Incursion Faces Dilemma After Quick Gains,” James Marson and Daniel Michaels, WSJ, 08.12.24. 

• "The next phase of the Kursk incursion depends on what reserves each side has available and how it deploys them, said Franz-Stefan Gady, a Vienna-based military analyst. Ukraine will need to deploy additional manpower and military resources to maintain momentum, while Russia will want to counterattack swiftly and bring to bear its superior firepower, including massive glide bombs, if a static front line develops."
• "The main issue with the operation, Gady said, was that it doesn't change the fundamentals on the front lines in the east of Ukraine, where Russian troops are advancing, albeit slowly, against outgunned and outnumbered Ukrainian forces." The operation in Kursk demands considerable resources, especially in infantry personnel, which might be more urgently needed elsewhere," he said."
• "In eastern Ukraine, officers from brigades that were desperate for more men questioned the wisdom of committing forces to an attack in Russia, despite hopes it could draw Russian forces away from that battlefront." We don't feel any changes, at least so far," said the Ukrainian officer near Chasiv Yar. "The Russians are not going to move any troops from the east to Kursk. They have reserves.""

“How Ukraine pulled off its biggest gamble: invading Russia,” Christopher Miller, FT, 08.12.24.

• "Volodymyr and the other soldiers of [Ukraine’s] 82nd air assault brigade... faced no resistance as their eight-wheeled, 20 ton U.S. Stryker fighting vehicle stormed across the border [into Russia’s Kursk region] in broad daylight [on Aug. 6]. They soon encountered a Russian unit “sitting in the forest, drinking coffee at a table”, Volodymyr recalled. “Then our Stryker drives right into their table. ...Not wanting to end up like their comrades, he added, “dozens” of stunned Russian soldiers simply laid down their weapons and surrendered."
• "Over the next six days, the fear felt by many of the thousands of Ukrainian troops taking part in this audacious operation yielded to exhilaration. They advanced quickly — by 5km-10km a day — seizing several villages, part of a railway line and a key gas transit point. They began hastily digging positions and preparing for Russian reinforcements to arrive. But to their surprise, Russian troops did not appear."
• "The Ukrainian troops said their operation was progressing as they had hoped. In less than a week, they had entered more than 30km inside Russia and seized about 350 sq km of territory."

"There are no obstacles - just take it and go forward. A former commander of a Russian reconnaissance unit, who fought in Ukraine, explains why the Ukrainian Armed Forces so easily broke into the Kursk region,” Irina Dolina, Important Stories, 08.12.24. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated. 

• "Why did all these [pro-Ukrainian volunteer units manned by Russian nationals] earlier venture [into Russia’s border regions, including the Kursk region]? They did so to carry out additional reconnaissance [of the area].
• For those [Russian units] deployed along the LOC, this breakthrough has come as no surprise at all. They knew for a long time that sooner or later something like this would start, the question was when it would start.
• This came as a major failure of the intelligence of the Ministry of Defense, and the "tick-tock army" on the border (the interviewee was referring to Chechen battalion "Akhmat," which was sent to protect the border with Ukraine in the Bryansk region).
• Ukrainian armed forces planned everything competently, everything is textbook: you conduct additional reconnaissance, you then lay out a route and, most importantly, you do it all quickly. Here they dashed in groups [across the border] and simply began to dash forward without establishing fixed positions at certain localities. They just dashed further and further in. Had they established fixed positions, it would have given us more time and opportunities to pull troops into the area to stop them.
• [Russian soldiers] surrender in packs, because, firstly, conscripts do not know how to fight, and secondly, they do not have weapons to repel such attacks… What would you do with a machine gun against a tank?
• Perhaps, this offensive is being carried out in order to make [the Russian command] pull troops from the Donbass, where our troops have recently increased their pace [of advance]. Or maybe they want to capture the Kursk NPP and then ask for Zaporizhia [NPP] in exchange?  

“Vladimir Putin held an operational meeting in Novo-Ogaryevo,” Kremlin.ru, 08.12.24. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• The topic of our meeting is the situation in the border territories of Russia: Bryansk region, Belgorod region, Kursk region… The main task is, of course, for the Ministry of Defense to squeeze out, knock out the enemy from our territories… and ensure reliable protection of the state border.
  • Apparently, the enemy with the help of his Western masters, fulfills their will, and the West is at war with us with the hands of Ukrainians, so, apparently, the enemy strives to improve its negotiating positions in the future. But what kind of negotiations can we talk about with people who indiscriminately attack civilians, civilian infrastructure, or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities? What can you talk about with them at all?
  • [Their] main military goal… is to stop the advance of our troops for the complete liberation of the territories of the Luhansk, Donetsk People's Republic, and the territory of Novorossiya. And what? What is happening on the line of combat contact, what are the results? The pace of offensive operations of the Russian armed forces not only did not decrease, but on the contrary, increased—increased by one and a half times. Along the entire line of combat contact, our armed forces are moving forward.
  • And finally, one more of the obvious goals of the enemy is to sow discord, discord in our society; to intimidate people, destroy the unity and cohesion of Russian society; that is, strike a blow at the domestic political situation. Putin’s tasking of the Ministry of Defense with pushing Ukrainian forces out entails that his earlier decision to declare a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in the three regions doesn’t necessarily entail the Federal Security Service’s lead in driving the AFU out even though FSB is Russia’s lead counter-terrorism agency.

"Will the Battle of Kursk become a turning point? Following the latest events on the Russian-Ukrainian front, the Chinese are also asking this question,” Dmitry Goncharov, Republic.ru, 08.11.24.. Clues From Chinse Views. Machine-translated

• Two or three days after the beginning of the Ukrainian special operation in the Kursk region, Chinese publications began to publish detailed assessments of what was happening, clearly under the supervision of political curators of the blogosphere. Below I will present an overview of evaluation publications of both conditionally pro-Russian publicists and bloggers, as well as those who strive to adhere to balanced positions as much as possible.
  • "Three days have passed since Ukraine attacked Russia and took hundreds of people captive. The Russian army made a fatal mistake,” Chinese blogger “History of the Flower Fairy” (花仙原师说) wrote on Aug. 10… "The tactics of the Ukrainians turned out to be very well-thought-out: they split into several detachments, interacted with each other and advanced to the end." In the case of 20 Russian settlements [in the Kursk region], they took advantage of the weak defense of the Russian army and struck quickly, capturing them all at once. "But Russia is not blind either, and although at first Russia may have been taken by surprise, it quickly counterattacked and achieved some successes."
• As for the purpose of the Ukrainian military operation, the Chinese public online forums agree that the Ukrainian side is probably trying to win more trump cards for future negotiations with Russia and distract the attention of Russian troops from other areas on the front line. At the same time, some Chinese observers wonder why Ukraine invests its already scarce resources in risky attacks on new territories, when it already has to wage fierce defensive battles on its territory.
  • The blogger "Youth Backpack" (青年的背包) writes: "Ukraine has gone too far. Kyiv did not expect that, when in the midst of the fierce battle near Kursk, Ukraine's backyard would actually catch fire, and it would be surrounded on two sides. Now the situation for Ukraine is complicated, moreover, it can be said that it has changed dramatically for the worse."
• In conclusion, I will quote several fragments from posts of the blogger "Aba Is Telling" (阿霸聊事): "The sudden change in the situation led to confusion of the Russian public even more. Previously, Putin's government explained the "special military operation" as the protection of Russia's national interests, but after Ukraine's invasion of Russian territory, this argument became impossible to justify… "The breakthrough of the Ukrainian army across the Russian border is also very important militarily too. It broke the stalemate on the battlefield and brought a strategic initiative to the Ukrainian army."

“Can Ukraine Get Back on the Offensive? How Kyiv Can Capitalize on Russia’s Waning Momentum,” Mick Ryan, 08.08.24. 

• Moscow’s forces are not done with their offensive. They keep attacking across multiple fronts on the ground and bombing Ukrainian infrastructure from the air… Moscow will eventually have no choice but to pause its offensive and regroup… Russia has been attacking for more than half a year, and it can probably sustain its current tempo for only a month or two more.
• That means Ukraine must begin planning for how best to capitalize on Russia’s impending wane.
• Ukraine cannot control global geopolitics, and it has little sway over the domestic politics of its partners. But much of what will shape 2025 is well within Kyiv’s power to influence.
  • Consider, for instance, training… Kyiv can take the lead on giving basic recruits better training.
  • Ukraine also has agency over its operational and strategic targeting campaigns… Kyiv’s strike complex is currently being employed against three key targets: the Russian oil industry; standard military assets, such as airfields, headquarters, troop reserves, air defenses, and logistics hubs; and Crimea and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Over the next few months, Ukraine will have to make difficult tradeoffs about how to prioritize these targets and how many weapons it should keep in reserve. But these choices are entirely within Ukraine’s remit. So are decisions about the timing and location of future offensive operations.
  • Kyiv has no shortage of potential targets. It could choose to start in the Donbas, in order to frustrate Putin’s aim of taking Ukraine’s entire east. It could select Kharkiv, to ensure that Ukraine’s second-largest city remains outside the range of Russian artillery. Other possibilities include parts of southern Ukraine, because of its economic importance, or even Crimea.
  • Kyiv’s military operations must… achieve political outcomes and ensure that Ukraine is optimally placed if it is forced into early negotiations.
• Ultimately, the country’s success will hinge on whether Kyiv can develop a theory of victory that draws from its own resources and from those of its supporters.
  • This theory… will seek a political outcome—including the liberation of all Ukrainian territory, Crimea and the Donbas among it—but it must consider the range of strategic and operational realities presented by the current state of the war.
  • The theory will require battlefield victories on the ground, in the air, and at sea that at least double the number of casualties that Ukraine is currently imposing on Russia… Ukraine… will need to develop new, more effective offensive military doctrines and incorporate larger masses of unmanned systems in the air and on the ground. Defensive operations are now the dominant form of war for Ukraine, but Kyiv will need new offensive maneuvers to approach and break through Moscow’s lines.
  • It must do so with NATO’s help… To succeed, Ukraine should remind its partners that there is no way to end the war as long as Putin still believes he can win. 

“PhDs, Fake Documents, Avoiding Public Transit: How Ukraine's Draft Dodgers Stay Away From the Front; Young men are going into hiding or are trying to find ways out of the country,” Ian Lovett, WSJ, 08.10.24. 

• “Ukraine is in the midst of a massive mobilization drive, with the goal of adding hundreds of thousands of new troops to the country's forces. New laws have lowered the age of conscription from 27 to 25, and imposed harsh new penalties on men who fail to update their draft registration. But unlike in the early days of the war—when so many Ukrainians volunteered after Russia's invasion that the army had to turn some away—many men of fighting age are trying to avoid the military by any possible means.”
• “Applications for postgraduate education programs, which traditionally came with an exemption from the draft, reached record highs this year. Smugglers charge up to $15,000 to get men out of the country illegally. Some men have effectively gone into hiding. Their efforts to avoid fighting highlight an uncomfortable reality for Ukraine in the third year of full-scale war: Most men who wanted to join the armed forces have already done so, and enlisting more men is likely to become increasingly difficult the longer the war goes on. Already, troops at the front in eastern Ukraine complain that their battalions are short of men and in desperate need of reserves.”
• “Draft dodgers list a host of reasons for trying to stay out of the military. Many have heard stories of men who were sent to the front with minimal training, and they fear being used as cannon fodder.”
• “A spokesman for the Defense Ministry, said the mobilization drive is going well: 4.6 million men have updated their data since the new law was passed, and more than 3,000 people have voluntarily applied to join the armed forces over the last three months, a sharp increase. He declined to comment on how many men had been added to the armed forces overall.”

For more analysis that is relevant for this section see

• “Ukraine’s shock raid deep inside Russia rages on. The surprise attack comes as Ukraine is under pressure in the Donbas,” The Economist, 08.11.24.
• “Ukraine’s audacious counter-incursion into Russia,” FT editorial board, FT, 08.12.24.
• “Russia, Facing Ukrainian Incursion, Maintains Pressure in Eastern Ukraine,”  Kim Barker and Evelina Riabenko, NYT, 08.12.24.
• “The New Kursk Offensive: Ukraine’s High-Stakes Gamble,” Mark Temnycky, NI, 08.10.24. 

For one up-to-date description of division of labor and authority in Russia’s multi-agency response to the incursion see this thread in X by Dara Massicot of CEIP.

Military aid to Ukraine

• No significant analysis.

Punitive measures related to Russia’s war against Ukraine and their impact globally:

“U.S. Surge in Financial Sanctions Called Inhumane by Lawyer Groups,” Courtney McBride, Bloomberg, 08.12.24. 

• Hundreds of lawyers from around the world called on the U.S. to end the use of unilateral economic sanctions, saying the tool amounts to collective punishment of civilians and is illegal under international law.
• In a letter to President Joe Biden, the lawyers, legal organizations and scholars decried the U.S.’s increased reliance on sanctions to punish and coerce its adversaries and said the measures can lead to economic instability, hunger and reduced access to medicine and essential goods. “Collective punishment is a standard practice of U.S. foreign policy today in the form of broad, unilateral economic and financial sanctions,” the signatories said. While the use of sanctions is different from conventional warfare, “its collective impact on civilians can be just as indiscriminate, punitive, and deadly,” they said.
• The letter amounts to an attempt to push back against successive administrations’ increased reliance on financial sanctions instead of military force to punish countries such as Russia and Iran. Waves of sanctions have now choked off Russia, Iran, Syria, Venezuela and many other countries from the global economy, though many regimes have found workarounds to stay afloat.

“Without ‘Black Knights:’ Do Third Countries Remain a Problem for the Initiators of Sanctions Against Russia?” Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club/RIAC,  08.07.24. Clues from Russian Views.  

• After the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the subsequent “tsunami of sanctions” launched against Russia by the collective West, the issue of a coalition was again on the agenda. A big problem for the initiators of sanctions has been third countries that maintain distance from the confrontation with Russia.
• The position and role of third countries in the Western policy of sanctions against Russia has several features.
  • First of all, what is striking is the almost complete absence of “black knights,” at least in the form in which they existed during the Cold War. The countries of the world majority have distanced themselves from Western sanctions and have not implemented them.
  • On the other hand, the continued leadership of the United States in the global financial system still allows it to influence businesses from countries that have not joined the sanctions against Russia.
• Numerous tactics to circumvent sanctions in the form of supplies through third countries are still hardly the most serious problem for the West. Secondary sanctions, criminal cases against those involved in circumvention, and administrative investigations into unintentional violations increase the cost of risk, and with it the cost of goods entering Russia. It will not be possible to stop their supplies, but costs for Russian consumers may rise. A much more serious challenge is Moscow’s consistent policy of building transaction mechanisms independent of the Western financial infrastructure.  

Ukraine-related negotiations: 

"Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia Could Bring a Quicker End to the War," Andreas Umland, FP, 08.09.24. 

• In a way, the new Ukrainian strategy [The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Russia’s Kursk region] may provide an opening for doves in the Russian leadership—assuming they exist and have any influence over Putin—to argue that the annexations should be reversed in order to restore Russia’s territorial integrity. As long as Ukraine can hold on to its captured territories in Russia, there will a strong pressure on Putin to return them under Moscow’s control.
• None of this, however, changes the most fundamental problem with a negotiated outcome: the fact that Russia has ignored just about every agreement it has signed with Ukraine. But for Ukrainians and their Western supporters hoping for an end to the war, some intriguing possibilities may soon be on the table.

Great Power rivalry/new Cold War/NATO-Russia relations:

“A Post-American Europe. It’s Time for Washington to Europeanize NATO and Give Up Responsibility for the Continent’s Security,” Justin Logan and Joshua Shifrinson, FA, 08.09.24.^[4]

“Ukraine War Illustrates Need for Robust Defense Industry, Eucom Commander Says,” Matthew Olay, Defense.gov, 08.09.24. 

• Speaking remotely to conference attendees of ...the Emerging Technologies for Defense Conference & Exhibition... Army Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, commander of Eucom and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said that the large-scale conflict in Ukraine is unlike other conflicts that the U.S. has observed over the last 30 years, "And that has profound implications, I think, for the sort of technologies and the sort of defense industry that we need based on the size of the conflict," Cavoli said.
• Cavoli went on to explain that, in conflicts as geographically big as the current one in Ukraine, quantities of equipment matter more than they have in recent decades. "If you have a very exquisite piece of equipment, but you only have one or two of them—and you've got a huge expanse geographically to cover—that might not turn out to be the best equipment strategy for the situation that you're in," Cavoli explained, adding that the U.S. hasn't been in such a position for many years.
• "[In the past], we've mostly defined the areas of operations and the battle space. We've had the luxury of defining it, as opposed to having an adversary impose on us their definition — geographically and spatially—of the battle space," Cavoli said. "That matters; and it makes numbers matter."
• Cavoli said that the war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that conflicts can often wear on for months and years, which necessitates that industry production can facilitate the replenishment of materiel. "We need to have the systems that allow us to do that… with equipment; and that needs to be planned-in," he said.   
• Cavoli also discussed how the topics of cost and speed of production are intertwined, noting that some higher-end technologies simply can't be produced as rapidly as desired because of their complexity. "This isn't just as simple as telling Ford that they need to start building airplanes during [World War II] because an airplane and an automobile may have been somewhat similar during that period," Cavoli explained. For a video of General Cavoli’s complete remarks see “Keynote: A Warfighting Perspective from USEUCOM,” GEN Christopher Cavoli, C-SPAN, 08.08.24

“Putin’s New Agents of Chaos. How Russia’s Growing Squad of Saboteurs and Assassins Threatens the West,” Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, FA, 08.09.24. 

“America's Anti-Terror Exit From Niger,” Review and Outlook, WSJ, 08.09.24, x

• "The Pentagon said Monday it had completed pulling out troops and equipment from Air Base 201 in the central Nigerien city of Agadez. Before last summer's coup in Niger, the U.S. maintained about a thousand American troops in the country as a base against the growing jihadist presence in Africa. But in March the ruling junta canceled the status of forces agreement that protected U.S. soldiers from legal risks in Niger, and two months later the U.S. agreed to a full withdrawal by mid-September."
• "Russia's Ministry of Defense has praised "the growth of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation" with Niger. The Kremlin has been working to expand its influence across Africa and has close ties to neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali. Russian state-owned media reported that military equipment and instructors arrived in Niger in April, and in May incoming Russian personnel and departing American troops overlapped at a Niamey air base."
• "The U.S. can't stay where it isn't wanted, and perhaps the Biden Administration couldn't do much to stop the Niger government's anti-Western moves. But the withdrawal is one more sign of America's weakening global influence."

“Prisoner swaps do not presage any sort of rapprochement with Russia,” Hanna Notte, FP, 08.07.24, 

• There is no indication that the prisoner exchange portends a Russian readiness to negotiate in good faith with, or to abandon its designs on Ukraine.
• It would also be naive to think that last week’s exercise in transactionalism presages a return to routine business with Russia more generally.
• For Putin, the prisoner exchange was principally about restoring confidence among his agents and would-be assassins that they can count on him if things go south. Releasing dissidents and hostages last week, Russia did not return to business as usual with Europe and the U.S.. Instead, Putin sent a message to the Russians he relies on to rough up the west: “Game on.”

“Prisoner Exchanges, Putin-Style: From Cold War-Era Spy Swaps to the Kidnapping and Criminality of Today,” Mark Kramer, PONARS Eurasia, 08.07.24

• The East-West prisoner exchange that was carried out last week—with eight Russian citizens transferred from Western countries to Russia and sixteen individuals released from Russia to Germany and the United States—bore a few similarities to prisoner exchanges during the Cold War but also had some striking differences. During the Cold War, swaps of accused spies tended to be the norm, whereas the exchange last week included a much more complex assortment of people, especially those released to the West. The Russian side of the deal was shaped by the thuggish criminality and disregard of international norms that have been hallmarks of the Russian state under Vladimir Putin. Whether the benefits for Western countries will outweigh the drawbacks is at best uncertain.
• The long record of prisoner exchanges during the Cold War is illuminating in… the stark contrast between those released by Russia and those who were transferred back to Russia. The sixteen people released from Russia included no genuine intelligence personnel. Instead, they consisted mostly of Russians and Western citizens who had fallen victim to Putin’s brutal crackdown in connection with Russia’s war against Ukraine. In contrast, the eight Russians transferred from Western prisons to Russia were all spies, cybercriminals, thieves, and a ruthless assassin, Vadim Krasikov, whose inclusion in the deal, by all accounts, was pivotal to Putin’s acceptance of it.
• The exchange would not have happened if Russia, under Putin, had not evolved into an “abductor state” akin to the regimes in North Korea and Xi Jinping’s China, which have raised kidnapping to a fine art. Over the past several years, and especially since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian authorities have gone about seizing and imprisoning Western citizens who can be held as hostages to be traded for Russian criminals, spies, and assassins.
• The inclusion of a large number of Russian human rights and pro-democracy activists in the prisoner exchange reflects another key goal of the Putin administration. Over the past decade, and especially since February 2022, Putin has repeatedly indicated that he wants to force “scum and traitors” to leave Russia—by which he means those who want Russia to be a democratic country living in peace with its neighbors.
• More generally, the deal that was just struck… raises the problem of “moral hazard…” If Putin is able to seize hostages and then use [innocent foreigners, journalists, and Russian human rights activists] for his own benefit with impunity, he has every reason to continue such behavior in the future. The clear risk of “moral hazard” in this case does not mean that Western leaders should have refrained from consummating the deal… But… Western governments need to think much more carefully about how to hold Putin accountable for his crimes and prevent him from continuing his malign actions both at home and abroad.

For more analysis that is relevant for this section, see 

• “Forget NATO membership for Ukraine; instead trade it for Ukrainian sovereignty,” Raphael J Piliero, ASPI, 08.09.24.
• “Kamala Harris's Senate Intel Committee Russian Investigation Experience,” Amy Mackinnon, FP, 08.09.24. 

China-Russia: Allied or aligned?

• No significant developments.

Missiles and missile defense:

“The return of long-range U.S. missiles to Europe,” Timothy Wright and Douglas Barry, IISS, 08.07.24.

• Amid Putin’s war in Ukraine and following Russian violations of arms-control measures, Washington and Berlin recently agreed to send American long-range missiles to Germany. Other European NATO allies are now seeking to acquire their own.
• The scheduled deployment follows Russia’s development and deployment of a long-range ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), in violation of its arms-control commitments, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• While the types of missiles that the U.S. and Germany announced would begin episodic deployment from 2026 are in the same broad classes as those deployed in the 1980s, the former are slated to carry conventional, not nuclear, warheads.
• The U.S.–German announcement was inevitably interpreted by Putin as a provocation, rather than a defensive measure. At Russia’s Main Naval Parade on 28 July, he warned that if the U.S. deployed missiles to Germany then Moscow would annul its claimed unilateral moratorium on deploying previously proscribed missiles in response.
• Putin’s comparison of the present situation with NATO’s 1979 decision to deploy American missiles to Europe disregards the fact that, in both instances, U.S. missile deployments have followed a Russian precedent.
  • Moscow has repeatedly denied that the 9M729, which has conventional and nuclear armed variants, breached the INF Treaty. The Novator 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw), a 500 km-range version of the same missile family, has been used in Ukraine, and Moscow has likely also used the war to test the 9M729 in an operational test environment at considerably greater range. It is likely that Russia has in development—or has already developed—other ground-launched systems with ranges beyond 500 km, which was seemingly confirmed by Putin on 28 July.
• The agreement by Berlin and Washington over ballistic- and cruise-missile deployment, combined with the launch of the ELSA program, marks a shift in NATO’s previously cautious position on long-range ground-launched systems. But Moscow’s characterization of Berlin and Washington’s decision as a provocation is inaccurate. Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the deterioration of its relations with NATO, are the cause of the reassessment.  

“Missiles on the move: Why U.S. long-range missiles in Germany are just the tip of the iceberg,” François Diaz-Maurin, BAS, August 2024. 

• The proliferation of stand-off weapons and air and missile defense systems among European NATO members is driven by regional deterrence and conventional warfighting strategies. Likewise, forward-deployed missiles provide the United States with additional options in regional war scenarios.
• By contrast, however, Russia views these capabilities also as strategic threats that could potentially undermine its nuclear deterrence force. In a crisis, Russia could be tempted to pre-emptively target these systems or decide to escalate the conflict early on. For European NATO members, in turn, nearly all Russian missile systems are strategically relevant because their use—at least potentially—could pose an existential threat to them.
• These structural factors of escalation won’t be easily resolved unless radical geopolitical changes or complete disarmament efforts are engaged. Meanwhile, however, these factors must be effectively managed to control military escalation between nuclear powers, even if war were to break out.
• Addressing these challenges requires that public debates in Germany and other European countries go beyond a discussion over some individual weapon systems and deterrence rhetoric. Instead, European analysts should contribute to developing alternative military doctrines, warfighting strategies, and operational employment options all aimed at providing defense at lower risks of nuclear escalation in the region, similar to what U.S. analysts have proposed vis-a-vis China. An informed debate can help choose the right trade-offs to ease some of the challenges of the new missile age and prevent worst-case scenarios from materializing.

“Three Visions for NATO Air and Missile Defense,” Shaan Shaikh, War on the Rocks, 08.12.24. 

• For two years, Russia has launched constant air and missile attacks against Ukraine, featuring thousands of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, unguided rockets and bombs, and one-way attack drones. So, it’s no surprise that at the recent 75th anniversary of NATO, the allies paid close attention to their air and missile defense capabilities.
• Three visions for NATO air and missile defense.
  • One aspires for greater NATO involvement in allied air defense development and deployment plans. It requires the most political and financial support but offers significant military benefits.
  • Another aims for Europe to expand air defense procurement of common systems to quickly boost defenses, create economies of scale, and improve allied interoperability.
  • A third vision predicts that a federated approach to air defense will continue for years to come, but suggests that NATO can do more at the margins to encourage air and missile defense coordination.
• The debate over these visions may not be resolved for some time. Yet as NATO considers its options, its window for air and missile defense modernization is time limited... NATO and national political leaders should consider these visions and their respective tradeoffs and, to the extent possible, collectively push in favor of one path for allied air and missile defense.

Nuclear arms:

• No significant developments.

Counterterrorism:

• No significant developments.

Conflict in Syria:

“Explaining the Diplomatic Rush to Normalize Syria's Assad,” Burcu Ozcelik, RUSI, 08.06.24. 

• Despite external support from Russia and Iran, Damascus still controls only 70% of Syrian territory.
• Russia, a steadfast ally of Assad, has been pushing for normalization as part of its broader strategy to consolidate its influence in the Middle East.
• Syria’s vulnerability in the crossfires of the proxy war between Israel and Iran has pushed Assad to remain on the sidelines as much as possible, while trying to balance Russian interests.
• Like Russia, Turkey seeks to assert a role over the post-war Syrian political economy, and will look to balance its interests with and against U.S. and European positions depending on the trajectory of the conflict.
• International actors may have no choice but to engage with Assad to address the ongoing threat posed by extremist and terrorist groups such as Islamic State, as evidence suggests that the group is exploiting the current volatility to reconstitute. Moreover, calibrated cooperation with Assad could be viewed as a necessary evil to address the plight of the Syrian civilian population, who face dire prospects under crippling U.S. and European sanctions which have had little impact on the Assad system’s resilience.  

Cyber security/AI: 

“How to Make Military AI Governance More Robust,” Brianna Rosen, War on the Rocks, 08.06.24. 

• AI-enabled warfare has reached its “Oppenheimer moment.” From the backroom to the battlefield, AI is now being integrated into the full spectrum of military operations, including in logistics, intelligence collection, wargaming, decision-making, target identification, and weapons systems, with increasing levels of autonomy. The Ukrainian military is flying AI-enabled drones; the Israel Defense Forces are relying on AI to accelerate and expand targeting in Gaza; and the Pentagon is using AI to identify targets for airstrikes. The military AI revolution has arrived, and the debate over how it will be governed is heating up.
• As AI pervades the battlespace, it is time to implement policies and forge consensus around how it will be governed. And while policy debates finally have moved beyond lethal autonomous weapons systems, governance frameworks still suffer from a narrow focus on military operations and international humanitarian law, leaving critical gaps in protection for civilians. Building on the international agreement, policymakers have a rapidly closing window of opportunity to address these problems and ensure that military AI is truly safe — on and off the battlefield.
• The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia, among other states, repeatedly have stressed that international humanitarian law is sufficient to regulate lethal autonomous weapons systems. That view is largely correct.    
• As with other emerging technologies, the solution to AI governance problems may lie more at the level of policy than law. Policy guidance, political declarations, rules of engagement, and codes of conduct play a crucial role in areas where the law is difficult to interpret or apply. Non-legally binding policies also help build consensus on international norms surrounding the development and deployment of military AI.
• The Political Declaration represents an important step toward achieving that goal. But the principles contained in that agreement must be strengthened to fully realize its potential. As policymakers prepare for the Responsible AI in the Military Domain Summit 2024, concrete steps must be taken to address the myths and misconceptions surrounding military AI that impede effective governance. As a starting point, states should expand the scope and ambition of the Political Declaration. At present, the principles apply primarily to Western countries and the military organizations within them. Key powers — notably China, Russia, and Israel — have not endorsed it. That is problematic considering that Ukraine and Gaza are testing grounds for military AI right now.
• The future of military AI governance hinges on collaborative policy efforts rather than legal regulation.  

Energy exports from CIS:

“Russian LNG: Winning Battles but Losing the War,” Mikhail Krutikhin, Moscow Times/Russia.Post, 08.09.24. Clues from Russian Views.

• In the first five months of the year, Russia outpaced the U.S. in terms of growth of liquefied natural gas exports, with a 3.8% year-over-year increase versus a 0.2% decrease, respectively. The U.S. is still ahead in volume terms, however, having exported 35.41 million tons in that time frame versus Russia’s 14.47 million tons, but growth is growth.
• However, the backdrop of these “successes” for the Kremlin is sobering. “Since November 2023, the Russian LNG industry has taken several heavy blows from both the Americans and the Europeans, from which it is unlikely to recover in the coming years, if not decades.”
  • The two Arctic LNG 2 lines in the Gulf of Ob could supply more than 13 million tons of LNG for export each year, yet there is no way to transport the production, with such vessels seemingly impossible to secure.
• Overall, Russia’s widely publicized plans to ramp up LNG exports to 100 million tons per year by 2030 are destined to fail. In the face of sanctions, new projects now look unfeasible—the war unleashed by Putin against Ukraine has curbed international cooperation with them. Meanwhile, a surplus in the global LNG market, widely expected next year, suggests that the world will do just fine without Russian supplies.

Climate change:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian economic ties:

• No significant developments.

U.S.-Russian relations in general:

• No significant developments.

II. Russia’s domestic policies 

Domestic politics, economy and energy:

“Vladimir Putin spends big—and sends Russia’s economy soaring. How long can the party last?” The Economist, 08.11.24. 

• “This year Russian GDP is expected to rise by over 3% in real terms, faster than 95% of rich countries. In May and June economic activity “significantly increased,” according to the central bank. ...Unemployment is close to an all-time low; the ruble is doing fine. True, inflation is too high—in June prices rose by 8.6% year on year, well above the central bank’s target of 4%—but with cash incomes growing by 14% year on year, the purchasing power of Russians is rising fast. Consumer confidence, as measured by Russia’s statistical agency, is well above its average since 2000.”
• “To understand the accelerating economy, look to two aspects of macroeconomic policy.”
  • “The first is fiscal policy. Mr. Putin has abandoned austerity. This year Russia will run a budget deficit of 2% of GDP—hefty by its standards—which it is funding in large part by drawing on its enormous financial reserves.”
  • “The second reason for Russia’s party economy relates to its unusual monetary policy. To deal with high inflation the central bank has raised interest rates from 7.5% to 18%. This has the effect of strengthening the ruble by attracting foreign investment from “friendly” countries such as China and India, which in turn cuts the price of imports and thus inflation.”
• “How long can the party last? Mr. Putin’s attempts to blunt interest-rate rises will lead inflation to rise higher, and last longer, than it would have otherwise. At some point, people may get angry about the rising cost of living. He also cannot run budget deficits forever. At current rates, Russia’s financial reserves will be exhausted in five years or so; meanwhile, the government faces high borrowing costs. But for now, Mr. Putin has a war to win. And so the party goes on.”

“Why is investment in Russia at a 12-year high?” Denis Kasyanchuk and Alexander Kolyandr, The Bell, 08.10.24

• Capital investment (expenditure on new construction, higher-tech equipment for enterprises, purchase of new kit, etc.) in 2023 hit a 12-year high of 34 trillion rubles. That’s almost 10% more than the year before, according to experts.
• More than two-and-a-half years since the start of the fighting, some economists predicted that the Central Bank’s tight fiscal policy, coupled with a labor shortage, would slow investment increases. However, it shows no sign of slowing. In the first three months of this year, Russian companies invested 5.9 trillion rubles, up 14.5% year-on-year. Russia’s positive “investment gap”—i.e. the difference in growth rates between investment and GDP—has reached a 15-year high, according to the Moscow-based Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting (CMASF). All this means that the government is getting close to hitting one of its long-term targets—getting the proportion of investment in Russia’s GDP to 25%.
• The investment boom is yet more proof that international isolation—at least for the moment—is working to Russia’s advantage. And it’s another reason for the Kremlin to keep the war going: if Russia were to return to the global economy and open up its markets, then all its import substitution and home-grown innovation would suddenly become useless.

“The Putin Era: Seven Factors Driving Russia’s Economy Over the Last 25 Years,” Sergey Vakulenko, CEIP, 08.12.24. Clues from Russian Views. 

• Both Russia and its economy have changed a lot over the 25 years of Putin’s rule.
• Global economic and technological progress is oftentimes the main driver of a country’s development—and this has been true for Russia too, both in the last 250 years and in the last 25. But there are other factors, both internal and external, that may prove more significant for certain countries in certain periods. We will try to identify such factors for the Russian economy at the beginning of the 21st century in the hope that, when combined, they explain (econometrically and statistically) its development.
  • Factor 1: The natural transformation of the Russian economy and its maturation
  • Factor 2: Rising commodity prices
  • Factor 3: Globalization
  • Factor 4: Digitalization
  • Factor 5: Less competition and more concentration
  • Factor 6: The new nobility and its role in the economy
  • Factor 7: Growing participation of the state and state-owned companies in the economy
• One can probably come up with several other interesting factors. Take employment: unlike in 1999, the scourge of the Russian economy is not unemployment or underemployment, but a lack of labor. One can probably break down subfactors into baskets differently and get a good framework for analysis. In economic history, claiming to be the only correct approach is completely ridiculous, and I do no such thing. However, perhaps it would be more correct to talk not about 25 but 23 years—in February 2022, many trends snapped, if not on command, then in the form of a phase transition from quantity to quality. Putin and many of those who run the economy for him have remained in place, yet many of the rules of the game have changed radically—some quite to the delight of Putin and at his behest. He might have been happy to keep some of the old rules, but in an environment where ties with the West are being systematically severed, this has become impossible. As happens during a phase transition, the continuity of many functions has been disrupted, and from now on it will make sense to talk about some new trends in some other Russia.

“Russia’s New Queer Purge," J. Lester Feder, FP, 08.06.24

• In March, a little-known volunteer organization dedicated to “reviving the religious and secular unity of the Russian people” escorted agents from the Internal Affairs Ministry and the Russian National Guard on a raid in the remote city of Orenburg, a city of 500,000 near the Kazakh border. Their target was a bar called Pose, which was locally famous for its drag shows. The volunteer organization, called Russian Community Orenburg, posted videos of the raid online, highlighting people in skimpy outfits, asking attendees why they were in a “faggot bar,” and showing clubgoers cowering on the floor as agents conducted their search.
• The agents in Pose that night were armed with a major new weapon in Russia’s long crusade against its queer citizens. Last November, in a secret proceeding sealed to observers, Russia’s Supreme Court decreed the “international LGBT movement” to be an “extremist” organization, adding it to a list of banned entities that includes terrorist groups and the political operation of the late opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The decision is so broad that it can potentially be used against anyone who has—or simply “promotes”—a “nontraditional sexual orientation,” including people who are not LGBTQ but support queer people’s rights. People convicted under the law face up to 10 years in some of Russia’s harshest prisons, where queer people fear sexual violence or worse.
• Pose’s owner and two of its employees are now awaiting trial. A court announcement on Telegram notes they are accused of “being persons with nontraditional sexual orientation … who also support the views and activities of the international public LGBT association banned in our country.”
• [A 2013 “gay propaganda”] law, which went into effect just before Russia was due to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, provoked an international outcry, and Putin detected homophobia could also be a tool of foreign policy. His government leaned into the controversy, portraying Russia as a defender of traditional values against a degenerate West that had lost its way. Kremlin allies also began using it in a more targeted way in Ukraine, where an oligarch close to Putin ran an ad campaign warning closer ties to the European Union would force the recognition of same-sex marriages. His decade-long strategy has used homophobia to try to drive a wedge between Eastern Europeans and the West, as well as to delegitimize fundamental notions of human rights and democracy.

For more analysis that is relevant for this section see

• “Weapons of the Weak: Fighting Literary Censorship in Contemporary Russia,” Galina Yuzefovich, CEIP, 08.08.24. 

Defense and aerospace:

•  See section Military aspects of the Ukraine conflict and their impacts above.

Security, law-enforcement and justice:

• No significant developments.

III. Russia’s relations with other countries

Russia’s external policies, including relations with “far abroad” countries:

• No significant developments.

Ukraine:

• No significant developments.

Russia's other post-Soviet neighbors:

“Turkish Challenge in Central Asia,” Anna Machina, Valdai Club, 08.09.24. Clues from Russian Views. Machine-translated.

• It is obvious that now is the right time [for Turkey] to re-establish its spheres of influence in the [Central Asian] region due to the fact that Russia is busy solving problems in the Ukrainian direction, and most of the population of Central Asia is represented by the generation that grew up in the post-Soviet period and "calls" for its cultural roots… Thanks to this, Turkey has an indisputable advantage here, which it certainly uses. Thus, the promotion of the idea of ​​a common past helps to establish relations in various spheres. Turkey’s influence penetrates into the fields of defense, energy and culture, becoming a real counterweight to Russia’s.
• Turkey [also] establishes itself in the region and in the role of a peacemaker; contributing to the negotiations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the delimitation and demarcation of state borders.
• Turkey has [also] successfully promoted its own multilateral format—the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which has gradually grown from a platform for dialogue into a full-fledged organization promoting close cooperation in a wide variety of areas. Turkey’s aspiration to reach the level of a "supra-regional state" and strengthen its status as a leading player on the "global chessboard" is quite feasible precisely due to the deepening of the Turkic vector in Turkey's foreign policy. All the initiatives of Turkey, proposed in Central Asia, are perceived by the countries of the region in a positive way, because the "idea of ​​kinship:" the idea of ​​spiritual and cultural closeness is successfully formed and planted. Other players cannot boast of such a resource, and this increases Turkey's chances of strengthening its position in the region.

For more analysis that is relevant for this section see:

• “Taliban’s diplomatic advances in Central Asia,” Ayjaz Wani and Aneesh Parnerkar, ORFO, 08.12.24.
• “A Summer of Hope and Despair in Tbilisi,” Nadia Beard, The New Yorker, 08.07.24. 

Footnotes

1. This year actually saw Russia post a consolidated budget surplus of 559.6 billion rubles ($6.3 billion) in January–May, with its national debt under 20% of GDP, according to RM’s 07.31.24 blog post that compares recent predictions of Russian economy spiraling into bankruptcy with current realities.
2. Parts of the English-language version of Antonov’s remarks can be accessed here and here.
3. "We continue to conduct offensive operations in the Kursk region. As of now, about 1,000 square kilometers of the territory of the Russian Federation are under our control," Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed on Aug. 12, according to AFP.
4. Justin Logan is Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Joshua Shifrinson is Associate Professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute.

The cutoff for reports summarized in this product was 11:00 am Eastern time on the day this digest was distributed. Unless otherwise indicated, all summaries above are direct quotations. 

Here and elsewhere, the italicized text indicates comments by RM staff and associates. These comments do not constitute an RM editorial policy.

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